Persons

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.October 12, 2010.
*IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an
OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL
attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he
CASTILLO. Judgments; Words and Phrases; Plagiarism; Plagiarism means the theft
deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo
of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas; The passing off of the work of
passed off the challenged passages as his own.Same; Same; If the Justices citations
another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.At its most
were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or
basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas.
deceit.That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the
To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas,
introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make a case of
writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own. The passing off of
mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest intellectual theft
the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of
and outright plagiarism. If the Justices citations were imprecise, it would just be a
plagiarism.Same; Plagiarism; Although Tams himself may have believed that the
case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many
footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of referencing, he and
would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing
petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such
pagination, and for every technical detail of form.
passages; Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams work as his own.Petitioners
point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams book, Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with
what the author thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself
may have believed that the footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of
referencing, he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source
or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams work as his
own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno
Same; Same; Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers explanation
regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the three authors is
credible.The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers
explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the three
authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in use
by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research
materials is not remote.
Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart
Same; Same; Perjury; Nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false
from Simma, Tams article as another source of those ideas.Same; Same; The
testimony; Justice Del Castillo merely explained that there was every intention to
statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law
attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never any malicious intent to
(2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it
appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it turns out is a true statement.
gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved.The Court believes that whether
But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del
or
the
Castillo merely explained that there was every intention to attribute all sources
footnoting_______________* EN BANC.608608SUPREME COURT REPORTS
whenever due and that there was never any malicious intent to appropriate
ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate
anothers work as our own, which as it turns out is a true statement. He recalled
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillostandards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical
how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major revisions
matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing
in the draft of the decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied, discussions
not
the
footnote
is
sufficiently
detailed,
so
as
to
satisfy
modified, passages added or deleted. Nothing in the letter609VOL. 632,
affirmed the academic freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a
OCTOBER 12, 2010609In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against
student obtained based on evidence that she misappropriated the work of others,
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillosuggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not
passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as already stated, Justice
preclude a researchers inadvertent error.
Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to others.
Same; Same; The process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is
610610
confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the
attendance of the other parties.And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo
did not initially disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the Court
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its
Same; Same; Stare Decisis; The judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare
preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court
decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related
is confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without
studies in their decisions.To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic
the attendance of the other parties.
publishing model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system
Same; Same; Plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is

inherent; Plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal
anothers work and pass it off as ones own.But petitioners theory ignores the fact
that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent.
Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position
considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of
discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse
even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and logical explanations. Indeed,
the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the deliberate and
knowing presentation of another persons original ideas or creative expressions as
ones own. Thus, plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to
steal anothers work and pass it off as ones own.
Same; Same; Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an
intent to pass off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism.The
Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to
pass off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely
is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical
legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision
lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal
opinions it draws from Administrative Law; Judges; Only errors that are tainted with
fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.On occasions judges
and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks,
inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these
do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud,
corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action. This is not the case here.
Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown to have been impelled by
any of such disreputable motives. If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice,
however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the
judiciary with an unblemished record.
Same; Same; Assigning cases for study research to a court attorney, the equivalent of
a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high
courts of all nations.Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the
equivalent of a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is standard practice
own. As the work is anothers and used without attribution, the plagiarist derives the
in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by necessity. With about 80 to 100
benefit of use from the plagiarized work without expending the requisite effort for
cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly senseless for
the sameat a cost (as
him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet,
checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself,
he would have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has
612SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

been submitted for decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind
in the concept of opportunity cost) to its author who could otherwise have gained
to a halt under such a proposition.611VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010611In the
credit for the work and whatever compensation for its use is deemed appropriate and
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
necessary.
CastilloSERENO,
J., Concurring Opinion:Judgments; Words and Phrases;
Plagiarism; The text of the Decision itself reveals the evidence of plagiarism.The
text of the Decision itself reveals the evidence of plagiarism. The tearful apology of
the legal researcher to the family of the ponente and her acknowledgment of the
gravity of the act of omitting attributions is an admission that something wrong was
committed. Her admission that the correct attributions went missing in the process
of her work is an admission of plagiarism. The evidence in the text of the Vinuya
Decision and the acknowledgment by the legal researcher are sufficient for the
determination of plagiarism.Same; Plagiarism; Plagiarism is an act that does not
depend merely on the nature of the object, i.e. what is plagiarized, but also hinges on
the process, i.e. what has been done to the object; Plagiarism thus does not consist
solely of using the work of others in ones own work, but of the former in
conjunction with the failure to attribute said work to its rightful owner and thereby,
as in the case of written work, misrepresenting the work of another as ones own.
Plagiarism is an act that does not depend merely on the nature of the object, i.e. what
is plagiarized, but also hinges on the process, i.e. what has been done to the object.
The elements of this process are the act of copying the plagiarized work and the
Same; Same; There is no requirement of extent of copying or a minimum number of

instances of unattributed usage for an act to be considered a plagiarist act, nor is the
intent to deceive or to copy without attribution a prerequisite of plagiarism.If the
question of plagiarism, then, turns on a failure of attribution, judicial plagiarism in
the case at bar arises when judges author opinions that employ materials from
copyrighted sources such as law journals or books, but neglect to give credit to the
author. Doing so effectively implies the staking of a claim on the copied work as
the judges own. Note that there is no requirement of extent of copying or a
minimum number of instances of unattributed usage for an act to be considered a
plagiarist act, nor is the intent to deceive or to copy without attribution a prerequisite
of plagiarism. In Durshts exhaustive analysis of judicial plagiarism she cites the
case of Newman v. Burgin wherein the court said that plagiarism may be done
through negligence or recklessness without intent to deceive. Dursht in addition
notes that intent may also be taken as the intent to claim authorship of the copied
work, whether or not there was intent to deceive, citing Napolitano v. Trustees of
Princeton Univ.
subsequent omission in failing to attribute the work to its author. Plagiarism thus
Same; Same; Judicial Plagiarism; Findings of judicial plagiarism do not necessarily
does not consist solely of using the work of others in ones own work, but of the
carry with them the imposition of sanctions, nor do they present unequivocal
former in conjunction with the failure to attribute said work to its rightful owner and
demands for rehearing or the reversal of rulings.Findings of judicial plagiarism do
thereby, as in the case of written work, misrepresenting the work of another as ones
not necessarily carry with them the imposition of sanctions, nor do they present
unequivocal demands for rehearing or the reversal of rulings. In Liggett Group, Inc.,
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a
et al. v. Harold M. Engle, M.D. et al., a U.S. tobacco class action suit, [the]
designated member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their
plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for rehearing alleging that the appellate opinion
meanings to support the decision.
copied large portions of the defendants briefs. . . . without attribution. The result of
this, the plaintiffs claimed, was the creation of the appearance of impropriety, the
The Background Facts
abdication of judicative duties, the relinquishing of independence to defendants, the
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of
failure to maintain impartiality, and therefore, as an act of judicial plagiarism, was a
the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special
misrepresentation of the facts found by the trial court and denied plaintiffs due
civil action of certiorari with application for preliminary mandatory injunction
process of law. The three-judge panel denied the motion.
against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of
Same; Same; Unless reconsidered, the Court would unfortunately be remembered as

the Court that made malicious intent an indispensable element of plagiarism and
that made computer-keying errors an exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism,
without clarifying whether its ruling applies only to situations of judicial decision-
Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.Petitioners claimed that in destroying
villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army systematically
raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses
or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.
making or to other written intellectual activity.Unless reconsidered, this Court
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive
would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made malicious intent an
Department, represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in
indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an
filing claims against the Japanese military officers who
exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling

applies613VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010613In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo only to situations
of judicial decision-making or to other written intellectual activity. It will also
weaken this Courts disciplinary authoritythe essence of which proceeds from its
moral authorityover the bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered
tenuous its ability to positively educate and influence the future of intellectual and
academic discourse.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Plagiarism.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court PER CURIAM:
established the comfort women stations. But that Department declined, saying that
petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive
Department to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action.
as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court
International Law (2006); andc.Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J.
essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition because,
Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).Petitioners claim that the integrity of the
first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution
Courts deliberations in the case has been put into question by Justice Del Castillos
and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan; and,
fraud. The Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the
second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse
manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism3 that resulted in gross prejudice
their claims.
to the petitioners.Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for
On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts

decision. More than a month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty.
Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog that his clients would file a
supplemental petition detailing plagiarism committed by the court under the
second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these stolen passages
were also twisted to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino
comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies. The media gave
publicity to Atty. Roques announcement.
reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues,

subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision for the Court he had
the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent part:It must be
emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At
no point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our
own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the Court en
banc. It was deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20,
2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time, suggestions were made which
necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that
modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with
Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of manifest intellectual theft
78 footnotes.x x x xAs regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as
and outright plagiarism1 when he wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting
contained in the above foreign materials were twisted, the same remains their
the true intents of the plagiarized sources _______________
opinion which we do not necessarily share.4On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc
1 Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Exhibit A, p. 5.
referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve
615VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010615In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.2 They charged Justice Del Castillo
of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign
articles:a.A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan FoxDescent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);b. Breaking the Silence: Rape
as consultant of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del
Castillos verified letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.In the
meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his coauthor Evan Fox-Descent referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged
plagiarism involving their work but Criddles concern, after reading the
supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the Courts conclusion that
form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the
prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding
decision may have used his work to support an approach to erga omnes concept
norms that treaties cannot diminish.
(obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations) that is not
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in
mentioning his work, the Court may have misread the argument [he] made in the
article and employed them for cross purposes.
2 Id., at p. 3.3 Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 1, at p. 5.
616SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In the Matter of the Charges of
consistent with what he advocated.On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the
parties submissions in the summary manner of administrative investigations.
Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the Committee and
submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.Counsels for Justice
Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so they
could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential,
involving the drafting process that went into the making of the Courts decision in
the Vinuya case. Petitioners counsels vigorously objected and the Committee
Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy
sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo, his counsels requested
for victims of war crimes.
the Committee to hear the Justices court re-_______________5 Statement of the
On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for
investigation, (the Dean of the University of the_______________
4 Justice Del Castillos Verified Letter, p. 3, Exhibit G of the petitioners
.617VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010617In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo Philippines (U.P.) College of
Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming that the Vinuya decision was
an extraordinary act of injustice and a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The statement said that
Justice Del Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors
work, and that the Courts decision amounted to an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.5On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian
J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although relevant sentences in
the Courts decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference only
in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma)
rather than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty dated July 27, 2010, Exhibit J
of the petitioners.618618SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the
Castillosearcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work
that went into the making of the decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted
the request.The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the
attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found
in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally
deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her grievous mistake and grief for
having caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his
family.6On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researchers
explanation, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in
plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that certain words
or language in his work were taken from anothers work. Counsel invoked the
Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals
and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,7 arguing that standards on plagiarism
in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.After the hearing, the
Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They filed
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.,
their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee
against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillodid not pass off Tams work as his
submitted its unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.The IssuesThis
own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno
case presents two issues:1.Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in
Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart
the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors
from Simma, Tams article as another source of those ideas.The Court believes that
Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis._______________6 Transcript of Stenographic
whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting
Notes taken on August 26, 2010, p. 31.7 G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999, 313
standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning
SCRA 404.619VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010619In the Matter of the Charges of
clarity of writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in
Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo2. Whether or
International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams
not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that
thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution
such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision.The Courts
altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged
RulingsBecause of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the
passages as his own.That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the
Court like its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid
touching the merits of the Courts decision in that case or the soundness or lack of
soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The Court will deal, not
with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but how the
decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those
works and for what purpose the decision employed the same.At its most basic,
pagination, and for every technical detail of form.The Passages from Ellisand
plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
Criddle-DescentPetitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas,
footnotes, without attribution to the author, passages from the published work of
writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.8 The passing off of
Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page 27 of its decision, marked
the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.The
with Footnote 65 at the end:We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and
Passages from TamsPetitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages
sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under
from Tams book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006)
contemporary international law. 65 x x x621VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010621In
and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought was a mere generic
the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C.
reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in this
Del CastilloFootnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy
case was not an appropriate form of referencing,9 he and petitioners cannot deny
passages in that footnote came almost verbatim from Ellis article,10 such passages
that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del
ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement that they are from that
Castillo_______________8 Websters New World College Dictionary, Third
article. The footnote could very well have read:65 In an article, Breaking the
Edition, Macmillan USA, p. 1031.9 Exhibit I for the petitioners.620620SUPREME
Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international
the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
crime is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically
connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.The Nuremberg
not emerge until after World War II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was
Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge
not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and
acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of Amity and
Punishment in the International Arena, 7 ILSA J. Intl. Comp. L. 667, 676.)
Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all
However, International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape crimes,
women and children shall not be molested in their persons. The Treaty of Amity
even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal
and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of
held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister
America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Intl Agreements
Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by
Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of troop
persons under their authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International
discipline. (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as
Military Tribunal For The Far East 445-54 (1977).The first mention of rape as a
a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Intl. L. 219, 224).
specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10 included
It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id., at p. 236).
the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by
The 1907 Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their
the four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for
honour. (Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as
prosecuting war criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law
well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV)
No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General
Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany
Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, Affirmation of the
50, 53 (1946))The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg
of War was the first modern-day international instrument to establish protections
Tribunal; General Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the
against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter established
(entry
crimes against humanity as the following:_______________10 Breaking the Silence
Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal
of Rape as an International Crime, 38 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 225 (2006).622622
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloCRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
into
force
Oct.
20,
1950)
[hereinafter
Fourth
Geneva
enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against

humanity.But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction
was missing from Footnote 65.623VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010623In the Matter
of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
CastilloNext, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their
accompanying footnotes appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:x x x
attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which
In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to
report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
materials to which the Court subscribes.In the old days, the common practice was
international norms of equivalent authority.71Early strains of the jus cogens
that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study and report, the researcher
doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms began to attract
would source his materials mostly from available law books and published articles
greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdrosss influential
on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue
1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus
or for the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page,
cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation
pencil mark the item, and place the book on his desk where other relevant books
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a
would have piled up. He would later paraphrase or copy the marked out passages
consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,75
from some of these books as he typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying
occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials used to their
peremptory norms.After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus
authors or sources.With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos
cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally
researcher also explained, most legal references, including the collection of
accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having
decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that
the character of jus cogens.76 In a
offer
commentary accompanying the draft
virtual
libraries of books
and articles.
Here,
as the researcher
convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave
found_______________11 34 Yale J. Intl. L. 331 (2009).625VOL. 632, OCTOBER
the full content of this
rule to be worked out in State practice and in the
12, 2010625In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate
jurisprudence of international tribunals.77 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo items that were relevant to her assignment, she
in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance, beyond a
downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of
tiny core of principles and rules.78Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the
materials that she thought she might need. The researchers technique in this case is
above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary
not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first gets the
624624SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges
pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object
of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloTheory of Jus
he has in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he
Cogens.11 Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decisions own
needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table.
footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.The
He would get rid of the scraps.Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that.
ExplanationUnless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and
She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw
Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos
website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained
researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the
the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the
Microsoft Word program.12 Later, after she decided on the general shape that her
researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-
report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did
in-the-making in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer
not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and
program in use, automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of
adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions
researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if the preceding footnote in the manuscript when
with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the
the passage from627VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010627In the Matter of the
standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their
Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
work.Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her
Tolentino was pasted on it is 23, Tolentinos footnote would automatically change
report in the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the separate
from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.But then, to be of use in his materials-
articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors.
gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the Tolentino passage with a short
But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher
description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description would be:
accidentally deleted the attributions._______________12 Memorandum for Justice
The inalienable character of juridical personality.23 The footnote mark, 23 From
Del
REPORTS
Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him
Castillo,
paragraphs
25-35.626626SUPREME
COURT
to attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been
Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloFirst FindingThe Court adopts the Committees
tagged, it would now appear like this:The inalienable character of juridical
finding that the researchers explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper
personality.23x x x Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but
attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the
qualities of persons; hence, they
Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to
x_____________________________23 From Tolentino.24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1
sources of research materials is not remote.For most senior lawyers and judges who
Valverde 291.The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves
are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the circumstances of the
but a marker to help researcher X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his
present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident
final manuscript.The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the
happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the inalienable
Justice had decided what texts, passages, and citations were to be retained including
character of juridical personality in connection with an assignment and if the book
those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was already cleaning up her
of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a
work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted the footnotes that
website, researcher X would probably show interest in the following passage from
went with such tagswith disastrous effect.To understand this, in Tolentinos
that book:x x x Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but
example, the equivalent would be researcher Xs removal during cleanup of the tag,
qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.15x x
The inalienable character of juridical personality.23, by a simple delete
x_____________________________15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.Because
operation, and the unintended removal as well628628SUPREME COURT
the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is
REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against
evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect.
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castilloof the accompanying footnote (#23). The
He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.When
erasure of the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source,
cannot be alienated or renounced.24x x
Tolentinos book. Only the following would remain in the manuscript:x x x Both
the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is confidential, which
juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence,
explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of the
they cannot be alienated or renounced.43_________________________________43
other parties.Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or
3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.As it happened, the Microsoft word program does
reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis.
not have a function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned.
The latter authors are highly respected professors of international law. The law
The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the manuscript, adjusting
journals that published their works have exceptional reputations. It did not make
the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together had just
sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision cites an
been severed.This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-
abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages
Descent. The researcher deleted the subject tags and, accidentally, their
would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del
accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of the lifted
Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to
passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not
mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to
easily detectable.Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified
inadvertence or pure oversight.Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material
letter of July 22, 2010 is inconsistent with his researchers claim that the omissions
in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to
were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact that the Justice did not disclose his
enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from
researchers error in that letter despite the latters confession regarding her mistake
which these were taken.14 Petitioners point out that the Court should apply
even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in
to_______________
his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to whitewash
the case.13But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony.
Justice Del Castillo merely explained that_______________13 Petitioners
Memorandum, pp. 26-27.629VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010629In the Matter of the
Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillothere
was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never
any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it turns
out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more
than once, prompting major revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process,
(s)ources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or deleted.
Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not preclude a researchers
inadvertent error.And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially
disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the Court and was expected
to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its preparation. What is more,
14 Supra note 6, at p. 41.630630SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn

Del Castillo this case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v.
Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.15 They argue that
standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the
judiciary.But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form
of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors
in research, an unrealistic position considering that there is hardly any substantial
written work in any field of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places
an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and
logical explanations.Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines
plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons original
ideas or creative expressions as ones own.16 Thus, plagiarism presupposes intent
and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers work and pass it off as ones
decision without placing them in quotation marks. But such passages are much
own.Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate
unlike the creative line from Robert Frost,17 The woods are lovely, dark, and deep,
that an intent to pass off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism.
but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I
The Court merely affirmed the academic freedom of a university to withdraw a
sleep. The passages here consisted of_______________17 Stopping by the Woods
masters degree that a student obtained based on evidence that she misappropriated
on a Snowy Evening (1923).632
the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as
already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to
others.Second FindingThe Court also adopts the Committees finding that the
omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis did not bring about an
impression that Justice Del Castillo himself_______________15 Supra note 7.16
Blacks Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).631VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010631In the
Castillocreated the passages that he lifted from their published articles. That he
merely got those passages from others remains self-evident, despite the accidental
deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the sources from which
Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.This is best illustrated in
the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and, accidentally, its
footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:x x
x Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons;
hence,
they
cannot
be
alienated
or
renounced.43_____________________________43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde

291.Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to Tolentino, the
passage remains to be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that
Tolentino himself cites. The text and its footnote reference cancel out any
impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is the same with the
passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed
by the footnotes to the authors original sources, the omission of attributions to
Criddle-Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of
Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his
own thoughts.True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillocommon
definitions and terms, abridged history of certain principles of law, and similar
frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature, already belong to
the public realm.To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,18 while the academic publishing
model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based
on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to
produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the
soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it
draws from.Third FindingPetitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages
from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The Court adopts the Committees finding
that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or misrepresentation remains a
mystery to the Court. To twist means to distort or pervert the meaning of.19 For
example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and
declares that Jose Palma who wrote it did not love his country, then there is
twisting or misrepresentation of what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the
Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams,
Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines is
not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.The
fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally
deleted, it is impossible_______________18 Bast and Samuels, Plagiarism and
Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual
Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV 777, 800 (2008).19 Websters New World College
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished
Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 1445.
record.22No Inexcusable NegligenceFinally, petitioners assert that, even if they
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillofor any person reading the
decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude that in
writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended messages. And,
second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state
of international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that
could support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the
power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether
the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus
cogens.Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted
the meaning of the passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and
Ellis, the charge of twisting or misrepresentation against him is to say the least,
unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge is reckless and obtuse.No
MisconductOn occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong
sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information
from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct.
Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of
disciplinary action.20 This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or
omissions were not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable
motives.21 If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however
competent,_______________20 Atty. Alberto P. Quinto v. Judge Gregorio S. Vios,
Municipal Trial Court, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1551, May
21, 2004, 429 SCRA 1; Tolentino v. Camano, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ 10-1522, January
20, 2000, 322 SCRA 559.21 Daracan v. Natividad, A.M. No. RTC-99-1447,
September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161.
were to concede that the omission was the result of plain error, Justice Del Castillo
is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that he has full
control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the
writing of the decision to the latter.23But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo
abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is contrary to
the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the Justice set
the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the issues with
her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the
study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it.24 In
every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the
Court, which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and determined its
final outcome.Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the
equivalent of a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is standard practice
in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by necessity. With about 80 to 100
cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly senseless for
him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet,
checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself,
he would have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for_______________22
Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 88;
Tan v. Adre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 145.23 Supra
note 13, at p. 25.24 Supra note 6, at pp. 27-30.635VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12,
2010635In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castilloeach case that has been submitted for decision. The wheels
of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.What is
important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing
of the decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his
researchers shoulder as she cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the
of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillohonest, or
right computer keys. The Justices researcher was after all competent in the field of
assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third in
her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and placed fourth in
the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters degree in International
Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top
post graduate programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did
not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to
her.Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be
operated by human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites
who believe that the courts should be as error-free as they themselves
are.Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits, the
Committee noted that petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of
the U.P. College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a
mere dummy. The whole of the statement was reproduced but the signatures portion
below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters
Sgd or signed printed beside the names without exception. These included the
name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.
of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloBecause the
Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque
to present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing.25 He
complied. As it turned out, the original statement was signed by only a minority of
the faculty members on the list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth
in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out of the
81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of the
Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not
sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee
wondered why the Dean submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has
an abundance of copying machines.Since the above circumstances appear to be
related to separate en banc matter concerning the supposed Faculty statement, there
is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the same to the en banc
for its consideration in relation to that matter.WHEREFORE, in view of all of the
above, the Court:1.DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo;2.DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies

of this decision to Professors Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis,
and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses;3. DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and reporting with
copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in the
Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume
of citations and footnoting is substantial; and_______________25 Order dated
August 26, 2010, Committee Records, pp. 382-383.637VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12,
Mariano C. Del Castillo4.Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the
necessary software for use by the Court that can prevent future lapses in citations
and attributions.Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards to turn over to the en banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of
petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring Integrity, a statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en bancs consideration in
relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty
statement.SO ORDERED.Corona (C.J.), Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Carpio, J., On
Official Leave.Carpio-Morales, J., I join the DISSENT of J. Sereno.Peralta, J., On
Leave.Del Castillo, J., No Part.Sereno, J., I dissent and reserve my right to issue a
separate opinion.DISSENTING OPINIONSERENO,J.:What is black can be
called white but it cannot turn white by the mere calling. The unfortunate ruling of
the majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to
distinguish between the determination of the objective, factual existence of
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision1_______________1 Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. v.
The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 1622309, April 28, 2010, 619
SCRA 534.638638SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castilloand
the determination of the liability that results from a finding of plagiarism.
Specifically, it made malicious intent, which heretofore had not been relevant to a
finding of plagiarism, an essential element.The majority Decision will thus stand
against the overwhelming conventions on what constitutes plagiarism. In doing so,
the Decision has created unimaginable problems for Philippine academia, which will
from now on have to find a disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by
students and researchers on the justification of the majority Decision.It has also
undermined the protection of copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists
lack of malicious intent as a defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic
rights of the copyright owner committed through lack of attribution. Under Section
184 of R.A. 8293 (An Act Describing the Intellectual Property Code and
Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and
Functions, and for Other Purposes), or the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, there is no infringement of copyright in the use of anothers work in:(b)
the making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use
and only to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper
articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries: Provided that the source and
the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned. (Emphasis
supplied)Because the majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the
complaining authors in the Vinuya decision to editorial errors and lack of malicious
intent to appropriateand that therefore there was no plagiarismlack of intent to
infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may now639VOL. 632,
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castilloalso become a defense, rendering the
above legal provision meaningless.2Tables of ComparisonThe tables of comparison
below were first drawn based on the tables made by petitioners in their
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. This was then compared with Annex A
of Justice Mariano del Castillos letter, which is his tabular explanation for some of
the copied excerpts.3 The alleged plagiarism of the cited excerpts were then
independently verified and re-presented below, with the necessary revisions
accurately reflecting the alleged plagiarized works and the pertinent portions of the
decision. A few excerpts in the table of petitioners are not included, as they merely
refer to in-text citations.TABLE A:Comparison of Christian J. Tamss book,
entitled Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law (2005), hereinafter
called Tamss work and the Supreme Courts 28 April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary.
Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations
in International Law (2005).Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230,
28 April 2010.1.x x x The Latin phrase erga omnes thus has become one of the
rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based
international public order based on law. x x xAs often, the reality is neither so clear
nor so bright. One*The Latin phrase, ergaomnes, has since becomeone of the
rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based
international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neitherso
clear nor so bright. _______________2 Judges cannot be liable for copyright
infringement in their judicial work (Section 184.1(k), R.A. 8293).3 Justice Mariano
Del Castillos letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and Colleagues,
dated July 22, 2010.640640SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the
Castillo problem is readily admitted by commentators: whatever the relevance of
obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realised in
practice. x x x Bruno Simmas much-quoted observation encapsulates this feeling of
disappointment: Viewed realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is still
the world of the ought rather than of the is.
(pp. 3-4 of the Christian
Tamss book)Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept,
its full potential remains to be realized in practice.[FN69] (p. 30, Body of the 28
April 2010 Decision)[FN69]Bruno Simmas much-quoted observation encapsulates
this feeling of disappointment: Viewed realistically, the world of obligations erga

