Chistopher Stead

Doctrine and Philosophy

in Early Christianity

Alius, Athanasius, Augustine

Ashgate
VARIORUM
Aldershot

Burlington USA Singapore Sydney

This edition copyright 2000 Christopher Siead

Published in the Variorum Collected Studies Series by
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Gower House, Croft Road,
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Ashgate Publishing Company

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CONTENTS
Introduction

Asbgate website: http://www ashgate com

ix-xviii

Greek Influence on Christian Thought

ISBN 0-86078-830-X

175-185

Early Christianity
Origins and Evolution
to AD 600
festschrift
in Honow
ofW.HC
Frend, ed I
Hazlett
London
1991

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Stead, G.C (George Christopher), 1913
Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity: Arius,
Athanasius, Augustine
(VariorumCollected Studies Series; CS224)
1 Christianity-Philosophy. 2 Philosophy, Ancient.
3 Theology, Doctrinal-History-Early Church, ca 30-600
Title.
189

II

The A p p r o p r i a t i o n of the Philosophical Concept

o f G o d by Early Christian Theologians:
W Pannenberg's Thesis Reconsidered
English
Translation
of Die Aufnahme
des
philosophischen
Gottesbegriffs
W. Pannenberg's
neu bedacht',
Theologische
Rundschau
Tubingen,

III
US Library of Congress Control Number: 00-100058

VIII

1 Oxford,

1994

Patrstica

32

Leuven

.39-52
1997

of Theological

Studies

36

153-157
Oxford,

198.5

The W o r d ' F r o m N o t h i n g '

Journal

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Information Sciences - Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39 48-1984 ( g )

24-36
45 pt

A r i u s on God's ' M a n y W o r d s '

Journal

VII

Studies

Was A r i u s a Neoplatonist?
Studio

VI

140-150

Abramowski

A r i u s in M o d e r n Research
lour nal ofTheological

These
1986

M a r c e l Richard on M a l c h i o n and Paul of

Samosata
Logos
Festschrift
in Honour
of Luise
ed HC
Brennecke et al Berlin,
1993

IV

of Theological

Studies

671-684
49, pt

2 Oxford

1998

The A r i a n Controversy: A New Perspective

EPMHNEYMATA
CEp\n\\'Z\)\xa%a) Festschrift
in
of Hadwig Horner, ed H Eisenberger:
Heidelberg
1990

Printed by St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk

V A R I O R U M C O L L EC T ED S T U D I E S SERIES CS684

-18

51-59
Honour

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

vi

IX

K n o w l e d g e of G o d i n Eusebius and Athanasius

The Knowledge
of God in the Greco-Roman
World,
ed J Mansfeld
et al Leiden, 1989

Athanasius' Earliest W r i t t e n W o r k
Journal
of Theological
Studies 39, pt 1 Oxford

XI

229-242

Athanasius als Exeget

Christianae

St Athanasius on the Psalms

Vigiliae Christianae
39 Leiden 198.5
W h y N o t Three Gods? The L o g i c of G r e g o r y o f

A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g
The Philosophy
of Christianity,
ed G Vesey.
1989

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

71-84
Cambridge

1-14

Publication

Augustine's Universe
Fir st
Publication
A u g u s t i n e ' s De Maghtro:

1-13

A Philosopher's V i e w

63-73

Signum Pietatis
Festchrist
in Honour
of
Cornelius
Petrus Mayer, ed. A Zumkeller.
Wrzburg, 1989
A u g u s t i n e ' s De Maghtro:
XIX

This v o l u m e contains x v i i i + 294 pages

149-163

The I n t e l l i g i b l e W o r l d i n P l a t o n i c T r a d i t i o n ,
First

XVIII

1-7

65-78

M a r i u s V i c t o r i n u s and A u g u s t i n e

XVII

255-269

1982

Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der

christlichen
Sptantike, ed H R Drobner
and C Klock
(Supplements
to Vigiliae Christianae
12). Leiden
1990

XVI

D i v i n e S i m p l i c i t y as a P r o b l e m for O r t h o d o x y
The Making
of Orthodoxy.
Essays in Honour
of
Henry Chadwick
ed R Williams
Cambridge
1989

Index

233-250
36 Leiden,

Nyssa's T r i n i t a r i a n D o c t r i n e

XV

XXI

The Scriptures and the Soul o f C h r i s t i n

Vigiliae

XIV

303-320

174-184

Athanasius

XIII

L o g i c and the A p p l i c a t i o n o f Names to G o d

El 'Contra Eunomium
I en la produccin
literaria
de
Gregorio
de Nisa, ed L F. Mateo-Seco
and I L
Bastero
Pamplona,
1988

76-91
1988

Christliche
Exegese zwischen Nicaea und
Chalcedon
ed. J. van Oort and U. Wickert Kampen
Neth 1992
XII

XX

A n Addendum

A u g u s t i n e , the Meno
and the Subconscious M i n d
Die Weltlichkeit
des Glaubens
in der Alten
Kirche
Festschrift
in Honour
of Ulrich Wickert, ed D Wyrva
et al Berlin, 1997

1-2
339-345

The articles in this volume as in all others in the Variorum Collected Studies
Series,
have not been given a new, continuous pagination
In order to avoid confusion
and to
facilitate their use where these same studies have been refer red to elsewhere the original
pagination
has been maintained wherever
possible
Each article has beengiven
a Roman number in order of appearance,
as listed
in the Contents above This number is repeated on each page and is quoted in the
index entries

INTRODUCTION

I have collected i n this volume the most important of the papers that I published
in 1985-1997, as a sequel to m y Doctrine and Illusion in the Christian
Fathers
(Aldershot, Variorum, 1985) M o s t of them deal with three notable theologians
o f the 4th-5th century, as my title suggests B u t I start w i t h the beginnings o f
Christian doctrine, and thereafter f o l l o w a chronological order
The fust two pieces turn on the influence of Greek philosophy on early
Christian doctrine. To begin w i t h , I have deliberately chosen a very simple i n troductory essay; well-informed readers w i l l find nothing new, except perhaps
the choice o f philosophers who need to be considered The discussion that f o l lows is inevitably much more complex, as it involves the Greek philosophers'
views o f the nature o f God, and is prompted by the w o r k o f the well-known
dogmatic theologian Wolfhait Pannenberg, set fotth in an essay w h i c h has been
reproduced i n English i n his Basic Questions in Theology. This has been quoted
w i t h evident approval by English writers, and may w e l l be still influential.
I have examined it very closely, as Pannenberg's reputation demands, and have
concluded w i t h reluctance that, although he makes some good points, his conclusions as to the philosophers' views o f God's nature and their influence, are
incoherent, i f not self-contradictory The critical tone o f my paper cannot be
mistaken; but no answer has reached me, either (so far as I am aware) i n print or
by private communication; for that matter, Pannenberg's essay itself remained
virtually unchallenged, apart f r o m the indignant ('temper amentvolV) reply b y
Professor de Vogel and an excellent short summary by Professor Ritter The
paper is complex, but ends with a summary w h i c h states m y own conclusions i n
simple terms
The third essay considers the testimony concerning Paul o f Samosata,
Bishop o f Antioch, 260-268 Paul is conventionally written off as a heretic, but
on two quite different grounds: first, that he was an Adoptionist, holding that
Jesus Christ was a mere man, inspired like other good men by the H o l y Spirit
(according to Eusebius H.E.I 29, 'he strutted about i n the abominable heresy
o f Attemas'); alternatively, that he was a Sabellian, denying that G o d is a real
Trinity o f Persons What is certain is that he was an able disputant, and was only
dislodged f r o m his see by a powerful group of Alexandrian-type theologians,
who had to engage a professional rhetorician named Malchion to put their case.
They gained the upper hand; Paul was condemned and discredited; and the

INTRODUCTION

Paulianists, his professed followers, had very little influence

But how much do we really k n o w of his teaching? Eusebius does not
report it in detail, though he expatiates on Paul's alleged misconduct B u t he
does tell us that Paul's debate w i t h M a l c h i o n was taken down by stenographers,
in w h i c h case it may have been accessible i n Eusebius' time However, an essay
by the redoubtable Marcel Richard has argued that 'stenographers' is a mistranslation; they were in fact simply 'spies', w h o gave their o w n version o f his
teaching
I give evidence to show that Richard himself has mistranslated the critical term, and that Eusebius really d i d report that stenogr aphers were present, In
that case we can make a slightly more confident approach to the 'fragments' of
Paul, especially those drawn from the debate w i t h Malchion, i n which he seems
to speak for himself The whole material has been carefully edited by G Bardy,
and again by Henri de Riedmatten, w h o argues for its substantial authenticity.
I think myself that Paul was a much more interesting theologian than his
detractors allege. This is too complex a question to be considered i n detail here;
but it does involve a problem o f the highest theological importance, namely the
divinity of our L o r d , and the question whether his real human sufferings impair,
or contrariwise reveal, that divinity Moreover, the victory o f the Alexandrian
party had momentous consequences for the shaping of Christian doctrine They
were concerned above all things to uphold the Tohannine avowal that Hhe Word
became flesh'; the complementary truth that 'God sent his Son, born of a woman,
born under the L a w ' was to them o f less account. They were thus inclined to
argue that the acknowledged sufferings of Christ were something external to his
real nature; Tesus had no natural human soul; its place was taken by the i n d w e l l ing W o r d ; i n Athanasius' phrasing, his sufferings impinged only on his flesh
The absence o f a human soul was clearly stated by Apollinaris, and officially
condemned; but i n Cyril of Alexandria and others this human soul was given
little more than formal recognition; Christ had one nature only, and that was
divine Thus the Monophysites obtained a commanding position in the Eastern
church; the Chalcedonian doctrine of Christ as 'true God and true man', o f two
natures united i n this single individual ('hypostasis'), was either rejected or so
much diluted in the interests of concord that its significance was lost. The
Monophysites drew away some of the best elements i n the Eastern church, and
the schism still continues in being.
I n the f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d five essays devoted to Ar ius, five to
Athanasius, and five to Augustine This neat and symmetrical arrangement is i n
fact misleading, since the fortunes o f A t ius and of Athanasius are closely connected Right down to c 1950 it was customary to treat Athanasius as a fully
trustworhy source for the period f r o m 318 to 3 73, when he died aged about 75
years Modern scholarship has brought about a reassessment of his conduct, his
controversial politics and even of his theology; while his conception o f Arius,
and o f the theologians w h o m he scornfully nick-named 'Ariomaniacs' is now

INTRODUCTION

xi

seen to be prejudiced and misconceived

Even Athanasius' defenders have accepted his 'forceful' treatment of the
opposing party. Many modern scholars go much further. Richard Hanson, in a
lively survey of fourth-century theology ('The attainment o f orthodoxy in the
Fourth Century A D ' , in The Making of Orthodoxy: Festschrift
in Honour of
Henry Chadwick, ed Rowan Williams) refers to his 'unscrupulous violence',
highlighted by two papyrus letters discovered i n the 1920s (ibid , p 151) A n d
the so-called 'Ariomaniacs' were i n fact a diffuse collection o f theologians w h o
distrusted the Nicene term 'consubstantial', homoousios, as suggesting an identity
o f the Father and the Son, and who expressly stated that they were not followers
of Arius Further, my o w n studies have shown that even where Athanasius' theology was sound - and i t very often is so - the arguments he used against these
opponents often rely upon ambiguous phrases and faulty inference; this w i l l be
shown i n paper s V I and V I I of this collection Perhaps his pr incipal weakness as
a theologian was to share the perspective o f the 'Alexandrians' already mentioned; his occasional r efer ences to Chr ist's human soul are quite insufficient to
make his position clear M y papers X I I and X I I I have some bearing on this
subject 'Insufficient' because his attribution of the Lord's sufferings to his 'flesh',
understood i n a broad sense, ignores the agony o f mind which the Gospels attest, and makes him far too much like a Stoic sage A n d in any case the two
passages which have been quoted i n his favour only hint indirectly at a soul;
w h i l e Athanasius' alleged authorship o f the Contra Apollinarem has been disproved by m y o w n review o f George Dragas's edition {Journal of
Theological
Studies 39 [1988], 250-53). Needless to say, much o f Athanasius' teaching is
very good indeed; his little w o r k on the Incarnation has always been acclaimed
as a masterpiece
The next two pieces, nos I V and V, deal w i t h A r i u s ' theology, but in very
different idioms. N o I V is a fairly straightforward examination o f A r i u s ' teaching as it appears to me; it was written to be delivered at Mainz, at Gerhard
M a y ' s k i n d suggestion, and was repeated b y invitation at Heidelberg and
Marburg No. V is a detailed critique o f the remarkable theory proposed, w i t h
all due caution, by D r Rowan Williams, to the effect that Arius was an up-to-the
minute student o f the Neoplatonists, including even his near-contemporary
Iamblichus, as w e l l as Porphyry Despite m y admiration for Dr W i l l i a m s ' wideranging scholarly and devotional works, I have to say that the evidence he propounds for this particular view is w h o l l y inadequate
The next two essays consider two A r i a n pronouncements w h i c h were
held up for ridicule by 'orthodox' theologians, f o l l o w i n g Athanasius I have
argued that both the phr ases attr ibuted to A r i u s ar e patient o f a number of different interpretations; and there is no evidence at all that Ar ius understood them i n
the objectionable sense, or senses, fathered upon them by his critics The first
is a fairly simple point; the Bible represents God as speaking to his people o n
many different occasions, and o f course using different phrases as the occasion

XI)

INTRODUCTION

demands There is no evidence that A l i u s himself thought that the divine Word
was comparable to these occasional pronouncements; on the contrary, though
he states that the Word was created, in accordance w i t h Proverbs 8:22 L X X , he
clearly regarded him as an 'only-begotten Son', to be described in Isaiah's phrase
as 'mighty G o d ' , though personally distinct f r o m 'the God' and Father o f all, as
w e l l as flom all other creatures and words
The next piece, no V I I , is longer and more substantial The phrase that
the W o r d is ' f r o m nothing' is capable o f various meanings; several o f these
were used in malam partem by critics intent upon showing that A r i u s ' teaching
was blasphemous or absurd In my opinion, b y far the most likely meaning o f
the phrase as used by Arius conveyed the doctrine that the Word, being in a
carefully guarded sense 'a creature', was not created by God's imposition of
order on a pre-existing unformed matter, as several Greek philosophers had
held; rather, in the beginning, before time began, only God the Father existed
This doctrine resembles that taught by Irenaeus, and by Tertullian (in the beginning God was Deus, but was not Dominus, since there was nothing for him to
dominate) B y A r i u s ' time i t had become accepted doctrine that God created ex
nihilo. A n d the doctrine that the Son was coeternal w i t h H i m , though widely
accepted, had not yet become a requirement for orthodox belief. Even the Nicene
Creed o f 3 8 1 , which we commonly use today, contents itself w i t h the phrase
'begotten of his Father before all w o r l d s ' ; not, o f course, the rendering 'eternally begotten o f the Father', which has been ignorantly intruded into the Creed
by the authors of the Anglican Alternative Service
Book
There is thus a good deal o f evidence that A r i u s ' teaching has been m a l i ciously caricatured by his opponents, though I do not o f course think it defensible in toto; also that his treatment, and that of his followers by Athanasius and
his adherents, was harsh and unchristian I sought to express this opinion in
simple and dramatic terms by a piece o f pure invention; though I could also say
that it has precedents in the practice o f ancient historians, who even when they
knew what was actually said on a given occasion were often prepared to substitute a composition of their own, reflecting their own awareness o f the speaker's
character and circumstances M y little piece does not even profess to report
what Arius, or an Arian, said on any particular occasion; but I think I have
expressed his opinions as discovered f r o m a careful study o f what was said of
him, especially by Athanasius in his De Synodh; and have given f u l l references
to the relevant passages.
This piece was delivered at a session of the Patristic Seminar at Cambridge, and was well received; though my intention o f reading it w i t h a perfectly
dead-pan expression was not sufficiently w e l l maintained to take in the more
alert o f my hear er s, whose suspicions in any case should have been aroused by
my failure to indicate the provenance o f the supposed A n a n document I had
hoped the proverb dulce est desipere in loco w o u l d suffice to teveal my intentions to my readers; but it seems that truth w o r n lightly is less familiar in

INTRODUCTION

xiii

Germany, for example, than I had thought; German scholars are accustomed to
discuss a serious subject w i t h unrelieved gravity, at least in print, though in
spoken lectures and in conversation they can display a delightful humour
Nos I X and X I are short pieces both written by invitation for conferences, and can I think be left to speak for themselves The case is different with
the more controversial no X M y close stylistic examination of the letters'Evq
ocoumof; and ' H <piXccp%o<;, both attributed to Bishop Alexander, has convinced me that they come f r o m different authors The former, though doubtless
written at Alexander's request, perfectly resembles the w o r k o f Athanasius; it is
forceful, concise and unpretentious; whereas the latter is much more discmsive
and notably polysyllabic, as one might expect o f a bishop w h o wished to recommend his position to important and cultivated colleagues There is nothing new
in m y suggestion, which was put forward more than a century ago by l o h n Henry
Newman; but I claim to have established by a mass o f evidence that Mhler,
Newman and Robertson were right
M y title 'Athanasius' Earliest Written Work' o f course implies that it
precedes the pair o f treatises Contra Gentes and De Jncarnatione. M y argument
has shown that he developed a f u l l maturity o f style at a very early date I f we
accept Opitz's dating o f 318 for 'Evo<; o w u x t t o q , Athanasius was capable of
drafting a forceful attack on Arianism at the age o f about 2 0 ; whereas i t is comm o n l y held that the attacks did not begin until the late 330s (Hanson, in The
making of Ortholdoxy, p 145, suggests 339) Nevertheless the two letters are
closely linked; Opitz cannot be far w r o n g I used to think that the t w o treatises
just mentioned must be very early, since they do not allude to A r i a n i s m .
Nevertheless the evidence o f the Festal Letters shows that Athanasius could
simply ignore the Arians and concentrate on his own positive teaching; his first
reference to 'Ariomaniacs' occurs in 9 o f Letter 10, for 338, w h i c h accords
closely w i t h Hanson's dating It is thus more than possible that the t w o apologetic treatises were written in the 330s, as Charles Kannengiesser has argued
The early dating of'Ev6i;Gc6u.axoi;, and its assignment to Athanasius, still leave
h i m as a sort o f ' t h e o l o g i c a l M o z a r t ' , to quote my admired and well-respected
friend But my arguments f r o m both style and content are I think decisive: despite all difficulties, the two propositions must both be accepted
Pieces X I I and X I I I both deal w i t h the important question whether
Athanasius acknowledged a fully human soul in Christ, to which I have already
alluded in N o I I I It seemed to me important to consider the evidence offered
by Athanasius' exposition of biblical texts, especially those of the N e w Testament M y examination o f these in no I X , pp 234-7 on the whole confirms the
opinion o f modern critical scholars; Athanasius fails to attach any meaning to
the texts referring to Christ's yx>%f\ which brings out its decisive theological
importance as affirming a common humanity w i t h ours From this point on I
pass to consider the evidence o f the Expositio in Psalmos, which had long been
accepted as an authentic work o f St Athanasius I had not realised that it had

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

been shown very recently by Dr Gilles Dor ival that this w o r k must assigned to a
fifth-century author, as noted i n Paper X I I I . Nevertheless, I had no. X I I reprinted, as the w o r k i n question had never, I think, received a f u l l examination
In the next paper I returned to this subject, but here m y main emphasis falls on
the undoubtedly authentic Ephtula ad Marcellinum
M o s t o f this, I confess,
strikes me as rather prosy and unoriginal; but chapters 27-9 are interesting, first
as showing some acquaintance w i t h Plato's so-called doctrine o f a tripartite
soul, which does not appear elsewhere; and secondly as indicating Athanasius'
attitude to the use o f music i n worship. Singing he regards as completely
acceptible as pointing to 'the rhythmical and tranquil condition of the m i n d ' ,
but he refuses to endorse the Psalter's robust acceptance of trumpets, shawms
and the like The references to a well-tuned orchestra become for h i m a symbol
o f the proper coordination o f our thoughts, though his br i e f reference to symbolic interpretation falls far short o f the elabor ation o f this theme by the author
o f the Expositiones.
Paper X I V deals w i t h Gregory of Nyssa's theology of the f t inity I need
not return to his argument in its general lines, which is convincing enough; but
there is r o o m for some further comment on the remarkable claim put forward i n
the treatise 'On N o t Three Gods', also k n o w n as the Epistle to Cledonius The
Father is God, the Son is God, and the H o l y Ghost is God, says Gregory, and yet
we do not confess three Gods, but one God He uses the analogy o f thr ee men,
say Peter, Paul and John; we commonly speak o f them as thr ee men; but i n a
correct use of language, we should speak of them as one man, since their manhood is one and the same
I have to say that m y careful examination of Gregory's argument has
convinced me that it has all the attributes o f a philosopher's paradox, putting
forward a case which we w o u l d not dream of accepting i f i t were concerned
w i t h common life and not w i t h transcendent realities According to his argument, we could infer quite properly that every chariot is a one-horse chariot,
since wher e ther e seem to be t w o , both o f them ar e in fact one hor se, i f we take
'one' in its proper sense as indicating unity o f species Or again, that the plural
number, and indeed numerals themselves, can now be dispensed with M y objection would of course fail i f we could show that in Gregory's view, when we
refer to to divine realities, our ordinary logic w i l l not apply But I do not think
this is the case; he seems to found his argument on perfectly general considerations o f correct usage, though he also makes the point that the Bible itself adopts
an incorrect usage as a concession to our human frailty.
B u t there is an even more disturbing aspect o f Gregory's argument, remaining strictly w i t h i n the theological field I f we agree that, f o l l o w i n g the correct use of language, three men are really one man, should we not apply the
same principle to the three divine Persons? In that case, while Gregory attempts
to rebut the charge that he is a tritheist, his argument also proves him a Sabellian!
The best answer, I think, is to say that his case is established on quite different,

theological considerations; the appeal to logic is a mere faade But I do not for
a moment suppose that Gregory himself saw it i n this light; much more probably, he saw it as a triumphant vindication of his position, and many orthodox
scholars have contentedly followed his lead

xiv

XV

Gregory has of course a reply to the objectionable inference about the

divine Persons He argues that they differ in their mode o f origination. But this
cannot be sufficient; there would be no point in different modes o f origination i f
they produced mere replicas o f the original Source We have to admit that the
Persons, while equal in dignity, have different functions So much can be said
by way of summary
M y argument, as I said, is a challenge to orthodox opinion B u t perhaps
I could say that even such a very careful scholar, and fervent admirer o f Gregory,
as Dr Andreas Spira, wrote to me privately about my essay as first printed,
expressing his regretful acceptance o f my view
Augustine is the subject o f nos X V to X X . Once again, I have included a
relatively simple piece to begin w i t h , though i t also deals w i t h a concept that is
both central and highly abstract i n its verbal expression, but embodies the paradox that the abstract term in fact names the fullness o f concrete existence and
life N o X V I is more technical, but once again we meet the Platonic paradox
that the highest reality must be all-embracing as well as unique Mar ius Victorinus
shows us one possible reductio ad abautdum o f this view; conceptual generality
is in itself a mark o f higher status and authority Augustine takes a bolder and
more original line: Platonism is for him a useful ally to theology, but not a
master to be slavishly followed; the concept of divine Being has always to be
modified in accordance w i t h the teaching o f H o l y Scripture Much the same w i l l
apply to the doctrine of divine simplicity, on w h i c h I shall comment i n no. X X I I .
N o X V I I took shape as a talk deliver ed to a cultivated but mostly nonspecialist audience I have included it since to m y knowledge there has been no
full-scale study o f Augustine's cosmology I enjoyed w r i t i n g i t , and i t was well
received The text under discussion was Augustine's third attempt to comment
in detail on the Book of Genesis, but the only one to approach the obvious
difficulty of reconciling the Hebrew concept o f the world's beginning with his
fairly considerable knowledge of Greek science in his day The reader w i l l see
at once that he has set himself an intractable problem i n trying to harmonize
them; but despite his deference to the literal sense o f Scripture he realises the
importance o f trying to do so, and defends himself against the all too common
charge o f idle curiosity The reader, I think, w i l l seldom be convinced but w i l l
always be fascinated by his ingenuity.
N o X V I I I and deals w i t h the De Magistro, T'heMaster, in whichAugustine sets out his views on human language and especially the use o f statements
in imparting knowlege His teaching, as I note, has been summarily condemned
by D r C A K i r w a n , but has been defended i n great detail b y no less an authority
than Professor Myles Burnyeat in his Inaugural Address to the Aristotelian So-

xvi

INTRODUCTION

ciety, 1987 Burnyeat's article seems to me extraordinarily valuable i f one wishes

to learn something of the truth about the theory o f meaning On the other hand,
he seems to be attributing to Augustine views which no competent teacher would
dream of expounding i f he were w r i t i n g for an intelligent p u p i l on the level, say,
of Adeodatus. I n fact I should be surprised i f Burnyeat's own paper, as a spoken
lecture, could have been followed even b y the extremely sophisticated and wellinformed members o f the Aristotelian Society For present purposes, I must be
content to write far more simply, though 1 think I shall be on safe ground in
dismissing Dr Kirwan's view
I am not convinced by Burnyeat's suggestion that in his early chapters
(down to 11 36) Augustine deliberately incorporates some mistakes w h i c h the
alert reader w i l l recognise; he does not suggest any parallel i n Augustine for this
extremely demanding procedure Thus I am not convinced by his suggestion
(p 8, c f my X V I I I , p 1, note) that Augustine makes a clear division between
purely dialectical suggestions and his o w n vision o f the truth, since in the sec
ond section there are patent fallacies w h i c h he does not try to correct M y own
opinion is that, despite some useful clarifications, Augustine has never shaken
o f f the fatal attraction of the view that all words are names; see, e g 11 36,
'words
b i d us look for things' He does not see that some words can only be
understood by their function, in the context o f a sentence, of modifying the
meaning of other word-groups; ' i f and 'not' are obvious examples But I can
not, n the limits of this Introduction, develop my views on so complex a sub
ject, even i f I were capable o f doing so
Professor Rist, writing more simply for the non-specialist, seems to de
fend the view, deriving f r o m Porphyry, that all statements can be seen as the
conjunction o f a subject and a predicate. I f 'predicate' here means simply 'some
thing other than the subject', this is uninformative; but since Porphyry seems to
take 'predicate' as having the force o f an adjective, his view fails to explain an
enormous number o f ordinary statements; I have cited 'a man learns', but per
haps a clearer example is 'the Queen was in the garden'; this does not tell us
who or what the Queen was, i.e 'the disambiguating features of the subject', but
where she was; and though it is true that it tells us something about the Queen, i t
is equally true that it tells us something about the garden; that is where the
Queen was For the rest, my paper must speak for itself
N o X I X , again, seems fairly straightforward It does of course advert to
the controversial question o f Augustine's knowledge o f Platonism, We are t o l d
that (his) 'fust-hand knowlege o f Plato was confined to the portion o f the Timaeus
translated by Cicero', and that 'he refers to the Meno often enough' but does not
know o f it in detail, relying instead on Cicero, Tusculan Disputations,
I 57-8
- so Burnyeat, op c i t , p 22, n 30 But a footnote cannot convey the proper
sense o f a well-stocked mind accustomed to thrashing out his ideas in discus
sion; the scissors-and-paste approach inevitably suggested in this context is
w h o l l y alien to his m i n d

INTRODUCTION

I might perhaps have added a further w o r d on memory I remember being

puzzled by Augustine's comprehensive use o f the word, which I myself had
always understood in a more specific sense B u t in the modern w o r l d , where
'memory' names a vital function o f computers and word-processors, there is no
need to be puzzled; though our computers have not as yet developed anything
very like the sorting-out process which I have attributed to the subconscious
m i n d , or even to vague and ill-defined memories On such questions, Augustine
is far ahead o f his time.
N o X X was delivered at Pamplona to a conference o f theologians dis
cussing St Gregory o f Nyssa's work directed against the extreme Arian Eunomius
Eunomius was a thorough going rationalist who held, inter alia, that the Greek
w o r d aTEVVTiTOt;, 'ingenerate', 'having no beginning', was the sole and all-suf
ficient designation that could be used to name the divine nature But m y essay
has to take the form suggested by its title, namely an examination o f the theories
o f names in the philosophical tradition which was available to Gregory, though
I t h i n k very inadequately explored or criticized by him D i d names correspond
w i t h the nature o f what they represented, or were they merely the products of
social convention? In the former case, did they in some way picture the realities
they represented? H o w were they chosen? - could one imagine some anony
mous 'name-giver', who fulfils the function assigned to A d a m in Genesis 2:19
20? I then come to the distinct question whether God himself can be named; but
before this can get o f f the ground, I have to give some space to the w o r d eni'vota,
w h i c h is used for the 'designations' applied to God's activities, assuming that
there are many such activities which can be distinguished and named, as against
the one mysterious divine nature, to w h i c h no name can be given. This discus
sion to some extent overlaps w i t h no X X I , which gives further thought to the
concept o f divine simplicity M y researches seemed to indicate that the word
ETtivoia had not been adequately discussed; whereas ojikov^c,, the w o r d com
monly used for 'simplicity', had been interpreted only in a moral sense, the
'sincerity' or 'unaffectedness' displayed by good men
Returning to paper X X , I return to the problem that the O l d Testament
teaches variously that God himself cannot be named, and that He himself has
indicated his name; though later Jewish tradition came to hold that the proper
name Mahweh' was too sacred to be pronounced, so that in reading the Scrip
tures, where the reader w o u l d f i n d the purely consonantal spelling I H W H , he
w o u l d pronounce the w o r d Adonai, 'my L o r d ' ; so that later Latin authors re
ferred to God by the composite name ' Jehovah'. More generally, I note that a
proper name is not necessarily a-personal name, as was often assumed In con
clusion I refer to the theories of Eunomius himself, who seems to suggest that
the actual word a y t w r i T O ^ is indispensable for sound theology The objection
is obvious: i f the actual Greek w o r d must be used, only a Greek-speaker can
formulate a sound theology; but i f translation is allowable, an element o f inter
pretation cannot be avoided M o r e generally, while Eunomius, like his elder

INTRODUCTION

xviii

colleague Aetius, had some merits as a logician, his theology has the defect of
eliminating any element of mystery f r o m our conception of the Godhead, as
w e l l as making the divine Son and Spirit 'unlike' and thus inferior to the Father
No.. X X I returns to the words anhSvi\q and sjuvotoc, mentioned above.
I think m y discussion can be followed without further comment; but i f space had
allowed I w o u l d have liked to mention the very interesting position adopted by
Augustine, who assents to the traditional doctr ine o f divine simplicity, but is far
f r o m endorsing the extreme position adopted by Plotinus. Augustine has a considerable debt to Plotinus, amply documented in the footnotes to Henry
Chadwick's translation of the Confessions; but he is far f r o m adopting the view
that the highest principle, as a perfect unity, can neither think nor be thought,
since either activity would import a duality o f subject and predicate Plotinus
apparently was not satisfied by the answer that perfect knowledge implies a
perfect identification o f the knower and the thing known B u t this is not Augustine's method of argument Rather, where there is an irremovable conflict beween
the inferences o f philosophy and the deliverances o f Holy Scripture, we must be
guided by the divine Word Thus God must be fully personal; he must love us
himself, and not delegate this divine work. Every line o f Augustine recalls us to
this tremendous mystery
CHRISTOPHER STEAD
Haddenham,
February

Cambridgeshire
2000

Greek Influence on Christian Thought

C h r i s t i a n i t y was f i r s t p r e a c h e d as an i n v i t a t i o n t o accept Jesus as
L o r d ; his c o m i n g was seen as t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f G o d ' s purpose f o r the
h u m a n race. B u t t h e earliest preachers c o u l d take for g r a n t e d a belief
i n G o d ' s existence a n d his p r o v i d e n c e , already w e l l r e c o g n i z e d in
J u d a i s m W h e n t h e C h u r c h began t o expand i n t o non-Jewish
societies, i t m e t w i t h e n q u i r e r s w h o d o u b t e d or d e n i e d such beliefs,
a n d was f o r c e d t o d e f e n d t h e m b y a r g u m e n t ; St L u k e presents an
e a r l y stage o f t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t i n Acts 17 1 6 f f , w h e r e St Paul
e n c o u n t e r s E p i c u r e a n and S t o i c p h i l o s o p h e r s B y t h e second cent u r y , C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s had b e g u n t o restate their f a i t h as a c o h e r e n t
t h e o l o g y , d r a w i n g l a r g e l y u p o n G r e e k t h o u g h t , w h i c h was b y far the
m o s t i m p o r t a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f l u e n c e o n t h e R o m a n E m p i r e , and
i n d e e d since t h e Renaissance has r e i n v i g o r a t e d our o w n a r t , science
and p h i l o s o p h y .
T h e G r e e k s ' m o s t creative p e r i o d can be r o u g h l y d e f i n e d as
5 0 0 - 2 0 0 B C B y e a r l y C h r i s t i a n times t h e y had b e c o m e less b o l d and
e x p e r i m e n t a l , m o r e accustomed to i m i t a t e classical m o d e l s , and
m o r e i n c l i n e d t o w a r d s r e l i g i o n ; atheism and scepticism w e r e still
t a u g h t , b u t w e r e less p o p u l a r i n a society w h i c h s o u g h t reassurance
N e v e r t h e l e s s G r e e k c u l t u r e r e t a i n e d an a t t r a c t i o n a n d power w h i c h
c a n n o t be a p p r e c i a t e d w i t h o u t some u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s great
classical masterpieces.
A m o n g t h e G r e e k s t h e visual ar ts w e r e better developed t h a n their
m u s i c , w h i c h r e m a i n e d v e r y s i m p l e ; and t h e i r s c u l p t u r e was far m o r e
impressive t h a n t h e i r p a i n t i n g . E a r l y C h r i s t i a n m o n u m e n t s echo
c o n t e m p o r a r y G r a e c o - R o m a n styles, i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e great G r e e k
masterpieces o f t h e f o u r t h c e n t u r y BC; t h u s the earliest p o r t r a i t s of
C h r i s t d e p i c t h i m as a h a n d s o m e y o u t h n o t u n l i k e t h e G r e e k A p o l l o
T h e severe lines o f the later B y z a n t i n e p o r t r a i t s , h o w e v e r , owe
s o m e t h i n g t o G r a e c o - R o m a n p a i n t i n g s l i k e those discovered at

Greek

P o m p e i i G r e e k a r c h i t e c t u r e also m a d e its c o n t r i b u t i o n ; t h e earliest

large C h r i s t i a n churches w e r e rectangular p i l l a r e d halls, r e s e m b l i n g
t h e secular 'basilica' ( l a w - c o u r t and c o m m e r c i a l exchange). L a t e r
examples a d o p t e d the d i s t i n c t i v e R o m a n use o f arches a n d d o m e s ,
w h i c h was finely e x p l o i t e d i n t h e B y z a n t i n e p e r i o d .
G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e d i d n o t always appeal t o C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s . T h e y
o f t e n profess t o despise fine w r i t i n g ; and o f course t h e G r e e k s had
p r o d u c e d , inter alia, b a w d y comedies and e r o t i c l y r i c s w h i c h w e r e
offensive t o serious m e n . C h r i s t i a n s m a d e use o f t h e G r e e k o r a t o r s
for t r a i n i n g preachers, a n d o f t h e h i s t o r i a n s , t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e
b i b l i c a l narratives; b u t t h e great G r e e k dramatists w e r e u n d e r v a l u e d ,
as p r e s e n t i n g t h e gods i n h u m a n guise T h e a t t i t u d e o f St C y p r i a n is
i n s t r u c t i v e ; o n b e c o m i n g a b i s h o p he t h r e w away his p a g a n b o o k s ,
and pr ofessed t h a t he o w e d n o t h i n g t o p a g a n i s m , w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g
t o w r i t e t h e i m p e c c a b l e f o r m a l prose w h i c h he had l e a r n t f r o m his
pagan schoolmasters T e r t u l l i a n , J e r o m e a n d o t h e r s s h o w a s i m i l a r
c o m b i n a t i o n o f affected d i s d a i n w i t h actual indebtedness.
B u t such attitudes w e r e n o t u n k n o w n i n t h e p a g a n w o r l d P a g a n
teachers w o u l d i n t r o d u c e t h e i r charges t o t h e great G r e e k classics,
especially t h e p o e t r y o f H o m e r ; b u t t h e y a p p r o a c h e d t h e m i n t h e
serious, q u e s t i o n i n g f r a m e o f m i n d t h a t was c o m m o n i n late a n t i q u i t y , t r e a t i n g t h e H o m e r i c p o e m s as i n s t r u c t i v e w o r k s , i n d e e d as
actually i n t e n d e d t o c o n v e y lessons a b o u t h u m a n l i f e a n d d e s t i n y
w h i c h t h e c a r e f u l s t u d e n t c o u l d d e t e c t T h e p h i l o s o p h e r s also w e r e
o f course c o n s u l t e d for m o r a l and r e l i g i o u s g u i d a n c e ; b u t whereas
P l a t o , for example, w r o t e m a n y o f his dialogues i n a v e i n o f
l i g h t - h e a r t e d , t e n t a t i v e e n q u i r y , his f o l l o w e r s u s u a l l y r e g a r d t h e m as
a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e text i n w h i c h a p p a r e n t inconsistencies m u s t be
explained away. O n e reason for t h i s was t h e i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h p a g a n
educators attached t o r h e t o r i c , t h e a r t o f persuasion and p u b l i c
speaking, w h e r e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n is a f a u l t t o be a v o i d e d at a n y cost
C h r i s t i a n s a c c o r d i n g l y m a d e strenuous e f f o r t s t o present t h e B i b l e as
an i n s p i r e d b o o k , consistent and h a r m o n i o u s i n all its parts. W h a t w e
r e g a r d as crude and p r i m i t i v e ideas expressed i n t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t
c o u l d be defused b y s p i r i t u a l i z i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s l i k e those i n v e n t e d
b y h i g h - m i n d e d expositors o f H o m e r

Influence on Christian

Thought

1 5 . 1 8 f f ) . A first-century c o m m e n t a t o r explains t h a t 'the w o r d s of

