GR 93891: Pollution Adjudication Board v.

CA
FACTS:
September 22, 1988, Pollution Adjudication Board (petitioner) issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation (STFC) which is involved in bleaching, rinsing, and dyeing textiles to immediately
cease and desist from utilizing their wastewater pollution source installations discharging untreated wastewater of
about 30 gpm (gallons per minute) directly into a canal leading to Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Such Order was
signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran Jr. as Board Chairman.
The order was based on the result of several inspections done on STFC's plant: (1) inspections conducted on Nov.
5, and 12, 1986 by NPCC and (2) inspection conducted on Sept. 6, 1988 by DENR, revealing that the
Corporation's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational. It is also found that corporation's plant generated
wastewater where 80% of which was being directly discharged and untreated into the drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River while only the remaining 20% is channeled into the non-operational wastewater
plant. Chemical analysis samples of STFC effluents showed presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what
was permissible under PD 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
STFC then filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal against the Order to which the Board granted the motion and
allowed STFC to operate temporarily and also to enable the Board to temporarily conduct another inspection and
evaluation of STFC's wastewater treatment facilities.
April 21, 1989 however, STFC went to RTC of Quezon City for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
against the Board docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287. RTC dismissed STFC's petition based on the grounds
that appeal and not certiorari from questioned Order as well as Writ of Execution was the proper remedy and
Board's subsequent order allowing STFC to operate temporarily rendered STFC's petition moot and academic.
Dissatisfied, STFC appealed to CA which then reversed the Order of dismissal in RTC remanding the case for
further proceedings and also declaring the Writ of Execution as null and void.
The Board however argued that the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution were in accordance with PD 984 Section
7(a) and were not violative of the requirements of due process and that the order and the writ of execution are not
the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. As to their first contention, the Board argued that they have the legal
authority to issue the order as there is a prima facie evidence that STFC is discharging wastewater of a maximum
pollution level higher as to the permissible standards set by NPCC (now, the Board).
STFC, on the other hand contended that according to Board's rules and regulations, ex parte Order shall only be
issued if the effluents (discharged) pose an immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life. Moreover, STFC then stated there were no findings pointing out that their discharged effluents
posed a threat.
ISSUE:
WON the Board has the legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of Execution against STFC
HELD:
Yes. PD 984 Section 7(a) provides an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board
(a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." Moreover, the Court provided that it is not essential for the Board
to prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists

before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes
discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to
which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist
order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Since the one
being sued is not a local government, but the Board itself tasked in determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions.
It was also found out through the November 1986 inspections that the previous owner of the Corporation was also
issued a notice of violation of the Board's standards and was issued a cease and desist order and in the present
case, STFC was shown to be continuously violating the same standards and it was recommended that appropriate
legal action be instituted immediately.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations like in situations presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers
and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the
ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential
appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of
that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police
power. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating
expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general
welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing
regulations.
The Court however, does not hold it correct that STFC be denied of an opportunity to contest through a public
hearing. STFC should be given an opportunity to contest it to the Board and for the Board to hold a public hearing
as provided in the due process clause of the Constitution.
[Note: Basta ang chikka kay dapat tagaan ang STFC ug opportunity to contest through public hearing kay gi
provide man sa due process clause pero sa kani nga case since ang continuous discharge kay maka-affect sa
environment, it is also necessary nga dili na i-require or kinda i-forego ang public hearing kay if mu-wait pa na
mahuman ang case damaged na ang River; opportunity for public hearing= correct; public hearing be
required= wrong]