omnes is still the world of the ought rather than of the is The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary 125 (Simma, ed. 1995). See Tams, Enforcing
Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005).*The decision mentioned
Christian Tamss book in footnote 69. TABLE B: Comparison of Evan J. Criddle &
Evan Fox-Decents article in the Yale Journal of International Law, entitled A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens (2009), hereinafter called Criddles & FoxDecents work and the Supreme Courts 28 April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary.641VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010641In the Matter of the
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 Yale J.
Intl L. 331 (2009).Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
20101.In international law, theterm jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers
to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. xxx Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
international norms of equivalent authority.[FN2] [FN2] See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. (pp. 331-332 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl
Law)In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers
to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
international norms of equivalent authority.[FN70] (pp. 30-31, Body of the 28 April
2010 Decision) [FN70] See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter
VCLT].2.Peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the
publication of Alfred von Verdrosss influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in
International Law.[FN10] [FN10] For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case,
Judge Schckings influential dissent stated that neither anx x x but peremptory
norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von
Verdrosss influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law. [FN72]
(p. 31, Body of the 28 April 2010 Decision)[FN72] Verdross argued that certain
discrete rules of international custom had come to 642642SUPREME COURT
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
international court nor an arbitral
tribunal should apply a treaty provision in contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar
Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schcking, J.,
dissenting).
(p. 334 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)be recognized as
having a compulsory character notwithstanding contrary state agreements. At first,
Verdrosss vision of international jus cogens encountered skepticism within the
legal academy. These voices of resistance soon found themselves in the minority,
however, as the jus cogens concept gained enhanced recognition and credibility
following the Second World War. (See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus
cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status
150 (1988) (surveying legal scholarship during the period 1945-69 and reporting
that about eighty per cent [of scholars] held the opinion that there are peremptory
norms existing in international law).3.Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius,
Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff drew upon the Roman law distinction between
jus dispositivum (voluntary law) and jus scriptum (obligatory law) to differentiate
consensual agreements between states from the necessary principles of
international law that bind all states as a point of conscience regard-[FN71]
Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff drew
upon the Roman law distinction between jus dispositivum (voluntary law) and jus
scriptum (obligatory law) to differentiate consensual agreements between states
from the necessary principles of international law that bind all states as a point of
conscience regardless of con- 643VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010643In the
Castillo
less of consent.[FN6] [FN6] See Hugonis Grotii, De Jure Belli et Pacis
[On the Law of War and Peace] (William Whewell ed. & trans., John W. Parker,
London 2009) (1625); Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle [The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law] 9, 27 (1758)
(distinguishing le Droit des Gens Naturel, ou Ncessaire from le Droit
Volontaire); Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractorum [A
Scientific Method for Understanding the Law of Nations] 5 (James Brown Scott
ed., Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764). (p. 334 of the Yale Law
Journal of Intl Law)sent.
(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)4.Early twentieth-century publicists such as Lassa Oppenheim and
William Hall asserted confidently that states could not abrogate certain universally
recognized principles by mutual agreement.[FN9] Outside the academy, judges on
the Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed the existence of peremptory
norms in interna-[FN71] xxx Early twentieth-century publicists such as Lassa
Oppenheim and William Hall asserted that states could not abrogate certain
universally recognized principles by mutual agreement. xxx Judges on the
Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed the existence of peremptory
norms in international law by referencing treaties contra bonos mores
of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
tional law
by referencing treaties contra bonos mores (contrary to public policy) in a series of
individual concurring and dissenting opinions.[FN10] xxx [FN9] William Hall, A
Treatise on International Law 382-83 (8th ed. 1924) (asserting that fundamental
principles of international law may invalidate [], or at least render voidable,
conflicting international agreements); 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 528
(1905). [FN10] For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case, Judge Schckings
influential dissent stated that neither an international court nor an arbitral tribunal
should apply a treaty provision in contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn Case,
1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schcking, J., dissenting). (pp.
334-5 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)(contrary to public policy) in a series of
individual concurring and dissenting opinions. xxx
(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28
April 2010 Decision)5.[FN9] William Hall, A Treatise on International Law 382-83
(8th ed. 1924) (asserting that fundamental principles of international law may
invalidate [], or at least render voidable, conflicting international agreements)
[FN71] xxx (William Hall, A Treatise on International Law 382-83 (8th ed. 1924)
(asserting that fundamental principles of international law may invalidate [], or
at least render voidable, conflicting international agreements) xxx 645VOL.
632, OCTOBER 12, 2010645In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.,
against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
xxx (Footnote 9 of the Yale
Law Journal of Intl Law)(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)6.
[FN10] For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case, Judge Schckings influential
dissent stated that neither an international court nor an arbitral tribunal should apply
a treaty provision in contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schcking, J., dissenting). (Footnote 9 of
the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)[FN71] x x x (For example, in the 1934 Oscar
Chinn Case, Judge Schckings influential dissent stated that neither an
international court nor an arbitral tribunal should apply a treaty provision in
contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at
149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schcking, J., dissenting). (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April
2010 Decision)7.Verdross argued that certain discrete rules of international custom
had come to be recognized as having a compulsory character notwithstanding
contrary state agreements.[FN12] [FN12] [Von Verdross, supra note 5.] (pp. 335 of
the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)[FN72] Verdross argued that certain discrete
rules of international custom had come to be recognized as having a compulsory
character notwithstanding contrary state agreements. x x x (p. 31, Footnote 72 of
the 28 April 2010 Decision)8.At first, Verdrosss vision of international jus cogens
encountered skepticism within the legal academy. x x x These voices of resistance
soon found themselves[FN72] x x x At first, Verdrosss vision of international jus
cogens encountered skepticism within the legal academy. These voices of resistance
soon found themselves in the 646646SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
in the minority, however, as the jus cogens
concept gained enhanced recognition and credibility following the Second World
War. (pp. 335-6 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)minority, however, as the jus
cogens concept gained enhanced recognition and credibility following the Second
World War. xxx (p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)9.[FN18] See
Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law:
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status 150 (1988) (surveying legal
scholarship during the period 1945-69 and reporting that about eighty per cent [of
scholars] held the opinion that there are peremptory norms existing in international
law). (Footnote 18 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)[FN72] xxx (See Lauri
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status 150 (1988) (surveying legal scholarship
during the period 1945-69 and reporting that about eighty per cent [of scholars]
held the opinion that there are peremptory norms existing in international law). (p.
31, Footnote 72 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)10.x x x the 1950s and 1960s with
the United Nations International Law Commissions (ILC) preparation of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).[FN20] [FN20] VCLT, supra
note 2.x x x the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).[FN73] (p. 31, Body of the 28 April
2010 Decision) [FN73] In March 1953, the ILCs Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, submit- 647VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010647In the Matter of the
(p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)ted for the ILCs consideration a
partial draft convention on treaties which stated that [a] treaty, or any of its
provisions, is void if its performance involves an act which is illegal under
international law and if it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice.
Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B.
Intl L. Commn 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.11.In March 1953, Lauterpacht
submitted for the ILCs consideration a partial draft convention on treaties which
stated that [a] treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its performance involves an
act which is illegal under international law and if it is declared so to be by the
International Court of Justice.[FN21] [FN21] Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties:
Report by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 90, 93, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/63. (p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)[FN73] In March 1953,
the ILCs Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, submitted for the ILCs
consideration a partial draft convention on treaties which stated that [a] treaty, or
any of its provisions, is void if its performance involves an act which is illegal
under international law and if it is declared so to be by the International Court of
Justice. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur,
[1953] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63. (p. 31, Footnote 73 of
the 28 April 2010 Decision) 12.Lauterpachts colleagues on the ILC generally
accepted his assessment that certain international norms had attained the status of
jus Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the
status of jus cogens, [FN74] the ILC was unable to reach a consensus
of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
cogens.
[FN23] Yet despite general agreement over the existence of international jus cogens,
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus regarding either the theoretical basis for
peremptory norms legal authority or the proper criteria for identifying peremptory
norms. [FN23] See Hannikainen, supra note 18, at 160-61 (noting that none of the
twenty five members of the ILC in 1963 denied the existence of jus cogens or
contested the inclusion of an article on jus cogens in the VCLT); see, e.g., Summary
Records of the 877th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 227, 230-231, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that the emergence of a rule of jus cogens banning
aggressive war as an international crime was evidence that international law
contains minimum requirement[s] for safeguarding the existence of the
international community). (p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)on the
proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. (p. 31, Body of the 28 April 2010
Decision) [FN74] See Summary Records of the 877th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Intl
L. Commn 227, 230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that the emergence of a
rule of jus cogens banning aggressive war as an international crime was evidence
that international law contains minimum requirement[s] for safeguarding the
existence of the international community). 13.[FN23] x x x see, e.g., Summary
Records of the 877th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 227, 230-231, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that[FN74] See Summary Records of the 877th Meeting,
[1966] 1 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 227, 230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that
the emergence of 649VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010649In the Matter of the
the emergence of a rule of jus cogens banning aggressive war as an international
crime was evidence that international law contains minimum requirement[s] for
safeguarding the existence of the international community). (Footnote 23 of the
Yale Law Journal of Intl Law)a rule of jus cogens banning aggressive war as an
international crime was evidence that international law contains minimum
requirement[s] for safeguarding the existence of the international community).(p.
31, Footnote 74 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)14.After an extended debate over
these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that
there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general
rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.[FN27] x x x In
commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the
prudent course seems to be to . . . leave the full content of this rule to be worked out
in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.[FN29] x x x
[FN27] Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 1, 52,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156.[FN29] Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note
27, at 53. After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the
ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted
criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the
character of jus cogens.[FN75] In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave
the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the
jurisprudence of international tribunals.[FN76] x x x (p. 32, Body of the 28 April
2010 Decision)[FN75] Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Intl L.
Commn 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156. Id., at pp. 53. 650650SUPREME COURT
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(p. 337-8 of the Yale Law Journal of
Intl Law) 15.In some municipal cases, courts have declined to recognize
international norms as peremptory while expressing doubt about the proper criteria
for identifying jus cogens.[FN72] [FN72] See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001) (expressing concern that jus cogens
should be invoked [o]nly as a last resort). (p. 346 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl
Law)[FN77] x x x In some municipal cases, courts have declined to recognize
international norms as peremptory while expressing doubt about the proper criteria
for identifying jus cogens. (See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250
F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001) (expressing concern that jus cogens should be
invoked [o]nly as a last resort)). x x x (p. 32, Footnote 77 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)16.In other cases, national courts have accepted international norms as
peremptory, but have hesitated to enforce these norms for fear that they might
thereby compromise state sovereignty.[FN73] xxx In Congo v. Rwanda, for
example, Judge ad hoc John Dugard observed that the ICJ had refrained from
invoking the jus cogens concept in several previous cases where peremptory norms
manifestly clashed with other principles of general international law.[FN74]
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed jus [FN77] x x x In
other cases, national courts have accepted international norms as peremptory, but
have hesitated to enforce these norms for fear that they might thereby compromise
state sovereignty. (See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding
that the prohibition against torture does not entail a right to a civil remedy
enforceable in a foreign court)). In Congo v. Rwanda, for example, Judge ad hoc
John Dugard observed that the ICJ had refrained from invoking the jus cogens
concept in several previous cases where 651VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010651In
Del Castillo cogens only once, in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it famously
rejected the argument that jus cogens violations would deprive a state of sovereign
immunity. [FN73] See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding
that the prohibition against torture does not entail a right to a civil remedy
enforceable in a foreign court). [FN74] See Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), at 2 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Dugard) x x x. (pp. 346-7 of the Yale Law Journal of Intl
Law)peremptory norms manifestly clashed with other principles of general
international law. (See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of February 3, 2006), at 2 (Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Dugard)) Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed jus
cogens only once, in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it famously rejected the
argument that jus cogens violations would deprive a state of sovereign immunity. AlAdsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 61). (p. 32, Footnote 77 of the
28 April 2010 Decision)TABLE C:Comparison of Mark Elliss article in the Case

Western Reserve Journal of International Law, entitled Breaking the Silence: Rape
as an International Crime (2006-7), hereafter called Elliss work and the Supreme
Courts 28 April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary.
Mark
Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38 Case W. Res. J. Intl
L. 225 (2006-2007).Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
2010. 652652SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the
1.The concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new. This is not to say
that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war.[FN7] The 1863
Lieber Instructions, which codified customary inter-national law of land warfare,
classified rape as a crime of troop discipline.[FN8] It specified rape as a capital
crime punishable by the death penalty.[FN9] The 1907 Hague Convention
protected women by requiring the protection of their honour.[FN10] But modernday sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. [FN7]
For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce Prussia and the United States
provides that in time of war all women and children shall not be molested in their
persons. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of
Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8
TREATIES & OTHER INTL AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85, available at
xxx. [FN8] David Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian
Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clari-[FN65] The concept of rape as an international
crime is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically
prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did
not emerge until after World War II. xxx (For example, the Treaty of Amity and
Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all
women and children shall not be molested in their persons. The Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of
America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Intl Agreements
Of The U.S. 78, 85[)]. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of
troop discipline. (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the
death penalty (Id., at pp. 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected women by
requiring the protection of their honour. (Family honour and rights, the lives
fying the Doctrine, 15
DUKEJ. COMP. INTL L. 219, 224. [FN9] Id., at pp. 236. [FN10] Family honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
& Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm #art46. (p. 227 of the
Case Western Law Reserve Journal of Intl Law)of persons, and private property, as
well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907[)]. x x x.
(p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)2.After World War II, when the
Allies established the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The
article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was
not mentioned by name.[FN11] [FN11] See generally, Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. (p. 227 of the Case Western Law
Reserve Journal of Intl Law)[FN65] xxx In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape
was not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth
prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. xxx See Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. x x x. (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28
April 2010 Decision) 654654SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the
Castillo
3.The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and
rape was not prosecuted.[FN13] x x x.It was different for the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East.[FN15] xxx The Tribunal prosecuted
rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape.[FN17] The
Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and
Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including
rape, committed by persons under their authority.[FN18] [FN13] Judge Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena, 7 ILSA J. INTL COMP L. 667, at 676. [FN15] See Charter of
the International Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589. [FN17] See
McDonald, supra note 13, at 676. [FN18] THE TOKYO JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FAR EAST 445-54 (B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Ruter eds.,[FN65] x x x The
Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,The International Criminal Tribunals
Crime and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. Intl. Comp. L. 667,
676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape
crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East
Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign
Minister Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape,
committed by persons under their authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of
The International Military Tribunal For The Far East 445-54 (1977). x x x
1977). (p. 228 of the
Case Western Law Reserve Journal of Intl Law)(p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April
2010 Decision)4.The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December
1945 when Control Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of
crimes against humanity.[FN22] Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying
powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts. [FN22] Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10:
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53
(1946), avail-able at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccno10.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2003). This law set forth a uniform legal basis in Germany for the
prosecution of war criminals and similar offenders, other than those dealt with
under the International Military Tribunal. See Id., at pp. 50. [FN65] x x x The first
mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council
Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity.
Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to
establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals in German courts. (Control
Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946)) x x x (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28
April 2010 Decision) 656656SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the
Castillo (pp. 228-9 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of Intl Law) 5.The
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first
modern-day international instrument to establish protections against rape for
women.[FN23] However, the most important development in breaking the silence of
rape as an international crime has come through the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these Tribunals
have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as
genocide, a war crime, and a crime against humanity. x x x. [FN23] Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950)
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].(p. 229 of the Case Western Law Reserve
Journal of Intl Law)[FN65] x x x The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-day international instrument to
establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by
enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against humanity.
x x x. (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010 Decision)657VOL. 632,
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloForms of PlagiarismThere are many ways
by which plagiarism can be committed.4 For the purpose of this analysis, we used
the standard reference book prescribed for Harvard University students, Writing
with Sources by Gordon Harvey.Harvey identifies four forms of plagiarism:5 (a)
uncited data or information;6 (b) an uncited idea, whether a specific claim or general
concept;7 (c) an unquoted but verbatim phrase or passage;8 and (d) an uncited
structure or organizing strategy.9 He then explains how each form or mode of
plagiarism is committed. Plagiarism is committed in mode (a) by plagiarizing
information that is not common knowledge.10 Mode (b) is committed when
distinctive ideas are plagiarized, even though you present them in a different
order and in different words, because they are uncited.11Even if there has been a
prior citation, succeeding appropriations of an idea to make it appear as your own is
plagiarism, because the [previous] citation in [an earlier] passage is a deception.
Mode (c) is committed when you borrowed several distinctive phrases verbatim,
without quotation marks Mode (d) is committed when, though the words and
details are original, (y)ou have, however, taken the structural framework or outline
directly from the source passage even though, again, your language differs from
your source and your invented examples are original.12_______________4
Gordon Harvey, Writing with Sources: A Guide for Harvard Students (Hackett
Publishing Company, 2nd ed. [c] 2008).5 Id., at p. 32.6 Id., at p. 33.7 Id.8 Id., at p.
34.9 Id., at pp. 32-35.10 Id., at p. 32.11 Id., at p. 33.12 Harvey, supra at
32.658658SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the
Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloThese
forms of plagiarism can exist simultaneously in one and the same passage. There
may be a complete failure to use quotation marks in one part of the sentence or
paragraph while combining that part with phrases employing an uncited structure or
organizing strategy. There may be patchwork plagiarizing committed by collating
different works or excerpts from the same work without proper attribution.13These
acts of plagiarism can also be committed in footnotes in the same way and at the
same degree of unacceptability as plagiarized passages in the body. This is
especially frowned upon in footnotes that are discursive or content footnotes or
endnotes. Harvey explains that a discursive footnote or endnote is a note that
includes comments, not just publication information . . . when you want to tell your
reader something extra to the strict development of your argument, or incorporate
extra information about sources.14Violations of Rules againstPlagiarism in the
Vinuya DecisionBelow are violations of the existing rules against plagiarism that
can be found in the Vinuya decision. The alphanumeric tags correspond to the table
letter and row numbers in the tables provided above.A.1 Failure to use quotation
marks to indicate that the entire paragraph in the body of the decision on page 30
was not the ponentes original paragraph, but was lifted verbatim from Tamss work.
The attribution to Tams is wholly insufficient because without the quotation marks,
there is nothing to alert the reader that the paragraph was lifted verbatim from Tams.
The footnote leaves the reader with the impression that the said paragraph is the
authors own analysis of erga omnes._______________13 Id., at p. 32.14 Id., at p.
26.659VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010659In the Matter of the Charges of

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo The See
Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005) line in
footnote 69 of the Vinuya decision does not clearly indicate that the statement on
Simmas observation was lifted directly from Tamss work; it only directs the reader
to Tamss work should the reader wish to read further discussions on the
matter.B.1Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the two sentences were
not the ponentes, but were lifted verbatim from two non-adjoining sentences found
on pages 331 and 332 of the Yale Law Journal of International Law article of
Criddle & Fox-Decent and with absolutely no attribution to the latter.B.2 Failure
to use quotation marks to indicate that the sentence fragment on peremptory norms
was not the ponentes original writing, but was lifted verbatim from page 334 of the
Yale Law Journal of International Law article of Criddle & Fox-Decent with
absolutely no attribution to the authors.B.3Failure to use quotation marks to
indicate that the first sentence in discursive footnote number 71 was not the
ponentes idea, but was lifted verbatim from Criddle & Fox-Decents work at page
334.B.4 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the third sentence in
discursive footnote number 71 was not the ponentes idea, but was lifted from
Criddle & Fox-Decents work at 334-335.B.5Failure to indicate that one footnote
source in discursive footnote 71 was lifted verbatim from discursive footnote 9 of
Tams; thus, even the idea being propounded in this discursive part of footnote 71
was presented as the ponentes, instead of Criddles & Fox-Decents.B.6 Failure
to indicate that the last discursive sentence in footnote 71 and the citations thereof
were not the660660SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castilloponentes, but were lifted verbatim from footnote 9 of Criddle & FoxDecents work.B.7Failure to indicate that the first discursive sentence of footnote
72 was not the ponentes, but was lifted verbatim from page 335 of Criddle & FoxDecents work.B.8Failure to indicate that the second discursive sentence of
footnote 72 was not the ponentes, but was lifted verbatim from pages 335-336 of
Criddle and Fox-Decents work.B.9Failure to indicate that the citation and the
discursive passage thereon in the last sentence of footnote 72 was not the ponentes,
but was lifted verbatim from discursive footnote 18 of Criddle & Fox-Decents
work.B.10Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that a phrase in the body of
the decision on page 31 was not the ponentes, but was lifted verbatim from page
336 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.B.11Failure to indicate that the entirety of
discursive footnote 73 was not the ponentes, but was lifted verbatim from page 336
of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.B.12Failure to indicate that the idea of lack of
consensus on whether certain international norms had attained the status of jus
cogens was a paraphrase of a sentence combined with a verbatim lifting of a phrase
that appears on page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work and was not the ponentes
own conclusion. This is an example of patchwork plagiarism.B.13 Failure to
indicate that the entirety of discursive footnote 74 on page 31 of the Decision was
not the ponentes comment on the source cited, but was lifted verbatim from
footnote 23 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.661VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12,
Mariano C. Del CastilloB.14Failure to indicate through quotation marks and with
the proper attribution to Criddle that the first two sentences of page 32 were not the
ponentes, but were lifted verbatim from two non-adjoining sentences on pages 337338 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.B.15 Failure to indicate through quotation
marks and the right citation that the discursive sentence in the second paragraph of
footnote 77, and the citation therein, were not the ponentes, but were lifted verbatim
from page 346 of the body of Criddle & Fox-Decents work in the instance of the
discursive sentence, and from footnote 72 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work in the
instance of the case cited and the description thereof.B.16 Failure to indicate that
the choice of citation and the discursive thereon statement in the second sentence of
the second paragraph of discursive footnote 77 was not the ponentes, but was lifted
verbatim from footnote 72 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.B.17 Failure to
indicate through quotation marks and the right citations that the entirety of the
discursive third to fifth paragraphs of footnote 77 were not the product of the
ponentes own analysis and choice of sources, but were lifted verbatim from
footnotes 73 and 77 on pages 346-347 of Criddle & Fox-Decents work.C.1 to C.6
Failure to use quotation marks and the right citations to indicate that half of the
long discursive footnote 65, including the sources cited therein, was actually
comprised of the rearrangement, and in some parts, rephrasing of 18 sentences found
on pages 227-228 of Mr. Elliss work in Case Western Law Reserve Journal of
International Law.662662SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the
CastilloThis painstaking part-by-part analysis of the Vinuya decision is prompted by
the fact that so many, including international academicians, await the Courts action
on this plagiarism chargewhether it will in all candor acknowledge that there is a
set of conventions by which all intellectual work is to be judged and thus fulfill its
role as an honest court; or blind itself to the unhappy work of its member.The text of
the Decision itself reveals the evidence of plagiarism. The tearful apology of the
legal researcher to the family of the ponente and her acknowledgment of the gravity
of the act of omitting attributions is an admission that something wrong was
committed. Her admission that the correct attributions went missing in the process
of her work is an admission of plagiarism. The evidence in the text of the Vinuya
Decision and the acknowledgment by the legal researcher are sufficient for the
determination of plagiarism.The Place of the PlagiarizedPortions in the Vinuya
DecisionThe suspect portions of the majority decision start from the discursive
footnotes of the first full paragraph of page 27. In that paragraph, the idea sought to
be developed was that while rape and sexual slavery may be morally reprehensible
and impermissible by international legal norms, petitioners have failed to make the
logical leap to conclude that the Philippines is thus under international legal duty to
prosecute Japan for the said crime. The plagiarized work found in discursive
footnote 65 largely consists of the exposition by Mr. Ellis of the development of the
concept of rape as an international crime. The impression obtained by any reader is
that the ponente has much to say about how this crime evolved in international law,
and that he is an expert on this matter.There are two intervening paragraphs before
the next suspect portion of the decision. The latter starts from the second paragraph
on page 30 and continues all the way up to the first paragraph of page 32. The
discussion on the erga omnes663VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010663In the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castilloobligation of states almost cannot exist, or at the very least cannot be
sustained, without the plagiarized works of Messrs. Tams, Criddle and Decent-Fox.
There is basis to say that the plagiarism of this portion is significant.How the
Majority DecisionTreated the Specific Allegationsof PlagiarismThe majority
Decision narrates and explains:The researcher demonstrated by Power Point
presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of CriddleDescent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo,
were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her grievous
mistake and grief for having caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice
Del Castillo and his family.On the other hand, addressing the Committee in
reaction to the researchers explanation, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of
intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to
acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from anothers
work. Counsel invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, arguing
that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the
judiciary.x x x x x x x x x although Tams himself may have believed
that the footnoting in his case was not an appropriate form of referencing, he and
petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such
passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams work as his own. The Justice
primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom
Tam himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma,
Tams article as another source of those ideas.The Court believes that whether or
not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of
counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity
of664664SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the
writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in
International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams
thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution
altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged
passages as his own.That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the
pagination, and for every technical detail of form.x x xFootnote 65 appears down
the bottom of the page. Since the lengthily passages in that footnote came almost
verbatim from Ellis article, such passages ought to have been introduced by an
acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have
read:65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said.) x x xBut, as
it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from
Footnote 65.x x xAdmittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their
footnotes, from Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.
Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decisions own footnotes
but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.Unless amply
explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a courtemployed attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions,
originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which report
eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts,
she did her research electronically. For international665VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12,
Mariano C. Del Castillo materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an
online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court
subscribes.x x xWith the advent of computers, however as Justice Del Castillos
researcher also explained, most legal references, including the collection of
decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that
offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that
were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main
manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The
researchers technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a
carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the
kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a table. When ready, he
would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he
had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.Here, Justice
Del Castillos researcher did just that. She electronically cut relevant materials
from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main
manuscript in her computer that contained the Microsoft Word program. Later,
after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning
from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the
general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs,
sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her
chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computerliterate court researchers use everyday in their work.Justice Del Castillos
researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case
and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent
and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the
course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the
attributions.The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers
explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the three
authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in use
by the Court, the acciden-666666SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn
Del Castillotal decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not
remote.Contrary to the view of my esteemed colleagues, the above is not a fair
presentation of what happens in electronically generated writings aided by electronic
research.First, for a decision to make full attribution for lifted passages, one starts
with block quote formatting or the keying-in of quotation marks at the beginning
and at the end of the lifted passages. These keyed-in computer commands are not
easily accidentally deleted, but should be deliberately inputted where there is an
intention to quote and attribute.Second, a beginning acknowledgment or similar
introduction to a lengthy passage copied verbatim should not be accidentally
deleted; it must be deliberately placed.Third, the above explanation regarding the
lines quoted in A.1 in the majority Decision may touch upon what happened in
incident A.1, but it does not relate to what happened in incidents B.1 to C.6 of the
Tables of Comparison, which are wholesale lifting of excerpts from both the body
and the footnotes of the referenced works, without any attribution, specifically to the
works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis. While mention was made of Tamss
work, no mention was made at all of the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis
even though the discussions and analyses in their discursive footnotes were used
wholesale.Fourth, the researchers explanation regarding the accidental deletion of 2
footnotes out of 119 does not plausibly account for the extensive amount of text
used with little to no modifications from the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and
Ellis. As was presented in Tables B and C, copied text occurs in 22 instances in
pages 27, 31, and 32 of the Vinuya decision. All these instances of non-attribution
cannot be remedied by the reinstatement of 2 footnotes.Fifth, the mention of Tams in
See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005) in
footnote667VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010667In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo69 of the Vinuya
decision was not a mere insufficiency in clarity of writing, but a case of plagiarism
under the rule prohibiting the use of misleading citations.Sixth, the analogy that was
chosenthat of a carpenter who discards materials that do not fit into his carpentry
workis completely inappropriate. In the scheme of cutting and pasting that the
researcher did during her work, it is standard practice for the original sources of the
downloaded and copied materials to be regarded as integral parts of the excerpts, not
extraneous or ill-fitting. A computer-generated document can accommodate as many
quotation marks, explanatory notes, citations and attributions as the writer desires
and in multiple places. The limits of most desktop computer drives, even those used
in the Supreme Court, are in magnitudes of gigabytes and megabytes, capable of
accommodating 200 to 400 books per gigabyte (with each book just consuming
roughly 3 to 5 megabytes). The addition of a footnote to the amount of file space
taken up by an electronic document is practically negligible. It is not as if the
researcher lacked any electronic space; there was simply no attribution.Seventh,
contrary to what is implied in the statement on Microsoft Words lack of an alarm
and in paragraph 4 of the decretal portion of the majority Decision, no software
exists that will automatically type in quotation marks at the beginning and end of a
passage that was lifted verbatim; these attribution marks must be made with
deliberate effort by the human researcher. Nor can a software program generate the
necessary citations without input from the human researcher. Neither is there a builtin software alarm that sounds every time attribution marks or citations are deleted.
The best guarantee for works of high intellectual integrity is consistent, ethical
practice in the writing habits of court researchers and judges. All lawyers are
supposed to be knowledgeable on the standard of ethical practice, if they took their
legal research courses in law school and their undergraduate re-668668SUPREME
against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillosearch courses seriously. This
knowledge can be easily picked up and updated by browsing many free online
sources on the subject of writing standards. In addition, available on the market are
software programs that can detect some, but not all, similarities in the phraseology
of a work-in-progress with those in selected published materials; however, these
programs cannot supply the citations on their own. Technology can help diminish
instances of plagiarism by allowing supervisors of researchers to make partial audits
of their work, but it is still the human writer who must decide to give the proper
attribution and act on this decision.Plagiarism and Judicial PlagiarismPlagiarism is
an act that does not depend merely on the nature of the object, i.e. what is
plagiarized, but also hinges on the process, i.e. what has been done to the object. The
elements of this process are the act of copying the plagiarized work and the
subsequent omission in failing to attribute the work to its author.15 Plagiarism thus
does not consist solely of using the work of others in ones own work, but of the
former in conjunction with the failure to attribute said work to its rightful owner and
thereby, as in the case of written work, misrepresenting the work of another as ones
own. As the work is anothers and used without attribution, the plagiarist derives the
benefit of use from the plagiarized work without expending the requisite effort for
the sameat a cost (as in the concept of opportunity cost) to its author who could
otherwise have gained credit for the work and whatever compensation for its use is
deemed appropriate and necessary.If the question of plagiarism, then, turns on a

