DEVELOPMENT AND FLIGHT TESTING OF THE HL-10 LIFTING BODY

Robert W. Kempel*
PRC Inc.
P.O. Box 273
Edwards, California 93523-0273
and
Weneth D. Painter*
National Test Pilot School
P.O. Box 719
Mojave, California 93502
We have been convinced of the feasibility of a lifting entry, horizontal-landing spacecraft since we flew the
M2-F1 seven years ago. . . . On the basis of our own experience, we cannot discuss the practicality of the proposed launch, boost, and orbit operations, nor can we assess the status of required technology in such critical
areas as materials, structures, and thermal protection systems. . . . If all the other NASA centers, in conjunction
with the Department of Defense and industry, can get the [space] shuttle off the ground, into orbit, and ensure
that it survives the entry, we at the Flight Research Center can guarantee that it can be flown to the destination
and landed safely (reference 3).
-Milton 0.Thompson

Abstract
The Horizontal Lander 10 lifting body successfully
completed 37 flights, achieved the highest Mach number
and altitude of this class of vehicle, and contributed to the
technology base used to develop the space shuttle and
future generations of lifting bodies. Design, development,
and flight testing of this low-speed, air-launched, rocketpowered lifting body were part of an unprecedented effort
by NASA and the Northrop Corporation. This paper
describes the evolution of the HL-10 lifting body from theoretical design, through development, to selection as one
of two low-speed flight vehicles chosen for fabrication and
piloted flight testing. Interesting and unusual events which
occurred during the program and flight tests, review of significant problems encountered during the first flight, and
discussion of how these problems were solved are presented. In addition, impressions of the pilots who flew the
HL-10 lifting body are given.

Nomenclature
AGL

above ground level, ft

AOA
D

angle of attack, deg

drag, Ib

FRC

Flight Research Center, Edwards, California

&'

acceleration due to gravity, 32.174 ft/sec2

h
altitude, ft or m
HL-10 Horizontal Lander 10
' ~ e r o s ~ a cengineer.
e
~ o ~ ~ r iThis
g h paper
t ~ is declared a work of the U.S. Govemmenr and
is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

lift, lb

L/D

lift-to-drag ratio

LaRC
M

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia

Mach number

MSL mean sea level

MLRV Manned Lifting Reentry Vehicle
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
NASA National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
RC

radio controlled

SAS

stability augmentation system

USAF United States Air Force

Xexperimental

Background
A significant percentage of the entire planet's population has seen the space shuttle launch and its gliding return
to Earth from orbital missions. Before these events could
occur, significant amounts of preparation had to be completed. A large part of this preparation included the successful demonstration of unpowered landings by a new
class of vehicle. This paper describes the conception,
design, development, and flight testing of a wingless
experimental aircraft: the Horizontal Lander 10 (HL-10).
Commonly referred to as a "lifting reentry" or "lifting
body" vehicle, the HL-10 contributed significantly to the
development of the terminal gliding and horizontal landing technique currently used by the space shuttle. In the
early 1950's. the concept of lifting reentry from suborbital

or orbital space flight evolved at the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),* Ames Aeronautical
Laboratory (Ames), Moffett Field, California, through the
efforts of two engineers: Messrs. H. Julian "Harvey" Allen
and Alfred Eggers. Their work with the reentry survival of
ballistic missile nose cones revealed that if the nose of a
missile were blunt, then the reentry energy would rapidly
dissipate through the large shock wave. Conversely, a
sharp-nosed missile would absorb a great deal of energy in
the form of heat through skin friction. Blunt-nosed vehicles were also more likely than sharp-nosed vehicles to
survive reentry. The sharp-nosed vehicles may suffer
severe damage from heating. In addition for a ballistic
reentry vehicle, the maximum deceleration loads would be
on the order of 8.5 g.l Using a blunt, 30" half-cone wingless reentry configuration resulted in a high-lift-high-drag
configuration. This configuration would result in maximum deceleration loads on the order of 2 g or less and
would accommodate aerodynamic controls. This configuration was also capable of a lateral reentry path deviation
of approximately k230 miles and a longitudinal variation
of approximately 700 miles.
Advantages of a blunt half-cone or wingless reentry
vehicle configuration concept are numerous. Simply
stated, lifting reentry would be achieved by flying from
space to a conventional horizontal landing using such
vehicles as a blunt half-cone body; a wingless body; or a
vehicle with a delta planform, for example, the space shuttle. This approach would take advantage of the ability of
these vehicles to generate body lift and thus fly. These lifting bodies would have significant glide capability downrange (the dircction of its orbital track) as well as cross
range (the direction across its orbital track) because of
their ability to produce aerodynamic lift (L) during
reentry.
Space capsules, on the other hand, reenter Earth's atmosphere on a ballistic trajectory and decelerate rapidly
because of high-aerodynamic drag (D). Capsules can produce small amounts of lift and large amounts of drag.
Consequently, capsules are subject to high reentry forces
because of rapid deceleration and have little or no maneuvering ability. Figure l 2 represents the hypothetical orbital
track of a spacecraft following a launch from NASA
Kcnncdy Space Center, Florida. The small triangular area
labeled Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, off the southeast
coast of the United States, represents a typical landing
footprint of a capsule vehicle. By contrast, the lifting body
landing footprint for a hypersonic Mach number greater
than or equal to 5 (M 2 5) lift-to-drag ratio ( L P ) of
approximately 1.5 includes the entire western United
States and parts of Mexico. This difference represents a
significant improvement over a capsule.

