Irwin, The Inside Story of The Seventh Platonic Letter

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic
Letter: a Sceptical Introduction

Terence H. Irwin
1. The possible significance of the Letter

This paper is a revised version of an introduction to a Portuguese translation
of the Seventh Letter ascribed to Plato.1 It retains its introductory character.
It is not intended to be a scholarly treatment of the vexed questions that
have received many book-length treatments, and it does not profess to say
anything new on these questions.2
I originally wrote it because I was in the position of many students
of Plato who are curious about the Letter and unsure what to do with it.
Sitting on the fence is not a reasonable option. For if the Letter is genuine,
it may be too important to be ignored. If it is spurious, it may not deserve
the important place it occupies in some presentations of Plato. Different
writers on Plato take different views on the authorship of the Letter, but do
not always explain their views.3 I have no idea what the current majority
opinion is among students of Plato, or (more important) among those who
have examined the authenticity of the Letter carefully.

Ed. J. Trinidade Santos, Edipuc, Rio, 2008. I refer to the Letter, with initial capital,
and refer to the author as Plato, without pre-judging questions of authorship.
2
I have received helpful comments from Istvn Bodnr. I am grateful for the
encouragement of Myles Burnyeat.
3
See, e.g., Kahn (1996), 48n: I have no doubt that the letter was written by Plato.
Most twentieth-century Plato scholars have recognized the letter as authentic,
but in the last generation the doubters were more conspicuous. The communis
opinio seems now to be swinging back in favour of authenticity. See also Knabe
(2006), 6: Heute ist die These von der Authentizitt des 7. Briefes communis
opinio. He cites Reale and Szlezk. On the other side, Rowe (2007) assumes that
the letter is spurious, without giving arguments.
1
VI.2 (2009), 127160
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Terence H. Irwin
If Plato wrote the Letter, it may be extremely important, for these

reasons:
1. It presents Plato avowedly speaking in his own voice, in contrast to
the dialogues, where Plato does not openly appear as a character. And it
presents him speaking on topics that he does not discuss in the dialogues.
2. Apart from the Letter, we have very little reliable material for a Life of
Plato. Ancient biographies are often tissues of gossip, scurrility, and legend,
often constructed from the authors works. Most of the biographical material
on Plato follows this pattern.4 The Letter may be a crucial exception, if Plato
wrote it; for in 324b326b he describes not only some episodes from his life,
including the trial and death of Socrates, but also his attitudes to them. He
offers a partial intellectual autobiography that we may use to supplement, and
perhaps even to correct, the picture we might derive from the dialogues. An
intellectual biography of a modern author allows us to trace the development
of his thought in connexion with events in his life. The Letter seems to offer us
an opportunity to do this for Plato.5 Understandably, then, modern attempts
at biography of Plato rely heavily on the Letter.6
3. In the Letter we discover a side of Plato as political thinker that we do
not find in the dialogues. The Republic, Statesman, and Laws construct utopias
and criticize the government and outlook of actual states. It is not clear how
these theoretical discussions are to be applied to political issues that Greek
cities faced in Platos own time. The Letter, however, offers specific political
advice for a particular situation. We might hope that it will be illuminating to
compare Platos practical political advice with his political theory.
Riginos (1976) collects the ancient sources on Platos life. The evidence is treated
sceptically by Boas (1948). Bluck replies in Bluck (1949).
5
The claims of Kahn (1996), 48, illustrate the importance of the Letter for
Platonic intellectual biography: In the case of ancient authors we are generally
without any serious documentation concerning the personal context of their
literary work. For Plato, however, there is one exception. His Seventh Epistle
offers a brief sketch of his early life, from the vantage point of his old age. As
Dodds and others have recognized, this account is most plausibly read as Platos
own self-portrayal of the events that led to the composition of the Gorgias. The
letter gives us a picture of Platos concerns in the 390s that seems quite different
from the preoccupation with the theory and teaching of virtue that we find in
the Protagoras and the dialogues of definition.
6
An account of Platos life, relying on the Letter, may be found in, e.g., Guthrie
(1975), ch. 2.
4
The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter
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4. The philosophical section of the Letter may be no less important.

Together with a short passage in the Phaedrus, the Letter has been taken to
provide crucial evidence on Platos attitude to his own dialogues, and to writing
in general. We have ancient evidence suggesting that Platos oral teaching was
not entirely reproduced in the dialogues. One explanation offered by some
modern writers for this difference between oral and written appeals to the
inadequacy of written compositions for conveying philosophical insight.7
The Letter is often supposed to confirm this explanation.
If Plato wrote the Letter, it may deserve the close attention of every
reader of his dialogues. If he did not write it, it may still be historically and
philosophically significant. But its significance is different if we believe it is
not by Plato.
2. Does authenticity matter?

One popular but questionable approach to the Letter takes no stand on
its authenticity, but uses it as if it gave reliable biographical, historical, and
philosophical information. Some defend this approach on the ground that
the writer of the Letter, even if he is not Plato, is well informed, and therefore
to be trusted on the points on which he is the only source.8 This approach
seems to take too much on blind faith. If the author is not Plato, and he is
the only source for some ostensible information about Plato, how can we tell
whether he is reliable on these points? We can answer this question only if
we form some views about his aims and intentions.
But it is equally necessary to examine the aims and intentions of the
Letter if we think Plato wrote it. An authentic letter gives us facts about Platos
life and thought only to the extent that Plato tells the truth about himself. If
the aim of the Letter requires him to misrepresent his life or his views, we

A brief and sensible discussion of Platos oral teaching: R. Krauts Introduction

in Kraut (1992), 2024.
8
Brunt (1993), 31925, takes the Letter to be probably the work of a disciple
if not of Plato, and therefore proceeds on the basis that the letter is at least
true to his own recollections and provides insight into his mentality (325).
Similarly, Nails (2006), 3: The letters authenticity was once much discussed,
but even its detractors concede that its author, if not Plato, was an intimate
of the philosopher with first-hand knowledge of the events reported. On this
basis Nails gives the Letter an important place in her account of Platos life. She
follows it, for instance, in saying that he imagined for himself a life in public
affairs.
7
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Terence H. Irwin
cannot use it as reliable evidence. Students of the Attic orators recognize that
we need to be cautious about believing what an orator says, and that we need
to consider what he is arguing for, and how likely it is that his audience could
detect any lies he might tell. If the Letter is relevantly similar to a forensic
speech, we may have to treat it with similar caution.
If, then, we are interested in the Letter because we would like to know
more about Platos life and philosophy, the question of veracity and reliability
is more important than the question about authenticity. I will therefore
discuss both the authenticity and the veracity of the Letter, to see which of
the many arguments that have been offered might be persuasive, and what
conclusions they might support. Perhaps this brief and imperfect treatment
of the problem will stimulate others to reconsider the main questions.
3. Some inconclusive considerations

Decisions about the Letter are difficult because some of the considerations
that might seem to be helpful for settling questions about authorship turn
out to be unhelpful in this case.
The Letter is not mentioned by any ancient source before Cicero,
nearly three centuries after the ostensible date of writing.9 Hence we lack
early evidence of its being treated as genuine. Aristotles apparent ignorance
of the Letter is especially surprising. He describes Plato as someone who
has not taken part at all in practical efforts at political reform.10 He shows
no knowledge of Platos intervention in Syracusan politics.11 Though he
mentions Dions conflict with Dionysius, he never seems to allude to Platos
letters.12 But these silences do not prove inauthenticity.
Morrow (1935), 3237, argues that the 4th-century Sicilian historian Timaeus
(whose works are lost) probably used Letters VIIVIII. His argument is
tenuous. Cf. Westlake (1994), 694. Tarrant (1983) argues that the philosophical
digression was not known to Plutarch (who used other parts of the Letter in his
life of Dion), and that knowledge of it is not clearly attested before the second
half of the first century CE.
10
Politics 1273b2730. One might perhaps argue that Aristotle implies only that
Plato never held any political office.
11
See Gulley (1972), 11012. Aristotles silence may also count against the
historicity of the narrative in the Letter.
12
Politics 1312a47, 3338, b1617. Cf. Rhetoric 1373a1821 (contrast with Platos
denunciation of Callippus perfidy, 334ac).
9
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The linguistic and stylistic tests that have been used to fix the order of
the dialogues do not show the Letter to be authentic.13 To decide whether
they show it is authentic, we need to ask whether a skilful imitator could
write something that we cannot distinguish, on linguistic grounds, from a
genuine work.14 This question is difficult to settle, because it is difficult to
know how far different stylistic features might result from conscious choice,
even if they are not themselves consciously chosen. The stylistic similarity
between the Letter and the dialogues assures us that the author was not an
unskilful forger. If he was not Plato, he must have been sufficiently immersed
in Platos style to be able to reproduce it faithfully, and so he must have
wanted to represent the Letter as Platos, rather than simply something that
Plato might have written on this occasion. If, then, the Platonic style of the
Letter may result from conscious imitation by a skilful imitator, we cannot
settle the issue about authenticity by appeal to language and style. We must
also consider the content, both historical and philosophical.
The historical study of the Letter reveals no errors (e.g. anachronisms)
that are inconsistent with authenticity. We cannot compare the Letter with
any detailed and reliable account of Syracusan history compiled from wellinformed and trustworthy sources.15 The main extant sources are Diodorus
History, Neposs Life of Dion, and Plutarchs Lives of Dion and Timoleon. If we
are to use these sources to compile an account of Syracusan history, we must
try to decide how far they use earlier sources that are closer to the events, and
how reliable these earlier sources might be. Our task is complicated by the
fact that some of our extant sources (or their sources) rely on the Letter as
a contemporary source; hence, it may actually have influenced the historical
account on the basis of which we seek to evaluate it.

