G.R. No.

L-44347 September 29, 1988

VICENTE TAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.
Occea Law Office for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondent.
FACTS:
The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their lifetime, were
residents of Davao City. As they were childless, they adopted a three-year old
girl whom they named Dominga Garcia and brought up as their own. At the
age of nineteen years, Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias
Seng Yap, with whom she had three children, named Vicente, who was born
in 1916, Mariano who was born in 1918, and Luis who was born in 1921. In
1923, Dominga Garcia and her three children emigrated to Canton, China. In
less than a year, Tan Seng followed his family to his country of origin.
Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left in the Philippines a 1,966square-meter lot on Claveria Street, Townsite of Davao, District of Davao,
registered in her name under T.C.T. No. 296 (T-2774) of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City. Since her departure for China with her family, neither
she, nor her husband, nor any of their children has returned to the Philippines
to claim the lot.
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In 1948, her
nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected
the rentals from the owners of other houses occupying the land. Another
nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in a burst of civic spirit, informed the
Solicitor General about the property. The City Fiscal and NBI agents, Antonio
Gonzaga and Felix Valencia, investigated Segundo Reyes, Ramon Pizarro
and Aurelio Pizarro regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia, Tan Seng,
and their children.
City of Davao filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I
(Special Civil Case No. 1220) to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in
its favor. RTC dismissed petition, CA affirmed the appealed decision. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Davao had personality to file escheat petition.

HELD:
With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General, may file the escheat petition under
Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Appellate Court
correctly ruled that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition
was filed on September 12,1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of
the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.When a person dies intestate,
seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or
person by law entitled to the same, the municipality or city where the
deceased last resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or
city in which he had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may file a
petition in the court of first instance of the province setting forth the facts, and
praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, may commence escheat
proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964. Although the escheat
proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be
applied to the petition because to do so would work injustice to the City of
Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving" clause:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases
brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases
pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure shall apply.
G.R. No. 192413
June 13, 2012
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner,
vs.
Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Before the Court is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against
respondents Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri) and Luz R. Bakunawa
(Bakunawa).

The case before the RTC involved the Complaint for Escheat filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pursuant to Act No. 3936, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 679 (P.D. 679), against certain deposits, credits,
and unclaimed balances held by the branches of various banks in the
Philippines. The trial court declared the amounts, subject of the special
proceedings, escheated to the Republic and ordered them deposited with the
Treasurer of the Philippines (Treasurer) and credited in favor of the
Republic.3 The assailed RTC judgments included an unclaimed balance in
the amount of P 1,019,514.29, maintained by RCBC in its Ermita Business
Center branch.
ISSUE:
WON allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic.
HELD:
Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue
of its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed
property, without there being an interested person having a legal claim
thereto.15 In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status,
custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the
inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or
abandonment by the depositor.16 If after the proceedings the property
remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be
reverted to the state "to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first
comers."17 However, if interested parties have come forward and lain claim
to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit
should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state.18 We
emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing
to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the
state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is
substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or
without an owner.19
G.R. No. 143483
January 31, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA
H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO , J.:

FACTS:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins
executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found.
The lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in favor
of the state.
HELD:
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession
or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and
claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no
heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since
escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such
property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may
be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed
within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim
not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it
is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in

asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.

G.R. No. L-44658

January 24, 1936
EMILIA DIVINO, as guardian of the minors Bienvenido Esperanza and
Narciso surnamed Loo Tan y Divino, petitioner,
vs.
CEFERINO HILARIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao and
THE MUNICIPALITY OF GUIANGA, respondents.
Suazo,
Bastida
and
Pelayo
for
petitioner.
No appearance for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner, as guardian of the minors
Bienvenido, Esperanza and Narciso, surnamed Loo Tan y Divino, to the end
that this court should set aside and nullify the order issued by the respondent
judge on August 24, 1935, that the respondent municipality with the clerk of
court the sum of P5,000, that the above-named minors should be declared
heirs of the deceased Tan Chay entitled to inherit in equal share said amount
of money, and that they should be granted such other remedy as may be just
and equitable.
ISSUE:
WON the minors should be declared heirs.
HELD:
Section 750 provides how the Court of First Instance may acquire jurisdiction
over the properties left by s deceased who resided in the Philippine Islands
and may decree its escheat to the municipality where he resided. It provides
that the municipal president and the municipal council may file a petition to
that effect, whereupon the court shall set the same for hearing and shall
cause the latter to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the