failure of attribution, judicial plagiarism in the case at bar arises when judges
author opinions that employ materials from copy-_______________15 Stuart P.
Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Observations on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 Hastings L. J. 167,
at 173.669VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010669In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillorighted sources
such as law journals or books, but neglect to give credit to the author.16 Doing so
effectively implies the staking of a claim on the copied work as the judges own.17
Note that there is no requirement of extent of copying or a minimum number of
instances of unattributed usage for an act to be considered a plagiarist act, nor is the
intent to deceive or to copy without attribution a prerequisite of plagiarism. In
Durshts exhaustive analysis of judicial plagiarism she cites the case of Newman v.
Burgin18 wherein the court said that plagiarism may be done through negligence or
recklessness without intent to deceive.19 Dursht in addition notes that intent may
also be taken as the intent to claim authorship of the copied work, whether or not
there was intent to deceive, citing Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton
Univ.20George describes the following among the types of judicial
plagiarism:Borrowed Text:When quoting a legal periodical, law review, treatise or
other such source, the judicial writer must surround the borrowed text with quotation
marks or use a block quote. . . . Additionally, the source should be referenced in the
text . . .Using anothers language verbatim without using quotation marks or a block
quote is intentional, as opposed to unintentional, plagiarism._______________16
Jaime S. Dursht, Judicial Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use but Is It Ethical?, 18
Cardozo L. Rev. 1253, at 1.17 Joyce C. George, Judicial Plagiarism, Judicial
Opinion Writing Handbook, <http://books.google.com.ph/books?
id=7jBZ4yjmgXUC&pg=PR1&hl=en&lpg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false>
(accessed on 10/12/2010).18 Newman v. Burgin, 930

F.2d 955 (1st Cir.) as cited in Dursht, supra at 4 and
note 60.19 Newman v. Burgin, id., at p. 962 as cited in
Dursht, id., at p. 4 and note 61.20 453 A.2d 279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) as cited in Dursht, supra at 1
and note 6.670670SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,
etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
CastilloReference errors: The judge may fail to put
quotation marks around a clause, phrase or paragraph
that is a direct quote from anothers writing even
though he cites the author correctly. This is plagiarism
even though it may be inadvertent.21While indeed

the notion of having committed judicial plagi
achievement23 to the extent of rescinding or denying degrees. In the case of law
sm may be unsettling to contemplate, as it may raise
hindered due_______________21 George, supra at p. 715.22 Id., at pp. 707-708.23
students who do manage to obtain their degrees, their admission to the bar may be
in the mind of a judge the question of his or her own

culpability22, it is a grievous mistake to overlook the
Dursht, supra note 16 at p. 5.671VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010671In the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castilloto
questions about their character or fit ness
to practice law.24
possibility of the commission of judicial plagiarism or
Indeed, plagiarism, due to the severity of the penalties
the fact that judicial plagiarism is categorized by its
it may incur, is often identified with the punishment of
very definition as a subset of plagiarism. That a judge,
academic
in lifting words from a source and failing to attribute
harshness of the sanctions it imposes with the
said words to said source in the writing of a decision,
seriousness of the offense: plagiarism is seen not only
committed specifically judicial plagiarism does not
to
derogate from the nature of the act as a plagiarist act.
scholarship, but also to deprive the rightful author of
Nor does any claim of inadvertence or lack of intent in
what is often one of the most valuable currencies in
the
the
the academe: credit for intellectual achievementan
characterization of the act as plagiarism.Penalties for
act of debasing the coinage, as it were. Thus the rules
Plagiarism
academe,
of many academic institutions sanctioning plagiarism
plagiarism is generally dealt with severely when found
as a violation of academic ethics and a serious offense
out; many universities have policies on plagiarism
often classed under the broader heading of academic
detailing the sanctions that may be imposed on
dishonesty.The imposition of sanctions for acts of
students who are found to have plagiarized in their
judicial plagiarism, however, is not as clear-cut. While
coursework and other academic requirements. These
George recognizes the lack of attribution as the
run the gamut from an automatic failing grade in the
fundamental mark of judicial plagiarism, she notes in
course for which the offending work was submitted, or in more
the same breath that the act is without legal
commission
of
andJudicial
plagiarist
act
PlagiarismIn
change
the
egregious cases, outright expulsion from the university. Sanctions for plagiarism in
the academe operate through the denial of certification or recognition of
death.25
undermine
the
The
academe
credibility
and
justifies
importance
the
of
sanction.26 Past instances of censure notwithstanding
(as in examples of condemnation of plagiarism cited
obligations, it may become imperative for the judge to use the legal reasoning and
by Lebovits et al.,27 most particularly the censure of
language [of others e.g. a supervising court or a law review article] for resolution of
the actions of the judge who plagiarized a law-review
the dispute.31 Although these obligations of the judicial writer must be

acknowledged, care should be taken to consider that said obligations do not negate
article in Brennan28; the admonition issued by the
the need for attribution so as to avoid the commission of judicial plagiarism. Nor do
Canadian
in
said obligations diminish the fact that judicial plagiarism detracts directly from the
the_______________24 In re Widdison, 539 N.W.2d 671
legitimacy of the judges ruling and indirectly from the judiciarys legitimacy32 or
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
(S.D. 1995) at 865, as cited in Dursht, id., at p. 5 and

note
92.25
Rebecca
Moore
Howard,
Plagiarisms,
that it falls far short of the high ethical standards to which judges must adhere33.
The lack of definitiveness in sanctions for judicial plagiarism may also be due to the
reluctance of judges themselves to confront the issue of plagiarism in the context of
Authorships, and the Academic Death Penalty, 57
judicial writing; the apprehension caused by feelings of guilt being due to the
College English 7 (Nov., 1995), at 788-806, as cited in
possibility that plagiarism has unknowingly or intentionally been committed and a
the
traditional hesitance to consider plagiarism as being applicable to judicial
JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org./stable/378403
(accessed on 02/05/2009, 17:56) 789.26 George, supra
writings.34_______________29 Apotex Inc. v. Janssen-Ortho Inc., 2009, as cited

in Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed, 22 No. 4 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 15, 1.30
note 17 at p. 715.27 Klinge v. Ithaca College, 634
Richard A. Posner, The Little Book of Plagiarism, 22 (2007), and Terri LeClercq,
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1995), Napolitano v. Trustees of
Failure to Teach: Due Process and Law School Plagiarism, 49 J. Legal Educ., 240
Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 279, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
(1999), as cited in Carol M. Bast and Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism and Legal
Div. 1987), and In Re: Brennan, 447 N.W.2d 712, 713-14 (Mich.
1949), as cited in Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical
Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 264, note
190.28 See In re Brennan, 447 N.W.2d 712, 713-14 (Mich. 1989) as cited in
Lebovits, et al., supra at note 191.672672SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillocase of Apotex29) there is still no strictly prevailing
consensus regarding the need or obligation to impose sanctions on judges who have
committed acts of judicial plagiarism. This may be due in a large part to the absence
of expectations of originality in the decisions penned by judges, as courts are
required to consider and usually . . . follow precedent.30 In so fulfilling her
Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual Honesty,
57 Cath. U.L. Rev. 777, note 85.31 George, supra note 17 at p. 708.32 Lebovits,
supra at p. 265.33 See generally Dursht; supra note 16; and Lebovits, supra.34
George, supra note 17 at p. 707.673VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010673In the Matter
CastilloFindings of judicial plagiarism do not necessarily carry with them the
imposition of sanctions, nor do they present unequivocal demands for rehearing or
the reversal of rulings. In Liggett Group, Inc., et al v Harold M. Engle, M.D. et
al.35, a U.S. tobacco class action suit, [the] plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for
rehearing alleging that the appellate opinion copied large portions of the defendants
briefs. . . . without attribution. The result of this, the plaintiffs claimed, was the
creation of the appearance of impropriety, the abdication of judicative duties, the
relinquishing of independence to defendants, the failure to maintain impartiality, and
for part of the work. That would have been a very interesting argument to consider.
therefore, as an act of judicial plagiarism, was a misrepresentation of the facts
But ignorance is not pleaded here, nor is the inability to supervise a legal researcher
found by the trial court and denied plaintiffs due process of law.36 The three-judge
pleaded to escape liability on the part of the ponente. Rather, the defense was that no
panel denied the motion. In addition, courts generally have been reluctant to
plagiarism existed. This conclusion however is unacceptable for the reasons stated
reverse for the verbatim adoption of prepared findings.37 In Anderson v. City of
above.As noted above, writers have ventured to say that the reluctance to address
Bessemer City, North Carolina38 it was held that even though the trial judges
judicial plagiarism may stem from fear, nay, guilt.40 Fear that the judge who says
findings of fact may have been adopted verbatim from the prevailing party, the
plagiarism was committed by another is himself guilty of plagiarism. But that is
findings may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.39On Guilt and HypocrisyIt is
neither here nor there. We must apply the conventions against judicial plagiarism
not hypocrisy, contrary to what is implied in a statement in the majority Decision, to
because we must, having taken on that obligation when the Court took cognizance of
make a finding of plagiarism when plagiarism exists. To conclude thus is to
the plagiarism complaint, not because any one of us is error-free. In fact, the
condemn_______________35 Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla.
statement on hypocrisy in the majority Decision_______________40 See Stuart P.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003), as cited in Bast and Samuels, supra at note 102.36 Id.37
Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Observations on the Use of
Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d at 363, as cited in Roger J. Miner, Judicial
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 Hastings L. J. 167;
Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends, 32 Hofstra Law Rev. 1135,
and Peter Shaw, Plagiary, 51 Am. Scholar 325, 328 (1982); and Green, supra at 180
note 154.38 Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985) as cited in
as cited in George, supra at note 1.675VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010675In the
Miner, id.39 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., p. 656, and United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, p. 615, as cited in George, supra note 17 at p.
Castillobetrays prejudgment of the complainants as hypocrites, and a complaint
719.674674SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the
against a sitting judge for plagiarism would appear impossible to win.In a certain
Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
sense, there should have been less incentive to plagiarize law review articles because
Castillowholesale all the academic thesis committees, student disciplinary tribunals
the currency of judges is stare decisis. One wonders how the issue should have been
and editorial boards who have made it their business to ensure that no plagiarism is
treated had what was plagiarized been a court ruling, but that is not at issue here.
tolerated in their institutions and industry. In accepting those review and quality
The analysis in this opinion is therefore confined to the peculiar situation of a judge
control responsibilities, they are not making themselves out to be error-free, but
who issues a decision that plagiarizes law review articles, not to his copying of
rather, they are exerting themselves to improve the level of honesty in the original
precedents or parts of the pleadings of the parties to a case.As earlier said, a
works generated in their institution so that the coinage and currency of intellectual
determination of the existence of plagiarism in decision-making is not conclusive on
lifeoriginality and the attribution of originalityis maintained. The incentive
the disciplinary measure to be imposed. Different jurisdictions have different
system of intellectual creation is made to work so that the whole society benefits
treatments. At the very least however, the process of rectification must start from an
from the encouraged output.In the case of judicial plagiarism, it is entirely possible
acknowledgment and apology for the offense. After such have been done, then
for judges to have violated the rules against plagiarism out of ignorance or from the
consideration of the circumstances that mitigate the offense are weighed. But not
sheer fact that in order to cope with their caseloads, they have to rely on researchers
before then.The Unfortunate Result ofthe Majority DecisionUnless reconsidered,
this Court would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made malicious
intent an indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying
Castillo4.That court attorneys should be provided with the appropriate manuals on
errors an exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its
writing and legal citation, and should be informed that the excerpts complained of
ruling applies only to situations of judicial decision-making or to other written
and described in Tables A, B, and C of this opinion are acts of plagiarism and not
intellectual activity. It will also weaken this Courts disciplinary authoritythe
mere editing errors or computer-generated mistakes;5. That the refusal of the
essence of which proceeds from its moral authorityover the bench and bar. In a
majority to pronounce that plagiarism was committed by Justice del Castillo means
real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability to positively educate and
that any judicial opinion on his liability or that of his researcher would be academic
influence the future of intellectual and academic discourse.676676SUPREME
and speculative, a ruling which this Dissenting Opinion will not venture to make a
pronouncement on; and6.That a copy of this Dissenting Opinion should be
against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del CastilloThe Way ForwardAssuming that
circulated by the Public Information Office in the same manner as the Majority
the Court had found that judicial plagiarism had indeed been committed in the
Decision to the complaining authors Christian J. Tams, Mark Ellis, Evan Criddle and
Vinuya decision, the Court could then have moved to the next logical question: what
Evan Fox-Decent.Charges of plagiarism dismissed.Note.Under Section 1, Rule 36
then is the legal responsibility of the ponente of the Vinuya decision for having
of the Rules of Court, judges are mandated to directly prepare a judgment or final
passed on to the Court en banc a ponencia that contains plagiarized parts?There
order determining the merits of the case, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
would have been at that point two possible choices for the Court vis--vis the
law on which it is based; A judge who holds a position of responsibility cannot hide
ponenteto subject him to disciplinary measures or to excuse him. In order to
behind the irresponsibility of the branch clerk of court because the latter is not the
determine whether the acts committed would have warranted discipline, the Court
guardian of his responsibilities. (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613
should have laid down the standard of diligence and responsibility that a judge has
[2008])o0o...Page Edit Line Bottom
over his actions, as well as the disciplinary measures that are available and
appropriate.The Court could also have chosen to attribute liability to the researcher
who had admitted to have caused the plagiarism. In In re Hinden, disciplinary
G.R. No. 187512.June 13, 2012.*REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
measures
review
vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, respondent.Civil Law; Family Code;
articles.41Response to the DecretalPortion of the Majority DecisionIn view of the
were
imposed
on
an
attorney
who
plagiarized
law
Declaration of Presumptive Death; Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code
above, it is my opinion:1.That Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and his unnamed
provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
researcher have committed plagiarism in the drafting and passing on of the ponencia
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
in the Vinuya decision;2.That this Court should request Justice del Castillo to
executory.Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code
acknowledge the plagiarism and apologize to the complaining authors for his
provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
mistake;3.That this Court should cause the issuance of a corrected version of the
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
Vinuya decision in the form of a Corrigendum;_______________41 In re Hinden,
executory.Civil Procedure; Appeals; Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing
654 A.2d 864 (1995) (U.S.A.).677VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010677In the Matter
party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground that, in rendering
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.PETITION for review on
judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the
lack of jurisdiction.In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
opinion of the Court.434434SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRepublic
losing_______________*
13,
vs. Granada Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Ramoncito M. Chavez
2012433Republic vs. Granada party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
for respondent.SERENO,J.:This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.In
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paraaque where
dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on
both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was
3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean
immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.Civil
Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed
Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death; Requisites for the declaration
down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
of presumptive death under the Family Code.The four requisites for the
time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows: 1. That the
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.After nine (9) years of waiting,
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4.
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead._______________1 Rollo, pp. 30-
presumptive death of the absentee.Civil Procedure; Immutability of Final
33. The Court of Appeals Fifth Division Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 was
Judgments; Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Justices Jose
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.The RTC ruling on the issue
C. Reyes, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro.2 Rollo, pp. 35-36.435VOL. 672, JUNE 13,
of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that her absent
2012435Republic vs. GranadaOn 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to
Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
the motion.Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA,
SECOND
DIVISION.433VOL.
672,
JUNE
presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a
subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
is unavailing.We affirm the CA ruling.Article 41 of the Family Code provides:Art.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41.A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the_______________5 Supra note
is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.In its 23 January 2009
3.437VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012437Republic vs. Granada celebration of the
Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a
and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
upon notice to the parties.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was
of only two years shall be sufficient.For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4Hence, the present
marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
Rule 45 Petition.Issues1.Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to
(Underscoring supplied.)Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of
the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal._______________3 489
an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article
Phil. 761; 449 SCRA 57 (2005).4 Rollo, pp. 35-36.436436SUPREME COURT
41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family
REPORTS ANNOTATEDRepublic vs. Granada2.Whether the CA seriously erred
Code.Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial
in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247,
under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
which provide:Art.238.Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
presentedOur Ruling1.On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to
without regard to technical rules.xxxxxxxxxArt. 247.
the par-ties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appealIn the assailed Resolution
The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.Further, Article
dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of
253 of the Family Code reads:ART.253.The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69,
41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,5 the appellate court
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.Taken together, Articles 41, 238,
noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of
247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall
RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties,
be immediately final and executory.438438SUPREME COURT REPORTS
by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not
ANNOTATEDRepublic vs. GranadaIn Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic
likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition
petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held
Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter
Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not
elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the
required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.We
Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section
ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court
247, Family Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.xxx
in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the
xxxxxxBut, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance
Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its
of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7,
ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial
2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course
under Article 41 of the Family Code was_______________8 The case cited Rule 41,
thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should
Sec. 2(a), which reads:SEC.2.Modes of appeal.(a)Ordinary appeal.The
have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.Justice (later Chief Justice)
appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.In the
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in
present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served
later.In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of
in like manner. (Underscoring supplied.)440440SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner
ANNOTATEDRepublic vs. Granada intended to set the records straight and for the
Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
future guidance of the bench and the bar.At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this
disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the_______________6
Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary
Supra note 3.7 497 Phil. 528; 458 SCRA 200 (2005).439VOL. 672, JUNE 13,
proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9This case
2012439Republic vs. Granada Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be
presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous
reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or
decisions thereon.Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:ART.238. Until modified
Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same
by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.In turn, Article
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final
253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.2. On whether the CA
three of the same title. It states:ART.253.The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3
seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Pre-
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69,
sumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evi-dence that
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)In plain
respondent had presentedPetitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for
text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:ART.247. The judgment of
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground
the court shall be immediately final and executory.By express provision of law, the
that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by 442442SUPREME
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRepublic vs. GranadaArticle 41 of the Family
courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,10 United States v. Biasbas11 and
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.In Nolasco,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse
petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of
of discretion_______________9 G.R. No. 161062, 31 July 2009, 594 SCRA
respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a
560.441VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012441Republic vs. Granada amounting to lack of
British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to their
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with
son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner
the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original
Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
able to establish his well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead, as
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles
the proper subject of an appeal.In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison,_______________10 G.R. No. 94053,
losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 20.11 25 Phil. 71 (1913).12 513 Phil. 391; 477 SCRA
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
277 (2005).13 Art.83.Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:(1) The
matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or(2) The first spouse had been absent
of Court.Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
determining the existence of a well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage,
Code:For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
a competent court.443VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012443Republic vs. Granada the
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.The spouse present is, thus,
Family Code provision prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is
burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of
a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:1. That the absent spouse
belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en
has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
motivos racionales.Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which
down in Article 391, Civil Code;2.That the present spouse wishes to remarry;3.
may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and4.
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
presumptive death of the absentee.In evaluating whether the present spouse has been
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to
able to prove the existence of a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found
competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.The belief of the
to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.In
present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
the fact of her absence.Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro,
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the
by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)Applying the
ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a well-founded
foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
belief that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Petition, and provided the following criteria for_______________14
The case
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from
originated from a bigamy suit against defendant Biasbas, whose defense was that he
the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados
contracted a second marriage on the good faith belief that his first wife was already
testi-445VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012445Republic vs. Granadamony. In short,
dead.444444SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRepublic vs. Granada
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner
argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.The Republics arguments are well-
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Republic vs.
taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.The RTC ruling on the
Granada, 672 SCRA 432(2012)]
issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
G.R. No. 166357.September 19, 2011.*VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs.
Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.Family Code; Annulment of Marriage;
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; The
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.15WHEREFORE, premises
burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff; The psychological
considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Carpio
incurable.Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
(Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur. Resolutions affirmed.Notes.
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving
No appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
Code. (Republic vs. Tango, 594 SCRA 560 [2009])_______________15 Chan-Tan
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
v. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, 25 February 2010, 613 SCRA 592.446446SUPREME
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem
COURT
must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDRepublic
vs.
GranadaThe
doctrine
of
immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisionssince the

present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine
or principle, the judgment
rendered by the Special Third Division may be
considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final; A decision rendered

