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PAULMITAN vs. CA (1992)

Agatona Paulmitan had two children: Pascual (he died and left 7 kids who are respondents in
this case) and Donato (1 child, Juliana Fanesa).
Agatona died and left two parcels of land (Lot 757 and Lot 1091). Her estate was unsettled.
But then Donato extrajudicially adjudicated onto himself Lot 757, and a TCT was issued in his
name. Then donato executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter Juliana
o Lot 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes. Juliana
Fanesa redeemed the property.
The respondents (kids of Pascual) filed a case to partition the properties plus damages.
RTC: The respondents, as descendants of Agatona, are entitled to of Lot 1091 pro indiviso.
The deed of sale to Juliana Fanesa is valid as to the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091,
while the remaining half belongs to the respondents. CA: Affirmed.

Issue: Does Juliana own the entirety of Lot 1091?

Held: NO. Only pro-indiviso share.

When Agatona died, she left two kids, Pascual and Donato. Art 777 says: The rights to the
succession are transmitted form the moment of the death of the decedent, so the right of
ownership of Pascual and Donato was vested in them when Agatona died.
But when Donato sold Lot 1091 to his daughter, he could only sell that portion which
may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership, because he co-owned
the lot with his brother Pascual who died and left 7 kids, so the kids/respondents
are the co-owners along with Donato. Donatos sale to his daughter did not vest
ownership in the entire land with his daughter, but transferred only the sellers pro
indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the
land until it is partitioned.
Juliana Fanesa claims that the owns the land by virtue of her redeeming it from the
government. But the redemption did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the
entire land subject of the co-ownership.
o But she can be reimbursed for half the redemption price she paid on behalf of her coowners.

MINDANAO vs. YAP (1965)


Rosenda de Nuqui (widow of deceased Sotero Dionisio) and her son Sotero sold three parcels
of land in favor of Yap. Included the sale were also buildings on the land as well as lab
equipment, books, furniture and other fixtures used by two schools established on the
properties (the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis Academy). The price was P100,700.
But Rosenda actually co-owned the land with many of her other children. And the lab
equipment, buildings, books, etc were owned by the Mindanao Academy and the Misamis
Yap took possession of the properties and even changed the names of the schools to
Harvardian Colleges.
The children who did not take part in the deed of sale filed two cases: one was for annulment
of the sale and the other for rescission.

Issue: What is the status of the sale?


The contract purported to sell properties of which the sellers were not the only owners. Plus
the prestation involved in the sale was indivisible and therefore incapable of partial annulment,
inasmuch as the buyer Yap, by his own admission, would not have entered into the transaction
except to acquire all of the properties purchased by him. So there is no necessity to rule on
the question of rescission since the contract itself is null and void.
The buyer and seller were both in bad faith. The return of the properties by the buyer is a
necessary consequence of the decree of annulment. No part of the purchase price having been
paid, as far as the record shows, there is no need for restitution (just return of the properties).

Note: See Villanuevas explanation in the book (his opinion is that the sale is NOT null and void
because a seller may validly enter into a valid and binding contract of sale on properties which he
entirely does not own; there is a diff between the perfect stage and the consummation stage).

LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her

husband CIRIACO PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24419

July 15, 1968

Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, was originally owned by the late
spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely,
Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October
28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802
consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque. On October
29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia
P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot
No. 802 to Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita
Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and
Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802
with an area of 958 square meters.
Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of
Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square
meters as evidenced by a deed of sale,which was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina
Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3
portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the plaintiff
bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence
there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintiff bought the aforesaid
portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of.

Estoques stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the
deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any
definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided share,
since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition
takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this
premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area,
should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at
the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said
vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot 802 became the common
property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant argues, when Crispina sold the
rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the former was selling an undivided 2/3
that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant to Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the
defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal
redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.

WON right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?
NO. Appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802
on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And
when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds
of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since
their respective portions were distinct and separate.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold
as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840
square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could
not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two
brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to
appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the

deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have validly sold her one-third
undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to sell the same. .
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed,
the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day (October 29,
1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners
(Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey
(Llacer vs. Muoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly
prescribes that .
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law
to the buyer or grantee."
CA decision affirmed

Almendra vs. IAC

G.R. No. 75111 November 21, 1991

During the two marriages of Aleja, she and her respective husbands acquired parcels of land. The
lands from the first marriage were duly partitioned. After the death of her second husband, Aleja sold
to her son Roman, and daughter Angeles, parcels of land. After Alejas death, her other children filed
a complaint against Roman & Angeles for the annulment of the deeds of sale in their favor executed
by Aleja; and to partition the properties. Among the questioned sales was the one executed in favor
of Angeles which is a half portion of the conjugal property of Aleja and her 2nd husband, the hilly
portion was specifically marked in a sketch.
Issue: WON Aleja may validly sell a one half portion of a conjugal property, the hilly portion of which
had been specifically marked in a sketch.
Held: Yes, she may validly sell one-half portion of a lot, the hilly portion of which had been
specifically identified/marked in a sketch, but there must be proof that the conjugal property had
been partitioned after the death of the 2nd husband. Otherwise, the sale may be considered valid only
as Alejas one half interesttherein.
Aleja could not have sold particular hilly portion specified in the deed of sale in absence of proof that
the conjugal partnership property had been partitioned after the death of Santiago. Before such
partition, Aleja could not claim title to any definite portion of the property for all she had was an ideal
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.


G.R. No. 171571
March 24, 2008
FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following
in four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono

share in the two lots;

b) Tito Dignos share in the two lots;

c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents

share in the two lots;


d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents

share in the two lots

It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.

It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold
the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public
instrument entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of respondents
whose predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA),
erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families, who had built their
dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security.

MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to

occupy the lots but the same was ignored.

Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City.
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated
or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had
given them any written notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.

The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from
the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired
valid title to the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and
assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years,
acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all events, petitioner contended
that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches.

The trial court found for respondents. the CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari

1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents

2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD: the petition is denied

1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to thesale.This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the
sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners
is NOT null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellersheirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.

2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence
that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then
extraordinary, does not lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions
thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots were registered: x x

That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have

been lost and/or destroyed and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute
said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs,
successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so
that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance
with law x x x x

As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market
value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received just
compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the
property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several
hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side.

Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of the
increase in value of the lots.

As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the
sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:

That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake andagree to
warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies
herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and
should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the
Courts of Justice.

Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners
right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.
Figuracion vs. Figuracion-Gerilla
G.R. No. 151334
Topic: Partition of inherited property (intestate) originally belonging to CPG but was not immediately
liquidated and delivered to heirs upon death of one of the spouses.
Date: February 13, 2013


Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch
The RTC decision:
1. Dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia) complaint for partition,
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and
2. Annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Carolina (Carlina)
Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
Antecedent Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958.
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were
acquired by Leandro during his lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 and (2) Lot No.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio),
Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom
Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina,
with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).
On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No.
707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
On December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased
parents, Eulalio and Faustina. Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in
favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the cancellation of OCT
No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in
1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half
of Lot No. 707
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to
demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No.
707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into:
o W/N Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of Leandro
o W/N respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707
RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997:
o RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their
ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs

RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half () share to Felipa and
Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void.
o RTC refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of
respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled
that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707.
o The CA agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed
premature considering that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No.
705 and Lot No. 2299
o The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under judicial
administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and
o The proper action in such case is for a division or partition of the entire lot.
o A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 707 to be owned by:
appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], pro indiviso share
appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share,
appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share
Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court
In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the
CAs ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1)
the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the
expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed
by the CA.
Position of Petitioner
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership
because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation
that contained no acceptance
Position of Respondent
Respondent Emilia contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous
donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the
formalities for a simple donation.


W/N the decision rendered by the CA is contrary to law and existing jurisprudential dicta laid
down by the honorable SC.

No, CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No.
707 partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the belowdiscussed apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.

Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed
under Rule 45

The Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of
Quitclaim are questions of fact. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province
of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts
The respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
o The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership.
o The respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed
of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of
the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
The respondents right to demand for partition is not barred by acquisitive prescription or
o The Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the
co-ownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed.
o Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
o More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
Partition of Lot No. 707
o Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas
marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property.
o When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the
surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Marcelas rights to the other
half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse
o When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the
conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his
second marriage with Faustina.
o When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her
share in the conjugal partnership. The remaining were transmitted equally to the
widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina and Agripina.
o Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 were in turn inherited by Carolina.
o Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8
pertains to Carolina.
o Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8
portion of the subject lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern
portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof,
the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral relative, who,
records show, is her sister Carolina.
Final Ruling:
o The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in dated December 11,
2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel
portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina) Vda.
De Figuracion.

The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch
49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the
actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie
therein, in the foregoing manner.

FACTS: Josefina bought a parcel of land from Villarin. By verbal agreement, Josefina sold a portion thereof to
Nicanora for P3,000. Nicanora paid P1,000 then P400all evidence by receiptsthen she loaned Josefina P1,000
and thereafter along with her spouse, took possession of the lot and built their house as well as apartments
thereon. Villarin then issued a Deed of Sale to Josefina,but the latter refused to execute the corresponding
Deed of Sale to Nicanora. Josefina claimed that the amounts paid by Nicanora were in the concept of loans.
Thus, Nicanora filed a case for specific performance.
ISSUE: W/N there was a sale between Josefina and Nicanora
HELD: YES. Assuming that at the time when Josefina sold the lot to Nicanora, she was not yet the owner
thereof. When Villarin executed the Deed of Sale in her favor, title passed to Nicanora by operation of law.
Although the sale between Josefina and Nicanora was verbal, it was as between them. Considering that
Nicanora has paid the purchase price, she became owner of of the lot. Likewise, although the complaint
was titled specific performance it was actually one for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible so long as the
plaintiff is in possession of the lot.


FACTS: Bugsuk Lumber had an office in Manila. The City Treasurer assessed it for license fees and mayors
permitalleging that Bugsuk sold at wholesale and retail to different lumber dealers in Manila. Bugsuk refused to
pay alleging that the lumber it produced were delivered directly from the shipper to the buyer, that they paid
the appropriate Timber License Fees and that their Manila Office only received orders and accepted
payments. Bugsuk alleges that it is not a dealer and its office is not a store to warrant the imposition of the
additional taxes.
ISSUE: W/N Bugsuk is liable for the additional taxes
HELD: NO. A dealer buys to sell again; Bugsuk produced its own lumber from Palawan. Thus, it is not a dealer.
Its Manila office is not a store as well. A store is a place where goods are kept for salewhether for retail or
wholesale. The Manila office only processed the orders and payments; it did not keep goods therein or act as a
dealer or intermediary between the field office and the customers. Thus, it is not liable for the said taxes.

a person identifying himself as Prof. Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone w/ EDA for 406
books, payable on delivery. The invoice was prepared and the books were delivered, for which
Cruz issued a personal check drawn against Phil. Amanah Bank amounting to 8,995.
Cruz then sold 120 books to Santos, who after verifying the sellers ownership from the invoice
he showed her, paid him 1,700.
EDA became suspicious and made inquiries w/ De la Salle and found out that he had no more
account w/ the bank. A trap was set and it was discovered that he was really Tomas de la
EDCA, together w/ the police, then forced their way into Santos store and threatened Santos
w/ prosecution for buying stolen property then seized the books w/o warrant.


Who is the lawful owner of the books? Santos

Art. 559: the possession of a movable property in good faith is equivalent to a title.
EDCAs contentions:
o that Santos has not established their ownership bec. they have not produced a receipt
not required, as the provision itself dispenses w/ further proof.
o That Santos was in bad faith Santos was in good faith. Santos first ascertained the
ownership from the EDCA invoice showing that they have been sold to Cruz, who said
he was selling them for a discount for he was in financial need. It is hardly bad faith
for any one in the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a discount and
resell them.