See Brandwood (1992), see especially 112, on the Letter, and cf. Brandwood
(1990), 241n. Ledger (1989), 14851, defends the authenticity of the Letter.
14
It is instructive to compare stylistic arguments about Plato with Dovers
discussion of questions about the speeches ascribed to Lysias, in Dover (1968),
esp. chs. 67. Though the problems raised by the Lysianic Corpus are in many
ways quite different from those raised by the Platonic Corpus, Dovers cautious
conclusions about the use of stylistic arguments to determine authorship are
relevant to Plato. Cf. Ledger (1989), 93f, who mentions the possibility that
imitative writing can fool the computer, or the statistical method (though he
argues against this possibility for the Letter). An interesting comparison with
another author is provided by Griffith (1977).
15
A brief discussion of the historical aspects of the Letter is Finley (1977), ch. 6, at
7680. Fuller discussions are Morrow (1935); Westlake (1994); Brunt (1993), ch. 10.
13
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Terence H. Irwin
In any case, no one has managed to find a historical error of the sort
that would expose the Letter as the work of an ignorant forger who did
not know the history of Syracuse. This conclusion disposes of one possible
argument for inauthenticity. It does not prove authenticity, but it at least
proves that if the author was not Plato, it was probably someone who was
well informed about the events in which Plato was involved. The absence of
evident historical errors may make us less inclined to believe that the author
is a much later writer engaged in a rhetorical exercise (What would Plato
have said and done if he had gone to Syracuse?) or in the composition of a
collection of forged letters. Nothing suggests that the letter was not written
close to the time it describes.
We must, therefore, examine the contents of the Letter and compare
them with what we can reasonably ascribe to Plato. Similarity to the rest of
the Platonic Corpus does not prove authenticity, and difference from the rest
of the Corpus does not prove spuriousness. An intelligent and well-informed
forger might try hard to avoid any departures from the Platonic outlook;
Plato himself, however, had no such reason to avoid saying something
different from what he said in the dialogues. Hence, many arguments from
comparisons with the dialogues are double-edged. We need to find unPlatonic features of the Letter that are unlikely to be Platos own work; but it
is difficult to decide what features satisfy this condition.
4. The point of the Letter

The ostensible purpose of the Letter, to answer the request of Dions friends
for advice, is carried out briefly in a short section (at 334c337e); but even
while Plato is giving this advice, he is recalling his past relations with Dion
and Dionysius. Most of the Letter is a defence of Platos past behaviour that
may initially seem rather remote from the immediate occasion.
We can see the point of the Letter if we distinguish public facts, generally
known to people on both sides of the conflict between Dionysius and Dion,
and an inside story of private facts known only to the participants in
specific conversations and discussions. The Letter is a systematic effort to reinterpret the admitted public facts by telling an inside story that places these
public facts in the context of alleged private facts.
Among the public facts that Plato acknowledges are these: (1) He
discouraged Dion from immediately enlisting Dionysius in Dions political
programme. (2) He remained in Syracuse after Dionysius had expelled Dion.
(3) He accepted Dionysius invitation to return to Syracuse (for the third
visit), even though Dion had not been recalled from exile. (4) He remained
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in Syracuse even when Dionysius had shown hostility to Dion by denying

him the income from his property. (5) Plato and Dionysius were generally
supposed to be friends. (6) Dionysius engaged in philosophical studies with
Plato, and gave an accurate written account of the views normally ascribed
to Plato. (7) Plato refused to join Dions expedition against Syracuse (after
Platos third visit), and refused to express any open disapproval of Dionysius.
(8) The assassin of Dion was Callippus, a member of the Academy.
From these admitted public facts one might readily draw some
conclusions: (a) Plato was always on good terms with Dionysius and did not
object to his treatment of Dion. (b) He did not approve of Dions activities.
(c) Since Dion had been associated with the Academy, but was also murdered
by a member of the Academy, Plato had in effect betrayed one of his students
and associates. Dions supporters might be expected to regard these as serious
charges against Plato.
Throughout the Letter Plato answers the three charges implicit in these
conclusions, He maintains that he has been loyal to Dion, and has always
given the same political advice both to him and to Dionysius. He repudiates
the Athenian friends of Dion who later plotted against him. Though he admits
that he visited Syracuse (for the third time) before Dion had been recalled,
he insists that he always tried in private to secure Dions recall. He denies
that Dionysius and he were intellectual associates to any significant degree.
Though he does not point to any inaccuracy in Dionysius account of Platos
views (if that was what Dionysius wrote about), he claims that the very fact
that Dionysius tried to put Platos philosophy in writing shows that he did
not understand it.
And so, even if we confine ourselves to the Letter, we can see that the
public facts of Platos dealings with Dionysius and Dion suggest a quite
different story from the inside story that the Letter presents. The Letter
defends Plato against the charge that he had favoured Dionysius and opposed
Dion.
Later sources mention sharp attacks on Platos conduct and motives
during his visits to Syracuse.16 The Letter suggests that these attacks may
have begun during Platos lifetime or (if the Letter is spurious) shortly
afterwards. It tries to answer the supporters of Dion who accused Plato of
disloyalty towards Dion. The narrative makes it clear why such accusations
might have seemed plausible. The account of Platos actions and motives tries
16
See Riginos (1976), 72.
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Terence H. Irwin
to answer the accusations; Plato did his best behind the scenes and by quiet
diplomacy.
The longest apparent digression is the discussion of philosophical
knowledge and the impossibility of discursive expression of it. From this
we can infer as I suggested in (6) above that Dionysius account of Plato
did not conclude any obvious inaccuracies that could readily be cited as
evidence of his ignorance. If, for instance, Dionysius had written that Plato
took knowledge to be perception, or supposed that sensible things are always
changing in every respect, Plato could have pointed out that Dionysius had
misread the Theaetetus, and had ascribed to Plato the view that Plato was
arguing against. If Dionysius had made a specific error of this sort, Plato
would have strengthened his case by pointing it out. Since he mentions no
such specific error, we can reasonably infer that here too the public facts
counted against the position taken in the Letter. Since the public facts do not
help him, Plato needs a more elaborate argument from the spirit of Platonic
philosophy to show that Dionysius did not understand him and therefore
could not have been a close associate. The argument fits the apologetic
purpose of the Letter, and, given this purpose, it is not a digression at all.
If we read a speech by a defending counsel, and we have no independent
access to the facts, we can still form a plausible view about what the accused
was accused of, if the speech admits, and tries to answer, points that tend to
incriminate the accused. Similarly, we can estimate from Platos defence the
admitted facts that that he needs to answer. Since the stories about him are
damaging, he would have every reason to deny them if he thought that a
denial would be credible. Since he does not deny them, they were either true
or at least generally accepted.
5. The Academy and Syracusan politics