The L/D is very important to an airplane, particularly

one without power. This ratio is a direct measurement of
how far an unpowered glider, sailplane, or airplane can
glide. The higher the number, the farther the glide. Everybody wants to reduce drag. At an L P = 20 and at a given
airspeed, for every 20 ft forward the sailplane moves, it
will sink 1 ft for a glide ratio of 20 to 1 and have a glide
angle of less than 3" nose down. Lifting bodies are vehicles with subsonic L P of approximately 3 to 4 at the best.

Program Concept
The HL-10 was not the first lifting body tested at the
NASA Flight Research Center (FRC), Edwards, California.** In the spring of 1963, the Dryden M2-F1, a blunt
half-cone configuration, was the first lifting body tested
(Fig. 2). Lifting bodies were envisioned to be a new
manned research program by Mr. R. Dale Reed, FRC, an
innovative engineer and private pilot. Mr. Reed reviewed
the plan for the Apollo mission to the Moon and return to
Earth and found that the plan called for a ballistic reentry
capsule. In addition, the program planners considered a
lifting reentry vehicle configuration as still too risky,
although at this time the Saturn booster had provided sufficient thrust and reliability.
Mr. Reed reasoned that if a lifting body could be built
which would demonstrate a horizontal landing, then such a
demonstration would build confidence within NASA that
this class of vehicle could be used to great advantage.
Having long been interested in work at NASA Ames with
the M2 lifting body under the direction of Mr. Eggers,
Ames Deputy Director, Mr. Reed contacted him and proposed the idea of building a large-scale, piloted, demonstrator lifting body vehicle. Mr. Eggers thought that the
idea was good and told Mr. Reed to pursue it further. Mr.
Reed proceeded, on his own, to build a small, free-flight
M2 model which was towed aloft by a large radiocontrolled (RC) model and released. His wife, Mrs. Donna
Reed, took some 8-mm home movies of successful glide
flights and landings.
Next, Mr. Reed approached Mr. Milton 0. Thompson,
an FRC X-15 test pilot, and got him interested in the concept. Mr. Thompson agreed to fly such an unusual configuration if wind tunnel tests validated the design, even
though it had the gliding characteristics of a well-polished
brick. Armed with the movies and other presentation materials, Messrs. Reed and Thompson briefed Messrs. Paul F.
Bikle, FRC Director, and Eggers. With Mr. Thompson's
assurance that he was a proponent of this concept, Messrs.
Bikle and Eggers agreed on the spot.
With a modest budget and some dedicated volunteer
help, a small team headed by Mr. Victor Horton. FRC, was
established. Other team members included Messrs. Reed,
**

* The NACA was the predecessor

Administration (NASA).

of the National Aeronautics and Space

In 1956, the NACA High-speed Flight Station, Edwards, California,

was renamed the NASA Flight Research Center. In turn, the FRC was
renamed the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center in 1976.

Dick Eldredge, and Richard Klein. This team enlisted the

aid of Mr. Gus Briegleb, a well-known glider builder and
operator of the nearby El Mirage Dry Lake glider port, and
the design and construction of the M2-F1 was launched.
The M2 was basically a 13' blunt half-cone that was
flat on top and round on the bottom. What resulted was a
rather unusual creation which was nicknamed "The Flying
Bathtub." This vehicle consisted of a steel tube primary
structure covered with plywood, cockpit with minimal
instruments, control surfaces, and landing gear (Fig. 2).
The entire M2-F1 program was completed for less than
$30,000, an unheard of sum even in those days.
Reference 3 presents an excellent review of the overall
lifting body programs at FRC. The M2-F1 program was
successfully completed in August 1964.
With the initial successes of the M2-F1 program,
Messrs. Bikle, Thompson, and Reed traveled to NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C., with their presentation
materials and proposed a follow-on program which called
for the design and construction of two heavyweight aluminum M2 vehicles. One of these vehicles would be
reserved as a backup. This proposal called for the vehicle
to be carried aloft and launched using the NASA B-52
(Boeing Aircraft Company, Seattle, Washington) aircraft.
This B-52 had been structurally modified and configured
for the launching of the joint NASA and United States Air
Force (USAF) X-15 hypersonic research aircraft. While at
NASA Headquarters, it was proposed to the FRC people
that the Langley Research Center (LaRC), Hampton, Virginia, HL-10 be included in a flight test program as the
second candidate configuration. The FRC group agreed
with this proposal. As a result, NASA Headquarters
approved the program and funding for the construction of
two heavyweight vehicles: the Ames M2-F2 and the LaRC
HL- 10.
Configuration Design Evolution
Many hypersonic configuration studies were conducted
to evaluate various candidate aerodynamic shapes within
the Aero-Physics Division at LaRC. These studies indicated that as an advantage a reentry vehicle with negative
camber and a flat bottom, rather than a blunt half-cone,
may provide higher trimmed L/D over the angle-of-attack
(AOA) range. In 1957 during theoretical trade-off studies
and wind tunnel experiments, this negative-camber concept was used in developing a configuration stable about
its three axes. A flat lower lifting surface was retained for
improved hypersonic lifting capability. This vehicle was
first referred to as a "manned lifting reentry vehicle"
(MLRV). It w8s found that a vehicle with the combination
of a nose tilted up at an angle of 20, an aerodynamic flap,
and a flat bottom would be stable about the pitch, roll, and
yaw axes. In addition, such a vehicle would trim at an
AOA up to approximately 52O at a lift coefficient in excess
of 0.6. This vehicle configuration, now referred to as a
"lifting body," would also retain higher trimmed L/D over