Z e u s t o H e r a are t h e w o r d s o f G o d t o m a t t e r ' ; h e t r a n s f o r m s the
w r o n g e d h u s b a n d i n t o a s u p r e m e creator w h o imposes restr aints o n
m a t t e r t o p r o d u c e an o r d e r l y w o r l d T h e m e t h o d o f a l l e g o r y g r e w up
at A l e x a n d r i a and was already a p p l i e d t o S c r i p t u r e b y t h e Greeks p e a k i n g Jewish aristocrat P h i l o , w h o d i e d t A D 50 O r i g e n , w h o
r e c o r d s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Zeus and H e r a , {Against Celsus 6 42,
w r i t t e n c. A D 250) uses s i m i l a r m e t h o d s t o e x p l a i n p u z z l i n g or
o b j e c t i o n a b l e passages o f S c r i p t u r e ; m a n y examples are g i v e n i n his
On First Principles, 4. 3
B u t i t was G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y t o w h i c h C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t was
c h i e f l y i n d e b t e d ' P h i l o s o p h y ' means ' t h e love o f w i s d o m ' ; i n ancient
t i m e s i t i n c l u d e d a great v a r i e t y o f subjects w h i c h are nowadays
r e g a r d e d as separate disciplines I n e a r l y C h r i s t i a n times i t was
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s : l o g i c , e t h i c s , and
physics ' L o g i c ' a n d 'ethics' m e a n t r o u g h l y w h a t t h e y m e a n today,
despite d r a m a t i c d e v e l o p m e n t s i n b o t h subjects i n the last h u n d r e d
years. E t h i c s i n A r i s t o t l e ' s day h a d i n c l u d e d p o l i t i c a l science a n d the
g e r m o f e c o n o m i c s , b u t these had l i t t l e interest f o r later t h i n k e r s .
'Physics' was a general t e r m for t h e s t u d y o f t h e universe; i t i n c l u d e d
all t h a t was t h e n k n o w n o f physics p r o p e r , c o s m o l o g y , a s t r o n o m y ,
g e o g r a p h y , b i o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y , and t h e o l o g y t o o , for those w h o
believed i n d i v i n e a c t i o n a f f e c t i n g t h e w o r l d . W e s h o u l d also notice
t w o studies closely a l l i e d to p h i l o s o p h y , b u t n o t n o r m a l l y r e c k o n e d
as b e l o n g i n g t o i t , n a m e l y m e d i c i n e a n d mathematics. T h e s e had
l i t t l e d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e o n C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t , b u t t h e sheer b r i l l i a n c e
o f G r e e k m a t h e m a t i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m p e l s our a t t e n t i o n

O n e f a v o u r i t e m e t h o d a m o n g o t h e r s was t o t r e a t t h e o f f e n d i n g
passage as an a l l e g o r y T h u s H o m e r describes the h i g h g o d Z e u s
r e m i n d i n g his c o n s o r t H e r a o f her a d u l t e r y w i t h t h e f i r e - g o d
Hephaestus, for w h i c h she was b o u n d i n g o l d e n chains
{Iliad

L o g i c was v i r t u a l l y t h e c r e a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e , w h o was also

accepted as t h e p r i m a r y a u t h o r i t y u n t i l w e l l o n i n the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s t e n d e d to c r i t i c i z e his minutiloquium,
his
obsession w i t h exact d e t a i l ; and i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t the m i n o r i t y
o f t h e o l o g i a n s w h o d i d t r y t o a d o p t his m e t h o d s , b y expr essing their
t e a c h i n g as a series o f syllogisms, make n o t a b l y d i s m a l r e a d i n g . T h e
reason is n o t t h a t C h r i s t i a n t e a c h i n g is necessarily i l l o g i c a l , but
rather t h a t l o g i c a l m e t h o d r e q u i r e s exact d e f i n i t i o n and consistent
use of t e r m s ; and t h i s is h a r d t o achieve w h e r e r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s have
been expressed i n p o e t i c language or i n m e t a p h o r s d r a w n f r o m
everyday l i f e I t is especially m i s l e a d i n g if, o n a p r e t e x t o f exact
d e f i n i t i o n , one represents a n c i e n t w r i t e r s as a r g u i n g for o r against a
p r o p o s i t i o n d e f i n e d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y t e r m s T h e better course was

176

177

I
Greek Influence on Christian Thought
t o p a y a t t e n t i o n t o t h e uses o f m e t a p h o r ; and her e t h e G r eek liter a r y
c r i t i c s and their L a t i n i m i t a t o r s c o u l d o f f e r valuable g u i d a n c e . B u t
t h e w a y was c o n s t a n t l y b l o c k e d b y t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e B i b l e
m u s t be a w h o l l y consistent and u n i f o r m l y u p l i f t i n g t e x t , r ather t h a n
t h e legacy o f m a n y d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s o f d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s and d i f f e r e n t
levels o f c u l t u r e , as we t e n d t o see i t today.
G r e e k ethics, i n e a r l y C h r i s t i a n t i m e s , u s u a l l y assumes a d i s t i n c tive t h e o r y o f h u m a n nature. M o s t p h i l o s o p h e r s , P y t h a g o r e a n s ,
P l a t o n i s t s and m a n y Stoics, h e l d t h a t consciousness arises w i t h i n t h e
s o u l , a personal b e i n g w h i c h can f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e b o d y
a n d survives its d e a t h (whereas for t h e H e b r e w s t h e so-called ' s o u l ' is
a n i m p e r s o n a l a n i m a t i n g p r i n c i p l e , a n d consciousness can o n l y arise
w i t h i n a n a n i m a t e d b o d y ) . Y e t P l a t o suggested t w o d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t pictures o f t h e soul. T h e Phaedo sees i t as essentially c o n c e r n e d
w i t h higher truths, i n contrast w i t h the distracted pleasure-loving
b o d y ; b u t t h e Republic describes i t as h a v i n g t h r e e p a r t s , o f w h i c h o n l y
t h e highest, t h e m i n d or i n t e l l e c t , is capable o f real v i r t u e ; i t is t h e
d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e w h i c h our e m o t i o n s a n d impulses o u g h t t o o b e y
Plato's s t r o n g l y idealized v i e w o f t h e i n t e l l e c t w i l l h a r d l y c o n v i n c e
us m o d e r n s ; we see t o o c l e a r l y t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t i t s e l f can be misused
or c o r r u p t e d M o r e o v e r i t d i s t o r t e d t h e C h r i s t i a n m o r a l t r a d i t i o n . St
P a u l , t h o u g h he spoke o f a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n flesh and s p i r i t ( G a l
5.17), accepted self-denial f o r t h e sake o f his m i s s i o n ( P h i l 4.12)
w i t h o u t c o n d e m n i n g b o d i l y satisfactions; b u t later C h r i s t i a n s , l i k e
m a n y pagans, o f t e n assumed t h a t t h e f i r s t step t o w a r d s m o r a l
i m p r o v e m e n t was t o neglect t h e b o d y and c u l t i v a t e t h e m i n d
C h a r i t y , i f i t m e a n t c o n c e r n for t h e bodily needs o f o t h e r s , was t h u s
often undervalued
C h r i s t i a n s m a d e o n l y a rather selective use o f t h e G r e e k m o r a l i s t s
P l a t o was w i d e l y praised, for reasons w h i c h w i l l s o o n appear; e v e n so,
his Republic caused o f f e n c e b y its e c c e n t r i c p r o g r a m m e f o r w o m e n i n
society, as m e r e child-bearers w i t h o u t a t t a c h m e n t s either t o h u s bands or c h i l d r e n ; w h i l e his Symposium, a m a g n i f i c e n t defence o f
physical love as a gateway t o h i g h e r affections, presupposed t h e
G r e e k acceptance o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y . A r i s t o t l e , w h o w r o t e i m p o r t a n t
treatises o n ethics, was c r i t i c i z e d f o r w h a t seemed an u n h e r o i c v i e w ,
t h a t p e r f e c t happiness r e q u i r e s some degree o f o u t w a r d p r o s p e r i t y ;
also, less f a i r l y , for his c o n c e p t o f v i r t u e as a m i d d l e course b e t w e e n
t w o o p p o s i t e failings (e.g.. c o w a r d i c e and rashness); t h i s ' d o c t r i n e o f
t h e m e a n ' was o f t e n m i s c o n s t r u e d as i m p l y i n g o n l y a m o d e r a t e

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e n t h u s i a s m for v i r t u e T h e Stoics w e r e o f t e n t e d i o u s t o r e a d , and

m o r e o v e r changed t h e i r g r o u n d ; the earlier Stoics preached a fierce
a n d exclusive m o r a l i t y ; p e r f e c t w i s d o m was d e m a n d e d , a n d the
slightest occasional lapse c o n d e m n e d ; a l l o t h e r supposed goods were
c o n s i d e r e d w o r t h l e s s . B u t t h e later Stoics t o o k a m o r e m o d e r a t e
v i e w : our n a t u r e , t h e y said, p r o m p t s us t o seek c e r t a i n advantages,
s u c h as b o d i l y h e a l t h and t r a n q u i l l i t y ; these were n o t g o o d i n the
absolute sense, y e t i t was ' p r e f e r a b l e ' t o seek t h e m , at least f o r other
people. I t is t h i s later phase o f S t o i c ethics, w i t h its str ess o n c o m m o n
duties, w h i c h i n f l u e n c e d St Paul's t e a c h i n g
T h e r e was thus n o u n i v e r s a l l y a p p r o v e d a u t h o r i t y ; t h e most
c o n v e n i e n t h a n d b o o k s were p r o b a b l y C i c e r o ' s p o p u l a r i z i n g L a t i n
adaptations, w h i c h set various systems side b y side. A n d t h e f u r t h e r
d i f f i c u l t y o f a m a l g a m a t i n g G r e e k and b i b l i c a l t e a c h i n g m e a n t that
C h r i s t i a n ethics was s l o w t o d e v e l o p a c o h e r e n t f r a m e w o r k . T h e
B i b l e p r o v i d e d s i m p l e f o l k w i t h d i v i n e laws and vir tuous examples
T h e s e w e r e s u p p l e m e n t e d b y t h e d o c t r i n e , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e Stoics,
o f a ' n a t u r a l law', w h i c h i m p l i e d t h a t a l l m e n have the same perc e p t i o n o f basic m o r a l duties (1 C o r 11.14); this i g n o r e d t h e actual
evidence o f d i v e r s i t y a m o n g d i f f e r e n t races, and even suggested,
a b s u r d l y , t h a t w r o n g d o e r s are adequately p u n i s h e d b y the agonies
o f conscience t h a t t h e y are b o u n d t o feel B u t C h r i s t i a n Platonists
t e n d e d t o define goodness as a r i g h t c h o i c e o f objectives; our affect i o n s m u s t be fixed o n t h e e t e r n a l rewards. I n d e e d A u g u s t i n e , f o r i n stance, tends t o suggest t h a t all o u r feelings are f o r m s o f a f f e c t i o n ; fear,
e g. o f r o b b e r y , is r e a l l y a b y e - f o r m o f t h e love o f riches a n d ease
M o r e o v e r t h e clash b e t w e e n P l a t o n i c a n d b i b l i c a l views o f t h e soul
confused the C h r i s t i a n teaching o n the afterlife T h e Hebrews
l o o k e d f o r w a r d t o a r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e b o d y ; o n l y so c o u l d c o n sciousness be r estor e d ; and i t w o u l d take place o n a day of j u d g e m e n t
after a p e r i o d o f absolute non-existence, B u t C h r i s t i a n s t e n d e d (as
m a n y s t i l l do) t o accept also t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e soul as Plato
c o n c e i v e d i t , so t h a t consciousness c o n t i n u e s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n
b e y o n d t h e m o m e n t o f d e a t h ( c f L u k e 23.43) B u t g r a n t e d the
p r o m i s e o f a f u l l y s u r v i v i n g consciousness, i t is h a r d t o see t h e p o i n t
o f a subsequent r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e b o d y , w h i c h C h r i s t i a n s were
b o u n d t o accept i n accordance w i t h t h e i r Creeds
B e f o r e c o m i n g t o t h e c e n t r a l topics o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y , somet h i n g s h o u l d be said a b o u t t h e i r m a t h e m a t i c s T h e Greeks excelled
h e r e t h r o u g h their intense i n t e r e s t i n s o l v i n g p r o b l e m s for t h e i r o w n
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sake, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f a n y p r a c t i c a l value T h e i r g e o m e t r y , as f o r m u l a t e d b y E u c l i d (c 300 BC) h e l d t h e field u n t i l t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ,
a n d is s t i l l acceptable as a basic d i s c i p l i n e . I n a r i t h m e t i c t h e y
achieved r e m a r k a b l e r esults despite t h e h a n d i c a p o f a c l u m s y system
o f n u m e r a t i o n , u s i n g t h i r t y l e t t e r s o f t h e alphabet t o d e n o t e u n i t s ,
tens and h u n d r e d s u p t o 1000, w h e r e t h e system b e g a n t o repeat.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t o k n o w t h a t t w i c e t h r ee is six d i d n o t at o n c e i n d i c a t e
h o w t o m u l t i p l y t w e n t y b y t h i r t y ; i t was as i f w e w r o t e t h e t w o sums as
' b x c = P and ' k x l = x'.
T h e B i b l e , i n 1 K i n g s 7.23, states t h a t S o l o m o n m a d e a 'sea', or
c e r e m o n i a l water-tank, t e n c u b i t s i n d i a m e t e r a n d t h i r t y c u b i t s
r o u n d , thus i m p l y i n g t h a t t h e c o n s t a n t we k n o w as TT is 3.0. T h e
G r eeks n o t o n l y k n e w t h a t i t was n o t a n exact w h o l e n u m b e r , b u t t h a t
i t was n o t expressible b y any r a t i o o f w h o l e n u m b e r s : A r c h i m e d e s (c.
2 8 7 - 2 1 2 BC) c o m p u t e d i t b y a p p r o x i m a t i o n as b e t w e e n V/? a n d
3 / 7 i , i.e.. r o u g h l y b e t w e e n 3 142857 a n d 3.140845 M a n y f u r t h e r
examples c o u l d be g i v e n , i f space a l l o w e d ,
10

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e G r e e k s d i d n o t solve t h e m u c h m o r e
d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m o f t h e n a t u r e o f n u m b e r itself, w h i c h was e l u c i dated b y B e r t r a n d Russell some t i m e ago, I f I u n d e r s t a n d h i m r i g h t ,
t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f n u m b e r s is t h a t b y w h i c h (e g.) w e ' n u m b e r
o f f ' t h e houses i n a street; c a r d i n a l n u m b e r s , w h i c h w e use t o q u a n tify a group, depend o n the further operation o f ' s u m m i n g up' h o w
m a n y houses w e have passed T h e G r e e k s , h o w e v e r , assumed t h a t
t h e c a r d i n a l n u m b e r s w e r e p r i m a r y , and t h a t t h e w h o l e system o f
n u m b e r s o r i g i n a t e d f r o m t h e ' m o n a d ' , t h e n u m b e r o n e ; their a r i t h m e t i c l a c k i n g a zero. M a t h e m a t i c a l l y m i n d e d p h i l o s o p h e r s such as
P y t h a g o r as a n d his f o l l o w e r s c o u l d t h u s suppose t h a t t h e M o n a d was
t h e source o f a l l r a t i o n a l order i n t h e universe; o r , p u t conversely,
t h a t t h e creative p o w e r b e h i n d i t had t h e characteristics o f t h e
M o n a d . T h i s p r o m p t e d C h r i s t i a n s t o t h i n k t h a t G o d m u s t be c o m p l e t e l y s i m p l e and s t r i c t l y i m m u t a b l e , a v i e w w h i c h s t i l l r e m a i n s t h e
o f f i c i a l o r t h o d o x y , t h o u g h i t has r e c e n t l y c o m e i n for v i g o r o u s attacks
T h i s d o c t r i n e o f G o d was c o m b i n e d , rather a w k w a r d l y , w i t h t h e
b i b l i c a l p i c t u r e o f G o d as a creator and l o v i n g Father o f t h e w o r l d
a n d m a n k i n d . P l a t o , m o r e o v e r , gave s u p p o r t t o this t h e o l o g y
t h r o u g h an i n f l u e n t i a l d i a l o g u e , t h e Timaeus, w h i c h p i c t u r e s t h e
c r e a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d b y a d i v i n e ' c r a f t s m a n ' or ' a r t i f i c e r ' I t was
never clear w h e t h e r t h i s d i v i n i t y was m e a n t t o be t h e source o f all
p e r f e c t i o n (as i n C h r i s t i a n i t y ) , or m e r e l y t o i m i t a t e some r e a l i t y

180

h i g h e r t h a n h i m s e l f B u t Plato's w o r k was valued b y C h r i s t i a n s as

c o n f i r m i n g t h e b i b l i c a l a c c o u n t o f the cr eation. Y e t w h e n G o d came
t o be described i n m a t h e m a t i c a l t e r m s as s i m p l e a n d i m m u t a b l e , i t
became less easy t o u n d e r s t a n d his p r o v i d e n t i a l care o f t h e w o r l d ;
t h i s m u s t , i t w o u l d seem, r e q u i r e a d i v i n e m i n d w h i c h can a t t e n d t o
m a n y d i f f e r e n t concerns C h r i s t i a n s t e n d e d to solve the p r o b l e m by
d e v e l o p i n g St J o h n ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e d i v i n e W o r d or L o g o s i n a
m a n n e r already f o r e s h a d o w e d b y t h e Stoics; G o d the F a t h e r was
seen as w h o l l y t r a n s c e n d e n t ; h e exercised his p r o v i d e n t i a l care n o t
d i r e c t l y , b u t t h r o u g h his L o g o s ; w h o is sometimes d e s c r i b e d , e g. b y
A t h a n a s i u s , as a c t u a l l y p e r v a d i n g t h e physical w o r l d , and indeed
i n h e r i t s t h e Father 's t i t l e o f ' C r a f t s m a n ' , demiourgos.
G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y affected C h r i s t i a n i t y m o s t d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h the
d e p a r t m e n t o f 'physics' t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e v e r y abstract s t u d y w h i c h
came t o be called m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f this s u b j e c t is far
t o o c o m p l e x t o be s u m m a r i z e d h e r e ; b u t we m a y n o t i c e t w o p h i l osophers earlier t h a n P l a t o w h o left t h e i r m a r k o n all subsequent
thought
P a r m e n i d e s (t 5 1 5 - 4 5 0 ) a t t e m p t e d t o deduce t h e n a t u r e o f the
universe, b y p u r e l y l o g i c a l m e t h o d s , f r o m the n a t u r e o f b e i n g as
s u c h H e t r e a t e d ' b e i n g ' as a s i m p l e c o n c e p t , a v i e w w h i c h logicians
have n o w discarded; f o r i t can i n d i c a t e b o t h passing states ('he is i l l ' )
a n d i n v a r i a b l e facts ('he is a m a n ' ) ; or again, m e r e existence, as
o p p o s e d t o fantasy; o r again t r u t h , as o p p o s e d t o falsehood ('that is
so') B u t f o r P a r m e n i d e s these concepts w e r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; thus
t h e necessities o f l o g i c r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e w o r l d , despite appearances,
m u s t be u n c h a n g i n g , s i m p l e a n d c o m p a c t (for e m p t y space w o u l d
i m p l y t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t ' n o t - b e i n g is').
I n sharp c o n t r a s t H e r a c l i t u s (c. 5 4 4 - 4 8 4 ) saw the w o r l d as a
p e r p e t u a l process o f change; b u t f a r s i g h t e d l y perceived t h a t this
need n o t m a k e i t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , since its changes take place i n an
o r d e r l y sequence and i n p r i n c i p l e can be measured. T h e y were
g o v e r n e d , he t h o u g h t , b y a 'logos', a c o n t r o l l i n g agency diffused
t h r o u g h o u t t h e u n i v e r s e ; H e r a c l i t u s ' obscure language does n o t
m a k e i t clear w h e t h e r this l o g o s s h o u l d be considered s i m p l y as a
m a t h e m a t i c a l measure or r a t i o , or as a c o n t r o l l i n g mind..
P l a t o (t 4 2 9 - 3 4 7 ) was n o t impressed b y H e r a c l i t u s ' c l a i m that
change can be measured. H e s o u g h t n o t o n l y m a t h e m a t i c a l but
m o r a l t r u t h s , w h e r e i t is h a r d e r t o d i s t i n g u i s h o b j e c t i v e changes f r o m
changes a n d u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n h u m a n j u d g e m e n t H e t h e r e f o r e saw
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r e a l i t y or b e i n g {ousia) as t w o f o l d ; a n e t e r n a l w o r l d o f p e r f e c t F o r m s ,
p e r c e i v e d o n l y b y t h e m i n d , a n d t h e c o n f u s e d and changeable w o r l d
o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s , w h i c h b e c o m e real a n d d e f i n i t e o n l y i n so far as
t h e y i m i t a t e those e t e r n a l p r o t o t y p e s T h i s v i e w is k n o w n as 'Plato's
T h e o r y o f Ideas'; b u t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t these are o b j e c t i v e
realities, n o t just p r o d u c t s o f our t h i n k i n g ; P l a t o calls t h e m b o t h
ideal, Ideas, and eide, F o r m s .
P l a t o never made i t clear w h a t k i n d s o f F o r m s t h e r e are; i t
s o m e t i m e s appears t h a t t h e r e is a F o r m f o r every class o f n a t u r a l
p h e n o m e n a (e g even for diseases!); b u t s o m e t i m e s o n l y w h e r e
p e r f e c t i o n is possible S o m e later P l a t o n i s t s r e g a r d e d t h e F o r m s n o t
o n l y as ' t h i n k a b l e ' (noeta) b u t as t h i n k i n g beings {noerd), p l a y i n g
d o w n the o r i g i n a l emphasis o n t h e i r u n c h a n g i n g character; t h u s
C h r i s t i a n s c o u l d easily r e g a r d t h e m n o t o n l y as m o r a l ideals b u t as
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e b i b l i c a l angels. T h i s was a drastic d e p a r t u r e P l a t o
h a d p i c t u r e d t h e F o r m s as a h i e r a r c h y , such t h a t t h e m o r e i n c l u s i v e
F o r m s are n o b l e r and better B u t t h e r e can be n o society b e t w e e n
beings o f d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l levels; Socrates m a y converse w i t h a n o b ler a n d better m a n , say P a r m e n i d e s ; b u t n o t w i t h i d e a l m a n h o o d i t self, a n y m o r e t h a n a w o m a n can mar r y t h e aver age m a n A fortiori t h e
all-inclusive F o r m , p u r e B e i n g itself, c o u l d have n o c o n t a c t w i t h h u m a n beings N e v e r t h e l e s s C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s a d o p t e d ' p u r e B e i n g ' as
an appropriate symbol o f God's supremacy and unchanging power.
A r i s t o t l e (384-322) raised l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n s t o Plato's d o c t r i n e o f
tr anscendent F o r m s , b u t r etained t h e n o t i o n o f f o r m as a n i m m a n e n t
p r i n c i p l e w h i c h , e g., guides t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f l i v i n g t h i n g s T h e
f o r m (small ' f ' n o w b e t t e r ! ) b e l o n g s t o t h e species; i n d i v i d u a l beings
e x h i b i t t h e same f o r m i n a separate b i t o f m a t t e r ; a n d t h e w o r d
' b e i n g ' {ousia) can d e n o t e either t h e f o r m , o r t h e m a t t e r , o r t h e
c o m p o u n d i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h results f r o m t h e i r u n i o n . B u t t h i s
r e l a t i v e l y clear p i c t u r e is c o n f u s e d b y t w o o t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s . F i r s t ,
A r i s t o t l e m o d i f i e s t h e sense o f ' b e i n g ' b y r e c o g n i z i n g a special sense
w h i c h came t o be k n o w n as 'substance' A t h i n g ' s 'substance' is t h e
character w h i c h i t m u s t have a n d can never lose ( c o n t i ast t h e sense o f
' b e i n g ' i n 'he is a m a n ' a n d 'he is h e r e ' ) ; a n d 'substances' are t h i n g s
w h i c h r e t a i n t h e i r i d e n t i t y despite changes o f size, c o n d i t i o n , etc.
Secondly, despite his emphasis o n f o r m a n d species, A r i s t o t l e
asserted, i n t h e Categories, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l , n o t t h e species, is t h e
p r i m a r y f o r m o f b e i n g , or ' p r i m a r y substance'
T h e n o t i o n o f substance became a b a t t l e - g r o u n d for later C h r i s 182

t i a n t h e o l o g i a n s ; b u t b e f o r e d e s c r i b i n g t h i s , we m u s t i n t r o d u c e a
r e l a t e d t e r m , 'hypostasis', w h i c h owes i t s p o p u l a r i t y to t h e Stoics,
b e g i n n i n g i n t h e c e n t u r y after A r i s t o t l e ( Z e n o , c 3 3 2 - 2 6 2 ; C h r y s i p p u s , t 2 8 0 - 2 0 7 BC). T h e Stoics w h o l e h e a r t e d l y accepted H e r aclitus'
p i c t u r e o f t h e universe as a process o f p e r p e t u a l change (whereas
A r i s t o t l e saw i t as basically u n c h a n g i n g , and i n d e e d e t e r n a l ) . T h e y
h e l d t h a t m a t t e r is t h e o n l y t r u e r eality; t h o u g h t s a n d concepts arise
i n m e n ' s m a t e r i a l o r g a n o f t h o u g h t B u t t h e y also h e l d t h a t every
k i n d o f m a t t e r e x h i b i t s some degree o f o r d e r ; t h i s increases as we
pass t o plants, t o animals a n d h u m a n beings, a n d finally t o the
universe itself, w h i c h is p e r v a d e d b y a s u p r e m e l y r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e
or L o g o s , w h o can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be h o n o u r e d as a g o d
' H y p o s t a s i s ' liter a l l y m e a n s ' t h a t w h i c h u n d e r l i e s or s u p p o r t s ' , e g
t h e legs o f an a n i m a l , t h e base o f a statue, T h e w o r d t o o k o n m a n y
d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s ; b u t we have t o m e n t i o n t w o , w h i c h , strangely,
have a l m o s t exactly o p p o s i t e i m p l i c a t i o n s ' H y p o s t a s i s ' can m e a n the
' u n d e r l y i n g r e a l i t y ' o f a t h i n g , w h i c h p r o b a b l y i t w i l l share w i t h other
t h i n g s ; or i t can m e a n t h e ' e m e r g e n t p e r c e p t i b l e r e a l i t y ' , w h i c h is
m o r e l i k e l y t o be t a k e n as i n d i v i d u a l . T h e f o r m e r m e a n i n g is
suggested, e.g., b y a c o u n t e r f e i t c o i n ; t h e c o i n ' r e a l l y is' lead, the
base m e t a l u n d e r l y i n g its g i l d e d surface T h e second m e a n i n g stems
f r o m t h e use o f 'hypostasis' t o m e a n a 'sediment'. T h e Stoics
p i c t u r ed t h e universe as e v o l v i n g f r o m a p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n o f pure
fire, w h i c h b y degrees p r o d u c e s s o l i d m a t t e r , l i k e a s e d i m e n t or
p r e c i p i t a t e d e p o s i t e d b y a l i q u i d , a n d so gives rise to persistent
i n d i v i d u a l things.
T h e n a t u r a l L a t i n e q u i v a l e n t for 'hypostasis' was substantia; b u t
t h i s latter w o r d was used t o translate t h e G r e e k ousia; a better L a t i n
e q u i v a l e n t here w o u l d have b e e n essentia (cf 'essence'); b u t t h i s w o r d
sounded a r t i f i c i a l t o t h e L a t i n s , and was n o t m u c h used before
A u g u s t i n e ' s t i m e , t h o u g h i t became p o p u l a r later w i t h the m e d i e v a l
philosophers
G r e e k t h e o l o g i a n s came t o describe t h e F a t h e r , Son a n d H o l y
S p i r i t as a t r i a d , or T r i n i t y , o f d i v i n e beings T h e y o f t e n spoke of
t h r e e hypostases, i.e t h r e e d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l beings; t o a c k n o w l edge o n l y one d i v i n e hypostasis m i g h t suggest, e g , t h a t o n l y the
Father is d i v i n e . B u t t h e L a t i n s , following T e r t u l l i a n , spoke o f t h e m
as t h r e e persons p r o c e e d i n g f r o m a single 'substance', as h a v i n g a
c o m m o n o r i g i n i n t h e Father and a c o m m o n d i v i n i t y ; a n d some
G r eeks agr eed t o accept t h e idea o f ' o n e hypostasis', t a k i n g t h a t wor d

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I
Greek Influence on Christian Thought
i n its larger sense T h e L a t i n s d i s l i k e d ' t h r e e hypostases', w h i c h t o
t h e m suggested t h r e e gods
T h e t e n s i o n and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g came t o a head w h e n A l i u s (c
2 6 5 - 3 3 7 ) began t o a f f i r m t h a t t h e S o n and S p i r i t w e r e s u b o r d i n a t e
a n d hence i n f e r i o r t o t h e Father. T h e C o u n c i l o f N i c a e a , A D 325,
r u l e d t h a t t h e y w e r e 'the same i n b e i n g ' (or ' c o n s u b s t a n t i a l ' , or
'coessential'); and t h e p o s i t i o n was c l a r i f i e d b y t h e C a p p a d o c i a n
Fathers, h a l f a c e n t u r y later, w h o a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f o n e
' b e i n g ' or 'substance' d i d n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h ' t h r e e hypostases', w h i c h
t h e y n o w clearly d e f i n e d as individual r e a l i t i e s , or 'persons'
M u c h i n k has been wasted i n discussing t h e precise m e a n i n g
w h i c h t h e C o u n c i l o f N i c a e a gave t o ' c o n s u b s t a n t i a l ' ; d i d i t i m p l y
'same i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g ' , or m e r e l y 'same species', or s o m e t h i n g else.
I t m u s t be emphasized t h a t t h e N i c e n e Fathers w e r e n o t t r a i n e d
p h i l o s o p h e r s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , A r i s t o t l e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n o f ousia, 'substance', as either i n d i v i d u a l or g e n e r i c , was q u i t e u n f a m i l i a r t o t h e m .
All t h e ter ms t h e y had available at t h i s stage car r i e d a v a r i e t y o f senses
w h i c h their users o n l y h a l f u n d e r s t o o d . T h u s m o d e r n scholars w h o
have debated w h e t h e r such-and-such a t e r m was used ' i n t h e sense o f
P e r s o n ' , or t h e l i k e , give us a n i m p r e s s i o n o f c l e a r l y d e f i n e d
alternatives w h i c h is c o m p l e t e l y u n h i s t o r i c a l
S o m e t h i n g m o r e s h o u l d be said o f ' P e r s o n ' , n o n e t h e less L a t i n
usage was l a r g e l y based o n legal c o n v e n t i o n ; a ' p e r s o n ' was anyone
c o m p e t e n t t o plead i n a l a w - c o u r t , e x c l u d i n g slaves and m i n o r s T h e
c o r r e s p o n d i n g G r e e k wordprosopon suggested rather a character i n a
p l a y (cf. our phrase dramatis personae)
Neither word strongly
emphasized t h e qualities w e associate w i t h ' p e r s o n a l i t y ' , viz. o r i g i n a l i t y , e n t e r p r i s e , leadership. M o r e o v e r , as f i r s t used, n e i t h e r w o r d
necessarily i m p l i e d an i n d i v i d u a l ; a p a r t y t o a law-suit c o u l d be a g r o u p
o f p e o p l e a c t i n g j o i n t l y , and i n a p l a y a c h o r u s o f actors c o u l d take a
single p a r t B u t later C h r i s t i a n usage f o l l o w e d t h e C a p p a d o c i a n s '
clear d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ( i n d i v i d u a l ) P e r s o n a n d ( c o m m o n ) S u b stance; other k i n d s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , e g i n d i v i d u a l islands or stars,
wer e l e f t o u t o f account
C h r i s t i a n s w e r e d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y s l o w t o realize t h a t the same
d i s t i n c t i o n applied t o t h e w o r d phusis, ' n a t u r e ' ; and t h i s l e d t o b i t t e r
disputes c o n c e r n i n g t h e d o c t r i n e o f C h r i s t w h i c h s h o u l d have been
avoided I t s h o u l d have b e e n clear t h a t C h r i s t existed ' i n twophmeis\
provided t h a t this was clearly u n d e r s t o o d as i n d i c a t i n g t w o states or
c o n d i t i o n s , his e t e r n a l f e l l o w s h i p w i t h t h e F a t h e r , and his incarnate
184

l i f e as m a n B u t d e v o u t eastern C h r i s t i a n s were haunted b y the

s u s p i c i o n t h a t 'twophusevC m u s t i m p l y t w o d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l beings,
a d i v i n e C h r i s t and a h u m a n Jesus, a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w i t h d r e w to
f o r m t h e M o n o p h y s i t e c o m m u n i t i e s T h e o r t h o d o x f a i t h , as d e f i n e d
b y t h e C o u n c i l o f C h a l c e d o n , A D 451 agreed w i t h t h e L a t i n s that
C h r i s t e x h i b i t s t w o phuseis, t w o m a n n e r s o f b e i n g , d i v i n e and h u m a n ,
u n i t e d i n t h i s one u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l , or i n a single hypostasis
I n c o n c l u s i o n : C h r i s t i a n i t y d e v e l o p e d o u t o f a J e w i s h sect i n t o a
w o r l d r e l i g i o n t h r o u g h t h e use o f its G r e e k i n h e r i t a n c e , by m o u l d i n g
its beliefs i n t o a c o h e r e n t system w h i c h c o u l d appeal to t h o u g h t f u l
m e n and leaders o f society, w i t h o u t l o s i n g the e l e m e n t o f f a i t h and
p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t e x h i b i t e d b y s i m p l e r believers I f w e have
l e a r n t t o appreciate t h e d i s t i n c t i v e genius o f H e b r e w r e l i g i o u s
t h o u g h t , t h i s has c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h t h e gradual d e v e l o p m e n t of
scholarly methods w h i c h were initiated b y Greek literary critics I t
r e m a i n s a live q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y expressed i n
G r e e k concepts is s t i l l serviceable f o r a C h u r c h faced w i t h the
challenge o f f u r t h e r expansion, e.g. i n A f r i c a and L a t i n A m e r i c a
W h a t can be said w i t h assurance is t h a t such questions c o u l d n o t
even be raised, let alone c o n s i d e r e d , w i t h o u t t h e arts o f accurate
s t a t e m e n t and r a t i o n a l debate w h i c h t h e C h u r c h absorbed f r o m its
Greek-speaking adherents

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Readers unfamiliar w i t h Greek literature can gain a lively impression from
Livingstone, R, The Pageant of Greece (Oxford University Press, 1923). He
also edited The Legacy of Greece (Oxford University Press, 1921), a collection
o f essays dealing w i t h all aspects o f Gr eek culture
There ar e numerous histories of Gr eek philosophy; Armstrong, A H , An
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (London, Methuen, 1965 ; Totowa, Rowman, N J, and Allanheld, repr o f 3rd edn, 1983), has the advantage o f giving
generous space to philosophers of early Christian times
Hatch, E, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church
(London, W i l l i a m s and Norgate, 7th edn 1898 and r e p r ) , is still well worth
consulting Look in libraries or second-hand bookshops for a spine lettered
' T h e H i b b e r t Lectures 1888'. The faint-hearted may prefer to begin with
Lecruie I I See also: Jaeger, W , Early Christianity and Gi eek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1962); Chadwick, H , Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1966);
Markus, R A , Christianity in the Roman World, (London, Thames and
Hudson, 1975), with excellent illustrations
4

185

II

The A p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the
Philosophical Concept o f G o d by early
Christian Theologians:
W. Pannenberg's Thesis Reconsidered
Patiistic scholars live nowadays under the threat of the axe I do not mean
this quite literally; no doubt a radical Marxist government would f i n d other
Christian victims to polish o f f more quickly than the modest and retiring
scholars w h o m I intend to address But since the time of Harnack at the latest
we have had to live w i t h the accusation that the Fathers w h o m we study have
falsified the original and authentic message of Christianity; misled by the
seductions of Greek philosophy, even when they protested against them, they
have bequeathed to us a theology w h i c h misconstrues and abridges the biblical insistence on God's transcendence, his freedom, and his total sovereignty over this and a l l possible worlds. Harnack o f course detects other
failings, which w i l l not detain us o n this occasion; for instance, that whereas
Jesus taught men to worship his heavenly Father, the Christian Fathers taught
them to worship esus. This whole complex o f accusations, though often dismissed, has recently acquired new force through the rise of liberation theology in the Third W o r l d , and its newly explicit demand that Christianity
should now shake o f f its traditional dependence on European, and therefore
on Greco-Roman, forms o f thought
Even Roman Catholic scholars, bred in a tradition which speaks of a natural
knowledge of God and of grace which perfects nature but does not remove it,
are becoming sensitive to this demand; for Protestants i t would seem only to
underline a conviction which is integral to their tradition But Protestant
scholars, w i t h their Anglican and other allies, have i n fact played a leading
part in patristic studies; and in recent years many of them have been impressed
by a paper published by Wolfhart Pannenberg some twenty-five years ago,
'Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffes als dogmatisches
Problem der frhchristlichen Theologie', Zeitschrift fr Kirchengeschichte
70
(1959), pp 1-45, which appears i n English i n the second volume o f his Basic

II

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2

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

Questions in Theology, pp 119-83 Professor A d o l f Martin Ritter has said of

this piece 'Es ist seinerzeit unter protestantischen Patristikern m i t nahezu einhelligem Jubel begrsst worden, whrend es andernorts eher betretenes
Schweigen auslste. Einer ernsthaften Diskussion aber ist es
nirgends
gewrdigt worden, bis es zwanzig Jahre nach seiner Erstverffentlichung C J
de Vogel einer temperamentvollen K r i t i k unterzog' Dr. Ritter's o w n discussion is excellent w i t h i n the limits he has set himself, occupying seven pages i n
a more general survey o f recent w o r k on the relations between Platonism and
early Christianity But I believe there is r o o m for a more thorough-going critique In general, the reputation of this famous piece is well deserved;
Pannenberg handles questions of crucial importance w i t h a wealth of learning
and a good eye for what is relevant; but his w o r k is markedly uneven i n
quality. M u c h of i t is true and important; some of i t , I believe, is over-simplified; and i n places Pannenberg seems confused, i f not self-contradictory. As a
result, it is not easy to f o r m a clear impression of the course o f his argument

doctrine of God's sovereign freedom in relation to all other beings; in fact,

says Pannenberg, 'God, as the origin, is never merely the invisible ground of
present reality, but the free, creative source of the ever new and unforeseen'.
Hence, he writes, 'wherever philosophical concepts are taken over, they must
be remolded i n the light of the history-shaping freedom of the biblical God'
(p. 1 3 9 = 15/312)

The literary structure is simple enough; i t is divided into three parts, preceded by a brief introduction; but the three parts are notably unequal in length
and complexity; Part I I I in fact extends to two thirds of the total space, and is
divided into five subsections, of which the fourth alone occupies sixteen
pages; the f i f t h is also substantial, but its last six pages are i n effect a general
summary o f the whole preceding argument
The introduction explains 'the adverse judgements of Harnack, Loofs and
others upon the Apologists of the second century' and their basis i n the dogmatics of Albrecht Ritschl This is a fairly familiar thesis, w h i c h incidentally
was echoed i n an early work by T.F Torrance; I need not consider it further .
3

Of the three main parts that f o l l o w , the first is entitled 'The Philosophical
Concept of G o d ' ; the second carries the title 'The Task and Danger i n
Theological Linkage w i t h the Philosophical Idea o f God'. I t sets out rather
briefly some features of biblical monotheism which Pannenberg takes to be
crucial; broadly speaking, he contends that the philosophers' contribution to
Christian theology was a two-edged affair; i t was helpful as providing confirmation of the claim that there is only one true God; i t was unhelpful, in that
the philosophers thought of God as the origin f r o m which our world is
derived, and as a being whose nature is i n some way restricted and indeed
deducible f r o m the fact that he is the origin This conflicts w i t h the biblical

This is translated from the German reprint Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie

(Gttingen, 1971). pp 296-346
A M Ritter, 'Piatonismus und Christentum in der Sptantike . Theologische Rundschau 49:1
(1984). pp 3S-56; here p 39; C J de Vogel. Scripta Theologita 11 (1979), pp 929-52. Since
writing the above I have had the privilege of a brief discussion with Professor de Vogel; but my
text remains substantially as delivered in Cambridge in October 1984
1

In Part I I I , which bears the general title 'The Iheological Appropriation',

Pannenberg considers five different aspects of the philosophical concept of
God, and tries to show where they helped to articulate the biblical doctrine
and where they tended to obscure i t . I shall of course return to this part and
review it i n detail; at this stage i t w i l l perhaps be enough to note that
Pannenberg's judgement on the contribution of the philosophers is on the
whole rather negative; while helpful at times, they have misled the Fathers
into neglecting important aspects of biblical theology But this negative
judgement takes a most unexpected form Pannenberg's initial remarks about
the drawbacks of envisaging God simply as the source f i o m which the world
is derived might lead us to expect an argument that the Greeks made the
mistake of connecting God too closely w i t h the world, as its origin and explanation whose properties can be deduced f r o m it B u t i n fact Pannenberg
comes to precisely the opposite conclusion, namely that the philosophers
came to envisage a God who cannot enter into any meaningful relation with
the world of time and change. So he writes 'Immutability and timelessness,
simplicity, propertylessness, and namelessness, have repeatedly forced the
concept of God into an unbridgeable distance f r o m the contingent changes of
historical reality in which the salvation of men is decided, and the assertions
o f faith regarding God's historical acts of salvation were purchased' - presumably by the best of the Christian Fathers - 'only at the of expense of violating the strict sense of these attributes' (p 180 = 43/343) In other words,
the philosophical doctrine which the best of the Fathers had to remould was
not an unexciting immanentism, as the early pages might lead us to think, but
a baffling transcendence We shall have to consider whether this unexpected
TreptTreTeia can be adequately supported by the argument in detail.
Let me then return to Part I , w h i c h I have not yet summarized, and which
raises troublesome questions i n m y m i n d ; though I do not regard all the questions as equally important
First, is Pannenberg justified i n speaking of 'The Philosophical Concept of
God'? He notes, quite correctly I think, that early Christian theology was
indebted to M i d d l e Platonism for 'the conceptual tools for its reflections upon
the nature of God' (p 122 = 3/299); but he also suggests that Middle

The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (London 1948)

My quotations are taken from the English translation mentioned on p 2 above; I give references to this, followed by references to the original ZKG article, then to the German reprint; here
p 138- 14/311
4

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

Platonism represents a k i n d of consensus among, the philosophers; so 'The

theories that had arisen i n Greek philosophy concerning the divine reality by
no means present a chaos of unrelated, merely adjacent, opinions On the
contrary, these opinions grew out of a common formulation of the problem
and constitute variations on one and the same theme' (p 123 = 3/299) B u t is
this really tenable ? N o doubt there was a complex of theological views which
was acceptable to many or even most second-century philosophers; nevertheless, some philosophers were sceptics, some were atheists, some were
Epicurean polytheists; and i f we comment, quite properly, that such untypical
views could not possibly have influenced Christian thinkers, i t is worth
remembering that an un-platonized, unassimilated Stoicism has left its mark
on Tertullian's aberrant description o f God as a corpus. But this is a fairly
trivial point; I pass to the more important question:

knowable w o r l d and 'his essence is exhausted i n this function'; but the third
section is headed 'The Otherness and Unknowability of the O r i g i n ' ; moreover this doctrine is exhibited as the outcome of precisely the same tendency
as was already described i n section one; so Pannenberg writes, 'nevertheless,
the insight into the otherness of the divine was already rooted i n the initial
tendency o f the philosophical idea o f God' (p 128 = 7/303). The argument
seems to be that the method of rational inference led by successive stages to
the theories o f God as m i n d , as completely simple, and as inaccessible to
human thought. Nevertheless, these are all products o f the same method;
hence even after describing the most extreme theories of divine transcendence, Pannenberg can still write that 'the divine spirit remained bound to a
material principle' (p 142 = 17/314) In other words, precisely the same formulation of the problem produced the conviction, first, that God is totally
knowable, and secondly, that God is totally unknowable.