province where the deceased had resided, or in default thereof, in some

newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate, for a
period of six successive weeks, the last of which publications shall be at least
six weeks before the time appointed for the trial. Section 752 provides that
any heir or legatee may appear in the proceeding within 17 years, and after
establishing his hereditary right, it shall be the duty of the court to order the
municipality to which the estate was escheated to return the same for
adjudication to the former, and in case it had been sold the municipality shall
return its avails after deducting charges for its care.
In the case under consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750 has
neither been followed nor complied with, wherefore, we hold that the
respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao did not acquire
jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the escheat case or to promulgate the
order of August 24, 1935, whereby the sum of P5,000 was escheated or
adjudicated the municipality of Guianga. No petition was filed either by the
required publication made which was the essential step which should have
conferred jurisdiction.
As the special proceeding No. 314 has been instituted, neither could the
petitioner resort to the remedy granted by section 752, because if the
respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao never acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the escheat case, it is clear and logical that
they neither have jurisdiction to grant the aforesaid remedy. As we have seen,
the only petition which conferred jurisdiction over the state of the deceased
Tan Chay was that filed by Tan Kui Sing, which was for the sole purpose of
appointing a special administrator to represent the deceased in the appeal
interposed in civil cause No. 1147 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. If
another petition for the appointment of a regular administrator had been filed,
it should have been incumbent on the court to follow the entire procedure in
intestacy in order to determine the heirs and to distribute finally the estate
among them.

G.R. No. L-16106

December 30, 1961
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., defendants,
THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK
FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines filed on September 25, 1957 before the Court
of First Instance of Manila a complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed bank
deposits balances, against several banks, among them the First National City
Bank of New York. It is alleged that pursuant to Section 2 of said Act
defendant banks forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement
under oath of their respective managing officials of all the credits and
deposits held by them in favor of persons known to be dead or who have not
made further deposits or withdrawals during the period of 10 years or more.
Wherefore, it is prayed that said credits and deposits be escheated to the
Republic of the Philippines by ordering defendant banks to deposit them to its
credit with the Treasurer of the Philippines.
In its answer the First National City Bank of New York claims that, while it
admits that various savings deposits, pre-war inactive accounts, and sundry
accounts contained in its report submitted to the Treasurer of the Philippines
pursuant to Act No. 3936, totalling more than P100,000.00, which remained
dormant for 10 years or more, are subject to escheat however, it has
inadvertently included in said report certain items amounting to P18,589.89
which, properly speaking, are not credits or deposits within the contemplation
of Act No. 3936. Hence, it prayed that said items be not included in the claim
of plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WON demand draft and telegraphic orders come within the meaning of the
term "credits" or "deposits" employed in the law? Can their import be
considered as a sum credited on the books of the bank to a person who
appears to be entitled to it? Do they create a creditor-debtor relationship
between drawee and the payee?
HELD:
To begin with, we may say that a demand draft is a bill of exchange payable
on demand (Arnd vs. Aylesworth, 145 Iowa 185; Ward vs. City Trust
Company, 102 N.Y.S. 50; Bank of Republic vs. Republic State Bank, 42 S.W.
2d, 27). Considered as a bill of exchange, a draft is said to be, like the former,
an open letter of request from, and an order by, one person on another to pay
a sum of money therein mentioned to a third person, on demand or at a future
time therein specified (13 Words and Phrases, 371). As a matter of fact, the
term "draft" is often used, and is the common term, for all bills of exchange.
And the words "draft" and "bill of exchange" are used indiscriminately (Ennis

