G.R. No.

175926
July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, AccusedAppellants.
FACTS
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused
Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander called
SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him to talk to Milans sister, who was in their office.
SPO2 Red, accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milans sister. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2
Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang,
hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not
able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at
the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan
lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan.
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the
presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the police
officers who fired all the shots. P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on Chua
yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
ISSUES: (1) WON THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE APPELLANTS
(2) WON THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
HELD
At first glance, Milans act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually
facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants
to take strategic positions which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside,
they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said police officers were not able to return
fire.Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and moral ascendancy to his co-conspirators as
evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police officers with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not
immediately surrender even when he had the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their arrest.Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the
actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during
and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all
regardless of the degree of participation of each.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims
(Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas
directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not
meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct
participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are
considered principals by direct participation.

G.R. No. 181035

July 4, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NOEL DION, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Noel Dion y Duque (Dion) was charged with two counts of rape in two separate criminal complaints filed directly before the RTC.
AAA, the private complainant, was the first witness for the prosecution. She testified that it was sometime in April 2001 when she was first raped by Dion,
whom she knew as a distant relative. She identified Dion in open court. AAA alleged that at around three oclock in the afternoon, after she had finished
throwing garbage at the "bakir" or garbage pit located some 300 meters from the back of their house, Dion came out from behind some trees, beckoning
her to approach him. Instead of going to Dion, AAA started to run to their house, but she tripped and fell to the ground. This allowed Dion to catch up to
her, and he then pulled her toward an area covered with tall grasses. After threatening AAA that he will cut her tongue and neck if she shouted, Dion
forced her on her back and removed her undergarments. Dion then removed his own short pants and briefs then climbed on top of her. AAA described how
Dion made the "push and pull movement" after he inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA claimed that when Dion had finished, he stood up and again
warned her not to report the incident to anyone, otherwise he will cut her neck or tongue. Regarding the second incident of rape, AAA averred that while
she was getting water from their kitchen, she heard knocking at the door. AAA inquired who it was but received no response. She testified that all of a
sudden, Dion was already inside their house, and he was calling her. Once again, Dion gave the same threats to AAA before raping her as he did
previously, in April 2001. Dion had just finished his deed and was about to go home when AAAs uncle, CCC, arrived. Following the sound he had heard,
CCC found Dion hiding in a corner in the kitchen. CCC immediately collared Dion and woke up BBB, AAAs grandmother. BBB thereafter called Dions
father and their Barangay Chairman.
Noticeable in the Medico-Legal Certificate were the findings that the hymenal lacerations on AAA were not only healed but also only superficial.
Moreover, the cervicovaginal smear done on AAA to test for presence of spermatozoa yielded a negative result.
Dion denied that he had raped AAA, whom he claimed he had never talked to. He alleged that he could not have raped AAA in April 2001 because he was
in Barangay Dusoc, Bayambang, Pangasinan the entire month, working as a "bata-bataan" (boy) in the carnival which was situated there at that time. Dion
averred that he was on his way to a dance in the barangay when AAA called him to enter her house. He obliged, but upon entering her house, he found
AAAs uncle, CCC, who, for no reason, accused him of raping AAA. Dions father, Pepito Dion, Sr., later arrived with their Barangay Chairman, Leonardo
Neris, to look into what happened. Dion said his father "mauled" him when he said that he didnt do it. Afterwards, he was brought to the municipal hall
where he was "incarcerated.
RTC rendered its Decision, finding Dion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. Dion elevated the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals, attacking the second information as defective and AAAs testimony as incredible and full of inconsistencies. The Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the second complaint and held that "in a prosecution for rape, x x x, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, not the time of its commission." The Court of Appeals also stated that "the testimony of [AAA] bear[s] the hallmarks of truth" and that "the
prosecutions evidence is overwhelming that it stands against the bare denial and alibi of [Dion]."
ISSUES (1) WON the second complaint filed was insufficient because of the failure to include the date and time of the commission of the crime; (2)
credibility of AAAs testimony; (3) WON the findings in the medico legal certificate are relevant in deciding the case
HELD
(1) Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact, or at least the approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not able to
intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him. The requirement of indicating in the complaint or information the
date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material ingredient of the offense. An information is valid as long as it distinctly
states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of
it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The
failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The time of the commission
of the crime assumes importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically
hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.
(2) Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the
resolution of rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victims testimony is straightforward,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of
credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially
if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. In refuting AAAs testimony, Dion proffered the defense of alibi and denial. This
Court has time and again held that alibi is one of the weakest defenses, not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check out or rebut. the requisites for the defense are: (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense; and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. Dion has failed to show us that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime in April 2001.
(3) It must be pointed out that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina of the victim does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the
mere touching of the labia of the female organ by the penis is already considered as consummated rape. The presence of sperm is not a requisite for rape.
For in rape, it is not ejaculation but penetration that consummates the sexual act. The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly
held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful
prosecution thereof.

