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PROFETA VS DRILON

G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992


FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta service were as follows:
> Executive Dean of Rizal Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978
> Acting president of the same college from 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979
> President of the same college from 1 May 1979 to 21 March 1986
> Acting president of EARIST from 4 November 1988 to 28 March 1989
> President of EARIST from 29 March 1989
On 16 June 1989, petitioner reached the retirement age of 65 years.

To enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146, petitioner asked the
GSIS to allow her to extend her service as EAARIST president beyond the age of 65 years.

GSIS advise her to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled the 15 year service requirement
pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146 for her to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan.

. The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered
the sufficient number of years of service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that
her creditable service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only
claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable
service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS.

On 6 October 1989, the DECS, Earist Board of Trustees and President Aquino, extended the term of
petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required 15 years of service after
reaching the age of 65 years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional
period of 2 years, 7 months and 12 days.
In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt
practices.
Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period
of ninety (90) days. After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and
functions as President of EARIST.
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cario recommended the compulsory retirement of
petitioner.
A committee was created to investigate her case 12 February 1991. Pending resolution of the
administrative charges against her, she was detailed with the DECS Central Office. Petitioner filed a
petition before the RTC seeking her seeking her reinstatement as EARIST President. RTC dismissed the
petition; CA also denied her petition. She also filed a complaint before the CSC but was denied.

On appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed her petition 3 March 1992.


On 23 October 1991, the dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner. Office of the
President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991,
holding that if her 62 day sick leave and her 2 week stint as a professional lecturer were to be added, she
had already completed the required 15 years service.
Petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her retirement. The GSIS advised her that
the exact date of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992.
A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President, assailing the
portion of its decision and questioning its jurisdiction. Her petition was denied.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the petitioner should be considered compulsory retired on 15 October 1991 (as
declared by the Office of the President)
(2) W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction on the issue.
HELD:
No on both.

Retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of 65 years with at least 15 years of
service. If he has less than 15 years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete
the 15 years, to avail of the old-age pension benefit (Presidential Decree No. 1146).
The petitioner was allowed to continue her term as Earist president for 2 years, 7 months and 12 days to
complete the required years of services under Section 11 of PD 1146. The period was shortened when
the Office of the president resolved the administrative complaint against her, including in the computation
her sick leave and her stint as professional lecturer
On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement of petitioner fell
on 14 August 1992. Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by the Office of the President for 2
years, 7 months and 12 days which brought her services only up to January 1992, would not enable
herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for purposes of retirement. Such
reduction from petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension
plan, based on the computation of the GSIS.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a
member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of service with the government. The computation of a member's
service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 and her parttime service as a lecturer f approximately 2 weeks, or a total of 3 1/2 months is not reflected in her service
record. Said period should be considered as part of her service with the government and it is only but
proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period of service.
The Court have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirement failed
to take into account the 3 1/2 months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If
we deduct this unrecorded 3 1/2 months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be
considered retired on 30 April 1992. Petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her former position to enable

her to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement purposes is no longer possible,
considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service requirement as of 30 April 1992.

PANLILIO VS REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


G.R. No. 173846 February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Erlinda Panlilio, Nicole Morris and Marlo Cristobal (petitioners), as
corporate officers of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (SIHI), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 24, a petition for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 24, issued an Order staying all claims against SIHI.
At the time, however, of the filing of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal
charges pending against petitioners filed before Branch 51 of Manila RTC.
These criminal charges involved estafa for non-remittance of SSS contributions. It was initiated by
respondent Social Security System (SSS.
Consequently, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 51, a Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings. Petitioners argued that the stay order issued by Branch 24 should also apply to
the criminal charges pending in Branch 51.
Petitioners prayed that Branch 51 suspend its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was finally
resolved but Branch 51 issued an Order denying petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings. It ruled
that the stay order issued by Branch 24 did not cover criminal proceedings.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to no avail. Hence this petition before the SC.
ISSUE: Does the suspension of "all claims" as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also contemplate
the suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the distressed corporation?
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The criminal charges are not included.
In Rosario v. Co24 (Rosario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved by this Court was whether or not
during the pendency of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal charges for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 should be suspended, was disposed of as follows:
x x x the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent
damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court
declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.

Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within
the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result
in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a criminal action.
A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the
offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The
reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the
social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and
the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.
The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal ground for
the extinction of petitioners criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal proceedings should be
suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. As correctly
observed in Rosario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape
punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer.
The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the
corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities.
Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since
the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law.
On a final note, the Court pointed out that Congress has recently enacted Republic Act No. 10142, or
the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010. Section 18 thereof explicitly provides that criminal
actions against the individual officer of a corporation are not subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in
rehabilitation proceedings,