lower AOA when compared with a vehicle with a 0' nose

tilt. Advantages of a lifting body over a capsule included
relatively high-lift-high-drag ratio characteristics as compared with zero-lift-high-drag. In addition, lifting bodies
could achieve the specified goals because of the ability to
be maneuvered during orbital reentry and in the terminal
landing flight phase similar to conventional airplanes. The
ability to control roll and pitch axes (to control the direction and magnitude of the lift vector and hence the flightpath) was also considered a great advantage. This control
was to be achieved by the use of either reaction jets, aerodynamic control surfaces, or both.
In 1962, a negatively cambered lifting body configuration emerged and was designated the HL-10. Camber, the
curved part of a wing surface, was upside-down. Figure 3
shows an original 1962 sketch of an MLRV known as the
HL-10. The established mission goals were as follows:
1. Hypersonic L/D without elevon deflection of
approximately 1

2. High trimmed lift at hypersonic speeds

3. Subsonic L/D of approximately 4
4. High volumemc efficiency, 12-person capability
5. Acceptable body shape at all speeds

6. Statically stable and controllable at all speeds

7. Launch vehicle compatibility

8. Low heating rates and loads comparison

9. Low AOA for a given subsonic lift coefficient
10. Reduced subsonic flow separation
The symmetrical configuration met 5 of these 10 mission goals. On the other hand, the negative-camber configuration met 9 of the 10. The negative-camber
configuration did not meet goal 9: low AOA for a given
subsonic lift coefficient.
Configuration Development
With NASA Headquarters approval for a heavyweight
lifting body program, the FRC team compiled the requirements and specifications for the two lifting body vehicles.
With the statement of work completed, the NASA Request
for Proposal, PR-2694, was issued to various manufacturers for the design and construction of two heavyweight,
aluminum-structured lifting bodies consisting of the M2F2 and the HL-10. On April 13,1964, the Northrop Corporation, Hawthorne, California, submitted proposal NB 6431, titled "Design and Fabrication of Two (2) Research
Lifting Body Vehicles, M2/HL-10," to NASA. This corporation was subsequently awarded contract NAS4-603 to
design and build the two vehicles.
Meanwhile, wind tunnel tests at LaRC revealed that the
basic configuration trimmed subsonic L/D was only

slightly in excess of 3. This finding was considerably less

than the established goal of a subsonic L/D of 4. In addition, negative values of directional stability existed at low
supersonic speeds and at some AOA. To rectify this situation and to increase subsonic L P , an ejectable tip fin
scheme was briefly considered; however, the ejection of
tip fins during the final phase of a mission was considered
unacceptable. From wind tunnel results, a tip fin
configuration was developed that included changes in the
tip fin shape which resulted in increased area, toe-in angle,
and rollout angle that provided the required subsonic
trimmed maximum L/D. In addition, simple two-position
flaps were added to the trailing edge of the tip fins and
upper elevon to vary the base area and, consequently, the
subsonic base drag. Closing these flaps would minimize
base drag. This modification also reduced the directional
stability problem. This change was now required to be
incorporated into the design specification.
On February 3, 1965, almost 10 months following contract award, a meeting was scheduled at FRC to present
the modified tip fin and two-position flap proposals. Several top engineers from LaRC presented the proposal to
add six control surfaces to the HL-10. These additions
would include two-position surfaces. These surfaces consisted of two elevator flaps located on the upper surface of
the elevon and tip fin flaps. These additional surfaces
meant that a design change and modification to the existing contractual agreement was now required. The change
was made but did not have overwhelming support from
the FRC team at the time. Later in the program, however,
the change was viewed as one of the best decisions made.
This modification allowed a simplified flight control
design and permitted the vehicle to fly from subsonic to
supersonic speeds with less trim change in the pilot's control stick position. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show a side-view
comparison of the basic and final configurations. The
enlarged center and tip fin modifications on the final configuration are obvious in these figures.

and red tape were eliminated. Engineers and technicians

from FRC worked with their contractor counterparts at the
Northrop Corporation facility. The result was a superior
end product with no cost overruns or significant schedule
delays. When the final cost was totaled, these vehicles cost
$1.2 million each; an unheard of price, even in 1965, for a
new research aircraft.

Vehicle Description
The final flight configuration (Fig. 5) was a single-place
vehicle with a relatively conventional 1960's aircraft cockpit and instrument panel (Fig. 6). This configuration consisted of a negatively cambered airfoil with a 74' sweepback delta planform with three aft vertical fins. The vehicle length was 21.17 ft. Figure 7 shows the critical dimensions and physical characteristics. Vehicle launch weight,
with propellants, was 10,009 Ib. Landing weight was
6,473 lb. Center of gravity ranged from 53.14 percent of
the body length for the launch weight configuration to
51.82 percent for the landing condition.
Rocket power was provided to boost the vehicle to test
Mach numbers and altitudes. The rocket motor was an
upgraded, off-the-shelf item which had been used during
earlier programs at FRC. This rocket motor consisted of a
four-chambered XLR- 11 RM- 13 which produced 2120 lb
of thrustfchamber at 265 lb/in2 chamber pressure. Individual chambers could be operated for thrust modulation to
achieve the desired flight test conditions. Liquid oxygen
was used as the oxidizer, and a water-alcohol mixture was
used as the fuel. Total propellant weight was 3536 lb. The
oxidizer and fuel were delivered to the chambers by a turbopump driven by decomposed hydrogen peroxide. Typical rocket motor burntime lasted approximately 90 to 100
sec at maximum thrust using four chambers.
No new rocket motors were used during this program.
These rocket motors had previously been used in the early
X-15 program. At that time, at least one XLR-11 RM-13
motor had been loaned to a museum for display. As a
result, the FRC team had to obtain the return of this motor
before using it in this program.