vs. Coshoctan Nat. Bank, 108 S.E., 811; Hinnemann vs. Rosenback, 39 N.Y.
98, 100, 101; Wilson vs. Bechenau, 48 Supp. 272, 275).
On the other hand, a bill of exchange within the meaning of our Negotiable
Instruments Law (Act No. 2031) does not operate as an assignment of funds
in the hands of the drawee who is not liable on the instrument until he accepts
it. This is the clear import of Section 127. It says: "A bill of exchange of itself
does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee
available for the payment thereon and the drawee is not liable on the bill
unless and until he accepts the same." In other words, in order that a drawee
may be liable on the draft and then become obligated to the payee it is
necessary that he first accepts the same. In fact, our law requires that with
regard to drafts or bills of exchange there is need that they be presented
either for acceptance or for payment within a reasonable time after their
issuance or after their last negotiation thereof as the case may be (Section
71, Act 2031). Failure to make such presentment will discharge the drawer
from liability or to the extent of the loss caused by the delay (Section 186,
Ibid.)
A cashier's check issued by a bank, however, is not an ordinary draft. The
latter is a bill of exchange payable demand. It is an order upon a third party
purporting to drawn upon a deposit of funds. Drinkall v. Movious State Bank,
11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724, 57 L.R.A. 341, 95 Am. St. Rep. 693; State v. Tyler
County State Bank (Tex. Com. App.) 277 S.W. 625, 42 A.L.R. 1347. A
cashier's check is of a very different character. It is the primary obligation of
the bank which issues it (Nissenbaum v. State, 38 Ga. App. 253, S.E. 776)
and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand (Steinmetz v. Schultz,
59 S.D. 603, 241 N.W. 734)....lawphil.net
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XIII, HON. JESUS P.
MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK INC.,
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known as the Unclaimed
Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein private respondent Pres.
Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of
1968 separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of

all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such
depositors or creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from,
or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding
ten years or more. In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent
Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126.54
and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.
Upon receipt of these sworn statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines
caused the same to be published in the February 25, March 3 and March 10,
1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald", an English newspaper, and the"El
Debate", a Spanish newspaper, both of general circulation in the Philippines.
Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted
before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31
banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise named defendants
therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors reported in the sworn
statements and listed in Annex "A" of the complaint. Summonses were
accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring
them to file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the
first publication of the summons with notice that should they fail to file their
answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by default. The aforesaid
complaint, list of depositors-creditors (Annex "A"of the complaint), summons
and notice were duly published in the August 25, September 1, and
September 8, 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald" and "El Debate."
On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to
dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue.
Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was granted in the first
assailed Order. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having
been denied in the second assailed order.
ISSUE:
WON Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings
HELD:
We find these contentions unmeritorious.
A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of
the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this
definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government
would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this
sense that it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this
reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall
be joined as a party in the action for escheat, thus:

Section 3. Whenever the Attorney General shall be informed of such

unclaimed balances, he shall commence an action or actions in the name of
the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province
where the bank is located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank and
such creditors or depositors. All or any member of such creditors or
depositors or banks, may be included in one action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not
have provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings.
Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, private respondent
bank is a real party in interest as its presence in the action is necessary for a
complete determination and settlement of the questions involved therein.
Private respondent bank being a real party in interest, it may and can file a
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
In defense of the second issue raised, petitioner points to the last sentence of
Section 3 of Act No. 3936 above-quoted as authority for saying that the venue
of the escheat proceedings was properly laid in the City of Manila. Petitioner's
reliance on said sentence is patently misplaced, the same having been
obviously read out of context instead of in relation to the sentence preceding
it.
The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General,
now Solicitor General, to commence an action or actions in the name of the
People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where
the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant.
It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to
cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally
feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same
section, i.e., the province where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of the
last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that
for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the
same province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may be
made parties defendant "in one action" 2 was clearly intended to save on
litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the
lumping together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in one single
escheat proceedings.

G.R. No. 153142

March 29, 2010
CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, assisted by her husband, ELEUTERIO
MABANAG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D.
ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, Respondents.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Romulo A. Coronel, Alarico A. Coronel, Annette A. Coronel, Annabelle C.
Gonzales, Floraida C. Tupper, and Cielito A. Coronel (Coronels) executed a
document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that they received
from respondent Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (Ramona), through Ramonas
mother, respondent Concepcion D. Alcaraz (Concepcion), the sum of
P50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for
their "inherited house and lot
The receipt of down payment contained other stipulations, as follows:
We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased
father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon
our receipt of the down payment above-stated.
On our presentation of the TCT already in our name, we will immediately
execute the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz shall immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00. 3
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the
Coronels father (Constancio P. Coronel) was transferred in the name of the
Coronels under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 327043 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No.
327043 to the petitioner for the higher price of P1,580,000.00 after the latter
delivered an initial sum of P300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels
rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her downpayment of
P50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, through one Gloria P. Noel as her
attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in
her own name in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City against the
Coronels, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore
be raised to forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment.
HELD:

The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of
the respondents qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is
fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity.13 Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug,14 this Court had the occasion to
hold that a judgment involving the same parties, the same facts, and the
same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any other
admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.

