Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Yoichiro Sato
ASIA PROGRAM
During the final decade of the Cold War, China, Japan, and the United States formed a pseudo alliance against the Soviet
Union. Completing the rapprochement following the dramatic visit to Beijing by U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1972,
Chinas internal domestic economic reform to introduce capitalistic incentives since the end of the 1970s was welcomed
by Japan and the United States, which gave a boost to Chinas effort through infrastructure developmentASIA
aid, PROGRAM
direct
investment, and market access. During the first decade of the post-Cold War period, China mostly continued to enjoy
economic engagement under amicable relations with its neighbors. But the seeds of growing disputes over various security
issues were already visible by the mid-1990s; over the Taiwan presidential election in 1996; allegation of Chinese nuclear
spying in the United States; and the Chinese declaration of the Territorial Water Law in 1992 inclusive of the Japanesecontrolled Senkaku Islands. The growing security rivalry between China on one hand and the United States and Japan on
ASIA PROGRAM
the other, however, has coexisted with the momentum of their growing economic engagement with China. In the case of
Japan, rapid cooling of political ties with China since the mid-2000s did not alter the growing economic interdependence.
Appointment by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government in 2010 of the Japanese ambassador to China Uichiro
Niwa, whose background was in Japans major trading firm, Itochu & Co., symbolized the governments hope in liberal
peace that the growing economic interdependence will moderate the security rivalry between Japan and China. Niwas
remark on the Senkaku Island dispute defying the official Japanese government line that there is no dispute eventually
led to his replacement, however. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Nodas decision in 2012 to nationalize the Senkaku Islands by
purchasing three islands from their private owner in order to more effectively control landing attempts by both Chinese and
Japanese protestors unleashed massive Chinese protests, and riot activities against Japanese business sites in China
Yoichiro Sato
Yoichiro Sato
Conclusion
Liberal optimism that economic interdependence eases
security rivalry is increasingly under reexamination as
the rising maritime disputes in East Asia reveal their
geopolitical characters. Japan and China have a common
concern about the safety of their shared maritime shipping
routes through the South China Sea, Malacca Strait, and
the Indian Ocean, but their preferred means of securing the
sealanes differ. China challenges the existing combined
naval dominance of the United States and Japan in the
Western Pacific and seeks accesses to the Indian Ocean
region. Their rivalry, if unchecked, will likely develop into
a greater alignment involving India, Australia, and some
Southeast Asian countries. Whether the rivalry can be
tamed largely depends on Chinas ability to maintain its
social stability through the period of slowing economic
growth.
Yoichiro Sato
2. Yoichiro Sato, Substituting Multilateralism, Guiding Trilateralism: The Japan-ROK Investment Agreement in the Growing East
Asian Regionalism. In Marie Soderberg, ed., Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations between
Japan and South Korea (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 144-148.
6. Ibid, 6.
7. Sankei News, 8 May 2015. http://www.sankei.com/world/news/150508/wor1505080015-n1.html.
8. Sankei News, 15 June 2015. http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/150615/plt1506150012-n1.html.
9. Jiji.com. 28 May 2015. http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201505/2015052800636.
10. Asahi Shimbun, 8 July 2015. http://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S11846781.html.
11. Yoichiro Sato, Chinese Announcement of the Air Defense Identification Zone What Follows? PacNet, no. 87, 4 December
2013. Downloadable at: http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-87-chinese-announcement-air-defense-identification-zone-whatfollows.
Yoichiro Sato