Can we estimate the veracity of Platos version of events? If the Letter
conflicts with other sources, it does not follow that we should believe the
other sources and reject the Letter. Still, a comparison is useful, since some
conflicts may arouse reasonable suspicion.
The Letter diverges from other sources is its portrayal of Dion. In
the Letter, he is the innocent victim of Dionysius unjustified suspicions.
Dionysius expulsion of Dion is described vaguely as the result of accusations
that Dion was plotting against Dionysius (329c). Plutarch, however, mentions
that Dionysius had obtained a letter written by Dion to Carthaginian
ambassadors, promising to help them get what they wanted in negotiations
with Dionysius (Dion 14.3). If the story in Plutarch is true, Dion was hardly
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an innocent victim. Later, when Plato (during his last visit) was trying to
persuade Dionysius to recall Dion from exile, Dionysius responded by
preventing Dion from using the income from his property (345c). In the
Letter this is unwarranted malevolence on Dionysius part. According to
Plutarch, however, Speusippus came to Syracuse with Plato, and tried to stir
up popular opinion in favour of a rebellion led by Dion (Dion 22.13). Dion
gave Speusippus his country house in Attica (Dion 17.2), and Speusippus kept
in close touch with Dions expedition to expel Dionysius. He received letters
from Timonides, a supporter of Dion (Dion 35.4). If Dionysius believed that
Dion and Speusippus were plotting against him, his decision to prevent Dion
from using the income of his property (which Dion would have used to pay
for mercenary soldiers to join his expedition against Syracuse) is defensible.
The Letter omits these details about Dion and Speusippus. They present
a less favourable picture of Dion than we find in the Letter, and they suggest
that some members of the Academy were partisans of Dion. But not all
members of the Academy supported Dion; one member, Callippus, was his
assassin, as the Letter acknowledges. This difference of opinion in the Academy
matches the difference between the public and the private facts mentioned
in the Letter. The public facts the basis of the accusations that Plato tries to
answer make him at least indifferent, and at most unfriendly, to Dion. The
inside story claims to reveal the private facts make him a supporter always
quiet and always behind the scenes of Dion who tried to win Dionysius
over to Dion. According to the Letter, Plato refused to join any attempt to
overthrow Dionysius because he had accepted Dionysius hospitality; rather
than take sides, he offered to mediate between Dionysius and Dion. But the
fault lay with Dionysius for not restoring Dions property.
Plato does not mention the activities of Dion and Speusippus that made
Dionysius restrictions on Dions property an intelligible measure of selfdefence. These activities also make it difficult to believe that Plato could have
reasonably expected Dionysius to release Dions property and thereby to
supply Dion with the resources for an attack on Dionysius. We may therefore
doubt whether Plato could seriously have offered advice that Dionysius could
not reasonably be expected to follow. Plato claims to have offered the advice,
but he does not mention that the circumstances made it foolish for him to
offer the advice, and foolish for Dionysius to accept it.
Platos alleged actions in support of Dion were all strictly behind the
scenes. They were efforts of quiet diplomacy that caused no open rupture
with Dionysius. It is not surprising that Plato cannot point to any public
facts that supported his version of events. Since his advice would have been
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Terence H. Irwin
misguided and pointless in the circumstances described by other sources, we

may reasonably doubt whether he is telling the truth.
Doubts about the veracity of the Letter are neutral on the question
of authorship, unless we suppose that Plato could not have fabricated his
version of events. Plato may have wanted to vindicate Dion and to represent
himself as Dions constant supporter. Still, the bias of the Letter is relevant
to the question about authorship, since it suggests a motive that might have
encouraged a contemporary forger to take the trouble to fabricate the Letter.
We will return to this possibility once we have examined other questions
bearing on authenticity.
6. Autobiography and politics

The Syracusan narrative suggests some questions about the sections of the
Letter that might be used for Platonic biography. If the autobiographical
claims mention public facts that would be widely known to Platos readers,
or if readers could easily detect the falsity of Platos claims if they were false,
or if his admissions raise difficulties for his argument, we have good reason
to treat the autobiographical claims as reliable. But if the alleged facts are
not publicly accessible, and if Platos claim fit the apologetic purpose of the
Letter, we should not treat them as reliable sources for a biography of Plato.
The autobiographical section fits the apologetic purpose of the Letter.
Plato claims that when he was in Syracuse he offered political advice, and that
indeed he went back to Syracuse for his third visit in order to give political
advice. This motive is not attested by any public fact. Nor does Plato say that
his intervention in Syracuse was only to be expected, because he habitually
took an active part in politics both in Athens and in other Greek cities. The
public fact is the exact opposite; Plato has to explain why he intervened in
Syracuse when he was well known for non-intervention. The account of his
early life explains his reputation for non-intervention as his reaction to the
state of political life in Athens since the restoration of the democracy. It is
therefore part of the apologetic argument of the Letter.
Can we assume that the account of Platos early life is reliable because
the intended readers could easily detect falsity? The intended readers are
Sicilians, not Athenians, and Plato is writing fifty years or more after the
events he describes. We cannot safely assume that details of his early life were
well enough known to make it futile to compose a false story that would suit
the purpose of the Letter. Plato had something to gain from a false story. This
does not prove that the story of his early life is false, but it casts reasonable
doubt on the story.
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Plato traces his political convictions to their origins in his experience. He

describes his early ambition to take an active part in political life (324b8c1),
and his attitude to the regime that overthrew the Athenian democracy after
the Peloponnesian War. At first he had high hopes for the Thirty, but before
long their lawless behaviour dashed his hopes. He mentions their attempt to
implicate Socrates in their practice of summary arrest and execution (324c
e). The incident that Plato refers to here matches the description given in the
Apology (32c) of Socrates refusal to take part in the arrest of Leon.
Platos account of his political ambitions has no basis in public facts.
He says he thought of (ithn, 324b8) of entering politics, and that his
relatives and friends among the regime of the Thirty encouraged him. But
he never did anything about his ambitions, because he was disillusioned
with the Thirty because of their bad behaviour, including their treatment
of Socrates. Nor did he take an active part in politics after the restoration
of the democracy, because he recognized that the circumstances were not
favourable (325c326b). He does not suggest that the death of Socrates
was the only reason or the main reason for his view. When he arrived in
Syracuse he was still anxious to take an active part in politics, if only he
could find the right circumstances. Plato therefore acknowledges that his
alleged intervention in Syracuse had no precedent.
Platos inside story of his political ambitions is not inherently incredible;
it does not arouse the sorts of doubts that arise about his alleged mediation
between Dion and Dionysius. In fact, he points out that his story is inherently
plausible. His youthful political ambitions were similar to those of many
others (324b8), and it was only to be expected that he would be hopeful
about a regime that included many of his friends, and that they would invite
him to join them (324d). But he does not point to any public facts that might
support his story; he relies wholly on its inherent plausibility.
We have no good reason, therefore, to treat this part of the Letter as
evidence for a biography of Plato. If there had been no Letter and no ancient
stories about Platos political ambitions, modern critics might still have
argued that Plato must have thought of a political career, given his ancestry,
that he must have been optimistic about the Thirty, and that he must have
been disillusioned first by the Thirty and then by the democracy. Must have
(or will have) is the sign that critics are appealing to inherent probability in
the absence of specific evidence. It would be a mistake to suppose that the
Letter allows us to go beyond appeals to inherent probability in this part
of Platos life. At this stage the Letter also appeals to nothing more than the
readers sense of inherent probability.
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Terence H. Irwin
These doubts about Platos autobiography should warn us against

confidence in one remark that could not have been extrapolated from
information about Platos relatives and from the Apology. Plato asserts that,
though he took no active part in politics, he was always on the lookout for an
opportunity that might arise in favourable circumstances (325e326b). If this
is true, it is valuable biographical information. But since it is necessary for
Platos argument, we should not accept it on the strength of the Letter alone.
Since Plato is trying to convince his readers that he intervened in Syracuse,
even though no one knew of his ever having taken an active political role
anywhere, he needs an inside story that says he was always waiting and
hoping for an opportunity. We ought not to trust the Letter on this point.
7. Socrates as a philosopher
One part of Platos account of his early life deals with the trial and death of
Socrates, whom Plato calls the most just man of his time (324d). The Phaedo
says more about Socrates:
Such was the end of our comrade17, who was, we may fairly say, of all
those whom we knew in our time, the best and also the wisest and justest
man. (Phaedo 118a)
The Letter omits any mention of Socrates virtue (indicated in best) and
wisdom, and mentions only his justice.
This omission of Socrates wisdom draws our attention to a more
surprising omission in the Letter. Plato is explaining to his Syracusan readers
who Socrates is, and what his connexion with Plato was, on the assumption
that Socrates needs some introduction. A reader of the dialogues might
reasonably expect some reference to the philosophical connexion between
Socrates and Plato. The dialogues represent Socrates as the central figure
in a group of young men, including Plato. Socrates did not claim to be
anyones teacher, since he claimed to have no knowledge to communicate
to others; but his philosophical inquiries inspired his companions in their
own philosophical pursuits. The Letter says nothing about this. If this were
our only source on Platos life, we would not gather that Socrates influenced
Platos intellectual development or philosophical outlook at all.
To explain this omission in the Letter, we might say: (1) Socrates
philosophical influence on Plato was so well known that it could safely be
omitted in a short account. (2) Since the incident that Plato reports illustrates

