CHAPTER 9 POWERS OF CONGRESS CASE DIGESTS

1. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNDERS IN THE PHILIPPINES INC. v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM
FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious
purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property
in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.
2. GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino
Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon
Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales
averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power.
He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to
say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to
an act of Congress.

3. DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined the basic ARMM structure. It also
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054, which was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections
nd
to the 2 Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22,
2011 with 191 (of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756,
on June 6, 2011. 13 (of the 23) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.
ISSUE/S: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 require a supermajority vote [at least 2/3 of all members of Congress] and a
plebiscite?
a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No.
9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1 and
16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting] irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under Section 18(2), Article X of
the 1987 Constitution?
4. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
HELD: [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all
future elections whether national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions
during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
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Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
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From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as

evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous
region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional
elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. xxx.
2.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution because the President certified on the urgency of [the enactment of] RA No. 10153.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception to this is when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII,
Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President
under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the
factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review.
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the
Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for [our intrusion under the power of
judicial review]. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills
to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the
legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the
enactment process.
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed
measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153
on the cited ground.

3.

NO, the passage of [RA No. 9333 and] RA No. 10153 DOES NOT require a supermajority vote and a plebiscite

A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are NOT amendments to RA No. 9054
[N]either RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No.
9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections,
which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in
the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.
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From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this
intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section
1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
B. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054] VIOLATES Section 16(2), Article VI for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this
2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to
restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature
which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution
requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
C. Plebiscite requirement only applies to the creation of autonomous regions; Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9054 unconstitutional for excessively enlarging the plebiscite requirement in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
[T]he plebiscite requirement under Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions
and for [the determination of] which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.
While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to
become effective, questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required
for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these

wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in
the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction;
and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section
20, Article X of the Constitution.
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the
plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial
amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
4.

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs is constitutional

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who
should sit as ARMM officials in the interim: (1) allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize
the President to appoint OICs, [their terms to last] also until those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume
office.
A. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the [hold over] option xxx violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
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In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution
and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective
term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given
the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary
rulings, where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or Sanggunian Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the
three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress
cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover
rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is
wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.
B.

The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately
conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other
date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or
the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional
and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an
act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special
elections.
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Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis
likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically
given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms
of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution
cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority
to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years as
this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
D. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the
President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise
of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is
the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in
the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character
of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA
No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how
RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside
from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that
the synchronization requires.
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Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the
Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of
the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
4. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC
Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted
into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20

million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities
from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved
the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
5. PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC. v. VINUYA
FACTS: On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM
and its President with labor arbiter alleging among others that the agency deployed them to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer for the agencys principal, Modern Metal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year employment
whose contracts were approved by the POEA providing for nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime
pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry and free medical and
dental services. However, on April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters different
from that of originally signed, increasing their employment terms and reducing their salaries and allowances and removing
certain benefits. Further, the working conditions were not as promised and they repeatedly complained with their agency
about their predicament but to no avail. Respondents resigned from their job citing personal/family problems for their
resignation except for Era who mentioned the real reason, which is due to the company policy. After several weeks,
petitioner repatriated the respondent to the Philippines who shouldered their own airfare except for Ordovez and
Enjambre. The agency countered that the respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that the respondents
voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. The agency furthered alleged that the respondents
even voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim and release.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the respondent voluntarily resigned from their job. Respondent
appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found that the respondents were illegally
dismissed. NLRC also pointed out that the signing of a different employment contract in Dubai is illegal. Consequently
NLRC ordered the agency and the principal to pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary, placement fee, and
exemplary damages. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC but modified their
judgment adjusting the awards particularly the payment of their salaries in the light of the Courts ruling in Serrano striking
down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of the RA 8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. The
agency again moved for reconsideration reiterating its earlier argument and questioned the applicability of the Serrano
ruling because it is not yet final and effective but was denied by the NLRC. Petitioner appealed with CA, which upheld the
decision of the NLRC finding the resignation letter as dubious.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Serrano ruling, which declared the subject Section 10 of RA 8042 unconstitutional, can be
given retroactive application in the present case
Whether or not RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring the subject clause in Section 10 of RA 8042

being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively

RULING: The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive application as resolved in Yap vs. Thenamaris
Ships Management in the interest of equity and that the Serrano ruling is an exemption to the doctrine of operative fact.
Moreover, the SC held that the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 cannot be given retroactive effect not only because
there is no express declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because the retroactive application will result in an
impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all statutes
are to be construed as having only a prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
them retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.
HELD: The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution were AFFIRMED.
6. ATIZADO v. PEOPLE
7. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197
and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
8. FABIAN v. DESIERTO
FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the
Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy
Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides
that: In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770
cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of
the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated
therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is, the courts composing the integrated
judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

But what is the proper remedy?

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
9. LIDASAN v. COMELEC
FACTS: Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios
located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman
of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be
spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
10. PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ
FACTS: The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of
RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress).
The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that the provision for the retirement of the members and certain
officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
HELD: YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are
granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This provision is
related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to
members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials would relate to subject matter, not germane to CA 186.
11. TOBIAS v. ABALOS
Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same
bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of
Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a
highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues: WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating
the legislative districts.

Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI
26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to
increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative
district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
12. BANAT v. COMELEC
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the
petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said
resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major
political parties participate in the party-list elections?
Held: (1)
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of
RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of
the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
13. GIRON v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality of Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the
Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which specifically requires: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof. He avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act:
the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the
official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso
facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one title rule?
HELD: The petition must fail.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, as
Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who
asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution;
otherwise, the petition must fail.
The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of
validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public
14. BOLINAO v. VALENCIA
FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the
Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their
permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing
operation had caused damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN
to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation
allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation
or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions,
has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, itfollows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
15. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. PURISIMA
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC

officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government
agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not
suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR
and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD: Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
22
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue23
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically
pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
16. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1 That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses
of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where
he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2 That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1 There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the
period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
17. GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of
President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the
president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played
during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court
praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such
investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make
such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their
investigation?
HELD: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they
will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without
observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of
law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in
observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still
does not conforme with what the constitution propounded. In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction
preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

18. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
19. GUDANI v. SENGA
FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued
a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before
it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However,
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege,
but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The
impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of
the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
20. BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege
before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies
or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard
to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on
the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they
know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify,
invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case
before the Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has provided that the
allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held
in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle
in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private
affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any
and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it
is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or
not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of investigations
where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he is
already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to
take the witness stand completely.
21. ARNAULT v. NAZARENO
FACTS: This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created
by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . .

the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid
of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be
detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.
22. LOPEZ v. DELOS REYES
23. NAZARETH v. VILLAR
24. PASCUAL v. PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
FACTS: Pascual, in his official capacity as the Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioned for a writ of certiorari against the
dismissal of the case and dissolving of the preliminary injunction held by the Court of the First Instance. Petitioner prayed
for that RA #920 be declared null and void, that the alleged Deed of Donation made by Zulueta be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner also prayed for an injunction enjoining Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
Director of Public Works and Highways and the disbursing officers of the latter department from making and securing any
further release of funds for the said road project. RA# 920 contained an item appropriating P85,000.00 which the
petitioner alleged that it was for the construction of roads improving the private property of Jose Zuleta, a member of the
Senate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA # 920 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not Pascual has the legal capacity or to sue.
HELD:
1. RA #920 is unconstitutional because the Congress is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
public purpose.
2. Pascual has the personality to sue as a taxpayer recognizing the right of the taxpayer to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating public funds.
25. GARCIA v. MATA
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus
to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at
least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).
Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any
appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the
AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act.
When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

26. DEMETRIA v. ALBA

FACTS: Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform
Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides
that: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by
law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
27. PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transfers its functions to the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutional
pursuant to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA). Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before
the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of E.O. 13.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional

Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power to appropriate public funds in view of such reorganization
Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman
Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichays right to due process and the equal protection of the laws

HELD: E.O. 13 is constitutional

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
The Office of the President must, in order to remain effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped by
the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own
office. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of
the Presidents authority to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency. This
recognizes the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, even
to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose. Thus, while there may be no specific amount
earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the Presidents own office budget
without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, the President simply allocates the existing funds previously
appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman
may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. Since the case filed before
the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, Pichay may not invoke the primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is
by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a
fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As
such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsmans constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to due process and the equal protection of the laws
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means
having the opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his side and
present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he
comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters
that require his informed decision. There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying
upper-level positions in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in
government.
28. BINAMIRA v. GARRUCHO
FACTS: Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He was
designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board.
In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his designation is invalid because
it was not her, the President, who appointed him as what is required by PD No. 564. As such, he will remain in the
position until the President appoints a person to serve in a permanent capacity.
Held: Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, the
appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in nature. The implication is that he shall hold office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.

29. AGLIPAY v. RUIZ

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of
Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the
Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor
upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on
its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that Religious freedom, as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino people implored the aid of Divine Providence, they thereby manifested
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.
30. GARCES v. ESTENZO
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution
No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the
hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmea, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church
because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the
priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of
the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was
not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they
contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public
money to favor any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with
barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and
providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect,
priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting
shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious
beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding
a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such
as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a
socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.
31. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. CAMACHO
32. ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION v. CITY OF ANGELES
FACTS: Building permit fees are not impositions on property but on the activity subject of government regulation.

Angeles University Foundation (AUF) filed with the Office of the City Building Official an application for a building permit
for the construction of the Angeles University Foundation Medical Center in its main campus located in Pampanga. The
office issued a Building Permit Fee Assessment. AUF claimed that it was exempt from the payment of the building permit
and locational clearance fees as building permits granting the exemption were previously issued. After obtaining a
favorable opinion from Secretary Raul Gonzales, AUF appealed to the mayor but did not receive any response.
Consequently, AUF paid under protest the total sum of Php 826,662.99. AUF was issued the corresponding Building
Permit, Wiring Permit, Electrical Permit and Sanitary Building Permit. The City Treasurer denied AUFs formal request for
a refund of it payment made under protest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angeles University Foundation is exempt from the payment of building permit and related fees imposed
under the National Building Code
HELD:
Exempted from the payment of building permit fees are: (1) public buildings and (2) traditional indigenous family dwellings.
Not being expressly included in the enumeration of structures to which the building permit fees do not apply, AUFs claim
for exemption rests solely on its interpretation of the term other charges imposed by the National Government in the tax
exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.
That charges in its ordinary meaning appears to be a general term which could cover a specific fee does not support
petitioners position that building permit fees are among those other charges from which it was expressly exempted.
NotethattheotherchargesmentionedinSec.8ofR.A.No.6055 is qualified by the words imposed by the Government on all...
property used exclusively for the educational activities of the foundation. Building permit fees are
33. LLADOC v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,m as intended. In1958, MB
Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the
parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes as contradistinguished from
excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise
of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.
34. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems
of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were
specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the
Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether
the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total

number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision
is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still
dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for
whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is
adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a
peoples initiative.