The delivery of the M2-F2 occurred on June 15, 1965,

and of the HL-10 occurred on January 18, 1966. Following delivery of these vehicles to FRC, the next phase of
the lifting body program began. This phase involved
installing and testing the extensive flight test instrumentation, vehicle systems, and subsystems and lasted approximately 1 year for each of these vehicles. The first
heavyweight lifting body flight, the M2-F2, took place on
July 12, 1966, 2 years following contract award, with a
glide flight from an altitude of 45,000 ft with Mr. Thompson at the controls.

In addition to the XLR-11 RM-13 primary rocket

engine, two small hydrogen peroxide landing rockets were
installed in the vehicle. These rockets were capable of
producing 500 lb of thrust each for 30 sec and were provided in the event that a landing approach needed to be
extended. These rockets were never used as an aid to landing. The only time these rockets were used was for experimentation purposes during the last phase of the program.

Development of the two heavy lifting bodies required

an unprecedented NASA and contractor effort. Each of the
involved organizations contributed talents and resources
to the fullest. The program was based on the ideals of
innovation, initiative, and simplicity above all where possible. Unneeded management, unnecessary paperwork,

The pilots on the FRC team required that the design

specification include speed brakes to provide added drag,
on demand, much like an inverse throttle to vary the landing pattern parameters. In addition, the weight of these
brakes was minimal, and they did not require fuel. These
requirements were later specified for the space shuttle.

Aerodynamic control was provided by the primary control surfaces, elevons, and rudder. Symmetric deflection of
the elevons provided pitch control, and differential deflection provided roll control. A split rudder on the center vertical fin provided yaw control and speed brake. Pitch, roll,
and yaw damping were provided through the limited
authority stability augmentation system (SAS) to the
elevons and rudder. Trim was provided by the elevons for
pitch and roll and by the rudder for yaw or directional
trim.

tude information. Deviations from planned profiles, such

as high- or low-energy states, were radioed to the pilot for
the appropriate corrective action. The low-key point
shown on the ground track occurred at an altitude of
approximately 20,000 ft. At this point, research data acquisition was terminated, and the full attention of the pilot
was given to the landing approach pattern. The landing
approach technique used in these lifting body programs
was similar to the one developed and used in the X-15
program.

The limited authority SAS provided angular rate feedback about all three axes for damping augmentation operating through servoactuators. The pilot could select SAS
gains via switches on the SAS control box. This box was
located on the left-hand console. This system was all analog (electrical wires connected to resistors, capacitors, and
operational amplifiers) with an electromechanical interface and was relatively simple when compared with the
digital computer-based flight control systems of today.

The average glide flight lasted 4.2 min, and powered

flights lasted approximately 6.7 min. The average rate of
descent in gliding flight approached 11,000 ft/min. One
pilot indicated that if a brick were dropped from the B-52
at the same time that a lifting body were launched, the lifting body would beat the brick to the ground.

Secondary movable surfaces were located on the

inboard and outboard trailing edges of the tip fins and the
upper surface of the elevons. These electric motoractuated surfaces were two-position flaps to either a
closed position, the subsonic configuration, or opened for
the transonic configuration (Figs. 8(a) and 8(b)).
The landing gear consisted of off-the-shelf parts from
several airplanes. Main gear wheels, tires, brakes, and
gear and door toggle locks were T-38 hardware. The main
gear shock strut consisted of F-5A hardware. The nose
gear shock strut, wheels, and tires were comprised of T-39
hardware. Main landing gear and nose gear were pneumatically actuated and had extension times of approximately
1.2 and 1.5 sec, respectively. Once lowered, this gear
could not be retracted while airborne.

Flight Mission
The HL-10 was carried aloft by the NASA B-52 launch
aircraft (Figs. 9(a) and 9(b)). This aircraft had been modified earlier specifically to launch the X- 15 hypersonic airplanes from a right-wing pylon. To carry and launch the
lifting bodies, a special adapter was constructed and fitted
to the B-52 wing pylon. Use of this airplane was complicated because the X- 15 program was still operational.
A typical HL-10 mission involved a launch at an altitude of 45,000 ft and at Mach 0.65. Eleven glide flights
preceded the powered flights, so the pilots could become
familiar with the vehicle handling qualities and
aerodynamic characteristics, and the vehicle systems
could be checked out. Figure 10 shows the ground track of
flights in the terminal approach and landing pattern.
Launch point for the powered flights was located southwest of the glide flight launch point by approximately
40 miles. During flight, ground radar tracked the vehicle
and provided mission control with ground track and alti-

Most lifting body landings occurred on Rogers Dry

Lake, runway 18, Edwards, California. This runway was
approximately 4.5 miles or 24,000 ft long. The final
approach and landing flare were accomplished by establishing a preflare aim point (Fig. 11) during the 270 to 300
kn final approach (approximately 4000 ft above ground
level). The unpowered approach and landing of the HL-10
was relatively typical of each of the lifting bodies. Landing occurred in three parts: final approach, flare, and postflare deceleration (Figs. 12(a), 12(b), and 12(c)). The final
approach was typically done at 300 kn at a flightpath angle
of 16 to 18" nose down. Flare initiation usually initiated at
300 to 270 kn and 1000 ft above ground level. The flare
was done at approximately 1.5 g to bring the vehicle to a
relatively level flight attitude at an altitude of approximately 100 ft. At this altitude, the speed of the vehicle had
decreased to approximately 220 to 240 kn, and the landing
gear was lowered. The postflare deceleration was made
with touchdown between 155 to 223 kn (Fig. 13). Once
the landing gear was down, maximum L/D was reduced by
approximately 25 percent. To the pilots, however, the landing speeds were no problem. One advantage to the high
speeds was that the handling qualities were improved.