17
hetairos, also used of Socrates in the Letter, 325c1.
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Socrates justice, only that feature of Socrates needs to be mentioned in this

context.
This explanation of the omission is doubtful. Plato writes on the
assumption that he needs to tell his readers who Socrates is, and so one
might expect him to mention the salient facts about Socrates. A phrase such
as the man from whom I learned to pursue philosophical inquiry would
convey a salient fact. One might expect Plato to include it in even a brief
mention of Socrates.
Though it is surprising if Plato omits any reference to Socrates as a
philosopher, it is not surprising if a later defender of Plato omits any such
reference. If the Letter was written close to the death of Plato in 347, and
hence well over fifty years after the death of Socrates in 399, its writer might
treat Socrates as a remote figure to be mentioned with respect, rather than
as a significant philosopher. Some aspects of Platos later philosophy pursued
questions quite remote from Socrates philosophical interests. These aspects
especially influenced two leading philosophers of the next generation,
Speusippus and Xenocrates, who succeeded Plato as head of the Academy
(in that order). We might be surprised that members of the Academy could
overlook or minimize the philosophical significance of Socrates, if we relied
primarily on the Platonic dialogues and on Aristotle. Aristotle, in contrast
to Speusippus and Xenocrates, shares many of Socrates philosophical
interests, and, for his own philosophical purposes, finds it important to
distinguish the contributions of Socrates and Plato both to metaphysics and
to moral philosophy. But the fact that Aristotle pays attention to Socrates as
a philosopher does not show that other members of the Academy took the
same view of his importance.
One might object, however, that it is not un-Platonic to diminish the
philosophical status of Socrates. In the later dialogues he is not the dominant
figure in the discussion, and in the Laws he does not appear at all. Does
this feature of the later dialogues not suggest that the older Plato might well
have said what the Letter says? In reply to this objection, we may cite the
Philebus. Whatever we may conjecture about the unwritten Philosopher, the
Philebus demonstrates that the older Plato was still ready to make Socrates
the protagonist in a dialogue. If this is so, we cannot appeal to Socrates
minor role in other later dialogues to show that Plato no longer thought him
an important philosopher. The treatment of Socrates in the Letter remains
surprising, if Plato wrote it.
The silence of the Letter about Socrates as a philosopher is some evidence
of non-Platonic authorship. It does not constitute a conclusive case against
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Terence H. Irwin
authenticity, since the assumption that Plato would have referred to this fact
about Socrates, though reasonable, is not certainly correct.18
Plato now describes the restored democracy that succeeded the Thirty.
He recognizes that in general the democracy displayed moderation, and that,
while some people found ways to take revenge on political enemies, these
tendencies were generally restrained. Still, he became disillusioned with the
democracy, because of its treatment of Socrates.
some of those in power brought against this associate of mine, Socrates,
whom I have mentioned, a most sacrilegious charge, which he least of all
mean deserved. They put him on trial for impiety and the people condemned
and put to death the man who had refused to take part in the wicked arrest
of one of their friends, when they themselves were in exile and misfortune.
(325c)
He refers to the episode in Socrates life that provides the occasion for the
Apology, and he agrees with the Apology in saying that Socrates was prosecuted
for impiety.
The Letter differs from the Apology, however, on two points:
(1) It says that the charge was brought by some of the powerful people
(hoi dunasteuontes). Perhaps Plato uses it to refer to an organized group
(usually called a political club, hetaireia19) who were especially powerful
and influential in the restored democracy. (b) If this is what Plato means, he
suggests that Socrates accusers were members of a politically powerful group.
The Apology does not suggest this about the three named accusers (Meletus,
Anytus, and Lycon; Apology 23e). It represents them as three individuals who
objected to Socrates beliefs and actions.
(2) It leaves out one of the charges that Socrates discusses in his selfdefence. Socrates mentions that he was accused not only of recognizing
new deities of his own invention rather than the gods of the state, but also
of corrupting the young men, by making the weaker argument appear the
stronger (Apology 19b, 24b).
The opposite conclusion on Socrates is drawn by Aalders (1972), 151. He argues

that a forger would never have been so restrained and detached in the treatment
of Socrates, but would have taken care to sound more Platonic. This is a
reasonable caution, illustrating the double-edged character of arguments about
authenticity. But it does not explain why Plato would, on this one occasion, fail
to mention a fact about Socrates that was particularly salient to Plato.
19
Cf. Republic 365d.
18
141
The Letter, therefore, adds one point to the Apology and subtracts one
point from it. How plausible are these variations?
(1) If Socrates had been prosecuted by members of a powerful political
faction, we might expect the Apology to mention this fact. If the accusers
were members of a powerful faction, the jury would know this, and Socrates
would have nothing to gain by not mentioning it. On the contrary, he would
have something to gain by mentioning it. He could say These charges
are frivolous, and they have been brought only because my accusers are
powerful people who think they can intimidate you. Since Socrates forgoes
this particular defence, he probably does not believe, or at least does not
suppose the jury believes, that the accusers belong to a powerful faction. The
same point applies if we suppose that the Apology is a Platonic fiction remote
from anything Socrates said at his trial. If Socrates had been the victim of
a plot by powerful people, Plato would have every reason to mention it in
order to make Socrates look better, and especially in order to explain why
Socrates was convicted. Since Plato forgoes these points in Socrates favour, he
probably did not hold, at the time he wrote the Apology, the view maintained
by the Letter.
(2) The subtraction from the Apology might be explained by the brevity of
the Letter. Impiety might be taken to cover the two charges against Socrates,
and hence to refer to his corrupting the young men as well as his believing
in new deities. This explanation is open to doubt, however. According to the
Apology, Socrates was prosecuted not only for his religious belief, or even
for his religious practices, but also for his philosophical activity; that is why
much of his speech is devoted to a defence of his philosophical practice.
The Letter does not recognize that Socrates was a philosopher. If it had
recognized this, even a few words could have conveyed the fact that Socrates
philosophy got him into trouble. This feature of Socrates is highly relevant to
the purpose of the Letter. Socrates trial and death shows that philosophers
can become unpopular. The treatment of Plato by Dionysius illustrates this
point, according to the Letter. Would the example of Socrates not have been
apposite? Platos failure to connect the treatment of Socrates by the Athenians
with Dionysius treatment of Plato is surprising.
The presentation of Socrates raises reasonable doubts. According to the
Letter, Socrates was an ordinary innocent person who, for some reason that
the Letter does not mention, attracted the hostility of a powerful faction
who accused him of impiety. The Apology, by contrast, presents Socrates as a
philosopher who suffered for being a philosopher. This is such a vital part of
Socrates defence that it is difficult to suppose Plato could ever have omitted
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Terence H. Irwin
it. If, then, Plato wrote the Letter, he must have changed his mind, and come
to believe that Socrates philosophical activity was not worth mentioning,
and had nothing to do with his trial and execution. Such a change of mind
is possible, but the dialogues offer no evidence of it. The fact that we need to
assume it if we are to defend the authenticity of the Letter may justly increase
our doubts about Platonic authorship.
The treatment of Socrates is intelligible, however, if Plato did not write
the Letter. A younger member of the Academy might never have encountered
Socrates philosophical conversations, and might have had no first-hand
knowledge of what happened between 404 and 399. He might easily be
misled into speaking of a plot of powerful people against Socrates, and might
not know that Socrates philosophical activity aroused peoples hostility.
This passage gives us a reason not only to doubt the truth of the
account of Socrates, but also to doubt Platonic authorship. For in this case
it is difficult to argue that the Letter has anything to gain by omitting any
mention of Socrates as a philosopher. Plato would not have weakened his
case by mentioning Socrates philosophical influence on him. The omission
of this aspect of Socrates is more likely to be the work of someone other than
Plato. But we may fairly keep these grounds for suspicion in mind when we
consider other parts of the Letter.
8. Political theory and political action

If the Letter is reliable, it adds potentially valuable evidence to what we learn
from the Platonic dialogues about the conditions under which philosophers
might come to power, and what they should do in such circumstances. In the
Republic Socrates insists that the impossibility of realizing the ideal city he
has described would make no difference to the accuracy of his description
or to the truth of the political and moral principles he has defended. But he
describes the minimum change that would be necessary to make the ideal
city possible: either philosophers must become kings, or the kings and rulers
in cities must pursue philosophy seriously (473ce). This claim leads into the
long discussion of philosopher rulers in Republic VVII. In the Letter Plato
describes his decision, after the death of Socrates, to avoid political activity
until the right time. He came to the conclusion that the right moment would
not arrive until the combination of philosophy and political power could be
achieved (326ab).
The Republic and the Letter offer the same solution (the convergence of
philosophy and political power), but they address different questions. In the
Republic the question is: (1) How could the ideal city come into being? In
143
the Letter, however, the question is: (2) When should we engage in political
activity? The Republics answer to the first question does not imply the
Letters answer to the second question. One will give the same answer to
both questions only if one assumes that the only reason one could have for
engaging in political activity is the realistic prospect of realizing the ideal
city. The dialogues give us no reason to suppose that Plato assumes this.
Hence the Letter does not express the position of the Republic, since it uses
the point about philosophers and rulers to answer a different question from
the one that normally occupies Plato. But it does not express a view that is
clearly inconsistent with the dialogues.
One might suppose that we could build an argument either for or
against the authenticity of the Letter by comparing the content of the
political proposals that Plato endorses in the Letter with the political views
expressed in the dialogues. Since we have quite a lot of evidence to consider,
this strategy of argument might seem promising.20
One basic flaw in the strategy, however, makes it unnecessary to
compare the political views of the Letter and the dialogues in detail. The
political dialogues (Republic, Statesman, Laws) do not offer practical political
proposals intended for application to a situation such as the one that Plato
faced in Syracuse. We cannot infer, for instance, from any favourable or
unfavourable attitude that Plato expresses in the dialogues towards one of
the prevalent forms of government in Greek cities that he would or would
not have favoured that very form of government, in the specific conditions
described in the Letter. He might well have supposed that the political
programme that (he tells us) he consistently favoured for Syracuse was the
best for it at the time, however far short it might have fallen of the principles
of the Republic or the Laws.
Dion wrote to Plato that this was the time to make a ruler into a
philosopher by educating Dionysius, and that Plato ought to come to educate
him (327c328a). Plato decided to answer Dions appeal for help, for two
reasons: (1) He was ashamed at the thought of refusing the opportunity to
put his philosophy into practice (328c, 329b). (2) Loyalty and friendship to
Dion in particular required him to offer the help that Dion asked for.
Nothing in these two motives tells us anything one way or the other
about the relation of the Letter to the dialogues. We have no reason to
suppose from the dialogues that Plato would have found it shameful to make