by a Division of the Supreme Court in violation of Section 4(3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalidany entry of
judgment may thus be said to be inefficacious since the decision is void for being
unconstitutional. (Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr., 643 SCRA 23 [2011])o0o ...Page
Edit Line Bottom
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.Even assuming arguendo
that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
legal
separation,
but
it
does
not
necessarily
constitute
psychological
incapacity.PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Erlando A.
Abrenica and Jose Mari S. Velez, Jr. for petitioner. Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez &
Bretaa for respondent._______________* FIRST DIVISION.823Kalaw vs.
US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with
Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19, 2011823DEL CASTILLO,J.:A finding of
Malyn.Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and
psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to
plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of these facts.Before the
Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends
Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004
because of alleged weekend plans with their father.11Complaint for declaration of
Decision2 and December 15, 2004 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which
nullity of marriageOn July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his
reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein parties marriage. The
wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
fallo of the assailed Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and
36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for
to per-_______________6 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 11-12.7 Social Case
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.4Factual
Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.8 Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and
AntecedentsPetitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena
13; id., at pp. 213 and 215.9 Dr. Dayans Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 7; id.,
Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually
at p. 259.10 Id., at pp. 10-11; id., at p. 259.11 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 23-24;
married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
Dr. Dayans Psychological Evaluation Report, pp. 7-8; Records, Vol. I, p. 259.12 Id.,
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro
at pp. 1-4.825Kalaw vs. Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19, 2011825form and comply
(Jay).Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.5In May
He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-
children with Tyrone.6_______________1 Rollo, pp. 26-56.2 Id.,
at pp. 9-20;
habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:1. she left the children without
penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Associate
proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;2. she left the
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Vicente Q. Roxas.3 Id., at pp. 22-23.4 CA
house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 19.5 Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p.
day; and3.she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered
216.824824SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDMeanwhile, Tyrone
in flagrante delicto.13During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.7In 1990, Tyrone
alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law,
went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four
Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that
children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a
Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he
househelp and a driver.8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the
proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.15 At rebuttal, Tyrone
children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody
elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was
agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.9In 1994, the two elder
lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge
children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week
Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental
vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the
rights.16 They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.Tyrone
presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
2011827familial duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological
as grave and incurable.24He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial
incapacity._______________13 Id., at p. 2; Petitioners Memorandum in JDRC
transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert
Case No. 3100, records, Vol. II, pp. 306-307.14 The case proceeded to trial after the
witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual
fiscal manifested to the court that there was no collusion between the parties
allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to
(Records, Vol. I, p. 45).15 TSN dated January 5, 1995, pp. 16-17.16 Id., at pp. 17-
do so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual
18.826826SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Dr. Gates explained on
allegations are indeed true.Malyns versionMalyn denied being psychologically
the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behaviorher sexual
incapacitated.27 While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friendsmay
frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times
reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a person is
a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.28 And in those instances, she
obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.18
always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their
Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19Dr. Gates
respective yayas with her.29 She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as
reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her
mother and wife.Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She,
marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the
however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.30
psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset
model.20Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with
that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read
instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes
the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.21Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates
on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another
assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform
beating,_______________23 Id., at pp. 30-31.24 Id., at pp. 26-27.25 Id., at pp. 22-
her marital duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her
23.26 Id., at p. 23.27 Records, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.28 TSN dated July 8, 1998, pp. 5-
role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
7.29 Id., at pp. 6-7.30 TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 12-13.828828SUPREME
point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDMalyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her
secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her
mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her
familys needs.Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with
mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.31 She never returned to their
friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological
conjugal home.Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes,
incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that
detriment of ones_______________17 Psychological Report, Records, Vol. I, pp.
Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.32Malyn
173-175.18 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 6-7.19 Id., at p. 7.20 Psychological
denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at
Report, Records, Vol. I, pp. 174-175.21 TSN dated February 15, 1995, p. 4.22 TSN
the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She
dated June 17, 1998, p. 24.827Kalaw vs. Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19,
admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room,
but maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the
interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fundancing, drinking, or
letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.34After the Hyatt
simply flirting.Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn
Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in
adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved
school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal
issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work
separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently
and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns
dismissed for lack of interest).As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it
and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they
was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his
experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to
drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn
avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual personalities broke through,
presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.Dr. Dayan
precipitating the demise of their marriage.38_______________36 Dr. Dayans
interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological
Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 13; id., at p. 259.37 Id., at pp. 4-6; id.38 Id., at
evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal
pp. 17-18; id.; TSN dated March 14, 1996, p. 10.830830SUPREME COURT
that
her
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation
mahjong_______________31 Id., at pp. 11-12.32 Id., at pp. 9-11.33 Id., at pp. 15-
Tyrone
found
Malyn
lousy
mother
because
of
report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
17.34 Id., at pp. 17-18.35 Records, Vol. I, p. 21.829Kalaw vs. Fernandez,
compulsiveness.39On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011829habit,36 while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual
relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with
infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone
her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to
their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage.
Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41Childrens
Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:The marriage of Tyrone and
versionThe children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for
Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for
their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to
marriage even after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn
White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them
first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his
reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.The two elder kids remembered the
overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the minute
fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing
she started to care, she became a different personclingy and immature, doubting
physical abuse inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person
the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.43The children recalled
in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was
living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their
when she begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus
dad was abroad.44 While they did not live with their mother while
on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to
they_______________39 TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.40 Id., at p. 15.41 TSN
Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted
dated March 14, 1996, p. 12.42 Social Case Study Report, p. 13 (Records, Vol. I, p.
that when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His
215); Dr. Dayans Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 9 (Records, Vol. I, p. 259).43
TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 6; Dr. Dayans Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 9
Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children
(Id.); Rios deposition, p. 3 (Id., at p. 356).44 Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and
clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend
13; Records, Vol. I, pp. 213 and 215.831Kalaw vs. Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19,
custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their
2011831were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother
needs and to devote time with them.51On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of
took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common
the children since the couples de facto separation, simply left the children for
recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of
several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his
them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.45Other witnessesDr. Cornelio
second family abroad.52 The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his
Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for
second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during
the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was
the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable
commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.46 He likewise testified that
parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded._______________50
Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.47Malyns brother,
Tyrone alleges that he married Jocelyn Quejano in 1990 in California, United States
Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie
of America after divorcing with Malyn also in California sometime in 1987. There
in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor
is, however, no documentary evidence of the divorce and remarriage. There is no
Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing
allegation that Tyrone had obtained American citizenship and is indicated in the
Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who
Social Case Study Report as a Filipino citizen (Records, Vol. I, p. 219).51 Social
was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they
Case Study Report, pp. 19-20; id., at pp. 221-222.52 Id.; id.833Kalaw vs. Fernandez,
would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011833Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53After summarizing
friend afterwards.49Social workerThe trial court ordered the court social worker,
the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the
minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children
Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:From the
Miggy/Mickey and Jay;_______________45 TSN dated June 8, 1995, p. 9; Social
evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to
Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 19 (Id., at pp. 213 and 221).46 TSN dated November
perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
20, 1995, pp. 15 and 21.47 Id., at pp. 8-10.48 TSN dated January 4, 1996, pp. 4-6.49
parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails.
TSN dated April 2, 1998, pp. 18-20.832832SUPREME COURT REPORTS
They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the
ANNOTATEDTyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyns only
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive
education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the
children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family members
ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established
themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise
and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.54The trial court then declared
better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after
the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.55_______________53 Records, Vol. II, pp. 382-389; penned by Judge Jose
NPD;61_______________56 CA Rollo, pp. 262-273.57 CA Decision, p. 7; CA
R. Hernandez of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.54 RTC
Rollo, p. 268.58 Id., at p. 11; id., at p. 272.59 CA Rollo, pp. 281-298.60 Id., at pp.
Decision, pp. 7-8; id., at pp. 388-389.55 The fallo reads:WHEREFORE,
the
310-311.61 Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 23-26; Rollo, pp. 606-609.835Kalaw vs.
marriage between petitioner Valerio Kalaw and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19, 2011835 b)these expert witnesses proved that
celebrated on November 4, 1976 is declared void ab initio pursuant to the provisions
respondents NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her
of Article 36 of the Family Code, and of no further effect.The
provisions of
essential martial obligations;62 andc)that respondents NPD existed at the time of
Article[s] 50, 51, and 52 of the Family Code of the Philippines relative to the
the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
delivery of their childrens presumptive legitime shall not apply because parties
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.63Petitioner stresses that
were not able to prove the existence of any conjugal partnership of gains.Upon
even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological
finality of this Decision, furnish a copy each to the Office of the Local Civil
incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.64Respondents argumentsRespondent
Registrar of Pasig City and the National Statistics Office, Quezon City for their
maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged
appropriate
(Id.;
psychological incapacity.65 She argues that the testimonies of her children and the
id.)834834SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuling of the Court of
action
findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and
Appeals56Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent
trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties
and irresponsible.66She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth.
allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover,
psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity
her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave
and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most,
and incurable.67 Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on
there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.57 Moreover, the
Tyrones version of the facts.68Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the
psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not
trial
explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
support_______________62 Id., at pp. 13-20; id., at pp. 596-603.63 Id., at pp. 20-
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of
22; id., at pp. 603-605.64 Id., at pp. 26-27; id., at pp. 609-610.65 Respondents
marriage.58Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on
Memorandum, p. 2; id., at p. 551.66 Id., at pp. 17-18; id., at pp. 566-567.67 Id., at p.
December 15, 2004.60Petitioners argumentsPetitioner Tyrone argues that the CA
19; id., at p. 568.68 Id., at p. 20; id., at p. 569.836836SUPREME COURT
erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is
REPORTS ANNOTATEDits conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual
in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented
findings.Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had
preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw
perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates
Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing the
and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity,
possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones
self-obsession
psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with
and
consistent
with
self-centeredness
this
were
Decision.SO
manifestations
ORDERED.
of
respondents
court
Decision
is
intrinsically
defective
for
failing
to
justice.70 Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20,
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.For instance, petitioner
2010 Resolution.71IssueWhether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent
alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a
suffers from psychological incapacityOur RulingThe petition has no merit. The CA
result. Re-_______________72 Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502; 470 SCRA
committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of
508, 525 (2005), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678; 268 SCRA
legal and factual basis.A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed
198, 211 (1997).73 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676; 268 SCRA
by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:ART. 36. A marriage contracted
198, 209 (1997).74 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39; 240 SCRA 20, 33-
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
34
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
even
its
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
solemnization.Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital_______________69 Rollo, pp.
was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
650-654.70 Respondents Manifestation, p. 2; id., at p. 651.71 Rollo, p.
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
662.837Kalaw vs. Fernandez, SEPTEMBER 19, 2011837obligations.72 The burden
that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong
that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem
respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
incurable.74In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed
that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect
expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated,
on the children were not proven.Also unproven was petitioners claim about
but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior
respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to
relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.But
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another
petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
if
such
incapacity
becomes
manifest
only
after
(1995).838838SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDspondent
legal
separation,
but
it
does
not
necessarily
constitute
psychological
affirmed.Note.A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
incapacity.Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in
personalities does not equate to psychological incapacity. (Halili vs. Santos-Halili,
the behaviors described as constitutive of839Kalaw vs. Fernandez, SEPTEMBER
551 SCRA 576 [2008])o0o _______________** In lieu of Associate
19, 2011839NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13,
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
2011....Page Edit Line Botto
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was
not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when
they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of
familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both
failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their
academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.After poring over the records of the case,
the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There
is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the
veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for
its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.What transpired between the parties
is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be
grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court
of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CAG.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.840840SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED SO ORDERED.Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Perez,** JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution
G.R. No. 190710.June 6, 2011.*JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S.

LUCAS, respondent.Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; An order denying a
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the meritsas such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion
to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders
denying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates
nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial
of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari,
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal
unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court
has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to
dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.Same;
Jurisdiction; A petition directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns
the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.An action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem
proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest
names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the thing
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
itself or the res,_______________* SECOND DIVISION.668668SUPREME
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. Lucaswhich concerns the status of a
file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he669VOL. 650, JUNE 6,
in the birth certificate, is an action in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over
2011669Lucas vs. Lucas has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has
the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.Same;
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
Same; Same; A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by
To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in
the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name
the power of the court is recognized and made effective.Same; Same; Filiation; Due
of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service
Process; A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in remby the
of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking
simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the Regional
relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
Trial Court (RTC), which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
opportunity to contest it. In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice
petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case; If at all, service of
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication
summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the
of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the
court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.The
trial court.Same; Same; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Cause of Action;
herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple
Elements; A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement
filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
of the cause of action inadequate.The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a
objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all
cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission
notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
of the defendant in violation of said legal right.Same; Same; Same; Paternity;
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but
Evidence; A party is confronted by the so-called procedural aspects in a paternity
case during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidencethey
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which,
proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable
allegations in the initiatory pleading.The statement in Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA
cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
197 (2005), that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explainedAlthough a
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects
paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
during trial, 670670SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs.
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
Lucaswhen the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are re-671VOL.
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a
650, JUNE 6, 2011671Lucas vs. Lucasquired, but those jurisdictions have almost
paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and
also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the
find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.Same; Same; Same;
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; Paternity; Searches and Seizures; In some
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
foreign states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under
order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our
their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
order to be valid, hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.PETITION for review on
cause; The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
the putative father from mere harassment suitsthus, during the hearing on the
stated in the opinion of the Court. Cruz, Neria & Carpio Law Offices for petitioner.
motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the petitioner must present prima
Punzalan, Lising & Punsalan for respondent. Ramirez, Lazaro and Associates Law
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.In some states, to
Office co-counsel for respondent.NACHURA,J.:Is a prima facie showing
warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing
The facts are
with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of
59.673VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011673Lucas vs. Lucasfiliation. His counsel therefore
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December
went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the
17, 2009.The antecedents of the case are, as follows:_______________1 Penned by
petition.Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez,
Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in
Jr. and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring; Rollo, pp. 35-46.672672SUPREME
form and substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. LucasOn July 26, 2007, petitioner,
anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also
Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for
directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother,
furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and
Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain Ate
represent the State in the case.On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the
Belen (Belen) who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would
September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He
oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate relationship
petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969,
served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required,
she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not
he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4)
stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner
notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the
that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San
confidentiality of the subject matter.4On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a
Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship
Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature;
of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of support
hence, he should be served with summons.After learning of the September 3, 2007
and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie
Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the
made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in
petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have
vain.Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live
personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing
birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing
cannot be had on_______________3 Penned by Executive Judge Maria Nena J.
that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Santos.4 Rollo, p. 76.5 Id., at pp. 156-157.674674SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate
ANNOTATEDLucas vs. Lucasthe basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent
of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f)
as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability
clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
of DNA evidence. On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for
prodigy.Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
reconsideration, issued an Order6 dismissing the case. The court remarked that,
respondent learned of the petition to establish_______________2 Id., at pp. 50-
based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a prima facie case,
included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim,
the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish
in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and
the allegation that the statements in the petition were not of petitioners personal
filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood
knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondents arguments
group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show
that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still
that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA
case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or
relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him
upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed
litigation._______________8
by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there
Palmones; id., at pp. 65-69.10 Id., at p. 69.11 A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, October 15,
was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his
2007.676676SUPREME
family. The court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case,
LucasRespondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20,
respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive
2008 and for Dismissal of Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due
portion of the said Order therefore reads:WHEREFORE, for failure of the
form and substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic
petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects of a traditional
allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case, which made the
paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA
petition susceptible to dismissal.The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated
testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED
January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13Aggrieved, respondent filed a
without prejudice._______________6 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Belen
petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008
Ringpis-Liban; id., at pp. 61-64.7 499 Phil. 185; 460 SCRA 197 (2005).675VOL.
and January 19, 2009.On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for
650, JUNE 6, 2011675Lucas vs. LucasSO ORDERED.8Petitioner seasonably filed
certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC
certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated
resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court,
the courts previous order, thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order
Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED
dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.Let the Petition (with
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on January
07 is DISMISSED.14The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.x x x xSO ORDERED.10This time, the RTC held
the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondents
that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition is
special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was
premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court
filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over
stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it
respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over
Rollo, p. 64.9
COURT
Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDLucas
vs.
the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right
denied the motion for lack of merit.16_______________15 Id., at pp. 45-46.16 Id.,
to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.The CA remarked that
at p. 49.678678SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. LucasIn
petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a
this
DNA
that
issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
petitioner_______________12 Rollo, p. 161.13 Id., at p. 71.14 Id., at p. 46.677VOL.
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
650, JUNE 6, 2011677Lucas vs. Lucas failed to show that the four significant
OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.I.AWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT
establish a prima facie case, thus:While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA
ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.I.BWHETHER OR
Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended to
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE
trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO
instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.I.CWHETHER OR NOT THE
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE
situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA
TITLE
test. If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the
CONTROLLING.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of corroborative
WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF
proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote
THE MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO)
harassment and extortion.x x x xAt the risk of being repetitious, the Court would
FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA TESTING.II.AWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a
OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA TESTING
compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima
CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA
facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the court
FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the
APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF
prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists
HERRERA VS. ALBA, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT
and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in
679VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011679Lucas vs. LucasPROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A
their younger years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women,
TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.17Petitioner contends that respondent
unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-
never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts lack of jurisdiction over
by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute
his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not
and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case opens wide
raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several
scandal.15Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA
motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of
testing
order
to
abbreviate
the
proceedings.
It
noted
petition
OF
for
review
on
PLEADING,
certiorari,
petitioner
RATHER
THAN
raises
ITS
the
following
BODY,
IS
the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for
that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondents motion to
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for
dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is
Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition.
an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it
Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent
merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to
academic.Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a
caption of the petition does not state respondents name, the body of the petition
motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or
clearly indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the
order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary
petition is controlling and not the caption.Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion
remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been
for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion_______________19 Supra note 7.20 Rollo, p.
a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the
30.681VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011681Lucas vs. Lucasamounting to lack or excess of
propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the motion.18 Petitioner
jurisdiction.21 In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the
points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there
part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.The grounds for dismissal
must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that
relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person
the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity
due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the
case, as_______________17 Id., at pp. 16-17.18 Id., at p. 23.680680SUPREME
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. Lucasenunciated in Herrera v. Alba.19
cause of action.We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was
Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the
raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We
trial.20In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in
find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first
the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on
place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners
case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
assertion, he raised the issue before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition
question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action
was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to the
in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.An action in personam is lodged against a
service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance
person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed required. He
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but
avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over
its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of
obligation. A petition directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns
jurisdiction over such person.The petition is meritorious.Primarily, we emphasize
the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.22In an action in
SCRA 134, 148 (2005).683VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011683Lucas vs. Lucasings in this
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
filiation. To address respondents contention that the petition should have been
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite_______________21 Lu Ym v.
adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was
Nabua, 492 Phil. 397, 404; 452 SCRA 298, 306 (2005).22 Alba v. Court of Appeals,
sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which
503 Phil. 451, 458-459; 465 SCRA 495, 505 (2005).682682SUPREME COURT
lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and
REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. Lucas to confer jurisdiction on the court,
the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe
brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as
effective.23The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem.
directed by the trial court.The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance.
By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC,
It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to
which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states a cause
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2)
objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all
the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.If at all, service of summons or
defendant in violation of said legal right.29The petition sufficiently states the
notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent.
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but
Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest
they were not of petitioners personal_______________27 Republic v. Capote, G.R.
if he so chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its
No. 157043, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 76, 85.28 Ceroferr Realty Corporation v.
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be
Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 522, 528; 376 SCRA 144, 148 (2002).29 Spouses Diaz
excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to
v. Diaz, 387 Phil. 314, 329; 331 SCRA 302, 315 (2000).684684SUPREME COURT
file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with
REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. Lucas knowledge. Such matter is clearly a
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial
proceed-_______________23 Id., at p. 459; p. 505.24 Barco v. Court of Appeals,
when petitioner presents his evidence.In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on
465 Phil. 39, 57; 420 SCRA 162, 173-174 (2004).25 Alba v. Court of Appeals, supra
lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the
note 22, at p. 459; pp. 505-506.26 Ceruila v. Delantar, 513 Phil. 237, 252; 477
sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action
and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30 The inquiry is
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the
order.The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with
prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
the prayer of the complaint.32If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources
form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent
of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as
upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer
well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and
be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33The statement in Herrera v.
properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall
Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity
continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in
prejudice the public.35_______________35 Rationale of the Rule on DNA
this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
Evidence.686686SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLucas vs. LucasNot
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
states:SEC.4.Application for DNA Testing Order.The appropriate court may,
petitioner failed to es-_______________30 Balo v. Court of Appeals, 508 Phil. 224,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
231; 471 SCRA 227, 236 (2005).31 Id.32 Id.33 Id.34 Supra note 7.685VOL. 650,
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
JUNE 6, 2011685Lucas vs. Lucastablish a prima facie casethe first procedural
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:(a) A
aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i)
partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.Clearly then,
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
good reasons;(c)The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;(d) The
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has
to the proper resolution of the case; and(e) The existence of other factors, if any,
yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
hearing.At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA
DNA testing.This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior
testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention.
court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
suit or proceeding is commenced.This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
County Department of Social Services on Behalf of Maureen E. v. Robert J, 126
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
A.D. 2d 786, 510 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (1987); State ex rel. McGuire v. Howe, 44 Wash.
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
App. 559, 723 P.2d 452 (1986).37 In the Interest of J.M., supra, at p.
good cause for the holding of the test.36 In these states, a_______________36
568.688688SUPREME
State ex rel. Department of Justice and Division of Child Support v. Spring, 201
LucasNotwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
Or.App. 367, 120 P.3d 1 (2005); State v.687VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011687Lucas vs.
order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider
Lucascourt order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only
to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
be
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The
testing.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court
Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained Although a paternity action is
of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17,
civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.SO
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
ORDERED.Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Petition
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.Notes.Lack of knowledge
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of the client,
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
or on the part of his counsel. (In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and
Villa, 442 SCRA 706 [2004])For too long, illegitimate children have been
find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. DNA testing is a valid means of
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
determining paternity. (Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA 315 [2005])
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
o0o ...Page Edit Line Bottom
corroborative,
the
COURT
court
may,
REPORTS
in
its
ANNOTATEDLucas
discretion,
disallow
vs.
DNA
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing.37The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
A.M. No. P-08-2549.June 18, 2010.*ANONYMOUS, complainant, vs. EMMA
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
BALDONADO CURAMEN, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court, Rizal,
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity._______________
Nueva Ecija, respondent.Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Falsification of Public
Shaddinger, 702 So.2d 965, (1998); State in the Interest of A.N.V. v. McCain, 637
Documents; Birth Certificates; A birth certificate, being a public document, serves as
So.2d 650 (1994); In the Interest of J.M., 590 So.2d 565 (1991); Schenectady
prima facie evidence of filiation, and the making of a false statement therein
constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.With respect to the
for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. No doubt,
alleged falsification of the childs birth certificate, we find respondent guilty of
court officials occupy an exalted position in society. They enjoy authoritative
dishonesty and falsification of a public document. A birth certificate, being a public
influence, which leaves the innocent public unlikely to raise any objection.
document, serves as prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false
Unfortunately, this is also the reason why they have more opportunities to commit
statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
dishonest acts. But dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the Court will not
Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to
hesitate to remove from among its ranks those found to be dishonest.Same; Same;
conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the childs true
Termination of Employment; Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be
filiation to the childs prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to
committed in the course of the performance of official duties.Dishonesty, in order
injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the
to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document
official duties. If a government officer is dishonest, even if the conduct is not
proclaims.Same; Same; Same; Same; It taxes ones imagination how concealment of
connected with the official function, it affects the discipline and morale of the
the childs true parents, through falsification of the childs birth certificate, will
service. The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest employee, even if
make it easier for a court employee to support the child.Respondents justification
official duties are performed well. Respondent cannot separate her private life as a
for her actthat the true parents of the child are unable to support the child as they
registrant of the childs false birth certificate from her public life as a court official.
are fully dependent on respondent for their own supportis an affront to common
She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a dishonest act, whether in her
sense. It taxes ones imagination how concealment of the_______________*
private life or in her public life.Same; Same; Falsification of Public Documents;
SECOND
Mitigating Circumstances; Penalties; Although under the schedule of penalties
DIVISION.213VOL.
621,
JUNE
18,
2010213Anonymous
vs.
Curamenchilds true parents, through falsification of the childs birth certificate, will
adopted
by
the
Civil
Service,
make it easier for respondent to support the child. Respondent can very well
public214214SUPREME
continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino families,
Curamen document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact
without having to tamper with the childs birth certificate.Same; Same;
that this is respondents first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in
Administrative Law; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is defined as intentionally
her favor.The extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed,
making a false statement on any material fact in securing ones examination,
especially where mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of
appointment, or registration, a serious offense which reflects a persons character
penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public
and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity.
document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact
is respondents first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her
in securing ones examination, appointment, or registration. Dishonesty is a serious
favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the
offense which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which
proper party. But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the
virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place
mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by
in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand
respondent.ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Dishonesty and
COURT
dishonesty
REPORTS
and
falsification
of
ANNOTATEDAnonymous
a
vs.
Falsification of Public Document.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the
Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth certificate of the child
Court.R E S O L U T I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is an administrative case
indicated
against Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court
husband._______________2 Id., at p. 6.3 Id., at p. 8.4 Id., at pp. 13-
that
the
childs
of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.The
14.216216SUPREME
FactsOn 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an
CuramenIn her Comment,5 respondent admitted that the real parents of the child
anonymous complaint1 charging respondent with falsification of a public document
were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino. Respondent claimed
and simulation of birth. The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of
that the childs parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves let
a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry
alone their child. She asserted that the childs parents actually depended on her and
of Rizal, Nueva Ecija._______________1 Rollo, p. 5.215VOL. 621, JUNE 18,
her husband for support. According to respondent, it was the childs parents
2010215Anonymous vs. CuramenComplainant submitted the childs purported birth
themselves who proposed to register the birth of the child anew. Respondent insisted
certificate2 to show respondent misrepresented that she was the childs biological
she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child. Respondent justified
mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. Complainant
her act as an example of a common practice among Filipinos to extend help to
claimed respondent was, in fact, the childs maternal grandmother. Complainant
family members. As to the alleged falsification of her income tax return, respondent
submitted the childs original birth certificate3 to show that the childs real name
denied listing the child as additional dependent.The OCAs Report and
was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae
Recommendation As to the alleged falsification of the childs birth certificate, the
Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant, respondent
OCA, in its Report and Recommendation,6 found respondent guilty of conduct
included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.In his
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. According to the OCA, respondents act
Report,4 Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
created a negative impression in the minds of the public that court officials could
24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae
violate the law with impunity. As for the alleged falsification of respondents income
Baldonado Curamen were the same child. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child
tax return, the OCA found no evidence that respondent claimed the child as
was, in fact, respondents granddaughter. The childs real mother, Olga, was one of
additional dependent. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from
respondents children. On 27 November 2005, Olga gave birth to a child named
the service for six months and one day, thus:Respectfully submitted for the
Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino. The fact of birth was registered in the Civil Registry of
consideration of this Honorable Court are our recommendations that:1. this
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2005-15495. The birth certificate
administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;2.
indicated that the childs parents were Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun
respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial
Aquino.Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an
Court, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, be found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
affidavit for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent
Interest of the Service and be SUSPENDED FROM THE SERVICE for a
claimed that her supposed child, Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen, was born on 30
period_______________5 Id., at pp. 25-28.6 Id., at pp. 1-4.217VOL. 621, JUNE 18,
November 2005. Respondents application was given due course and the supposed
2010217Anonymous vs. Curamenof six (6) months and one (1) day, the same to take
birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal,
effect immediately upon receipt by the respondent of the Courts decision;3. Ms.
COURT
parents
REPORTS
were
respondent
and
ANNOTATEDAnonymous
her
vs.
Carmelita N. Ericta, Administrator and Civil Registrar General, National Census
own supportis an affront to common sense. It taxes ones imagination how
Statistics Office, be FURNISHED a copy of the Courts decision, the Certificate of
concealment of the childs true parents, through falsification of the childs birth
Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen,
and the Affidavit for Delayed
certificate, will make it easier for respondent to support the child. Respondent can
Registration of Birth executed by the respondent so that appropriate amendments
very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino
relative to the true circumstances of the birth of one Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino
families, without having to tamper with the childs birth certificate.Dishonesty is
can be effected; and4.the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija be FURNISHED
defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing
with a copy of the Courts decision on this administrative matter for appropriate
ones examination, appointment, or registration.12 Dishonesty is a serious offense
action.7The Courts RulingAs to the alleged falsification of respondents income
which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which virtually
tax return, we find no evidence on record showing that respondent listed the child as
destroys honor, virtue, and integrity.13 It is a malevolent act that has no place in the
additional dependent. Respondent presented a certification8 issued by the Municipal
judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater de-
Social Welfare and Development Office of Rizal, Nueva Ecija as well as her income
_______________11Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro, 478 Phil. 871; 435 SCRA 11
tax returns for taxable years 2005 and 2006 to prove that the only dependent she
(2004). 12 Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo, A.M. No. P-05-2004, 14
claimed was her 90-year old father, Rafael Baldonado. Against this, complainant has
March 2008, 548 SCRA 219.13 Id.219VOL. 621, JUNE 18, 2010219Anonymous
nothing but bare allegations. Whoever alleges a fact must prove that fact by
vs. Curamenmand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the
convincing evidence.9 Complainant failed on this score.With respect to the alleged
judiciary.14No doubt, court officials occupy an exalted position in society. They
falsification of the childs birth certificate, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty
enjoy authoritative influence, which leaves the innocent public unlikely to raise any
and falsification of a public document. A birth certificate, being a public document,
objection. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why they have more opportunities to
serves as prima facie evidence of filiation.10 The_______________7 Id., at pp. 3-
commit dishonest acts. But dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the Court
4.8 Id., at p. 31.9Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of
will not hesitate to remove from among its ranks those found to be dishonest.Under
Appeals, 351 Phil. 438; 288 SCRA 197 (1998).10 Heirs of Cabais v. Court of
Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Appeals, 374 Phil. 681; 316 SCRA 338 (1999).218218SUPREME COURT
Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification
REPORTS ANNOTATEDAnonymous vs. Curamen making of a false statement
of a public document are considered grave offenses punishable by dismissal for the
therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.Respondent
first offense.Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the
course of the performance of official duties.15 If a government officer is dishonest,
identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the childs true filiation to
even if the conduct is not connected with the official function, it affects the
the childs prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third
discipline and morale of the service.16 The government cannot tolerate in its service
person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of
a dishonest employee, even if official duties are performed well. Respondent cannot
the
document
separate her private life as a registrant of the childs false birth certificate from her
proclaims.11Respondents justification for her actthat the true parents of the child
public life as a court official. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a
are unable to support the child as they are fully dependent on respondent for their
dishonest act, whether in her private life or in her public life.However, the extreme
public
faith
and
the
destruction
of
the
truth
the
penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where mitigating

circumstances_______________14 Re: Spurious Certificate of Eligibility of Tessie
G. Quires, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Quezon City, A.M.
No. 05-5-268-RTC, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 349.15 Faelnar v. Palabrica, A.M. No.
P-06-2251, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 392.16 Corpuz v. Ramiterre, A.M. No. P04-1779, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA 108; Alabastro v. Moncada, Sr., 488 Phil.
43;
447
SCRA
42
(2004).220220SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAnonymous vs. Curamenexist. Although under the schedule of

penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public
document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this
is respondents first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her
favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the
proper party.17 But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the
mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by
respondent.18We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which
is suspension for six months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.WHEREFORE, respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I
in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, is found GUILTY of
dishonesty and falsification of a public document and SUSPENDED for six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.Let copies of
this Resolution be furnished the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija for
appropriate action, including the possible filing of a special proceeding for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen as
well as the Affidavit for Delayed Registration of Birth executed by respondent.SO
ORDERED.Nachura,
Leonardo-De
Castro,**
Peralta
and
Abad,
JJ.,
concur._______________17 De Vera v. Rimas, A.M. No. P-06-2118, 12 June 2008,