G.R. No. 156686

July 27, 2011
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Barangay Sun Valley, Paraaque
City, Roberto Guevarra IN HIS CAPACITY AS Punong Barangay and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, Respondents.
FACTS
The Sangguinaang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (BSV Sangguniang Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096 entitled "Directing the New Sun
Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic,. The New Sun Valley Homeowners
Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with
prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution
No. 98-096 would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes";
that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public
places"; and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision.
The maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated by the Association
and why the passing through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of the
roads in question.
ISSUE: WON THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION HAS THE RIGHT TO THE PROTECTION OF THE LAW THAT WOULD ENTITLE IT TO
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BSV RESOLUTION NO. 98-096 (they can prevent the Sangguniang Barangay from
opening roads to the public)
HELD
.The subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the
Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paraaque since the year 1964. Having been
already donated or turned over to the City Government of Paraaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are
withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the
lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic. The barangay resolution had
for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public
road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.
Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned,
shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the
importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial
court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local
Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because
the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.
The local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which
provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any
local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by
at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is
provided.

G.R. No. 153809

July 27, 2011
ELOISA L. TOLENTINO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROY M. LOYOLA, Municipal Mayor, DOMINGO C. FLORES, Municipal Budget Officer,
ALICIA L. OLIMPO, Municipal Treasurer, ANNALIZA L. BARABAT, Municipal Accountant, AMADOR B. ALUNIA, Municipal Administrator,
NENITA L. ERNACIO, Municipal Agriculturist, AMELIA C. SAMSON, Human Resource Officer IV, EDWIN E. TOLENTINO, Community
Affairs Officer IV, DOMINGO R. TENEDERO and ROEL Z. MANARIN, Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Members, All from Carmona, Cavite,
Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents with Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents and, administratively, for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Gross
Neglect of Duty, and Falsification of Official Documents. spondent Municipal Mayor Roy M. Loyola requested the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona,
Cavite for the creation of twenty-four (24) unappropriated positions for the inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla. the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmona, Cavite
passed Municipal Resolution No. 061-98 approving the creation of only 19 out of the 24 requested positions, under the different offices of the
Municipality of Carmona for inclusion in the 1998 Plantilla of Personnel. Despite the disapproval of the aforesaid positions, on April 5, 1999, the
Personnel Selection Board presided by the respondent Municipal Mayor as Chairman with Amelia C. Samson, HRMO V, as Secretary, together with the
following respondents Board Members: Edwin E. Tolentino, Domingo R. Tenedero and Roel Z. Manarin, filled-up the aforesaid inexistent positions. The
appointment papers of the aforesaid personnel were subsequently approved by the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, respondents Budget Officer
Domingo C. Flores, Municipal Treasurer Alicia L. Olimpo, Municipal Accountant Annaliza L. Barabat, Municipal Agriculturist Nenita L. Ernacio and
Municipal Administrator Amador B. Alumia, allowed and caused the payment of salaries of the aforesaid employees. The petitioner further alleged that by
the respondents concerted efforts to make it appear that the inexistent positions were created, causing the unlawful payment of salaries to illegally
appointed employees, the respondents are liable for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents. The respondents filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits on February 16, 2000, alleging among others that the Appropriation Ordinance No. 006-98 which is the Annual Budget of
the Municipality of Carmona for the year 1999 carries with it the 24 positions requested in the letter-request dated October 6, 1998 of the respondent
Mayor for the inclusion of such 24 positions in the proposed 1998 Annual Budget. The approval of the budget was in the form of an ordinance. Moreover,
the appointments were approved by the Civil Service Commission and the salaries were paid out of savings.
ISSUES: (1) WON THE QUESTIONED POSITIONS WERE CREATED; (2) WON RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FROM SERVICE
FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT, GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, DISHONESTY AND FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
HELD: petition to be without merit
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a
prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved
being to seek a rehearing. The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and
thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower
court and in any subsequent appeal.
In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any finding. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act
or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. While in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean evidence that which produces absolute certainty; only moral
certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
On a procedural note, the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman obviously possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal. Findings of fact
by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable. A decision of the Ombudsman absolving the
respondent of an administrative charge is final and unappealable.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and instead filed a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, the 24 new positions were included in Ordinance No. 006-98 enacting the 1999 Annual Budget. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan
later affirmed the creation of all questioned positions in separate resolutions and continued to include the said positions in the appropriations in subsequent
budget ordinances. It is likewise undisputed that the questioned appointments were all approved by the Civil Service Commission.