G.R. No. L-45460

February 25, 1938
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicantsappellants,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.
FACTS:
This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in
behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they
claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat The Colegio
de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the petition upon the
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the
case and that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the
applicants to the remedy prayed for; and asked that the petition be finally
dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion asking for the
dismissal or the petition upon the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure,
under which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was not yet in
force when the original owner of the hacienda died, which was in April, 1596,

and that the petition was irregularly docketed as the applicants had paid at
the docket fees which the clerk of court should collect. Subsequently the
attorneys for both parties filed another motions of minor importance, almost
all of which contains the arguments advanced in support of their contentions.
ISSUES:
WON municipality of San Jose has neither right standing to file a petition for
escheat; that the petition does not state facts sufficient a cause of action and
that the same does not lie, and that the Court of First Instance of Laguna is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide said petition.
HELD:
In the appealed resolution the court held that the municipality of San Pedro,
represented by the petitioners, has no personality to institute the petition for
escheat that the latter does not state sufficient facts, and that the court is
without jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the proceeding or to grant the
remedy sought. These legal conclusions are the subject matter of the fourth
assignment of error.
According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to
the escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the
Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were
confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on the Crown
of Spain. The following allegations of the petition are important and specific
and clearly the theory maintained by the petitioners: "11. As a result of the
perpetual expulsion of the Jesuits in their dominions, the King also decreed
the confiscation of all their properties, estate, rents, foundation, etc., in favor
of the Crown of Spain, and the order of the King was thus complied with here
in the Philippines. The Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa from then on passed
to the Crown of Spain under the administration and management on its
respective here, the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands. 12. As a
result of the war between Spain and the United States, the latter acquired by
way of transfer, all the properties of the Crown of Spain in the Philippines,
under articles III and VIII of the Treaty of Peace entered into in Paris on
December 10, 1989, and among which properties was included the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan. 13. That the said hacienda thereafter passed to the
Government of the Philippines Islands by virtue of the Act of the United States
Congress of July 1, 1992 (Philippine Bill), by mere administration for the
benefit of the inhabitant of the Philippines; and there after, under the TydingsMcDuffie law approved by the same Congress on March 24, 1934, section 5,
the United States, in turn, have ceded to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, upon its inauguration, all the properties, estate, etc., ceded by

Spain to the United States as above stated, among them being the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan. Said Commonwealth was inaugurated on November
15, 1935."
If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to
be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already
passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident
that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said
municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a
deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may legality claim
it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a
petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was
confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of
the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or
the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the
petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some other right
to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition which
gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot
avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. We, therefore, hold that the court did not commit the error
assigned in ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts justifying the
escheat of the hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in finally
dismissing the same. Having reached this conclusion we do not believe it
necessary to go into further considerations regarding the personality of the
municipality of San Pedro and the court's lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 170207

April 19, 2010
VICENTE CAWIS (substituted by his son, EMILIO CAWIS), PEDRO
BACLANGEN, FELIZA DOMILIES, IVAN MANDI-IT a.k.a. IVAN MANDI-IT
LUPADIT, DOMINGO CAWIS and GERARD LIBATIQUE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as the DENR Secretary, HON.
MANUEL GEROCHI, in his capacity as the Director, Lands, Management
Bureau, and MA. EDELIZA PERALTA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), pursuant to