554 SCRA 253.18 Id.** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 6 January
2010....Page Edit Line Bottom
G.R. No. 168785.February 5, 2010.*HERALD BLACK DACASIN, petitioner,

vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, respondent.Civil Law; Contracts; Parties
to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum
ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
existence, deemed inexistent and void from the beginning. For lack of relevant
stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law
serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreements joint child
custody stipulations.Same; Same; The Family Code; Child Custody; Sole parental
custody of a child less than seven years oldThe relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother; This is mandatory grounded on sound
policy of consideration; Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine Law.At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28
January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old
(having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were
no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law
(under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed:
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x. (This
statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on
sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain
here.) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes
Philippine
law._______________*
SECOND
DIVISION.658658SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDDacasin vs.
the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.659VOL. 611,
DacasinSame; Same; Same; Same; The agreement would be valid if the spouses
FEBRUARY 5, 2010659Dacasin vs. DacasinABAD,J., Separate Opinion:Family
have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority
Code; Child Custody; In the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the childs
when spouses live together.The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being
parent takes precedence in the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow
law.I submit that, in the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the childs
joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not
parents takes precedence in the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the
divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when
law. The law becomes relevant, only as a default, if a separated couple cannot agree
spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
on the custody of their child. The law should not supplant parental discretion or
sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement
unnecessarily infringe on parental authority.Same; Same; The statutory preference
to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1)
for the mothers custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve
children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child
custody fights between separated parents; Where the parents settle the matter out of
within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
court by mutual agreement, the statutory preference reserved to the mother should
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give
not apply.The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be
custody to the separated mother.Same; Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; An alien
read as prohibiting separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.The argument
than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The statutory preference for
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly
the mothers custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve
novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985) settled the matter by holding that
custody fights between separated parents. Where the parents settle the matter out of
an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There,
we dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-
not apply.Same; Same; No legislative policy is violated if separated parents are
divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
allowed to voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction.Same; Same; Same;
custody.No legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to
It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity
voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal custody. It
against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
is not the policy of the state to prohibit separated parents from compromising on
aliens nationality irrespective of who obtained the divorce.We reiterated Van
child custody even if the child is of tender age. On the contrary, voluntary custody
Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989) to dismiss criminal
agreements are generally favored as it can only work for the best interest of the
complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce
child.PETITION for review on certiorari of orders of the Regional Trial Court of
decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as
Makati City, Br. 60. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Puyat, Jacinto
offended spouse entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules.
&
Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much
ANNOTATEDDacasin
validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of
respondent.CARPIO,J.:The CaseFor review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a
Santos
for
petitioner.660660SUPREME
vs.
Dacasin
Poblador,
COURT
Bautista
&
REPORTS
Reyes
for
post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.The
jurisdiction.7_______________5 Under
FactsPetitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del
provides: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent
living abroad.6 This provides: No compromise upon the following questions shall
sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
be valid: x x x (5) The jurisdiction of courts[.]7 The trial court held (Records, pp.
Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois
157-158):[H]aving
court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent
judgment [petitioner] is bound by its provisions including the provision that the
sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
Court would maintain sole jurisdiction to implement and enforce the provisions of
purposes.On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
the said judgment which necessarily included guidelines for the childs custody.
contract (Agreement4) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
[Petitioner] being admittedly an American, following the nationality rule which
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
Philippine civil laws adhere to, the Judgment of the Illinois Court would be binding
Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
upon him since the judicial disposition refers to matters of status or legal capacity
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.In 2004, petitioner sued respondent
of a person.x x x xMoreover, this Court cannot act upon [petitioners] prayer to
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the
enforce the terms of the said Compromise Agreement the said agreement being
Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
invalid and
exercised sole custody over Stephanie._______________1 Under Rule 45 of the
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. DacasinPetitioner sought reconsideration,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005
raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.3 Petitioner did not
Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the
contest the proceedings.4 Denominated Compromise Agreement on Child Custody
case.In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding
and
vs.
that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
DacasinRespondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of
under the laws of his nationality.Hence, this petition.Petitioner submits the following
jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the
alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by
divorce decree.The Ruling of the Trial CourtIn its Order dated 1 March 2005, the
the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the
trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the case for lack of
terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is
jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over
independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondent.The IssueThe question is
the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce
whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and
decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child._______________
divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in
seeks to transfer jurisdiction over the issue of child custody from the Illinois Court
this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
to this Court by agreement of the parties, when the previous Court had already
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on
effectively asserted its authority to act upon all matters relating to the said issue.In
Support.661VOL.
611,
FEBRUARY
5,
2010661Dacasin
Article 15 of the Civil Code which
expressly recognized the validity of the Illinois Courts
therefore, void, precisely because it662662SUPREME COURT
this regard, Art. 2035 of the Civil Code expressly states that no compromise upon
(emphasis supplied).664664SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDDacasin
the questions of civil status of persons, validity of marriage, or legal separation,
vs. DacasinThus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called
future support, jurisdiction of courts and future legitimate shall be valid.8 As a
retained jurisdiction.Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of ActionThe foregoing
corollary claim, petitioner submits that the stipulation in the Agreement vesting
notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to
exclusive jurisdiction to Philippine courts over
conflicts arising from the
law.In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
Agreement, even if void for being contrary to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
Code, is severable from and does not affect the validity of the other terms of the
customs, public order, or public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
Agreement on joint custody.663VOL. 611, FEBRUARY 5, 2010663Dacasin vs.
existence, deemed inexistent and void from the beginning.13 For lack of relevant
DacasinThe Ruling of the CourtThe trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law
petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual
serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody
and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call
stipulations.14At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002,
for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody.Regional
two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was_______________12 Article 1306 of the
Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdictionto Enforce ContractsSubject matter jurisdiction
Civil Code provides: The contracting parties may establish
is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.13 Article
incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as
1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides: The following contracts
petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this
inexistent and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is
species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; x x x x14 It
court.Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not
can be inferred from the terms of the Agreement that the parties intended to be
on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce
bound by Philippine law on its intrinsic validity (this is evident, for instance, from
decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois
the stipulation selecting Philippine courts as exclusive forum to settle any legal
court retained was jurisdiction xxx for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
issue or dispute that may arise from the provisions of [the] Agreement and its
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.11 Petitioners suit seeks the
interpretation x x x (Records, p. 19; emphasis supplied). At any rate, Philippine
enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-
law has the most substantial connection to the contract, considering its object
divorce Agreement on joint child custody._______________9Section 19,
(custody of a Filipino-American child), subject (Filipino-American child under
paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
seven years of age, born of a Filipino mother, both of whom reside in the country)
provides: Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional
and parties (Filipina mother
Trial Courts shall exercise
such stipulations,
are
and alien father).665VOL. 611, FEBRUARY 5,
exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
2010665Dacasin vs. Dacasinunder seven years old (having been born on 21
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x x x10 See Ortigas & Company,
September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under
Limited Partnership v. Herrera, 205 Phil. 61; 120 SCRA 89 (1983).11 Records, p. 17
the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine
law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under
authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses,
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother xxx.16 (This statutory
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and
awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on
any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
sound
regime
policy
consideration,19
subject
only
to
narrow
exception
for
(1)
children
under
seven
of
(2)
separated
or
not_______________15 Including those marriages whose vinculum has been
divorced_______________The general rule that children under seven years of age
severed (see Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 67-68
shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of
[1988]).16 The provision states: In case of separation of the parents, parental
minor children for their mothers loving care. In explaining the rationale for Article
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus:The general rule is
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.No child under seven years of
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling
order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)17Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers
(Res.), G.R. No. 174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320 (reversing the Court of
heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
Appeals ruling mandating joint custody and awarding sole
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be
custody to the
sufficient
mother).18Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014; 255 SCRA 661 (1996). For
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon
children over seven, custody decisions are guided by the standard of best interest
the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. (Report of the Code
of the child.19 Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, G.R. No.
Commission, p. 12)20 Sole
154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450, 471-472, on the statutory genealogy and
reasons such as
policy grounding of the second paragraph of Article 213 is enlightening:[A]rticle
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:Art. 363. In
communicable disease (Id., at 476; internal citation omitted).21 Civil Code, Article
all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters
211,
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under
Dacasinspouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
seven years of age, unless the court
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how
measure.666666SUPREME
COURT
finds compelling reasons for such
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDDacasin
as
maternal custody is denied only for compelling
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
amended.667VOL.
611,
FEBRUARY
5,
2010667Dacasin
vs.
vs.
best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother.
Dacasinalleged to obtain here.20) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.The Agreement is not only void ab
privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the
application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of
even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the
Article 213.22It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement
Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that No
by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the_______________25 This
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability
line of argument can be subsumed under the rubric of unfair state intervention but
to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is
this complaint can very well be leveled against the entire field of family law where
to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old
the state injects itself on a host of areas impinging on the decision-making capacity
of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple
and autonomy of individuals ranging from the intensely personal (e.g. who can
expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the
marry [Article 5, Family Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family Code], who can
separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age to avoid a
celebrate the marriage [Article 5, Family Code], and how to relate to ones spouse
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.23 This ignores the
[Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125, Family Code, on property
legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
relations of spouses and Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to familial (e.g.
deprived of her child of tender age.24It could very well be that Article 213s bias
Articles 209-233, Family Code, on parental authority).669VOL. 611, FEBRUARY
favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal
5, 2010669Dacasin vs. Dacasinsecond paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental cus-_______________22 See note
vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.Nor can petitioner rely on the
20.23
REPORTS
divorce decrees alleged invaliditynot because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction
ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. Dacasintody, robs the parents of custodial options, or
or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained
hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are
by his Filipino spouse26to support the Agreements enforceability. The argument
objections which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not
novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the
ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the
alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:There can be no
which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.Further, the imposed
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration,
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
lasting only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly,
policy._______________26 Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v. Gonzales
See
note
19.24
Id.668668SUPREME
COURT
(58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95 Phil. 579 [1954]) and Tenchavez v. Escao
the divorce.The Facts of the Case and Nature of ProceedingJustify RemandInstead
(122 Phil. 752; 15 SCRA 355 [1965]). These cases, involving Filipino spouses,
of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of
merely applied the nationality rule (now embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanies
Code) to reject validating foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipino spouses to
cus-_______________29 G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.671VOL.
circumvent the no-divorce rule in this jurisdiction. They are no authority to support
611, FEBRUARY 5, 2010671Dacasin vs. Dacasintody. Stephanie is now nearly 15
petitioners submission that as to aliens, foreign divorce decrees are void here.27
years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal
223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985).28 Id., at pp. 361-363. Van Dorn spawned the
custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
second paragraph of Article 26 granting to Filipino spouses of aliens who obtain
standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child.30 As the
foreign divorce decrees the right to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No.
question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs parents, by
154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 114).670670SUPREME COURT REPORTS
executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. Dacasin
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
advantage of the courts jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
best serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest.31 WHEREFORE, we
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings
dissolves the marriage.x x x xThus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
consistent with this ruling. SO ORDERED.Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
concur._______________30 Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November
below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
2009.31 Thus, in habeas corpus
is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
resolutions extend beyond
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
authority over the child and reach issues on custodial arrangements serving the
his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
childs best interest (see Bagtas v. Santos, Id., remanding a habeas corpus petition
conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied) We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-
to determine the fitness of the legal custodians notwithstanding that the question of
Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee
illegal withholding of custody has been mooted by the transfer of the childs
(who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
physical custody to the habeas corpus petitioners).672672SUPREME COURT
because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled to file the complaints
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. DacasinSEPARATE OPINIONABAD, J.:I
under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign
agree with the reasons that the majority of the Court gave in support of the decision,
divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction
except one. I am uncomfortable with the proposition that an agreement between the
as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained
mother and the father on a joint custody over a child below seven years of age is
proceedings involving child custody, judicial
the custodial right of persons exercising parental
void for being contrary to law and public policy. True, the law provides in Article
keep the child in her home during schooldays but allow the father to have him on
363 of the Civil Code that No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
weekends. And they could agree on some device for arriving at a consensus on
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. The State
where the child will study and how his spiritual needs are to be attended to.The law
can think up ways of protecting the child. But the 1987 Constitution acknowledges
does not take away from a separating couple the authority and competence to
in Article II, Section 12, the natural and primary right and duty of parents to nurture
determine what is best for their child. If they resolve on their own that shared
their children and that the State must support them in this respect.1I submit that, in
parental custody is in their childs best interest, then the law and the courts have no
the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the childs parents takes precedence in
business vetoing their decision. The parents enjoy a primary right to make such
the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the law. The law becomes
decision. I cannot concede that, where the child is below seven years of age, any
relevant, only as a default, if a separated couple cannot agree on the custody of their
agreement that diminishes the mothers absolute custody over him is void.The
child. The law should not supplant parental discretion or unnecessarily infringe on
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read as
parental authority.Parents have a natural and fundamental right to autonomy in the
prohibiting separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than
care, custody, and upbringing of their children. The Family Code recognizes this in
sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The statutory preference for the
Article 209:_______________1
Article II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the
mothers custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
custody fights between separated par-674674SUPREME COURT REPORTS
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. Dacasinents. Where the parents settle the matter out of
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
not apply.A reading of the entire text of Article 213 shows that the second paragraph
character shall receive the support of the Government.673VOL. 611, FEBRUARY
applies only to custody disputes that have reached the courtroom. Thus:Article
5, 2010673Dacasin vs. DacasinArt.209.Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
213.In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
parent chosen is unfit.No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
physical character and well-being. (n)The State ought not to interfere with the right
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.It is
of parents to bring up their child unless its exercise causes potential harm to him.
unmistakable that the legislative policy is to vest the separated mother with physical
The State steps in, through the law, only if there are compelling reasons to do so.
custody of the child under seven years old, in cases where the courts are called upon
State intrusion is uncalled for where the welfare of a child is not
to designate a parent for the exercise of parental authority. The second sentence of
jeopardized.Regardless of marital circumstances, the mother and the father are
the first paragraph and the second paragraph itself merely qualify the general rule
presumed to be fit and competent to act in the best interest of their child. They can
expressed in the first sentence that parental authority shall be exercised by the
agree to share parental authority or, if you will, parental custody even as they decide
parent designated by the Court, in case of parental separation.In choosing the
to live under separate roofs. In a voluntary joint custody the mother might want to
parent who will exercise parental authority, the court must take into account all
sanctity of family life
relevant considerations. One of these is the childs age, as the court is directed to
even of the child can change and render performance of such agreement no longer in
give due regard to the childs choice, if the child is more than seven years of age. If
the latters best interest. If the parents disagree on what they think is best for the
the child, however, is below seven years of age, the court cannot separate the child
child, recourse to the Court may be inevitable. But I sug-676676SUPREME COURT
from the mother, except for compelling reasons. This is the import of the entire
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDacasin vs. Dacasingest that the parent who wants the
provision.Thus, no legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to
joint custody agreement changed or set aside bears the burden of showing to the
voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal custody. It
court the new situations of the parties and how such arrangement have become
is not the policy of the state to prohibit separated parents from compromising
unfavorable or detrimental to the child under the circumstances. This is a
on675VOL. 611, FEBRUARY 5, 2010675Dacasin vs. Dacasin child custody even if
consequence of the presumption that contracts that are valid remain valid unless
the child is of tender age. On the contrary, voluntary custody agreements are
shown otherwise.Here, the agreement between petitioner Herald and his estranged
generally favored as it can only work for the best interest of the child.It is not logical
wife providing for joint custody of their then six-year-old child is a valid exercise of
to say that the Court would be subverting the legislative policy of avoiding a
parental discretion and authority. It is independent of the foreign divorce decree and
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her if separated parents
may be enforced or repudiated in this jurisdiction, since its object is the custody of a
are allowed to enter into a joint custody agreement. It can hardly be said that a child
Filipino-American minor residing in the Philippines. Although Heralds complaint
is being torn away from the mother, if the mother sees the wisdom and benefit of
before the trial court appears to be one for specific performance, it is, at heart, an
sharing custody of the child with the father. The voluntary nature of the agreement
action for custody and enforcement of parental rights. Being so, the Regional Trial
negates any deep sorrow or sense of deprivation that the mother may experience
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the action.I concur in the decision
on account of her separation from the child.Consequently, if separated parents
subject to my above reservations.Orders reversed, case remanded.Note.A foreign
mutually stipulate to uphold some form of joint authority over their children of
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
tender age, it cannot in any way be regarded as illegal or contrary to public policy.
as valid under the national law of alien spouse. (Bayot vs. Court of Appeals, 570
Joint parental authority and custody is the norm and should be viewed as the more
SCRA 472 [2008])o0o ...Page Edit Line Bottom
desirable custody arrangement. It encourages continuing contact with and

involvement of both parents in the lives of their children. It can only redound to the
minors greater well-being and should thus be favored.To declare that a joint custody
G.R. No. 178902. April 21, 2010.*MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L.
agreement over minors of tender age contravenes Philippine laws will only
FUENTES, petitioners, vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON,
discourage separating couples from sharing parental duties and responsibilities. It
ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, respondents.Civil Law;
will render shared parenthood illegal and unduly promote paternal alienation. It also
Family Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; The Family Code provisions
presumes that separated parents cannot cooperate and compromise for the welfare of
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice
their children. It constitutes undue interference in the parents intrinsic right to direct
to vested rights.The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on
their relations with their child.A joint custody agreement can of course never be
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil
regarded as permanent and unbending. The situations of the mother or the father and
Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare
prejudice to vested rights. Thus: Art. 105. xxx The provisions of this Chapter shall
its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses
action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.Same;
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
Property Relations; Possession; Possessor in Good Faith; He is deemed a possessor
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in
(n)Same; Same; Same; Same; In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.He is deemed a
124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave
possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that
no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property; It simply provides that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. As
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for
same would be void.In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the
their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against
Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
them. What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the
may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the
improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be
reimbursement is made.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
void. Article 124 thus provides: Art. 124. xxx In the event that one spouse is
Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Law Firm
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
of Lapea & Associates for petitioners.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
respondent.704704SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDFuentes vs.
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
RocaABAD,J.:This case is about a husbands sale of conjugal real property,
_______________* EN BANC.703VOL. 618, APRIL 21, 2010703Fuentes vs.
employing a challenged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers
Rocamust have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.The
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
Facts and the CaseSabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
void. x x xSame; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; A void or inexistent contract has
Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
no force and effect from the very beginning; And this rule applies to contracts that
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for the meantime
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
have the registered title transferred to his name.Six years later in 1988, Tarciano
property without the other spouses written consent.Under the provisions of the
offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they
from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by
asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that
positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the
Atty. Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that
other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
it was to take effect in six months.The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or
pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him.
prescription. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is
And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants
Sam Norman G. Fuentes for
and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the
5.706706SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. Roca 11, 1989.7
sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to
All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal
take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 or P160,000.00,
to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it.
for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. Both the Rocas and the
If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would
Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial. Comparing Rosarios
become
and
standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents she signed, the
payment._______________1 Records, p. 8.2 Id., at p. 149.705VOL. 618, APRIL 21,
Rocas expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same person.
2010705Fuentes vs. RocaThe parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata
Making the same comparison, the spouses expert concluded that they were.8 On
who then worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he
February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the
went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the
consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized
sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four
Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a
years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the
deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the
fraud from the date the deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and
additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the
the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years
name of the spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On
after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9Moreover, the
January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine
Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere variance in
months afterwards. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario,
the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery.10 The RTC ruled that,
namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R.
although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be
Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her
bound by his opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty.
son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of
Plagatas testimony remained technically unrebutted.11Finally, the RTC noted that
sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional
Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did not invalidate
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that
the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed
the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her
of_______________7 TSN, April 12, 2000, pp. 16-18.8 Rollo, p. 42.9 Id., at p.
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus
72.10 Id., at p. 73.11 Id., at p. 92.707VOL. 618, APRIL 21, 2010707Fuentes vs.
prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that
Rocasale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosarios consent. She
the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They
personally signed the affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12On appeal, the
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient evidence
affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted,
of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario
however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later on
sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing
January_______________3 Id., at p. 10.4 Id., at p. 9.5 Id., at p. 171.6 Id., at pp. 1-
the questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant
owners
of
the
lot
without
any
further
formality
variance between them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30
no weight to Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in
years since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been
Manila on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat
forged.Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that
that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.The Court
their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for
agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand,
wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the
are_______________111).
action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January
reconsideration and referred to the En Banc on a consulta. (Rollo, pp. 199-200).15
11, 1989 sale.Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and
Records, p. 10.16 Exhibits E to E-21 consisting of personal letters and legal
Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to
documents signed by Rosario relative to a special proceedings case tried by another
reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of
court.709VOL. 618, APRIL 21, 2010709Fuentes vs. Rocaconsistently of a lighter
the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in
stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R and s were written is also
good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the
remarkably
value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award
eye.Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that
damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorneys fees to the
she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable
Fuentes spouses.13 Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to
standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario
this court by petition for review.14_______________12 Id., at pp. 95-96.13 Id., at
suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature
pp. 45-50.14 A Division of the Court already denied the petition for having been
when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living
filed late and on other technical grounds. (Rollo, pp. 7 and 110-708708SUPREME
separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. RocaThe Issues PresentedThe case
Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature
presents the following issues:1.Whether or not Rosarios signature on the
and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff
document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the
price for it.What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit
Fuentes spouses was forged;2.Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration
of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in
of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and3. Whether or not only
Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she
Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that
supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on
sale.The Courts RulingsFirst. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosarios
September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely strip the document
signature on the document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were
of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken
genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husbands sale of the conjugal land
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof
would render the other issues merely academic.The CA found that Rosarios
of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied
signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked difference between her
on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is
signature on the affidavit of consent15 and her specimen signatures.16 The CA gave
still void without an authentic consent.Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
different.
But
The
it was
variance
is
reinstated on
obvious
even
second
to
motion
the
for
untrained
Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283, 290.711VOL. 618, APRIL 21, 2010711Fuentes vs.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal
RocaArt. 105.xxx The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code
this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations.
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)Consequently, when
While its Article 165 made Tarciano the 710710SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law
ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. Rocasole administrator of the conjugal partnership,
that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.In contrast to
Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without
Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of
not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale
the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent
annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in
or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus
that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value
provides:Art.124.xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:Art. 173. The wife may,
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x xUnder the provisions
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared
husband.But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its
void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of
without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing
the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the
and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification
Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
or prescription.21_______________20 Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1409.21
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.19 Thus:_______________17Art.
Id.,
166.Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
631.712712SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. RocaBut,
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate
although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside,
or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes
when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her
necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action,
to grant the same.18 Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 254.19 Id., Art. 105; see
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:Art. 1410.
also Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Miguela C. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
Vol.
IV
(1990-1991
Edition)
Arturo
M.
Tolentino,
pp.
629
&
prescribe. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
action to declare void her husbands sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without
1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared
their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the
void is forever lost?The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
right to bring such an action.Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to
bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under
during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action
Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11,
disposal.In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among
1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC
other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs,_______________23 Id.,
nullified the sale to them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable
979.Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely,
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given to the
different
Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of
ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. Rocathe Rocas, the P200,000.00 that they paid him, with
action already prescribed in 1993.But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this
legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.Further, the Fuentes
case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the
spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building
property upon an honest belief that Rosarios written consent to the sale was
improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing
genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned that her
and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosarios signature on the
signature_______________22
21,
affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer
2010713Fuentes vs. Roca had been forged within which to file an action to annul the
had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario
sale and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.If, on
did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a
the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false
premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it
willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months earlier on the
turned out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time
assurance that it was forthcoming.Further, the notarized document appears to have
she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But
comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano
that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid
consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her
the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of
written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery
Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It
but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely
was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on
evidence of lack of consent.Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to
it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is
Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
Id.,
at
p.
632.713VOL.
618,
APRIL
marriages.x
x714714SUPREME
COURT
Art.
REPORTS
invalidates it.As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no
acquired by reason thereof.
(453a)716716SUPREME COURT REPORTS
obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a
ANNOTATEDFuentes vs. Roca2.The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is
final judgment against them.24 What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to
DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T.
indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of
Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R.
retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:_______________24 Id., Art.
Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay
544.715VOL. 618, APRIL 21, 2010715Fuentes vs. RocaArt.448.The owner of
petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid
the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid,
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of
chargeable against his estate;4.Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R.
the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made;
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and5.The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)The Rocas
to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner
shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code,25 of
spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.SO ORDERED.Puno (C.J.), Carpio,
indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,
increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Petition
improvements.WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH
denied, judgment affirmed with modification.Notes.Sale of one-half of the
MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated
conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is voidthe right of the
February 27, 2007 as follows:1.The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution
Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L.
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are
Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that
net assets left which can be divided between the717VOL. 618, APRIL 21,
deed of sale are DECLARED void;_______________25 Art. 546. Necessary
2010717Fuentes vs. Roca spouses or their respective heirs. (De Leon vs. De Leon,
expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
593 SCRA 768 [2009])The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses shall be
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by one
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
of the spouses. (Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, 604 SCRA 120 [2009])o0o
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
...Page Edit Line Bottom
G.R. No. 161793.February 13, 2009.*EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner,

vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor.Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;
Judgments; In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA
198 (1997), in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended
consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
con-_______________* THIRD DIVISION.194194SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tesume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutionsfar from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article
36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages
on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.Same; Same; In
dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the
Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the
remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. In

obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be195VOL. 579,
FEBRUARY 13, 2009195Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te stressed that the infliction of physical
violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let
it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the
same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be misunderstood, the
Court is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in the instant caseit is simply
declaring that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.Lest
it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very
nature of Article 36 of the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months.
They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and
parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as 196196SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tedecisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.Same; Same; Same; Same;
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999) emphasizes the importance of presenting expert
testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not
to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge
to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist
the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with
the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.PETITION for review
on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The facts are
stated in the opinion of the Court. Froilan M. Bacungan and Associates for
petitioner. The Solicitor General for oppositor.197VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13,
2009197Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeNACHURA,J.:Far from novel is the issue involved in
this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this
case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine
has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should
be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in
form and devoid of any definition.For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5,
2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The
petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.The relevant facts and proceedings
follow.Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as
the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That
was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a
freshman.3Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one
another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that_______________1Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando,
with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-36.2 Id., at pp. 38-39.3 TSN, September 12, 2000, p.
2.198198SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tethey
elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4However,
Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996,
they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and
Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to
stay with Rowena at her uncles place.5On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought
the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two
then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner
he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his
guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however,
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8After a month,
Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask
for him.9_______________4 Id.5 Id., at pp. 2-3.6 Records, p. 8.7 TSN, September
12, 2000, pp. 3-4.8 Id.9 Id.199VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009199Ngo Te vs. YuTeIn June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives. They then parted ways.10After almost four years, or on January 18,
2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11As
Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was
collusion between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13On August 23, 2000, the OCP
submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14The
clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:BACKGROUND
DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE.
He presented himself at my office_______________10 Id., at p. 4.11 Records, p.
1.12 Id., at p. 24.13 Id., at pp. 36-37.14 Id., at p. 39.200200SUPREME COURT

REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Te for a psychological evaluation in
relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds
of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon
City.Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as
generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of
the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He
clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his
luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And
because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long
in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a
priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.Respondent
is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate
sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.In January of 1996,
respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent
that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner
is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed
to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so
petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and
seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of
petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to
go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at 201VOL.
579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009201Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tetheir home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him.
Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally
and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again.
Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner
does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a
case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked
her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent
brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to
pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage
License.Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened
that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends
to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home.
He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him
by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he
signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner
was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to [sic] the home of petitioners
parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his
share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life.
Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner
where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the
home of his parents. 202202SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te
vs. Yu-TeHe told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have
a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not
have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.The said relationship between Edward
and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The breakup was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age.
He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.TESTS ADMINISTERED:Revised Beta
ExaminationBender Visual Motor Gestalt TestDraw A Person TestRorschach
Psychodiagnostic TestSachs Sentence Completion TestM M P ITEST RESULTS &
EVALUATION:Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on marriage.Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the
petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life.
He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of
interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time
alone.ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her
[plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she
thought that her marriage203VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009203Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In
order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her]
husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance
for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.REMARKS:Before
going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is
profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case
presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties
have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own
selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his
weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides
toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and
incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started
since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display
psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15The
trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.17 The Repub_______________15 Id., at pp. 48-55.16 Id., at pp. 61-66.17 The dispositive portion
of the RTCs July 30, 2001 Decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE
and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable
Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab initio, on the
ground of the couples psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the204204SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Telic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18On review, the appellate
court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to
prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not
personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by
petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina21

needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the
required certification of the OSG_______________Family Code; and dissolving
their property regime in accordance with law, if there is any.Let copy of this
Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the marriage
took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision originated
for proper recording.SO ORDERED. (Id., at p. 66.)18 Records, pp. 67-68.19 Supra
note 1.20 The dispositive portion of the CAs August 5, 2003 Decision
reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated
July 30, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
106, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-39720, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te VALID and
SUBSISTING. The petition is ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p.
35.)21 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).22Executive Order No. 209, entitled
The Family Code of the Philippines, enacted on July 6, 1987.205VOL. 579,
FEBRUARY 13, 2009205Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tebriefly stating therein the OSGs reasons
for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 The CA
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January
19, 2004 Resolution.24Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25In his
memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only
because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for
the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is
bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial;
and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and
notices.27For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the
OSG_______________23 Rollo, pp. 28-35.24 Supra note 2.25 Rollo, p. 79.26 Id., at
pp. 95-104.27 Id., at pp. 100-102.28 Id., at pp. 82-93.206206SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Teconcludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and
void.31I.We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.Article 36 of the Family Code32
provides:Article36.A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil
Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33However, as a
member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code._______________29 Supra note 21.30 Rollo, pp. 86-92.31 Supra note 22.32
Id.33 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.207VOL. 579, FEBRUARY
13, 2009207Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeDuring its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a
new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on
two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person
would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such
a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes
on this matter.Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the
draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage asa special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by law.With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and
also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to
whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action 208208SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tewould not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State.
Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping
of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result
was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:(7)those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.as well as the following
implementing provisions:Art. 32.The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.Art. 33. The action or
defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.x
x xx x xx x xIt is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in
our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by
the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was
informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been 209VOL. 579,
FEBRUARY 13, 2009209Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tedeclaring marriages null and void on the
ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man
who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family;
the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly.34In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:At
the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:(7) Those
marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:(7)
That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.Noticeably, the
immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of ones marital obligation. There_______________34 Id., at
pp. 38-41. (Italics supplied.)35 Supra note 21.210210SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tebeing a defect in consent, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.My own position as a member of the
Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or
mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.One of the guidelines
enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36
is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.The
Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give
rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured
after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.For clarity, the
Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:1. lack of one
or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;2. reasons of public

policy;3.special cases and special situations.211VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13,
2009211Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeThe ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed
under special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36
in the Family Code as finally enacted.Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on
Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.Where consent is vitiated due to
circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.On the other hand, for
reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void
from the beginning.With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping
with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that
the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.Such so-called church annulments are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, 212212SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Tethe former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.It was precisely to provide
a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity
into the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.A brief historical note on the
Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a

combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons
be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon
#1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack
of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological
grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases
that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was
paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
213VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009213Ngo Te vs. Yu-Teceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36Interestingly, the
Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.38Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase psychological
incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inabil-_______________36Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina, supra note 21, at pp. 681-685.37Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429,
June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108, quoting Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.38 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 33, at p. 31.39 Id.40 Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:Art. 68.
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.214214SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Teity to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law,
thus:3.5.3.1.The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume.A sharp conceptual
distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095,
namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to
enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz., the house. The
house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal
with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a
priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with
the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid
and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which
is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph
deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The
person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of
fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.Since the
address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has
been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity
which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric._______________41 Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 33, at p. 34.215VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009215Ngo Te
vs. Yu-TeThe problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies
always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects
the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological
dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving
intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual
activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher

faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact,
he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can
assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by
church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example,
arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is
prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a
decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It
would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter
of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think
that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can
understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it
implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he
cannot posit the object of 216216SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo
Te vs. Yu-Teconsent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and
with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may
indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an
object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.3.5.3.2.Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground.Sabattani seems to have seen
his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the
inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually
able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free
and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference
between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating
intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.3.5.3.3
Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a

consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature
evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard
to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in
facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of
assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and
evaluating of those same obligations.Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon
Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or
psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity217VOL.
579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009217Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and
the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the
anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial
pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of
moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.x x x x3.5.3.5Indications of
Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of
those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic
personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let
alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be
due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another
incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or
of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of
the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable
of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and
this is not the place for detained and individual description.A rotal decision c. Pinto
resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential
obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
constitutional immorality.Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of
the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the 218218SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Temarital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume
the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the
party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in
fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19
Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely
on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably
disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement,
unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present.
Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken
advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.Authors have made listings of
obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right
to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the
incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some
cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features
of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity,
narcissism, and antisocial traits.Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not
very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of
marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to
evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able
to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is
to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial
consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium
totius vitae. The219VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009219Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te third
paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the
complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily
impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually
capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and
a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the

responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of
consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity.A
last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must
be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in
the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity
that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only
to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution
which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in
ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however
remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity
must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42Conscious of the
laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
_______________42 Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and
Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-119.220220SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-TeCourt of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the
trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44Again, upholding the trial
courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation
of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.The resiliency with
which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,46
thus:From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:(1) The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the

nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state._______________43 326 Phil. 169; 256 SCRA 158
(1996).44 Id., at p. 182; p. 170.45 334 Phil. 294, 300-304; 266 SCRA 324, 333
(1997).46 Supra note 21.221VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009221Ngo Te vs. YuTeThe Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.(3)The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(4) Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness 222222SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Temust be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7)

Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:The following are incapable of
contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.Since the purpose of
including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our c
l laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on
evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.This is one instance

where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the
State
independent,
and
the
Churchwhile
remaining
separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.(8)The
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the
trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
on all fours with another case. The trial judge must
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating 223VOL. 579,
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
FEBRUARY 13, 2009223Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tetherein his
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
court.48Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
cases,49
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
standards, without too much_______________47 Republic
such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the
v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at pp.
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
676-680; 209-213.48 Id., at p. 680; p. 214.49 See
the court. The Solicitor General shall
Republic of the
equivalent
function
of
the
discharge the
defensor
vinculi
the
Court
has
applied
the
aforesaid
Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-
Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30,
2008, 556 SCRA
contemplated under Canon 1095.47Noteworthy is
711; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R.
that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
167523,
membership
Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R.
concurred
in
the
ponencia
of
then
June
27,
2008,
556
SCRA
272;
No.
Lester
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
No. 165424, April 16, 2008,
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result
Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA
and another threeinclu-ding, as aforesaid, Justice
123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007,
Romerotook
529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No.
pains
to
compose
their
individual
551 SCRA 576; Bier v.
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
162049,
April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v.
emphasized that each case must be judged, not on
Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007,
517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously_______________396;
141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177;
v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495

SCRA224224SUPREME
COURT
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v.
Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy,
REPORTS
G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R.
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Teregard for the laws clear
No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R.
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900; 424
courts should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis; guided by experience, the findings of
SCRA 725 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626; 412 SCRA 41
(2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175; 392 SCRA 641 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408
Phil. 713; 356 SCRA 588 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840; 343 SCRA 755 (2000);
and by decisions of church tribunals.In hindsight, it
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA
may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
76.50 See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at p. 668; p.
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
201.225VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009225Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tedebase and pervert

the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.51_______________51
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for
Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity,
the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
2006 ed., pp. 14-16, cites the following:Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological
the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most

liberal
divorce
procedure
in
the
world.50
The
incapacity pointed out cases of various psychological disorders from the Roman
Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).6.1. From the 1917 Code of the
Second Vatican Council1.Coram Teodori in Italy
on January 19, 1940 on
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
Nymphomania.2.Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.3. Coram
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
Heard in Quebec
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality

anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little
on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.4. Coram
Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General Paralysis.5. Coram

Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.6. Coram Mattioli
in Rome
on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.7. Coram Lefebvre on
the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.8.Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes
on Schizophrenia.6.2From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of
to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
the 1983 Code9.Coram Monsigneur Charles
applying
Homosexuality,b.Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,c.Hypersexuality-Satyriasis,
Molina,
has
allowed
diagnosed
sociopaths,
schizophrenics,
Lefebre on the following:a.
andd.Affective Immaturity and
Passive Dependent Personality.10. Coram
29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.25.Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9,
Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.11. Coram De
1984 on Psychic Immaturity.26.Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on
Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto
Alcoholism and Gambling.27.Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December
Gomez on the following:a.Serious Paranoid
Schizophrenia (November 26,
20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-Nymphomania.227VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13,
1969),b.Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),c. Vaginismus or
2009227Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tecollusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April
evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
20, 1979)e.Sexual Disorder (December
3, 1982)13.Coram Bruno on the
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.In
(December 15, 1972)b. Sexual
following:a.Hypersexuality-Nymphomania
Neurosis
(March
17,
1982)226226SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-TeThe
Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36,
for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction
intervention
of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
by
27,
the
State,
1981)c.Psychoneurosis
through
against_______________14.Coram
Jose
the
public
Maria
(December
prosecutor,
Serrano
Ruiz
to
guard
on
the
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
following:a.Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)b. Lack of Interpersonal
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
Integration (April 15, 1973)c.Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)d. Psychic
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the
Immaturity (November 18, 1977)e.Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)f.
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
Obsessive-Compulsive
stillborn marriage.The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should
Personality (May 23, 1980)g.Frigidity (July 28,
1981)h.Affective Immaturity (January
15, 1977)15. Coram Ewers on the
not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none
following:a.Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)b. Sexual Neurosis (April
of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
4, 1981)16.Coram Pariscella on
the following:a. Obsessive-Compulsive
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
Neurosis (February 23, 1978)b.Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)17.Coram Fiore
spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
(May 27,
23, 1982)6.3.After the
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law19. Rotal Case No. 41:c.
incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their
Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality20. Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot
marriage._______________52 Justice Padillas Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court
on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature Personality.21. Rotal Case No. 43:
of Appeals, supra note 33, at pp. 36-37; Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at p.
c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.22. Rotal Case No. 45: c.
917.53 Supra note 34.54 See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice
Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest who was a liar, cheat and
Carpios Dissenting Opinion,
swindler (Anti-Social Personality)23.Rotal Case No. 46: c.
Stankiewiez on
February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.228228SUPREME COURT REPORTS
November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.24.Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-TeLest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
Promulgation
1981)18.Coram Agustoni (March
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758,
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
breakdown and premarital causes.During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
by decisions of church tribunals.II.We now examine the instant case.The parties
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January
matrimonial consent.Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June.
psychological incapacity,
The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others body for heterosexual acts,
antisocial personality disorder.56By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
and mental temperaments of the parties.57_______________55 Supra note 49, at p.
development of an adult personality; as mean-_______________defective
370.56 Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.57 Archbishop Oscar
matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor
V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains in Marriage
causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and
Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that [s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability
inability to assume essential obligationsalthough the law categorically mandates
of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on the ground of
said intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder x x
229VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009229Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeJustice Romero explained
x. (p. 106).230230SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-
this in Molina, as follows:Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
Teing the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.The Church
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength
took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.Fr.
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
marital relationship:The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.61 Ver-_______________58
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at pp. 685-688; p. 221.59
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
Supra note 49, at p. 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at p.
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
743.60Supra note 49, at p. 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note
strains of marriage, etc.Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
49, at p. 742; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at p. 526; Zamora v. Court of
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:At stake is a type of
Appeals, supra note 49, at p. 27; Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at pp. 96-97.61 The
constitutional
impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
Court, however, by saying[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality
never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to
with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement [I]f what
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x xx x x xObviously, Dr.
inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of
Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely
reasonable expectations.x x x xThe psychological grounds are the best approach for
been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
and secondhand information fed to him by 232232SUPREME COURT REPORTS
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-Teily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
fits very easily into the psychological category.231VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13,
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
2009231Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeAs new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
disorder itself.This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
parties inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties incapacity to
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62_______________one
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
unreliable.Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
assess petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent,
almost always is proof of someones failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
but also through the formers at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.58Hernandez v. Court of
transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a
Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of
and
petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.in
mechanisms, or any useful compensation that might be helping the client maintain
Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at pp. 190-191), in effect, required the personal
himself/herself. Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical
examination of the person to be declared psychologically
picture of the client as a total person against the background of his marital discords
Psychologists of
(PEERS)
incapacitated.62
the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services
enumerate the segments of the psychological evaluation report for
psychological incapacity as follows:
and life circumstances. Hypotheses posed through the referral question
and
generated and integrated via test results and other reliable information. Summary,
Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness
and accuracy so that the reader can quickly find the essential information and
overall impression.Conclusion: Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly
Identifying Data: Personal Information Referral Question: Data coming from
stated conceptualization of the clients personality and problem areas as regards
informants and significant others (psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians, parents,
root causes and characteristics as ground for nullity of
brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, etc.). Test Administered (Dates): List by name
Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed impression of
Background Information: Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal
personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the criteria and multi
and marital conflict), history of problem, and consequences in clients life.Life
axial system of the DSM IV.Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data
History
obtained that are relevant to the current functioning of the client, albeit under ideal
Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational
marriage.Diagnosis:
history, medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals. Behavior
conditions. Recommendation:
Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test related
based on the referral sources and obtained data in dealing with a particular client
behaviors. Interpretation of Test Results:Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests,
that may be ameliorative, remedial, or unique treatment/intervention approaches. As
Stanford-Binet,
and
to psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on the nullity of marriage
deficits.Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality
based on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment of the
or perceptual efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological233VOL. 579,
Clinical Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal
FEBRUARY 13, 2009233Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeParenthetically, the Court, at this point,
and
finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
181.)234234SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-TeNullity
_______________needs, conflicts, preoccupations, suspiciousness, hallucinations,
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial
or
Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of
judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
impulse control, predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety,
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist
etc.
Obtained
delusions.Emotional
emotions,
IQ
scores
and
specific
Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, supra note 51, at pp.
179-
Patterns (MMPI,
the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent
school, friendships, intimate
and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with
immaturity, irresponsibility, cooperativeness,
the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.Going back, in the case
introversion, impulsivity, aggression, dangerousness to self or
at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced
depression, guilt, dependency, and hostility.Relationship

Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or
relationships, difficulties such as
sociability,
strengths
Providing a careful specific recommendation is
others.Defenses and
compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping
the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that
Health discusses personality disorders as follows A group of disorders involving
early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
personality patterns.Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some
cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable
to genetic factors.Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in
personality,
middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
time.The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been
a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired
problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
smooth
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble
years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared
a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
with 19 percent in a control group.Types of Disorders According to the American
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated
Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
or_______________63 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.235VOL.
ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three
579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009235Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tedependent. Such traits can lead to
major clusters:236236SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.Causes of
TeCluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals
Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes
who have these disorders
of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
traits.Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline,
theories and brain wave activity.Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders
erratic and dramatic.Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent,
as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
appear anxious or fearful.The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
disorder not otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the
personality disorders.Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
researchers
pursuit
eye
have
found
movement.Brain
that
Wave
low
cerebrospinal
Activity
fluid
Abnormalities
5-
in
often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and

histrionic and narcissistic personality
obsessive-compulsive and
qualify as any of the specific
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be
long-term.64Dependent
characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
personality disorder is characterized in the following mannerA personality
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-
disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they
scandal.During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as
fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.Dependent personality
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.According to the classification system
disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may
used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
may
(such
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66The seriousness
as_______________64 Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health,
of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as long-standing, inflexible
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties
ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional
psychological incapacity. We further_______________65 Id., at p. 131.66 Id., at pp.
styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
50-51.238238SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNgo Te vs. Yu-
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
Teconsider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
others. Some psychologists view personality disorders as interpersonal strategies or
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with
as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of personality traits. (Citations
dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
omitted.)237VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009237Ngo Te vs. Yu-Tewhere to live),
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things
helpless
of being
on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
follows
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the
with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.Although on a different plane, the same
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is
may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality
often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.Although
takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
allow
others
when
to
make
alone and
abandoned.65and
antisocial
most
of
are often
personality
their
important
preoccupied
disorder
with
decisions
fears
described,
as
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance
petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, respondent.Succession; The order
of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as
of preference set out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in the appointment
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
of an administrator of an estate is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
and circumstances of each casejurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.Section 6, Rule 78 of
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
declared null and void._______________67 Supra note
65.68 Supra note
administrator of an estate: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
66.239VOL. 579, FEBRUARY 13, 2009239Ngo Te vs. Yu-TeWHEREFORE,
granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson),
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Peralta, JJ., concur.Petition granted, judgment
competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
and resolution reversed and set aside.Notes.A grant of annulment of marriage or
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, hence, in all cases
or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
granted
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
DIVISION.143VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010143Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntaybe
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
158 [1996])A subsequent pronouncement that the accuseds marriage is void from
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
the beginning is not a defense in a charge for concubinagehe who contracts a
such other person as the court may select. However, the order of preference is not
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. (Beltran vs. People, 334 SCRA 106
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
to
some
other
person,
it
may_______________*
SECOND
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III
of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate
Relatives; Iron Curtain Bar Rule; The Court is not unmindful of the critiques of
G.R. No. 183053.June 16, 2010.*IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that
is Article 992 of the Civil Code.Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that
Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in
indubitably demonstrate the contraryEmilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son,
legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out
reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally
by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
letters of administration. We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a
descendants of a deceased.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992
Court of Appeals.
of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes: In the Spanish
Aquino for petitioner. Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent.NACHURA, J.:Unlike
Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
Pope Alexander VI1 who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal,
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
New
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
with_______________1 Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
religious title of Pope and assuming the name Alexander VI.2 The Papal Bull which
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
Islands) and bestowed all145VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010145Suntay III vs.
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
Cojuangco-Suntaythe difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.3 This is a petition for review on certiorari
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,4 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
(RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
issue 144144SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs.
95.5Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.On June 4, 1990, the decedent,
Cojuangco-Suntayenjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art.
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico),
992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles
died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I),
995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude
predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was
vis--vis illegitimate children.Same; Same; Same; Same; The peculiar circumstances
survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
Suntay.During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.The
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all
factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two _______________non-
World
by
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Honorato Y.
issuing
the
Inter
Caetera,2
we
are
confronted
Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and east of the line to Portugal.3 In The
of administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:[A]t the time of
Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of 15th Century Rome,
[the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Mario Puzo recounts that the ostensibly fair and just papal ruling actually favored
Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and personal
Spain and placed Portugal at a disadvantage because
papal intervention and
properties, with a probable gross_______________6 Rollo, p. 43.7 Id., at pp. 137-
arbitration of the matter was made at the behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More
138.147VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010147Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntayvalue of
importantly, Pope Alexander VI was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his
P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of the
career as a cleric in Italy, conveniently changed his name from the Spanish Borja
[decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident
to the Italian Borgia to gain acceptance and credibility as an authentic Roman
of xxx; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
clergy.4 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices
resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam,
granddaughter and a resident of xxx; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years
concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-32.5 Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; Rollo, pp.
old, legitimate grandson and a resident of xxx; and that as far as [respondent] knew,
35-60.146146SUPREME
vs.
the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her death.8Disavowing the
Cojuangco-Suntaychildren out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDSuntay
III
allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
(Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:[B]eing the
respectively.Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he
surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should
was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an
be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.As
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.6
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the
Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely:
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal
Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of
grandparents.Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II.
who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as
Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the
stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that
petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to
some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.9Meanwhile, after a
thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
grandparents.Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
adjudged
Nenita.7On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters
administration._______________8
as
the
one
with
a
Id.,
better
at
right
p.
35.9
to
Id.,
the
at
letters
of
pp.
21-
22.148148SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs. Cojuangco-
the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
SuntaySubsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his
the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:WHEREFORE, in view of all
Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his
the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M.
Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is
Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to
hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
work in his early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo
Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the
Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father;
amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.No pronouncement as to
the significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his
costs.SO ORDERED.12The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been
curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation
denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:A. IN
in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural
THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
Bank; x x x.10In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE
died.After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on
992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and_______________11 Id., at p. 60.12 Id.,
their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on
at pp. 31-32.150150SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs.
November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
Cojuangco-SuntayB.UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN
decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel
PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED
is
INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO
GRANTED.Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby
AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
DECEDENTS ESTATE.13In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
RTC ratiocinated, thus:Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both
P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:(1)To make and return within three (3)
testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the
months, a true and complete inventory;_______________10 Id., at p. 58.149VOL.
estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M.
621, JUNE 16, 2010149Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay(2)To administer the
Suntay III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special
estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or
proceedings.Based on the evidence and demeanor of
dividends thereon;(3)To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at
[respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged.
any other time when required by the court, and(4) To perform all orders of the
The root cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time
Court.Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
and the proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of
issued in his favor.SO ORDERED.11Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before
the
and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention
the parties in court,
estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter
estrangement.The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go
Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;2. As between
against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home
the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of
in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to
surviving spouse xxx who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution
administrator.As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is
of Cristinas estate as an heir;3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article
accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of
99216
Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of
ab_______________14 Rollo, pp. 59-60.15 Id., at pp. 25-31.16 Art. 992. An
the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child.
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed
same manner from the illegitimate child.152152SUPREME COURT REPORTS
away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover,
ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay intestato from the legitimate
from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III]
of the
Civil
Code
bars the
illegitimate
child from
inheriting
appear[s]
children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as
inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,_______________13
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and4. Contrary to
Memorandum of petitioner; id., at p. 195.151VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010151Suntay
the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to administer and
III vs. Cojuangco-Suntayacademically and by experience, for the demands and
manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified in
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not
Section 1,17 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.The pivotal issue in this case turns on
unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate
who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator
and the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an
of the decedents estate.We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a
Emilio III in the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the
position to better handle the preservation of the estate.14In marked contrast, the
CA glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:1. The underlying
CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus,
philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;2. The basis for
mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was
Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,18 is quite the
merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters
opposite scenario in_______________17 Sec.1.Who are incompetent to serve as
appointment as administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the
executors or administrators.No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator of the decedents estate for the following reasons:151. The
administrator who:(a)Is a minor;(b)Is not a resident of the Philippines; and(c)
appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos
Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina,
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
the decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.18 Called as such because the
law does not recognize the natural tie of blood and is based on the presumed
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband
intervening antagonism and incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate
or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
family of a deceased. See Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574,
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645.153VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010153Suntay III vs.
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b) If such surviving husband or
Cojuangco-Suntaythe facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
normal relationship of legitimate relatives;3. Emilio III was reared from infancy
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
as their grandchild;4.Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c) If
of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
during the subsistence of their marriage;5. Cristinas properties forming part of her
other person as the court may select.However, the order of preference is not
estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.19
the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
and unliquidated; and6.Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
discretion of the trial court.20 In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from
this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.From the
Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.In the case of Uy v. Court of
foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
Appeals,21 we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs
between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we_______________19 See Uy v. Court
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under the law,
of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of
[Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata,
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
46 Phil. 726 (1922).20See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court of
conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal
Appeals, supra; Capistrano v. Nadurata, supra.21 Supra note 19.155VOL. 621,
reasoningEmilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and
JUNE 16, 2010155Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay declared in Delgado Vda. de De
rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos deathwholly inapplicable to the case
la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:[i]n the appointment of
at bar.Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to
appointment of an administrator of an estate:154154SUPREME COURT REPORTS
be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs. Cojuangco-SuntaySEC.6.When and to whom
administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing
letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
obtains here.Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other
putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico,
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain
Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings
said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in
of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting
accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.23Manresa
claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina
explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:The law [of intestacy] is
and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move
founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends,
in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.One final note.
then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those
successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does
closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased
not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contraryEmilio
would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone
III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in
and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original
educational
oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.We are not unmindful
humanity.24_______________23 Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary
of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quarter
of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent
(1976), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes:_______________22 G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480
No. 66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; and Diaz v. Intermediate
SCRA 334, 360. (Citations omitted.)156156SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Appellate Court, supra note 18, at p. 651.24 Cited in Balane, Jottings and
ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs. Cojuangco-SuntayIn the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.157VOL. 621, JUNE 16, 2010157Suntay III vs.
the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much
Cojuangco-SuntayIndeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit
basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did
Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
antagonism
representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
deceased.Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice
shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the
and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet
institutions,
between
and
legitimate
thus
and
contribute
illegitimate
to
the
welfare
descendants
of
of
to be settled.Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata25 on the same issue remains
Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 [2001])The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74,
good law:[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although
which provides for execution of affidavits of adjudication is an exception to the
the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it _______________**
had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order
stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is
No. 842 dated June 3, 2010....Page Edit Line Bottom
liquidated.Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:Sec.1.When order for distribution of residue is made.x
xx. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
G.R. No. 169900.March 18, 2010.*MARIO SIOCHI, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY,
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.No
INC., and ELVIRA GOZON, respondents.G.R. No. 169977. March 18,
distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
2010.*INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. MARIO SIOCHI,
has been made or provided for, unless the_______________25 Supra note at 19, at
ELVIRA
p. 728.158158SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSuntay III vs.
respondents.Civil Law; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Property Sales;
Cojuangco-Suntaydistributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
Where the disposition of the conjugal property occurred after the effectivity of the
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.This case involves the
court directs.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
Code._______________** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 2
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
December 2009.* SECOND DIVISION.8888SUPREME COURT REPORTS
upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. GozonArticle 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124.
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.SO ORDERED.Carpio
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
(Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Perez, ** JJ., concur.Petition granted, judgment
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
reversed and set aside.Notes.A party may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
an essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent by raising
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. (Vda. de Manalo vs.
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
GOZON,
ALFREDO
GOZON,
and
WINIFRED
GOZON,
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
that [f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
offerors.Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of the consent of one of the spouses
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is
to the spouse who contracted the saleeven if the other spouse actively participated
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership
in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.Same;
sale is still required by law for its validity.In this case, Alfredo was the sole
Same; Same; Lis Pendens; Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the
fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration of
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property
the lis pendens.If IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the
without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of
consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon
spouses renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property
order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court
consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered
order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who
into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the
caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a
cancellation.Same; Same; Same; Donation; Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a
continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is
conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other
withdrawn, the fact that the89VOL. 616, MARCH 18, 201089Soichi vs.
spouse.Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would
Gozonproperty was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to
have discovered that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the
IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.Same; Same; Same;
consent9090SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. Gozonof
Legal Separation; Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would
by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; It is
buyer in good faith.PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
only the offending spouses share in the net profits which is forfeited.Among the
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
Court. Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for Mario Siochi. Eduardo R. Ceniza for Inter-
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
Dimensional Realty, Inc. Padilla, Reyes & Dela Torre for Elvira Gozon. Grajo T.
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits
Albano for Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon.R E S O L U T I O NCARPIO,
The facts are stated in the resolution of the
J.:This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July
declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent
2005 Decision2 and the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child
CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property)
Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.Furthermore, said parties
covered by TCT No. 5357.4 The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and
are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her needs
is registered in the name of Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon
arises.SO ORDERED.7_______________5 Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 163-
(Elvira).On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial
168.6 Id., at pp. 169-176.7 Id., at pp. 175-176.9292SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Court (Cavite RTC) a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2
ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. GozonAs regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it
January 1992, Elvira_______________1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
is deemed conjugal property.On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of
Procedure.2 Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 65-128. Penned by Associate Justice
Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred).
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and
The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued
Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.3 Id., at pp. 153-154.4 Rollo (G.R. No.
TCT No. M-105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and
169977), pp. 166-168.91VOL. 616, MARCH 18, 201091Soichi vs. Gozon filed a
the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by
notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.On 31 August
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney9 executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the
1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.10 IDRI paid
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property.11 Subsequently, the
property for the price of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were
Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-
that Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredos
1097612 to IDRI.Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon
exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357; (2)
RTC) a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation
secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from the legal
and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to
Restraining Order.On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision,13 the
the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands
dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5
is hereby rendered as follows:_______________8 Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp.
million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took
169-170.9 Id., at pp. 171-173.10 See Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994,
possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the Agreement
Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 174-177.11 See Memorandum for Inter-Dimensional
was annotated on TCT No. 5357.Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC
Realty, Inc., Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), p. 588. In their joint memorandum, Alfredo
rendered a decision6 in the legal separation case, the dispositive portion of which
and Winifred did not deny receipt of full payment from IDRI and in fact prays that
reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation
IDRI be considered a buyer in good faith and for value, Rollo, (G.R. No. 169900),
between petitioner and respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is
pp. 421-440.12 Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 178-179.13 Rollo (G.R. No. 169900),
entitled to live separately from respondent Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of
pp. 221-259.93VOL. 616, MARCH 18, 201093Soichi vs. Gozon01.On the
their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:1.1 The same is hereby made
permanent by:1.1.1.Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred

Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. and Gil
Gozon,
from the receipt of this DECISION.09.Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to
Tabije, their agents, representatives and all
pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) in
persons acting in their behalf from any attempt

their wrongful
of commission or continuance of
acts of further alienating or disposing of the
his one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by the award of damages in
subject
plaintiffs favor.10.Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-
Inc. from
Gozon the price they had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in
entering and fencing the property;1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon,
the subject property.11.Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil
Winifred
Tabije are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
property;1.1.2.Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty,

Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. to respect
plaintiffs possession
of the property.02.The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between
following:11.1 Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as actual and
compensatory
plaintiff and defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property
damages;11.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
and rights of defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
conjugal property subject of this case.03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as
1994, entered into by and between defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
hereby nullified and voided.04.The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994,
awards are subject to set off of
executed by defendant Winifred Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor
Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.05.
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:95VOL. 616, MARCH
Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer
18, 201095Soichi vs. Gozon12.1Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000.00) which
Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro
constitute the amount the former received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of
Manila.06.The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to
Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, with legal interest therefrom;12.2 One
cancel Certificate of Title Nos. 10508 in the name of Winifred Gozon and M-
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
10976 in the name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., and to restore Transfer
Pesos (P500,000.00) as
Certificate of Title No. 5357 in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira
Pesos (P100,000.00) as
Robles with the Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated
Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.SO ORDERED.14On
therein is hereby ordered.9494SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSoichi
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision with
vs. Gozon07.Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of
modification. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 7 July
Absolute Sale in favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject
2005 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April
property and to comply with all the requirements for registering such deed.08.
3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch 74, Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with
Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling
MODIFICATIONS, as follows:1.The sale of the subject land by defendant
price of her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute
Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared null and void for the
and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to
following reasons:a)The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-
comply with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen (15) days
appellee Elvira Gozon;b)Defendant Alfredo Gozons one-half () undivided share
damages;11.3
exemplary damages;11.4 Four

attorneys fees; and11.5 One
litigation expenses.11.6 The above
plaintiffs obligation in paragraph 9 hereof.12.
damages;12.3Five Hundred Thousand
exemplary damages; and12.4One Hundred Thousand

attorneys fees.13.Defendants Alfredo Gozon and
has been forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of
the decision in the legal separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16,
Cavite;2.Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant
Siochi the amount of P5 Million which the latter paid as earnest money in
consideration for the sale of the subject land;_______________14 Id., at pp. 257259.9696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. Gozon
3.Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered
to pay plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:a)
P100,000.00 as moral damages;b)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;c)
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;d)P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; ande) The
awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for lack of
basis.4.Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay
defendant-appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:a) P100,000.00 as
moral damages;b)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; andc)P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees.Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of
defendant Alfredo Gozon was awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to
dispose of her undivided share in the subject land.The rest of the decision not
inconsistent with this ruling stands.SO ORDERED.15Only Mario and IDRI
appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that the
Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct
signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo
and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of
P9 million to Elvira.On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith
and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that the Court should uphold the validity of IDRIs
TCT No. M-10976 over the property._______________15 Id., at pp. 126127.97VOL. 616, MARCH 18, 201097
Soichi vs. Gozon

We find the petitions without merit.This case involves the conjugal property of
Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of
the Family Code provides:Art.124.The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)In this case,
Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still
cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the
court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void.16 The absence of the
consent of one of the spouses renders the entire sale void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining_______________16 Spouses Guiang v. Court of
Appeals, 353 Phil. 578; 291 SCRA 372 (1998).9898SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. Gozon to the spouse who contracted the sale.17 Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that
other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.18
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent
his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Marios contention that
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
already withdrawn.However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
that the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in
conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in
favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal
favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of
separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market
and the same is awarded to Winifred.The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
following provisions of the Family Code:Art.63.The decree of legal separation
the market value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of
shall have the following effects:(1)The spouses shall be entitled to live separately
Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the
from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;(2) The absolute
net profits of the conjugal partnership property.With regard to IDRI, we agree with
community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual100100SUPREME
absolute community or the conjugal partner-_______________17 Alinas v. Alinas,
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSoichi vs. Gozon knowledge of facts and
G.R. No. 158040, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 154, citing Homeowners Savings and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further
Loan Bank v. Dailo, 493 Phil. 436, 442; 453 SCRA 283, 290 (2005).18 Jader-
inquiries about the vendors title to the property. The representative of IDRI testified
Manalo v. Camaisa, 425 Phil. 346; 374 SCRA 498 (2002).99VOL. 616, MARCH
that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and
18, 201099Soichi vs. Gozonship, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the
the legal separation case filed before the Cavite RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign
provisions
ignorance
of Article 43(2);(3)The custody
of the minor children shall be
of
the
Cavite
RTC
decision
declaring
the
property
as
awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this
conjugal.Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the
Code; and(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor
of the
Presidential Decree No. 1529,19 the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
operation of law.Art.43.The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to
who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was
in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:x x x(2) The absolute
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court
community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
cancellation.Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it
to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit
would have discovered that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was
or set forth in any particular document so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that
without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 12520 of the Family Code, a conjugal
such consent or approval was indeed given. (Pelayo vs. Perez, 459 SCRA 475
property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.
Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith._______________19 SEC. 77.

Cancellation of lis pendens.Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the
G.R. No. 178221December 1, 2010.*MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, petitioners, vs. INTESTATE
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G.
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
JALANDONI as Special Administrator, respondent.Civil Procedure; Parties;
thereof.20 Art. 125.Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property
Intervention; A courts power to allow or deny intervention is circumscribed by the
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent
basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an
of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for
action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.A courts power to allow
charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
or_______________*
family distress.101VOL. 616,
FIRST
DIVISION.421VOL.
636,
DECEMBER
1,
MARCH 18, 2010101Soichi vs. GozonNevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate
2010421Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandonideny intervention,
the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of the P18 million paid by
albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial
IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of
procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed
the Court of Appeals decision.WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We
to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has
AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.Same; Same; Same;
74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:(1)We DELETE the portions
Appeals; Certiorari; When a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested
regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons one-half undivided share in favor of
person to intervene in a case, the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one
Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose
of jurisdiction.When a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person
of her undivided share in the property; and(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and
to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the
jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction
Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-
and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the
error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.Civil Law;
finality of this Decision.SO ORDERED.Brion, Del Castillo, Abad and Perez, JJ.,
Documentary Evidence; Marriage Certificate; The fact of marriage may be proven
concur.Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modifications.Note.A wife, by
by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.While a marriage
affixing her signature to a Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of salea wifes consent
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration9 with
Hence, even a0 persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial
of the marriage between his parents.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision
settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338
of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Nelson A.
and is currently pending before the intestate court.10On 17 January 2003, the
Clemente for petitioners. Redentor D. Roque collaborating counsel for petitioners.
petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11 before the intestate court. In the
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for respondent.422422SUPREME COURT
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis
REPORTS
G.
(Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with
JalandoniPEREZ,J.:On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court
one John Desantis.12The petitioners and their siblings contend that their
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals
grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the
nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of
latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of
Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4 to
Rodolfo.Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray
intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal
that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the
portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:ACCORDINGLY, the petition
late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14 As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both
for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and
Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the
January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET
latter.15To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining
Manifestation, the following documents:_______________9 Id., at pp. 183-186.10
respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves,
Id.11 The Manifestation was coupled by a Motion to Admit Manifestation. See id.,
from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.6The antecedents are:Rodolfo G.
at pp. 52-56; id., at pp. 57-74.12 Id., at pp. 57-58.13 Id., at p. 57.14 Id., at p. 58.15
Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.7 He died without
Isabel Blee died on 21 November 1999 whereas Sylvia Blee Desantis died on 21
issue.8_______________1 Via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
November 1994, see their respective Certificates of Death, id., at pp. 65 and
the Rules of Court.2 Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with
84.424424SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAonuevo vs. Intestate
Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring. Rollo, pp.
Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandonia.)Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and
38-48.3 Orders dated 2 July 2004 and 26 January 2005, issued by Judge Reynaldo
Rodolfo;16b.)The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 andc.) Their
M. Alon, id., at pp. 49-55 and pp. 65-66.4 The other siblings of the petitioners are
respective proof of births.18It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings
Isabel Blee Desantis, Pierre Jojo Desantis Joven, Cynthia Desantis Handy, William
that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse
Chester Handy, Carroll Leon Handy and Nora Margaret Handy.5 Docketed as Spec.
of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.The respondent intestate
Proc. No. 338.6 Rollo, p. 47.7 Certificate of Death of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. CA
estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special
Rollo, p. 187.8 Petition (for the Issuance of Letters of Administration). id., at p.
Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground
183.423VOL. 636, DECEMBER 1, 2010423Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of
that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as
Rodolfo G. JalandoniOn 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the
an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
ANNOTATEDAonuevo
vs.
Intestate
Estate
of
Rodolfo
showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the
hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals._______________22
time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.In its Comment to the
Id.23 Rollo, pp. 120-121.24 Id., at p. 121.25 Id., at pp. 49-55.26 Id., at p. 54.27 Id.28
Manifestation,19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate
Id.29
of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth
ANNOTATEDAonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. JalandoniOn 31 May
of Sylvia states that she was a legitimate child of Isabel and John Desantis.21 The
2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the
document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as mar-
intestate court.30In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was
_______________16 Annex 1 and 2 of the Manifestation. The certificates attest
an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of
to two nuptialsthe first one being in 1951 and the other in 1953as both having
Sylvias birth certificate.31 The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that
been celebrated between Isabel and Rodolfo. id., at pp. 61-62.17 Annex 4 of the
Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated
Manifestation, id., at p. 64.18 Annex
6 to 14 of the Manifestation. The
which includes the civil status of her parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of
petitioners and their siblings all attached their birth certificates, with the exception
Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.The Court of
of Nora Margaret Handy who presented her American passport. id., at pp. 66-74.19
Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other
Id., at pp. 75-80.20 Id., at p. 76.21 Id.425VOL. 636, DECEMBER 1,
evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved
2010425Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoniried.22 The
by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry,
Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel
constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John
cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their
Desantis.23According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence
siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of
of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo
Rodolfo.Hence, the instant appeal.34The sole issue in this appeal is whether the
bigamous and void ab initio.24On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order
Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the
allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.The
proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand
petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:One.
adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token,
The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35 In
permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her
nullifying the intestate courts_______________30 Id., at p. 47.31 Id., at p. 45.32
behalf.26The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was
Id.33 Id., at p. 43.34 Petition for Review on Certiorari, id., at pp. 10-81.35 Id., at p.
insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John
17.427VOL. 636, DECEMBER 1, 2010427Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo
Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia
G. Jalandoni order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether
regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in
the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.36 Rather, it chose to re-assess
order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child
the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from
out of wedlock.28The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the
Rodolfo.37Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse
intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent
of discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act
Id.,
at
pp.
65-66.426426SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.38 Grave abuse of
proceeding, to intervene therein.46Consequently, when a court commits a mistake
discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders
and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply
may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and
an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in
Rodolfo.39Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was
excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of dis-
correct in addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that
_______________44 Id.45 See Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, in
Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there
relation to Paras v. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246-247 (1916).46 In the Matter of the
was none.40 A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the
Will of Cabigting, 14 Phil 463, 467-468 (1909).429VOL. 636, DECEMBER 1,
conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.41To begin with,
2010429Aonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandonicretion gravely
the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between
abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
Isabel and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn,
certiorari.Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review
only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.Moreover,
under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to
the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be
inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines
able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43 In assessing the
whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels
probative
should
interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable
have_______________36 Id., at pp. 21-22.37 Id., at pp. 17-22.38 Id.39 Id.40 Id., at
requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
p. 23.41 Id., at pp. 27-28.42 Id., at p. 26.43 Id., at p. 27.428428SUPREME COURT
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the
REPORTS
G.
intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with grave abuse
Jalandonitaken note of a typical practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in
of discretion.We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.Second
order to save face and not to embarrass their families, concoct the illusion of
ArgumentThe second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.44Since the
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed
alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven,
to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is
The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel
bigamous.We are not impressed.First ArgumentThe first argument raised by the
has interest in Rodolfos estate.Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately
abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was
established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate
sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.A
between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.While a marriage certificate is
courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is
considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person
exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that_______________47
with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise
Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 12, 30-31; 289 SCRA 188, 204
stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
(1988).430430SUPREME
value
of
such
entries,
ANNOTATEDAonuevo
vs.
the
Court
Intestate
of
Estate
Appeals
of
Rodolfo
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAonuevo
vs.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni the fact of marriage may be proven by
supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a persons birth
certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its
parents.49In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the
vital entries.Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their
competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned
siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel
earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis
was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of
were married and (b) that Sylvia is their legitimate child.50 In clear and
any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to
categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
between Isabel and John Desantis. Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries
therefore, void ab initio.The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present
are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless
evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the
establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the
facts attested.52 In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no
petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We
such rebuttal.The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in
affirm the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements_______________48 Pugeda v.
Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Trias, 114 Phil. 781, 787; 4 SCRA 849, 855 (1962).49 In Trinidad v. Court of
SP
Appeals, supra note 47 at p. 30, this Court held: To prove the fact of marriage, the
_______________53 Rollo, p. 27....Page Edit Line Bottom
following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the

matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during
No.
00576
is
hereby
AFFIRMED.Costs
against
the
petitioners.
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Aonuevo vs.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420(2010)]
such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. (Pugeda v.
Trias, id.) (Emphasis supplied)50 CA Rollo, p. 6451 See Article 410 in relation to
Article 408 of the Civil Code and Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.52
Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010, 620 SCRA 483.431VOL. 636,
DECEMBER
1,
2010431Aonuevo
vs.
Intestate
Estate
of
Rodolfo
G.
Jalandonimade only in order to save face.53 They urge this Court to take note of a
typical practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage
and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot
countenance.The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by
any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court
cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a
G.R. No. 170729.December 8, 2010.*ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN,

petitioner, vs. ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;
Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
involve a species of vice of consent.The petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that [a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
its solemnization. It introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition. The initial
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.Same; Same; Same;
was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Same; Legal Research; Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193 (2009), did not abandon
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the
Molina (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 [1997])far from
Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation
marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
requirementsNgo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193 (2009), declared that it may have been
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.Same; Same; Same; Same;
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
Expert Testimony; It is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
incurability can be duly established.In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20
contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
(1995), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with another.
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no
Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
forth in Molina. Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), and the fairly recent case
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
of Suazo v. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 (2010), squarely met the issue and laid to rest any
by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
give meaning and significance to the marriage. We laid down_______________*
relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te
THIRD
REPORTS
merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviador more definitive guidelines in the
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.Same; Same; Same; Same;
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court
The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
of Appeals (the Molina case) x x x These guidelines incorporate the basic
the most serious cases of personality disordersexisting at the time of the marriage
requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
755
the
significance to the marriage.These exchanges during trial significantly constituted
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
the totality of the petitioners testimony on the respondents supposed psychological
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the petitioners theory
(2000),
DIVISION.520520SUPREME
further
clarified
that
there
COURT
is
no
requirement
that
of
its
stringent
that521VOL. 637, DECEMBER 8, 2010521Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorthe
his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent
respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to
employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting
perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits
the familys earnings; belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies despite
such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do
the petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became close to a male
not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure
distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
to Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. The
ignored their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor
intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
to
most serious cases of personality disordersexisting at the time of the marriage
ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadortioner. Except for the isolated and
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
unfounded statement that Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a
her capacity to render love, respect and support to the family, there was no other
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as
statement regarding the degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the
bond he or she is about to assume.Same; Same; Same; Same; If a psychological
duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a supervening
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.We do not suggest that a
the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate,
personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be
insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do
declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a
the Family Code.Same; Same; Same; Same; Admittedly, the standards used by the
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt
evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.Same;
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of
Same; Same; Same; Insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
the marital vinculum.Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the
irresponsibility, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these
under Article 36 of the Family Code.Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. Marriage, an
simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to
suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the Background History portion of
show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party
bring
bad
fate
to
the
peti-522522SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta.3 Id., at pp. 56-57.4 Id., at pp. 33-
marital duties.PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
38.5
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Gonzaga
ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorhold chores like cleaning and
Law Offices for petitioner.BRION,J.:Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner)
cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a
challenges through his petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated May
lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to
31,_______________1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.523VOL. 637,
bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her
DECEMBER 8, 2010523Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviador20052 and the
activities.The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex
resolution dated December 6, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
with him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their
No. 75207. The challenged decision reversed the resolution4 of the Regional Trial
house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside
Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner
his room several times.The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and
latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied
alleged in the petition.6 The RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2,
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.Antecedent FactsThe petitioner first met
2001.7In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs
the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that
and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She
time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the
claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they
wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she
eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents
was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.The RTC
rented room, and soon entered into a common-law relationship.On May 23, 1973,
ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion
the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by
existed between the parties.9 The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed
Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was
the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.10 The petitioner, thus, presented
apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and
testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.In his testimony,
because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the
the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the respondent was
respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and
carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she wanted;
Eymarey.On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the
did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the
to take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring
Family Code, as amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He
bad luck upon him._______________6 Id., at p. 8.7 Id., at p. 36.8 Id., at p. 38.9
alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
Id., at p. 48.10 Id., at p. 53.525VOL. 637, DECEMBER 8, 2010525Agraviador vs.
essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
Amparo-AgraviadorThe petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned
to do house-_______________2 Rollo, pp. 39-55. Penned by Associate Justice
their sick child, which led to the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the
Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga
respondent became very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their
Records,
pp.
1-4.524524SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.The
Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently
petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent
manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband
refused to change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be
and children know where she stays when shes not at work. She falsified documents
affected by their mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would
as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in her present
benefit their children.Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a
employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported to be presently having an
certified true copy of their marriage contract (Exh. B)11 and the psychiatric
affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her
evaluation report (Exh. A)12 of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.In his Psychiatric
consultation with a mangkukulam point out her lack of care, love, and respect to
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:REMARKS AND
Enrique.Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to
RECOMMENDATIONSBased on the information gathered from Enrique, his son
render love, respect and support to her family.The above data shows that Erlinda is
and their helper, the psychological report and the mental status examination, Enrique
suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been
is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this
He coped with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed
disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of
what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her and exerted
marriage.In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same
every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family.
examination as Enrique underwent.13The RTC RulingThe RTC nullified the
Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the
marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw
family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as he
merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report, and
maintained to be financially productive.The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to
concluded that:Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive
of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed suffering from Mixed Personality
behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and
Disorder that render her incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
uncaring who did things her way without regard to the feelings of others. She is an
Respondents refusal to commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a
irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to
close relationship with Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally
her parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a
abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was
young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for
never prepared for marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply
herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of
rooted from her family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good
Enrique before and after marriage and she maintained to_______________11 Id., at
of society and of the parties themselves, it is_______________13 Id., at pp. 32-
p.
REPORTS
33.527VOL. 637, DECEMBER 8, 2010527Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorbest
ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviador be so with her children. She
that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA
abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed
AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at all. The Civil
long in their house despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her
Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National Census and
irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of their children.
Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to make the
5.12
Id.,
at
pp.
28-33.526526SUPREME
COURT
necessary correction of the civil record of the marriage between the parties and on
whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the
their respective civil status.The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will
obligations.The Courts RulingWe resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and
however remain as their legitimate children.It is SO ORDERED.14The CA
hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of
DecisionThe Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.The totality of evidence
General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision15 dated May
presentedfailed to establish the respondentspsychological incapacityThe petition for
31, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.The
declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
which provides that [a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity be-529VOL.
no basis in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment
637, DECEMBER 8, 2010529Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorcomes manifest
because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.The CA added that the
only after its solemnization. It introduced the concept of psychological incapacity
psychiatric remarks in the Report were nothing but a showcase of respondents
as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.The
character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor
initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the
Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices
essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee
a legal separation suit.The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA
that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
denied his motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005.16_______________14
consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and
Supra note 4, at pp. 37-38.15 Supra note 2.16 Supra note 3.528528SUPREME
obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-AgraviadorThe Petition
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply
and IssuesThe petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and
with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
seek the reversal of the CA ruling, based on the following arguments:I. THE
marriage.17In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared that
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
ESTABLISH
THE
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not
RESPONDENT[;]II.THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V.
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISFIED[;]III.THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT
marriage.19 It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
HAVING
AND/THE
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
RESPONDENT[; and]IV.THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL
significance to the marriage.We laid down more definitive guidelines in the
CASES HAD BEEN SATISFIED[.]The issue in this case essentially boils down to
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court
THE
BEEN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTESTED
XXX
INCAPACITY
BY
THE
STATE
OF
of Appeals20 (the Molina case) where we said:(1) The burden of proof to show
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
favor of the existence and con-_______________17 See Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(4) Such incapacity
155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 367, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals,
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
310 Phil. 21; 240 SCRA 20 (1995); A. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
of the Philippines (1988 ed.), 37; and A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines:
necessarily absolutely
Commentaries and Jurisprudence (1990 ed.), 274-275.18 G.R. No. 112019, January
incapacity must be
4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 33.19 Id., at p. 34.20 335 Phil. 664, 676-680; 268 SCRA
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
198, 209 (1997).530530SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador
employment in a job. x x x(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
vs. Amparo-Agraviadortinuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
mild
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.The
an531VOL.
Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
Agraviadoradverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.(2) The root cause of
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
obligations essential to marriage.(6)The essential marital obligations must be
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7)
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
Interpretations
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
given great respect by our courts. x x x(8) The trial court must order the
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
certification,
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.(3) The incapacity must be
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such

relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
637,
DECEMBER
8,
2010531Agraviador
vs.
as
Amparo-
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that essentially confirmed what
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
the petition alleged:Q:Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.These guidelines
blessed with children, and how many?A:Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4),
incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v.
two (2) boys and two (2) girls.Q:Where are they now?A: All grown up with the
Marcos,21
the
exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of my said wife
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.Q: Is that the reason why you
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?A:It is only one of the several reasons,
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
Sir._______________23 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.24 G.R.
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
No. 164493, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 154.533VOL. 637, DECEMBER 8,
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
2010533Agraviador vs. Amparo-AgraviadorQ:Can you cite these reasons, you
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.A later case, Ngo Te
mentioned?A:She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and
v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
used to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do household chores, like
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay from the conjugal
incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally
dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately fully abandoned the family
became_______________21 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.22
house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]At first, I discovered a love note while
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.532532SUPREME COURT
being so secretive and used to be very close to a male renter in the ground floor of
REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadora straightjacket,
their house and caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the
forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
reason why she refused to have sex since 1993,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because,
time.Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult mangkukulam to
with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours
bring bad fate against the family and death for me.Q: By the way did you give her
with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested
the chance to change?A:I gave her but she refused to reform.x x x xQ: Can you
guidelines set forth in Molina.Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of
not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?A: I think I cannot since she
Suazo v. Suazo24 squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding the
does not accept her fault and she does not want to change for the sake of our
applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon
family.25These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
petitioners testimony on the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady.
stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a
We glean from these exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents
more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform
marriages based on psychological incapacity.Under these established guidelines, we
certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as
find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to prove the respondents
immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.These acts, in our view, do not rise to
psychological incapacity.a.Petitioners court testimonyFor clarity, we reproduce
the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
further
clarified
that
there
is
no
requirement
that
up to and until the present
distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
essential marital obligationshad to be shown._______________27 Republic v.
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.26
Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177.28 Supra note
The_______________25 TSN, November 20, 2001, pp. 3-5.26 See Padilla-
23.29 G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123, 135.535VOL. 637,
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157,
DECEMBER 8, 2010535Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorb.
178.534534SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-
Psychiatric Evaluation ReportThe Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation
Agraviadorintent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disordersexisting at the time of
perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally
the marriageclearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give
evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his
meaning and significance to the marriage.27 The psychological illness that must
Report for the respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
underwent.30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor
the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.28In the present case, the
relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be
petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a
used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he
manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge
essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect
the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the
to the respondents condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the
party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.31We do not suggest that
respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the
a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be
mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure
declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a
would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.32 If a
that the respondent does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.33 No such independent
is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.In a
evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.In his
similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent,
Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal
behavior before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the
or supervening disabling factoran adverse integral element in the respondents
marriagethe_______________30 Records, p. 33.31 Suazo v. Suazo, supra note
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
24.32
Supra
at
note
21.33
Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua,
Dr. Patacs
supra
note
26.536536SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-
2010537Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadordisorder is grave, and how it
Agraviadorrespondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself;
incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise
and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our
no showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition
mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the
that effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying with the essential
respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the
marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true,
circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she
could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
defied her parents and decided to live alone; why she neglected her obligations as
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
a daughter; and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric
independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the
Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents negative behavioral traits
respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was
without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and
gathered in this case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the
insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to
Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents so-
engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but
called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the
these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
marriage.Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the
accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that
gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an
unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of
enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by
marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child
third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from
which eventually led to the latters death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the
mixed personality disorder. In the Background History portion of his Psychiatric
absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her
questionable traitshis flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that he
siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys
inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealouswere not
earnings; belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies despite the
pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no
petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became close to a male border;
more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a
had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to
reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness
Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored
of her condition.The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately
their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring
explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality
bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that
disorder had no definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love,
personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to
respect and support to the family,34 there was no other statement regarding the
show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to
degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to what extent
create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite
the_______________34
treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric
Records,
p.
32.537VOL.
637,
DECEMBER
8,
538538SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAgraviador vs. Amparo-
one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the
AgraviadorEvaluation Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with
time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of
any factual basis. It simply enumerated the respondents perceived behavioral
marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we
defects, and then associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it
are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.WHEREFORE, in light
unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to expound on
of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the
the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005,
have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.Admittedly, the
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.SO
standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation
ORDERED.Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ.,
reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that
concur.Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.Notes.A.M. No. 02-11-
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
10-SCwhich was promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly publishedis geared
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution
towards the relaxation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) certification that
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially
Republic v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), required. (Padilla-Rumbaua vs.
where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
Rumbaua, 596 SCRA 157 [2009])He who contracts a second marriage before the
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.The
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended
petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without
on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. (Jarillo vs.
hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void
People, 601 SCRA 236 [2009])o0o_______________36 See Paras v.
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the
Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81, 106....Page Edit Line
Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill
Bottom
the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The
State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be
available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Agraviador vs.
Amparo-Agraviador, 637 SCRA 519(2010)]
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,

civil interdiction, drug addiction,_______________35 Navales v. Navales, G.R. No.
167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 292.539VOL. 637, DECEMBER 8,
2010539Agraviador vs. Amparo-Agraviadorsexual infidelity, abandonment, and the
like.36 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or
G.R. No. 182367. December 15, 2010.*CHERRYL B. DOLINA, petitioner, vs.

GLENN D. VALLECERA, respondent.Support; Anti-Violence against Women and
Their Children Act (R.A. No. 9262); The petitioner evidently filed the wrong action
to obtain support for her childthe object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
putative fathers legitimate family. Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies
violence.Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child.
having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has
The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety
to be resolved in an appropriate case.PETITION for review on certiorari of an order
of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. The facts are stated in the opinion of
of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal
the Court. Vispero LL. Mayor for respondent.ABAD,J.:This case is about a
support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she
order and to legal support. Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing
sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought
her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not
against the supposed father.The Facts and the CaseIn February 2008 petitioner
the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with
Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support
protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial
from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child
vigorously denied this.Same; To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera
acknowledged; Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights
for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth
but their filiation must be duly proved.To be entitled to legal support, petitioner
which listed Vallecera as the childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order
must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not
Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of
admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based
support as the RTC may deem appropriate._______________1 Rollo, pp. 12-23.2
on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
An Act Defining Violence Against Women And Their Children, Providing For
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation
Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, And For Other
to him. The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
Purposes.3 Rollo, p. 22.709VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010709Dolina vs.
Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows
ValleceraVallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was
as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.Same; While the Court is
child abuses; that he was not the childs father; that the signature appearing on the
mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it
childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit
is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support;
and
and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
peace
of
the
DIVISION.708708SUPREME
putative
COURT
_______________*
REPORTS
SECOND
ANNOTATEDDolina
vs.
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.On March 13, 20084 the
Vallecerafathers legitimate family.While the Court is mindful of the best interests
RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing
of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
the filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis for an
order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition
but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first
may be integrated and resolved.11It must be observed, however, that the RTC should
file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support.
not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial
Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court.The
declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since the main issue
Issue PresentedThe sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC
remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her
correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her
child and whether they are entitled to protec-_______________7
application for temporary support for her child.The Courts RulingDolina evidently
paragraph 4 of the Family Code requires support between parents and their
filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under
illegitimate children.8 Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008,
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are
549 SCRA 68, 74.9 Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554
victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against
SCRA 513, 527.10 De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77867, February 6,
the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the
1990, 181 SCRA 861, 869.11 Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil. 307, 317; 460
child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal
SCRA 315, 323-324 (2005).711VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010711Dolina vs.
support._______________4 Id., at p. 41.5 Id., at p. 40.6 Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No.
Valleceration. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since
168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231, 238.710710SUPREME COURT
Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDolina vs. ValleceraDolina of course alleged that
conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from
Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC
Vallecera.While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases
upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor
involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate
to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the
family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies having a hand in the
father. He of course vigorously denied this.To be entitled to legal support, petitioner
preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an
must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not
appropriate case.ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that
on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation
April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.SO
to him.7 The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
ORDERED.Carpio (Chairman), Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Petition
Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support
denied, order affirmed.Note.While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the
follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10 Dolinas remedy is
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). (Go-Tan v. Tan, 567 SCRA 231
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
[2008])o0o _______________12 Nepomuceno v. Lopez, G.R. No.
Article 195,
181258, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 145, 153-154. [Dolina vs. Vallecera, 638 SCRA
ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to
707(2010)]
justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
Landingin vs. Republic G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006.*FIRST DIVISION.
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend
DIWATA
THE
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child. Same; Merely
PHILIPPINES, respondent.Adoption; The general requirement of consent and notice
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
an abandonment.Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the care of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.The general
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
Same; It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of
authority over his/her children.Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
the proposed adoption. Same; The written consent of the biological parents is
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.The written consent of the
the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be
biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Same; Section 9 of R.A. 8552 provides that if the
her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of
interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption. Same; Under Section 34, Rule
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.Petitioners contention must be
132, the offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its
rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
parties.Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the
the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly
consent of their legal guardian. Same; Words and Phrases; Abandonment means
upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same
_______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 416
is merely a scrap of paper barren of
RAMOS
LANDINGIN,
petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC
OF
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 417 Landingin vs. Republic probative weight.
May 19, 1990,7Id., at p. 5. the children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there
any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
Same; Since the
and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with
primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her inlaws from the time she left up to the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
considered.Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given
carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
their written consent8Id., at p. 9. to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
family. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The
married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in
facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nardo A. Capulong for petitioner.
her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
The Solicitor General for respondent.CALLEJO, SR., J.:Assailed in this petition for
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1Penned by
her children gave their written consent9Id., at p. 24. to the adoption of the minors.
Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Mario L.
Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his
Guaria III and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-35. of the Court of Ap-
willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody.
peals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2CA Rollo, p. 25. of
_______________ 3 Records, pp. 1-4. The Rule on Adoption was approved by the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733
Court in A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC and took effect on August 22, 2002. 4 Id., at p. 6. 5
granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein. The AntecedentsOn
Id., at p. 7. 6 Id., at p. 8. 7 Id., at p. 5. 8 Id., at p. 9. 9 Id., at p. 24. 419
February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of
JUNE 27, 2006 419 Landingin vs. Republic Petitioner prayed that, after due
America (USA), of Filipino parentage and _______________ 1 Penned by Associate
hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:WHEREFORE, it is most
Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III
respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing,
and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-35. 2 CA Rollo, p. 25. 418
VOL. 493,
418
judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic a resident
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and
of Guam, USA, filed a petition3Records, pp. 1-4. The Rule on Adoption was
ordering that the minor childrens name follow the family name of
approved by the Court in A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC and took effect on August 22, 2002.
petitioner.Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31,
premises.10Id., at p. 3.On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of
1986;4Id., at p. 6. Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5Id., at
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by
p. 7. and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6Id., at p. 8. The
Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia
thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
Ramos.Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on
petition.11Id., at p. 21. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance12Id., at p. 40. but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
as follows:The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this
behalf.13Id., at p. 41. Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her to appear for the personal
present her evidence ex parte.14Id., at p. 22.The petitioner testified in her behalf.
interview concerning the adoption of her children._______________ 17 Records,
She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written
pp. 43-47.
consent executed by her and her siblings.15Supra note 8. The petitioner marked in
evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary
public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16Supra note 9. _______________
10 Id., at p. 3. 11 Id., at p. 21. 12 Id., at p. 40. 13 Id., at p. 41. 14 Id., at p. 22. 15
Supra note 8. 16 Supra note 9. 420
ANNOTATED
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Landingin vs. Republic On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao,
Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child
Study Report, with the following recommendation:In view of the foregoing,
undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for
adoption because of the following reasons:1. Minors surviving parent, the mother
has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin
this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they
need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto
attached.2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A
joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment
to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.3. The minors are present
under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos
be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that
close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3
minors.17Records, pp. 43-47.Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview,
421
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 421 Landingin vs. Republic The plan for the
adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the
death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including
the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned
about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they
have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary
guardian.The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She
realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could
not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that
the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present
and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also
finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her
children.18Id., at p. 47.However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner,
likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to
the adoption.On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin.
Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has
long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-
Rollo, p. 55. on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August
Landingin._______________ 18 Id., at p. 47.
12, 2004.25Rollo, p. 22.Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac
for him to effect the corresponding changes/ amendment in the birth certificates of
the above-mentioned minors.SO ORDERED.19CA Rollo, pp. 27-28.The OSG
appealed20Records, p. 78. the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2,
2002. In its brief21CA Rollo, p. 15. for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the
following arguments:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.IITHE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK
OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION
FOR
ADOPTION
DESPITE
PETITIONERS
FAILURE
TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED

ADOPTEES.On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22Rollo, pp. 23-35.
reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job,
she was not stable _______________ 19 CA Rollo, pp. 27-28. 20 Records, p. 78. 21
CA Rollo, p. 15. 22 Rollo, pp. 23-35. 423
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 423
Landingin vs. Republic enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in
Spec.
Proc.
No.
2733
is
hereby
REVERSED
and
SET
ASIDE.SO
ORDERED.23Id., at p. 35.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24CA
certiorari26Id., at pp. 3-20. on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:1.

THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND
MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF
WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS
NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27Id.,
at p. 5.The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a)
whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of
their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with
the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the
adoptees. _______________ 23 Id., at p. 35. 24 CA Rollo, p. 55. 25 Rollo, p. 22. 26
Id., at pp. 3-20. 27 Id., at p. 5. 424
ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic The Courts RulingThe petition is denied

for lack of merit.It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept,
as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28153 Phil. 339; 54 SCRA 66 (1973). that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection
of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a
child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29Id., at pp. 346-347; p.
73.However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998,
296 SCRA 128. the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats
matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son,
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia
Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of _______________ 32 Re
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion
Adoption of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877. 426
to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic her minor children.
child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the
Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of
child.31Id., at p. 157.Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
the petition.Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides: _______________ 28 153 Phil. 339; 54
mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left
SCRA 66 (1973). 29 Id., at pp. 346-347; p. 73. 30 G.R. No. 105308, September 25,
for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care
1998, 296 SCRA 128. 31 Id., at p. 157. 425
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 425
of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
Landingin vs. Republic Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.After
provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother,
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the
hereby required:(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;(b) The biological
RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the
parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;(c) The legitimate and adopted
meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
of her three children by the petitioner.Petitioners contention must be rejected. When
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if
she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.
living with said adopter and the latters spouse, if any;(e) The spouse, if any, of the
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
person adopting or to be adopted.The general requirement of consent and notice to
be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If,
the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32Re Adoption
guardian.Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child
of Cannon, 243 Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877.Clearly, the written consent of the
without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
parental duties.33Matter of Adoption of Eder, 312 Or. 244, 821 P.2d 400 (1991). The
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she
abandons the child.34In Re: McLean, 179 N.Y.S. 182,183, 109 Misc. 479.
426 SUPREME
_______________ 33 Matter of Adoption of Eder, 312 Or. 244, 821 P.2d 400
children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children
(1991). 34 In Re: McLean, 179 N.Y.S. 182,183, 109 Misc. 479. 427
VOL. 493,
financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents.
JUNE 27, 2006 427 Landingin vs. Republic Merely permitting the child to remain
Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.39Records, p. 44.x x x
for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment.35Truelove
xV. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:x x x xAs
v. Parker, 132, S.G. 251, 191 N.C. 430. To dispense with the requirement of consent,
the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps
the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36Slattery v.
them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness
Hartford v. Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N.W. 902 (1931).In this case,
on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems
petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim
she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40Id., at p. 45.x x x
that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that
x_______________ 38 Id., at p. 21. 39 Records, p. 44. 40 Id., at p. 45.
matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now? A She left
for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for
Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family? A None, sir.
Q How about with her children? A None, sir. Q Do you know what place in Italy
did she reside? A I do not know, sir. Q Did you receive any news about Amelia
Ramos? A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man. Q
From whom did you learn that? A From others who came from Italy, sir. Q Did
you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage? A Yes, sir, she
got two kids.37TSN, April 4, 2002, pp. 9-10. Elaine, the eldest of the minors,
testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now? A In Italy, sir. _______________
35 Truelove v. Parker, 132, S.G. 251, 191 N.C. 430. 36 Slattery v. Hartford v.
Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N.W. 902 (1931). 37 TSN, April 4, 2002,
pp. 9-10. 428
Republic
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Landingin vs.
Q When did your mother left for Italy? A After my father died, sir. Q
How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990? A Two years old, sir. Q
At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38Id., at p. 21. However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social
Worker also stated the following:IV. Background of the Case:x x x xSince the
mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their
maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their
deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her
429
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 429 Landingin vs. Republic In their 5 years of
married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a
happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which
include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being
ashamed of just depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she decided to
work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in
going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.When she left for Italy in November
1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who
returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.While working in
Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners
since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an
annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.Amelia also sends financial support ranging from
P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of
P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41Id., at p. 46.Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints.
be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document _______________
Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
42 Republic Act No. 8552, Sec. 16. 43 Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at p.
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as
153. 44 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996, 255
claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
SCRA 438. 45 Supra note 9. 431
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children,
Republic notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No.
though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
2103,46Enacted on January 26, 1912. which states:Section 2. An instrument or
_______________ 41 Id., at p. 46. 430
document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
ANNOTATED Landingin vs. Republic Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between
following requirements:(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
vested on the adopter.42Republic Act No. 8552, Sec. 16. It would thus be against the
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place
spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children.
the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children,
where the act is done.(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he
adopting parent.43Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at p. 153. Again, it is the
is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.Section 34, Rule 132 of
and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to
the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the
rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The
barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings
officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless
who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary
formally offered.44Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29,
public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which
1996, 255 SCRA 438.Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of
he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take
the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the
of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.As
children45Supra note 9. was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to
the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with
VOL. 493, JUNE 27, 2006 431 Landingin vs.
the afore-cited law, the same can _______________ 46 Enacted on January 26,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention
1912. 432
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Landingin vs.
in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at
Republic at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity
Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized.
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by
Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47RULES
adoption proceedings.Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether
OF COURT, Rule 132-B, Section 20.Since, in the instant case, no further proof was
petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children in the US. She only has a parttime job, and she is rather of age. While
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is
relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her
personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former
siblings.48Rollo, p. 34. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially
and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation
capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to
earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and
support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA
siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the
on this issue.While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
Study Report that petitioner has limited income. Accordingly, it appears that she
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a
will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the
new petition for adoption of the herein minors.WHEREFORE, premises considered,
minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a
the petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.Since the
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.Petition denied.
primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and
considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be
adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.According to the
Adoption Home Study Report49Records, pp. 62-73. forwarded by the Department
of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer _______________ 47 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132-B,
Section 20. 48 Rollo, p. 34. 49 Records, pp. 62-73. 433
VOL. 493, JUNE 27,
2006 433 Landingin vs. Republic supporting her legitimate children, as the latter
are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
434
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson),
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Chaves vs. National
Labor Relations Commission Notes.The written consent of the natural parent to

the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. (Cang vs. Court of Appeals,
296 SCRA 128 [1998]) The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if
the parent has abandoned the child. (Ibid.) Abandonment of a child by his parents
means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children. (Ibid.) o0o
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved [Landingin vs.
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
Republic, 493 SCRA 415(2006)]
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other

words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 473 St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos G.R. No.
cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that
143363. February 6, 2002.*FIRST DIVISION. ST. MARYS ACADEMY,
cause,
petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA
_______________ * FIRST DIVISION.
DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO

VILLANUEVA, respondents.Schools and Universities; Persons and Institutions
With Special Parental Authority Over Minor Children; The special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.Under Article 218 of the Family Code,
the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
under their supervision, instruction, or custody. Same; Same; For a school to be
liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In
order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
474
which,
in
natural
and
continuous
sequence,
unbroken
by
any
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED St. Marys Academy
vs. Carpitanos efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.Liability for the accident,
whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents
primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause
of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Quasi-Delicts; Torts;
Motor Vehicles; The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held
that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs._______________ 1 In CA-G.R.
that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
CV No. 56728, promulgated on February 29, 2000, Reyes, Jr., J., ponente, Martin,
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
Jr. and Brawner, JJ., concurring.
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.PETITION for
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
respondents Daniel and Villanueva.
Peter Y. Co for
Feliciano M. Maraon for respondents
Carpitanos.
475
476
vs. Carpitanos 2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr.
and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages
above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of
Dipolog City;3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 475 St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos
commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St.
PARDO, J.:The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1In CA-G.R. CV
Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same
No. 56728, promulgated on February 29, 2000, Reyes, Jr., J., ponente, Martin, Jr.
being adjudged against de-fendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against
and Brawner, JJ., concurring. of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution
his parents;4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability.
denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an
His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby
accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit
DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-
the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment. The FactsThe facts, as
206).From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-
found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:Claiming damages for the death of
appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for
their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.On 20 February
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, PREMISES
Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:1. Defendant
then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.Sherwin Carpitanos
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:a. FIFTY
died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.2Rollo, pp. 53-55.In
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
due time, petitioner St. Marys Academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Carpitanos;b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred
Appeals.3Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56728.On February 29, 2000, the Court of
by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS
Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but
(P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
otherwise affirming the decision a quo in toto.4Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 52-
70. _______________ 2 Rollo, pp. 53-55. 3 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56728. 4
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 52-70. 477
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 477
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys
over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those
Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22,
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5Petition, Annex B, Rollo, pp. 72-
exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. 478
73.Hence, this appeal.6Petition filed on July 17, 2000, Rollo, pp. 9-48. On July 16,
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED St. Marys Academy vs.
2001, we gave due course to the petition, Rollo, pp. 202-203. The Issues1) Whether
Carpitanos supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
of Sherwin Carpitanos.2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
of moral damages against the petitioner. The Courts RulingWe reverse the decision
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
of the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 2187Article 218. The
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school
School, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
or its teachers.9Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, Alicia V.
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over
Sempio-Diy (1997), p. 344.Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person
the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. A... and
under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
2198Article 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction, or custody.10The Family
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
Code of the Philippines Annotated, Rufus B. Rodriguez (1990), p. 505.However, for
persons exercis... of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must
in the jeep.Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
have a causal connection to the accident.11Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
parental authority over a minor child while under their _______________ 5 Petition,
Appeals, 360 Phil. 199, 208; 300 SCRA 20 [1998].In order that there may be a
Annex B, Rollo, pp. 72-73. 6 Petition filed on July 17, 2000, Rollo, pp. 9-48. On
recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery
July 16, 2001, we gave due course to the petition, Rollo, pp. 202-203. 7 Article 218.
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
The School, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence
the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and
must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
premises of the school, entity or institution. 8 Article 219. Those given the authority
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 12Cruz
vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 872, 886; 282 SCRA 188 [1997]._______________ 9
accident.Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, Alicia V. Sempio-Diy (1997), p.
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must
344. 10 The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Rufus B. Rodriguez (1990),
be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
p. 505. 11 Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 199, 208; 300
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and
SCRA 20 [1998]. 12 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 872, 886; 282 SCRA 188
the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment
[1997].
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
479
480
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 479 St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos In
this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
vs. Carpitanos The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
proximate cause of the death of the victim.Respondents Daniel spouses and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.13Ford Philippines v.
of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
Citibank, G.R. No. 128604, January 29, 2001; 350 SCRA 446; Bank of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel
Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 641, 659 [2000]; Bataclan v.
spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the
Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 [1957].Considering that the negligence of the minor
cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be
spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
held liable for the death resulting from such accident.Consequently, we find that
report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
turtle.Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
Appeals.Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the
recovered if they are the proximate result of defendants wrongful act or
reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219
omission.14Article 2217 of the Civil Code. In this case, the proximate cause of the
of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the
accident was not attributable to petitioner.For the reason that petitioner was not
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.Further, there was no
petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep
Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than
of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
the rule.15Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil. 98, 111;
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the
273 SCRA 562 [1997]. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.16Morales
for damages based on quasi-delict for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving
v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil. 397, 422; 274 SCRA 282 [1997]. Thus, the grant of
the motor vehicle. (FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA
attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.Incidentally, there was no
718 [1998]) A party who asserts that another person, by violation of the Land
question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He
Transportation and Traffic Code, contributed to the collision _______________ 17
never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of
Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705, June 29, 2001, 360
any _______________ 13 Ford Philippines v. Citibank, G.R. No. 128604, January
SCRA 395; Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 107 [1957]. 18 CA-G.R. No. CV No.
29, 2001; 350 SCRA 446; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 326
56728. 19 In Civil Case No. 4924. 482
SCRA 641, 659 [2000]; Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 [1957]. 14 Article
ANNOTATED Mendezona vs. Ozamiz of vehicles, has the burden of showing a
2217 of the Civil Code. 15 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
causal connection between the injury received and the alleged violation, i.e., that the
340 Phil. 98, 111; 273 SCRA 562 [1997]. 16 Morales v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil.
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
397, 422; 274 SCRA 282 [1997]. 481
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 481 St.
substantially contributed theretonegligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
a contributing cause of the injury. (Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.17Aguilar Sr. v.
Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 [1998]) Accident and negligence are intrinsically
Commercial Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 395; Erezo
contradictoryone cannot exist with the other. (Jarco Marketing Corporation vs.
v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 107 [1957]. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 375 [1999]) The mere fact that an employee was using
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
charge his employer with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. The FalloWHEREFORE, the Court
employment. (Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez, Jr., 321 SCRA 393
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the de cision of the Court of Appeals18CA-G.R. No.
[1999])o0o
CV No. 56728. and that of the trial court.19In Civil Case No. 4924. The Court
remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants,
excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.No costs.SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J.,
In the result.Judgment reversed and set aside. Case remanded to trial court for
determination of liability of defendants.Notes.A rent-a-car company is not liable
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [St. Marys
Academy vs. Carpitanos, 376 SCRA 473(2002)]

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A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.October 12, 2010.

*IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES

Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an

OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL

another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.At its most

To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas,

the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of

footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of referencing, he and

pagination, and for every technical detail of form.

statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law

(2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it

footnoting_______________* EN BANC.608608SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate

Justice Mariano C. Del Castillostandards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical

modified, passages added or deleted. Nothing in the letter609VOL. 632,

affirmed the academic freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a

Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillosuggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not

preclude a researchers inadvertent error.

Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to others.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

the attendance of the other parties.

Same; Same; Plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is

the sameat a cost (as

612SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

to a halt under such a proposition.611VOL. 632, OCTOBER 12, 2010611In the

J., Concurring Opinion:Judgments; Words and Phrases;

Same; Same; There is no requirement of extent of copying or a minimum number of

Same; Same; Judicial Plagiarism; Findings of judicial plagiarism do not necessarily

demands for rehearing or the reversal of rulings.Findings of judicial plagiarism do

meanings to support the decision.

The Background Facts

abdication of judicative duties, the relinquishing of independence to defendants, the

failure to maintain impartiality, and therefore, as an act of judicial plagiarism, was a

civil action of certiorari with application for preliminary mandatory injunction

process of law. The three-judge panel denied the motion.

Same; Same; Unless reconsidered, the Court would unfortunately be remembered as

making or to other written intellectual activity.Unless reconsidered, this Court

would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made malicious intent an

Department, represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in

indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an

filing claims against the Japanese military officers who

exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling

614SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of

of judicial decision-making or to other written intellectual activity. It will also

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo

as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of

International Law (2006); andc.Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J.

to the petitioners.Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts

reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues,

the true intents of the plagiarized sources _______________

1 Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Exhibit A, p. 5.

as consultant of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the Courts conclusion that

norms that treaties cannot diminish.

(obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations) that is not

for victims of war crimes.

the Committee to hear the Justices court re-_______________5 Statement of the

COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.,

their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee

submitted its unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.The IssuesThis

Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis._______________6 Transcript of Stenographic

whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting

Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo2. Whether or