Whether EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check in payment therefore
was dishonored? NO
EDCA: that because the impostor acquired no title to the books because of the failure of
consideration that nullified the contract of sale, he could not have validly transferred them to
Non-pmt. Only creates a right to demand pmt. Or to rescind the contract or to criminal
prosecution, in the case of bouncing checks. But absent any stipulation, delivery will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
Actual delivery having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
then validly transfer to Santos. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter b/w him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by Santos to the books.

J. Regala
Article 559 of the Civil Code rules that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully
deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from
third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber.
The said article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the
(1) has lost the thing, or
(2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it
without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.

In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500.


In the afternoon of May 28, 1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to
the Santos residence to answer the ad.


Teodoro Santos instructed his son to see the said Vicente Marella.


At the meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car for P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price would be
paid only after the car had been registered in his name.


Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, together with L. De Dios, went to the office of a certain Atty. Jose
Padolina where the deed of the sale for the car was executed in Marella's favor. Up to this stage of the
transaction, the purchased price had not been paid.


From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro Santos returned to his house. He gave the registration papers and a
copy of the deed of sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to part with them until Marella shall have
given the full payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. De Dios then proceeded to 1642 Crisostomo Street,
Sampaloc, Manila where the former demanded the payment from Vicente Marella. Marella said that the
amount he had on hand then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be allowed to secure the
shortage from a sister supposedly living somewhere on Azcarraga Street, also in Manila. Thereafter, he
ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and suggested that Irineo Santos go with him. At the same time, he
requested the registration papers and the deed of sale from Irineo Santos on the pretext that he would like to
show them to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith of Marella, Irineo handed over the same to the latter and
thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and another unidentified person, proceeded to the alleged house of
Marella's sister.


At a place on Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L. De Dios alighted from the car and entered a house while their
unidentified companion remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios asked Irineo Santos to wait at the sala
while he went inside a room. That was the last that Irineo saw of him. For, after a considerable length of time
waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Irineo went down to discover that neither the car nor their unidentified
companion was there anymore. Going back to the house, he inquired from a woman he saw for L. De Dios
and he was told that no such name lived or was even known therein. Whereupon, Irineo Santos rushed to
1642 Crisostomo to see Marella. He found the house closed and Marella gone. Finally, he reported the matter
to his father who promptly advised the police authorities.


That very same day, or on the afternoon of May 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was able to sell the car in question
to the plaintiff-appellant herein, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. While the car in question was thus in the
possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was attending to its registration in his name, agents of the
Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in consequence of the report to them by Teodoro
Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him.


In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco, the head of the
Philippine Constabulary unit which seized the car in question Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed
for its delivery to him. In the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos moved and was allowed to
intervene by the lower court.

10. Lower court ruled in favor of Santos.

11. Aznar appeals contending that he is a buyer in good faith hence Article 1506 which provides that Where the
seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his, title has not been voided at the time of the sale, the buyer
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller's defect of title.


Who has a better right to the possession of the disputed automobile?


Teodoro Santos has a better right. He had been unlawfully deprived of his personal property by Vicente
Marella, from whom the plaintiff-appellant traced his right. Consequently, although the plaintiff-appellant

acquired the car in good faith and for a valuable consideration from Vicente Marella, the intervenor-appellee
was entitled to its recovery on the mandate of Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title.
Nevertheless, one who lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.

The contention of Aznar is clearly unmeritorious. Under the aforequoted provision, it is essential
that the seller should have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable where, as in this
case, the seller had no title at all. Vicente Marella did not have any title to the property under
litigation because the same was never delivered to him. He sought ownership or acquisition of it by
virtue of the contract. Vicente Marella did not acquire ownership or title to the car for it was not
delivered to him. Therefore Marella cannot transfer the Title to Aznar.