Flight Testing
Before every lifting body free flight, a series of captive
manned check flights was planned to evaluate the lifting
body systems and subsystems. The HL-10 completed two
captive flights in late 1966.
The HL-10 team convinced Mr. Bikle as well as the rest
of NASA and USAF management that all the necessary
engineering, systems, and mechanical work on the
airplane, piloted simulations, paperwork, and briefings
were completed. On December 21, 1966, the HL-I0 was
placed beneath the right wing of the B-52 aircraft and
lifted into position. Next, the HL-10 was attached to the B52 aircraft, and preflight checks were completed. Early the
next day all preparations for the first free flight were completed. Mr. Bruce Peterson (Fig. 14) took his place in the

cockpit, and the crew strapped him in. The takeoff of the
B-52 aircraft was smooth, and the prelaunch HL-10
checks were satisfactory. Everything was now ready. The
flight plan called for a launch point approximately 3 miles
east of the eastern shoreline of Rogers Dry Lake abeam of
the landing lakebed runway 18. Launch heading was to be
to the north with two left turns. The launch point was
almost hrectly over the USAF Rocket Propulsion Test
Site, Edwards, California. This ground track looked similar to a left-hand pattern with the launch on the downwind leg, a base leg, a turn to final approach, and a final
approach to runway 18.
Launch from the B-52 aircraft occurred at an altitude of
45,000 ft and an airspeed of 170 kn. This launch was similar to simulator predictions. Airplane trim was much as
expected although pilot Peterson sensed what he described
as a high-frequency buffet in pitch and some in roll. Later
this problem was identified as a limit cycle. As speed
increased, the oscillation became noticeably worse. In
addition as the first turn was completed, the pilot noticed
that the pitch stick sensitivity was excessively high. This
stick sensitivity resulted in too much pitching motion as a
result of a relatively small movement of the pitch stick by
the pilot. As the flight progressed, the high-frequency limit
cycle increased in amplitude, and excess sensitivity in the
longitudinal stick became even more obvious. Difficulties
in the roll axis were masked by the pitch problems. The
landing was completed somewhat prematurely because of
the sensitive control problem. The landing flare was initiated at approximately 320 kn with touchdown at approximately 280 kn or approximately 30 kn faster than
anticipated. Flight time was 189 sec (3 min and 9 sec)
from launch (45,000 ft mean sea level (MSL)) to touchdown (2,300 ft MSL). Average descent rate was almost
14,000 ft/min.

Mr. Peterson was greatly concerned with the pitch sensitivity and limit cycles. Figure 15 shows the flight control
system limit cycle time histories for the first flight of the
HL-10 lifting body. The amplitude of this sensitivity and
limit cycles became larger as a function of the vehicle airspeed and system gain setting. The pitch gain was adjusted
several times in an attempt to alleviate the problem. The
limit cycle was a 2.75-Hz oscillation feeding through the
SAS. The problem was primarily in the pitch axis, was
most severe during the last thud of the flight, and continued to exist despite the fact that the pitch SAS gain was
reduced from 0.6 to 0.2 degldeglsec. Toward the end of
the flight, the pitch limit cycle oscillation magnitude was
approximately 0.4 g peak-to-peak at 2.75 Hz.
The first flight was very disappointing. The FRC team
found the results quite poor when compared with the preflight simulations and analyses. Fortunately, FRC management was patient. In addition, the pending holiday season
provided the team with some time to work.

Following the holidays, initial discussions seemed to

lead the team to the conclusion that if the stick sensitivity
were fixed and the SAS gains were decreased, then
another flight could probably be tried. On the other hand,
one lone dissenter in the group was not convinced that
team had entirely understood all the problems. Mr. Weneth
D. Painter, FRC, continued to analyze the flight data and
argue against another attempt even though the project
pilot, Mr. Peterson, had convinced Mr. Bikle that a second
flight should be attempted.
The team initiated an in-depth, unified analysis of the
flight data at the beginning of 1967 with a fresh perspective. Each member knew what the job was and expended
maximum effort to understand exactly what happened on
that first flight and to fix the problems, whatever they
were. This analysis resulted in identification and correction of the following problems:
Large amplitude limit cycles in the SAS because of a
2.75-Hz elevon oscillation feeding through the SAS.
Extreme sensitivity in the longitudinal stick arising
from the high pitch stick gearing of 6.92" of elevon
travel per inch of stick travel which resulted in large
vehicle motions because of small stick deflections.
Lack of longitudinal- and lateral4uectional control
during portions of the flight.
As previously stated, the first two problems were immediately identified even before touchdown. The third problem
was more illusive, and its identification and resolution are
discussed later in this section.
The first problem, large amplitude limit cycles, was
apparently caused by higher elevon control effectiveness
than had been predicted during wind tunnel simulations
and by feedback of a 2.75-Hz limit cycle oscillation
through the SAS. This problem was partially solved by
modifying the structural resonance, 22-Hz mode, lead-lag
filter which had been installed before the first flight. This
modification consisted of a notch filter and a lead-lag network in the SAS electronics. The problem was totally
solved with the combination of installing the structural
notch filter with a center, or notch, frequency of 22 Hz and
of using decreased SAS gains.
The second problem, stick sensitivity, was solved by a
relatively simple gearing modification of the longitudinal
stick. This type of problem was easy to miss when preparations for flight were completed on a fixed-base engineering simulator.
A third, more illusive, problem was not really apparent
to the pilot or test team during the initial postflight analysis. This problem affected controllability of the vehicle at
some points in the flight profile. The program stability,
control, and handling qualities engineer, Mr. Robert
Kempel, FRC, launched an in-depth investigation.

The team had generated the HL-10 simulation from

wind tunnel results. Before the first flight, h e assumption
that this model was a relatively accurate representation of
the actual flight vehicle had been made. Now, a logical
approach was taken to verify that assumption. If flightrecorded control inputs were entered into the computerized model, and this model was a reasonable representation of the flight vehicle at the same flight conditions, then
the model dynamics (calculated motions) should be similar to those of the flight vehicle.
Twelve maneuvers from the first flight results were
selected as candidates for computer matching. These
maneuvers varied from 5 to 15 sec in duration. Seven of
these twelve maneuvers were successfully matched; however, seven matches were considered marginally acceptable. This finding called for a further examination of the
flight data.
The team decided to play the entire flight-recorded data
back through the ground station. These data were recorded
on magnetic tape, and the results were reviewed. This
time, however, the team reselected the parameters which
would be grouped together. These data were now arranged
in the best logical organizational manner which would
facilitate logical postflight analysis, so the physical relationships between certain sets of data provided increased
insight into how the vehicle was behaving dynamically.
The arrangement of the control room strip charts had been
laid out in a somewhat random manner and did not lend
itself to assessment of families of data. The three sets of
data, presented in the revised postflight manner, indicated
some very interesting features. However, during certain
portions of the flight, some of the traces would become
blurred and fuzzy, particularly the control surface strain
gauge data when some high-frequency disturbance
appeared. With these data lined up on a common time
interval, many data traces displayed a similar phenomenon. The question became identifying why this phenomenon occurred. This particular problem was not specifically
apparent to Mr. Peterson, and he made little or no comment regarding it during the flight or postflight discussions. Something did, however, disturb him relative to the
vehicle response to control input which caused the team to
investigate further. It was apparent that each time this situation occurred, the AOA was above 1l o to 13". As AOA
decreased through these values, the ailerons suddenly
became very effective by producing a roll angular rate of
30 to 45 degJsec.
The team began to think that a possible massive flow
separation over the upper aft portion of the vehicle at these
high AOA may have caused the control surfaces to lose a
large percentage of effectiveness. Figure 17 presents a 55sec recording of the inboard right and left tip fin strain
gauge data traces from flight. The flight-measured AOA
trace in this figure is indicated actual, not corrected, AOA.
Significant postflight AOA corrections were required for

such things as the angular difference between the nose

boom and the vehicle longitudinal reference axis, upwash, boom bending because of normal acceleration and
pitch angular rate.
Angle of attack is included in Fig. 16 as a qualitative
indicator of the flow separation. An AOA of 0" on this
scale corresponds to approximately 7' corrected and is
shown for comparison. As the AOA is reduced through 5"
at point A, the flow attaches abruptly. Between 5 and 10
sec, the AOA is increased to approximately 8". and the
flow separates. The trace gets fuzzy. At approximately 34
sec, the AOA is reduced through 7S0, and the flow
becomes dramatically attached once more at point B. As
the AOA decreased, the airflow would suddenly reattach,
and the controls would behave in their normal fashion.
Repeated analyses of these data caused the flow separation theory to seem increasingly plausible. Still, the wind
tunnel data did not indicate a problem to the degree that
had been experienced in flight. These data also indicated a
significant loss of L/D above Mach 0.5 at an AOA of 12".
These data further convinced the team that the problem
was caused by massive flow separation.
About this time, the FRC team decided to call the team
at LaRC and give them a preliminary assessment of the
findings. With LaRC's urging, the FRC team traveled to
Virginia to present first-hand these data and the hypothesis
that the problem was caused by massive flow separation.
At one point during the ensuing meeting, Mr. Robert Taylor, LaRC, jumped up from the table and angrily slammed
a mechanical pencil to the floor as he gave forth a stream
of oaths! Needless to say, everyone was shocked by this
outburst. When Mr. Taylor had calmed down, he resumed
his place at the table and said "I knew that this would be a
problem!" He had had a gut feeling that the flow separation which the LaRC team had seen on the wind tunnel
model would, in fact, be worse in flight. The LaRC team
indicated that they would give the problem immediate
attention and propose a remedy. The FRC team felt good
about the meeting, departed for California, and agreed that
the next move was up to LaRC.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1967, the LaRC
team worked on the problem and came up with two possib:e fixes. These fixes were identified as modification I and
modification I1 (mod I and mod 11). Both modifications
concentrated on changes to the outboard vertical fins
(Fig. 17). During the summer of 1967, Mr. Kempel plotted
all the data for mod I and mod I1 as a function of AOA for
constant Mach numbers. When complete, these data were
lined up for comparison. Some of the little wiggles
(nonlinearities) present in the original data were not
present. The FRC team hypothesized that if these nonlinearities indicated flow separation, then the lack of these
nonlinearities would indicate no flow separation or scparation to a lesser degree. Based on this premise, mod I1 was
selected as the appropriate fix.