Section 795 of the Public Land Act, 6 approved the sales patent application of
Jose V. Andrada (Andrada) for Lot No. 47 with an area of 1,339 square
meters situated within Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision in Baguio City. Sales
Patent No. 1319 was issued to Andrada upon full payment of the purchase
price of the lot on 20 November 1968, as evidenced by O.R. No. 459651. 7
On 4 August 1969, Republic Act No. 6099 8 took effect. It provided that subject
to certain conditions, parcels of land within the Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision,
which included Lot No. 47, would be sold to the actual occupants without the
necessity of a public bidding, in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 730.9
Claiming to be the actual occupants referred to in R.A. No. 6099, petitioners
protested the sales patent awarded to Andrada. The Bureau of Lands denied
their protest on the ground that R.A. No. 6099, being of later passage, could
no longer affect the earlier award of sales patent to Andrada. Petitioners
sought reconsideration, but the Bureau of Lands denied it on 19 May 1987.
Petitioners failed to appeal the adverse decision of the Bureau of Lands to
any higher administrative authority or to the courts. Thus, the decision had
attained finality.10
Sometime in 1987, private respondent Ma. Edeliza S. Peralta (Peralta)
purchased Lot No. 47 from Andrada. On 28 October 1987, the Deputy Public
Land Inspector, in his final report of investigation, 11 found that neither Andrada
nor Peralta had constructed a residential house on the lot, which was
required in the Order of Award and set as a condition precedent for the
issuance of the sales patent. Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the
petitioners, who had built a house on Lot No. 47.
On 13 November 1987, Sales Patent No. 1319 was nonetheless transferred
to Peralta. In the Order for the Issuance of Patent, 12 the Assistant Director of
Lands verified the investigation conducted by the Land Inspector, whose
report was fully endorsed by the District Land Officer, that Peralta had
complied with the requirements of the law regarding the construction of
improvements on the land applied for. In the Order for Transfer of Sales
Rights,13 the Director of Lands confirmed that before the transfer of the sales
patent to Peralta, Andrada had complied with the construction requirement.
On 4 December 1987, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1604 14 was
duly issued in Peraltas name.
On 8 September 1998, petitioners filed a complaint 15 before the trial court
alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales
patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47. They claimed they
had interest in the lot as qualified beneficiaries of R.A. No. 6099 who met the
conditions prescribed in R.A. No. 730. They argued that upon the enactment
of R.A. No. 6099, Andradas sales patent was deemed cancelled and revoked
in their favor.

In her answer with a motion to dismiss, 16 Peralta averred that petitioners have
no cause of action against her, that she obtained her title after compliance
with the legal requirements, that her title was issued more than ten years prior
to the filing of the complaint, that the action was a collateral attack on a title,
and that even if the action was a direct attack, petitioners were not the proper
parties.
ISSUES:
The twin issues raised by petitioners are (1) whether the actual occupants of
parcels of land covered by R.A. No. 6099, which includes Lot No. 47, have
standing to question the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate
of title issued over Lot No. 47; and (2) whether the suit for annulment of title
allegedly issued through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, has prescribed.
HELD:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in
bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act and our ruling in Alvarico v. Sola.23 Private
persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain. 24 Only the OSG or the officer acting in
his stead may do so. Since the title originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee.251avvphi1
Similarly, in Urquiaga v. CA,26 this Court held that there is no need to pass
upon any allegation of actual fraud in the acquisition of a title based on a
sales patent. Private persons have no right or interest over land considered
public at the time the sales application was filed. They have no personality to
question the validity of the title. We further stated that granting, for the sake of
argument, that fraud was committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a
reversion case, which is the proper party to file the necessary action. 27
In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed the
sales patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the validity of the
award of sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation

should thus be initiated by the State. The State has not done so and thus, we
have to uphold the validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as the
corresponding original certificate of title issued based on the patent.
At any rate, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may directly
resolve the issue of alleged fraud in the acquisition of a sales patent although
the action is instituted by a private person. In this connection, the 19 May
1987 letter of the Director of Lands to petitioner Vicente Cawis is instructive:
As to your allegation that the award in favor of applicant-respondent
(Andrada) should be cancelled as he failed to introduce improvements on the
land, we find the said contention to be untenable. Somewhere in your letter
dated July 11, 1983, you stated that you took possession of the lot in question
in the early 1950s, introduced improvements thereon, and resided therein
continuously up to the present. By your own admission, it would appear that
you were the ones who made it impossible for Mr. Andrada to take
possession of the said lot and to improve the same. This being the case, the
failure of the applicant-respondent (Andrada) to introduce improvements on
the land in question is not attributable to him.
G.R. No. 151243
April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr against Nelly S.
Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna.
a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered
into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However,
[Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the
partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she
did not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after
trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of
Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the
following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of

paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When
she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando]
the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her
repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered
the partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she
already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984
after the complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy
thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action against
her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who
is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is
the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the
corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly authorized to
do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that
they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint
was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an
Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss
prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting
the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos] amended
complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense
undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear
as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the
transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale
siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