Tagatac bought a car from Danielson and Kavarno Moters in California. Tagatac brought it to
the Phils. One of her friends, Lee, introduced Warner Feist (aka Warner Levy) to her. Feist was
posing as a very wealthy man; he let Tagatac believe that he was a millionaire, the manager of
a corporation, the owner of two houses and cars, etc. He offered to buy the car for P15k, and
she agreed. They signed a deed of sale and Feist paid the price to Tagatac thru a postdated
check. Tagatac then tried to cash the check with PNB, but the bank refused to honor it and
told her that Feist had no account and no funds with the bank. The car disappeared, and so
did Feist.
Feist managed to have the deed of sale notarized and the registration certificate of the car
transferred in his name. He sold it to Sanchez, and (registration was transferred in his name).
Sanchez sold the car to Jimenez (registration was transferred in his name). Jimenez then
delivered the car to a car exchange on Taft to display it for sale, and transferred it to two
people in order to facilitate the sale of the car, but they were unable to.
Tagatac found the car at the car exchange and filed a suit for the recovery of the possession of
the car. She claims that Jimenez is a purchaser in bad faith. She also claims that acc to the
ROC, there is a disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. She also claims
that Art 559 of the Civil Code applies here.

Issue: Who has valid title over the car?

Held: Jimenez.

The ROC presumption does not apply because the car was not stolen and Jimenez came into
possession of it 2 months after Feist swindled Tagatac.
Jimenez is NOT a purchaser in bad faith.
o When he acquired the car, he had no knowledge of any flaw in the title.
Art 559 does NOT apply. Art 559 says that although possession of movable property acquired
in good faith is equivalent to a title, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, may nevertheless recover it form the person in possession of the same.
o It only seems that Tagatac was unlawfully deprived. But this case doesnt fall under Art
559. There was valid transmission of ownership from Tagatac to Feist, considering that
there was a contract of sale between them. Remember, failure to pay the price or the
issuance of a check for the price w/o funds does not affect the validity of the transfer.
The contract between Tagatac and Feist, because of the fraud and deceit, is voidable.
Being voidable, it is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If ratified: action to
annul it is extinguished. If annulled: parties are restored to their situations before the contract
and there is mutual restitution.

However, as long as there is no action taken by the party entitled (he picks neither
annulment nor ratification), the contract of sale remains valid and binding. The title
that Feist acquired was defective and voidable, but at the time he sold the car to
Sanchez his title had not been avoided and Sanchez therefore conferred a good title on
the latter, provided Sanchez bought the car in good faith, for value, and w/o notice of the
defect of Feists title. There is no proof that Sanchez acted in bad faith, so its safe to assume
he acted in good faith. Jimenez thus bought the car in good faith, for value, and w/o notice of
any defect in Sanchezs title, hence he acquired a good title to the car. Good title means an
indefeasible title to the car as against the original owner.
Even under the rules of equity, Jimenez has the better title. Both Tagatac and Jimenez are
innocent parties. But it was through Tagatacs gullibility that Feist swindled her.

Roman vs. Grimalt (1906)

Roman filed a complaint against Grimalt for the payment of the purchase
price of a certain schooner (a vessel).
Roman alleged that he and Grimalt, through Pastor, verbally agreed for the
sale of a schooner for the amount of P1500 to be paid on installments.
However, when the schooner was about to be delivered, it was destroyed due
to a severe storm.
A couple of days later, Roman was demanding the purchase price of the said
Grimalt argued that accepted the offer of sale on condition that the title
papers were found to be satisfactory, also that the vessel was in a seaworthy
However, upon examination of the documents by a notary public, it was
found out that it was insufficient to show ownership and to transfer title.
Grimalt further argued that he accepted the offer because Roman promised
that he would perfect the documents (to show that he was the owner).
ISSUE: I. W/N there was a perfected sale.
II. W/N Grimalt should shoulder the loss of the schooner.