To accomplish mod 11, the final aerodynamic configuration change had to be made to the HL-10. The FRC contracted with Northrop Corporation, in early autumn 1967,
to design and install the mod I1 configuration change.
Northrop and NASA decided that a fiberglass glove,
backed by metal structure, would accomplish all configuration objectives very nicely.
In the spring of 1968, the final stages of vehicle preparation were nearing completion. Flight controls,
aerodynamic configuration, and internal systems corrections were completed. With the injury of Mr. Peterson in
the M2-F2 landing accident, Captain Jerauld "Jerry" Gentry, USAF, was named as HL-10 program pilot. Figure 18
shows Captain Gentry, who worked as a true professional
and gave the flight preparation his complete attention.
After many hours of simulation time, he was finally ready
to go fly.
The second flight occurred on March 15, 1%8, with
Captain Gentry at the controls. This relatively typical lifting body flight was launched from an altitude of 45,000 ft
at Mach 0.65. The flight plan called for pitch and roll
maneuvering to allow the pilot to get the feel of the airplane. Mild pitch and roll maneuvers were performed up
to an AOA of 15" to evaluate the possibility of control
degradation similar to that which occurred during the first
flight. In general, the flow did not significantly separate,
and no degradation of control occurred; however, some
sensitivity to AOA was observed. Flight time from B-52
launch to touchdown of the HL-10 vehicle lasted approximately 4.4 min.
Problems, there were none. The flight occurred exactly
as planned and was a resounding success from everybody's point of view. The pilot found that the HL-10 performed as well as an F-104 airplane when making a
similar approach. Throughout the life of the program, the
HL-10 underwent minor adjustments to make it the best of
the best. Before the program ended, the HL-10 went on to
fly 35 additional successful flights. Five pilots participated
in this program. Several technical "firsts" which occurred
during this program are discussed in the following
subsections.
First Powered Flight

The first lifting body powered flight was attempted with

the HL-I0 on October 23, 1968, with Captain Gentry at
the controls. The rocket failed shortly after launch requiring propellant jettison and an emergency landing on
Rosamond Dry Lake, 10 miles southwest of Rogers Dry
Lake, but within the boundaries of Edwards AFB, California. The first successful lifting body powered flight was
subsequently made on November 13,1968, with Mr. John
Manke, FRC, at the controls. Figure 19 shows Messrs.
Weneth D. Painter, Herbert Anderson, Jack L. Kolf,
Manke, and Joe Huxman, FRC.

First Supersonic Flight

The first supersonic flight achieved by a lifting body

was completed on May 9, 1969, by Mr. Manke during
flight 17 of the HL-10 program. On this date, the HL-10
reached a maximum altitude of 53,300 ft and Mach 1.13.
This flight went according to plan. Mr. Manke later
reported that during the flight there were no significant
problems, and "everything went real well."
Fastest and Highest Flight

The HL-10 was the fastest and the highest flying of any
of the lifting bodies. Figure 20 shows Major Peter C.
Hoag, USAF, who achieved Mach 1.86 on February 18,
1970, during flight 34. The duration of this maximum
Mach number flight from B-52 launch to touchdown was
6.3 min. This speed was the fastest that any of the lifting
bodies achieved.
Figure 21 shows test pilot William H. Dana. FRC, who
reached an altitude of 90,303 ft 9 days later during flight
35. The flight to maximum altitude from B-52 launch to
touchdown lasted 6.9 min. This flight was at the highest
altitude any of the lifting bodies would achieve.

Significant Contributions and Lessons

Learned
Design, development, and flight testing of the lowspeed, air-launched, rocket-powered HL-10 lifting body
was part of an unprecedented effort. NASA Langley
Research Center conceived and developed the vehicle
shape and conducted numerous theoretical, experimental,
and wind tunnel studies. NASA Flight Research Center
was responsible for the final, low-speed (Mach numbers
less than 2.0) aerodynamic analyses, piloted simulations,
control law development, and flight tests. The prime contractor, Northrop Corporation was responsible for hardware design, fabrication, and integration.
The HL-10 completed a successful 37-flight program,
achieved the highest Mach number and altitude of this
class vehicle, and contributed significantly to the technology base used to develop the space shuttle and future generations of lifting bodies. This program
proved that changes in program structure which permit decisions to be made at the technical and engineering level eliminate unneeded layers of
management and unnecessary paperwork and result
in surprisingly low unit cost, for example the $1.2
million for the M2-F2 and HL-10 lifting bodies,
demonstrated that hybrid simulations could be created by interfacing analog computers with highspeed digital computers to generate complex, nonlinear, aerodynamic functions, and

assisted in demonstrating the importance and inherent reliability of speed brakes for unpowered reentry
vehicles.
In the process of making such contributions, several
lessons were learned. This program showed that
piloted entry vehicles could adequately complete relatively steep high-energy approaches, and such
approaches were accurate and safe operational techniques,
lifting bodies flying steep, high-energy approaches
and equipped with speed brakes could spot land with
an average miss distance of less than 250 ft,
vehicles with very high dihedral effect, a characteristic of lifting bodies, could be flown safely, and
powered landings using shallower approaches than
the steep ones normally used with the unpowered
HL-10 lifting body provided few benefits.