HELD:
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of
Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner,
with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed
minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those

residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified
of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is
indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as
his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could
help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives
living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple:
because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of
a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only
insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter
into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the
supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
G.R. No. 191993
December 5, 2012
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over the person and
properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
He averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a
resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of
a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take
care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of
deceit and exploitation.3
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due
course to the same and scheduled it for hearing, Leonardo Biason (Biason)
filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached
therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of
the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that
he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of
the petition for the appointment of the latters guardian. He vehemently

opposed the appointment of Abad as Mauras guardian as he cannot possibly

perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura
maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be
appointed as Mauras guardian since he was previously granted by the latter
with a power of attorney to manage her properties. 4
RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abads petition and appointing Biason as
Mauras guardian.
Hoewever, pending the proceedings, Biason died.
ISSUE:
WON issues raised by Abad became moot and academic.
HELD:
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.22
In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated
August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his
appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied
his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging
Biasons qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
guardian for Maura. However, with Biasons demise, it has become
impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a
well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. 23 The supervening
event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason s
appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or
anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.1wphi1
Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that the petition has
lost its purpose and even consented to Mauras prayer for the dismissal of the
petition.
G.R. No. 114217
October 13, 2009
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,1
Petitioners,
vs.

ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY,
BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY, JULIETA SY, and
ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 150797
ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA TAN,
and MA. EMMA SY, Petitioners,
vs.
BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY,
LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY,
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose, Julian and Oscar are children of the deceased Sy Bang from
his first marriage. Other petitioners include
Zenaida and Ma. Emma who are the wife and child of Jose. Respondents
Rosauro and eight others are children of Sy
Bang from his second marriage with his suriing spouse respondent
Rosita !errera "Sy.
Sy Bang died intestate in #$%# and in an out"of"court conference, the
children of &oth marriages diided upon themseles
the control and management of Sy Bang's arious &usinesses. (ertain
controersies arose which prompted respondent
Rolando to file a (omplaint of Partition against the petitioners. Rosita !
errera"Sy also filed a motion for payment of
widow's allowance. !rom the time of Sy Bang's death until the filing of the
motion in #$$), she claimed she was not
gien any widow's allowance. She cited Rule *++- of the Ro(.
Petitioners argued that Rule *++- is granted only during the settlement of the
estate and such allowance/ shall &e ta0en
from the common mass of property/ during li1uidation. Since this case is a
special ciil action for partition under Rule
)$, Rosita is not entitled to any widow's allowance. 2he (ourt granted Rosita's
motion for payment of widow's
allowance. Petitioners argued that Rosita had already e3ecuted a
Sinumpaang Salaysay waiing any claims against the
petitioners in e3change of a parcel of land and # million pesos. Respondents
countered that Rosita was no longer in full
possession of her mental faculties when she signed the waier. Petitioners
also argued that under Rule *++- a widow's
allowance can only &e paid in an estate proceeding. Een if the case for
partition &e considered as estate proceedings, only

the trial court hearing the partition case had e3clusie 4urisdiction to
e3ecute the payment of the allowance.
5n the meantime, Respondents filed a 4oint petition for the guardianship of
Rosita !errer"Sy where Rosauro Sy, who
sought to &e named special guardian, filed &efore the guardianship court a
motion to order the deposit of the widow's
allowance. 2he (ourt ruled in faor of the deposit of the widow's allowance.
2he petitioners all failed to comply with the
ruling. 2hey were all found guilty of contempt of court.
2he petitioners, who are now Zenaida and Emma, argued that they should
not &e made to pay the allowance as they did
not hae any participation in the management of the &usinesses of Sy Bang.
6lso, the said allowance must come from the
estate of Sy Bang and not from Jose or any of the latter's heirs. 2hey also
as0ed that the (ourt should e1ually diide the
lia&ility for the widow's allowance &etween the children of the first and
second marriages. 2hey also raised the issue of
the alidity of Rosita's marriage to Sy Bang. 2hey claimed that the
documents proing such were falsified.
ISSUES:
7hether or not the 8uardianship court has e3ceeded its 4urisdiction in
directing the deposit of the widow's allowance9
7hether or not the respondents are also lia&le for the payment of the widow's
allowance as heirs of Sy Bang9
HELD:
2he court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited 4urisdiction. 5t had
no 4urisdiction to enforce payment of the
widow's allowance. 2he court/ cited in Rule *+ +- is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate and it is this court
which has 4urisdiction oer the properties of the estate, to the e3clusion of
all the other courts. 5n a cited case, the court
said that the 8uardianship (ourt may order the deliery of the property of the
ward to the guardian only if the property
clearly &elongs to the ward or if the title has &een 4udicially decided.
2he widow's allowance is chargea&le to the estate of Sy Bang and since
petitioners are the one holding the properties
&elonging to Sy Bang, they should pay for the allowance.