1. The sale of the schooner was not perfected and the Grimalt did not
consent to the execution of the deed of transfer for the reason that the
title of the vessel was in the name of one Paulina Giron and not in the
name of Pedro Roman, the alleged owner.
2. Roman promised, however, to perfect his title to the vessel, but he failed
to do so. The papers presented by him did not show that he was the
owner of the vessel.

3. If no contract of sale was actually executed by the parties the loss of the
vessel must be borne by its owner and not by a party who only intended
to purchase it and who was unable to do so on account of failure on the
part of the owner to show proper title to the vessel and thus enable them
to draw up the contract of sale.
4. The defendant was under no obligation to pay the price of the vessel, the
purchase of which had not been concluded.
5. It follows, therefore, that article 1452 of the Civil Code relative to the
injury or benefit of the thing sold after a contract has been perfected and
articles 1096 and 1182 of the same code relative to the obligation to
deliver a specified thing and the extinction of such obligation when the
thing is either lost or destroyed, are not applicable to the case at bar.
6. The first paragraph of article 1460 of the Civil Code and section 335 of the
Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable. These provisions contemplate
the existence of a perfected contract which can not, however, be enforced
on account of the entire loss of the thing or made the basis of an action in
court through failure to conform to the requisites provided by law.


G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009
G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009

APT was a government entity created for the purpose to conserve, to provisionally manage and to
dispose assets of government institutions. It had acquired assets consisting of machinery and
refrigeration equipment stored at the Golden City compound which was leased to and in the
physical possession of Creative Lines, Inc., (Creative Lines). These assets were being sold on an asis-where-is basis.
Petitioner and respondent entered into an absolute deed of sale over certain machinery and
refrigeration equipment wherein respondent paid the full amount as evidenced by petitioners
After two (2) days, respondent demanded the delivery of the machinery it had purchased. Petitioner
issued a Gate Pass to respondent to enable them to pull out from the compound the properties
designated ; however, during the hauling of Lot No. 2 consisting of sixteen (16) items, only nine (9)
items were pulled out by respondent.
Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner and
Creative Lines. Upon inspection of the remaining items, they found the machinery and equipment
damaged and had missing parts.
Petitioner claimed that there was already a constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment
upon the execution of the deed of sale it had complied with its obligation to deliver the object of the
sale since there was no stipulation to the contrary and it was the duty of respondent to take
possession of the property.

The RTC ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract and should pay for the actual damages suffered by
respondent. It found that at the time of the sale, petitioner did not have control over the machinery and equipment
and, thus, could not have transferred ownership by constructive delivery.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment; hence, this petition.

Whether or not the petitioner had complied with its obligations to make delivery of the properties
Whether or not the failure to make actual delivery of the properties was beyond the control of petitioner
Whether or not the petitioner had complied with its obligations to make delivery of the properties

NO. There was no constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment upon the execution of the deed
of absolute sale or upon the issuance of the gate pass since it was not the petitioner but Creative Lines
which had actual possession of the property. The presumption of constructive delivery is not applicable
as it has to yield to the reality that the purchaser was not placed in possession and control of the
In order for the execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must be placed in
control of the thing sold. The ownership of a thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof. The thing sold shall be understood as delivered when it is placed
in the control and possession of the vendee.
As a general rule, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. And with regard to movable property, its delivery may
also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept.

However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such
presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment. It is necessary that
the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, its material delivery could have
been made. Thus, a person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer
constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.

Whether or not the failure to make actual delivery of the properties was beyond the control of petitioner

YES. Petitioner also claims that its failure to make actual delivery was beyond its control. It posits that the
refusal of Creative Lines to allow the hauling of the machinery and equipment was unforeseen and
constituted a fortuitous event. The matter of fortuitous events is governed by Art. 1174 of the Civil Code
which provides that except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.

A fortuitous event may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, or an act
of man such as riots, strikes or wars. However, when the loss is found to be partly the result of a persons
participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to a fortuitous event. Thus, the risk of loss or deterioration of property is
borne by petitioner. Thus, it should be liable for the damages that may arise from the delay.

Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. vs Tabora (1965)

Tabora bought from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. one complete
set of American Jurisprudence plus one set of AmJur Index for the total price

of P1,675. Tabora made a partial payment of P300 (left a balance of P1,300).

The books were delivered to his law office.
The contract stated: Title to and ownership of the books shall remain with
the seller until the purchase price shall have been full paid. Loss or damage
to the books after delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer.
A fire broke out at midnight of the day the books were delivered, and they
were destroyed. Tabora informed the company and they even gave him
volumes of the Phil Reports as goodwill. But since Tabora failed to pay the
balance, Lawyers Coop filed the present action against him.
Tabora claims: The books were lost through force majeure and he cannot be
held responsible for the loss. He claims that since it was agreed that the
ownership of the books shall remain with the seller until after the payment
of the purchase price, it is the seller who should bear the loss.

Issue: Who shall bear the loss?

Held: Tabora.

The contract actually states that Loss or damage to the books after
delivery to the buyer shall be borne by the buyer.
Art 1504 actually sanctions such stipulation: Where delivery of the goods
has been made to the buyer or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the
contract and the ownership in the goods has been retained by the seller
merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations under the
contract, the goods are at the buyers risk form the time of such delivery.
Tabora cannot claim that since the books were destroyed by fire w/o any
fault on his part he should be relieved from the resultant obligation, under
the rule that an obligor should be held exempt from liability when the loss
occurs thru a fortuitous event. This is because the rule only holds true when
the oblig consists in the delivery of a determinate thing and there is no
stipulation holding him liable even in case of fortuitous event. That doesnt
apply in the present case because the obligor bound himself to assume the
loss after the delivery of the goods to him; there is stipulation in the

Song Fo vs Oria, no digest just the original

G.R. No. L-10056 December 24, 1915
SONG FO & CO., plaintiff-appellant,
MANUEL ORIA, defendant-appellant.

Gutierrez Repide and Socias for plaintiff.

Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for defendant.

Song Fo & Co., the original plaintiff in this action, sold a launch to Oria, the defendant, for P16,500, payable in
quarterly installments of P1,000, together with interest at the rate of ten per centum per annum. The launch was
delivered to Oria in Manila, but was shipwrecked and became a total loss while en route to Oria's place of business in
Samar. No part of the purchase price has ever been paid and this action was instituted for the recovery of the total
amount of the purchase price with interest thereon until paid. The trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
P6,000 and interest, that being the amount of the unpaid installments due under the express terms of the contract at
the date of the institution of the action; but declined to enter judgment for the balance of the indebtedness on the
ground that, under the express terms of the contract, it was not due and payable when the complaint was filed.
From this judgment both parties appealed, and the record is now before us on their duly perfected bills of exceptions.
The defendant's contentions on this appeal are substantially limited to his claim that under the terms of the deed of
sale of the launch, Song Fo & Co. had obligated themselves to insure the launch, and since they had failed and
neglected to do so, they themselves should suffer the loss resulting from the shipwreck of the launch without