20
Arguments of this sort are used by Gulley (1972) and by Edelstein (1966), 26
31, and rebutted by Aalders (1972), and Morrow (1935).
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Terence H. Irwin
no effort to put his political views into practice. Nor have we any reason to
deny that this motive could have influenced him.
These aspects of the Letter, then, are neutral on questions of authenticity.
They are also neutral on questions of veracity; we have no reason to deny that
Plato could have held the attitudes to political intervention that the Letter
ascribes to him. Still, the reasonable doubt that arises about the account of
Platos early life arises about this section of the Letter as well. Once again
Plato is trying to explain why the admitted public fact of non-intervention
is consistent with his allegedly political motive for going to Syracuse. His
story about unfavourable circumstances before the Syracusan episode and
apparently favourable circumstances during the Syracusan episode is his
answer to doubts about whether he took any political position in Syracuse.
These doubts were founded on public facts about his previous nonintervention and about his invisibility in Syracusan politics. Plato answers
that previously he had been waiting, and that in Syracuse he had been active
behind the scenes. Since his claims about action behind the scenes are open
to reasonable doubt, on the grounds given earlier, his account of previous
non-intervention is open to reasonable doubt, on the same grounds. We
are not justified, therefore, in extracting any Platonic biography from this
section.
9. Writing about philosophy

The philosophical section of the Letter begins from Platos relations with
Dionysius during his last visit to Sicily.21 Plato was persuaded to return to
Syracuse partly by reports that Dionysius had made remarkable progress in
his philosophical education, and so would be receptive to instruction from
Plato (339b). To see how much progress Dionysius had actually made, and
how keen he was to go further, Plato gave him one elementary lesson that
made it clear how much remained to be done.
This was the extent, according to Plato, of his philosophical
communication with Dionysius, who claimed to be already familiar with
Platos doctrines from what he had heard from others. But afterwards Plato
heard that Dionysius had written a philosophical book of his own, dealing
with the subjects of that single lesson given by Plato. Since Dionysius
21
The most helpful compact discussion of this section of the Letter is White
(1976), ch. 8 (who defends the authenticity, or at least the Platonic character, of
the digression).
145
represented the contents of the book as his original philosophical views

(341ab), Plato thinks it opportune to deflate Dionysius pretensions.
The attempts of Dionysius and others at writing books on Platonic
philosophy prompt Plato to make a general statement on writing about
philosophy.
One thing at any rate I can say about all who have written or who will
write claiming to know the things that I take seriously (or that concern me;
peri hn eg spoudaz) it is impossible, in my opinion, for these people
to understand anything about the subject. There is certainly no treatise
(or work; sungramma) of mine about these things, nor will there ever be.
(341bc)
What Plato claims depends on the meaning of that I take seriously. Probably
he means that he has never written on the subjects he takes seriously (let
us call these serious subjects); that does not exclude his having written on
subjects that he does not take seriously. The dialogues, then, would have to
be on subjects that he does not take seriously.
He now explains why he has not written about serious subjects.
for it is not expressible (or sayable rhton),22 as other branches of learning
are, but after much intercourse and companionship about the subject,
suddenly, as though kindled by a leaping spark, a light comes to be in the
soul and at once sustains itself. (341de)
Plato does not merely say that serious subjects cannot be written about.
He says they cannot be expressed at all. This startling thesis about the
inexpressibility of serious subjects (the Inexpressibility Thesis) is meant to
explain why Plato has not written on serious subjects and why all others who
set out to write about them are wasting their time.
Now he suggests that it would be useful to say more about the
philosophical presuppositions of the Inexpressibility Thesis (342a). Plato
states the Thesis in order to deflate Dionysius efforts at philosophical writing.
But a mere statement of the Thesis does not vindicate Platos judgment.
Dionysius evidently did not know that Plato believed the Thesis. Nor does
Plato suggest that the Thesis will already be familiar to anyone who is familiar
with his views, or that any reader of the Phaedrus, for instance, can see that
he holds it. His acceptance of the Thesis is similar to his attitude to political
intervention and to his quiet diplomacy behind the scenes in Syracuse, in so
far as it is an unattested aspect of Platos view that needs to be explained to

22
Cf. Theaetetus 205e.
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Terence H. Irwin
place his behaviour in the appropriately favourable light. Plato explains and
defends the Thesis in the digression. At the end of the digression he returns
to the Inexpressibility Thesis (344ab), and to his judgment on Dionysius
and on other philosophical writers (344c345a).
The Inexpressibility Thesis is unparalleled in the dialogues, but this fact
alone does not prove inauthenticity, if we allow Plato to have new ideas. We
may reasonably regard it as Platonic in spirit, if it can be defended from
recognizably Platonic doctrines.
10. Cognition and reality

To explain why ultimate philosophical insight is inexpressible, Plato situates
it in an account of the progress of inquiry towards knowledge of reality. His
account distinguishes five items, which he refers to as the first, the second,
etc. He distinguishes the fifth (the knowable (or known; gnston), and truly
real) from the fourth (knowledge), and from three means to knowledge
the first (the name), the second (the logos), and the third (the image)
(342ab). Plato insists that the first four are all needed if we are to acquire
complete knowledge (epistm) of the fifth (342e), but they all fall short of
this knowledge.
The fivefold division applies to geometrical shapes, moral properties,
bodies, elements, animals, qualities, and active and passive states (342d).
Platos example is the circle. He does not refer to knowledge about particular
circles; these are destructible, but their destruction does not change truths
about the circle (342c). The various objects of knowledge seem to lack the
spatio-temporal properties of particular circles or bodies or animals. Platonic
Forms differ from sensibles in being exempt from the compresence of
opposites.23 The Letter makes similar claims about the objects of knowledge
(343ab). In these respects, then, it claims for the objects of knowledge what
the dialogues claim for the Forms. It does not call them Forms, but it speaks
of (e.g.) the circle itself (342c).
The cognitive deficiencies of the first three of the five are easy to see. The
name itself does not give us knowledge of the fifth, since names are unstable;
we could easily have used square as our name for circles, provided that we
attached to square the meaning that we currently attach to circle (343a).
Similarly, the mutability of the third (the image) shows that we cannot gain
23
On compresence see Phaedo 74b; Republic 479ab; Symposium 210e211a;

Irwin (1995), section 108.
147
knowledge of the fifth if we confine our attention to the third. But Platos
attitude to the second, logos, is more difficult to grasp.
Further, these <four> undertake to show what a given thing is like (poion),
no less than what it is, because of the weakness of logoi. For this reason no
man of intelligence will venture to put the things he has grasped by intellect
into this <weakness of logoi>, and moreover into an unalterable <weakness
of logoi>, which is true of things written in outlines. (342e343a)
This passage repeats the Inexpressibility Thesis. Someone who understands
the weakness of logoi will see not only that serious subjects cannot be put
into writing, but also that they cannot be put into logoi at all.
A logos seems to be a defining formula expressed in language; hence the
logos of a circle is the thing that has everywhere equal distance between its
extremities and its centre (342b). Plato argues that the instability of names
extends to logoi, because they are composed of names and predicates (342b).24
If this claim about instability is parallel to the claim about the instability of
names, Plato means that we could substitute wrong for right, and side for
angle, with appropriate assumptions about their meaning, so as to make the
sides in a triangle add up to two wrong sides true.. The two formulae the
angles in a triangle add up to two right angles and the sides in a triangle add
up to two wrong sides (with appropriate assumptions about meaning) are
both true, but they are different logoi, if logoi are unstable in the way Plato
describes. Similarly, if I translate a correct definition of a triangle into French
or Greek, I utter a different logos in each language.
Such a conception of a logos invites a reply. Though the verbal changes
that Plato describes result in different verbal formulae, these verbal formulae
none the less express the same definition or description of a triangle; if that
were not so, we could not translate it into another language, and we could
not perform the transpositions of names that Plato describes. Platos claims
about the instability of names and verbal formulae presuppose the stability
of meanings and definitions.
This reply to claims about the instability of logoi does not rest on unPlatonic assumptions about words and definitions. It is a mere summary
of an argument that Plato develops in detail in the Cratylus. Against
Hermogenes remarks about the mutability of names, Socrates observes that
the realities named do not change with the names, and that someone who
understands the realities has stable accounts of them (Cratylus 385d386e).
These accounts are logoi, but they are not verbal formulae; they are what