5n order to effect a partition of properties

so that the other children may be made liable
-, the issue of ownership or co"
ownership must &e first resoled in the action for partition. 5n the settlement
of estate proceedings, the distri&ution of the
estate properties can only &e made
G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Nilo, Cirilos father, filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of
Cirilo. In his petition, Nilo alleged due to old gage, Cirilo has become sickly,
in fact suffered two strokes, have had lapses of memory and shown to be
incapable of managing his property, hence, easy prey to manipulation of his
girlfriend. Cirilo opposed the petition, filing his Opposition and Supplemental
Opposition. Nilo then presented his evidence, and thereafter manifested that
he is resting his case; he, however, failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence, thus Cirilo filed an Omnibus Motion to consider Nilo as having
waived his formal offer of evidence, to consider the presentation of evidence
closed, and to file his demurrer to evidence. The trial court granted the
Omnibus Motion and allowed Cirilo to file his demurrer to evidence, which
Cirilo did. The trial court then dismissed Nilos petition for guardianship,
holding that Nilo did not adduce enough testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove his petition.
Nilo appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals which ale denied his appeal.
Nilo raised his case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
WON respondent is considered an incompetent person.
HELD:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed
to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to

preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision
reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid,
take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
G.R. No. 162421
August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Rufino Cabales died and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land to his
surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito.
Brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject
property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale
among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale")
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.

On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio

and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But
Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale"
of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco
and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus
and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00
Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that
petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from
respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that
Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner
Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of
the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt
of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the
formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back
to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from
his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified
his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation
process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for
redemption of the subject land plus damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Nelson has a right as co-owner of the property.
HELD:
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental
authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of
the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. 7 Corollary to this, Rule 93,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case,
automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without
need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property does not exceed
two thousand pesos,8 thus:

Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother,
without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x 9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of
court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh
of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos.
G.R. No. 132223
June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the
children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of
the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and
Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected
Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached
the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to
determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should
be his guardian.
ISSUE:
Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.
HELD:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be
his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes.
Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental
authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming
that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a

substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will
find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in
Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.

G.R. No. 108921

April 12, 2000
JOSEFINA VILLANUEVA-MIJARES, WALDETRUDES VILLANUEVANOLASCO, GODOFREDO VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VILLANUEVA,
GERMELINA VILLANUEVA-FULGENCIO, MILAGROS VILLANUEVAARQUISOLA, and CONCEPCION MACAHILAS VDA. DE VILLANUEVA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PROCERFINA VILLANUEVA, PROSPERIDAD
VILLANUEVA, RAMON VILLANUEVA, ROSA VILLANUEVA, VIRGINIA
NEPOMUCENO, PAULA NEPOMUCENO, TARCELA NEPOMUCENO,
MERCEDES VILLANUEVA, ADELAIDA VILLANUEVA, APARICION
VILLANUEVA, JOSEFINA VILLANUEVA, BETTY VILLANUEVA, BOBBY
VILLANUEVA, MERLINDA VILLANUEVA, MORBINA VILLANUEVA,
FLORITA VILLANUEVA, DIONISION VILLANUEVA, and EDITHA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Josefina Villanueva-Mijares, Waldetrudes Villanueva-Nolasco,
Godofredo Villanueva, Eduardo Villanueva, Germelina Villanueva-Fulgencio,
and Milagros Villanueva-Arquisola are the legitimate children of the late Leon
Villanueva. Petitioner Concepcion Macahilas vda. de Villanueva is his widow.
Leon was one of eight (8) children of Felipe Villanueva, predecessor-ininterest of the parties in the present case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to declare action by the
private respondents to recover the property in question barred by laches,
estoppel, prescription, and res judicata
HELD:

Under the jurisprudence prevailing before the new Civil Code, the rule was
that while parents may be the guardians of their minor children, such
guardianship did not extend to the property of their minor childrenparents
then had no power to dispose of the property of their minor children without
court authorization.Under the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of
Benitos death, the rule was that while parents may be the guardians of their
minor children, such guardianship did not extend to the property of their minor
children. Parents then had no power to dispose of the property of their minor
children without court authorization. Without authority from a court, no person
could make a valid contract for or on behalf of a minor or convey any interest
of a minor in land. Admittedly, Maria Baltazar showed no authorization from a
court when she signed the Deed of Sale of August 26, 1948, allegedly
conveying her childrens realty to Leon.
G.R. No. 164915
March 10, 2006
ERIC JONATHAN YU, Petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINE T. YU, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Court of Appeals alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu
(respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child
Bianca. The petition, which included a prayer for the award to him of the sole
custody of Bianca, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68460.
Subsequently or on March 3, 2002, respondent filed a petition against
petitioner before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for declaration of nullity
of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The
petition included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca
and for the fixing of schedule of petitioners visiting rights.
ISSUE:
WON question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the Pasay
RTC or before the Pasig RTC.
HELD:

udgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the
Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res
judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is
identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical
issue raised in both actions11 whether it would serve the best interest of
Bianca to be in the custody of petitioner rather than respondent or vice versa.
Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Pasig RTC is respondents alleged psychological incapacity to
perform her essential marital obligations 12 as provided in Article 36 of the
Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily
involves evidence of respondents fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the
elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other,13 are present.
G.R. No. 154994
June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,
vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 156254
June 28, 2005
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D.
PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.
FACTS:
[Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed before [the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City] a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to x x x
Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom
[Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his
school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque City)

when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early February 2002[.]

x x x [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort] heard the ancillary
prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. x x x [B]ecause [Joycelyn]
allegedly failed to appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a certain Col. Renato
Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x x Judge; x x x
documentary evidence [was] also presented[.] x x x [O]n April 3, 2002, x x x
[the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto.] [PabloGualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450(2005)]
ISSUE:
WON the party is the proper guardian
HELD:
The word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character.The
word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character. Article 213
and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of the
minor are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a
decree of legal separation or a de facto [Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V,
461 SCRA 450(2005)]
separation. In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter
of fact. [Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450(2005)]
G.R. No. 143989
July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the
Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which
she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo

in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA
No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and
lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back
on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in
the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether
or not the adopters action prescribed.
HELD:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light
of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was
months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force,
could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree
after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely

created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's

determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of
the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any
time before it has been exercised.
G.R. No. 167405
February 16, 2006
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67
of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator,
CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO,
GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.
FACTS:
respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and
raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of
Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco
were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising,
Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto
Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon
payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties
to the legal heirs.1
In her opposition, Reyes asks that the case be dismissed since she is an
adopted daughter of Sps. Delos Santos and thus rightful heir. She presented
documents pertaining to her adoption decree. The same was contested by
respondents alleging fraud and falsification of documents.
ISSUE:
WON decree of adoption can be assailed in a proceeding for settlement of
estate.
HELD:

NO. The presentation contrary to proof to nullify the adoption decree should
be presented in a separate action. The adoption decree cannot be assailed
collaterally in the proceeding of settlement of the estate.
G.R. No. 175080
November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA.
GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S.
REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO,
FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now
deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for
annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and
Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their
peaceful possession with damages.
Court ruled in favour of Libarda, hence petition filed by Reyes.

ISSUE:
WON Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by
Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot
with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir
HELD:
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. 19
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. 20 Well-known
civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is

rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained
thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of
the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the
legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles. 21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 22 the
Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. 23
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject
to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, 24 this Court reiterated that adoption
cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedents estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, 26 the Court declared
that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral
attack.27

G.R. No. 165546

February 27, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS,
Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving
spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her
claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn.
Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997.
In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested
Rosannas claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6

years earlier and that she was living with another man. Leticia further alleged
that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several
children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the
pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation confirmed that
Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable
of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that
Pablo was infertile.
It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume
payment and ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death
benefits already released to her and Jeylnn.
When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H.
Aguas also claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and
Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and
Janets certificates of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to
conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that
Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married
to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still married
to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for
Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of
Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)
The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled
to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not
Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The
SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the
same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and
Rosanna but with no legal papers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of
Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the
deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death
benefits.
Held:
Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the
signature of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on
October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on
December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until
the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was
born during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo.
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to
be dependent from support upon the husband
Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal
papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child
and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie

should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any
confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be
an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is
silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child
by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.
G.R. No. 164948
June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption
of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos
who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioners brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, remarried there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of
the biological mother?

HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed
her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section
9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their
legal guardian.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude

Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario
in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under
RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case
spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant

to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring
and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.