References
1. Faget, Maxime A,, Benjamin J. Garland, and James
J. Buglia, "Preliminary Studies of Manned Satellites-Wingless Configuration: Nonlifting," NACA
Conference on High-speed Aerodynamics, NACA
TM X-67319, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field, CA, Mar. 18-20, 1958,pp. 19-33.
2. McTigue, John G. and Bertha M. Ryan, LiftingBody Research Vehicles in a Low Speed Flight-Test

Program, International Congress of Subsonic Aeronautics, New York, Apr. 1967.

3. Flight Test Results Pertaining to the Space Shuttlecraft, NASA TM X-2101, 1970.

Acknowledgment
Mr. Milton 0. Thompson, NASA Dryden Flight
Research Facility Chief Engineer, supported and encouraged the generation of this report. In addition, he provided
many outstanding suggestions and useful comments
regarding its content. Mr. Thompson flew the first lightweight and heavyweight M2 vehicles. The first heavyweight lifting body flight, the M2-F2, took place on
July 12, 1966, with Mr. Thompson at the controls. Without
his outstanding ability as a research test pilot and engineer,
none of the work described in this report would have taken
place. Without his vision, in all probability, the success of
the space shuttle never would have been seen. He was
truly a man of far reaching vision.
On August 3, 1993, Mr. Thompson completed his final
editorial review of this report. On the evening of August 6,
1993, NASA planned a dinner celebration in honor of Mr.
Thompson. This dinner was to be a tribute from his
coworkers, friends, and colleagues. However on the morning of August 6, he passed from this life. The tribute was
held anyhow. The attendees remembered the 37 years of
NACAINASA service he rendered as a true professional
and as an aerospace pioneer, remembered him as a friend,
and remembered him as a visionary. Milton 0. Thompson,
we salute you.

Fig. 1. Orbital entry footprints.

Fig. 2. The M2-F1 lifting body in flight.

Fig. 3. Original, informal, 1962 sketch of the proposed HL-10 configuration.

461

3.42 m
(11.22 ft)

(a) Basic.

6.45 m
(21-17ft)

(b) Final.
Fig. 4. The HL-10 lifting body configurations.

EON l Obi
Fig. 5 . The HL- I0 lifting body as it appeared at rollout at Northrop Corporation.

E 20304
Fig. 6. Instrument panel arrangement.

7ai

/ Elevon flap

E1evOn

Bottom view
Top view

Inboard
tip fin flap

(21.17 ft)

(11.22 ft)

Fig. 7. The HL-10 lifting body. three-view drawing.

Rudder and
speed brakes

E 21536

k2153

(a) Transonic.

(b) Subzonic.
Fig. 8. The HL- 10 lifting body flap positions.

E-2 1087
(a) In flight.

E-16174
(b) Ground view.

Fig. 9. The B-52 aircraft and HL-I0 lifting body mated configuration.

Ground track, powered

.-------Ground track, glide

-.-.Low-energy track

--- - High-energytrack } Powered

Configuration change
(transonic to subsonic)

Distance, n. mi.
8
10

12

14

16

1
Glide flight
ground track

--.
-.
runwa!

Distance,
m

Point above
runway
intersection
h = 10,670 m
(35,000 ft)

I
II
I
I

6 Distance,
n. mi.

I
I

;!

\Powered
flight
':.,::
ground track -..

.,- -

10

;.,

:j

....-._,
,

launchpoint,
h = 13,716 m
(45,000 ft)

.-. ,..,,,
.,,

15
Distance, m

8,

20

25

3 0 lo3
~
930386

Fig. 10. Typical HL-10 powered and glide flight ground track in the terminal approach and landing pattern.

Altitude
above 609.6
ground, (2000)
m (ft)

Flare initiation
Postflare
deceleration

:
I
I

I
I

0.8045 (5)
Distance, km (mi)

1.SO9 (1)
930387

Fig. 11. Typical lifting body unpowered final approach, flare, and landing segments.

(a) Terminal approach and landing pattern.

Fig. 12. Final approach, deceleration, and landing of the HL- 10 lifting body.

Fig. 13. The first HL- 10 glide flight landing flare.

E-16199

Fig. 14. Mr. Bruce Peterson, NASA project pilot, after the first HL-10 glide flight.

Pitch angular
rate,
deglsec

Elevon position,
deg from
SAS servo

V V " V V V V

" V

y v vv

-2

10

Time, sec
930472

Fig. 15. The HL-10 first flight control system limit cycle time histories.

2" nose right sideslip

I
,
/
Right

Flow attaches

Flow attaches

Left

10

15

20

25

30
Time, sec

35

40

Fig. 16. Inboard tip fin flap strain gauge and angle-of-attack response.

45

50

55
930486

Sectlon 1
reference plane

Model centerline
Section 1

Model centerllne
Section 2

'Section 2
Horizontal reference plane

Section 1

Section 2
Fig. 17. Proposed tip fin modifications I and 11.

E 18875
Fig. 18. Captain Jerauld "Jerry" Gentry, USAF HL-10 project pilot.

E 20492
Fig. 19. Messrs. Weneth D. Painter, Herbert Anderson. Jack L. Kolf, John Manke, and Joe Huxman with USAF fire truck
and crew (left to right).

E-20777
Fig. 20. Major Peter C. Hoag, USAF, in a pressure suit.

E-20288

Fig. 2 1. Mr. William H. Dana, NASA HL- 10 project pilot.