24
On names and predicates cf. Sophist 262b.
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Terence H. Irwin
correct verbal formulae express.25 The Letter does not consider this Platonic
reply to its claims about the instability of logos.
Apparently, then, the charge that logoi are unavoidably mutable confuses
two conceptions of logos: (1) A logos is a verbal formula that changes to a
different logos if any of its component words is replaced by a different word
with the same meaning. (2) It is the common correlate of all those verbal
formulae that have the same meaning. Only the first conception supports
the claims about the mutability of logos. But the second conception seems to
underlie the description of the fourth. If Plato sticks to the second conception
in his account of the fourth, he has not shown that logos is necessarily
inadequate to capture the essence of the fifth.
The Platonic character of this passage cannot be defended by appeal to
the weakness of language.26 To demonstrate the instability of logos, Plato needs
to demonstrate the necessary instability not only of the words that formulate
a logos, but also of the logos that they formulate. But in this passage he fails to
distinguish the instability of words from the instability of the logoi that they
formulate. The Cratylus marks the distinction that the Letter ignores.
11. Inexpressibility
We might expect to find a more Platonic conception of logos in the remarks
about the fourth. The fourth includes
knowledge, understanding, and correct belief , all of which we must set
down as one more thing that is found not in sounds nor in shapes of bodies,
but in souls. In this respect it is evidently other than the nature of the circle
itself and from the three mentioned earlier. Of all these four, understanding
approaches nearest in affinity and similarity to the fifth, while the others are
further from it. (342cd)
The three terms that the Letter uses are all Platonic. It does not insist, as Plato
often does, on the differences between knowledge and correct belief (doxa),
but concentrates on their common characteristics. The Letter recognizes that
Cf. Laws 895d, quoted by Harward (1932), 214, and by Morrow (1935), 68n, who
do not think it raises any difficulty for the argument of the Letter.
26
See Morrow (1935), 6971. He argues that the Letter is in full agreement with
Platos view in the Cratylus in so far as we can determine what that view was,
instead of being, as Karsten maintains, the work of a bungling forger who
erroneously substitutes for Platos opinion the position of Hermogenes that
language is purely conventional. (70n)
25
149
these items constituting the fourth are not to be identified with images or
names or verbal formulae, and it claims that they are closer to the fifth than
the previous three were.
From this description of knowledge, the Letter infers that it is not
identical to the fifth, since knowledge has some object distinct from it. This
is a familiar Platonic doctrine, re-affirmed in the Parmenides (132bc) in
response to criticism of the Theory of Forms. This feature of the Form,
however, does not show that knowledge cannot give us complete insight into
its character.
Why, then, does Plato suppose that there is something inadequate about
the fourth? He suggests that each of the four tells us about what the object is
like, rather than what it is, about its qualities rather than its essence. This failure
to grasp the essence results from the inadequacy of logos (342e, 343bc). Hence
a grasp of what the fifth is in itself must take us beyond the first four.
The contrast between quality and essence is Platonic. Socrates complains
that Euthyphro has not told him what the pious is, but only a quality or affection
(pathos) of it. In saying that the pious is what all the gods love, Euthyphro has
said something true of it, but he has not grasped the fundamental character of
the pious that explains this fact about it (Euthyphro 11ab). But the dialogues
do not suggest that knowledge is inherently incapable of finding the essence,
and hence they do not explain why the Letter takes knowledge to suffer from
this incapacity. The only explicit reason that the Letter has given refers to the
mutability of logos. Perhaps, then, this is what the Letter means in speaking
of the inadequacy of logos.
Plato adds a further reason why the first four provide no insight into the
fifth. He suggests that when we try to express the fifth in verbal formulations
or images, we are liable to easy refutation by appeal to the senses (343c). If
we were not trying to find about the fifth, but confined ourselves to the first
four, we could undergo cross-examination without being refuted, but when
we pursue the fifth, we are more easily refuted, not because of our errors, but
because of the inadequacy of the first four (343ce).
Why does inquiry into the fifth make us especially open to refutation?
Perhaps Plato means that verbal formulae necessarily fail to grasp the essence
of the fifth, so that if we put them forward as accounts of the essence, we are
easy targets for refutation by a Socratic cross-examination. What has he in
mind? If refutation proceeds in the Socratic manner, by adducing counterexamples, we must apparently be able to say something about the character of
the object of inquiry. In the Euthyphro, for instance, Socrates grasps enough
about the essence of piety to say that it is essentially such that it is necessary
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that all the gods love piety. Even if it is difficult to find definitions or accounts
that are both informative and immune to counter-examples, it does not
follow that the object of definition is beyond conceptual understanding.
Platos conclusion would follow if he relied again on his claim about
the mutability of logos. But we have already explained why that claim fails
to prove the unreliability of verbal formulae. The fact that our attempts to
grasp the essence are embodied in such formulae does not ensure that all
these attempts fail.
Now that Plato has affirmed the inadequacy of the first four for inquiries
into the nature of the fifth, he re-affirms the Inexpressibility Thesis and its
consequences for the value of attempts to write down ones philosophical
insight (344bc). He repeats his claim that insight into the fifth must involve
sudden and inexpressible illumination. Such illumination is not a short-cut
to insight that makes the previous four unnecessary; it is the end of a long
road that involves systematic and co-operative inquiry using the first four.
After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are
brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of scrutiny
and examination with goodwill, when inquirers ask and answer questions
without envy, suddenly wisdom and understanding about every question
flashes forth (344b)
Though inquiry and discursive reasoning are needed to reach the fifth, the
illumination we achieve is essentially beyond discourse and reasoning; it
cannot be expressed. Plato returns to the futility of writing.
Therefore every serious man, dealing with serious subjects, will be far from
exposing <them> to envy and puzzlement among human beings through
writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees
written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in
any other form whatever, these are not for that man the most serious things,
if he is a serious man (344c)
Plato returns to his original charge that if Dionysius tried to write a book
about Platos philosophy, he thereby displayed his complete misunderstanding
of that philosophy.
This thesis about the inexpressibility of the highest philosophical
insight is the most original philosophical claim in the Letter. It has no clear
precedent in Greek philosophy or in the Platonic dialogues. It has much
more in common with later Platonism, which it may have influenced.27

27
See Tarrant (1983).
151
12. The Letter and the Phaedrus

In order to defend this claim that the Inexpressibility Thesis has no parallel
in Plato, we need to consider two alleged connexions with other parts of
Plato: (1) with the discussion of writing in the Phaedrus, and (2) with Platos
oral teachings. Do these other aspects of Plato make it easier to attribute the
doctrine of the Letter to him?
In the Phaedrus Plato criticizes anyone who thinks that reading a
written composition is an adequate substitute for engaging in philosophical
conversation (Phaedrus 275cd). Written texts are unable to defend
themselves when they are questioned (275de). For this reason, a dialectician
with knowledge of the Forms of just, fine, and good regards his writing not
as genuinely serious work, but as a form of recreation (276c277a). Socrates
agrees with Phaedrus that philosophical writing is a worthwhile occupation;
it is non-serious only in comparison with the co-operative dialectical inquiry
that is the philosophers primary task.
The Phaedrus and the Letter both suggest that written philosophical
compositions are inadequate means for expressing philosophical knowledge.
But the two passages differ on what is wrong with written compositions.
The Phaedrus does not say that it is difficult or impossible to express
philosophical knowledge in writing. A written text is limited because it
cannot defend itself in the way in which speakers who know what they are
talking about can defend a thesis in discussion. That is why reading a book
by Plato is not the same as discussing Platos philosophy with him. But the
Phaedrus gives Plato no reason to believe that his philosophical views are
inexpressible in writing.
The Letter gives a quite different reason for distrust of writing, which
does not apply to writing alone. It claims that philosophical insight is not
expressible verbally or conceptually at all, and so cannot be communicated
by the communication of conceptual thought; neither writing nor speaking
can convey philosophical understanding. Dialectical questioning is no better
than writing, from this point of view, if we want to convey philosophical
understanding.
The Letter does not infer that philosophical insight is incommunicable. It
suggests that such insight can be acquired as a result of close companionship.
(It is not clear whether this refers to companionship with the reality we are
seeking, or with another inquirer, or both.) As a result of this companionship,
something catches fire in the soul of the inquirer. This sudden insight is
the result of inquiry and reasoning, but the content of ones insight is not
expressible in rational thought and language.
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These claims in the Latter assume that philosophical insight is more