It cannot be denied that if the contract of sale did in fact impose on Song Fo & Co. an imperative obligation to insure
the launch, which under the terms of the contract was mortgaged to secure the payment of the purchase price, and if
Song Fo & Co. did in fact fail and neglect to insure the launch in compliance with the terms of the contract, Oria would
be entitled to have the amount of his indebtedness reduced by the amount of the insurance which he would have
been entitled to have applied to the payment of the purchase price had Song Fo & Co. faithfully complied with the
terms of the contract.
But an examination of the terms of the deed of sale of the launch discloses that Song Fo & Co. did not expressly
obligated themselves to insure and keep the launch insured, although it is true that the contract expressly authorized
them to insure it in their own name.
Counsel for Oria contend, however, that although the language of the contract did not in express terms obligate Song
Fo & Co. to insure the launch, it was their duty so to do under all the circumstances, and it is insisted that they should
not be permitted to evade the loss resulting from their negligence in the performance of that duty.
The contract expressly authorized Song Fo & Co. to insure the launch in their own name and to charge the estimated
cost of the premiums with interest at the rate of ten per centum to Oria, and there is much force in the contention of
counsel for Oria at least to extent that under all the circumstances, it was the duty of Song Fo & Co. to insure the
vessel if they could. But there is nothing in the record which would justify a holding that Song Fo & Co. obligated
themselves to insure the launch at all events. There is nothing in the written contract, examined in the light of all the
surrounding circumstances, which justifies an inference that there was any thought in the mind of either of the parties
that the vendor of the launch would himself insure her against loss or damage during the long period allowed for the
payment of the purchase price; yet that substantially would be the effect of the effect of the assumption of an
obligation of an obligation to insure and keep her insured at all events. On the contrary, the language of the contract,
which authorized Song Fo & Co. to take out insurance in their own name and to charge the amount of the premium to
Oria, when read in the light of the transaction of which it was a part, imposed at most, a duty upon Song Fo & Co. to
take such reasonable measures looking to the insurance of the vessel as might be required of a prudent man in
connection with the insurance of his own property.

The undisputed evidence of record shows that Song Fo & Co. did in fact make a bona fide attempt to insure the
launch, and to that end did all in their power and adopted all available means which could reasonably be required of
them. It appears, however, that partly due to the dangerous nature of the coast of Samar along which Oria desired to
operate the launch, and partly due to the some lack of confidence in the character and reputation of the owner of the
property for which application for insurance was made, the local agents of the marine insurance companies declined
to accept the risk without previous communication within their foreign principals: and the launch was lost before they
could ascertain the wishes of these principals as to the execution of an insurance contract. It appears also that Oria,
who had exclusive control of the operation of the vessel, sent her from Manila to Samar on the trip in the course of
which she was shipwrecked, well knowing that she had not yet been insured: and that Song Fo & Co. had no power
to interfere, or to keep her in port pending their application for insurance. Indeed it is evident that under the terms of
the deed of sale, they would not have had the right to detain the vessel in a place of safety, against the wishes of
Oria, had the insurance agents definitely declined their insurance proposals.
Under these circumstances we are of opinion and so hold that Song Fo & Co. were in no wise responsible under the
contract for the loss of the launch without insurance and that the contentions of the defendant in this regard furnish no
defense to the action against him for the purchase agreed upon in the deed of sale.
Coming now to examine the contentions of the plaintiffs on their appeal, we think that the trial judge erred in declining
to render judgment in their favor for the total amount of the purchase price of the launch. He appears to have relied
upon the provisions of article 1125 of the Civil Code but to have overlooked the co-related provisions of article 1129 of
the same code.
These articles are as follows:


1125. Obligations, the fulfillment of which has been fixed for a certain day, are exigible only when such day
By a certain day is understood one which shall necessarily arrive, even when the date of arrival is unknown.
When the uncertainty consists in the arrival or non-arrival of the day, then the obligations is conditional and
shall be controlled by the proceeding section.
1129. The debtor shall lose all right to profit by the term:
1. When, after the obligation has been contracted, it appears that he is insolvent, unless he gives security for
the debt.
2. When he does not give to the creditor the security he is bound to give.
3. When by his own acts, he acts, he has reduced such security after giving it, or when it disappears through
an unforeseen event (vis major), unless it is immediately substituted by a new one equally safe.
The security for the payment of the purchase price of the launch itself having disappeared as a result of an
unforeseen event (vis major), and no other security having been substituted therefor, the plaintiffs were clearly
entitled to recover judgment not only for the installments of the indebtedness due under the terms of the contract at
the time when the instituted their action, but also for all installments which, but for the loss of the vessel had not
matured at that time.
The judgment entered in the court below should be modified by substituting for so much thereof as provides for the
recovery by the plaintiff of P6,000 together with interest of November 1911, a provision for the recovery of P16,500
together with interest at the rate of ten per centum per annum, from the 15th day of November, 1911, and thus

modified, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.