Is Pannenberg right i n suggesting that the M i d d l e Platonists were continuing a tradition that goes back to the Olympian deities and to the sages of
Miletus? When he speaks of 'a common formulation of the problem' in the
passage just quoted, Pannenberg is appealing to a theory developed by
Werner Jaeger i n his book The Theology of the Early Greek
Philosophers
(Oxford, 1947) We are reminded of 'a peculiar feature of the Olympian
deities, viz, their peculiar immanental character'; Pannenberg writes, "The
fact that the gods are the origin of the reality encountered in normal experience is not i n itself anything specifically Greek but a widespread conviction
But that their essence is exhausted i n this function, and does not have a
hidden side, which is reserved for a special revelation, is a peculiarity of the
Olympian deities' (p 124 = 4, 5/300). A n d he clearly thinks that this formulation of the problem persists i n later Greek philosophy; accordingly 'the
truly divine can be grasped by an inference f r o m the known state of reality
back to its unknown o r i g i n ' (p 125 = 5/301), introducing a discussion of the
early physicists; or the beginning of section two of the first part: 'The question about the true God as the origin of present things and normal processes'
(p 126 = 6/302), leading on immediately to a mention of Justin Martyr and of
the concern for a unity o f explanatory principles i n second-century
Platonism Even the discussion of Plotinus mentions 'the initial tendency of
the philosophical question about the f o r m of the divine' and goes on to refer
once again to 'the inner unity o f the philosophical concept of God, regardless
of all the variations i n its formulation' (p 133 = 11/307)
5

But by this time, halfway through the third section o f the first part, the alert
reader of Pannenberg w i l l , as I have just explained, have suffered a powerful
intellectual shock In the first section we were told that for the Greeks 'the
truly divine can be grasped by inference', etc., because God is the origin of a

References to the method of inference recur throughout the paper; it may suffice to cite the
Englishpp 133. 143 157-9 165 77. 179
5

N o w as a piece of plain reporting this might possibly be correct Individual

philosophers often do h o l d mutually conflicting opinions; a fortiori, one and
the same movement of thought may harbour opposite views at t w o different
stages of its history What is disconcerting is that Pannenberg shows little
awareness of having noticed the inconsistency which he discloses Moreover,
if two contradictory conclusions emerge, there is at least some reason to
suspect that contradictory tendencies were at work, and a careful thinker
w o u l d seek to disprove this possibility M y own suspicion is that Greek
philosophical thought was never dominated by rationalistic assumptions to
the extent that Pannenberg has assumed; rationalist tendencies, though
coming easily to the enquiring Greek mind, were often checked by a sense of
ultimate mystery; the Olympian religion had no monopoly of attention; the
sense of numinous mystery and fascination and honor is powerfully
expressed i n the Dionysiac cult; Plato himself pronounced that ultimate
Goodness could not be described by any analogy. A n d some at least of the
later Platonists, Christians included, tended to emphasize Plato's spirituality
and discount his logic; so i t should come as no surprise that some of Plato's
o w n most hard-headed bits of reasoning were later treated as a species of revelation; or, for that matter, that Gnostic teachers of no intellectual ability
whatsoever dressed up their third-rate philosophical gleanings i n the trappings of divine disclosures
But Pannenberg, i t appears, w o u l d accept the judgement that a sense of
God's otherness appeared quite early in the Greek philosophical tradition.
One of the most baffling features of his v i e w in his insistence that this doctrine is not a late development w h i c h i n some degree qualified the immanentism of the method, of inference, but is actually a product of it: 'the insight
into the otherness orthe-divine was already rooted in the initial tendency of
the philosophical question about God' (p 128 = 7/303) The mysterious
nature of God, he says, was already expressed, by Xenophanes (p. 130 =

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

8/304) and in Plato's teaching that the Good 'transcends essence'; Plato's
description o f God as m i n d was also an attempt to convey it (p 130 = 9/305),
though i t proved an inadequate means of escape f r o m immanentist tendencies
and had to be supplemented by the doctrine that God is simple A n d although
formal recognition of the incomprehensibility of God arrived late on the
scene, the tendency towards i t was already contained in the recognition of
God's otherness.

tradition B u t others in both camps ignored the philosophers; given a bit more
eloquence and personality they might have had great influence There is no
reason why Jewish preachers of the first century A D should not have spoken
in the authentic tones o f fifth-century prophecy; and indeed the devout of
their time were ready to listen B u t i n fact, as we know, prophecy was by then
a spent force. Prophets there were, both Jewish and pagan, as well as Gnostic
and Hermetic sages B u t their achievements were insubstantial; before long
they were forgotten, and rightly

Pannenberg therefore seems to be claiming (a) that i n Greek philosophy

'the divine spirit always remained bound to a material principle' though per
contra the concept of God was forced 'into an unbridgeable distance f r o m the
contingent changes of historical reality', etc. (see pp 2, 3 above); (b) but this
need not have happened i f God had been viewed in more personal terms
expressing his faithfulness and freedom of action; but (c), as we shall f i n d ,
his freedom is to be understood i n terms of contingency which 'overturns all
expectations and w o r l d pictures' (p 181 = 44/344); (d) it also 'protects' God
against any inference as to his nature f r o m his operations (p 1 7 1 - 37/337) I
cannot help wondering whether this structure of thought is either coherent or
tolerable I t seems to make the 'personal' God more remote than the God of
the philosophers; and his 'faithfulness' seems to be presumed in default of
any consistency which w o u l d allow i t to be known
Let us now take a closer look at Part I I w h i c h I briefly described above It
begins by sketching the emergence of monotheism among the lews, and the
universalism w h i c h it implies The God of Israel, they claimed, is in fact the
God of all nations B u t how could other nations be brought to acknowledge
his dominion? Pannenberg replies, quite properly, that the Jews appealed to
the monotheistic tradition already developed in Greek philosophy: 'The universal claim of the God of Israel first acquired compelling validity for all men
by virtue of the fact that first the Jewish and then the Christian mission presented the God of Israel as the true God sought by philosophy' (p. 136 =
13/309) 'Compelling validity' seems to me a good translation o f the German
phrase 'verpflichtende K r a f t ' , i m p l y i n g both the persuasive force of the
Jewish claim as thus reformulated, and its absolute authority Pannenberg
does not mean, I take i t , that the prophecies of, say, deutero-Isaiah have no
authority in their original poetic and Semitic phrasing; but that their authority
could only be recognized by 'all men' (or 'all reasonably cultivated Greek
speakers'?), and so become 'compelling', when translated into philosophical
terms w i t h w h i c h they were familiar N o t that the alliance w i t h philosophy
was inescapable or predetermined, as the English term 'compelling' might
possibly suggest Some Jewish teachers, and some Christian teachers,
attacked the philosophers, condemning their disagreements, their contentious
vanity, and their failure to match their principles by their conduct (cf p. 140
= 16/313) In deploying such arguments the Jewish and Christian missioners
were no doubt developing familiar themes that lay ready to hand in the Greek

Pannenberg then explains that 'the linkage w i t h philosophy was facilitated

by the tendency of the philosophical idea of God towards unity' (p 137 =
14/310); but he goes on to explain that much of the force and distinctiveness
of the biblical view was lost, or at least endangered, by this linkage I assent
to this verdict, but w i t h some reservations on his account of the biblical view;
for if we speak of 'the personal mode in w h i c h the l i v i n g God confronted
men' (p 138 = 14/311) we certainly do not mean that God speaks to men
simply in the accents of another man - as i f this were something the Greeks
should have realized. The notion that God can appear in human f o r m , and be
mistaken for a man, belongs to a very primitive phase of Israelite tradition
(e g Gen 32:24-30, Judges 13:19-22), and i t is only a short advance to
imagine God's voice as mistaken for a human voice ( I Sam 3:4-8) The great
prophets picture God as a mysterious being who impinges on men in a personal mode only by m o v i n g their o w n minds and their own lips to conceive
thoughts and utter prophecies beyond the compass of their o w n unaided
powers A n d Greek philosophers developed a not dissimilar theory of divine
inspiration
M y third criticism of Pannenberg's Part I I is a more technical point, but
not I think unimportant He argues that 'the universal claim of the Israelites
to worship the one true God' led to 'a linkage w i t h philosophy
. facilitated
by the tendency of the philosophical idea of God towards unity' (p 137
14/310) This is of course true as far as i t goes; but Pannenberg seems to
ignore the striking contrast between the Hebrew and the Greek notions of
unity For the Hebrew, the claim that 'the L o r d , thy God is one' is relatively
straightforward; i t means that there is only one being who can properly be
called God, who is rightly to be worshipped, and so on But Greek speculations about unity have a subtlety and complexity, and also a set o f endemic
confusions, of which Pannenberg seems unaware I intend to discuss these
more fully elsewhere; for the moment let us simply recall the strange interpretations of Deut 6:4 and the l i k e produced by Philo under the influence of
Greek philosophy He says, for instance, that God resembles the Monad
because of his povsoic., his solitary existence {spec leg. 2 176, cf fuga 92,
6

See also ray book Divine Substance (Oxford. 1977) pp 180-89

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

I H E PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

Abr 22); where the Bible surrounds God w i t h his heavenly court, Philo
makes him the prototypical hermit, w i t h more than a suggestion of the
Aristotelian deity engaged i n his voriaic. vor|oecos Again he suggests that
God being one is necessarily simple {leg all 2 2, mut nom 184), an idea
which goes back to Xenophanes among the Greeks and passes on to Irenaeus,
but has no root i n the Hebrew tradition For of course there is no necessary
connexion between uniqueness and simplicity A thing can be simple without
being unique, as were some at least of the Democritean atoms; or it can be
unique without being simple, like the legendary phoenix But I w i l l return to
this point in discussing Part I I I

Thus when Pannenberg describes Greek philosophy as an obstructive

barrier to be broken through, he offers only a selective account of its achievements We are told once again that 'the divine spirit always remained bound
to a material principle' (p 142 = 17/314), and there is a reference to 'the
duality of effect and cause' (p 143 = 18/315), which seems to be presented as
a faulty premiss, which leads both to the conception of God and the world as
a dynamic unity, as in Stoicism, and to the dualistic theories w h i c h sharply
differentiate God and matter. I t is not made very clear why the latter are
objectionable, and how they differ f r o m Pannenberg's o w n view; he cannot,
surely, wish to condemn any theory which thinks of God as causing the
w o r l d , while establishing a contrast between them? But at this point
Pannenberg seems to be thinking not of God presented as a totally unknowable being, the culmination o f his argument i n Part I , but of the less extreme
theory of a God conceived on the analogy of a human mind, a second
explanatory principle coupled w i t h matter

Part I I I comprises five sections, together w i t h a brief introduction i n which

Pannenberg states that although the early Christian theologians appear to take
very different attitudes to Greek philosophy, none of them really escaped its
influence; not even those who professed to repudiate i t most strongly On the
other hand some of them were more effective at transforming and (one might
say) biblicizing it than others I accept this judgement, and no comment is
needed
It is otherwise w i t h the first main section, headed 'Monotheism and
Creation' Here Pannenberg is concerned to show how 'the almighty freedom
of the biblical God' was grasped by Christian theologians; he judges that
'early Christian theology was relatively quick and decisive in breaking
through the confines of the philosophical concept of God and creating fitting
room for the freedom of the biblical God' (p 146 = 20/317) I believe there is
a two-fold misrepresentation i n this section; i t both over-praises the achievements of the early Christian theologians and underestimates the positive help
which they received f r o m the philosophers. The main argument given for
holding that they 'broke through the confines of the philosophical concept of
God' is that they rejected the idea of matter as eternally coexisting w i t h God
and established the doctrine o f creation ex nihilo. But this, we shall see, is not
a distinctively Christian development; i t has important precedents i n the
Greek philosophical tradition A subsidiary point is that Irenaeus at least
derived the creation f r o m the contingency of the divine w i l l i n g . He does
indeed make this point, and the reference given to A H 2 10 4 could have
been supplemented by 2 1 1 (sua sententia et libere fecit omnia) and 2.30 9;
but the Platonists' understanding of God's PjouAnais was closer to Irenaeus
than Pannenberg w i l l admit; he ignores the immensely important text in the
Timaeus 41 ab, which was quoted as a commonplace by Philo {quts return
246), used by lustin (Dial 5 4), and echoed by Athenagoras (leg 6 2), not to
mention the Epistle of James (1 18)
7

He thus continues by stating that in Greek thought 'the concept of the

origin (arche) was not kept reserved for the divine' (p 143 =18/315) and
goes on to refer to philosophers such as Albinus who distinguished three
originative principles, matter, the ideas, and God; and he represents the
notion of creation ex nihilo as an important and characteristically Christian
development, admittedly with some Jewish antededents represented by 2
Maccabees; though Christians d i d not arrive at this notion immediately
M u c h of this is familiar ground; but it needs to be supplemented and corrected Pannenberg himself notes the opinion that the divine m i n d is the
source of the ideas, w h i c h reduced the number of originative principles to
t w o ; he fails to mention the Greek philosophers who argued that there can be
only one But this theory is already noted i n Aristotle's Physics B o o k T, he
attributes it to Parmenides and Melissus, w i t h a side-glance at the early cosmologists w h o thought i n terms of material principles; and it is a natural
outcome of Pythagorean theory, since the Pythagoreans taught that everything is derived f r o m numbers, and numbers derive f r o m the One. I n the first
century BC we already f i n d a theistic development of such theories which
anticipates the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo Cicero condemns, and
therefore knows, the theory that God created matter; see Lactantius DI
2 8 10; Eudorus defends i t ; see H. D o m e ' s Platonica Minora, p 306; and i t
is at least arguable that Philo, another Alexandrian, agrees
It should be
8

i 0

184 b 15 ff Note also the proof offered in de Philowphia. fr 17 noted by Professor de

Vogel, op cit p 935, n 20
See the neo-Pythagorean epitome preserved in Diogenes Laertius 8 25-35
Pannenberg s estimate of Philo's position (on p 144, n 82 as expanded in E T ) is probably
justified against Wolfsoa on the basis of the texts he considers; but the contrary view is argued
by R. Soiabji on the basis of his de Providentia, in Time Creation and the Continuum (London,
1983). pp 203-9
8

1 0

N B also the emphasis on God's ouAnais in Atticus. fi 4, = Eusebius P E 15 6 1-17

Galen de usu partium xi.14 (discussed in R Walzer Galen on Jews and Christians {Oxford,
1949). pp JI ff 23ff) shows that the word was current in pagan discussions of Jewish cosmology
7

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

noted that the phrase ex ouk onton is not i n itself precise enough to define the
Christian doctrine, since ouk onto, can refer to things w h i c h have no definite
being, a chaos or tohu-wa-bohu; or indeed to things w h i c h are not as they
should be; Paul applies the similar phrase ta me onta to despised Christian
missionaries, including himself So the verse f r o m 2 Maccabees is probably
inconclusive O n the other hand the doctrine of creation ex nihilo i n the f u l l
sense was enunciated by the Gnostic Basilides both earlier and w i t h greater
force than i t was by any second-century orthodox theologian
I conclude,
then, that Pannenberg seriously underrates the interest and value of Greek
reflections upon God as arche.

God is hidden precisely i n his historical acts', quoting Isaiah 45:15; this
agrees w i t h most English versions, including RSV, and w i t h Luther; though I
note that the New English Bible renders the verse ' H o w then cannot thou be a
god that hidest thyself, O God o f Israel?' But i f God is essentially hidden,
Pannenberg is quite consistent i n approving the philosophical tradition which
asserted God's incomprehensibility (the inconsistency we noted earlier lay i n
supposing that this was derived f r o m , and still limited by, the 'method of
inference'); consistent also i n defending those Christian theologians l i k e
Justin, Irenaeus and Clement w h o made use of i t ; i n fact he defends Justin
against the criticism put by Roman Catholic scholars that he placed an 'exaggerated emphasis on the transcendence of God'. But Irenaeus and Clement at
least are not approved without reserve; they made the mistake, he thinks, of
regarding our incomprehension of God 'simply as a provisional ignorance
that could be set aside by revelation' (p 155 = 26/324); Irenaeus, thus 'took a
fateful step in the direction o f a compromise which was actually impossible
from the standpoint of philosophy as w e l l as that o f theology' (p 157 =
27/325), a 'two-level structure' which led towards Latin scholasticism;
though i t seems that on Pannenberg's showing Irenaeus believed that our
natural ignorance of God was to be corrected by divine revelation; whereas
the normal scholastic v i e w was that our natural knowledge of God was to be
completed by it.

11

The second section of Part I I I is entitled 'God's Otherness and

Spirituality' It raises the question whether any predicate, such as M i n d , or
Spirit, is adequate as a characterization of God's nature; this is more fully
discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g section. For the present, Pannenberg's main contention is that the Greeks, and the Christian theologians who f o l l o w e d them,
gave insufficient expression to God's otherness and spirituality, since they
were dominated by the thought that God is other than matter, is spirit as
opposed to matter Perhaps this could have been put more effectively by
saying that the biblical contrast of the creator God and the created w o r l d was
weakened because it was assimilated to the existing Greek contrast between
m i n d and matter Pannenberg in fact suggests this i n a ponderous sentence
which refers to 'the spirit-body dualism o f Platonic anthropology' (p 148 =
21/319)
The third section of Part I I I is headed 'God's Otherness as Incomprehensibility and I n e f f a b i l i t y ' Pannenberg begins by considering various reasons
given by early Christian thinkers for the doctrine that God cannot be named;
some are based on philosophical tradition, he thinks, some are not These two
pages are perhaps not of the first importance, and can be passed over without
comment; though the subject of naming crops up again at p 154 (26/323),
where he remarks 'In every act of naming there is an element of seizing possession (Gen 2:19)'. Perhaps this need not be taken too seriously; when the
A l m i g h t y responds to Moses' request for his name (Exod 3:13-15) He is not
inviting Moses to seize possession of H i m ! But i n philosophical circles the
importance of names lies mainly i n the more or less unconscious assumption
that a name should provide an exact and even an unique description o f what
is named; this assumption could remain powerful i n theology, even though it
was easy to f i n d counter-examples i n common life. B u t this brings us to the
important topic of God's incomprehensibility, which occupies the bulk of this
section.
'For Israel's faith, God is essentially hidden', says Pannenberg (p 154 =
25/325); 'not because he stays away f r o m men, so to speak On the contrary

Hippolytus Ref. 7 21 1-4

11

What then is Pannenberg's o w n view? Since God is essentially incomprehensible to men (author's italics), even divine revelation must disclose precisely this fact; thus 'only i n v i e w of God's presence i n the destiny of lesus
can man endure the incomprehensibility of God and thus even i n the face of
the truth of God be truly man' (p. 156 = 26f /324) This is impressive; but i t
seems to me to be existentialist rather than Christian, even if it has some basis
in Marcan christology; for it seems to i m p l y that Jesus was mistaken i n
teaching his disciples to address God as their heavenly Father, or i n declaring
plainly to the Samaritan woman that God is a spirit I f God is essentially
incomprehensible, then all attempts to explain his nature, even by analogy,
must be misleading; and i t is strange to f i n d Pannenberg appearing to desert
the sober and biblical profession o f faith i n God the Father A l m i g h t y for the
sophisticated and Catholic Quicunque Vult w i t h its demand for belief in 'One
Incomprehensible'!
Let me throw out a few suggestions about the incomprehensibility of God
Since God is an absolute, it seems fitting to describe h i m i n absolute terms; i t
sounds patronizing to say that we don't know very much about h i m But i f
there is any truth i n Christianity, we must know something; otherwise, inter
alia, we should lack any moral guidance; for all we knew, God might be l i k e
K a l i , and intend that Christians should strangle unsuspecting travellers A n d
it not enough to say, w i t h some of the ancients, that we can have merely negative knowledge, and say what God is not; this w i l l either be a mere linguistic

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

substitution, e g 'God is not unrighteous', Hebi 6:10, or i t w i l l faii to tell us

what we need

simple and instructive case is that of the predicates 'hot' and ' c o l d ' These
look like symmetrical opposites; but scientists assure us that things cannot be
cold beyond a certain degree, at w h i c h all motion stops; but there is no l i m i t
which restricts their heat Hence i f I say ' X is hot' I need not be taken to
i m p l y that X is comparable to a cup of tea, or to Rome i n July

A possible way out is to observe that i n our ordinary discourse we require

that statements made to us should be not only true but proportionate Suppose
I tell you that the distance f r o m London to Manchester is more than four
inches This in perfectly true, but could w e l l be misleading; i f you understand
English but know no geography, y o u may be surprised to learn that i t is as
much as a mile. Our present problem, of course, is not so simple; i t is not a
matter o f incomparability i n a single dimension I t is that, i f we try to
describe God at all, we have to use predicates which also apply to finite
beings, and which we have learnt to use in these contexts H o w then can we
avoid reductionist suggestions?
I h e ancients, I believe, were often handicapped in this regard by an 'all-ornothing' theory of knowledge, treating 'knowledge' as a word w h i c h properly
applies only to perfect or complete knowledge, and assuming that a statement
cannot really be true unless i t states the whole truth (For the former point,
N B Plato's treatment of knowledge (emoTriuxi) in Republic 5, 476 f f , and
cf Aristotle's doctrine that actual knowledge is identical w i t h its o b j e c t )
But no one can state the whole truth about God; therefore, i t seemed, nothing
could truly be said about h i m . I am inclined to think, indeed, that this mode
of thought is still w i t h us, in the use, or perhaps the misuse, of what is called
'the paradigm case' We argue thus: the paradigm case o f statements such a
' X is wise' is a statement like 'the Vice-chancellor is wise'. But God is not
comparable w i t h the Vice-chancellor Therefore i t makes no sense to say that
God is wise
1 2

1 3

But this argument makes the stultifying assumption that our language does
not allow of being stretched and adapted to new cases; on which assumption
there could have been no development of civilized and expressive language at
all Inventing new words is a rather sophisticated business; reapplying old
ones is the procedure that originally made man capable of abstract thought.
The classic theory of reapplication in theology is of course the doctrine of
analogy. This has come under criticism as suggesting a sort of proportion
sum w h i c h we have not the means to w o r k out: God's wisdom exceeds man's
wisdom in proportion as God's being exceeds man's being But what proportion is that? Is i t perhaps enough to reply that i t is not our business to work
out proportion sums in relation to God? God is wise beyond our understanding; this is our faith; and i t is a faith which can be sufficiently defined
by hard-headed reasoning to have some definite content
We may start by noting that some of our concepts are truly open-ended. A

Be amino 3 5, 430a20; 3 7, 431al;cf 3.8. 431b22

Minucius Felix Octavius 18: magniludinem Dei qui se putat iwsse minuit qui non vult
minuete non novit
11

1 3

13

I n this example - and indeed in the doctrine of analogy - we are still

thinking i n terms of a single scale of measurement. The case of God's
wisdom is more complex To say that God is superlatively or transcendently
wise w i l l not explain the forms which God's wisdom w i l l take. But we
should not expect to k n o w this. Pannenberg introduces the notion of God's
contingent action in order to 'protect' the otherness of God against the possibility that his essence could be inferred f r o m his actions (p 171 =37/336f)
But I doubt if it is needed; even granted that we can sometimes identify an
event as an act of God (or as embodying an act of God) we can never understand all the reasons for i t , or determine what part i t plays in the complex
strategy of divine love But we can 'see through a glass, darkly' A n d since
Pannenberg himself makes positive statements about God, he must surely
agree that God's 'incomprehensibility' should not be taken to mean that our
knowledge of God is zero It is a rhetorical way of pointing to riches and
resources beyond our comprehension.
We come at last to the long and complex fourth section of Part I I I , with its
by now familiar heading 'The Consequences of the Method of Causal
Inference' The section begins w i t h a reference to proofs of the existence of
God i n connection w i t h Romans 1-5 Pannenberg claims that St Paul stands
outside the cramping influence of the inferential method, in that he presents
man's natural knowledge of God not as a human achievement but as a divine
judgement B u t early Christian theologians failed to f o l l o w Paul's lead; at
certain points they broke free f r o m the constraints of the inferential method;
at other points they were forced into 'a constriction o f the biblical idea o f
God, an abridgement of his transcendent freedom and omnipotence' (p 158 =
2 8 f / 3 2 7 ) One might perhaps compress the argument of the t w o f o l l o w i n g
subsections in these terms:
(a)

the philosophical concept of immutability does not do justice to the biblical notion of God's faithfulness;

(b)

the philosophical concepts of simplicity and absence of properties do

not adequately express God's otherness and transcendence

The pages devoted to subsection (a) seem to me the best i n the whole
paper I may perhaps quote the f o l l o w i n g lines: 'The concept of immutability
rightly says that God is no originated and transitory thing
But
immutability says too little, since God not only immovably establishes and
maintains reality in its lawful course, but has within himself an infinite pleni-

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tude of ever new possibilities i n the realization of which he manifests the

freedom of his invisible essence' (p 161 = 30/329) Pannenberg goes on to
point out that the concept o f divine immutability leads on to Pelagian errors
amongst others; for 'If God is immutable, then surely every change i n man's
situation i n relation to salvation must be initiated by a change f r o m a man's
side' (p. 163 = 31f/330).

do not wear out easily, and healthy bodies are not prone to disease; good
characters also resist temptation B u t a well-made cloak is not
immutable i n the way an equilateral triangle is immutable; i t is useless
unless i t can flex w i t h its wearer's movements A n d a healthy body does
not remain passive i n the face of fatigue or infection; though Plato could
not have k n o w n this, i t adjusts itself to the danger, secretes lactic acid,
breeds antibodies, and so on A n d of course immutability is not a sufficient recipe for either prudent or Christian conduct; i t excludes response
to divine grace and to particular inspirations.
I have thrown out these suggestions in the briefest possible f o r m ; I am w e l l
aware that much remains to be discussed

14

In general, i f not i n every detail, I warmly welcome these pages; and I

must not be taken to criticize them if I add t w o reflections on the philosophical reasoning involved:
(i)

Ancient reflections about immutability were much influenced by a

passage i n Plato's Republic
2, 380-381, which Pannenberg does not
mention Plato argues that i f a god changes, he must either suffer change
f r o m an outside influence, or else change himself But being ex
hypotheu
perfect he cannot change himself for the better; nor of course
for the worse Therefore he cannot change at all The argument that God
is incapable of improvement becomes a commonplace; it was used, for
example, by the not very philosophical Athanasius i n controversy w i t h
the Arians; and i f accepted, I think it w o u l d exclude Pannenberg's
concept of God's freedom, as 'having w i t h i n himself an infinite plenitude of ever new possibilities'; since any act of God in history brings
God himself into new relationships w i t h his creatures The concept of
divine immutability thus requires to be complemented by that of predestination; the whole course of w o r l d history is determined i n every detail,
and its actual development adds nothing to God's experience, but is
only undergone by the human participants God knows eternally that an
individual must undergo temptation x at time r; but he cannot know that
the individual w i l l undergo i t or has undergone i t , since to God it makes
no sense to say ' I t is now time f, and he is undergoing i t now'
Thus if we accept the Platonic argument, the biblical concept of
God's freedom has to be sacrificed But need we accept it? It seems to
me to rest on an over-simplified concept of goodness and badness; if
you like, i t fails to distinguish between perfection and the measure of
perfection If God does something new, say by creating man, this does
not mean that God's previous existence was imperfect; but its perfection
was capable of enlargement, i n that he accepted new responsibilities and
a new stance as creator For Plato, o f course, any conception of this kind
was ruled out by his preoccupation w i t h timeless and mathematical realities as the standard of perfection.

(ii)

For this reason, immutability was conceived primarily as resistance to

decay or other changes for the worse B u t even this resistance was misconceived as a purely static obstruction Plato, in the passage I have
mentioned, uses the argument that well-made articles like good clothes

15

14

The argument of subsection (b) may perhaps be summarized as follows:

(i)

'The immutability of the first cause leads to the thought of its simplicity';

(ii)

If God is conceived as simple, he has to be conceived as incomprehensible and indeed without properties (so the E T ) or qualities, apoios;
( i i i ) This, again breaks the connection between God's essence and his
action; since an action without properties is inconceivable
Pannenberg's criticisms of this structure of thought are mainly directed at
point ( i i i ) ; there is a brief glance at point ( i i ) on p. 172 (= 36/337), where he
says that the l i n k between simplicity and absence of properties i n only valid i f
one takes a realistic v i e w of universals; a previous page, 169 = 36/335, suggests that he is referring to the tough requirement that a valid definition
should have a structural correspondence w i t h the thing defined; human
beings, e g , consist of rationality combined w i t h animality; cf. Aristotle
Metaph
7 10-12. B u t point (i) is merely announced. I think this is a pity,
because arguments on this point are often vitiated by a very simple fallacy
Ancient thinkers frequently assume that there is a straightforward opposition
between what is simple (aTtAous) and what is composite (O"UV6ETOC); hence
one can prove that a thing is simple merely by showing that i t is not composite. But this is clearly false; a tree, for instance, is not composite in the
sense of having been assembled f r o m pre-existing parts, like a house; but
neither is it simple, since it consists of distinguishable parts like roots, a trunk
and branches; and these develop by differentiating themselves out of the relatively simple acorn or other seed.
Moreover, if i t is false that all complex beings arise from the assembly o f
their parts, it is probably also false that all decay and corruption are caused b y

Cf

my remarks in H

Dorne s Festschrift

Blume andF Mann (Mnster, 1983) p 252

Piatonismus und Christentum, edd

H-D

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

their separation If a house collapses, it is not usually the case that the various
bricks and timbers simply come apart; the process w i l l usually begin when
the timbers begin to rot and the bricks to soften and crumble Can one then
trace the softening and crumbling to a more intimate separation of the minute
particles? No doubt one can; but the ancients were certainly not in a position
to prove that simple bodies such as atoms cannot merely pass out of existence; modern science, after all, tells us that they can be transformed into
energy, w h i c h is then simply dissipated; still less could they prove (against
Plato, Timaeus 41a) that a thing can exist eternally only on condition that i t is
immutable, and therefore simple Are we not ourselves promised eternal life?
Pannenberg's discussion gives an important place to Irenaeus, and contains
the arresting sentence 'For Irenaeus, the concept of God's simplicity means
that the fullness o f all perfections and properties is realised by him in the
mode of unity' (p 167 = 34/333) One w o u l d have liked to see this idea
further developed; failing this, I would assume that Irenaeus' concept of
divine unity is a remarkable but not particularly original one which is clearly
traceable back to Xenophanes
But Pannenberg goes on to explain that if
God is really simple, no properties can be ascribed to h i m 'insofar as every
attribute is what i t is only in distinction f r o m another' ( i b i d ) . True, God is
sometimes described as apoios merely in the sense that he lacks sensory qualities, like the human m i n d ; but the more radical conclusion is justified: 'the
simplicity of God requires that he be conceived as propertyless' pp 169 =
36/335) A n d he continues, 'Awareness of the otherness o f God apparently
reaches its highest pinnacle w i t h the drawing of this conclusion But this sort
of otherness does not express his unforeseeable action; i t is not the otherness
of his freedom' Phis leads on to the conclusion that God must be seen as
operating contingently, as acting freely, w h i c h is repeated w i t h great force in
the concluding section five

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

17

simplified; (b) Pannenberg's notion of God's free creativity is arresting,

but goes far beyond anything realized by early Christian theologians; (c)
Pannenberg treats the hiddenness of God as an absolute; even though it
is closely connected w i t h specific acts i n history, i t is an essential fact
about h i m , not one that revelation can remove B u t his treatment seems
to rule out any positive teaching about God, even though he claims that
God is not 'propertyless' W e could reply that revelation does enlarge
our knowledge, even though it also increasingly reveals our ignorance
(2)

Pannenberg claims that the Fathers were justified in appealing to Greek

philosophy because of the support it gave to monotheism.
Comment: (a) This is by no means true of all Greek philosophy; (b)
Greek speculations about unity brought in concepts quite foreign to the
Bible

(3)

1 5

Pannenberg claims that the early Fathers were relatively successful in

breaking through the philosophical assumptions about God as a generalized cause and asserting his free creativity
Comment: This is inadequately supported, and also wrongly assumes
that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is a Jewish or Christian coinage

(4)

Pannenberg rightly criticizes the philosophers' tenet of divine

immutability; he fails to note weaknesses in the arguments foi
immutability

(5)

Pannenberg gives qualified support to the theory of divine simplicity, as

highlighting God's incomprehensibility, but notes that i t ends by
making God 'propertyless'. Once again he is uncritical in accepting
arguments in favour o f simplicity

(6)

Some doubt must persist as to the coherence of Pannenberg's view that

God 'confronts men in the personal mode' but, on the other hand, is
essentially
incomprehensible', 'essentially hidden', and 'hidden piecisely in his historical acts' This is a rhetorical way o f making a valid
point; i f understood at all literally, it makes any theology impossible

It has been a d i f f i c u l t task to describe and criticize a complex and influential article w i t h i n the limits of a single paper Perhaps it may make for clarity
if I end by restating my criticisms in the baldest possible summary:

Let me end, then, w i t h two general observations; one on the f o r m of

(1)

Pannenberg argues that a single method of inquiry, the 'method of inference', runs through all Greek philosophical theology It leads both to the
conclusion that God is part o f the natural order and (surprisingly) to the
doctrine that God is incomprehensible. Pannenberg does not seem to
reject the notion of God's incomprehensibility as such; but he claims
that as conceived by the Greeks it tends to depersonalize and deactivate
God; it masks the notion of God's free creativity
Comment:

Pannenberg's argument, the second on his theology:

(1)

16

(a) I f i e theory of a single philosophical method is over

See my Divine Substance pp i 87-9

We are t o l d that the Christian Fathers were partly successful, but not
wholly successful, i n 'remolding' the philosophical conception of God
so as to do justice to the biblical conception of a God 'who out of his
otherness effects the new and contingent, and is thus the personal
L o r d ' (p 180 = 43f / 3 4 3 f ) But what is the status of this 'biblical conception', as Pannenberg presents it? Its roots in the biblical tradition are

1 6

I he German seems to require the rendering and is contingent

II
18

(2)

I HE PHIL OSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD

undeniable; but i t does not echo the biblical tradition as it was understood by the rabbis, or by the Christian Fathers, or as i t might have been
explained by the biblical writers themselves It owes something to
Bultmann, something to Harnack, something to Luther, something to the
schoolmen, and much more to the Greek philosophers themselves It is
their labours that have enabled us to extract and refine this concept of
God's freedom and otherness and his shaping of history from the vast
and varied complex of biblical material I t is f r o m them that we derive
the key concept of critical revision; one could have explained this idea
to Plato or to Aristotle; one could have made i t intelligible to Origen or
to Augustine, and just possibly to Irenaeus It w o u l d have meant nothing
at all to the writers of the Bible
Arresting and valuable as Pannenberg's theology proves to be, there are
some expressions which give rise to misgivings; and among them I
would place the notion of God's contingent action I t has this to be said
for i t , that i f God acts i n history, and history includes contingent events,
including the decisions of human free w i l l , then God adapts his action to
contingent events. It also points to God's power of acting i n new,
unforeseen and creative ways B u t i t tends to mask the complementary
notions that God's actions f l o w appropriately f r o m his own nature, and
that they are also appropriate to the moment i n the historical process to
which they are directed There is a complexity here which cannot be
grasped by either of the conventional alternatives 'necessary' and 'contingent' When Pannenberg says that God's action is contingent, he does
not mean that it is arbitrary But when Plotinus, for instance, says that i t
is necessary, he does not mean that it is forced.

