Whose War

is it
Anyway?
A constructivist
perspective on the
World Wars
Trisha Ray

Course Name: Theory and

Practice of Security (SEST 500)
Instructor: Prof. Ariane
Tabatabai
Word Count: 2,879

INTRODUCTION
Who started the First World War? The answer to this question, according to the Treaty of
Versailles, was Germany. However in reality, the answer changes depending on how you ask the
question. If we look for triggers of war, Serbian nationalism could get the blame. However,
Serbian nationalism wouldnt have become a violent movement if it werent for the Habsburg
Empires suppressive policies in the face of what they saw as a challenge to the legitimacy of the
monarchy. If we look further, Austro-Hungary would never have been able to invade BosniaHerzegovina if the Russians werent so overwhelmed during the Russo-Japanese war, so really
Japan is to blame. The problem with holding one nation culpable for the World War is that
history doesnt give way to linear cause-effect and oversimplification. Many triggers culminated
in the war. This is why this paper makes the case for constructivism as the best theoretical
explanation for the onset of World War I.
The paper will begin with a brief outline of the contexts faced by various key players,
focusing on ideological leanings and how their predilections on internal factors led to the
formation of alliances, addressing alternative explanations on the way. For the sake of brevity,
the analysis will be restricted to only the initial entrants to the war in 1914: Germany, Britain,
France, Russia and Austro-Hungary. In the second part of this paper, the interwar period will be
explored briefly, highlighting the revisionism that the major powers underwent in the aftermath
of WW1. In the build-up to the war, major themes will be identified and woven together to test
the applicability of constructivism to World War II.

WORLD WAR I
The 19th century was marked by a shift in world politics. Growing nationalism led to the
creation of the German Empire, and changed the way France, Britain and Russia dealt with
conflict. The prominence of imperialism led to fundamental shifts in the perception of power,
and major re-alignments: by the early 20th century, there were two major blocs in Europe- the
Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. However, imperialism did just function solely on the
international level: it too was a key influencer of opinion at home. Finally, Europe was a
veritable cauldron of ideologies by 1914, and certain enduring beliefs marked action leading up
to the First World War.

Nationalism
Emergent nationalism was being deployed in different ways by different actors. It was both a
threat to established imperial-monarchic structures, as well as a unifying identity.
Austro-Hungary illustrates this binary. The Habsburg monarchy was fighting to keep its viselike grip on its empire. To them, the major threats came from Serbia which was promoting Slavic
nationalism, and drawing on a shared identity to connect it with the long-lost BosniaHerzegovina. Contrastingly, another shared identity was deployed to aid the empire, through an
alliance with Germany. It served as reassurance the German-speaking inhabitants of AustroHungary that past conflict would not dictate future prospects. The alliance metan emotional
need among many people in both countries at a time when, as never before, the public (or at least
the press) responded immediately to diplomatic moves, so that treaties could acquire a
significance with which their actual contents had little to do. (Joll and Martel, 2007: 55).
France presents a more straightforward case. It underwent a shift in foreign policy after the
capture of Alsace-Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian war, leading it to forge new alliances.
Frances political system was also pretty unique at the time: a republican system with no
monarchic head, and so French nationalism was not seen as a threat by the government. In the
lead-up to the war, there was considerable anti-German sentiment among the French people,
especially in relation to Alsace-Lorraine and the Agadir Crisis of 1911. The German
representatives in Paris were constantly reminded of this by the success in the Paris theatres of
patriotic shows (in which, as the British ambassador also noticed, the tirades against the
Germans were received with rapturous applause (Joll and Martel, 2007: 165). This sentiment
resulted in the election of Poincar, a hard line anti-Germany leader. Nationalism and foreign
policy in France therefore had a reciprocal relationship.
In Germany, the arms race was a means of deploying military might toward a nationalist
purpose.
The Prussian tradition of a strong army and strong military values continued to affect the
whole of German society. As the Kaiser proclaimed in 1891: The soldier and the army,
not parliamentary majorities and decisions have welded the Empire together. (Joll and
Martel, 2007: 89).
Therefore, to the Germans in these formative years, military strength was the indicator of
national prestige.