G.R. No. 182551

July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder in an Information. That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the
Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which
the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera.
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he
proceeded to Felipes house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had
no intention to back out because he was thinking that the victim might get a gun and use the same against him. The accused-appellant also asserted that
when he was about to deliver the second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and used him to shield the blow. There
was a long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able to take hold of the same because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted that he had a plan to
kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the latters house on the day of the attack, he had no intention to kill him
the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of double murder.
ISSUES: (1) WON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.; (2) WON THE
COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, INTOXICATION AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY.
HELD
The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was committed with treachery and evident premeditation.
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason for it is only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime is the person on trial should there be
a judgment of conviction. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence
for the defense. In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery,
thus qualifying the same to murder. According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of
murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the
provisions of Article 246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is
treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is
decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. In the case at bar, the RTC
gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out
the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil.
The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the weakness of the victim due to his tender years
results in the absence of any danger to the accused.
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the Court of Appeals appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For
evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between
determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or
surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation." In the case at bar, the evidence of the
prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident premeditation since the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of the actual
commission of the crime and the events that occurred thereafter.
the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. On the other hand, dwelling, minority and
intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or specified in the
information.
we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double
murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." There
are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other The evidence of the prosecution failed to
clearly and indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from the accused-appellant. The eyewitness
testimony of Carmela did not contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was committed
as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the application
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of murder. In the past, when two
crimes have been improperly designated as a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the component crimes separately
instead of the complex crime.

G.R. No. 159101

July 27, 2011
SPS. GONZALO T. DELA ROSA & CRISTETA DELA ROSA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN VALDEZ and SPOUSES POTENCIANO
MALVAR AND LOURDES MALVAR, Respondents.
FACTS
The instant Petition traces its roots to a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificates of Title involving the subject
property, filed before the RTC by Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (MCDC), against Gonzalo and Cristeta dela Rosa
(spouses Dela Rosa) and Juan, Jose, Pedro and Maria, all surnamed De la Cruz.
1. The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City consisting of one hundred three (103) hectares,
more or less;
2. Defendants dela Rosa spouses and Intervenors Valdez spouses have been in possession of the said parcel of land in question;
3. Several portions of the disputed property have been occupied by the other unknown defendants and numerous occupants;
4. Certification dated April 11, 2002 certified that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 541423-A was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds,
Marikina City;
5. Certification dated April 12, 2002 certified that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 541423-A was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds,
Antipolo City.
On the side of plaintiff MCDC:
1. MCDCs right or claim on the disputed parcel of land is based on Sales Patent No. 38713 issued in the name of plaintiff-intervenor Juan
Valdez;
2. The price or consideration stipulated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1996 covering the realty was not paid; thus, the sale is
simulated according to the handwritten letter dated April 5, 2002 of plaintiff MCDC and according to the Joint Venture Agreement;
3. The terms and conditions of the Joint Venture Agreement were not complied with as shown by the very allegations in paragraphs 12, 14 and
15 by the plaintiff [MCDC] in its complaint against defendant Dela Rosa spouses.
On the part of defendants Dela Rosa spouses:
1. Defendants Dela Rosa have been in the physical possession of the substantial portions of the questioned property;
2. They base their claim of possession and ownership: Firstly, on the Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 that was previously nullified in the
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals reported in Volume 265 Supreme Court Reports Annotated page
733; Secondly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 451423-A in the name of defendant Cristeta dela Rosa shows on its face the following:
a. June 16, 1934 was certified the date of original registration; while, the dates of survey of the subject land were on July 14-25,
1969 and the approval was on June 30, 1971;
b. The technical description of the disputed property Lot 4 of the plaintiff [MCDC] in the Sales Patent No. 38713 was copied and
manipulated in TCT No. 451423-A to be as Lots 4-A and 4-B;
3. TCT No. 451423-A was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Marikina according to the certification dated April 11, 2002 and was not
recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City per certification dated April 12, 2002.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not it should issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing that a party or parties be placed in possession of the
subject property; and (2) in whose favor should such writ be issued.
HELD
A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case and subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It may be: (1) a prohibitory
injunction, which commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; or (2) a mandatory injunction, which commands the performance of some
positive act to correct a wrong in the past. the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests on the sound discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its
conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. In the instant
Petition, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the
spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the spouses Dela Rosas
Petition for Certiorari.
A court should not by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of
some exceptions. For example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land. Nevertheless, the existence in the land records of the
Bureau of Lands now the Land Management Bureau of the Sales Patent (Exhibit "F") the recording in the Map of the Cadastral module of the Lungsod
Silangan of the subject property in the name of Juan Valdez are sufficient actual "caveat emptor" to defendants dela Rosa and their privies, [assignees] or
[transferees]. Thus, actual notice of the Sales Patent No. 38713 (Exhibit "F") has a binding [effect] on defendants dela Rosa and those whose rights were
derived from them.
Again it must be stressed that as a general rule a parcel of land in dispute cannot be taken from one party and given to another by an injunctive writ. But
that is not absolute or without exception. The exception to the general rule is when there is a clear finding of ownership of the land in litigation, as in this
case. Sales Patent No. 38713, covering the subject property, had already been issued to Juan Valdez which makes him, at the very least, the equitable
owner of the said property. The spouses Valdez acknowledge the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Malvar. In contrast, the title of the spouses
Dela Rosa to the subject property is nebulous.