Ill

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

Two third-century crises have long attracted the attention of scholars: the
contr oversy between the two Dionysii, and the trial and condemnation of Paul of
Samosata: Luise Abramowski has offered us a novel and carefully argued
approach to the former, but will, I trust, be content with a more pedestrian
approach to the latter, Our main source for this is of course

Eusebius'

Ecclesiastical History; but he tells us much less than we could wish H e describes
the events that led up to Paul's condemnation and reproduces part of the
Synodal Letter written to justify his deposition. This letter certainly contained a
description of Paul's theology and of the proceedings against him, since Eusebius
tells us that the writers "make manifest to all their zeal, and also the perverse
heterodoxy of Paul, as well as the arguments and questions that they addressed
to h i m ; and moreover they describe the man's whole life and conduct" ( H E

I o generalize this comment: the drawback of this concept of God's contingent action is that it expresses God's power mainly in relation to our o w n
ignorance of the inner logic and appropriateness of his action I t is better,
then, to talk of his freedom and his creativity I n the same way, the notion of
God's otherness contains an important lesson; but it suggests strangeness and
alienation, w h i c h are notions relative to our human condition; it needs to be
corrected by the more positive and absolute concepts of God's fullness,
mystery, and depth If we believe that it is God's w i l l to bridge the gap that
separates infinite f r o m finite being, the Christian preacher can never give p r i ority to the claim that God is a scandal He must affirm that God is love.

VTI,30, translation by Lawlor and Oulton, 1927) But the passages actually quoted
enlarge on Paul's "life and conduct", ignoring his theology, apart from the passing
remark that he "strutted about i n the abominable heresy of Artemas"; and
Eusebius' own comments i n effect repeat this, agreeing that "he espoused low
and mean views of Christ... namely that he was i n his nature an ordinary man".
Can we supplement this information? A fairly extensive dossier of texts
purporting to reproduce Paul's teaching, and indeed to derive from the acta of
the Synod of Antioch, can be collected from fifth- and sixth-century writers,
beginning i n 429 with Eusebius of Dorylaeum, who wished to represent Nestorius
as reproducing the heresy of Paul A good collection of this material was
published by H e n r i de Riedmatten i n 1952, building on earlier works by Bardy

ni

III
141

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

142

and Loots De Riedmatten argued that the fragments he printed are authentic
1

forger would not think of reproducing; other known and admitted forgeries in

I have always thought that he made a good case But some notable scholars were

fact make no attempt to avoid the language of what they regard as contemporary

not convinced; and their doubts were increased by Marcel Richard in 1959

orthodoxy

Amongst other arguments, Richard proposed a new translation of a crucial

Simonetti followed this article with a shorter paper devoted to a review of

passage in Eusebius ( H E. VII,29) which had seemed to support the authenticity

Richard's own arguments Here again I accept his conclusions; but I think it

of the fragments As commonly rendered, this passage asserted that Malchion,

possible to amplify and improve his criticism of Richard. I have neither the time

Paul's accuser, "had stenographers to take notes as he held a disputation with

nor the space to reopen the main question; but the more modest task I have

Paul, which (disputation) we know to be extant even to this day" Richard argued

mentioned may still be useful, and may help to throw light on an obscure but

that the alleged "stenographers" were actually "informers", who did not "take

important episode in the history of doctrine

notes" but rather "gave evidence", presumably of Paul's previous

actions or

We begin, like Richard, by considering the crucial passage from Eusebius H E

teaching. A n d he offered other arguments to suggest that the supposed fragments

VTI,29,2: fiXiaxa o' aTv eiK)va<; 7KpujTTp;vov SI^XEYE M a ^ x '

derive from Apollinarian forgeries, a literature with which he is extremely well

words omitted) QUT<; y i T O I jtLaTiu-etoufivwv Ta^uypottpuv ^ r r j a i v 7cp aTv

acquainted.

evarrjaoqjxvoi;, ijv Kai ci rtepo <pepo[j.VTjv lapiev, fivo i'axuaev T V aXXuv

Richard's

arguments have been accepted by a number of distinguished

scholars, including I N D

Kelly (1977), A Grillmeier and R L

Sample (both

(1981), W H C Frend (1984) and R D

Lorenz (1979), I D

Barnes

Williams (1987) *

But the whole question has been reopened in a masterly article by Manlio

(30

zpuibMouv vTa xa raTT|Xv <p<opc.aou TOV av&pG)7tov

Richard argues as follows:

1979), F.W Norris and H C Brennecke (both 1984) and R P C Hanson (1988)
Others have appeared unconvinced, including R

u v

(1) I h e verb icioripietoijaS-ai is a rare word, dating probably from the second
century A D Although by etymology it derives from cn)[i.Eioijv (and so from the
noun crr)(iefov, one can add), it connects "quant au sens" with the adjective
kniuT[\ioc\, "evident" or "well known"

I h e verb should

mean "to reveal"

Simonetti He examines the vocabulary of the "fragments" in detail, and thus

("dvoiler"); i t is balanced against e&9-va<; 7xpu7rr6[ievov above, and the same

developes and greatly strengthens de Riedmatten's claim that they exhibit archaic

object EEKJVCX (acc plur.) is to be understood; it can therefore be rendered

features which fit naturally into a third-century context, but which a post-Nicene

"mettre en vidence" (pp 326-8)

( 2 ) I t cannot refer to stenographers taking notes (the usual rendering as

Les Actes H.e Paul de Samosate (Paradosis 6), Fribourg/CH 1952. G. Bardy, Paul de Samosate
(SSL 4), Louvain 1929 F Loofs, Paulus von Samosata etc., T U 3rd series XIV, 5, Leipzig 1924.
Notably Bardy in his review of de Riedmatten, R H E 41 (1952) 643 ff, retracting his earlier
acceptance of them See also H. Chadwick, TThS 4 (1953) for a cautious approval of de
Riedmatten
M Richard, Malchion et Paul de Samosate Le Iemoinage d Eusebe dc Cdsaree: E l h L 35
(1959), reprinted in his Opera Minora 2 (Louvain 1977), no 25
* J N.D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, London 1977, 159; A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im
Glauben der Kirche I, Freiburg 1981, 297; R . L Sample, ChH 48 (1979) 18-21; F W Norris, JThS
35 (1984) 51f; H C Brennecke, ZNW 75 (1984) 274; R P C Hanson, The Search for the Christian
Doctrine of God, Edinburgh 1988, 72. On the other side see R Lorenz, Arius ludaizans?,
Gttingen 1980, 128-35; T.D Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, Cambridge 1981, 144; W H . C
Frend, The Rise of Christianity, London 1984, 394 no 117; R D Williams, Arius, London 1987,
I59f 305 no 27 These authors ignore Richard, though Williams refers to Norris
M. Simonetti, Per la Rivolutazione di Alcune Tesiimonianze su Paolo di Samosata: RSLR 24
(1988) 177-210
1

quoted above); such a procedure would be too commonplace to deserve notice

(P 3 2 7 ) .
( 3 ) The phrase ^TTjaiv rcpo aTov voTrio^evoi; cannot refer to a simple

debate; it must indicate a formal process of trial ("enqute", p 3 2 7 ; "enqute

judiciaire", p 3 3 0 ) , at which indeed Paul may not even have been present (p

3 2 6 ) . I h e supposed parallel with Origen's debates with Heraclides and with

Beryllus of Bostra is delusive, since these were amicable discussions with men of

"Paolo di Samosata e Malchione Riesame di Alcune Testimonianze , in: Hestiasis (FS S

Calderone), Studi Tardoantichi 1, Messina, 1-25

III

Ill
143

144

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

good faith (p. 331). The use of Z^TTICIZ

in the singular helps to mark the

distinction (pp 330-3) Richard adds some observations on conciliar procedure

can be gained by paying attention to the noun marHizitai which is surely

good evidence for the meaning of the v e r b

which I shall leave on one side (pp 333-8)

(4)

The common

M y list is as follows:

rendering of 7ti<rr)fAiou(iV(i)v TaxuYpacpwv rests on

mistranslations of Rufinus and Jerome, both of whom mistakenly connected it

Pagan authors:

with crritieiov and wrote "excipientibus notariis" (pp, 329-30) .

Diogenes Laertius 7,20 = SVF 1,308 (the noun)

(5) Richard adds evidence to show the growing importance of "tachygraphes

Anonymus Londiniensis (1st century A D ) 21,21

(excerptores, notarii, tribuni et notarii)" i n the third and fourth centuries and

Plutarch, Apophth Lac 55,2,235c Bernardakis.

their employment in responsible tasks apart from stenography (pp 328-9) I n this

Aspasius, In E N ( C A G 19,1), three refs : pp 101,1; 139,6; 165,33

case, then, they acted as informers who "gave evidence" at Paul's trial; and it is

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In SE ( C A G 2,3) p 145,29

this which Eusebius indicates by the phrase :ucrr](iELou[j.Evwv TaxuYpatpdJv

Sextus Empiricus 5,68

Such is Richard's case But we perceive at once that it involves a certain

Christian authors:

inconsequence Eusebius, he says, cannot have been referring to the presence of

Irenaeus, Haer. 1,8,2 (SC 264, 117-120 Rousseau)

stenographers', this would have been taken for granted But i n this case, whatever

Hippolytus, Haer IV,50,2 (the noun).

Eusebius' words may have meant, stenographers were present! A n d this, coupled

(Ps. Hippolytus fr 26, noted in P G L ( = L a m p e , Patristic Greek Lexicon), is

with Eusebius' reference to the survival of the trial records, is surely a point i n

probably to be discounted, as its authorship and date is uncertain; see GCS

favour of their survival into the fifth century, not against it?

1,2,150, 12 Acheiis.)

As to the supposed

antithesis between

euiKivoK; ETtixpurcTopiEvov and

Origen Cefs 4,12 (GCS 1,282,9 Koetschau)

Ejttmfi(ieLQU[iEvwv, Simonetti surely is right in objecting that the two verbs are too

Horn .1er. 14,5 (GCS 111,110,25 Klostermann), cf Jerome, PL 25,666B

widely separated for this to be probable (Hestiasis, p l O f ) But i n any case there

Comm.

is a certain difficulty in translating the former phrase, which is not entirely

XHI,62,436; plus the noun at X,40,274

in Joh,

five refs: 11,28,171; VI,60,307; X,19,114;

clarified by Richard's "qui dissimulait", still less by Simonetti's "ch' era abile a

nascondere le sue prevaricazione" (RSLR, p 179) EuiKivou;, which I agree i n

Africanus, Chron 13, 1, reproduced in Eusebius P E . X,10,2

taking as an accusative plural noun, cannot refer to Paul's "prevarications", but

Eusebius, D E V I I I proem 12; IX,4,2; plus the noun at V.11,3.

X1II,17,104;

Perp. 17 (Acts of the Christian Martyrs, Oxford 1972, 124 Musurillo).

H E VI,24,3 (the noun) and VII,29,2 quoted above

to something which he opposed; either the investigations, or the resultant

accusations directed against him The phrase must mean either that Paul was
obscuring

the evidence against him, or (with a slightly unusual

sense of

The verb exhibits a fair variety of senses, which itself suggests that i t was not

ETitxpuTtTtcS-ai) that he was evading the accusations that ensued. For this sense

exceptionally rare Let us begin by making a concession to Richard, who argues

of eii&uva cf Eusebius, H E. 111,10,8.

that it was felt to be cognate with the adjective EJUOT]|J.O. This is in fact

We pass to consider Richard's first point, on the word 7ctcrr)[itoua9-aL By

and large we can admit that the verb is uncommon

confirmed by the passage in Hippolytus noted above: ititc, oi av&pwToi Ttp<;

Richard gives a list of its

occurrences, to which I can make a few additions; but some important insights

Cf Richard, 327 n 5

III

Ill
145

146

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

7riaT)fifjjav TIVWV aoTpdiv ovofiaTa OTM xXEaav, tva aToF hzitrt^rx. j\,

commonest sense of 7utn)HEio0a9-at, which is that of pointing out what might

"men gave individual names to distinguish certain stars, to make them distinct".

otherwise escape notice.

Africanus (1 c. ) may possibly have felt the same, but this is less probable, since
43 words intervene to separate mari\Loi... jicrrj[itofivoi;
In

other cases, I shall argue, the connection with the noun ai)[Xbv is

M y list began with Diogenes Laertius 7,20 = SVF 1,308: [Zfjvwv E^T) BEIV] TOV
axouovxa OUTO npod TOI<; XEyofiEvan; yiy\>ea&a.i GJOTE \iri Xay.pa.veiv /povov ELQ

TT]V eiuirrjpxtcdaLv. This can only mean "the hearer should be so absorbed in the

The original sense of the word must be "to take notes", whether

discourse itself as to have no time for taking notes". We cannot of course be sure

in shorthand or otherwise. Thence there is an easy transition to the sense

that Diogenes is giving Zeno's exact words; but it is at least possible that

"observing" (in English, f r o m "taking notes" to "taking note"; i n German f r o m

ETCicmfiEioita^ai was used i n this sense in the third century B.C., long before it

"Notizen machen" to "Notiz nehmen").

appears i n Plutarch and the Anonymus Londiniensis of the first century A D .

unmistakeable

This is clearly the sense i n Sextus

Empiricus 5,68: e TOV opavv arcopXeTCuv itirjiHxeioTai T aviajrov yStov,

A p a r t from this passage it is not easy to find confirmation for the sense of

"he watches the sky and observes the constellation as it rises", and i n the

"taking notes" which is suggested for Eusebius, H E .

Martyrdom of Perptua, iTziGT\[Lzi<a<xa$ Ta npatKCL Tjfzwv rctfieXo Vva x a t

passage from the same work may be relevant A t VI,24,3, discussing the places

7YVWTE THISLQ v XEtvfl Tfj flfipa: "take note of our faces"; there is no question

where Origen wrote his various books, Eusebius tells us that the ten books of

of "revealing" them ("dvoiler") In Eusebius, D E. V I I I proem. 12 we find the

Stromaters were written at Alexandria > icai TOUTO oXoypottpot BirjXoGatv auTou

closely connected sense of "pointing out", "calling attention to": TOU; eayyeXticci

7ip6 T>V TOfiwv E7uarj[i.t(i)ai<;, The word 6X6ypacpo<; can hardly mean "written

cpwvat; v izpt-zo 7ua]pxt(oafj.voi Hippolytus' rcpo ETTtarjfiEtuotv is rather

in his own hand", as Lawlor and Oulton translate i t , if LSJ is right i n noting that

similar; and Plutarch speaks of an audience "recognizing" or "marking" some

this sense appears much later It should mean "written out in full" (so PGL

behaviour by applause: TWV 5 navEXXrjvfov iuaijfxeMoaaiivctw xpoTtp T E9-OC;

Lampe, cf. p 5) But why should Eusebius say this? The preface to the several

There is no need to follow Cobet and "emend" the text by substituting the more

volumes of a published work would hardly be written in short-hand

familiar word 7ticrr|^aivEa8-aL, for Kiar\\iEioa&a.i is used by Plutarch's near-

ejiicrrjpiELtjaii; were commonly used to indicate short-hand notes, it would be

contemporary Aspasius, and should be allowed to stand

natural to insert oXoypatpoi; to show that this sense was not intended..

Probably the commonest sense is that of "pointing out" a fact or situation, just

VII,29,2 B u t

another

But if

But the chief evidence for the sense is of course the independent testimony of

as i n English one can "observe" or "remark" that something is the case, even

Rufinus and

though not directly visible; OTI follows it i n Aspasius and Origen, and i t occurs

indisputably refers to the taking of short-hand notes; Rufinus in his translation

intransitively with rapt at Origen, Comm.. i n Joh XIII,62,436 Finally, it is used

of Eusebius H E . VII,29,2, Jerome i n his notice of Malchion, closely based upon

with an impersonal subject, where some event or tradition "indicates" some

Eusebius, i n de viris illustribus 71 Simonetti has already rejected Richard's

further fact, as i n Irenaeus, haer 1,8,2: Kou Ta

contention that they simply mistook the sense of the word: "it is hard to think

KO&T)

5 oLxr\, a. eita^EV,

Terome, who

use

the phrase

"excipientibus notariis", which

e7tiaeaTjfieiia9-at TOV Kptov axouaiv v T araupij) "it was her sufferings (viz.

that two, so to speak, professional translators, who had lived long years in the

those of Sophia) which, they say, the Lord indicated on the Cross" This, I think,

East, knew Greek less well than Richard"

is the nearest we come to Richard's required sense of "revealing" something that

at first sight lies hidden; but there is a clear distinction between this and the

R S L R 24 (1988) 181, repeated almost verbatim in ST 1,11

III
147

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

148

I agree with this judgement, and submit that my examination of the word goes
far to confirm i t I n particular I w i l l make three points:

texts which profess to reproduce a dialogue between him and Malchion (esp f r r
22,36) must of course be spurious But this conclusion by no means follows It

(1) Although my list, compiled from easily accessible indexes, is not markedly

would be quite natural at the Council to give evidence of Paul's opinions by

longer than Richard's (for writers down to Eusebius he gives 10 instances,

citing the records of earlier debates, the Xyoi xtx 7]TTiaei of H E VII,28,2

discounting Plutarch, I

Indeed it would be more effective to quote such statements, made in the

give 20, besides

an

additional 4 to

the

noun

eTUCTr]|iEi(oai<;) my list is strengthened for precisely those authors which Rufinus

and Jerome are bound to have read; 7 + 1 for Origen, 3 + 2 for Eusebius, as
against 2 in each case

(2) Richard, as we have seen, attaches great importance to the use of the
single word f)TT]civ, used he thinks to signify the "enqute judiciaire" conducted

(2) M y list includes Origen's Fourteenth Homily on Jeremiah, which Jerome

translated. A t the relevant point our only Greek

presence of witnesses, than to rely on the testimony of Richard's "informers"

manuscipt

by Malchion at H E. VI,29,2, as distinct f r o m the double plural Xoyoi x a i

reads ETCEE

TiTYjOEii; x a t BiaXo-you, H E. VI,33,2, cf 3 Obviously, if Paul were not

eoTifieiaiaafiev, but Jerome clearly read 7rErrr)fiLtoaa.(iEv, which he translated,

present, there could be no reference to a dialogue But Richard goes to great

quite correctly, as "annotavimus"; and his reading has been adopted by the editor,

lengths to deny any analogy with the case of Beryllus, or with the recently

E Klostermann, for the GCS text. The sense of "observing", "taking note", which

discovered conversations between Origen and Heraclides No doubt there is a

we have seen is frequent in Origen, is obviously close to that of "taking down

difference, i n that these two conversations ended in agreement; and a further

notes" which Jerome and Rufinus give to the word i n connection with Malchion

difference if Paul refused to attend the final Council But there seems to me a

(3) Richard's interpretation of e7ttcrYj[i.eiovio-&ai presumes that both Rufinus

touch of na'ivete in Richard's unquestioning acceptance of Eusebius' estimate of

and Jerome wholly overlooked its connection with the simple verb O^[AIQUCJ9-OU

Paul (p. 331): "Brylle et Hraclide taient de bonnes vques, qui enseignaient

and the analogous compound uTroariiitoua&a.i The simple verb occurs not very

de bonne f o i une doctrine errone et ne songeaient pas s'en cacher Paul de

seldom i n both Origen and Eusebius. Clement of Alexandria uses the noun

Samosata, au contraire, se drobait devant les accusations portes contre lui et

uTtoarifiEiwati;, A n d both it and the verb u7torjr)fiioua&at are indisputably used

le problme tait de prouver 1' objectivit de ces accusations" Only Malchion

in the sense of "taking notes", the noun at Diogenes Laertius 2,122, the verb at

succeeded " prendre V accus en flagrant dlit (<piopv)", ibid, cf VII,29,l-2,

2,48;' cf also Origen, Cels proem. 6

<ptpaiM, wpxaai Does Richard mean, after all, that Paul compromised

I have devoted some space to a modest, though necessary, philological task

Let me conclude with a few more general observations.
(1) Richard suggests that Paul may not have been present at the final Council
which pronounced his deposition (pp. 336,337 and no 25); the notice at H E
VII,30,19 that Aurelian referred the question to the Bishops of Italy and Rome
might suggest that he thought the authority of the Council diminished by Paul's
absence A hasty reader would infer that if Paul refused to present himself, the

Richard himself refers to these passages, cited by chapters as 2,13. 2,6 at 330 n 9, noting correctly
that there can be no question of stenography in Xenophon s time, but does not deny that they refer
to taking notes

himself at the Council'? This would not follow, since Eusebius can use tpopv
quite generally of an accusation proved by written argument, e g E T 1,20,40; I I I ,
3,47 But what concerns me more is that Richard's account of the events makes
no allowance whatever for any polemical bias on the part of Eusebius when he
speaks of Paul's "duplicity" We should not overlook the possibility that Paul's
accusers were simply puzzled; they were convinced that his teaching was
unacceptable, but could not identify it with any of the heresies which they

III

Ill
149

150

Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata

and can be seen in

certainly recognized such a soul ( f r r . 15,17 Sp.) whereas there is no direct

Eusebius himself, who generally brands Paul as an adoptianist and Marcellus as

evidence that Marcellus did so. But if Eusebius looked up the acta around 330

a Sabellian, though sometimes arguing that the latter's theology, per contra,

A D , it becomes easier to suppose that they were used by the homoeousian party

makes h i m a Paulianist

i n 358-9; at all events we have gone some way towards closing the gap between

already recognized

This technique is familiar enough,

10

1J

(3) A much better account of Paul is given by Eusebius in the Ecclesiastical

Theology 1,14 If I read h i m right, he recognizes four separate heresies and

268 and 429 - So much by way of tentative positive suggestions as an appendix

to my main demolitionary task

distinguishes Paul's teaching from that of Sabellius, from adoptonism, and from

Dormitat Homerus! Richard at his best is so superbly perceptive as well as

the theology of Marcellus: (1) Sabellius teaches one sole Godhead (1) but

learned that his less distinguished performances have carried a conviction they do

identifies the Father with the Son (3); (2) the "Ebionites" confess one God and

not deserve

do not deny the Saviour's body (i.e. bodily reality) but fail to recognize the Son's

Riedmatten's case will not easily be persuaded to change their views But I

divinity; (3) Paul, although he teaches that fesus is the Christ of God,

submit that Richard's attempt to discredit it must be pronounced a failure Paul

and

confesses one Almighty God like Marcellus, was condemned because he did not

Scholars who have accoustomed

of Samosata can once again emerge from the shadows

confess that Christ was both Son of God and God before his generation in the
flesh (xa TV ZapioaaTa S, xarcep Traouv TV XptaTv TQ 8-EOJ evai
SiSaxovTa, S-ev TE EVO. TV EITCIVTDJVb^otd opLoXoyoOvTa MapxXXp,
icxXTjo-ac TO 9-eoO aXXTpiov a7r<pT]vav o EJocXijatacTucoi n a ripee;, OTI

TTQ

xai

uEov 9-EO x a i 9-eov rcp xjs vapxou Yvae<o; ovTa TV Xptarv wfioXoyei)
Sabellius' heresy, however, involved the Father, not Christ; and (4) Marcellus
"apparently i n the same case as he was"" defines God and his Logos as one,
while granting him the two titles "Father" and "Son"
The account given of Paul agrees well with the fragments (Christ, frr.
6 79 1126; not pre-existent, f r r 2 3 26 e t c ) and is far more plausible than
Eusebius' usual caricature, which indeed recurs at E T. 1,20,43 It suggests that
Eusebius may have been prompted to re-read the acta of the Council, possibly
as a result of his previous controversy with Eustathius (Socrates, H E , I,23f).
Eusebius' efforts to tax Marcellus with admitting a human soul in Christ ( E . I
1,20,41 45) might well be a "left-over" from this earlier controversy, for Eustathius

See my paper Rethorical Method in Athanasius': VigChr 30 (1976) 121-37, reprinted in my

Substance and Illusion in the Christian Fathers, London 1985, no VIII, esp 131-3, where I show
that these techniques were widely practised
" The Greek is T<X Tea h auxip U7ri86(ivac; MapxeXXac rcaS-etv, where UIUS6[AV0(; must be
understood as a passive; '(rightly) suspected of the same fault"; the middle voice would translate,
improbably, as ' suspecting that he himself was in the same case

themselves to dismissing de

10

ia

So Simonetti, R S L R 24 (1988) 182

IV

IV
A R I U S

I N M O D E R N

ARIUS

R E S E A R C H

T H E R E is n o need t o a r g u e t h e c r u c i a l i m p o r t a n c e of t h e A r i a n
controversy i n the early d e v e l o p m e n t o f C h r i s t i a n doctrine, and
m u c h n e w l i g h t has b e e n t h r o w n o n i t s h i s t o r y i n r e c e n t years
Y e t t h e m o t i v e s a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f A r i u s h i m s e l f are s t i l l d i s p u t e d
I have taken the o p p o r t u n i t y to reconsider t h e m i n a f a i r l y n o n technical style, reproducing a lecture generously commissioned
b y t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M a i n z I s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h r e e s u b j e c t s : our
e v i d e n c e for A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e ; t h e m a i n i n t e n t i o n of h i s t h e o l o g y ;
a n d h i s r e l a t i o n to earlier t h i n k e r s I w i l l m a k e s o m e i n t r o d u c t o r y
r e m a r k s o n each o f these p o i n t s
i
A l i u s ' w r i t i n g s have n o t s u r v i v e d in extenso. O u r k n o w l e d g e
o f his t h o u g h t d e p e n d s o n t h r e e sources
(a) W e h a v e l e t t e r s w r i t t e n b y A r i u s , w h i c h d i f f e r n o t a b l y i n
t h e i r o c c a s i o n a n d t h e i r e m p h a s i s . T h e earliest, O p t i z Urkunde
i,
is a s h o r t n o t e w r i t t e n t o a n i n f l u e n t i a l f r i e n d , i n w h i c h A r i u s
c o m p l a i n s t h a t he has b e e n u n j u s t l y t r e a t e d b y h i s b i s h o p ,
A l e x a n d e r , a n d sets o u t some p o i n t s of d i s a g r e e m e n t T h e n e x t ,
Urkunde
6, is a r e s p e c t f u l a p p r o a c h t o A l e x a n d e r i n w h i c h A r i u s
explains his theology i n m o r e accommodating terms, apparently
i n t h e h o p e of s e c u r i n g t o l e r a t i o n . T h e t h i r d , Urkunde
30, is a
s h o r t credal statement addressed to the E m p e r o r Constantine,
w h i c h a v o i d s all c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t s T h e f i r s t t w o l e t t e r s w e r e
w r i t t e n . 3 2 0 A D . , t h e t h i r d , I b e l i e v e , c 333;' i t r e s u l t e d , o f c o u r s e ,
i n the E m p e r o r ' s w i t h d r a w i n g the condemnation imposed on
A r i u s b y t h e C o u n c i l of N i c a e a A f e w phrases f r o m a f o u r t h letter
are q u o t e d b y C o n s t a n t i n e ; see O p i t z Urkunde
34
(b)
W e h a v e s o m e r e m a i n s o f t h e Thalia,
a composition in
verse i n w h i c h A r i u s p r e s e n t s h i s t h e o l o g y i n f o r c i b l e t e r m s T h e
first seven lines are q u o t e d b y A t h a n a s i u s i n h i s ' F i r s t O r a t i o n
against t h e A l l a n s ' , p u b l i s h e d p e r h a p s c 340 A D , s o m e t w e n t y
years after t h e p o e m was w r i t t e n . T w e n t y years later again
A t h a n a s i u s q u o t e d s o m e f o r t y - t w o lines i n h i s w o r k De
Synodis,
a l o n g w i t h o t h e r A r i a n d o c u m e n t s T h i s , I b e l i e v e , is v a l u a b l e
evidence.
(c)
T h e r e is a g r e a t mass of m a t e r i a l i n t h e f o r m of r e p o r t s
a n d c r i t i c i s m s of A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e b y A l e x a n d e r a n d e s p e c i a l l y b y
Athanasius
I t i n c l u d e s t w o l e t t e r s w r i t t e n i n t h e n a m e of
A l e x a n d e r a n d n u m e r o u s s u m m a r i e s b y A t h a n a s i u s , all p h r a s e d
i n r o u g h l y s i m i l a r t e r m s T h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l of these has been
t h e r e p o r t , based o n t h e Thalia, w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s p r e s e n t s i n his
See Annik Martin, RHE

34 2 (1980), 31Q n 2, against Opitz

{327)

RESEARCH

25

' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 and. 6. N o t a l l o f t h i s r e p o r t is r e l i a b l e .

I t i n c l u d e s q u o t a t i o n s , or a l l e g e d q u o t a t i o n s , f r o m t h e w r i t i n g s of
A r i u s a n d o f h i s c o l l e a g u e A s t e r i u s . B u t these are i n t e r s p e r s e d
w i t h h o s t i l e c o m m e n t s , a n d w e also hear o f r e m a r k s t h r o w n off
i n c o n v e r s a t i o n b y u n n a m e d A r i a n p a r t i s a n s S c h o l a r s i n t h e past
h a v e b e e n far t o o r e a d y t o t r e a t a l l t h i s e v i d e n c e as e q u a l l y v a l i d .
I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e y h a v e p r e f e r 1 e d t h e i n d i i e c t e v i d e n c e of
A t h a n a s i u s t o p r o b a b l e q u o t a t i o n s f r o m A r i u s , w h o is a h e r e t i c
2
A r i u s ' c h i e f t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t , i t has l o n g been s u p p o s e d ,
was t o u p h o l d t h e u n i q u e d i g n i t y o f G o d t h e F a t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y
i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e d i v i n e L o g o s A l e x a n d r i a n t h e o l o g y at this
t i m e was p l u r a l i s t ; i t i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e S e c o n d a n d T h i r d Persons
of t h e T r i n i t y were real a n d substantial beings, and n o t mere
energies 01 f u n c t i o n s o f t h e F a t h e r , A l e x a n d e r f o l l o w e d O r i g e n i n
h o l d i n g t h a t t h e L o g o s was e t e r n a l l y g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r ;
h e d i f f e r e d f r o m O r i g e n i n a s c r i b i n g t o h i m e q u a l d i g n i t y and
p o w e r A r i u s r e j e c t e d b o t h these d o c t r i n e s T o m a k e t h e L o g o s
c o e t e r n a l a n d e q u a l l y d i v i n e , h e t h o u g h t , was t o p r e a c h t w o G o d s ;
t h e L o g o s m u s t be seen as j u n i o r , as r a d i c a l l y i n f e r i o r a n d s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e F a t h e r T h i s v i e w is s t r o n g l y expressed i n A r i u s '
f i r s t letter a n d i n t h e Thalia
fragments
N e v e r t h e l e s s A l i u s expresses t h i s d o c t r i n e w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s H e d e s c r i b e s t h e L o g o s , i n I s a i a h ' s w o r d s , as 'a m i g h t y
G o d ' A l t h o u g h j u n i o r t o t h e F a t h e r , a n d c r e a t e d b y h i m , the
L o g o s was c a l l e d i n t o b e i n g b e f o r e a l l c r e a t i o n a n d e x e c u t e d the
F a t h e r ' s c r e a t i v e w o r k So m u c h is r e p e a t e d l y d i s c l o s e d b y
Athanasius
B u t A r i u s appears t o h a v e b e e n i n c o n s i s t e n t H e e m p h a s i z e d
t h e lesser d i g n i t y o f t h e L o g o s b y p o i n t i n g to h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s
w h i c h he u n d e r w e n t as i n c a r n a t e i n Jesus: s u f f e r i n g , u n c e r t a i n t y ,
t h e need f o r d e c i s i o n , a n d t h e l i k e I t m i g h t s e e m t h a t a L o g o s
w h o was, n e x t t o t h e F a t h e r , t h e s u p r e m e a r c h i t e c t of t h e u n i v e r s e
s h o u l d eo ipso be w i s e a n d p o w e r f u l a n d p r o o f against h u m a n
weakness N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i u s , or s o m e o f h i s f o l l o w e r s , d e s c r i b e d
t h e L o g o s as, i n i m p o r t a n t respects, s u b j e c t t o o u r i n f i r m i t i e s ; the
o p p o s i n g p a r t y seized o n these a d m i s s i o n s , a n d c o m p l a i n e d that
he considered the L o g o s a mere man, n o m o r e t h a n a m a n
2

I t was t h i s side o f A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e t h a t was t a k e n u p b y t w o

A m e r i c a n scholars, R o b e r t G r e g g a n d Dennis G r o h
I n their
v i e w t h e m a i n c o n c e r n o f A l i u s was n o t t o s u b o r d i n a t e t h e L o g o s
t o t h e F a t h e r , b u t t o offer a d i s t i n c t i v e a p p r o a c h t o s a l v a t i o n T h e
3

n
1

I N M O D E R N

R Lorenz, 'Die Christusseele i m arianischen Streit', ZKG

(1983), r-51;
36
198 citing Urk. 30 2; 34 14, 32; also much indirect evidence
R Gregg and D G r o h , Early Arianhm, a View of Salvation (London, 1981)

IV

IV
ARIUS

26
A r i a n L o g o s , t h e y t h i n k , is c o n c e i v e d as a m o r a l l y p e r f e c t m a n ,
subject to our h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s , a n d s h o w i n g us b y his example
h o w those l i m i t a t i o n s c a n b e o v e r c o m e . T h i s v i e w has m e t w i t h
s o m e c r i t i c i s m ; b u t i t has b e e n g i v e n a c a u t i o u s w e l c o m e b y D r
R u d o l f L o r e n z . H e has e x p r e s s e d i t i n t h e p r e g n a n t p h r a s e ' A r i u s
ist I s o c h r i s t ' H e does n o t m e a n , o f c o u r s e , t h a t A r i u s w a s t h e
e q u a l o f C h r i s t ; n o r i n d e e d t h a t h e c l a i m e d t o b e so H e m e a n s
t h a t , i n A r i u s ' v i e w , m e n are capable o f a t t a i n i n g e q u a l i t y w i t h
C h r i s t ; a n d t h i s e n t a i l s , c o n v e r s e l y , t h a t A l i u s assigns n o greater
d i g n i t y to C h r i s t than a perfect m a n c o u l d attain.
4

3
L o r e n z agrees w i t h G r e g g a n d G i o h t h a t A r i u s ' m a i n i n t e r est lies i n C h r i s t o l o g y ; a n d h e seems t o accept t h e i r v i e w t h a t
A r i u s ' C h r i s t o l o g y is a n a d o p t i o n i s t o n e , ' a d o p t i a n h t u c K
These
p o i n t s ar e associated w i t h a d i s t i n c t i v e v i e w o f A r i u s ' antecedents
L o r e n z h o l d s t h a t A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e o f t h e L o g o s is i n f l u e n c e d b y
O r i g e n ' s teaching o n t h e s o u l of C h r i s t , rather t h a n b y Origen's
L o g o s d o c t r i n e i t s e l f F u r t h e r m o r e , h e b e l i e v e s t h a t A l i u s stands
i n a line o f t r a d i t i o n w h i c h derives f r o m Paul of Samosata B o t h
these s u p p o s i t i o n s l e n d s u p p o r t t o t h e v i e w t h a t A r i u s teaches an
adoptionist Chr istology
s

I h a v e d e s c r i b e d these p o i n t s v e r y b r i e f l y , as I m e a n t o r e t u r n
t o t h e m later F o r t h e m o m e n t I w i l l say t h a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n a b o u t
t h e s o u l o f t h e L o g o s is m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d s u g g e s t i v e ; b u t
i t i n v o l v e s c o m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h D r L o r e n z m a y p e r h a p s have
o v e r l o o k e d . B u t t o p r e s e n t P a u l o f S a m o s a t a as a f o r e r u n n e r o f
A r i u s is a n idea w h i c h , I m u s t confess, I b e l i e v e t o b e t o t a l l y
misconceived
I n o w r e t u r n t o m y first t o p i c , our evidence for A r i u s ' theology.
S c h o l a r s i n t h e past h a v e r e l i e d o n t h e t e s t i m o n y o f A t h a n a s i u s
and Alexander , and Lorenz followed t h e m i n his fascinating book
Arius Judaizans?
w r i t t e n i n 1979. H e e x h i b i t e d t h i s t e s t i m o n y i n
a s y s t e m o f e i g h t h e a d i n g s , w h i c h has b e e n w i d e l y a d o p t e d . S i n c e
t h a t t i m e h e has d o n e m e t h e h o n o u r o f g i v i n g c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n
t o a n essay o f m i n e i n w h i c h I p u t f o r w a r d a v e r y d i f f e r e n t v i e w .
I n fact I have entered this discussion w i t h three p r i n c i p a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s M y essay o f 1976, ' R h e t o r i c a l M e t h o d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' ,
attempted t o show that Athanasius was n o t objectively r e p o r t i n g
facts f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f f u t u r e h i s t o r i a n s ; h e was e n g a g e d i n a b i t t e r
7

'Christusseeie' 3, cf 41 n 250.
Ibid 3, cf. 40 f , 48
R Lorenz, Arius Judaizam?
(Gbttingen 1979) 128, cf 'Christusseeie' 48.
See n. 2.
Vig Christ
30 (1976), 121-37; JTS, N S , 29 (1978), 20-52; ibid 39 (1988),
76-91
4

IN MODERN RESEARCH

27

c o n t r o v e r s y , a n d w a s n o t a b o v e u s i n g t h e p o l e m i c a l devices
a l l o w e d b y t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f h i s t i m e I f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n served
h i s t u r n , h e w o u l d m i s r e p r e s e n t A s e c o n d essay o f r978, o n t h e
Thalia,
c l a i m e d t h a t OUT b e s t i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h a t w o r k i s t h e
e x t r a c t s p r e s e r v e d i n A t h a n a s i u s de Synodis
15, t o w h i c h I w i l l
r e t u r n M o s t r e c e n t l y , i n r988, I argued that o n e of t h e letters
a t t r i b u t e d t o B i s h o p A l e x a n d e r , b e g i n n i n g ' Evoq G<s>\iaxoq, is i n
f a c t t h e w o r k o f A t h a n a s i u s T h i s also affects L o r e n z ' s a r g u m e n t ,
since he c o u l d c l a i m t h a t o n s o m e p o i n t s t h e t e s t i m o n y of
A t h a n a s i u s is c o n f i r m e d b y t h a t o f A l e x a n d e r B u t t h e i r a g r e e m e n t
is m u c h r e d u c e d i f w e a d m i t t h a t o n l y t h e l o n g e r l e t t e r , ' H
fyiXapxoq,
w a s a c t u a l l y c o m p o s e d b y A l e x a n d e r L o i e n z cites i t
m u c h less, a n d i t s a g r e e m e n t w i t h A t h a n a s i u s is i n d e e d m u c h less
close T h e l i n g u i s t i c a r g u m e n t s f o r m y v i e w , I s t i l l t h i n k , are
i r r e f u t a b l e ; i f s o m e scholars h a v e b e e n s c e p t i c a l , i t is m a i n l y
because m y v i e w c o n f l i c t s w i t h a c o m m o n v i e w o f A t h a n a s i u s '
a c t i v i t y , n a m e l y t h a t h e w r o t e n o t h i n g u n t i l after h e became b i s h o p
i n 328; w h e r e a s I p r e s e n t h i m as w r i t i n g a n i m p o r t a n t d o g m a t i c
letter at t h e age o f l i t t l e m o r e t h a n t w e n t y ; i n C h a r l e s
Kannengiesser's w o r d s , I make h i m a sort o f theological M o z a r t !
A c c o r d i n g l y , n e x t t o t h e letters of A r i u s himself, o u r most
r e l i a b l e s o u r c e is t h e Thalia f r a g m e n t s o f de Synodis
15 W e have
s o m e f o r t y - t w o lines w r i t t e n i n rather c r u d e verse. I w a s w r o n g
i n t r y i n g t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e t r e as anapaestic; since t h e n Professor
M . L W e s t has d e s c r i b e d i t as S o t a d e a n , w h i c h agrees w i t h
A t h a n a s i u s ' r e m a r k s i n t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' a n d elsewhere B u t a
m e t r i c a l s t r u c t u r e , w h a t e v e r i t b e , suggests t h a t A r i u s ' t e x t has
b e e n p r e s e r v e d w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e I m y s e l f see these
l i n e s as a sequence o f d i s c o n n e c t e d f r a g m e n t s ; A t h a n a s i u s has i n
f a c t selected those l i n e s w h i c h g i v e a n o p e n i n g t o c r i t i c i s m , so
t h a t a l m o s t a l l o f t h e m c o r r e s p o n d t o o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h h e has
d e v e l o p e d e l s e w h e r e I t is m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t A l i u s c o u l d have
w r i t t e n a t h e o l o g i c a l p o e m i n w h i c h e v e r y l i n e w a s o f f e n s i v e to
o r t h o d o x sentiment; b u t i f t h e i e were inoffensive lines, i t w o u l d
s u i t A t h a n a s i u s ' p u r p o s e t o o m i t t h e m W h a t t h e n was t h e e x t e n t
o f t h e o r i g i n a l p o e m ? W e h a v e n o m e a n s o f k n o w i n g I f pressed
f o r a n a n s w e r , I w o u l d c o n s i d e r i t u n l i k e l y t h a t i t was less t h a n
r o o lines 01 m o r e t h a n 500; b u t I m u s t e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h i s is
mere conjecture,
9

T h e d o c t r i n a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s f i n d i n g is t h a t t h e Thalia
fragments p r o v i d e a check o n Athanasius' t e s t i m o n y , p a r t i c u l a r l y
i n t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6, w h i c h has l o n g b e e n t a k e n

JTS

32 (1982), 98-106.

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28
t o b e t h e best source A t o n e p o i n t i t is c o m p l e t e l y c o n f i r m e d :
A l i u s does i n d e e d , i n h i s o w n w o r d s , p r o c l a i m t h e i n f e r i o r i t y of
the Logos a n d his substantial unlikeness t o t h e Father i n just the
w a y t h a t A t h a n a s i u s c o n d e m n s ; t h o u g h n o d o u b t h e also p r a i s e d
t h e F a t h e r i n lines w h i c h w e h a v e l o s t
A t another p o i n t
A t h a n a s i u s is c l e a r l y at f a u l t ; A l i u s d e s c r i b e s t h e m a n y STtivotai
o f t h e S o n i n t e r m s w h i c h r e s e m b l e O r i g e n ' s ; t h e s j t i v o i c a are
f u n c t i o n a l t i t l e s o f d i g n i t y B u t A t h a n a s i u s t r e a t s these eTtivoioci
as m e r e fictions or p r e t e n c e s , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e w o r d w h i c h
is p o s s i b l e i n itself b u t e n t i r e l y u n j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s c o n t e x t I t is a
d i s c o n c e r t i n g t h o u g h t t h a t A t h a n a s i u s insists o n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
w h i c h w i l l later b e f o u n d i n E u n o m i u s , w h e r e a s A r i u s agrees w i t h
S t B a s i l . I n g e n e r a l , o n e m i g h t s u m m a r i z e t h e p o s i t i o n b y saying
t h a t A t h a n a s i u s has s l i g h t l y , b u t p e r s i s t e n t l y , e x a g g e r a t e d t h e
extent of A l i u s ' u n o r t h o d o x y N o apology can t u r n A r i u s into a
C h r i s t i a n F a t h e r B u t h e is n o t h i n g l i k e t h e v i l l a i n t h a t t r a d i t i o n
has m a d e o f h i m ; a n d at c e r t a i n p o i n t s , w h e r e h e m a d e u n w i s e
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , h e w a s later w i l l i n g t o r e t r a c t t h e m .
1 0

B u t c a n m y r e a d i n g o f t h e Thalia
be c o n f i r m e d o n critical
g r o u n d s ? I a m n o t aware t h a t t h e r e w a s w i d e s p r e a d dissent f r o m
m y 1978 paper N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e are t w o scholars at least w h o
h o l d s t r o n g l y d i s s e n t i n g v i e w s , w h i c h I w i l l a t t e m p t t o discuss
F i r s t , m y greatly respected f r i e n d Charles Kannengiesser m a i n tains the t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w t h a t o u r p r i m e source f o r A r i u s ' teaching
is t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6; b u t h e has p r o p o s e d an
e n t i r e l y n o v e l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e de Synodis m a t e r i a l
H e sees i t
as a n a r t i s t i c c o m p o s i t i o n d i s p l a y i n g a u n i f i e d s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h I
m y s e l f c a n n o t detect. I t seems t o m e t o c o n t a i n a n u m b e r o f f r e s h
starts a n d u n e x p l a i n e d t r a n s i t i o n s , as w a s o b s e r v e d l o n g ago b y
Bardy,
a n d as I h a v e a l r e a d y agreed
A s to its content,
K a n n e n g i e s s e r t h i n k s t h a t i t is a r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a l
Thalia,
m a d e s h o r t l y b e f o r e A t h a n a s i u s w r o t e t h e de Synodis, b y
a w r i t e r w h o was m o v i n g t o w a r d s a n e o - A i i a n p o s i t i o n T h i s v i e w ,
I b e l i e v e , is w h o l l y d i s p r o v e d b y m e t r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s T h e
o r i g i n a l Thalia was c o m p o s e d i n v e i s e , as A t h a n a s i u s r e p o r t s B u t
t h e v e r s i o n o f i t p r e s e n t e d i n h i s ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' is a l m o s t e n t i r e l y
u n m e t r i c a l I t m u s t therefore have diverged t o some extent f r o m
1 1

1 2

1 3

Cf U r k 6 z; Alexander, U r k u . 4 6
C Kannengiesser, Holy Scripture and Hellenistic Hermenutica (Berkeley
California, 1982), 14-20; R- C Gregg (ed.) 'Arianism' PMS 11 (1983), 59-78;
E . Lucchesi and H D. Saffrey (eds.) Memorial A J Festugire (Geneve, 1984),
1 0

11

143-Si
Lucien, 2557.
7 7 ^ 3 8 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , 199-201
1 2

1 3

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29

t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t . Y e t w e are t o l d t h a t a later w r i t e r b o t h r e f o r m u l a t e d A r i u s ' verses w i t h a n e w t h e o l o g y i n m i n d a n d r e i n t r o d u c e d

t h e o r i g i n a l m e t r e W h e t h e r h e based h i s w o r k o n t h e o r i g i n a l text
or o n A t h a n a s i u s ' p a r a p h r a s e , s u c h a p r o c e d u r e defies b e l i e f
Kannengiesser's
account m i g h t perhaps be t h o u g h t more
acceptable i f t a k e n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e analysis o f t h e ' F i r s t
O r a t i o n ' i t s e l f p r o p o s e d i n h i s Athanase,
Eveque et Ecrivain,
which
suggests t h a t c h a p t e r s r - r o are a later a d d i t i o n , c o m p o s e d p e r h a p s
i n t h e 350s ( o p . c i t p. 402). T h i s w o u l d m a k e t h e m r o u g h l y
c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h t h e m a j o r w o r k s i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s cites
a n u m b e r o f d o c u m e n t s verbatim
A n d t h e s o l i t a r y appearance of
6u,oo6atOt; at i . 9 c o u l d b e s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d o n t h e h y p o t h e s i s of
a later date B u t , as I h a v e a r g u e d w h e n r e v i e w i n g t h e b o o k i n
t h i s j o u r n a l (36 r ^ 9 8 5 ) , 226 f ) , t h e s u b t r a c t i o n o f c h a p t e r s 1-10
( w i t h 3 0 - 3 4 a n d p a r t s o f B o o k i i ) does n o t leave a c o n v i n c i n g
remainder
K a n n e n g i e s s e r argues f o r h i s r e d a t i n g o f c h a p t e r s r - 1 0 o n the
g r o u n d t h a t t h e i r c o n t e n t is n o t d i s c u s s e d i n t h e later c h a p t e r s ,
w h i c h are m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h A s t e r i u s B u t t h i s f a c t , I t h i n k ,
can be s i m p l y explained w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o theories of disloc a t i o n I f t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' a p p e a r e d , as w e agree, d u r i n g
Athanasius' Second Exile, i t w o u l d be natural for h i m t o begin
w r i t i n g w i t h the A l e x a n d r i a n situation i n m i n d and make A l i u s
h i s p r i n c i p a l t a r g e t . B u t b e f o r e l o n g h e w a s at R o m e i n t h e c o m p a n y o f M a r c e l l u s , w h o h a d p r o v o k e d a f u r o r e b y his a t t a c k o n
A s t e r i u s ; i n f a c t t h i s w o r k , a n d t h e r e p l i e s b y E u s e b i u s of Caesarea,
w e r e a m a j o r cause o f s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n R o m e a n d t h e
East. A s t e r i u s ' t h e o l o g y t h e r e f o r e m u s t h a v e b e e n a c t i v e l y d e b a t e d
at R o m e , as w e l l as M a r c e l l u s ' a t t a c k , a n d A t h a n a s i u s ' s h i f t of
o b j e c t i v e s is t h e r e b y e x p l a i n e d
S e c o n d l y , D i R u d o l f L o i e n z has d o n e m e t h e h o n o u r o f subj e c t i n g m y rg78 p a p e r t o v e r y c a r e f u l d i s c u s s i o n ; he t r e a t s i t ,
i n d e e d , w i t h r e s p e c t , besides o f f e r i n g v a l u a b l e c o r r e c t i o n s Y e t for
a l l i t s a c u i t y a n d l e a r n i n g , h i s paper s h o w s signs o f piecemeal
c o m p o s i t i o n H e begins b y stating his v i e w o f A l i u s , u s i n g the
t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l a n d t h e w e l l - k n o w n e i g h t headings H e t h e n
deals v e r y f u l l y w i t h m y c r i t i c a l w o r k , a n d accepts some o f m y
a r g u m e n t s ; b u t t h i s does n o t l e a d h i m t o reconsider t h e rather
c o n s e r v a t i v e a c c o u n t o f A r i a n i s m t h a t h e has p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n
H i s conclusion
is presented
i n notably moderate
terms:
'Athanasius' reports contain i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h should
n o t b e d i s r e g a r d e d A r i a n i s m is n o t a n i n v e n t i o n o f o r t h o d o x
p o l e m i c s ; a n d A r i u s is n o t t o b e b r a c k e t e d w i t h E u s e b i u s o f
Caesaiea ' B u t t h i s sentence leaves i m p o r t a n t t r u t h s u n s a i d

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A t h a n a s i u s ' i n f o r m a t i o n is o f c o u r s e i m p o r t a n t a n d w o u l d be
i n d i s p e n s a b l e i f w e h a d n o b e t t e r sources b y w h i c h t o c o r r e c t i t
B u t at c e r t a i n p o i n t s , I h a v e a r g u e d , w e have b e t t e r sources, w h i c h
e n a b l e us t o d e t e c t t h e e l e m e n t o f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t r u n s
t h r o u g h so m u c h o r t h o d o x p o l e m i c s , a n d so c o m e closer t o t h e
r e a l A l i u s D r L o i e n z ' s i m p r e s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n is n o t f u l l y r e l i able because i t uses m a t e r i a l f o r w h i c h , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , s u c h c o r r e c t i v e s are l a c k i n g . I agree, o f c o u r s e , t h a t A l i u s m a d e p r o v o c a t i v e
c l a i m s w h i c h E u s e b i u s a v o i d e d ; b u t n e i t h e r o f t h e m was w h o l l y
c o n s i s t e n t or w h o l l y i n t r a c t a b l e T h e c o m p a r i s o n is i n t r o d u c e d ,
p r e s u m a b l y , because L o r e n z t h i n k s I h a v e b e e n t o o k i n d t o A r i u s
B u t he s u r e l y w i l l n o t c l a i m t h a t I h a v e b e e n careless i n s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e evidence?
T h i s account m u s t suffice; i t cannot be stretched t o include a
detailed discussion o f texts W e t u r n , then, to the remaining topics,
t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f A r i u s a n d h i s antecedents.
H e r e D r L o r e n z makes the f o l l o w i n g four points.
A r i u s derives his v i e w o f the L o g o s f r o m Origen's teaching on
t h e soul of t h e L o g o s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e L o g o s h i m s e l f
2 I n O r i g e n , t h i s s o u l gains d i v i n e status b y a d o p t i o n .
3 A r i u s i n t h e Thalia declares t h a t t h e S o n was a d o p t e d
4. T h i s is c o n f i r m e d b y A l e x a n d e r ' s r e p o r t ( U r k 14 35 f ) w h i c h
links A l i u s w i t h Paul of Samosata
I t m a y be convenient to begin w i t h a r e m a r k o n the t e r m
' a d o p t i o n i s m ' , since L o r e n z has a t t r i b u t e d t h i s v i e w t o t h e A r i a n s .
E n g l i s h scholars s p e l l t h e w o r d w i t h a s e c o n d ' o ' , ' a d o p t i o n i s m ' ,
so t h a t i t has n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h e r e t i c a l A d o p t i a n i
l i k e E l i p a n d u s . . I n pr actice i t suggests t h a t s o m e o n e a t t a i n s a status
w h i c h is n o t h i s b y n a t u r e t h r o u g h h i s o w n m o r a l e f f o r t a n d
a c h i e v e m e n t . I t seems t h a t t h e G e r m a n t e r m Adoptianhmus
gives
m u c h t h e same i m p r e s s i o n . B u t a h i g h e r status n e e d n o t be gained
b y a d o p t i o n ; s o m e m e n b e c a m e R o m a n e m p e r o r s s i m p l y b y seizi n g power o n the s t r e n g t h of their m i l i t a r y prestige Conversely,
if a d o p t i o n takes p l a c e , i t n e e d n o t be a response t o r e c o g n i z e d
m e r i t N o r m a l l y , o f c o u r s e , i t w i l l take place o n t h e d o u b l e g r o u n d
of m e r i t i n t h e past a n d p r o m i s e f o r t h e f u t u r e B u t a d o p t i o n
w h e r e t h e r e is n o p r o m i s e is p o s s i b l e ; one m i g h t i n sheer p i t y
adopt a hopelessly d i f f i c u l t c h i l d A d o p t i o n o n performance only
is also u n l i k e l y ; y e t a k i n g m i g h t a d o p t a n h o n o u r e d c o u n s e l l o r ,
say, o n h i s d e a t h b e d , so as t o cheer h i s last h o u r s w i t h t h e t h o u g h t
that his c h i l d r e n w o u l d enjoy royal honours T h e n o r m a l situation
is a d o p t i o n ex praevius mentis, r a t h e r as S a m u e l j u d g e d t h a t D a v i d
w o u l d make a good king
1

B u t i f t h e essential p o i n t is t h a t s o m e o n e a t t a i n s d i v i n i t y b y

IN M O D E R N

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31

his o w n effort, w e need a better t e r m ; i n E n g l i s h w e m i g h t

perhaps
speak o f ' p r o m o t i o n i s m ' , i n G e r m a n
perhaps
of
Verbesserungstheologie;
this w o u l d correspond w i t h Athanasius'
accusations t h a t A r i u s c o n c e i v e d C h r i s t ' s goodness i n t e r m s
o f 7tpoKOTtfi a n d fi&k%i(OGic, I t h i n k t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t r u t h
u n d e r l y i n g these charges; b u t w e c a n n o t be s u r e , since at this
p o i n t t h e r e is n o f i r s t - h a n d e v i d e n c e t o p r o v i d e a check o n the
o p p o n e n t s ' r e p o r t s W h a t c a n b e said w i t h s o m e assurance is t h a t
i t is m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t A r i u s t h o u g h t o f s a l v a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y i n
e x e m p l a r i s t t e r m s A l m o s t a l l C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s e m p l o y a var iety
o f c o n c e p t s a n d s y m b o l s t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m y s t e r y o f our s a l v a t i o n
A n A r i u s w h o r e l i e d o n one alone is h a r d l y a c r e d i b l e figure.
1 4

L e t us t u r n , t h e n , t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t A r i u s ' v i e w o f the
L o g o s derives f r o m Origen's treatment o f the soul of Christ.
Lorenz provides a very careful and well-documented study, w h i c h
c a n n o t be f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s p a p e r ; b u t I w i l l s u m m a r i z e i t
as f o l l o w s
r

F o r O r i g e n , t h i s s o u l , l i k e o t h e r s o u l s , is a c r e a t e d b e i n g ; t h o u g h
its c r e a t i o n m u s t b e seen as a t i m e l e s s c o n d i t i o n
2. L i k e o t h e r s o u l s , i t has f r e e w i l l , a n d can act e i t h e r f o r the
better or t h e w o r se
3. B u t t h e s o u l o f Jesus c o n s i s t e n t l y adheres t o t h e L o g o s i n l o v e ,
a n d so b e c o m e s t o t a l l y f u s e d w i t h h i m i n one s p i r i t .
4 T h i s s o u l t h e r e f o r e receives a l l t h e h o n o r i f i c t i t l e s t h a t o r i g i n a l l y
belonged to the Logos,
5 T h e L o g o s assumed this soul i n order to become incarnate
B u t t h e L o g o s r e m a i n s d i s t i n c t , a n d is u n a f f e c t e d b y t h e h u m a n
emotions that attach to his soul.
6

T h i s soul's p e r s i s t e n c e i n w e l l - d o i n g is h e l d o u t to m a n k i n d as
a n e x a m p l e f o r us t o f o l l o w .
D r L o r e n z t h e n argues, i n a m u c h b r i e f e r p a r a g r a p h , t h a t A r i u s '
t e a c h i n g r e p r o d u c e s t h e p a t t e r n j u s t set o u t
I f i n d this argument impressive and largely convincing
N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e are s o m e r e s e r v a t i o n s t h a t n e e d to be m a d e
r.
O r i g e n ' s a c c o u n t is n o t as c o n s i s t e n t as L o r e n z m a k e s o u t .
I n s o m e c o n t e x t s h e e m p h a s i z e s t h e t o t a l f u s i o n o f t h e s o u l of
C h r i s t w i t h t h e L o g o s ; t h e y b e c o m e 'one s p i r i t ' , t h e y n e e d n o t be
s e p a r a t e l y n a m e d , a n d so o n E l s e w h e r e , he d r a w s clear d i s t i n c t i o n s : t h e s o u l is a n i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e L o g o s ; t h e s o u l is passible,
In some unpublished notes I have summarized Athanasius' salvation doctrine
under some twenty headings Exemplaiist teaching is widespread For Origen, see
Princ iv.4 4, p 354-26 F o r Athanasius, EF 2. 5, 10.7, Bp Marc 13 (of Christ's
earthly life); also c Ar iii 20 (ureoypttuiioc, from r Pet 2: 21) of Christ's unity
with the Father
1 4

IV
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ARIUS

the Logos impassible

M o r e o v e i , O i i g e n is u n c l e a i as t o t h e
m o m e n t at w h i c h t h e i r u n i o n takes place I n t h e de
Principiis
6.3, i n R u f i n u s ' t r a n s l a t i o n , i t takes place principaliter;
Lorenz
paraphrases i t ' v o n A n f a n g der S c h p f u n g a n h n g t sie u n z e r t r e n n l i c h d e m S o h n G o t t e s a n ' , etc
B u t i n C- Cels i i . 9 i t is
u n i t e d 'after t h e I n c a r n a t i o n ' . H o w t h e n was i t before? W a s i t n o t
y e t i n b e i n g , or n o t y e t o b e d i e n t ?
1 5

1 6

T h e r e is a c o m p l i c a t i o n h e r e O i i g e n h o l d s t h a t our a c t i o n s are
f r e e , b u t y e t are f u l l y f o r e s e e n b y G o d I d o n o t m y s e l f t h i n k t h i s
c o n j u n c t i o n is p o s s i b l e ; b u t for t h e m o m e n t l e t us accept i t . I t
does n o t t h e n f o l l o w t h a t a g o o d a c t i o n e t e r n a l l y f o r e s e e n b y G o d
ensures u n c h a n g i n g goodness. I t m i g h t b e n e g a t e d b y another
a c t i o n w h i c h G o d e q u a l l y foresees B u t undeviating
goodness f o r e seen b y G o d is q u i t e a n o t h e r m a t t e r . T h e r e is n o u n c e r t a i n t y here
w h i c h needs t o be d i s p e l l e d I t m a y b e t h a t A t h a n a s i u s has missed
t h i s p o i n t H e argues, a b s u r d l y I t h i n k , t h a t o n t h e A r i a n v i e w
t h e S a v i o u r d i d n o t b e c o m e L o g o s u n t i l h e h a d p e r f o r m e d the
good w o r k s w h i c h secured his d i v i n i t y
T h i s is l i k e s a y i n g t h a t
D a v i d d i d n o t b e c o m e k i n g u n t i l he h a d succeeded i n r u l i n g
w i s e l y , as S a m u e l f o r e t o l d
1 7

2
S o m e o f O r i g e n ' s a s s u m p t i o n s are c l e a r l y n o t shared b y
A l i u s , a f a c t w h i c h c o u n t s against L o r e n z ' s e m p h a s i s o n his
dependence A r m s clearly d i d believe i n G o d ' s total f o r e k n o w l e d g e ; t h i s p l a y s a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n his c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e Son's
m o r a l c o n d i t i o n , as free i n p r i n c i p l e b u t u n d e v i a t i n g i n f a c t H e
c l e a r l y d i d n o t b e l i e v e i n t h e e t e r n i t y of G o d ' s c r e a t i v e a c t i o n ,
a n d of t h e c r e a t u r e s t h e m s e l v e s T i m e is p a r t o f t h e order of
c r e a t i o n , a n d o u t s i d e t h e t e m p o r a l o r d e r s u c h w o r d s as ' b e f o r e '
and 'after' become obscure and uncertain i n their application
N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i u s insists o n a s s e r t i n g t h e p r i o r i t y of G o d over
h i s c r e a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g e v e n h i s S o n , w h o is p r i o r t o a l l t i m e ,
y e t ajcpovocx; ysvvriBeic; orco T O jcaTpoc;
O K f\v np
too

IN M O D E R N R E S E A R C H

3.3

yswriQfivai
H e r e L o r e n z v e r y perceptively points out observat i o n s b y O r i g e n w h i c h d o n o t square w i t h his g e n e r a l p i c t u r e , b u t
are n o t u n l i k e A r i u s ' o p i n i o n s
3.
T h e r e is o n e o b v i o u s o b j e c t i o n t o L o r e n z ' s v i e w A l i u s
p l a i n l y believed i n the pre-existence of the L o g o s , t h o u g h n o t i n
h i s e t e r n i t y ; t h i s is s h o w n b y h i s l i t e r a l acceptance of P r o v . 8: 22
B u t he c a n n o t h a v e b e l i e v e d i n t h e pre-existence o f souls. For
Peter of A l e x a n d r i a is k n o w n t o have a t t a c k e d O r i g e n ' s d o c t r i n e
at t h i s p o i n t , a n d A t h a n a s i u s repeats h i s c o n d e m n a t i o n
I f Arius
h a d accepted t h a t d o c t r i n e , i t is s u r e l y i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t
Athanasius should have missed the o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n d e m n h i m
1 8

1 9

2 0

I f is o f c o u r s e a c o m m o n o p i n i o n t h a t A r i u s d i d n o t a c k n o w l e d g e
any s o u l i n Jesus. B u t I d o n o t r e l y o n t h i s o p i n i o n O u r o n l y
f i r m e v i d e n c e f o r i t is a s t a t e m e n t b y E u s t a t h i u s o f A n t i o c h
But
A l i u s m u s t have f o u n d s o m e m e a n s o f i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e N e w
T e s t a m e n t passages w h i c h refer t o C h r i s t ' s s o u l . H e c o u l d w e l l
h a v e a c c e p t e d O r i g e n ' s d i c t u m : ' W h e n S c r i p t u r e wishes t o i n d i cate a n y s u f f e r i n g or t r o u b l e t h a t a f f e c t e d h i m , i t uses t h e w o r d
" s o u l " , as w h e n i t says " N o w is m y s o u l t r o u b l e d " ' , a n d so o n
O i i g e n t h u s dissociates t h e L o g o s f r o m s u f f e r i n g A t h a n a s i u s carries t h i s process f u r t h e r , a n d assigns t h e L o r d ' s s u f f e r i n g s t o his
' f l e s h ' H e c o u l d t h u s c o m p l a i n t h a t t h e A r i a n exegesis o f such
texts associates t h e L o g o s t o o closely w i t h s u f f e r i n g ; he does n o t ,
a n d p i e s u m a b l y c o u l d n o t , c o m p l a i n t h a t the A r i a n s f a i l t o g r a n t
the Logos a soul
2 1

T o s u m m a r i z e : A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e of t h e L o g o s was i n d e e d i n f l u e n c e d b y O r i g e n ' s v i e w s o n t h e s o u l o f C h r i s t . B u t one m u s t n o t

s u p p o s e w h a t a careless r e a d i n g o f L o r e n z m i g h t easily suggest,
t h a t he s i m p l y a d a p t e d O r i g e n ' s t e a c h i n g H e p l a i n l y d i v e r g e s at a
c i u c i a l p o i n t , over t h e p i e - e x i s t e n c e o f souls i n g e n e r a l ; a n d he has
n o c o n c e r n t o i n s u l a t e t h e L o g o s f r o m s u f f e r i n g T h e t r u t h is rather
that O i i g e n expressed a n u m b e r of sharply divergent views; A r i u s
adapted some and rejected others to f o i m his o w n synthesis.
22

Origen seems to hold both (i) that the soul of Christ is by nature like other
souls, and so permanently distinct from the Logos, and (ii) that its moral union
is unshakeable, so that it is permanently united For (i): it is created by the Logos,
Print 171,
Lorenz n 208 By nature intermediate: flesh/spirit, Co Rom 1 7 45;
flesh/deity, ibid 1 7 55, Pnnc ii 6.3. So can do good or evil, Print 6 5, Lorenz
n 226, 235 Not by nature God, Cels n 9 init, cf. Princ ii 6. 5 Doesn't change its
(created?) essence Cels iv 18 For (ii): It is united to G o d by its free choice, Princ
ii 6, iv 4 4 (35413), Cels v 39; but its obedience has become second nature, Princ
ii 6 5; it is so fused that it need not be distinguished or separately named, Cels
vi 47, Princ iv 4 4 and tr 37; it is in substance divine, Princ ii.6 6 For the notion
of acquired substance or 'second nature' see my Divine Substance p 148 n 18
'Christusseele' 38
C Ar . i 38
, s

1 6

1 7

I shall deal r a t h e i b r i e f l y w i t h L o i e n z ' s t h i r d p o i n t H e detects

a n act o f a d o p t i o n i n t h e w e l l - k n o w n c o u p l e t f r o m A r i u s ' s Thalia:
a p % f j v x o v u i o v s0riKs i d i v yevvTiTuiv 6 a v a p ^ o t ;
K a i f i v e y K e v etc; t r i d v eautcp TOV8S t e K v o T r o i f j a a c ;
Urkunde 6 4.
'Christusseele' 38 n 223 O n time see R Williams Arius p 122 nn 55, 56;
also 'Christusseele' 38 n 218 ref Princ ii 9 1 p. 164 1, eiuvoouuevn 4pxn
Peter: Leontius of Byzantium c Monoph , Fr in Routh Rel Sacr iv.50.
Athanasius ad Epict. 8, Vit. Ant
74.
F r 15, de Riedmatten p roo. It was of course upheld by some later Arians
So Lorenz, 'Christusseele' 38 n 223.
1 8

1 9

2 0

21

2 2

34

A R I U S IN M O D E R N

A r g u m e n t n a t u r a l l y arises o n t w o p o i n t s : does TSKVOTTOIGVV m e a n

'to b e g e t ' o r ' t o a d o p t ' ? A n d does t h e c o u p l e t refer t o t w o separate
d i v i n e acts, or t o a s i n g l e act w i t h a d o u b l e d e s c r i p t i o n ? L o r e n z
t h i n k s that the first line denotes the begetting of the Son, and the
s e c o n d r e f e r s t o a s u b s e q u e n t act o f a d o p t i o n
But this interpreta t i o n is d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t e d b y a p h r a s e i n A l i u s ' letter to
A l e x a n d e r , Urkunde 6 3: t h e S o n r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r h i s l i f e
and being and his d i g n i t i e s , w h i c h the Father b r o u g h t i n t o being
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h h i m , t a t ; &6t,<xq fJuvuTcoaxficravTOt; auxtp xoo
Ttaxpoc,. O f c o u r s e t h e o l o g i a n s c a n be i n c o n s i s t e n t , as I have
s h o w n ; b u t I d o u b t i f A l i u s w o u l d have c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m s e l f at
this vital p o i n t i n a carefully phrased dogmatic letter.
2 3

T h e r e r e m a i n s t h e q u e s t i o n of P a u l o f S a m o s a t a W e m a y start
f r o m s o m e a c k n o w l e d g e d facts L u c i a n was h i g h l y r e g a r d e d b y
A r i u s a n d h i s s y m p a t h i z e r s . L u c i a n is d e s c r i b e d as a successor of
P a u l b y A l e x a n d e r o f A l e x a n d r i a ; t h o u g h t h i s r e p o r t lacks c o n f i r m a t i o n A r i u s is p o r t r a y e d b y A t h a n a s i u s as s h a r i n g t h e e r r o r s
o f P a u l , b u t w e have n o s u r v i v i n g s t a t e m e n t b y A r i u s i n his
favour.
M y d i f f i c u l t y i n f o l l o w i n g D r L o r e n z is t h a t at a c r u c i a l p o i n t
A r i u s seems t o have a g r e e d w i t h P a u l ' s accusers, r a t h e r t h a n w i t h
Paul himself Certainly we must n o t make the mistake of t h i n k i n g
t h a t , w h a t e v e r h i s accusers b e l i e v e d , P a u l a l w a y s t o o k t h e o p p o s i t e
v i e w T h e r e a r e , i n f a c t , several p o i n t s o f a g r e e m e n t
Paul's
accusers a p p a r e n t l y h e l d a p l u r a l i s t i c t h e o l o g y r e s e m b l i n g t h a t of
D i o n y s i u s o f A l e x a n d r i a . P a u l a g r e e d w i t h t h e m t o t h e e x t e n t of
m a k i n g t h e L o g o s a d i s t i n c t p e r s o n a l b e i n g , i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h the
divine W i s d o m , and substantially distinct f r o m the Father. T h e
m a i n p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t t h e accusers h e l d t h a t t h e d i v i n e
W i s d o m was s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h e m a n Jesus, or essentially
u n i t e d w i t h h i m P a u l c o m p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s was e q u i v a l e n t t o
m a k i n g t h e t w o i d e n t i c a l , so t h a t t h e h u m a n s u f f e r i n g s o f Jesus
i m p i n g e d i r e c t l y o n t h e d i v i n e W i s d o m . H e h i m s e l f d r e w a sharp
distinction between the divine Logos and the m a n b o r n of M a r y ;
y e t he p r o t e s t e d t h a t h e h a d a n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t of t h e i r u n i o n ,
w h i c h a v o i d e d t h e e r r o r of m a k i n g t h e m i d e n t i c a l T h e m a n Jesus
was n o t p i e - e x i s t e n t ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d h i s c o m i n g was foreseen
and appointed b y the Father
B u t t h i s s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e L o g o s a n d t h e m a n is
w h o l l y f o r e i g n to A r i u s ' t h o u g h t I f we t h i n k that he used the
h u m a n sufferings o f C h r i s t t o p r o v e the i n f e i i o r i t y of the Logos,
t h i s argues s o m e t h i n g l i k e a s u b s t a n t i a l u n i o n b e t w e e n t h e m ; we
2 3

Better in R. Williams Arius

p 102, n

40

RESEARCH

35

h a v e s h o w n t h a t h e d i d n o t use t h e s o u l , or t h e flesh, of C h r i s t as
a n e f f e c t i v e b a n i e r b e t w e e n t h e m ; t h i s is t h e t r u t h u n d e r l y i n g
E u s t a t h i u s ' c o m p l a i n t B u t t h e lack o f a n adequate d i s t i n c t i o n also
e x p l a i n s t h e f a c t t h a t i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o m i s i e p i e s e n t A r i u s as a
follower of Paul One of t h e m appeared t o believe i n a m a n guided
m e i e l y b y e x t e r n a l i n s p i r a t i o n ; t h e o t h e r i n a passible L o g o s t o o
m u c h e n t a n g l e d i n h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s . B o t h t h e n were accused,
though on totally different grounds, of making Christ a mere man
I have h a d t o p r e s e n t P a u l ' s o p i n i o n s b r i e f l y a n d d o g m a t i c a l l y ,
i n a f o r m a p p r o p r i a t e t o a l e c t u r e . I h a v e c o n s u l t e d t h e t e x t s as
p r e s e n t e d b y de R i e d m a t t e n , w h i c h I b e l i e v e t o be a u t h e n t i c ,
t h o u g h n o d o u b t selective
A n d I h a v e t r i e d t o a v o i d some
c o m m o n m i s c o n c e p t i o n s . I r e m e m b e r m y p u p i l s at O x f o r d asking
m e w h e t h e r I t h o u g h t P a u l a n a d o p t i o n i s t 01 a S a b e l l i a n T h e
answer I s h o u l d h a v e g i v e n is t h a t t h e s e are n o t t r u e a l t e r n a t i v e s ;
b u t b o t h are p o l e m i c a l s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h a i e e x t r e m e l y r e m o t e
f r o m t h e facts. P a u l n o d o u b t a t t a c h e d i m p o r t a n c e to t h e h u m a n
acts o f Jesus, i n s t e a d o f m a k i n g h i m a m e r e m o u t h p i e c e o f the
d i v i n e W i s d o m B u t he d i d n o t make h i m s i m p l y an i n s p i r e d man
P a u l ' s W i s d o m f i g u i e is a s u b s t a n t i a l b e i n g , she has a d i g n i t y
w h i c h m u s t be u p h e l d , she d w e l l s i n t h e m a n Jesus as i n a t e m p l e
O n c e these facts are a d m i t t e d , t h e c h a r g e o f S a b e l l i a n i s m also
collapses.
W h e i e t h e n does L u c i a n fit i n t o t h e p i c t u r e ? H e r e I a m less
certain; b u t I w i l l make a suggestion I start f r o m the f o l l o w i n g
facts A r i u s r e g a r d e d L u c i a n as a r e s p e c t e d teacher N e x t , the
v i e w s o f t h e L u c i a n i s t p a r t y s h o w s o m e r e s e m b l a n c e t o t h o s e of
P a u l ' s accusers. B u t t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y b i s h o p s o f A n t i o c h ,
P h i l o g o n i u s a n d E u s t a t h i u s , ar e o p p o s e d t o t h e L u c i a n i s t s , t h o u g h
t h e y are n o t , o f c o u r s e , p r e p a r e d to d e f e n d t h e m e m o r y o f P a u l .
A t s o m e t i m e , t h e n , t h e r e m u s t have b e e n a r e v e r s a l o f t h e o l o g i c a l
t r a d i t i o n at A n t i o c h . B u t w e d o n o t h e a i of a n y b r e a k i n the
e p i s c o p a l succession I t m a y b e , t h e i e f o i e , t h a t B i s h o p D o m n u s ,
w h o succeeded P a u l , was n o t a n o u t r i g h t o p p o n e n t , b u t a n u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l figure c a l c u l a t e d t o appeal t o m o d e r a t e m e n o n b o t h
sides T h i s w o u l d e x p l a i n w h y t h e a m b i t i o u s a n d i n f l u e n t i a l Paul
left b e h i n d h i m no strong b o d y of s y m p a t h i z e s , b u t o n l y a quite
i n s i g n i f i c a n t gr o u p o f P a u l i a n i s t s
2 4

For a telling defence see M

Simonetti 'Per la Rivalutazione di alcnni
Testimonianze su Paolo di Samosata', RSLR
24 (1988), 177-210. H e criticizes
M. Richard's attack on the reliability of the fragments, in 'Malchion et Paul de
Samosate, L e tmoinage d' Eusbe de Cesare', Eph Theol Lov 35 (1959), 325 ff
I hope to reinforce this criticism; see H C Brennecke et al (edd ), Logos, Festschrift
fur Luise Abramowski, Gottingen 1993, 14050
2 4

IV

36
A s for L u c i a n , i f he r e a l l y was e x c o m m u n i c a t e d for the duration
o f t h r e e episcopates, h i s f a l l m u s t h a v e t a k e n place v e r y soon after
P a u l ' s e x p u l s i o n W e m a y see h i m , t h e n , as a n u n c o m p r o m i s i n g
p l u r a l i s t , s t r o n g l y opposed t o P a u l , w h o w a s c o n d e m n e d because
h e r e f u s e d t o accept t h e p o l i c y o f peace a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n B y
r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m as a successor t o P a u l , B i s h o p A l e x a n d e r means
no m o r e t h a n t h a t he was t h e n e x t p r o m i n e n t troublemaker
A l e x a n d e r n e e d e d t o g a i n t h e s u p p o r t o f E u s t a t h i u s a n d h i s allies,
w h o w o u l d n o t altogether approve o f his p l u r a l i s t i c T r i n i t y , w i t h
i t s b a r e l y - c o n c e a l e d d o c t r i n e o f t h r e e hypostases; so h e takes t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f f r o m t w o teachers w h o m
E u s t a t h i u s is sure t o d i s l i k e B u t w e n e e d n o t accept h i s i n s i n u a t i o n
t h a t t h e t w o a g r e e d w i t h each o t h e r

Was Ar ius a Neoplatonist?*

2 5

Dr. R o w a n W i l l i a m s is h i g h l y respected b o t h as a theological scholar and as

a master o f Christian spirituality; he has added to his distinction b y accepting
the B i s h o p r i c o f M o n m o u t h ; he is moreover a personal friend, w h o has done
me the honour o f dedicating to m e his b o o k o n A r i u s , published i n 1987 a n d
w i d e l y regarded as the best overall study o f that much maligned theologian, I t
is therefore w i t h some hesitance that I undertake to criticize a theory p r o pounded i n that book, namely that A l i u s was influenced b y Neoplatonist
thinkers, i n c l u d i n g Plotinus, P o r p h y r y and l a m b l i c h u s , besides Anatolius a n d
others I must appeal t o Proverbs 2 7 : 6 ' F a i t h f u l are the wounds o f a f r i e n d ' ,
recalling A r i s t o t l e ' s p a i n f u l resolve to c r i t i c i z e his f r i e n d s ' convictions (N..E
1.6) I t is unnecessary t o add that Dr. W i l l i a m s himself is a splendid exemplar
of controversy conducted w i t h courtesy and i m p a r t i a l judgement.
1

I n a r g u i n g t h i s case, I h a v e d i v e r g e d a l i t t l e f r o m m y p r i n c i p a l
t h e m e . M y p u r p o s e has b e e n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l estimate
o f A r i u s is t h e r i g h t o n e H i s m a i n c o n c e r n w a s t o u p h o l d t h e
u n i q u e d i g n i t y o f G o d t h e F a t h e r i n t h e face o f a t t e m p t s t o g l o r i f y
t h e L o g o s , as h e t h o u g h t , u n d u l y . T h i s i n t e r e s t is a b u n d a n t l y
a t t e s t e d i n h i s s u r v i v i n g f r a g m e n t s I t is a l l o w a b l e , i f rather
s t r a i n e d , t o say t h a t h i s m a i n i n t e r e s t w a s C h r i s t o l o g y . B u t t h e
i d e a t h a t h e w a s m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d t o p r o p o u n d an exemplar ist
t h e o r y o f s a l v a t i o n f i n d s l i t t l e or n o s u p p o r t i n h i s s u r v i v i n g
f r a g m e n t s I v e n t u r e t o t h i n k t h a t w e have seen t h e e n d o f a m o s t
interesting episode i n t h e h i s t o r y o f A r i a n scholarship; a n d that
after D r L o r e n z n o scholar o f e q u a l d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l c o m e f o r w a r d
to support this theory

The book was foreshadowed b y an article published i n the Journal of Theological Studies for A p r i l 1983, pp. 56-81, entitled "The L o g i c of A r i a n i s m ' T h e
t w o presentations agree i n the m a i n ; and a reference to the article made early i n
the book (p 31) may be quoted as an introduction to W i l l i a m s ' thesis, as i t is
entirely typical o f his blend of cautious assertion w i t h b o l d theorizing. ' L i k e w i s e ' ,
he writes, although (Arius) is described as a skilled dialectician , w e cannot w i t h
confidence reconstruct a philosophical education I f he was, as has been argued'
i n the article, of course 'indebted to certain currents i n revived Aristotelianism and lamblichus' version o f Neoplatonism, he could have encountered
such teaching i n Syria around 300, when lamblichus himself was teaching at
A n t i o c h and Apamea' This, however modestly propounded, is a startling h y p o thesis; i t suggests that A r i u s , whose philosophical education is considered u n certain, consulted lamblichus, whereas his contemporary Eusebius, w h o is w e l l
k n o w n as a student o f Greek philosophy, never even mentions lamblichus either
i n his Praeparatio Evanglica or i n any other w o r k that I can discover
2

I agree with Bardy (Lucien 48) in seeing Lucian as an opponent of Paul, and
in not pressing the sense of Alexander's 8ia8sauevoc; (Urkunde 14 36) to indicate
a formal succession (Lucien p 51 n 66); but I see no need to imagine two Lucians,
which would rob Alexander's remark of its point in seeking to discredit a teacher
revered by his Arian opponents
2 5

Part of this paper has already appeared in a Spanish version in D Ramos-Lisson et al (edd ),
El Dilogo Fe-Cultura en la Antigedad Cristiana (Pamplona. 1995), the record of a symposium
held there under the auspices of the Faculty of Theology I am most grateful both for their generous hospitality and for permission to print
' Arius Heresy and Tradition By Rowan Williams (London 1987)
The evidence is late: Socrates, H.E , 1.5, Sozomen, HE, 15.. Perhaps more significant is
Constantine's reference to his profession of belief 'worked out in bold and extremely detailed
terms', o-ofSapwc; root; icai \xXa Kpipok; ^ncncT|uva, Opitz Urk 34, 8.
2

40

Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?

The article puts forward three points i n favour of Neoplatonic influence o n

A l i u s , each of them based o n a phrase to w h i c h he took exception The fust, at
p. 5 8 , turns on the description o f the Son as 'integral to his Father's substance',
xr\q xou Ttaxpoc; ouatac; 1610c;, w h i c h in Anus* opinion as Williams presents it
w o u l d reduce the Son to a mere impersonal property or attribute The second, at
p 6 3 , springs from the phrase uepoc; 6u.ooucn.ov, where Williams adduces a
parallel in Iamblichus de mysteriis, illustrating the objectionable view that both
Son and Father participate i n a prior divine ousia, w h i c h thus would be divisible
and negate the divine simplicity This objection is w e l l k n o w n ; but the suggested
parallel drawn f r o m Iamblichus is new and surprising The third point i n the
article, at p 6 6 . begins from A n u s ' protest against the doctrine that Father and Son
are equal i n rank, w h i c h he says w o u l d result i n t w o ingenerate'beings, 8i>o dyevv u x a Williams discusses this i n relation to the concept o f participation, u s x o x f l ,
as expounded by Aristotelian scholars; but I must postpone any detailed analysis
The book does not reproduce the first t w o arguments that I have mentioned,
though i t refers to t h e m and makes i t clear that W i l l i a m s was prepared to
u p h o l d i n 1 9 8 7 the conclusions he had put out i n 1 9 8 3 I n their place we f i n d
t w o n e w suggestions The first begins w i t h an excellent review o f ancient
theories o f creation, and o f the Son's role i n i t W i l l i a m s adverts to the term
Suae,, the D y a d , as applied to the Son, and tries to explain i t b y c i t i n g numerological treatises b y Anatolius and Iamblichus I t h i n k this is far-fetched, and
prefer simpler explanations The second argument discusses the relation
between G o d and his Logos, and i n particular the Son's l i m i t e d knowledge o f
the Father, w i t h A n u s ' surprising comment that the Son does not k n o w his o w n
ousia, let alone the Father's Here W i l l i a m s finds a background i n Plotinus'
f i f t h Ennead; once again I remain unconvinced
3

In the third place the b o o k contains a chapter headed ' A n a l o g y and Particip a t i o n ' , w h i c h developes the t h i r d argument already presented i n the article
W e m a y say that W i l l i a m s ' argument for Neo-platonic influence o n A r i u s is
presented under f i v e headings, and i t w i l l be convenient to discuss them i n the
f o l l o w i n g order: ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) , the first t w o points f r o m the article; ( 3 ) and (4),
the first t w o points f r o m the b o o k ; and lastly, the concluding point f r o m b o t h
w o r k s , w h i c h correspond closely enough to allow o f a single discussion
( 1 ) W i l l i a m s begins b y n o t i n g that A r i u s condemned the phrase ioioc; ir\q
ouaiac;, w h i c h he says was 'current i n Alexander's c i r c l e ' as applied to the
Logos I t w o u l d , he says, present the Logos as an idion o f the Father i n terms
of A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , and thus reduce h i m to a mere impersonal property.
W i l l i a m s names Porphyry's hagoge as a l i k e l y source for this deduction, and
adds the comment ' G i v e n A r i u s ' reputation for expertise i n l o g i c , i t seems perfectly possible that he was familiar w i t h the hagoge'*

I agree that the phrase was current i n Alexander's c i r c l e : but I d o not t h i n k

it originates w i t h Alexander I t is n o t found i n his s u r v i v i n g texts Moreover
Alexander seems concerned to m i n i m i z e the difference between the Father a n d
the Son w h i l e emphasizing the real distinction between them They are x f j
bnoaxdoei
Suo <pt>asic/\ but the S o n is exactly l i k e the Father (|i(pepfjc;) ,
l a c k i n g only the attribute &yevvr|xoc; T h e epithet tSioc; of course appears,
notably in 3 2 w h i c h cites Romans 8 : 3 2 B u t tStoc; xf\c, ouaiac, is especially
characteristic o f Athanasius, and consorts w i t h his profoundly suggestive b u t
m u c h less l o g i c a l v i e w w h i c h recognize the distinctness o f the L o g o s as S o n
but also makes h i m integral to God's being as his Wisdom. Alexander no doubt
c o u l d accept such teaching; but his o w n emphasis is perceptibly different.
6

It seems to me, rather, that the phrase embodies a reaction against A r i u s '
formulations, real or supposed; a reversal o f W i l l i a m s ' explanation Arius w r o t e
in his Thalia the words: tStov ouSev e ^ s i t o o Oeou K a 9 ' UTtoaxamv iSioxnxoc;,
an e n i g m a t i c phrase to w h i c h w e must r e t u r n Alexander paraphrases t h i s
sentence i n 1 3 of his letter *H tpiXapxoc;: ouxs y a p tpuast uioc; xic; axt x o u
0 e o u , 9 a a i v , ouxe xivd e x w v ISioxTixa npbc, auxov, and the same charge is
often repeated b y Athanasius i n looser and more polemical expressions, as i n
c. AY. 1 6 , 6 Xoyoc; dAAoxpioc; p e v K & I dvournoc; Kaxd Jtdvxa xfjc, x o u
Traxpdc; ouaiac; K a i ISIOTTIXOC; a x i v The words d v o p o i o c , . . xrjc; . ouaiac;
read l i k e a response to A r i u s ' next f o l l o w i n g line ouSe ydp a x i v looq, a\,\*
ouSs 6 u o o u a t o c ; auxto
So far f have been presenting a f a i r l y minor disagreement w i t h W i l l i a m s o n
the o r i g i n of the phrase 1810c, xfjc; ouaiac. The case i s very d i f f e r e n t when I
t u r n to his comments o n the adjective 1810c; together w i t h its neuter form t S t o v
or xo i'8tov; for his argument is gravely weakened b y a failure to distinguish
between them. O n ISioc; he writes as f o l l o w s : "The point is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d :
d i v i n e properties are eternal and impersonal O f course G o d 'has' aocpia a n d
A-oyoc;, but they are qualities belonging to his substance Thus to say that t h e
Son is iSioc, to G o d is to reduce the Son t o being an impersonal quality
A r i u s , i n short, is quite clear about the meaning of iStoc;; i t relates only to a
q u a l i t y predicated o f a substance' W i l l i a m s then refers to P o i p h y r y ' s hagoge,
where he says A r i u s c o u l d have f o u n d a discussion of the meaning of iStoc;,
' m a k i n g i t abundantly clear that iSioc; cannot be used o f something which is a
substance i n its o w n r i g h t ' ; moreover a debt t o Porphyry m i g h t account f o r
Constantine's reference to the A r i a n s as ' P o r p h y r i a n s '
8

W i l l i a m s does not make it quite clear whether he h i m s e l f accepts the extraordinary doctrine that he attributes t o P o r p h y r y and A r i u s O f course 1810c;,

Op cil p 31, cf 189 196,223

llh S n s 34 (1983), p 60

4 1

Letter H (pUctpxo^, in Opitz Utk 14, 38; cf 15, 16, 52

Ibid. 4 7 : cf 38
Ibid 19; cf 47
I ThS 34 pp 59-60; cf Opitz Urk 33.

42

Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?

being an adjective, does not ordinarily name a substance; but i t is normally 'used
o f a substance' when i t is applied to a substance; w e need l o o k no further man
Romans 8:32, 'God spared not his o w n S o n ' ; and the N e w Testament provides
many other examples; i n St M a t t h e w alone w e find 'his o w n c i t y ' , 'his o w n
country', 'his o w n field', 'his o w n slaves' There is no evidence whatever that
A l i u s would have rejected this usage
W i l l i a m s , then, has misled us b y careless formulation The adjective iStoq
is essential to his argument, w h i c h begins f r o m the phrase I'Siog tfjc; oucrlag
B u t he assumes that Porphyry's use o f i t is dictated b y what he says about its
neuter f o r m TO i S t o v . H e refers to P o r p h y r y ' s Isagoge;
but the connection
with 'impersonal qualities' is made b y turning to another work, where equality,
TO I'CTOV, is said to be an i S i o v o f the category of quantity . T h i s , I concede, is
a quality: but if W i l l i a m s had followed up the hagoge passage a l i t t l e further,
he would have found Porphyry giving examples of the i S i a of mankind,
namely laughter, and turning grey-haired i n o l d age. These appear to be,
respectively, an activity and a passive affection: i t would be a misuse o f language to call them impersonal qualities.
9

A r i u s does i n fact use the neuter form t 5 i o v i n the Thalia

mentioned:

verse already

LOIOV otj8ev s^ei -coo 9eoi) K<X9' unooraorv ISiornTOC,

ou5e yap taxiv icroi;,
ou8e &uoo6o"io<; aoxcp
I am not sure about the meaning of KtzG UTtoaxaatv iSiOTnroc;. I t might conceivably be used metri gratia i n place of Kax 18tOTr|Ta UTtoCTTaaecuc;, which
would make good sense
I t seems to be an attempt to clarify the sense of
1810V B u t i t is plain that A l i u s objects to the t e r m i n this context for reasons
almost exactly contrary to those deduced by W i l l i a m s . A r i u s does not think i t
would degrade the Son b y reducing h i m to an impersonal quality, but rather
that i t would honour h i m unduly b y promoting h i m to equality with the Father.
That is w h y he continues ouSe ydp c m v taoq, &W ou8s d p o o u a i o c ; aura).

43

be some force i n this d e n i a l ; and there w o u l d be no force at all i f the items i n

question were mere impersonal attributes I f glories are to be inherited, they
must be real and substantial
T w o further point before w e close this rather l o n g discussion. First, an
Alexandrian writer c o u l d easily have based his use o f i S t o v on Clement, w h o
knows Aristotle's Topics and conforms to its usage ; there is no need to appeal
to Porphyry A n d secondly, theologians can b o r r o w the logicians' terminology
w i t h o u t adopting then doctrines Athanasius, for example, can say that i t is the
property o f created beings to choose between alternatives; i t is the property o f
bodies to be emptied and f i l l e d ; i t is the property o f Christians to be beaten .
The i d i o m is rhetorical; Athanasius does not seriously mean that n o one but a
Christian ever gets beaten, but rather that they often suffer this fate
11

12

M o r e generally, whether something is to be categorized as a q u a l i t y or n o t

depends largely o n the w r i t e r ' s intentions. T a k e the accepted d e f i n i t i o n of m a n
as 'a two-footed animal capable o f laughter' ' A n i m a l ' is the summum
genus;
'two-footed' defines a sub-class of i t ; but 'capable o f laughter' is the i o f o v ,
the q u a l i t y w h i c h belongs to m a n universally and uniquely, omni et solo B u t
i n describing i t thus, h o w extremely remote one is f r o m the reality under
r e v i e w , f r o m the i n f i n i t e l y variable performance w h i c h we c a l l 'a sense o f
h u m o u r ' , w h i c h involves b o t h action and response, f o r one can both m a k e
jokes and be amused b y t h e m ; n o t f o r g e t t i n g the category of quantity, since
everyone k n o w s that a good j o k e can be spoiled b y being overdone.

10

Our o n l y other evidence for A r i u s ' use o f 18101; is found i n his Letter to
Alexander, 2, where he states that the Father brought his Son into existence
I8icp 8eXfju.aTi, b y an act o f w i l l , whatever impersonal qualities may have
determined i t B u t A r i u s makes i t abundantly clear i n the same letter that he
does not think o f the divine properties as 'impersonal' The Son was 'created
b y the w i l l o f G o d before times and ages, and received f r o m his Father his l i f e
and being, and his glories, w h i c h the Father brought into substantial existence
along with h i m ' , auvoTrooTfjoavTOc; auTcp T O D TtaTpoc; H e adds that 'the
Father gave h i m the inheritance of all things without depriving himself of his
o w n unoriginate possessions' (cbv dyevvfjTcot; %ei v auTcp) B u t there must

10

Porphyry, Comm. on Arist. Categories C A G IV ed A. Busse p

See e g Porphyry Sent 33. p 37.23 Lamberz

115

A r i u s , then, wrote that the Son has n o t h i n g proper to G o d i n the real sense
of ' p r o p e r t y ' His intention is to indicate mysteries and glories i n the Father
w h i c h are u n k n o w n even to the Son. W e m a y dislike this d o c t r i n e ; but w e
should not c o m m e n d our dislike b y attacking the f o r m o f expression . Arius is
using a logician's short-hand that is allowable i n its proper context. We have
j u s t observed Dr W i l l i a m s w r i t i n g i n a s i m i l a r v e i n ; and no one, I trust, w i l l
dismiss Dr W i l l i a m s as an arid l o g i c i a n
I do not propose this as a conclusive demonstration, since the logicians
themselves were capable o f rhetorical and tendentious argument; nevertheless
I s u b m i t that so far w e have f o u n d no p r o o f that A r i u s was affected b y
Porphyrian l o g i c A n d there is another reason to doubt this suggestion Porp h y r y ' s l o g i c a l w o r k s ate not cited either b y Eusebius or by the A l e x a n d r i a n
philosopher Alexandet of L y c o p o l i s , though b o t h o f them k n o w his De Ab~
stinentia, nor again b y Methodius W h a t reason have w e to t h i n k that A r i u s
was better informed?
(2) T h i s first section of W i l l i a m s ' paper has required painstaking examination.
The second, I tfiink, can be more briefly considered W i l l i a m s refers to the phrase
pepoc; &u.oouoaov, w h i c h A r i u s rejects i n his credal letter, and comments,

II

1 2

Str 1 168.3, p. 105 5; 8.21 2, p 93 3

Oral 1 52; Hist Ai 41

V
Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?

44
correctly, that it was suspect because of its materializing implications Whatever grace or sonship the Father confers o n any other being cannot be viewed
as a material substance w h i c h issues f r o m G o d and passes to them, i f God is
k n o w n to be simple and i n d i v i s i b l e
W i l l i a m s then notes that the t e r m uooucjiot; appears i n Iamblichus, and
suggests, very tentatively, that Iamblichus also m a y have influenced A n u s He
refers to a passage discussing d i v i n e insphation. C o u l d this be regarded as a
process i n w h i c h d i v i n e inspiration mixes or amalgamates itself w i t h the soul?
N o , i t is r e p l i e d ; for i f some one t h i n g is composed out o f t w o , this is always
u n i f o r m and connatural and consubstantial B u t the d i v i n i t y , w h i c h is 'uncombinable', d u u c x o v , c o u l d not amalgamate w i t h the s o u l
13

I do not find this parallel c o n v i n c i n g , for several reasons:

(i) The context is d i f f e r e n t : d i v i n e generation i n A r i u s , divine insphation of a
soul in Iamblichus; both misleadingly compared, but to two contrary processes;
d i v i s i o n i n one case, amalgamation i n the other .
( i i ) Iamblichus does not use the term upoc;, w h i c h is crucial to A r i u s ' argument
' O u o o u r j i o c ; is a sort o f makeweight, used b y the opposite party to strengthen
then case; for it w o u l d be ridiculous to t h i n k o f the Son as a ppoc; o f the
Father w h i c h was not p o o m o v , like a l i n e , say, w h i c h is part o f a triangle
but is not a plane f i g u r e
( i i i ) I t seems unnecessary to b r i n g i n Iamblichus, for the docttine that i n corporeal substance is i n d i v i s i b l e has a v e r y long history. I t goes back, presumably, to the puzzle propouned i n Plato's Parmenides
( h o w can an Idea be
related to its m u l t i p l e instances?) and the subsequent analysis o f absolute
U n i t y This concept is taken up by Philo, Moderatus, A l b i n u s , Numenius and
Clement, contrasting either w i t h a dyad or w i t h an inferior u n i t y , and is v i v i d l y
characterized by O r i g e n De Principiis,
especially 1.2.6, ' W e must take care
not to f a l l into the absurd fables o f those w h o imagine for themselves certain
emanations, splitting the d i v i n e nature i n t o parts and d i v i d i n g G o d the Father';
and 4 4.4, Tt is impossible to speak o f a part of what is incorporeal, or make
any division of i t ' Moreover the same point is made by Alexander o f Lycopolis
as an objection against the Manichees' docttine o f a divine power analogous to
the L o g o s : " I f i t is part of G o d , then . they make out G o d to be composite
and corporeal; but this is absurd and i m p o s s i b l e '
A n d i t is precisely as a
Manichean doctrine that A r i u s rejects the phrase upoc; u o o m o v
14

Turning now to the points made i n the book: the first and second of them
have something i n c o m m o n W i l l i a m s attempts to explain A r i u s ' contentions
by c i t i n g parallels f r o m Neoplatonic writers, i n one case P o r p h y r y , in the other
Iamblichus The passages adduced are correctly interpreted, and have a certain

illustrative value. But they b y no means p r o v e , or even suggest, that Arius was
influenced by N e o p l a t o n i s m ; for i n both cases we c a n offer a n alternative
explanation w h i c h avoids this assumption
(3) W e begin at p 191 o f the b o o k , where W i l l i a m s introduces the puzzling
line f r o m the Thalia: a u v e c ; o x i f| jiovdc; f j v , f j Suae; 8' O U K f i v Ttptv u n a p c ^ :
i n W i l l i a m s ' Y o u should understand that the M o n a d (always) w a s , but the
D y a d was not before it came to b e ' . W i l l i a m s refers to m y o w n account o f the
term Suae; , w h i c h I still think was basically correct, but w h i c h admits of better
presentation. I w i l l b r i e f l y outline the background T h e Neoplatonic use o f
povctt; and SuctQ derives from the antithesis attributed to Plato by Theophrastus
and other commentators between the One and the 'Indefinite D y a d ' ; the One,
or the U n i t , functions as a measure; the D y a d i s a second or derivative power,
and also a d u a l i t y ; it represents those aspects of our experience w h i c h are
unquantified, and therefore can be either m o r e or less; accordingly it stands
for the indefinite m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the w o r l d ' s constituents w h i c h issue f r o m
their p r i m a l source Philo identifies the Suae; w i t h t o y s v o u e v o v , a s opposed
to the uov&c,, w h i c h is 6 jtSTtotnKcbc; (masculine, N B ) ; he describes it a s
etKcbv JtaSnTTjt; itdi Siaipexfjc; uXr\c, B u t a c o m p l i c a t i o n was introduced b y
the later recognition that there are t w o possible concepts of the M o n a d a
theory that was deduced f r o m Plato's Parmenides
namely a One that i s
pure s i m p l i c i t y and a One w h i c h i s essentially m u l t i p l e ; applied to theology,
this appears as a distinction between a first and a second God, w h i c h is w e l l
k n o w n f r o m its appearance i n N u m e n i u s and Origen Numenius does not h i m self use Suae; to denote the second G o d i n any s u r v i v i n g fragment; the w o r d
appears o n l y once, identified w i t h matter in the manner o f P h i l o
But he
certainly holds that there is a secondary G o d w h o is also a duality; so i n fragment
16/25 reproduced by Eusebius 6 y d p Ssutspoc; Sixxdc; <BV a u t o T t o t e t xfjv i s
iSeav feauxou K a i x d v KOCTUOV Festugiere therefore is certainly r i g h t i n seeing
the closest possible c o n n e c t i o n between N u m e n i u s and f r a g m e n t 8 of t h e
Chaldean Oracles preserved by Proems: Suae; Ttapd xcp8e KCtSnxai auxpoxspov
15

16

1 8

19

yap

16

ITh S. art. cit. pp. 63-6

Alex L y c p. 24 Brinkmann; see An Alexandrian Platonist (etc.), ed P W
and I Mansfeld (Leiden. 1974), p 80; ed A. Villey (Paris, 1985), p 77
14

1 7

van der Horst

g j t s i , vco p e v

Kaxex

l v

v o n x d . a i a O n a t v 8' j r d y s t v KOCTUOIC;

w h i c h expresses both his secondary position (for i n fr 7 he appears a s 'second

m i n d ' ) and his dual role i n cosmology A n d we c a n recognize this dual r o l e
in the A r i a n L o g o s , though admittedly it is not expressed i n a single antithesis,
for he both g l o r i f i e s the Father and attends to the created world. I w o u l d n o t
assert that A r i u s k n e w the Chaldean
Oracles; but since most of the s u r v i v i n g
fragments o f N u m e n i u s are preserved by Eusebius they could have reached

1 5

45

IR

1 9

flh S. ns. 15 (I960), p 19

W D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951) pp 184-5.
Somn ii 70, Spec Leg. iii 180
Fr. 11 des Places, 1 15.
La Rvlation d'Herms Trismgiste iii (Paris, 1953), pp 55-6

V
Was Alius a Neoplatonist ?

46
Axius directly, quite apart f r o m some indirect influence mediated by Origen. I n
either case appeal to the Neoplatonic arithmetic is unnecessary, i f not positively
misleading Consider this passage f r o m Iamblichus Theologoumena
Arithmeticae
p 9: Soctc; X e y c x a t rcapd t o 8 u s v a i K a i SiaTtopeueaGat: 7tpd)TT| y a p fj Suae;
8textbpto"v a d x h v K xfjc; u.ovd8oc;, o 0 e v K a i x o X p a K a X s t x a t , and so on.
I translate: 'The D y a d is so called because o f its " d i a d y c t i c " and penetrative
p o w e r ; for the D y a d was the f i r s t to separate itself f r o m the M o n a d , whence
indeed i t is called self-assertion' I need n o t emphasize the contrast between
this d i v i s i v e self-originating power and the A r i a n L o g o s , evoked f r o m nothing
b y his Father's w i l l and addressed i n the words ' T h o u art m y Son, this day
have I begotten thee'
(4) The f o l l o w i n g section of the book, entided 'Intellect and B e y o n d ' , is an
extended discussion o f the r o l e o f intellect i n the universe, including the
distinction between a primary intellect identified as its first principle and a
secondary intellect, the divine L o g o s
O n p p 208-9 W i l l i a m s discusses A r i u s '
v i e w s on the Son's knowledge o f the Father. A r i u s appears to contradict h i m self; on the one hand he argues for a positive though l i m i t e d knowledge
Thalia 14, 15, 31 W based o n the Father's self-knowledge ( 1 4 ) ; o n the
other he says (35, 36) ' I t is impossible for h i m to search out the mysteries of
the Father
for the Son does (even) k n o w his o w n substance ( o u o i a ) ; thus
(39) 'He cannot k n o w b y comprehension sv KaxaXntj/ei the one w h o
gave h i m b i r t h ' A c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m s the Son's ignorance of his o w n oucria
'has l o n g been a puzzle' (p 2 0 9 ) ; and he proposes to explain the contradiction
b y c i t i n g Plotinus 5.3 7, w h i c h admittedly bears some resemblance to A r i u s '
words
20

Nevertheless we need not i n v o k e Plotinus, for a far simpler explanation

lies ready to hand I t is to be f o u n d in Bishop Alexander's letter ' H (ptXapxoc,,
2 0 , 2 1 . Alexander asks, h o w can any sane man explain the hypostasis of
the Logos? The prophetic Spirit refers to it, saying ' W h o shall declare his
generation?' (Is. 5 3 : 8 ) ; and the Saviour himself, i n h i s kindness towards the
Saints, r e l i e v e s them of any responsibility for such knowledge, saying that i t is
naturally incomprehensible to them all ( j r a a t [ v ]
auxoic; dipocriKdv eiq KaxdA,n y t v ) , a m y s t e i y k n o w n only to the Father; he then quotes a N e w Testament
text i d e n t i f i e d b y Opitz as M a t t 11:27, but i n r e a l i t y closer to its parallel at
L u k e 1 0 : 2 2 ; Alexander's w o r d i n g i s : ouSeu; y a p eyvco xxq e a x t v 6 uloc, c i
urf 6 Ttaxfjp, K d t x o v T t a x e p a o68sic; syvcoKcv s i
6 uioc;. Recalling the
same text at 4 7 , he reverses the order of the t w o clauses, but retains L u k e ' s
xicj 0 x 1 f o r m u l a t i o n i n both cases
The text presents problems w h i c h had long been r e c o g n i z e d : Christian
theology w o u l d come to a stand i f we had absolutely no k n o w l e d g e of the Son,
21

and y e t had to depend upon the Son for our k n o w l e d g e of the Father The
solution must be that we have a degree of k n o w l e d g e sufficient for our needs,
but not exact or comprehensive k n o w l e d g e A n d both Alexander and A r i u s
t h i n k along these lines; they both introduce the Stoic t e r m KaxdXrpj/n; to i n dicate the complete understanding that we cannot attain I n other respects, o f
course, they differ. Alexander says that the Son's hypostasis is 'not naturally
comprehensible' (dcpuatKOv etc; KaxdA,ri\|/iv) to anyone but the Father, since
he holds that the Son exactly resembles the Father; he tactfully omits any
q u a l i f y i n g clause to the effect that our ignorance of the Son cannot be absolute. A n d A r i u s is also concerned w i t h the Son's hypostasis, and is indebted
to the same L u c a n text; its opening words Ttdvxa p o t rtapsSoBrj 6no x o u
Ttaxpoq u o u are recalled i n his Letter to Alexander, 5, r t a p d t o o 9eou
xd
Ttdvxa auxtp 7tape860q Arius is concerned to stress the absolute transcendence
o f the Father; and since the Lucan text asserts that only the Father knows ' w h o
the Son i s ' , xic; c m , it is a simple deduction that even the Son has mysteries
w h i c h he cannot explain i v KaxaX.f|\|/et He cannot exactly comprehend either
his Father or his origination or his o w n being, his oucria. There is no need,
therefore, to appeal to Plotinus
(5) I turn n o w to W i l l i a m s ' last p o i n t , set out in I I I of the paper and e x panded i n Part I I I Section C o f the b o o k , entitled ' A n a l o g y and Participation'
A c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m s ' " P a r t i c i p a t i o n " is p r i m a r i l y the w o r d used by Plato
to designate the relation existing between f o r m s or ideas and p a r t i c u l a r s ' ;
he means, of course, that particulars participate i n the forms, but not vice versa.
B u t A r i s t o t l e denied such f o r m s ; and his successors, w e are t o l d , redefine
participation to denote a relationship between equal members o f the same
species. 'Substantial participation, then', says W i l l i a m s , 'is understood by tire
third-century writers we have mentioned in a " l a t e r a l " rather than a " v e r t i c a l "
sense' This leads h i m to make the useful point that not only 6 p o o o a i o c ; b u t
6JIOIO6CTIOC; c o u l d suggest that ' G o d ' is the name of a genus w h i c h has several
members
H e then refers to the A r i s t o t e l i a n commentators Alexander o f
Aphrodisias and P o r p h y r y , suggesting that i t was they w h o put the so-called
'lateral' sense o f participation i n t o c o m m o n usage
22

23

24

W i l l i a m s offers no concrete evidence to suggest that his proposed redefinition

influenced Christian writers Alexander 's relevance m i g h t yet be arguable; b u t
the evidence taken f r o m Porphyry can be dismissed at once, as i t rests on a sheer
mistranslation . W i l l i a m s makes h i m say that i f A and B participate, then they
are equal. W h a t he actually says is that i f A and B participate in a third thing, C,
then they participate equally i f C is a species or a genus, but may participate
unequally i f C is an accident (hagoge, p 17.6, cf. 22.9-10); thus Socrates a n d

1 1

2 0

21

See PGL s v vout; F 3 a, Son as voOc."

S e e e g EusebiusDem Ev 5.1.25-6

47

2 4

JTkS
34, p 67
Ibid p. 68
Ibid , p 70.

V
Was Alius a Neoplatonist ?

48
Callias must be equally men, b u t need not be equally wise. This is simply a
version of Aristotle's w e l l - k n o w n d i c t u m that substance does n o t admit of
degrees Moreover Porphyry clearly sets aside Aristotle's view o f participation
as ' a n empty metaphor' and continues to use i t its Platonic sense
The w h o l e argument needs to be reconsidered. First, the distinction between
t w o senses of p e x s x s t v and its cognates does n o t originate w i t h Platonic metaphysics and its detractors, as W i l l i a m s appears to suggest M e x e x s t v is prePlatonic, and is used w i t h a genitivus rei, for instance by Theognis and
Herodotus; and u.sxoxo<; likewise. The looser sense of pxxoxoc; to mean simply
'partner', w i t h a personal genitive to mean 'someone's partner', appears i n the
t h i r d century B.C., according to B a u e r ; b u t the most s t r i k i n g case is the L X X
version o f Psalm 4 4 ( 4 5 ) ; 3, w h i c h is quoted at Hebrews 1:9: S i d xouxo
8"Xpic>sv ~ soc;, 6 6s6<; a o u , e X a t o v dyaXXtcoaecoi; Ttapd xouc; jxexoxoui;
a o u . T h e j i e x o x o t here may be seen as companions o f inferior rank, but they
clearly do n o t participate i n the authority o f the prince as their ideal exemplar;
and i n L u k e 5 : 7 , KCU Kaxevsucrav xotc; p c x o x o i c ; v xcp sxepcp TtXoicp, w e
translate quite naturally 'they beckoned to their partners', w h o are fishermen
o f equal rank I t f o l l o w s , fust, that Aristotle does not use j i e x e x e i v t o denote a
relation between equals, but rather i n its Platonic sense, to express his criticism of
Plato; and Porphyry f o l l o w s suit Secondly, that what W i l l i a m s calls 'horizontal
participation' was expressed i n texts that were familiar to the C h u r c h almost
f r o m its outset
25

26

27

A s the distinction of t w o senses does not originate i n philosophical discussion,

I w o u l d prefer to contrast them by the p u r e l y f o r m a l point that one is s y m metrical, the other is not. I f A is B ' s partner, then B must be A ' s ; but i f A or
B engage i n an activity C, then C does not engage i n them St Paul says that
' w e all partake of one bread'; w e a l l eat this bread, b u t w e ourselves are not
eaten
I t seems, then, that a reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias is n o t needed t o
explain the facts as presented. T h e hypothesis that Aristotelian commentators
c o u l d have influenced Christian thought i n the early f o u r t h century w o u l d be
hard to disprove; but w e can surely establish that i t is most unlikely. W e can
reflect that the A r i s t o t e l i a n commentators examined their master's works w i t h

Categg 5, 3 b 33, 4 a 9
The distinction between substantial and accidental participation should be noticed It is found
both in Alexander and in Porphyry But I have not found it in Christian writers Athanasius at least
assumes that 'participation' indicates an unstable and impermanent relation; thus (IETOIXTCC is
regularly contrasted with ooia The contrast is found in the literature relating to Paul of Samosata;
see H. de Riedmatten, Les Actes du Procs de Paul de Samosate (Paradosis 6; Fribourg, 1952),
p. 149f (S. 25): Tu vero videris mihi secundum hoc nolle compositionem fateri ut non substantia
sit in eo Filius Dei sed sapiemia secundum participationem Cf. also S 31, p 155. and esp
S 36. p. 157, 11 4-10.
2 5

2 6

2 7

W Bauer. Griechisch-deutsches Wrterhuch des NI, etc (6th edn . 1988)

49

the same patient and meticulous care as Christians devoted to the B i b l e ; there
is no sign that Christians examined even A r i s t o t l e ' s o w n w o r k s i n this fashion,
let alone the commentators upon h i m I n particular Eusebius, the most learned
scholar of his generation, k n o w s and quotes P o r p h y r y , b u t never once refers t o
his l o g i c a l w o r k s , n o t even the Isagoge
A n d as for Alexander, Eusebius
quotes his i n f l u e n t i a l De Fato; b u t so far f r o m citing his commentaries, he
never even mentions their existence.
I t remains nevertheless t o consider a point w h i c h c o u l d seem to support D r .
W i l l i a m s ' views o n 'horizontal participation'. I refer to the claim, introduced b y
the homoiousian party and attributed b y Athanasius to Paul o f Samosata , that
i f t w o beings are homoousia there must be a t h i r d , prior, ousia f r o m w h i c h both
are derived. T h i s argument presumably originated i n Christian circles, though
perhaps using pagan m a t e r i a l ; homoousios was important for Christians, b u t
rather marginal for pagans; yet it seems to involve a fairly sophisticated reflection
on the t e r m , contrasting w i t h its loose and ill-defined usage, say, i n Irenaeus
and probably at Nicaea.
28

29

The Nicenes replied that the Father himself is the supreme ousia, as o f
course the A r i a n s insisted; i t then remained t o be argued whether any other
being can be called homoousios w i t h h i m w i t h o u t suggesting some loss of substance or some infringement of his supremacy. T h e Nicenes of course admit
that the Son and the S p i r i t are d e r i v e d f r o m the Father, but insist that they
nevertheless enjoy f u l l equality w i t h h i m This m i g h t suggest that they reinterpret
the language o f participation, g i v i n g importance, i n Dr. W i l l i a m s ' terms, t o
' h o r i z o n t a l ' rather than ' v e r t i c a l ' participation
I f a prior ousia be disallowed, homousios can indeed indicate w h a t call a
symmetrical relation I t can be used of the Father and Son i n conjunction, or o f
the T r i n i t y as a w h o l e B u t the s y m m e t r y is n o t complete; I have n o t yet traced
any pronouncement that the Father is homoousios w i t h the Son or the Spirit; such
teaching, i f i t ever existed, must have been a rarity M o r e important, i t has n o t
been shown that this controversy affected the terms expressing participation,
e.g. p e x c x E i v , pxoxo, p x x o u a i a , i n such a w a y as to c o n f u m D r W i l l i a m s '
proposal O n the contrary, w h e n used i n Trinitarian contexts, they seem to i n dicate an asymmetrical relation w h i c h is also accidental rather than essential; this
is particularly clear i n the case of p s x o u o t a . The use o f u x x e x s i v , qualified
by Xco, to denote the Son's relation t o the Father, i n Athanasius c. Ar i 16,
is d i s t i n c t l y unusual and perhaps inadvertent, since the w o r d is used i n the
f o l l o w i n g sentence to denote our participation i n the Son b y grace; this fact,
and its connection w i t h y e v v d v , suggests that he was t h i n k i n g currente
calamo

See Hilary syn 81; Athanasius syn 45; Basil Ep 52 1 Excellent discussion in F Dinsen,
Homousios (Diss , Kiel, 1976) pp 41-51
2 8

2 9

See for instance Plotinus Enn 6 1 2, presumably based on Aristotle, Metaph T 4, 1000 b 26

V
Was Arius a Neoplatonist?

50
rathei than f o l l o w i n g any established convention H i s normal use of such
terms appears at c. Gent 4 6 , c Ar i 9, and Syn, 5 1 .
W e have shown above that fourth-century Christians had access to texts i n
w h i c h participation needs to be understood i n a symmetrical sense. B u t it seems
most improbable that they recognised this as a distinct usage I k n o w o f no text
that points this out; rather, the accidental sense o f participation seems to be taken
for granted It is therefore a surprising thesis that fourth-century Christian writers
went over to use participation language to denote equal partnership The further
suggestion that this was prompted b y a general adoption of A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics w h i c h discarded the Platonic F o r m s , I can o n l y regard as fantastic.
am quite unable to believe that this aspect of A r i s t o t e l i a n thought influenced
either Christians o f the f o u r t h century or contemporary Neoplatonists; though
b o t h c o u l d accommodate A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , f o l l o w i n g P o r p h y r y ; and the N e o platonists at least c o u l d find a place for the voXov ESO B u t this was not felt
as a challenge to the authority o f Plato. B y w a y of c o n f i r m a t i o n , a quick l o o k
at the first book of Iamblichus On the Mysteries
of Egypt yielded about thirty
examples of i i e x e / G i v , pxoxo and related terms, a l l entirely consonant w i t h
the Platonic tradition and w i t h o u t any sense o f participation between equal
partners,

distinguishes between c r e a t i o n and the eternal generation of the Son: ' t h e

creation o f the w o r l d f r o m n o t h i n g implies a new subsistence and a recent
beginning' (xo SG t% O 6 K ovxcov SnpoupyeTaOai xov K O G U O V vecoxepav E%EI
x f j v f)7t6axacn.v K a i 7tp6o-q>axov xrjv y e v e c n v ) , w h i c h seems to preclude any
suggestion of previous w o r l d s B u t A r i u s takes a more radical l i n e ; as I p r e v i o u s l y expressed i t , ' O r i g e n had placed the Father i n an eternal relationship,
not o n l y w i t h the Son, but even i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h the w o r l d A r i u s asserts the
Father's p r i o r i t y , not o n l y to the w o r l d , but t o the Son'. A c c o r d i n g l y the Son
had a real and momentary b e g i n n i n g , even i f i t is not strictly a beginning i n
time
34

B u t this surely means that A r i u s stands at the furthest possible r e m o v e f r o m

the m a j o r i t y , or eternalist, school o f Neoplatonic philosophers; f r o m Plotinus,
P o r p h y r y , and Iamblichus. I have t r i e d to show that his supposed dependence
o n various points o f then doctrine is i l l u s o r y B u t even i f I am here mistaken,
and there were some traces o f dependence, nevertheless any sort of general
agreement is out of the question. I have to conclude that Dr.. W i l l i a m s has been
advancing, w i t h great ingenuity and learning, a theory w h i c h we must reject as
unfounded

I w i l l conclude by reverting to a point suggested i n m y 1964 paper w h i c h

perhaps needs to be more clearly restated It has been customary among scholars
to d i v i d e the later Platonists i n t o t w o groups, distinguished according to their
treatment o f Plato's Timaeus. The great m a j o r i t y accepted A r i s t o t l e ' s doctrine
o f the eternity o f the w o r l d and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a beginning of t i m e ;
accordingly Plato's description o f a quasi-temporal act of creation was treated
b y them as a mere pedagogic device, intended f o i simple people to show the
w o r l d ' s eternal dependence o n its first principle, O n l y a m i n o r i t y , among
w h o m Plutarch and A t t i c u s ate c o m m o n l y named, continued to interpret the
Timaeus as describing a real beginning, at least o f an ordered cosmos, though
not necessarily o f material being itself, The m a j o r i t y , represented b y Plotinus,
P o i p h y r y and Iamblichus, were i n v a r y i n g degrees hostile to Christianity;
nevertheless some Christian thinkers, O r i g e n i n particular, were influenced b y
their teaching O r i g e n is clearly impressed b y the reasoning that since the
Father is eternal, his relationships must be eternal; so just as he always had his
eternally begotten Son, so ' a l l genera and species have for ever existed, and
possibly even i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' , and the b i b l i c a l doctrine o f creation has to
be relativised, as describing the o r i g i n simply o f this w o r l d , considered as one
o f a successive series , B i s h o p Alexander rejects this theory, since he sharply
3 0

3 1

32

33

3 0

3 1

3 2

3 3

Gael 3 2, 301 b 33
Metaph 12 6, 1071 b 7
Princ. 1 4 5
Ibid 3 5 3, ci 2.3 5-6.

51

3 4

Opitz Urk

14, 18

VI

52
Appendix
Metechein,

metochos,

metoche,

metousia,

methexis,

in late

antiquity

1 Aristotle follows Plato's usage of terms such as metechein while rejecting the ideal
theory So also his commentators; e g :
Alex Aphr. in Metaph
101 3: K a i TOOTO, UEXEXEIV xd xfjSe sKeivcov, KvoX,oyeTv
s a r i Kai ustaipopaig %p"f\aQai noinxucaic, Cf Metaph. A 9 , 991 a 21-2
2 The commentators also continue to use metechein etc. to denote hierarchical relations
between individuals, species and genera: see next item.
3. Both Alexander and Porphyry draw a clear distinction between essential and accidental participation:
Alex op cit. 91.10: s i 5e urj KtxO' ctirro dXka Kara aojifiejinKoc, JISTEXSI xd
evrauOu xcov iSecov ..
Porphyry hagoge

17 6: K a i TOO uev VEVOUC, i%iar\q xd pexsxovxa u-Eiexsi, xou

8e aoppepnKoxoc, OUK s^ionc; ercixaoiv yap Kai d v s a i v srtiSexsxai f| xcov autiPsfinKOTGW \iiit\iq
Ibid 21.15: K a i tot) fiev ei'Souc; fj tiexoxfi ETcionq, xou 8s CTUU^SPTIKOTOC,, x d v
dxo')ptoxov r j , O6K ^Tri-cnc,
Ibid 22 9-10: K a i xcov JIEV eiScov
f\ uexoxri, xtov 5e CTuuPePriKOTiov f j
u,v udAAov f\ 5e f j i x o v
4 The distinction is less sharp in some Platonist writers; thus the 'second God'
participates in the first, indicating neither complete correspondence nor mere accidental
similarity:
Numenius fr. 20 (Eus P E 11 22.10) SIKOTCOC, 6 Snuoupyoc, euuep ori uexoucig
xou rtpuVtoo dya9ou dyaQoc,, (dyaBou) i5ea dv ein 6 npiaxoq
vovq.
Cf. also fr. 19
Origen is similar: In loh 2.2 16: icdv 8e TO itapd TO auxoGeoc, \iexo%r\ xr\q exeivou Oeoxnxoc, GeorcoioDiasvov oux o Oedg &Xka GEOC,
Per contra Sel in Ps 135 (Lomm, 13.134): The Logos is God ouaia, not fieroucria Ihis contrast was imitated: see 6 below
5 Metousia can also apply to the created world:
Numenius fr 16 (Eus. P E 11 22 5): r\q u i u n u a 6 KrrXoc; KOGUOC,, KSKaAAcurtio"\isvoc, tiExooaia xou Kd^ou:
not mere accidental likeness, but obvious inferiority
6 Christian writers often ignore essential participation and imply that any participation
is always accidental:
Paul of Samosata (as reported), fr. 33 (p 155 de Riedmatten):
xf)v 5e cuvdtpetav sxEptoc, Ttpdc, xfjv aocpiav vost, Kara pafhicuv Kai ^erovjaiav,
ob%i ouoiav oooicopgvnv v aebpaxi. (Cf fr. 22 and 25 for background).
7 This contrast is often used as an artifice of controversy; e g by Athanasius; but he
is not consistent; thus c Ar i 15 Kara p e t o u o i a v uloc, is supposedly an Arian phrase;
yet ib 16, peiplexingly, 6 uloc, ouSsvoc, u,xsxt, xo 8e EK xou Jtaxpoc, uetExd(J.SVOV, TOUXO SGTIV 6 i>lOCj

ARIUS

ON

GOD'S

' M A N Y

WORDS'

A F T E R s i f t i n g t h e e v i d e n c e as c a r e f u l l y as I c a n , I a m s t i l l p u z z l e d
h o w to answer t h e q u e s t i o n : D i d A r i u s t e a c h a r a d i c a l l y r e d u c t i o n i s t
v i e w of the Logos?
V j i t u a l l y a l l our k n o w l e d g e of A r i u s ' t e a c h i n g d e r i v e s f r o m his
o p p o n e n t s N e v e r t h e l e s s i t is p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h some m a t e r i a l
w h i c h is c l e a r l y p r e s e n t e d as actual q u o t a t i o n o f A r i u s ' o w n
w r i t i n g s ; s o m e o t h e r m a t e r i a l is g e n e r a l l y a d m i t t e d to b e m e r e
p o l e m i c a l t r a v e s t y ; a n d t h e r e is a large d i s p u t e d m i d d l e g r o u n d ,
to w h i c h u n f o r t u n a t e l y one m u s t assign t h e i m p o r t a n t s u m m a r i e s
t r a n s m i t t e d i n A t h a n a s i u s c. A r i . 5-9 W e l l - r e s p e c t e d scholars
s u c h as B a r d y a n d K a n n e n g i e s s e i t r e a t these as q u o t a t i o n s ; I and
s o m e o t h e r s dissent.
I have r e c e n t l y a r g u e d t h a t t h e u n d i s p u t e d d o c u m e n t a r y sources
p r e t t y c o n s i s t e n t l y disclose A r i u s as t e a c h i n g a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h v i e w
o f t h e L o g o s H e is d e t e r m i n e d t o s a f e g u a r d t h e F a t h e r ' s p r e e m i n e n c e ; b u t , t h i s p o i n t s e c u r e d , h e has n o p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n
to r e d u c e t h e h o n o u r s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a c c o r d e d t o t h e L o g o s ; he
d e s c r i b e s h i m as ' m i g h t y G o d ' , as Monogenes, as G o d ' s f i i s t - b o t n
S o n , as t h e W i s d o m w h o assisted t h e Father at the c r e a t i o n
A t h a n a s i u s h i m s e l f , w h i l e c r i t i c i z i n g A r i u s ' p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s last
p o i n t , cannot deny t h a t it was m a d e T h e c o n t r a r y view, that A r i u s
desct i b e d t h e L o g o s as m e r e l y o n e of t h e c r e a t u r e s , o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y
as a m e r e m a n , does n o t rest o n g o o d d o c u m e n t a r y evidence b u t on
p o l e m i c a l sallies w h i c h h a v e been w r o n g l y t r e a t e d as q u o t a t i o n s
T h i s is t h e case w h i c h I have d e f e n d e d I t seems clear, at least,
t h a t t h e c o n t r a r y v i e w so e n g a g i n g l y p r e s e n t e d b y D r s G r e g g and
1

See especially my article ' T h e Thalia of Arius and the Testimony of Athanasius', ]f T $ N s xxix (1978), pp 20-52 T h i s is perhaps the moment to record
my appreciation of Professor M L . West's subsequent article "The Metre of Arius'
Thalia', ibid (1982), pp 98-105 I will say at once that I bow to Professor West's
knowledge of Greek metrics, and apart from small details, I think his analysis is
much more likely to be right than my own; Sotadeans let it be! At the same time his
analysis does not damage, and was not intended to damage, two points which I
regarded as fundamental in my own article: (i) that any convincing metrical analysis
of the Thalia text provided by Syn 15 sets that text on a much better critical basis
than the material given in c Ar. i. 5-9, apart from the first five lines quoted in i 5;
(ii) that the former text shows Arius to be less radically opposed to orthodoxy than
his opponents try to make out.
1

VI

VI
154

155

G r o h is o p e n t o g i a v e o b j e c t i o n o n c r i t i c a l g r o u n d s . Professor
5 G H a l l has d r a w n a t t e n t i o n t o s o m e o f t h e i r m i s t a k e s ; t h u s o n
p . 21, w h e n q u o t i n g a sentence f r o m c Ar. i i i 24 w h i c h p u r p o r t s
t o express t h e A r i a n v i e w , t h e y e n t i r e l y o v e r l o o k t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y
clause 'unless t h e y are so r a s h as t o say', w h i c h c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s t h e
s e q u e l as an A t h a n a s i a n c o n s t r u c t A n o t h e r g e m f r o m t h e i i b o o k ,
w h i c h H a l l has n o t m e n t i o n e d , is f o o t n o t e 45 o n p. 33, w h e r e a
sentence f r o m t h e Thalia
is m i s c o n s t r u e d so as t o suggest t h a t Jesus
was n o t e v e n ao^os- T h e i r a r g u m e n t rests o n a j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f t h e
t w o clauses ' H e is n o t c o n s u b s t a n t i a l w i t h H i m ' , n a m e l y G o d , a n d
' G o d is w i s e ' . B u t o b v i o u s l y t h e c o n c l u s i o n does n o t f o l l o w ; a n d w e
c a n n o t e v e n b e s u r e t h a t i t w a s m e a n t t o f o l l o w , since w e c a n n o t
p r o v e t h a t A r i u s h i m s e l f m a d e t h e t w o clauses r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y ;
for w h a t i t was w o r t h , B a r d y m a r k s a b r e a k at t h i s p o i n t .
2

M y g e n e r a l stance, o f c o u r s e , a d m i t s of s o m e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
W i t h i n the A r i a n c a m p I t h i n k there were some real reductionists;
Athanasius of Anazarba, perhaps, for one; w i t h A e t i u s o c c u p y i n g
a p o s i t i o n s l i g h t l y to the left o f A r i u s himself. B u t the discussion
m u s t n o w be b r o u g h t t o a p o i n t ; a n d I w i s h t o c o n s i d e r one r e p o r t e d
s a y i n g o f A r i u s w h i c h has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d as e v i n c i n g a r e d u c t i o n i s t v i e w . I t o c c u r s i n de Decreth
16, b u t r a t h e r o d d l y was
o m i t t e d b y B a r d y f r o m his a t t e m p t e d c o l l e c t i o n of fragments. A f t e r
a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f o l l o w e r s o f E u s e b i u s , A t h a n a s i u s says t h a t
t h e A r i a n p a r t y f i n d t h e i i last r e s o u r c e , eKetvo XOLTTOV
exovoiv
vnoXenrofxevov,
iv TT) eavrov

Kai
6

in a question put
aXia

0S'.. TTOLOV avrcov

b y A r i u s , o Kai ev aafiariois

cos iiraTroptov
dpa

Xeyop,V

TTOXXOVS XaXet

pivQoXoytt

qp.f.is viov

Kai

Xoyov

"Apeios
Xoyovs

p.ovoyevr)

rov

JTarpos;
r o u g h l y , ' G o d speaks m a n y w o r d s ; w h i c h o f these d o w e say
is t h e S o n a n d o n l y - b e g o t t e n W o r d o f t h e F a t h e r ? ' A t h a n a s i u s
r e t o r t s t h a t G o d u t t e r s o n l y one W o r d ; t o use m o r e w o u l d b e a s i g n
of weakness T h i s o f c o u r s e is a m e r e d e b a t i n g p o i n t , since he h i m self is q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o d e s c r i b e G o d u s i n g a p l u r a l i t y o f w o r d s ; as

a r t i c l e i n ZKG
( 1 9 8 3 ) , p 25, w h i c h suggests a p a r a l l e l f r o m
O r i g e n ' s Commentary
on John,
i i 3 23; O r i g e n , h e says, m e n t i o n s a
c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e s u p r e m e L o g o s a n d o t h e r logoi of t h e second
a n d t h i r d degree I d o n o t t h i n k he is r i g h t i n his r e a d i n g of t h e text;
as I see i t , O r i g e n is n o t r e v i e w i n g a h e a v e n l y h i e r a r c h y , w h i c h
m i g h t offer a p a r a l l e l t o t h e A r i a n L o g o s ; he is s a y i n g t h a t t h e w o r d
Xoyos has m u c h t h e s a m e v a r i e t y o f senses as t h e w o r d 0eos; 0os can
be u s e d o f t h e F a t h e r , o f (e g ) M o s e s , as p a r t a k i n g of G o d , or of
false gods S i m i l a r l y , t h e ' s e c o n d l o g o s ' is t o be i d e n t i f i e d as the
d e v o u t m a n ' s reason; t h e ' t h i r d l o g o s ' is t h e d e c e p t i o n w h i c h falsely
c l a i m s t h e n a m e o f r e a s o n ; O r i g e n speaks o f VO{JUL]O[J.VLOV p,ev Xoyov
3

OVK OVTOJV Se dXrjBcos

X6ytov,

dXX'

iv' OVTOJS

eiVoj, oXov

TOVTO

aXoycov

Xoycov, c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e false gods

So t h e suggested p a r a l l e l f r o m O r i g e n does n o t s u p p o r t L o r e n z ' s
v i e w I c a n n o t see a n y i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e 'false r e a s o n ' is per s o n i f i e d
a n d r e g a r d e d as a s p i r i t o f d e c e p t i o n M o r e o v e r , I c a n n o t d i s c e r n
t h a t t h e L e x i c o n o f f e r s a n y p a r a l l e l for t h e use of Xoyoi i n t h e p l u r a l
t o d e n o t e h e a v e n l y p o w e r s , t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y several G n o s t i c
s y s t e m s i n c o r p o r a t e a singular
A6yo$ i n t o t h e i i h i e r a r c h y of s p i r i t u a l
b e i n g s I t h i n k t h a t L o r e n z m a y p o s s i b l y have d r a w n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f r o m a n essay b y t h a t a d m i r a b l e scholar F r a n z - H e i n r i c h
K e t t l e r ( F S R o b e r t S t u p p e r i c h (1969), p 237 n. 4) w h o also
m a i n t a i n s t h a t O r i g e n refers to the heavenly h i e r a r c h y by the term
XoyoL, t h o u g h o n l y s e l d o m K e t t l e r n o t e s t h r e e passages, o f w h i c h
t h e f i r s t is t h a t u s e d b y L o r e n z a n d a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d T h e second
passage o c c u r s earlier i n t h e Commentary
on John ( i . 7. 38) a n d the
c r u c i a l p h r a s e is b y n o m e a n s c l e a r t o m e ; O r i g e n is p l a i n l y r e f e r r i n g
t o t h e umpliciores
w h o are i n s t r u c t e d , n o t b y t h e L o g o s h i m s e l f , b u t
b y p r e p a r a t o r y agents a d a p t e d t o t h e i r state; t o t h e m oi^ev^poSpo/ioi
Xptorov

in ideSr) fir) Kaoi iraiai

tfivxais

dpixo^ovres

Xoyoi.

But

the

whole

w h i c h t h e L e x i c o n g i v e s p a r a l l e l s , s v I A . 9); b u t i t s h o w s t h a t he
t o o k t h e A r i a n t e x t t o m e a n t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t
t h e L o g o s ; he is m e r e l y one o f a class of b e i n g s T h e r e is a rather
s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t i n c A r i i 36, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s asserts t h a t m e n
u t t e r m a n y w o r d s because each o f t h e m p e r i s h e s w h e n s p o k e n ; b u t
G o d has o n l y one W o r d , w h o is u n c h a n g i n g .
A t h a n a s i u s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e A r i a n sentence has b e e n
g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d ; a n d m o s t r e c e n t l y b y R u d o l f L o r e n z i n a fine

d i s c u s s i o n b e g i n s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e G o s p e l is a Xoyos ( i .5
27), a n d a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n L a w a n d G o s p e l i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w s
(sect 39); after w h i c h a c o n t r a s t is d r a w n b e t w e e n the S a v i o u r ' s
Xoyoi a n d h i s irpa^eis; a l l o f w h i c h suggests t o m e t h a t Aoyot i n i 7 . 38
m o s t p r o b a b l y m e a n s e l e m e n t a r y d o c t r i n e s or s a y i n g s , or p o s s i b l y
p r o p h e t i c t i t l e s o f C h r ist. W e c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , disprove
the notion
t h a t A l i u s m a y have p e r s o n a l i z e d t h e p h r a s e , t a k i n g i t o u t o f c o n t e x t ; b u t t h i s w o u l d b e g r a s p i n g a s t r a w T h e t h i r d case, a passage
f r o m Comm.
Matt
x i i i , K l . p. 183
r , seems to m e t o be d o u b t f u l
t o o , because i t t h r o w s o u t t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t E l i j a h m i g h t b e a Aoyos
(or ' E l i j a h ' s i g n i f y a Aoyos?), a n d t h i s appears to b e a n a f t e r t h o u g h t ,

Early ArianismA
(London, 1981)

'Die Christusseele i m Arianischen Streit Nebst einigen Bemerkungen zur

Quellenkritik des A r i u s u n d zur Glaubwiirdigkeitdes Athanasius', op cit , pp
1-51

i n c, Ar.

i i i . 2, Kal o jikv Mcoa^s

rovs

irapa. rov

eov Si-n/covei Xoyovs

(to

View of Salvation, by Robert C Gregg and Dennis E . G r o h

VI

VI
156

157

as i f O r i g e n w e r e m e r e l y n o t i n g a n o p i n i o n w h i c h m i g h t be h e l d a n d
s h o w i n g t h a t i t does n o t r a d i c a l l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f M a t t x v i i 10 T h i s r e a d i n g o f t h e passage w o u l d be e n d o r s e d i f
we were to f o l l o w D i e h l , Koetschau, and the L a t i n translation i n
r e a d i n g KCLI ovrcos f o r t h e /cat O U T O S o f t h e G r e e k m a n u s c r i p t s a n d
K l o s t e r m a n n ' s t e x t . A s i t i s , w e f i r s t h a v e a sentence w h i c h seems t o
t a k e Xoyot as ' s a y i n g s ' or ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' : Kai eot/ce ye 5ta rovrwv
(sc..
Mai

in

22 f ) SrjXoOoBat

ort 7Tpourp7ri^L

7Ti8Tjfj,Ca oid rivcov Ltpttiv Xoyajv

o 'HXias

/cat Karaordoetov

rfj ivho^oj

Xpiarov

v r a i s iftvxo-ls rovs

eis

TOUTO TTLTr)8etovs yavop.ivous

. a n d t h e n after a n i n t e r v a l a sentence
w h i c h might a l l o w o f a p e r s o n a l i z i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : eiSe KCU X6yo$ r l s
ionv
Xoyov,

VTToSeeorepos

o *HXias,

/cat OVTOS

eroifxa^op-evit)

(OUTCOS?)

Xatp

VTT'

Xoyov

rov

dv Svvairo
avTov,

iv apXT)

irpos

coorrep TTpoyvpivaopa

iva

rov

deov

KareaKevaofievos

yevrjrai

deov

eirio~7]pLeiv rd)
npos

vnoSoxrjv
rov reXeiov Xoyov. N o n e of these passages m a k e s i t seem
v e r y n a t u r a l t h a t A r i u s s h o u l d have used a phrase about w o r d s
s p o k e n b y G o d as a r e f e r e n c e t o h e a v e n l y p o w e r s ; t h o u g h I a d m i t
t h a t w e can find m u c h b e t t e r p a r a l l e l s f o r t h i s m o v e m e n t o f t h o u g h t
if w e are p r e p a r e d t o go b a c k t o P h i l o ; see, f o r i n s t a n c e , L e g All.
iii r76-7
B u t I w o u l d l i k e t o suggest t h a t t h i s w h o l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
t h e A r i a n d i c t u m m a y be m i s t a k e n . C o n s i d e r t h e w o r d i n g again:
TTOXXOVS XaXei

Xoyovs

o 5.

TTO'IOV avrcbv

dpa

Xiyop-ev

rjiJ-eis viov

/cat

Xoyov novoyevrj
rov LJarpos,
I f A l i u s w e r e r e a l l y a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e is
n o t h i n g u n i q u e l y d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t t h e d i v i n e L o g o s , as A t h a n a s i u s
alleges, w h y s h o u l d he s p o i l h i s case b y i n t r o d u c i n g a r e f e r e n c e
p r e c i s e l y t o t h e unique,
or o n l y - b e g o t t o n , S o n a n d W o r d o f t h e
F a t h e r ? I f t h e c o n c l u d i n g w o r d s are g e n u i n e , t h e y d e m a n d some
o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; i f t h e y are n o t , t h e w h o l e q u o t a t i o n is so
c o r r u p t t h a t n o c o n c l u s i o n c a n be d r a w n .
T h e p o i n t w h i c h I t h i n k A r i u s is m a k i n g is as f o l l o w s : t h e t e r m
' l o g o s ' , t a k e n b y i t s e l f , is i n s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t i v e to i n d i c a t e t h e
t r u e d i v i n e L o g o s , w h o is G o d ' s o n l y S o n , a n d u n i q u e or o n l y b e g o t t e n W o r d . G o d speaks m a n y w o r d s ; 7roiov avrwv apa Xeyop,ev
r)p.eh

viov

Kai Xoyov

{lovoyevr)

rov

TJarpos;

The

question appears to

e x p e c t t h e answer ' N o n e ' ; a n d of c o u r s e t h e r e is g o o d p r e c e d e n t i n

O r i g e n f o r seeing t h e L o g o s as e n d o w e d w i t h a c o m p l e x o f t i t l e s
w h i c h h a v e t o b e t a k e n t o g e t h e r to e x p r e s s h i s f u l l b e i n g , he m u s t
n o t be d e s c r i b e d as ' L o g o s ' o n l y A w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e is
Commentary
on John,
i 21-4 ( = i 23), t h o u g h t h e passage is t o o
l o n g to q u o t e
B u t w h y s h o u l d A r i u s a r g u e i n t h i s w a y ? I t w o u l d be n a t u r a l to
see i t as a n a r g u m e n t d i r e c t e d against M a r c e l l u s , w h o after a l l was
m o r e r a d i c a l l y o p p o s e d t o A l i u s in theology
t h a n was h i s b i s h o p ,

A l e x a n d e r , a n d w h o was c o n s i d e r a b l y senior t o A t h a n a s i u s
Marc e l l u s h a d a r g u e d t h a t p r i o r t o h i s I n c a r n a t i o n G o d ' s L o g o s was
L o g o s a n d n o t h i n g else ( f i 42, 43, 48, 49, 91, e t c . ) ; a n d w e f i n d
E u s e b i u s o b j e c t i n g t o t h i s v i e w , a n d a r g u i n g i n several places t h a t
a w h o l e c o m p l e x of t i t l e s b e l o n g s to h i m , S o n , G o d , L i f e , L i g h t
( T i i 1 0 , p i n , c f . i i r4, p p r r 5 , r r 8 ) T h e r e is also a p a r a l l e l to
t h e o p e n i n g s e n t e n c e TTOXXOVS XaXet

Xoyovs

6 @0S, t h o u g h i t o c c u r s

i n a rather c o m p l e x a r g u m e n t at i i . 24 w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t to q u o t e
E u s e b i u s c o m p l a i n s t h a t M a i c e l l u s b i i n g s t o g e t h e r a w h o l e ser ies of
t e x t s w h i c h n a m e ' t h e w o i d o f t h e L o r d ' a n d w r o n g l y conflates
t h e m w i t h t h e W o r d w h o was i n t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h o u g h i n f a c t t h e y
a r e m e r e l y c o m m a n d m e n t s a n d d i i e c t i v e s : so 0 Oavftaoros
OVTOS (sc
M a r c e l l u s ) rds ivroXds
Xoyovs

diro

Tys Beias

rov 6eov Kai rovs

avvayaycbv

TrapayyeXriKOVs

ypa<j>i)s TOLOVTOV nva

TOJV

rrpaKricDv

6pit,erai

rov

iv

dpxfi Xoyov
A n d a f t e i q u o t i n g M a i c e l l u s at l e n g t h he adds: ' W h a t
w o r d does t h i s t e x t ( A m o s 5: 10) p i e s e n t b u t t h e w o r d o f c o m m a n d m e n t a b o u t h o l y a n d l i g h t e o u s actions? A n d he i n t e n d s a n y t h i n g
r a t h e r t h a n a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e S o n of G o d , as i f he w e r e a s h a m e d to
m a k e m e n t i o n of t h e S o n ' r o yap ipiaT}aav
.
Kai Xoyov
oaiov
ifi&eXvavro

TToiov VTroriBtTai

re p^aAAov 77 rov

viov

rov

Xoyov

9eov

rj

. . rov.

ofioXoyeiv

jrapayyeAn/coV,

jSoiiAerat, coanep

irdvra

aiBovp,vos

p,vT}p,ovvoai r o v viov. T h e A l l a n sentence m i g h t a l m o s t be d e s c r i b e d

as a n a b b r e v i a t i o n o f t h i s passage. C f also c Marc
i 1 16
I f t h i s is c o n c e d e d , i t h e l p s t o e s t a b l i s h a p i c t u i e of t h e A i i a n
L o g o s s u c h as K e t t l e i h i m s e l f a t t i i b u t e d to O r i g e n C o n t r a s t e d
w i t h G o d t h e F a t h e r he m u s t i n e v i t a b l y be seen as b e l o n g i n g t o the
c r e a t e d o r d e r ; b u t i f w e c o n s i d e r his p l a c e w i t h i n t h a t o r d e r , he
a p p e a l s as f i r s t - b o r n a n d u n i q u e I f m y a r g u m e n t is s o u n d , there
is n o n e e d f o r us to accept A t h a n a s i u s ' c l a i m t h a t A r i u s r e g a r d e d
t h e L o g o s as m e r e l y one o f t h e c i e a t u i e s

VII
T H E
FOR

W O R D

R E I N H A R D

' F R O M

H U B N E R :

N O T H I N G '

amico bene

merito

A R I U S ' d i c t u m t h a t t h e L o g o s is ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' , e| OVK OVTCOV, has

a t t r a c t e d s o m e n o t i c e ; b u t I t h i n k t h a t its m e a n i n g has n o t been
s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d . I p r o p o s e t o discuss f o u r p a r t i c u l a r s : first,
t h e p r o v e n a n c e o f t h e p h r a s e ; s e c o n d l y its c o n t e x t i n A r i u s ' doct r i n e of t h e L o g o s ; t h i r d l y , t h e p a r t i t p l a y e d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y
c o n t r o v e r s y ; a n d f o u r t h l y , t h e j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e o f the c r i t i c i s m s
it incurred
1

'FROM

N O I H I N G ' :

PHILOSOPHICAL

BACKGROUND

T h e phrase o c c u r s i n w h a t is c o m m o n l y c o n s i d e r e d A r i u s ' e a r l i est s u r v i v i n g w o r k , t h e letter t o E u s e b i u s of N i c o m e d i a , p r i n t e d

b y O p i t z as Urkunde
i a n d d a t e d b y h i m c 318 A r i u s w r i t e s : 'We
are p e r s e c u t e d also because w e said, he is f r o m n o t h i n g . W e spoke
t h u s because he is n e i t h e r a p a r t of G o d nor ( d e r i v e d ) f r o m any
( p r i o r ) s u b s t a n c e ' (SttoKoueda
OVTCUS L7TO[iV KaOoTl
}

Kai

6rt

eLTTop-ev, l | OVK OVTOJV

hariv

OV$ fXp0S 6eOV OTtV OvSe l | V7TOKLp,VOV

TWOS) T h e 'also' r e f e r s b a c k t o t h e p r e v i o u s sentence: ' w e are

p e r s e c u t e d because w e said, " t h e S o n has a b e g i n n i n g , whereas
G o d (o f?eo's) is w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g " ' , w h i c h can b e left aside for
the moment
I d i s c u s s e d A r i u s ' r e a s o n i n g i n m y b o o k Divine
Substance
p p . 235 f , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t i t stems f r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m o n p l a c e f o u n d i n I r e n a e u s , T e r t u l l i a n , a V a l e n t i n i a n speaker
quoted by M e t h o d i u s , and Theognostus quoted b y Athanasius;
i f s o m e t h i n g comes i n t o b e i n g i t m u s t d e r i v e either f r o m somet h i n g or f r o m n o t h i n g , a n d i n t h e f o r m e r case either f r o m G o d or
f r o m s o m e t h i n g else R u d o l f L o r e n z has n o t i c e d the same t r i a d
i n C l e m e n t o f A l e x a n d r i a , str 2.74 1; a n d I s h o u l d have m e n t i o n e d
O r i g e n princ. 4.4 r , a n d t h e o b s e r v a t i o n m a d e b y V e r b e k e t h a t the
same t h r e e p o s s i b i l i t i e s are suggested b y P l u t a r c h ,
Platonic
Questions 4, p 1003a: ' f o r t h e s o u l was n o t m a k i n g the n a t u r e of
t h e b o d y f r o m i t s e l f , nor f r o m n o t h i n g , b u t ( m a d e ) an o r d e r l y
b o d y o u t o f w h a t was w i t h o u t o r d e r a n d u n s h a p e d ' (o> yap k
2

avrfjs

-r) ifivxfj rrjv TOV oiop.aTo$ I S n ^ i o u p y e i <f>voiv ouS'

I K rot) p.r) OVTOS,

See R. P C Hanson, 'Who taught e OVK OVTCUV, in R C Gregg (ed ), Ariamsm

(Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 79-83; R Lorenz, Arius Judaizant? (Gottingen, 1979)
(hereafter Af),
pp 38 f ; G C Stead, 'The Platonism of Arius', JTS,
NS, 15
(1964), 25 f.
Iren., Haer, 2 1 0 4; Tertullian, adv Herm. 2 1; Methodius, Autex 2 9, p 150;
Athanasius, Deer 25
1

VII

VII
672

673

dXX K acofiaros

CLT&KTOV Kal do-x-qparioTov

acou-a Teraypevov)

There

are s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e w o r d i n g : l OVK OVTOJV is t h e f o r m w h i c h

o c c u r s i n M e t h o d i u s ; T h e o g n o s t u s has t h e v a r i a n t ex p.7/ ovrvov,
w h i l e P l u t a r c h ' s rati [nj ovros is u s e d o c c a s i o n a l l y b y A r i u s '
opponents.
W e m a y n o t i c e i n A r i u s ' l e t t e r t h e s l i g h t l y a p o l o g e t i c t o n e of
' W e spoke t h u s ..'; a n d i n f a c t t h e r e is a f l a w i n his l o g i c ; b y
o p t i n g f o r e OVK OVTOJV he e x c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e L o g o s
is I K f?eoii: t h e reason g i v e n is t h a t ZK deov w o u l d i m p l y t h a t he is
piepos 6eov, t h u s r a i s i n g w e l l - f o u n d e d o b j e c t i o n s t o a n y d i v i s i o n or
d i m i n u t i o n o f t h e G o d h e a d . A r i u s m a y w e l l be f o l l o w i n g O r i g e n
loc. c i t . {non enim dicimus
.. partem
aliquam
substantiae
dei in
filium versum) w h i l e i g n o r i n g t h e c o r r e c t i o n s w h i c h O r i g e n hastens
t o a d d : t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e L o g o s does n o t i n v o l v e c o r p o r e a l
passions, b u t r e s e m b l e s t h e g e n e r a t i o n of (an act o f ) w i l l f r o m t h e
m i n d I n h i s o t h e r w r i t i n g s A l i u s a l l o w s i n d e e d insists one/c
0ov: so e g Thalia
1 31 ( A t h Syn 15, O p i t z 243
1 12) w h i l e
m a i n t a i n i n g h i s p r o t e s t against a n y p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t
(Urk
6 5).
T w o o b s e r v a t i o n s are n e e d e d t o e x p l a i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d of the
p h r a s e ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' . F i r s t t h e r e is t h e w e l l - k n o w n c o m m o n p l a c e
ex nihilo nihil fit, w h i c h o r i g i n a t e s q u i t e e a r l y i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y .
P o s s i b l y i t s f i r s t o c c u r r e n c e is P a r m e n i d e s f r 8 ( S i m p l i c i u s Phys.
145 i f f )
. . oi)b" I K jj,fj kovros

cf>ao8ai o' ouoe voeiv,

'iuTIV OTTOJS OVK

kdoow

ov yap car6v ouSe vo-qrov

OTlV

nor shall I allow thee to say or to think ' f r o m that which is not'; for it is
not to be said or thought that it is not [Or perhaps, more logically, 'for
non-existence cannot be described or conceived']
C o m p a r e Empedocles ft r r , [ A r i s t o t l e ] M X G
re yap ovBafi eoVros ap^avov

eon

2, 975

b r,

yzveaQai

Fot coming into being f r o m that w h i c h i n no way is, is inconceivable

N o d o u b t t h e p r i n c i p l e w a s w i d e l y accepted. I t m a y h a v e b e e n
c h a l l e n g e d b y w r i t e r s w h o refer t o a b e i n g w h o is avToyevr/s
or
avToyev(v)T}Tos,
t w o w o r d s r e n d e r e d m L S J as ' s e l f - p r o d u c e d ' a n d
' s e l f - g e n e r a t e d ' B u t these m i g h t r e f e r t o a n e t e r n a l g e n e r a t i o n ,
w h i c h w o u l d n o t e n t a i l t h e e m e r g e n c e of s o m e t h i n g f r o m n o t h i n g
A l t e r n a t i v e l y avroyev-qs
at least m i g h t m e a n ' u n i q u e i n k i n d ' , an

' i n d i v i d u a l species' ( c f p-ovoyev-qs)', i t can be u s e d , p e r h a p s c o n f u s e d l y , o f a b e i n g w h o is c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e p r i m a r y source (see e g

l i e n haer 1 29 2, c i t e d i n P G L ) H o w e v e r i n Orac
Sibyl
f r 1 17
G o d is avroyevrjs ctyevrjTos, p r e s u m a b l y ' u n i q u e a n d u n d e i i v e d '
N e v e i t h e l e s s t h e p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil was p i o b a b l y r o b u s t
e n o u g h to w i t h s t a n d s u c h r a r i f i e d o b j e c t i o n s
Secondly, i m p o r t a n t clarifications were made b y A r i s t o t l e , who
n o t e s the a m b i g u i t y o f ydveodai, either ' c o m i n g i n t o b e i n g ' absol u t e l y , or ' c o m i n g t o be s u c h a n d s u c h ' I n De Generatione
et
Corruptione
1 3 , 3 i 7 b 2 f f , h e a p p e a l s t o suggest a n o b j e c t i o n to
the former concept:
el yap airXCbs curat yevecrts, arrXojs av yivono
Xtyeiv on

rial

TO pi] ov

I K prj 'ovros, aior

a\rj8es av e'n?

n's pev yap yeVeois ex pi] OVTOS TWOS, oiov

K pr) XevKDV Tj prj KaXov, ij Se awAij e a^Aiis pr/ OVTOS

W e may translate, rather freely:

If there is a case of coming-to-be in an absolute sense, s o m e t h i n g w o u l d
c o m e to be f r o m that w h i c h is n o t h i n g , so that it w o u l d be t r u e to say
that there are things to w h i c h ' n o t h i n g ' a p p l i e s ; for b e c o m i n g s u c h

and

s u c h p r o c e e d s f r o m w h a t is not s u c h and s u c h , e g w h a t is not w h i t e or

not b e a u t i f u l ; but a b s o l u t e b e c o m i n g p r o c e e d s f r o m absolute not-being

T h e a b s u r d i t y lies n o t so m u c h i n t h e last p h r a s e as i n t h e sugg e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e are t h i n g s t h a t are n o t , m a d e i n t h e w o r d s

u n d e r l i n e d , a n d i n d e e d s u g g e s t e d b y t h e p h i a s e k OVK OVTWV
N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i s t o t l e h o l d s t h a t n o t h i n g comes t o be i n a n absol u t e sense, i e. f r o m w h a t is n o t , f o r t h e r e is no s u c h t h i n g (cf.. op
cit 317 b 12); i t is a m i s t a k e t o say t h a t n o t - b e i n g exists (Phys
1 3, 187 a 2). A n d i f w e d o say t h a t a s u b s t a n c e X o r i g i n a t e s f r o m
w h a t is n o t X , t h i s m u s t be q u a l i f i e d as ' p o t e n t i a l l y t h o u g h not
a c t u a l l y X ' ; see Gen. et Con- 317 b 7-26
F u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n is o f f e r e d b y A r i s t o t l e ' s w e l l - k n o w n t h e o r y
o f f o u r causes, w h i c h sheds l i g h t o n t h e a m b i g u o u s p r e p o s i t i o n
ex. T h e b r i e f r e s t a t e m e n t i n Metaph
1 3, 983 a 26 f f , r u n s as
follows:
4

r d atria Aeyercu rerpa^ajs, cov piav pev alriav <$>ap.v eivai rijv ovaiav feat TO TI
Yjv elvcu
Ktvrjaews.

krepav 8e rrjv vXrjv Kal TO urroKeipevov, rpirrjv oe odev 7) a-PX ?