Foreign Policy is Built on Internal Factors

Imperialism was partly about acquisition of resources and partly about the assertion of
influence and the expression of the abstract concept of power. Imperialism was also strongly
linked to nationalism, specifically for nation-building and negotiating a space within the
European sphere. It changed the basis of power and led to the emergence of a new, tenuous
balance. This explains why competing imperial powers were forging alliances. Statesmay
reach agreements with one another to maintain the peace, whether they remain in a Lockean state
of nature or leave it by forming a more peaceful international community (Viotti and Kauppi,
2001: 280). Alliances were therefore viewed as a means of maintaining stability, both at home
and outside.
This was true of Germany. In its early years, Otto von Bismarck dominated with Realpolitik.
However rather than describing Realpolitik as an absence of morals as it usually is, it should be
viewed as an approach to international relations adopted due to the state of German society at the
time which was fractured and in need of a firm, unifying policy. Realpolitik was therefore not
just a diplomatic scare-tactic, but a stance adopted due to internal instability. Weltpolitik can then
be viewed as in continuum with rather than a break from the previous foreign policy. With the
German people unified, the Kaiser needed to shift focus to raising the standard of living of the
people and build a national identity. Germany turned to its European neighbors and saw
imperialism as the indicator of national strength, and launched a new foreign policy that would
assert the German-ness of Germany which would in turn lead to domestic stability.
On the flip side, Britain was nearing the zenith of its imperial power, but domestic turbulence
was rocking the political classes. The powers of the House of Lords were restricted, trade unions
gained prominence, womens suffrage gained momentum and a bill relating to Home Rule in
Ireland led to a lockdown in parliament. At the same time, Britain was engaged in a naval arms
race with Germany, and supported France in the Agadir Crisis. Britain was also secure in its
island protected by a powerful navy. Therefore, certain inferences can be drawn from this
situation- first, for Britains leaders nationalism was an important ideological tool in the face of
divisive crises. Second, for Britain the alliances it forged were not to prepare for the event of war
but for the purposes of domestic stability.
Russia was in a particularly peculiar position in the build-up to World War I. It was in
alliances with two powers that it had competing interests with in nearly every sphere.

Nationalism, never far when viewing decision-making in this period, played a role here as well.
With Russia and Austro-Hungary competing in the Balkans, Russia decided to enter into an
alliance with France. A possible factor in their decision to enter the 1907 alliance with Britain
may have been the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
The tsar and his advisers had considered Japan an easy target: a small backward, inferior
Asiatic state. A short, successful war, they believed would mobilize support for the
government and dissipate the groundswell of complaints against the autocratic system
and its failure to provide its subjects with an adequate standard of living. (Joll and
Martel, 2007: 155).
Losing a war they began to mobilize popular support exacerbated the problems they had set out
to resolve. In the face of growing discontent, the Tsar allowed the formation of a weak Duma
and entered into a new alliance to reassure the Russian people.
Persistent Beliefs
Beliefs can lead to war, and a prime example of this is The Cult of the Offensive, which to
some extent explains the pre-emptive German attack on France. What this implied essentially
was that in the event of war, offense has considerable advantage over defense. The persistence of
this belief is quite unusual, especially given the recent Russo-Japanese War in which the
offender, Japan, incurred much larger losses than the defensive power, Russia. Why then would
offense continue to be held over defense? Realism would argue that in a state of anarchy,
aggressive behavior is a given. However, given that realism also presumes rationality- would a
rational actor continue to be on the offensive when the material losses were proven to be higher
in this strategy? Additionally, the search for diplomatic solutions in 1914, particularly by Edward
Grey, contradicts the notion that states are always set for a war of all against all. Liberalists
would state that flawed civil-military relations exacerbated and liberated the militarys endemic
bias for offensive strategies, creating strategic instability despite military technologies that aided
the defender of the status quo. (Snyder, ed. Waltz and Art, 2003: 134). This kind of catch-all
assumption disregards unit-level differences between states. The military was restricted by
budgetary restraints that in turn were linked to political considerations, and was always at the
behest of popular perception. In Germany, for instance, the sudden expansion of the military and
navy were brought about by the demands of elected (which implied they were responding to
popular demand) officials, and was considered by military leaders themselves as excessive. The

best explanation therefore, is that the Cult of the Offensive was indelibly linked to popular
perception- the offense was not about material gain, but about the psychological impact it had on
citizens of warring nations. A key element of war is mobilization of popular support, and
offensive strategies tend to motivate public sentiment more than waiting to be attacked. This
works in reverse for the defending power as well.
There is considerable interaction between all ideas and themes mentioned above as they
clashed and melded at the systemic, state and local level. The interplay of all these became the
factors that led to World War 1.

WORLD WAR II
The Interwar Period
The First World War resulted in economic, political and social exhaustion for all the major
powers involved (with the notable exception of U.S.A, whose late entry into war saved it from
the worst of the conflict). All the powers involved in the war went through a serious reassessment of their foreign policy doctrines, though not all the powers drew the same
conclusions.
In 1914, France and Britain inserted the exploitative War Guilt Clause in the Treaty of
Versailles which forced Germany into paying reparations, giving up it military, relinquishing its
colonies and resource rich territory in Rhineland. It may be regret over these harsh measures and
the citizens experience of the horrors of long wars that motivated their pursuit of the policy of
appeasement in later years. In Britain, the experience of the Great Depression built a post-war
consensus that emphasized liberalist ideals of collective good and cooperation for growth, which
may have contributed to the conciliatory approach to Germany, culminating in the Munich
Agreement of 1938.
U.S.A, contrastingly, withdrew into an isolationist foreign policy. The U.S Congress passed
the Neutrality Act in 1937 forbidding the sale of arms to belligerents. The Americans felt that
they had been used and deeply distrusted French and British motives due their behavior in
Versailles. The isolationist lobby was particularly strong in this period, preventing Roosevelt
from focusing abroad.
Soviet Russia was drastically different from the pre-War Russian Empire. On a fairly clear
ideological level, its Communist government drew disapproval from nearly all the Western

