FEATI VS.

BAUTISTA
FACTS1.
On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty
Club-PAFLU wrote a letter to the President of petitioner Feati University informing her
ofthe organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union.2.The Faculty Club
is composed of members who are professors and/or instructors of the
University.3.The President of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing
twenty-six demandsthat have connection with the employment of the members of the
Faculty Club by theUniversity.4.The University administration refused to bargain
collectively and so PAFLUspresident filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of
Labor. Thereafter, the members ofthe Faculty Club declared a strike resulting to
disruption of classes.5.Despite further efforts of the officials of the Department
of Labor, no settlement canbe reached between the parties. Subsequently, the
President of the Philippinescertified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute
between the management ofthe University and the Faculty Club.6.The University
filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that CIR has no jurisdiction
over the case because the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to thefaculty members,
they being independent contractors and not employees. Therespondent judge denied
the motion but ordered the strikers to return to work and theUniversity to take them
back.ISSUE
Whether or not a charitable institution or one organized for profit is included in the definition of
employer?
HELDYES. The term employer encompasses all employers except those specifically
excluded inthe Industrial Peace Act. The Act itself specifically enumerated those who
are not includedin term employer namely: (1) labor organization; (2) anyone acting in
the capacity of officeror agent of such labor organization (3) the Government and any
political subdivision orinstrumentality. Among these statutory exemptions, educational
institutions are notincluded; hence they can be included in the term employer.The
Industrial Court has jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges against institutionsthat
are organized, operated and maintained for profit. The Industrial Peace Act isapplicable
to any organization or entity whatever may be its purpose when it was created that
is operated for profit or gain
PAL v. PALEA
Facts:
Certain illegally dismissed PAL employees were ordered reinstated by the CIR which
was affirmed by the SC.
Issue:
What are the rights and privileges of reinstated employees during the layoff period?
Held:

Where, in the resolution of the CIR, it was held that the reinstated employees were
entitled to back wages from the date of their dismissal to the date of their reinstatement
and without prejudice to their seniority rights and privileges, it was held that the
resolution intended to restore the said employees to theri status immediately prior to
their dismissal and this means that they should receive Christmas bonus, accumulated
sick leave privileges and transportation allowance during the layoff period. They were
treated as if they had not been absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working
during the layoff period. However, said employees are not entitled to the free trip passes
which were not given automatically or indiscriminately.

Allied Free Workers Union v. Compaia Maritima

Facts:
MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business. Teves is its branch
manager in the port of Iligan City. And AFWU is a duly registered legitimate labor
organization with 225 members.
On August 11, 1952, MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT 4 with
AFWU to do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its
vessels or boats calling in the port of Iligan City, beginning August 12, 1952.
During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT, AFWU rendered satisfactory
service. So, MARITIMA, through Teves, verbally renewed the same. This harmonious
relations between MARITIMA and AFWU lasted up to the latter part of 1953 when the
former complained to the latter of unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers
doing the arrastre and stevedoring work. This deteriorating situation was admitted as a
fact by AFWU's president. To remedy the situationsince MARITIMA's business was
being adversely affected -Teves was forced to hire extra laborers from among "standby" workers not affiliated to any union to help in the stevedoring and arrastre work. The
wages of these extra laborers were paid by MARITIMA through separate vouchers and
not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not charged to the consignees or owners of
the cargoes.
On July 23, 1954, AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal5 for a collective
bargaining agreement. This demand embodied certain terms and conditions of
employment different from the provisions of the CONTRACT. No reply was made by
MARITIMA.

AFWU sued MARITIMA for unfair labor practice saying that MARITIMA refused to
bargain collectively. CIR dismissed the case on the ground that it has no jurisdiction
over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the case?
Whether or not MARITIMA can be considered an employer of the members of AFWU?
Held:
No to both.
It is true that MARITIMA admits that it did not answer AFWU's proposal for a collective
bargaining agreement. From this it does not necessarily follow that it is guilty of unfair
labor practice. Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the
"employer" and its "employees". Where neither party is an ''employer" nor an
"employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no
duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right.
The court a quo held that under the CONTRACT, AFWU was an independent contractor
of MARITIMA.
Neither is there any direct employment relationship between MARITIMA and the
laborers. The latter have no separate individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the
court a quo found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only possible connection with
MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted with the latter. Hence, they could not
possibly be in a better class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.

Calderon vs Carale
Posted by kaye lee on 11:20 PM
208 SCRA 254
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA,

such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an

encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the CoA.
RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads
of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights)