Bus Rapid Transit in Jakarta,

Indonesia: Successes and

Lessons Learned

W. Hook and J. Ernst, March 2005

Institute for Transportation and Development Policy

TransJakartas BRT Characteristics

12.9 km trunk corridor on

main corridor through city

center
2nd Line Under
Construction
14 Corridors Identified
Fully physically
segregated bus lanes
Fare collection at
enclosed stations rather
than on bus
Bus operator paid by the
bus kilometer
Bus operation is private

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BRT
Corridor
1 (& 2)

Jakartas Planned 14 BRT Corridors

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Smart card fare collection

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Success Points
Implemented
rapidly (8 months)
B
ta Public supports
r
a
k
1-hour reduction in
Ja
T
travel time at peak
R
B
t
for TransJakarta
Jk
s
s
e
c
passengers
c
u
s
S
m
le Operational cost
b
o
r
covered by fare
P
s
on
revenue after 6
s
s
Le
months
RT

Political demonstrators, wellknown for blocking traffic, let the

busway through. Busway
ridership surged during the 2004
campaigns.

60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000

Monthly

SE
P

JU
L
AU
G

JU
N

AY
M

AP
R

AR

0
FE
B

Avg Daily Passengers

2004 Ridership,
TransJakarta

Previous mode used by BRT

Passengers
B

Motorcycle
6%

RT

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Private Car
14%
Paratransit
0%
Bajaj (3wheeled taxi)
1%
Taxi
5%

Train
1%

Walking
6%
Airconditioned
(AC) Bus
32%

Non-AC Bus
35%

Thats a way to get us out of our cars!

(Even I used to drive in Jakarta!)

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TransJakarta Suceeded in Giving

Public Transport a Better Image
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Security against pickpockets was a key to

attracting upper and middle income

TransJakarta Breaks Even

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Millions

Annex 5: Revenue vs O/M cost

4.500
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.500
1.000
500
Jan

Feb

M ar

Revenue (Rp.)

Apr

M ay

O / M co st (Rp.)

Jun

Governor Got Some Political

Benefit (for better or worse)
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Lessons
No clear or enforced structure of making
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decisions
Contracting and procurement noncompetitive and non-transparent!
System was designed with no reference
to potential demand.
System capacity only 8000 pphpd when
total bus demand in corridor was about
12000.
System only captures 1/3 of potential
demand.
Ticketing system disfunctional and nontransparent

Institutional Issues
Budget went through Department of
Transportation. (DisHub)
Nominal Authority was head of the
busway coordination team (Tim
Coordinasi). (ITDP input was to this
body)
All procurement, contractual, and
ultimately technical decisions were made
by DisHub. Influence of coordination
team was not so strong.

Contracting Issues
Bus Procurement done by government (DisHub)
rather than private operators w/out competitive
bid in non-transparent way. Price high and bus
sub-optimal.

Ticketing system equipment and software also

procured by DisHub. The system is almost
useless for fiscal control and ridership
monitoring.

Operating contract awarded w/out competitive

bid to consortium of existing operators and govt

owned taxi company. (operating cost/km are too
high)

Problems w/ the Buses

12 meter non

articulated is too
small
1 floor-level /
platform-level door is
two few
Overweight,
damaging the road
and consuming too
much fuel
Cost too much
Euro I (not exactly
clean)
Non-owner operated
means maintenance
is an issue

Station Issues
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station width determined by

available median

Single door, single

station at each
stop dramatically
reduces capacity

Designed to protect the

bus, not the passenger . A
few minor accidents.

Station design and operating

schedule main capacity problem
Bus queuing due
to slow boarding
times
Also caused by
weak schedule
enforcement
A passing lane
and a second
station at each
stop could triple
capacity

Blok-M Bus Terminal badly

designed:a major bottleneck
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Blok M Terminal Alighting &

Boarding Problems
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Fortunately, mistakes reasonably

easy to fix

Kota terminal alighting & boarding

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Enforcement is good, but

roundabouts are difficult to control

Muara
Muara Angke
Angke

Tanjung
Tanjung Priok
Priok

Kota
Kota

Kalideres
Kalideres

Grogol
Grogol

Rawa Buaya
Rawa
Buaya

Senen
Senen

Pulo
Pulo Gadung
Gadung

Tanah Abang
Tanah
Abang

Rawa Mangun
Rawa
Mangun

Pulogebang
Pulogebang

Manggarai
Manggarai

Klender
Klender

Kampung
Kampung Melayu
Melayu

Ciledug
Ciledug

Blok
Blok M
M

Pasar
Pasar Minggu
Minggu

Lebak
Lebak Bulus
Bulus

Pondok
Pondok Gede
Gede
Pinang
Pinang Ranti
Ranti

Kp.
Kp. Rambutan
Rambutan

4900 pax/hr
12.000
pax/hr
8000
Peak Hour Demand : 2000
10.000

Pedestrian facilities

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typical pedestrian ramp

primary route
from train
station to Kota
busway
terminal

Pavement Damage: Should have

used concrete and lighter buses
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Lessons Learned
Essential that the decision maker
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empowers people who are

technically competent
Building supporting institutions and
regulatory structure is more difficult
than physical BRT design issues
Public and local NGOs can play a
role in pressing govt to fix problems