radically inexpressible than the Phaedrus, or any other Platonic dialogue,
takes it to be. This conclusion does not prove that the Letter is spurious.
It only shows that either the Letter is spurious or Plato changed his views
fundamentally after he wrote the Phaedrus; for if he already held the view of
the Letter when he wrote the Phaedrus, why should he conceal his basic reason
for rejecting writing as a means of conveying philosophical understanding?
It would be rash to deny that Plato could have changed his philosophical
outlook so fundamentally; but the fact that the Letter is the only part of
the Corpus that would require us to attribute this particular fundamental
change of view to him is a reason for doubting its authenticity.
A correct understanding of this part of the Letter justifies a further
conclusion about our other evidence on Plato. Both the Phaedrus and the
Letter have been used to support two claims: (1) The dialogues do not
convey Platos fundamental philosophical doctrines. (2) These doctrines are
contained in his oral teaching, which we know of from other sources.
The Phaedrus supports neither of these claims. As we have seen, it gives
us no reason to suppose that the content of a philosophical doctrine cannot
be expressed in writing; the limitation of a written text lies in its inability to
defend itself under criticism.
The Letter supports the first claim, but not the second. If philosophical
insight is inexpressible, it cannot be put into oral teaching any more than it
can be put in writing. The Letter gives us no reason to suppose that Plato
regards speaking as a better medium than writing for the expression of
philosophical insight; each medium is entirely unsuitable.
The view that Platos oral teaching, rather than his dialogues, contains
his authentic philosophy, has been defended by a number of modern critics.
No plausible historical or philosophical argument has been given to support
this view. Neither of the two alleged Platonic sources the Phaedrus and the
Letter gives any support.
13. The philosophical value of the Letter

Our discussion of the defence of the Inexpressibility Thesis suggests a
conclusion about the philosophical merits of the Letter. A favourable
view of its merits does not prove authenticity, and an unfavourable view
does not prove inauthenticity. Someone other than Plato may have had
good ideas, and Plato may have had bad ideas at some stages of his long
philosophical career. None the less, the question is relevant to a judgment
about authenticity.
153
The argument of the Letter contains a crucial weakness that we might

reasonably expect Plato to have noticed and avoided. Several claims about
the inadequacy of the first four for grasping the fifth are relatively easy to
understand if they rely on the mutability of logos. But the relevant claim
about the mutability of logos rests on an error that Plato exposes in the
Cratylus. The error is not only serious, but also un-Platonic, if we judge by
the evidence of the dialogues. Plato may not have been immune to serious
philosophical error, and he may have been capable of changing his mind
for the worse. But we have some reason to doubt whether he would rely on
an assumption whose falsity he exposes in the Cratylus, and which he does
not seem to regard with any more favour in any other dialogue. Probably,
therefore, Plato did not write the Letter.
But even if we grant that the argument of the Letter is un-Platonic, we
might still think the Letter is authentic. The Inexpressibility Thesis provides
a decisive refutation of Dionysius claim to report Platos serious philosophy.
It therefore advances the apologetic aims of the Letter. We might suggest,
then, that Plato is the author, and does not care how bad his argument is
provided that it serves his apologetic aims. Even if he does not accept the
argument, he may not have scrupled to put it forward as part of his elaborate
self-defence.
I do not see how to rule out this possibility, but I believe it is less probable
than non-Platonic authorship. If Plato had wanted to discredit Dionysius, we
might expect him to offer something better than the argument that the Letter
offers. More precisely, we might not expect him to think of an argument
whose faults should be clear to a reader of the Cratylus. It is more likely that
someone else resorted to this argument.
It may not be too fanciful to see a parallel between the apologetic
technique of the historical and of the philosophical section of the Letter. In
both parts Plato relies on the contrast between the outside and the inside
story. In the historical section he mentions public facts that appear to indicate
his views about Dionysius and Dion, and he discounts the appearance in
the light of the inside story about his quiet diplomacy. In the philosophical
section he mentions public facts that appear to indicate that Dionysius
had learnt some of Platos philosophy, and he discounts the appearance in
the light of the inside story about the inexpressible character of Platonic
philosophy. In both cases the truth is available only to the insiders, and leaves
no evidence for outsiders.
We have some reason to believe that the inside story of Platos dealings
with Dionysisus is false, and that someone is trying to make Plato seem
154
Terence H. Irwin
more sympathetic to Dion than he really was. Similarly, we have some reason
to believe that the inside story about Platos philosophy is false, and that
someone is trying to make Plato seem less intelligible than he really was.
We have not proved that the someone was not Plato. Perhaps Plato
had a change of heart about Dion after his death, or for some other reason
wanted to appear to have been more sympathetic to Dions political aims
than he really was. But since we have some evidence of a division within the
Academy about Dion, and we have no evidence outside the Letter for Platos
support of Dion, we may reasonably suspect that the Letter is someone elses
effort to enlist Plato on Dions side. In that case, the attempt to use the inside
story of Platos philosophy against Dionysius is also part of someone elses
effort to misrepresent Plato on behalf of Dion.
I have argued that two conclusions are probable: (1) Both the historical
and the philosophical inside story are false accounts of Platos position. (2)
They are not by Plato. The first conclusion is independent of the second.
Moreover, they still deserve our attention even if we do not think they are
more probable than their negations. If we have raised reasonable doubt about
the truth of the historical and the philosophical inside stories, we should not
treat them as reliable evidence of Platos life and thought.
14. Who wrote the Letter?

If we have plausible grounds for doubting the reliability of the Letter, we
cannot treat it as Platos reflexions on his life or, on his epistemology and
metaphysics. But it is still a valuable source for part of the political history of
4th-century Sicily. It is also an important philosophical document, if it shows
how a philosopher close to Plato enlists and adapts Platonic doctrines in
support of the Inexpressibility Thesis.
We cannot expect to draw firm conclusions about who wrote the Letter.
But reasonable speculation may throw some more light on the circumstances
that might have led to the writing of the Letter.
We can plausibly say this much about the author, if he is not Plato. (1) He
was intimately acquainted with Platos style. (2) He was well informed about the
political history of Syracuse and Platos part in it. (3) He had some reason for
undertaking the considerable effort of writing this long defence of Platos conduct.
Someone who just enjoyed the challenge of trying to write in Platos style, or who
took pleasure in deceiving the reading public, could have put less effort into it. (4)
His philosophical thinking was formed in a Platonic environment, but developed
in an original direction, in formulating the Inexpressibility Thesis. (5) He wanted
to safeguard Platos reputation against the various people who claimed to publish
155
written accounts of Platos philosophy. (6) He was not, however, interested in

Socrates as a philosopher, or in defending Plato as the genuine heir of Socrates
against the various other people who claimed to inherit the mantle of Socrates.28
(7) Though he was well informed about Plato in Syracuse, he was less well
informed about the trial and death of Socrates. (8) He wanted to show that Plato
had steadily supported Dion, and had never supported Dionysius against Dion,
despite the strong evidence to the contrary.
All these conditions would be fulfilled by a younger member of the
Academy, writing at some time close to Platos death. Such a person might try
to defend his philosophical school by defending the posthumous reputation
of its founder. If he incorporated his own philosophical views rather than
Platos, this would be intelligible, for two reasons: (a) He might well regard
his own views as an appropriate extension and development of Platos, or
even as what Plato must have meant, or would have said if he had been
clear. (b) He might regard them as an especially appropriate defence of the
Inexpressibility Thesis and hence of the radical devaluation of philosophical
writing. He could then dispose at one stroke of all the people publishing
written expositions of (allegedly) Platonic philosophy. The author might
well have believed that the Inexpressibility Thesis offered a better defence of
Platos reputation than Plato provided.
One member of the Academy who seems to fit these conditions, and
therefore has sometimes been suggested as the author of the Letter, is
Speusippus, Platos nephew and his successor as head of the Academy.29 Some
other evidence on Speusippus may be relevant here:
(1) He may have had some interest in maintaining, and even enhancing,
Platos reputation through biography. He is mentioned as the source of the
legend that Platos father was really Apollo.30 At any rate, he was interested
in Platos life. Some of his account of Platos early years apparently claimed
to rely on information from Platos family; it described the virtues that Plato
displayed both in his youth and in his later life.31

For some evidence of rivalry among followers of Socrates see Aristotle, Rhetoric
1398b2931 (on Aristippus); Diogenes Laertius, VI 5354 (on Diogenes).
29
Speusippus is mentioned as a possible author of the Letter by (among others)
Tarrant (1974), 138.
30
See Diogenes Laertius, III 2. It is not clear, however, that Speusippus propagated
this legend (as opposed to simply mentioning it).
31
See Apuleius, De Platone I 2 (= Speusippus F2 [Tarn]); Riginos (1976), 13. The
biography of Plato may have been part of Speusippus Encomium of Plato,
mentioned in the list of his works by Diogenes Laertius IV 5.
28
156
Terence H. Irwin
(2) Speusippus supported Dions political ambitions in Syracuse. The

Letter acknowledges public facts suggesting that Plato was more favourable
to Dionysius than to Dion. Speusippus had a motive for trying to present
these facts in a light that would be more favourable to Dion. According to
the Letter, Platos journeys to Syracuse were attempts to forward the cause
of Dion, and Platos final verdict on Dionysius was unfavourable; similarly,
the Letter tries to explain away the events that tended to suggest cordial
relations between Plato and Dionysius. This version of events may have been
fabricated by a supporter of Dion; it would be welcome to Speusippus, given
our other evidence about his views on Syracusan politics.32
(3) He may have believed a version of the Inexpressibility Thesis.
One basis for attributing this thesis to Speusippus is a passage in Proclus
commentary on the Parmenides. Proclus explains why we must recognize
a One that is beyond being, and so cannot be a being at all. He quotes a
passage (otherwise unknown) from Speusippus.33 Speusippus believes that
this doctrine of a One beyond being, simple and inexpressible, is warranted
by the second part of the Parmenides. This is not the doctrine of the Letter,
which identifies the inexpressible fifth with plural objects of knowledge (the
good, the just, the equal, etc.). But it may help to explain why Speusippus
would be inclined to attribute the Inexpressibility Thesis to Plato. Speusippus
also argues that our grasp of first principles must be some sort of immediate,
intuitive grasp, more evident than the acquaintance that sight gives us with
visible objects.34 One might compare this epistemological doctrine with the
Letters comments on knowledge of the fifth.
On some of Speusippus other political views, and his possibly genuine letter to
Philip of Macedon (mentioning what Plato thought about Macedon), see Brunt
(1993), 292. The genuineness of the letter may be supported by the report of
Carystius, cited in Athenaeus, XI 506de. The letter is Epistulae Socraticae 30 =
fr. 156 Isnardi Parente. The authenticity of this letter is accepted by Brunt and
Isnardi Parente, but disputed by others.
33
This is also how Speusippus takes it, presenting it as the doctrines of the ancients.
What does he say? For they took the one to be better than being and to be the
source of being, and they released it from the condition of being a principle
Speusippus too, testifies, then, that this was the view of the ancients about the one,
that it was carried off beyond being (Proclus, in Parm. 38.3240.7 (Klibansky)
= Speusippus F 48 Tarn. See Morrow and Dillon, 1992, 485, 5834.)
34
See Proclus, in Euclidem 179.1222 (Friedlein) = Speusippus F73 Tarn. See
Morrow (1970), 141.
32
157
Though the political and philosophical similarities between Speusippus

and the author of the Letter are suggestive, they are not conclusive. It is
safer to suggest that the author is an early member of the Academy whose
political and philosophical views are similar in some respects to those of
Speusippus. If the Letter emerges from a Platonist environment, it tells us
something about the early history of the Academy after Plato. We are not
well informed about this period; only fragments of the works of Speusippus
and Xenocrates survive, and it is difficult to construct an account of their
philosophical views. The Letter may be an important document in the early
history of Platonism.
We should not infer, however, that the Inexpressibility Thesis must have
been seriously held by some member or members of the Academy, if not by
Plato. If we have correctly described the role of the philosophical digression
in the Letter, it is no more evidence of Platonic or Academic doctrine than
the narrative of Platos role in Syracuse is evidence of his actual role. Both
sections of the letter the philosophical section no less than the political are
part of Platos effort to separate himself from Dionysius. Neither section can
be trusted as an expression of sincere belief Platos or someone elses on
the relevant points. The Inexpressibility Thesis is designed for its apologetic
function in the Letter, and we cannot reasonably infer, on the basis of the
Letter, that anyone believed it.
This estimate of the Letter may prompt a reasonable question that I have
already alluded to: Why should anyone have gone to the trouble of fabricating
autobiography, history, and philosophy so carefully and elaborately? Should we
not doubt the hypothesis of such an elaborate forgery? Fortunately, we have
found just enough evidence outside the Letter to answer this question. We have
good reason to believe that members of the Academy were involved in Syracusan
politics, on both sides, and in particular we have evidence of Speusippus support
of Dion. We therefore have a plausible context in which someone who knew
Plato and his philosophy had a reason to forge the Letter. In this instance, the
hypothesis of a skilful and well-informed forger who was willing to take some
trouble to produce a plausible forgery is not at all implausible.
If the authenticity of the Letter is subject to reasonable doubt, we ought
not to use it for evidence of Platos life or doctrines. In particular, we ought
not to recognize reasonable doubts about its authenticity and keep on using
it as a source of reliable information about Plato. We might find reliable
information in it if we knew both that the author is well informed, and the
information we want to use is unlikely to be affected by the apologetic aims
of the author. But in the case of the Letter, even if we concede that the author
158
Terence H. Irwin
is well informed, we cannot reasonably concede that his apologetic aims are
irrelevant to the presentation of the alleged information about Plato. The
ostensible autobiography serves the apologetic purpose of the writer, and so
does the ostensible Platonic philosophy.
Even if this is true, we might suppose that we can rely on or assertions
whose falsity, if they were false, would be apparent to the intended readers.
But we cannot use this argument in order to rely on the autobiography or
on the philosophy. We do not know that the intended readers are so well
informed about Platos early life and about the details of his philosophy that
they would be able to detect false statements on these points. As soon as we
recognize that the Letter is a systematic defence of Plato against accusations
that seem to be supported by the relevant public facts, we have found a
motive for the author to lie in Platos defence.
These warnings against the use of the Letter as evidence for Platos life
and thought still apply even if Plato wrote it. While I have offered reasons
to believe that the Letter is spurious, belief in its authenticity is not a good
enough reason to rely on it. If we have reasonable doubts about the veracity
of the author, whoever he is, we should not use passages from the Letter to
fill real or apparent gaps in our knowledge of Platos life and thought.
Keble College
University of Oxford
Oxford, OX1 3PG
England
<terry.irwin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk>
Bibliography
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Platonic Epistles, in von Fritz (1972), 147187.
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58, 5039
Boas, F. (1948), Fact and legend in the biography of Plato, Philosophical
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Brandwood, L. (1990), The Chronology of Platos Dialogues, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
159
_____ (1992), Stylometry and chronology, in Kraut (1992), 90120.

Brunt, P. A. (1993), Studies in Greek History and Thought, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Dover, K. J. (1968), Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, University of California
Press, Berkeley.
Edelstein, L. (1966), Platos Seventh Letter, Brill, Leiden.
Finley, M. I. (1977), Aspects of Antiquity, 2nd ed., Chatto and Windus,
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Guthrie, W. K. C. (1975), History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV: The Later Plato
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Harward, J. (1932), The Platonic Epistles, Cambridge University Press,
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Ledger, G. R. (1989), Re-counting Plato, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Morrow, G. R. (1935), Studies in the Platonic Epistles, University of Illinois,
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The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic

Letter: a Sceptical Introduction

1. The possible significance of the Letter

VI.2 (2009), 127160

If Plato wrote the Letter, it may be extremely important, for these

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

4. The philosophical section of the Letter may be no less important.

2. Does authenticity matter?

A brief and sensible discussion of Platos oral teaching: R. Krauts Introduction

3. Some inconclusive considerations

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

4. The point of the Letter

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

in Syracuse even when Dionysius had shown hostility to Dion by denying

See Riginos (1976), 72.

5. The Academy and Syracusan politics

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

misguided and pointless in the circumstances described by other sources, we

6. Autobiography and politics

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

Plato traces his political convictions to their origins in his experience. He

These doubts about Platos autobiography should warn us against

hetairos, also used of Socrates in the Letter, 325c1.

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

Socrates justice, only that feature of Socrates needs to be mentioned in this

The opposite conclusion on Socrates is drawn by Aalders (1972), 151. He argues

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

8. Political theory and political action

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

9. Writing about philosophy

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

represented the contents of the book as his original philosophical views

Cf. Theaetetus 205e.

10. Cognition and reality

On compresence see Phaedo 74b; Republic 479ab; Symposium 210e211a;

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

On names and predicates cf. Sophist 262b.

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

See Tarrant (1983).

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

12. The Letter and the Phaedrus

These claims in the Latter assume that philosophical insight is more

13. The philosophical value of the Letter

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

The argument of the Letter contains a crucial weakness that we might

14. Who wrote the Letter?

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

written accounts of Platos philosophy. (6) He was not, however, interested in

(2) Speusippus supported Dions political ambitions in Syracuse. The

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

Though the political and philosophical similarities between Speusippus

The Inside Story of the Seventh Platonic Letter

_____ (1992), Stylometry and chronology, in Kraut (1992), 90120.

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