powers, and the Russian governments propaganda was decidedly anti-West Europe. At the same
time, it acknowledged the threat from Germany and Japan but chose to remain neutral in the face
of it.
The German people meanwhile were facing economic crisis, loss of manpower and loss of
faith in the government. What was left of Germany was now the Weimar Republic. The
government instituted radical labor, social and healthcare reforms and also granted universal
adult suffrage. Whats important in understanding why the Weimar government became rapidly
unpopular was the stab-in-the-back legend (which highlights again how popular belief can
snowball into national policy). Right-wingers believed that the German Army did not lose World
War I, but was instead betrayed by the civilians on the home front, especially the republicans
who overthrew the monarchy. In 1923-24, hyperinflation pushed prices up- a loaf of bread that
cost 1 mark a year ago now cost 100 billion marks. In 1924, Germany implemented the Dawes
Plan of 1924 and brought back some semblance of stability. But then the Great Depression hit in
1929-30. Prices of food shot up, unemployment and plummeting trade caused economies to
collapse. Austria and Germany almost went bankrupt. In this milieu, Hitlers Nazi Party climbed
to power through growing popular support.
Can Constructivism be Applied to World War II?
The establishment of the League of Nations and the pursuit of economic appeasement
indicated a desire for cooperation and peace, driven by the belief that prosperity was the route to
stability. There was an underlying assumption that Germany and Japan did have real economic
claims which had to be respected, and that economic concessions in these areas would go far to
eliminating the evident sense of grievance that both powers harbored towards the west. (Overy:
2008: 42). This Liberalist turn in foreign policy was, however, inconsistent.
The conditions in Europe changed drastically in the face of the Great Depression. The
imperial powers scrambled to protect their interests, often at the cost of overall stability.
France manipulated its currency to remain competitive abroad. Most alarming of all,
Britain, the financial centre of the world market finally abandoned the commitment to
free trade and the gold standard and established a system of protection known as the
Imperial

PreferenceThis

engendered

growing

mood

of

resentment

and

disillusionment with the capitalist system in general, and with the more powerful trading
economies in particular. (Overy, 2008: 31)

Thus a discourse was brought to the fore that drew a sharp distinction between plutocratic
states like France, Britain and U.S.A that had wealth and material resources; and proletariat
nations, who were denied the equal access to the global economy by the plutocracies. As with
many persistent beliefs that emerge in times of crisis, this one was not entirely based on fact. For
all their dismissal of the have powers, the so-called have-not powers pursued their own
imperial ambitions with considerable enthusiasm.
One way to read the contradictions in foreign policy in the lead-up to the war would be
through The Logic of Appropriateness as explained in a constructivist framework:
As a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular
conception of selfWe explain foreign policy as the application of rules associated
with particular identities to particular situations. (Viotti and Kauppi, 2001: 289).
Once we look at the actions of all the major players through this lens, it becomes clear that their
Logic of Appropriateness (hereafter referred to simply as Logic) was shaped by their differing
experiences of First World War and the interwar period. For France and Britain, this meant
striving for liberalist ideals and greater global cooperation. Their behavior during the Great
Depression doesnt reflect the fact that their Liberal policies were poor disguises for Realist
motivations, but rather a response to a fundamentally changed situation, and therefore a different
set of interests. Germany, Japan and to some extent, Italy went through a more severe reorientation. To overcome the constraint imposed by an existing normative framework, norm
entrepreneurs and activists may have to act explicitly inappropriately, given existing generally
accepted norms. (Viotti and Kauppi, 2007: 289). Germany, under a new radical leadership,
wanted to challenge existing international norms set by France, Britain and U.S.A.
States (and other actors) as agents can shape the world within which they are immersed
and not just be prisoners of the status quo. Anarchy need not be the dog-eat-dog, junglelike Hobbesian world portrayed by many realists. (Ibid: 280)
Hitlers idea of Lebensraum had both material and ideological leanings. On one level, invading
Poland and Russia would establish a bread basket that would feed German expansion. On a
deeper level, it was re-establishment of German nationalism and a challenge to the plutocrats.
Japan too had similar considerations, with its conquests meeting both the immediate demand for
resources in a booming island nation and a greater Asian challenge to western hegemony. The
initial lack of response on part of the Allies to Italian, German and Japanese expansionism is

significant because of how it was perceived on either side. To the appeasers, it was a means of
preventing escalation and acknowledging sovereign claims. To the recipients, it was taken as a
sign of weakness. Thus constructivism ties together the contradictions in overall foreign policy
approaches, and highlights the importance of ideas and perceptions in triggering war.

CONCLUSION
Constructivism succeeds in demonstrating how the interplay of ideas at the national, regional
and systemic levels can create conditions conducive to conflict. In both wars, identity as a
nation, as imperial powers, as proletariat nations and more seeped into how states perceived
and reacted to threats. Finally, by filling in the gaps left by other theories, constructivism
provides a complete explanation of the wars. However, the predictive power of this theory is
limited because constructivism acknowledges that nothing is static, and with change being the
only constant, the standards that mark war also alter over time and space. The purpose is thus to
problematize the linear, unidirectional perception of world events and dig deeper.