1

rerdprrjv

Se

TO OV kvzxa Kal rtvyadov (TGXOS yap yeveaetos t a i

Kivr/oews rrdarjs TOUT* kariv)

Now

t h e i e are four r e c o g n i z e d k i n d s of cause

is the essence or essential n a t u r e of a t h i n g

O f these we hold that one

another is the matter or

1 myself find it unconvincing; it fits somt cases, e g a plant emerging from a

s t t d ; but quite often if X comes into being, all that is required is the pre-existent
factors which make X possible; they need not be consolidated into some supposed
*X existing potentially'
4

R. Loren2, Die Chtistusseelc im Arianischen Strdit', ZKG rg83 r-51 (hereafter Christusseele'), 47 n 282; cf G Verbeke, L'Evolution
tie la doctrine du
pneuma du stoichme a St Auguitin (Louvain, 1945), p 261 n 104
J

vndpxei

VII
675

674
substrate; the t h i r d is the source of m o t i o n ; and the f o u r t h is .. the
purpose or good; for this is the end of every generative or motive process
T h i s passage was accessible t o f o u r t h - c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s ,
as t w o b r i e f p a r a p h r a s e s o f i t are g i v e n b y C l e m e n t o f A l e x a n d r i a
(str 8.18. i a n d 28.2) a n d a n o t h e r is q u o t e d f r o m A l e x a n d r i a o f
A p h r o d i s i a s ' De Fato b y E u s e b i u s ( P E 6 9.1) B u t w e s h a l l f i n d
that anti-Arian writers were liable t o ignore Aristotle's careful
distinctions
I f we n o w r e t u r n t o t h e t h r e e f o l d scheme of d e r i v a t i o n , i t w i l l
be seen t h a t P l u t a r c h at least a p p l i e s i t i n a m a n n e r w h i c h does
n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil, since i t specifies
t h r e e w a y s i n w h i c h t h e s o u l m i g h t act; i n each case, t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e s o u l s u p p l i e s a m o t i v e cause. A n d i t is s u r e l y a r g u a b l e t h a t
A n u s ' use o f t h e s c h e m e e m b o d i e s a s i m i l a r a s s u m p t i o n H e c a n
t h u s a r g u e t h a t t h e L o g o s is ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' w i t h o u t d e n y i n g t h a t
he w a s m a d e by God the Father
o u t o f n o t h i n g I n d e e d t h i s is
clearly h i s view. Since he holds that t h e L o g o s is, i n a carefully
q u a l i f i e d sense, a c r e a t u r e , h e c a n a p p l y t o h i m t h e d o c t r i n e o f
c r e a t i o n a c c e p t e d b y second- a n d t h i r d - c e n t u r y F a t h e r s i n o p p o s i t i o n to t h e Platonist v i e w that G o d made t h e universe o u t of
p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g u n f o r m e d m a t t e r A n d t h i s is a d m i t t e d b y p r o N i c e n e c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s t s , w h o o b j e c t t o h i s use o f t h e t e r m s ' c r e a t i n g ' a n d ' m a k i n g ' i n place o f ' b e g e t t i n g ' , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s persist
i n c l a i m i n g t h a t A r i u s ' use o f
OVK OVTLOV c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e
p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil, as w e shall see.
2

A R I U S ' D O C T R I N E OF THE SON'S

O R I G I N

A r i u s r e p e a t e d l y states t h a t G o d e n g e n d e r e d (yewrjaavra)
an
o n l y S o n (vlov piovoyevr))', so Urkunde 62, cf. yevvrjfia, 3; yevvrjdets,
4, t h o u g h h e also d e s c r i b e s h i s o r i g i n a t i o n i n n e u t r a l t e r m s
(VTTo(jTYjoavTo.,
2; vTTGOTTj, 4), a n d , as c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d , refers
t o i t as a ' c r e a t i o n ' {uriopa, 2; KnaOevTa, 3; KTtoQeis, 4), t h o u g h
w i t h a q u a l i f i c a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o set h i m a p a r t f r o m o t h e r creatures
{KTiofia TOV deov TGXZLOV, dXK ov)( cLs 'iv rcov KTtofi&Ttov, 2) T h e n e x t
f o l l o w i n g p h r a s e is a t a c i t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t t h e use o f yew-npia
etc does n o t suffice i n i t s e l f t o g u a r a n t e e t h e S o n ' s u n i q u e n e s s :
yeVvr/jua, aAA' oi>x o\>$ ev TOJV yevvrjfidrojv,
a phrase w h i c h his o p p o n ents d e c r i e d as i n c o n s i s t e n t , a c c u s i n g h i m o f e x p l o i t i n g t h e v a r i able sense o f yevvav a n d i t s d e r i v a t i v e s t o r e p r e s e n t t h e S o n as a
c r e a t u r e tout court, w i t h a l l t h e p e j o r a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h t h e y
t h e m s e l v e s a t t a c h e d t o t h e t e r m A r i u s does also use t h e t e r m
yevvr/pa i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e d o c t r i n e s o f V a l e n t i n u s a n d M a n e s (3),

b u t w i t h o u t a n y clear i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s u s e d or
m i s u s e d t h e t e r m ; t h u s w h e n h e says t h a t V a l e n t i n u s c a l l e d the
( d i v i n e ) yivv-qpa
a n ' o f f s h o o t ' (rrpofioXr)),
i t is o n l y t h i s latter t e r m
that he means t o condemn.
A l l t h i s is f a m i l i a r g r o u n d . B u t t h e catalogue o f o p i n i o n s w h i c h
A r i u s d i s o w n s c o n c l u d e s as f o l l o w s : ' n o r t h a t h e w h o was b e f o r e ,
w a s a f t e r w a r d s g e n e r a t e d or n e w - c r e a t e d i n t o a S o n , as t h o u too
t h y s e l f , blessed P o p e , i n t h e m i d s t o f t h e C h u r c h a n d i n session
hast o f t e n c o n d e m n e d t h o s e w h o i n t r o d u c e these d o c t r i n e s (ovBe
TOV

ovra

ov

avTos,

rrporepov,
p.a.K&pie

vorepov

yevvrjOevra

TraTra, Kara.

r) kiriKTiudevTa

piOT)v Trjv

els vlov,

e/ciiAryrnai' xai ev

cos xai
GvveSpiqj

ravTa
elo"qyovu.evovs
airtyyopevaas,
n o t i n g that the three words
u n d e r l i n e d a r e o m i t t e d i n R o b e r t s o n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n u s e d above).
T h e r e is, I suppose, n o direct evidence t h a t Alexander c o n d e m n e d
a n y s u c h v i e w s ; b u t t h e y h a v e been p l a u s i b l y i d e n t i f i e d as those
of M a r c e l l u s a n d , one m i g h t add, o f T e r t u l l i a n . T h e doctrine
t h a t t h e S o n was i n i t i a l l y G o d ' s i m m a n e n t W o r d or R e a s o n w h o
b e c a m e S o n at t h e c r e a t i o n ( T e r t u l l i a n ) or i n c a r n a t i o n ( M a r c e l l u s )
w o u l d o b v i o u s l y b e d i s o w n e d b y A l e x a n d e r , w h o v i e w e d t h e Son
as c o e t e r n a l , b u t also, f o r q u i t e d i f f e r e n t reasons, b y A r i u s , w h o
e n v i s a g e d a single p r i m o r d i a l a c t i o n w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e S o n - L o g o s
i n t o existence, t h o u g h w i t h o u t d e p r i v i n g the Father o f his eterna l l y p r e - e x i s t e n t a t t r i b u t e s (wv ayevvrjTios
e x a h> eavrco).
TOUS

T h e passage j u s t c o n s i d e r e d seems t o m e t o t h r o w l i g h t o n a
d e b a t a b l e c o u p l e t i n t h e Thalia (1 6 f , O p i t z p p . 242 1 14 f . ) :
apxfjv TOV vlov edfjue rcov yev{y)rjrcov 6 arap^os
at rjveyKev els vlov eavTto roVSe reKVOTrotrjuas
T h i s c o u p l e t , t h o u g h v a r i o u s l y e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l , has o f t e n
been cited i n s u p p o r t of various f o r m s o f ' p r o m o t i o n ' theory,
w h i c h agree i n m a k i n g i t i m p l y t h a t t h e L o g o s a t t a i n e d his present
d i g n i t y i n t w o or m o r e d i s t i n c t stages. T h e passage discussed i n
t h e last p a r a g r a p h seems t o m e t o c o n t r a d i c t a n y s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; i n d e e d i t m a y w e l l be t h a t t h e Thalia h a d already appeared
w h e n t h e L e t t e r t o A l e x a n d e r was w r i t t e n , a n d this particular
couplet had attracted unfavourable comment, w h i c h A r i u s now
seeks t o d i s a r m . T h e ' p r o m o t i o n ' t h e o r y s u r e l y presupposes t h a t
t h e L o g o s was p r o m o t e d ' f r o m s o m e t h i n g ' , f r o m some l o w e r state;
7

'Christusseele' 26, more generally, 'Apologists and Clement'; and see

A. Robertson, Athanasius, p. 458 n 12; Tertullian, Prax 7
AJ 66; R. C Gregg and D E . G r o h , Early Arianism, A View Of Salvation
(London, 1981), pp 23, 96; Stead, 'Arius in Modern Research', jfTS, m, 45,
(1994), 264.
A n early date is suggested by C Kannengiesser, Kyriakon,
F S Quasten,
(Miinster Westf , 1970), pp 349-51; AJ 49 ff , esp 51
6

A t h c Ar ii. 19 f

VII

VII
676

677

a n d t h e p h r a s e I f OVK OVTCOV has t h e e f f e c t o f d e n y i n g t h i s . B u t i n

a n y case t h e ' p r o m o t i o n ' t h e o r y is e x c l u d e d b y o t h e r phrases i n
t h e l e t t e r , e s p e c i a l l y 6 irar-qp 8ov$ avrto irdvrojv TT)V KXr/povopitav (4)
w i t h its a l l u s i o n to H e b r e w s 1:3, w h i c h c o u p l e s t h e Son's o b t a i n i n g
t h a t i n h e r i t a n c e w i t h his r o l e i n c r e a t i n g t h e 'ages' (altovas), no
d o u b t b e f o r e our f a m i l i a r years a n d days b e g a n .
9

'FROM NOTHING'; F O U R I H - C E N I U R Y
INTERPRETATIONS

I t seems t o m e t h a t t h e p h r a s e I f OVK ovrtov, as u s e d b y A r i u s

a n d b y his c r i t i c s , c o n v e y s at least f o u r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e nuances,
w h i c h m a y be l i s t e d as f o l l o w s :
(a)
(b)
(c)

T h e S o n , b e i n g ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' , is n o t ' f r o m G o d ' .

T h e S o n ' s existence h a d an a b s o l u t e b e g i n n i n g
T h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e

(d)
T h e S o n is n o t t r u e b e i n g , is a n o n - e n t i t y .
O f these p r o p o s i t i o n s , A r i u s h i m s e l f w o u l d c e r t a i n l y d e n y (a), b u t
w o u l d a c c e p t , w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s , (b) a n d (c); (d) e m b o d i e s a s o p h i s t r y ; i n one sense o n l y t h e F a t h e r is t r u e B e i n g ( E x o d 3:14); b u t
his c r e a t u r e s possess t h e i r degrees of b e i n g as h i s g i f t .
T h e f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d w i t h d i f f e r e n t senses o f I K ,
as d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y L S I ; (a) i m p l i e s sense I I I , o f o r i g i n ; (6) s u g gests sense I I , of t i m e ;
( t ) d e r i v e s i n d i r e c t l y f r o m sense I I I ;
(d) i m p l i e s sense I 4, o f s e l e c t i o n f r o m a g r o u p .
1 0

I d o n o t of course i m p l y t h a t e i t h e r A r i u s or h i s c r i t i c s e x p l i c i t l y
m a d e these d i s t i n c t i o n s ; b u t c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n m u s t b e g i n f r o m
a clear s t a t e m e n t o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; w e can t h e n c o n s i d e r w h i c h
i m p l i c a t i o n was u p p e r m o s t i n t h e m i n d s of its u s e r s , a n d so pass
t o t h e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n o f h o w d a m a g i n g i t was t o o r t h o d o x b e l i e f ,
or w h a t degree o f t o l e r a t i o n i t m i g h t h a v e b e e n a c c o r d e d
(a) T h i s c h a r g e has b e e n discussed b y R. L o r e n z (AJ p p . 51 f ).
A r i u s i n c l u d e s t h e p h r a s e I f avrov rov 0eoO 6 vios i n a l i s t of
A l e x a n d e r ' s tenets w h i c h he d i s o w n e d (Urk
i , 2 ) , a n d is said to
h a v e b l a m e d A l e x a n d e r f o r s a y i n g I K rov narpds rov vlov, t h o u g h
his c o r r e s p o n d e n t G e o r g e o f L a o d i c e a suggests t h a t he s h o u l d
h a v e f o u n d t h e p h r a s e acceptable (Urk
13). B u t G e o r g e ' s a r g u m e n t has t h e b a d e f f e c t o f i m p l y i n g t h a t t h e S o n is i n n o w a y
distinguishable f r o m the lower creation. A r i u s ' more carefully
c o n s i d e r e d Letter
to Alexander
does n o t discuss t h e p h r a s e I f avrov
A paper of mine, delivered at the Colloquium Origenianum Septimum,
Hofgeismar-Marburg, in August 1997 adverts to the difficulties which arise from
different conceptions of time
See note 9 above

per

se, b u t i n c l u d e s i t i n a l i s t of phrases w h i c h can e a s i l y be

6 5 : ei he TO ' I f avrov

m i s i n t e r p r e t e d : Urk

er)\dov Kal TJKOJ' OJS /xepos avrov

voelrai,

ovvderos

eorai

poovoov

rrar-qp Kai

Siaiperos

Kai

TO ' I K rod

irarps

Kai JS rrpo^oXr vir rtvcov

etc.

I t is r e a s o n a b l e to

i n f e r t h a t A r i u s d i s l i k e d t h e p h r a s e because i t h a d b e e n u s e d b y
h e r e t i c s ( V a l e n t i n u s , M a n i c h a e u s , i b i d 2) i n a w a y w h i c h s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e S o n was e m i t t e d or p r o j e c t e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r i n
s o m e p h y s i c a l sense A s L o r e n z has r i g h t l y o b s e r v e d (AJ p 51 n
30), m u c h t h e same p o i n t is m a d e b y E u s e b i u s o f N i c o m e d i a i n
h i s Letter

to Paulinm;

I f avrov

rv) cos civ pipos avrov

f) I f

c o u l d be t a k e n t o suggest (rr'

dnoppoas

rfs ovalas',

he

adds t h a t

avrov
the

t e r m yewrrv m i g h t be m i s u n d e r s t o o d t o i m p l y chs av I K rrs ovalas

rrs rrarpLKfjs avrov yeyovra e t c . , t o w h i c h m u c h t h e same o b j e c t i o n s
a p p l y H e r e I f avrov rov irarps is c l o s e l y associated w i t h I K TJS
ovoias rrjs rrarpiKrjs, t a k i n g ovoia to m e a n ' m a t e r i a l substance'.
Athanasius, however, alleged that A r i u s denied in the
Thalia
t h a t t h e S o n was I K rov irarps (c Ar. i 9 ) a careless m i s t a k e
since (e g.) t h e t e x t of t h e Thalia,
w h i c h he h i m s e l f t r a n s c r i b e s i n
h i s later de Synodis
(15.3, O p i t z p. 243 r. 20), r e f e r s to t h e Son
as TOV I K rrarpos ovra. M o r e o v e r i n de Synodis
34 he a d m i t s that
h i s o p p o n e n t s d e s c r i b e d h i m as g e n e r a t e d I K ro) irarps: cf. the
' D a t e d C r e e d ' c i t e d , i b i d , c 8. I n h i s earlier w o r k A t h a n a s i u s
seems t o have a s s u m e d t h a t o r i g i n a t i o n I f OVK OVTOJV e x c l u d e s I K
TOV irarps

(loe

c i t , OVK eonv

I K TOV irarps,

dXX I f OVK OVTOJV vireorrj

Kai avrs), w h i c h i g n o r e s t h e v a r i a b l e sense of I K , p a r t l y e x p l o r e d

b y L o r e n z (AJ p. 5 r , ' z w e i e r l e i ' ) W h a t A r i u s d i s l i k e s is t h e m a t e r i a l i z i n g v i e w o f G o d w h i c h I K c o u l d suggest i f t a k e n i n a spatial
sense; b u t he makes i t a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t t h e S o n o r i g i n a t e s
f r o m t h e F a t h e r , a n d i n d e e d b y t h e d i v i n e w i l l (Tn)pfe OeX-qaei
irarptpa)(Opitz
p . 243, 11 3, 5, 11 f , 19).. A t h a n a s i u s a t t a c k s this
last p o i n t also: A r i u s s h o u l d h a v e said t h a t he d e r i v e s f r o m the
d i v i n e essence B u t t h e r e are o b v i o u s o b j e c t i o n s t o a n y s u g g e s t i o n
t h a t G o d ' s w i l l m i g h t c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s essence.
Athanasius
s h o u l d have said t h a t t h e S o n d e r i v e s i n d e e d f r o m his i m m a t e r i a l
essence, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s w i l l . T h e c r i t i c i s m s o f A r i u s w h i c h
w e have j u s t n o t e d w i l l n o t s t a n d
11

(b) ' E f OVK ovrtov c a n be t a k e n t o m e a n t h a t t h e Son's existence

h a d an a b s o l u t e b e g i n n i n g ; see f o r i n s t a n c e Urk. 4b, t h e letter
'Evos

oojpiaros

7:

OL>K e

rv rov

6eov

Xyos,

dXX

If

OVK OVTOJV

yyovev (the W o r d o f G o d w a s n o t a l w a y s , b u t o r i g i n a t e d f r o m
n o t - b e i n g ) . T h e first clause a t least is a p e r f e c t l y fair a c c o u n t of

1 0

G C . Stead, ' T h e Freedom of the Will and the Arian Controversy', in H -D

Blume and F Mann, (eds.), Platomsmus und Christentum, FS H . Drrie, (Munster
Westf , 1983), pp 256 f ( = Substance and Illusion, London, 1985, X V I )
11

VII

VII
679

678
A n u s ' t e a c h i n g ; see e s p e c i a l l y Urk. i 5: Kai rrpiv yewrjOf/ .. . OVK rjv,
s h o r t l y f o l l o w e d b y t h e defence o f I f OVK OVTOJV e x a m i n e d above.
T h e r e p o r t i n Deer
5 b r i n g s t h e phrases c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r : ov yap
fjv b vids irpiv yewr/df),

dXX I f OVK OVTOJV yeyove

o w n w o r d s i n t h e Thalia

Kai avros,

and A l i u s '

m a k e h i s p o s i t i o n clear:

avves STI r\ povas r/v, Tj Svas o" OVK rjv irplv vwdp^Tj. avTiKa yovv v\ov prj OVTOS
o nctTr^p 9eos kern Xomov o vto$ OVK OJV (uTTTjpfe e $eXrjoei warpojq) povoyevr/s
8e6s hart
( A t h Syn 15: Opitz p 243 11. 1-4)

Perhaps w e should render this:

Understand that the M o n a d was, b u t the D y a d was not before i t came
into existence For first, while the Son is n o t , the Father is G o d ; and
next, the Son w h o was not, b u t came into being by the Father's w i l l , is
G o d the only-begotten
M y v a r i a t i o n o f ' i s ' a n d ' w a s ' is s u g g e s t e d b y t h e tense o f t h e
associated v e r b
W e are d e a l i n g h e r e w i t h a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c o n f l i c t o f v i e w s .
Alexander a n d Athanasius h e l d that t h e Son was eternally begott e n , A r i u s t h a t h i s existence h a d a b e g i n n i n g . P e r h a p s t h e m o r e
i n t e r e s t i n g debate centres o n t h e associated p h r a s e rjv ore OVK rjv,
o n w h i c h I h a v e a l r e a d y c o m m e n t e d i n m y 1964 paper A l e x a n d e r
argues t h a t t h e use o f t h e i m p e r f e c t tense is i l l e g i t i m a t e (Urk..
i 4 2 2 f ) , since i t p r e s u p p o s e s t i m e , w h e r e a s t i m e c a m e i n t o b e i n g
t h r o u g h t h e L o g o s ; l i k e w i s e A t h a n a s i u s , c. Ar i 14, argues t h a t
t h e A r i a n d i s c l a i m e r rrpo xpdvojv is i l l e g i t i m a t e , since t h e y s t i l l
a c k n o w l e d g e p e r i o d s (oiaorqpiaTa
TWO) i n w h i c h t h e y i m a g i n e he
was n o t , so n o n e t h e less i n d i c a t i n g t i m e s (ovokv T\TTOV xpoeous
o-qpiaivovTts) a n d c h a r g i n g G o d w i t h u n r e a s o n (dXoyCa), v i z . absence
o f L o g o s T h i s a r g u m e n t c a n f a i r l y easily b e c o u n t e r e d , since i t
is i n p r a c t i c e i m p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d t e m p o r a l l a n g u a g e w h e n one
a t t e m p t s t o deal w i t h e t e r n a l r e a l i t i e s A l e x a n d e r h i m s e l f has
q u o t e d kv dpxtj rjv 6 Xoyos etc , a n d h o w e v e r t h i s is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d ,
i t c e r t a i n l y does n o t i n d i c a t e a p e r i o d o f t i m e i n w h i c h t h e W o r d
was i n t h e b e g i n n i n g , etc. A n d A t h a n a s i u s is p a r t i c u l a r l y exposed
to t h e tu quoque a r g u m e n t , since h e r e f e r s t o G o d c r e a t i n g t h i n g s
' w h e n h e saw t h a t t h e y w e r e c a p a b l e o f e x i s t i n g ' , ' w h e n h e w i l l e d ,
a n d i t was e x p e d i e n t f o r t h e m ' (c. Ar. 1 29). I t m i g h t m a k e sense
t o t a l k o f G o d c r e a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s , or even species, w h e n h e saw
t h a t c o n d i t i o n s w e r e r i g h t f o r t h e m : fishes n e e d a sea t o s w i m i n ;
b u t w h a t e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s c o u l d suggest t h e r i g h t m o m e n t f o r
i n i t i a t i n g c r e a t i o n as a w h o l e ? B u t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n m u s t be
o m i t t e d , since i t w o u l d h a v e t o deal at l e n g t h w i t h a n c i e n t t h e o r i e s
of t i m e , a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n m y 1964 paper a n d e l s e w h e r e .
12

12

See note 9 above

(c) A s f o r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e : i n t e r m s
o f f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n , t h i s is a p e r f e c t l y c l e a r - c u t issue S i n c e the
late s e c o n d c e n t u r y i t h a d b e e n g e n e r a l l y agreed a m o n g C h r i s t i a n s
t h a t G o d created all beings, b o t h material a n d s p i r i t u a l , f r o m
n o t h i n g T h i s excluded any doctrine o f u n f o r m e d matter existing
t o g e t h e r w i t h G o d b e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n ; a d o c t r i n e h e l d , as w e have
seen, b y P l u t a r c h , a n d also b y H e r m o g e n e s , w h o was a n s w e r e d
b y T e r t u l l i a n . S i n c e G o d is t h e sole s o u r c e , i t seems clear t h a t
n o t h i n g else b u t h i s c r e a t i o n c a m e i n t o b e i n g I f OVK OVTOJV, SO that
t h e r e f e r e n c e o f KTLOIS a n d I f OVK OVTOJV is i d e n t i c a l , t h o u g h their
sense is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e
B u t p r o b l e m s r e m a i n ; w e m a y ask, is I f OVK OVTOJV an a l l o w a b l e
p h r a s e , e v e n i f w e d i s t i n g u i s h G o d as t h e ' m o v i n g cause' of
c r e a t i o n ? W e h a v e n o t e d t h e v a r i a n t p h r a s e I K TOC/AT) OVTOS', we
k n o w f o r c e r t a i n t h a t A r i u s h i m s e l f u s e d t h e f o r m e r phrase,
w h e r e a s t h e latter is a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e A r i a n p a r t y (Urk. 4b 7;
A t h c Ar i 22, i i . 18). A r e t h e y r e a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ? T h e latter
appears t o s i g n i f y c o m p l e t e absence o f being.. B u t i n s u c h a case
i t m i g h t seem t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g w h i c h can b e i d e n t i f i e d or
c o u n t e d , so as t o j u s t i f y t h e p l u r a l n u m b e r
T a k e n l i t e r a l l y ret
OVK ovra s h o u l d i m p l y 'at least t w o n o t h i n g ' ! a n d t h e s i n g u l a r
p h r a s e , b e i n g r e l a t i v e l y n o n - c o m m i t t a l , m i g h t seem t o be
preferable
W e c a n r e p l y b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c o n t e x t T h e p h r a s e I f OVK
OVTOJV was u n d e r s t o o d , f r o m t h e late s e c o n d c e n t u r y , as e x c l u d i n g
the theory that G o d brought things into being b y imposing f o r m
o n a p r e - e x i s t e n t u n f o r m e d m a t t e r ; t h e r e are w e l l - k n o w n a r g u m e n t s against m a k i n g m a t t e r c o e x i s t e n t w i t h G o d . B u t these
w o u l d n o t a p p l y t o p r e - e x i s t i n g f o r m s o f t h i n g s t o be c r e a t e d ,
w h i c h c o u l d b e seen as e x i s t i n g i n t h e m i n d o f G o d . I n d e e d , some
a n t i - A r i a n w r i t e r s g o f u r t h e r ; t h u s A t h a n a s i u s i n c. Ar 11.75 quotes
E p h 1:3-5
d T i m r : 2 - i o : t h e c h o i c e o f t h e elect was foreseen
b e f o r e t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d B u t G o d c a n h a r d l y have
c h o s e n t h e elect w i t h o u t f o r e s e e i n g t h e i r c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; so i t seems
t h a t G o d ' s f o r e k n o w l e d g e m u s t e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e 'species and
p o s s i b l y i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' m e n t i o n e d b y O r i g e n (Princ
1.4 5) to
i n c l u d e t h e d e s t i n i e s o f each i n d i v i d u a l ; O r i g e n i n d e e d t h o u g h t
t h a t (as a l w a y s p e r f e c t l y f o r e k n o w n ) t h e y m u s t a l w a y s have
e x i s t e d . I c a n n o t m y s e l f accept a n y s u c h t h e o r y o f t o t a l p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t t h i s is n o t t h e p l a c e f o r i t s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n .
Y e t t h e v i e w t h a t t h i n g s c a n e x i s t ' i n idea' b e f o r e (or w i t h o u t )
a t t a i n i n g e x i s t e n c e i n r e a l i t y seems t o i m p l y t h a t e x i s t i n g is an
a

13

13

See my Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge, 1994), pp 232-35

VII

VIT

681

680
a c t i v i t y w h i c h can he e x e r c i s e d i n v a r i o u s f o r m s I t c o n t r a s t s w i t h
a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h e o r y o f existence p r o p o u n d e d b y m o d e r n
l o g i c i a n s , w h i c h e l i m i n a t e s t h i s s u p p o s e d a c t i v i t y a n d e x p l a i n s '%
e x i s t s ' b y ' s o m e t h i n g is x\ i n w h i c h p h r a s e t h e ' i s ' is a n e n t i r e l y
c o l o u r l e s s t e r m e x p r e s s i n g p r e d i c a t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o d e n o t i n g a n
a c t i v i t y w h i c h x p e r f o r m s a c c o r d i n g t o i t s n a t u r e I have t r i e d t o
e x p l a i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n s i m p l e t e r m s i n m y b o o k Philosophy
in
Christian
Antiquity,
pp. 120-26; b u t I c o u l d w e l l emphasize that
n e i t h e r t h e o r y can easily e x p l a i n t h e w h o l e r a n g e o f cases i n w h i c h
t h e n o t i o n o f ' e x i s t i n g ' is u s e d T h e s e c o n d t h e o r y w o r k s a d m i r a b l y w h e n w e w i s h t o c o n t r a s t t h i n g s t h a t a c t u a l l y exist w i t h m e r e
fictions; b u t i t is n o t easy t o a p p l y t o cases w h e r e s o m e t h i n g comes
i n t o existence b y r e c o g n i z a b l e stages.
T h i s p o i n t can be m a d e w i t h o u t a n y r e f e r e n c e t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
r e a l i t i e s , o r ideas i n t h e m i n d o f G o d , t h o u g h i t does n o t
exclude t h e m . W e still distinguish between intellect and matter
P y t h a g o r a s ' t h e o r e m , f o r i n s t a n c e , c o m e s i n t o b e i n g at t h e m o m e n t
w h e n i t is c o n c e i v e d ; i f t h e r e are stages i n t h i s process, t h e y are
stages i n P y t h a g o r a s ' m e n t a l t r a v a i l ; w h e r e a s A r c h i m e d e s ' 'eureka'
seems t o c e l e b r a t e a n i n s t a n t a n e o u s d i s c o v e r y B u t a t h i n g ' s
c o m i n g into being may w e l l involve b o t h mental and material
o p e r a t i o n s A b r i d g e m i g h t b e g i n s i m p l y as a d e s i d e r a t u m ; i t
b e c o m e s a p r o j e c t w h e n p o s s i b l e m e t h o d s are s u g g e s t e d ; m o d e l s
m a y be m a d e t o t r y o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s ; finally t h e b r i d g e is
b u i l t B e f o r e t h a t t i m e one m i g h t w e l l say t h a t t h e b r i d g e d i d n o t
e x i s t B u t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y stages c a n easily be i d e n t i f i e d , for
e x a m p l e , as ' w o r k o n t h e S y d n e y H a r b o u r B r i d g e ' . Per c o n t r a ,
w e c o u l d say, ' I n 1900 t h e S y d n e y H a r b o u r B r i d g e d i d n o t e x i s t ' ,
or a d d u c e t h e goat-stag or t h e c h i m e r a as t h i n g s t h a t never c o u l d
e x i s t I n s u c h cases t h e r e was n o t , or is n o t , a n y t h i n g t h a t answers
t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n , a n d t h e y c a n be d e a l t w i t h b y t h e t h e o r y
discussed above
T h e s e r e m a r k s o f c o u r s e take us s o m e w a y b e y o n d t h e c i r c l e of
ideas c o m m o n l y r e c e i v e d i n a n t i q u i t y , w h e n w e hear s o m e t h i n g
about the m e n t a l labour of conceiving a project, b u t v e r y little
a b o u t t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l t e s t i n g o f m a t e r i a l devices B u t t h e f a c t
t h a t e x t e n s i o n is p o s s i b l e does n o t m a k e t h e m i n a p p l i c a b l e t o
a n c i e n t p r o b l e m s W e n e e d n o t suggest t h a t a h u m a n a r t e f a c t must
b e g i n as a p r o j e c t ; t a k i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s e x a m p l e , a m a n m i g h t b e g i n
w i t h a mass o f b r o n z e f o r t u i t o u s l y a c q u i r e d , a n d t h e n d e c i d e t o
make it i n t o a statue, rather t h a n b e g i n n i n g w i t h the project and
t h e n a c q u i r i n g t h e necessary m a t e r i a l B u t i f t h e r e are a n y p r i o r i t ies i n G o d ' s a l l - p e r f e c t a c t i o n , he w i l l f i r s t c o n c e i v e a n d t h e n
execute

I n A r i a n t h e o l o g y t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i t seems, w o u l d a p p l y to the
L o g o s ' T h e r e w a s ' t h o u g h n o t ' t h e r e was a t i m e ' ' w h e n he
w a s n o t ' B u t f r o m a l l e t e r n i t y t h e r e e x i s t e d i n G o d his inseparable
W i s d o m , w h i c h is t h e p r o t o t y p e of his p e r s o n a l L o g o s . T h i s w o u l d
b e e s p e c i a l l y clear i f w e c o u l d accept t h e r e a d i n g ( A t h . c. Ar
15)
7] oofiia TTj oocp'Ca urri/pfe trot/iot) 6eov dcA-joei.
B u t h a v e w e a r r i v e d at a p r o p e r a n a l o g y f o r G o d ' s creative
w o r k ? I t d e p e n d s , I t h i n k , o n w h e t h e r w e accept or d e n y the
d o c t r i n e o f t o t a l p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y t h e d i v i n e w i l l . I f w e accept
i t , t h e n p r e s u m a b l y t h e w h o l e c o n c e p t o f a l l f u t u r e events o r i g i n a t e d w i t h o u t a n y lapse of t i m e , t h o u g h i t is a c o n c e p t o f events to
b e e n a c t e d i n t i m e B u t i f t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s w o r l d is at least p a r t l y
u n d e t e r m i n e d , a n d t h u s a l l o w s scope f o r h u m a n f r e e d o m i n a
r a d i c a l sense, w e m a y h a v e t o say t h a t G o d a l l o w s t h i n g s t o exist
and w i t h i n l i m i t s to d e t e r m i n e their f u t u r e w h i l e still exercising
o v e r a l l c o n t r o l . T h i s at least e l i m i n a t e s a d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h m i g h t
e m b a r r a s s t h e d o c t r i n e o f t o t a l d i v i n e f o r e k n o w l e d g e . T h e ancients
o f t e n r e g a r d e d k n o w l e d g e as a k i n d o f i d e n t i t y o f t h e k n o w i n g
m i n d w i t h t h e o b j e c t k n o w n . B u t i n t h a t case, w o u l d n o t the
d i v i n e p l a n collapse i n t o t o t a l i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e events i t s u p p o s e d l y k n o w s ? B u t i f d e t e r m i n a t i o n is n o t a l l - e m b r a c i n g , o n e m i g h t
suppose t h a t G o d h a d f r o m all e t e r n i t y an o u t l i n e plan o f what
was t o b e , b u t a l l o w e d f o r p h y s i c a l i n d t e r m i n a t i o n a n d f u l l h u m a n
freedom.
(d) W h a t of t h e f o u r t h p o s s i b i l i t y , or s u g g e s t i o n , t h a t f r o m the
language u s e d i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e Son is n o t t r u e B e i n g , or is n o t a
t r u e b e i n g , or is a n o n - e n t i t y ? I t d e p e n d s o n t h e exact phraseology
W e have c o n s i d e r e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e phrase I f OVK OVTLOV itself.
W h a t I have n o t so far d e t e r m i n e d is, w h e t h e r i t was used b y A r i u s '
o p p o n e n t s t o i m p l y t h a t A r i u s ' v i e w m a d e t h e S o n one of t h e 'things
t h a t are n o t ' c o n d e m n e d b y St P a u l i n 1 Cor 1:28 For t h e m o m e n t ,
I t h i n k t h i s idea was p r e s e n t as n o m o r e t h a n an i n n u e n d o T h e case
is rather d i f f e r e n t w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e phrase rov /tr) ovra, w h i c h is
a t t r i b u t e d to t h e A r i a n p a r t y b u t n o t d i r e c t l y attested i n A r i u s ' o w n
w r i t i n g s P r o b a b l y our best source is Urk. 4b, a letter w r i t t e n i n the
n a m e of A l e x a n d e r b u t d r a f t e d , I b e l i e v e , b y A t h a n a s i u s ; A r i u s is
said t o believe yp tov rov pi] ovra l/c rov IXT) ovros TTCTToirjKe. C l e a r l y
t h e s y n t a x a l l o w s us t o t r a n s l a t e t h e p a r t i c i p l e either as ' h i m that
was n o t ' or as ' h i m t h a t is n o t ' , j u s t as one can either make a statue,
sc. o u t o f b r o n z e , or m a k e b r o n z e , sc. i n t o a statue. T h e exegesis
' h i m w h o was n o t ' makes t h e p o i n t already c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r (b),
a n d c o u l d have been accepted b y A r i u s ; see e. g Thalia 1 20 (p. 243
14

See my 'Athanasius' Earliest Written Work', JTS,

M, 39, (1988),

76-91

VII

VII
682

683

1. i ) ovve;

o n rj piovds rjv, T) 8va$ Se OVK yjv -npiv v-ndp^n T h e exegesis

' h i m w h o is n o t ' seems m o r e e m p h a t i c ; one m i g h t p e r h a p s deduce

i t f r o m A r i u s , o p c i t . , XOVTOV 6 vids OVK SJV vrrr/p^e

)

&e deXrjoei

TraTpiba,

p,ovoyvr)s 9e6s I o n T h e p r o b a b l e basis is t h a t A n u s r e f u s e d t o a p p l y

t o t h e S o n t h e kyoj elpu 6 wv o f E x o d u s 3:14 E u s e b i u s ' t h e o l o g y
m o v e d away f r o m t h i s p o s i t i o n . I n DE 5 3 r6 ( p p 2 2 r 28 f f ) he
appears to suggest t h i s concession; b u t i t is o n l y i n h i s m a t u r e
Ecclesiastical
effi

Theology

6 vids TO "kyib

t h a t h e c a n say d i r e c t l y e t r ' ovv 6 TraTt)p

kip.1 o < w " , dXr/Oevot dv e/carepios b Xdyos

Xtyei

(2 20.15,

p p T29, 1 28 f . ) N e v e r t h e l e s s t h i s c r u c i a l t e x t uses o civ i n a h i g h l y

d i s t i n c t i v e sense; i t c a n n o t b e r i g h t t o argue t h a t i f A r i u s d e n i e d t h i s
t i t l e t o t h e S o n , he m u s t have r e g a r d e d h i m as TOV psr) t W a i n whatever
sense w e ourselves care t o a t t a c h t o t h e phrase

D i o n y s i i , A r i u s accepting t h e m o r e extreme statements of the

A l e x a n d r i a n w h i l e A l e x a n d e r t r i e d r a t h e r i n c o n s i s t e n t l y t o meet
t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e R o m a n p o p e w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an insistence
o n Teal d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t h e Persons o f t h e T r i n i t y S i n c e t h e
A l e x a n d r i a n D i o n y s i u s was i n c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h Sabellians i n
L i b y a , i t has been p l a u s i b l y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t he f o s t e r e d a m a r k e d
anti-Sabellian reaction towards w h i c h A r i u s was d r a w n Such
e x p l a n a t i o n s appear t o m e m u c h m o r e c o n v i n c i n g t h a n a supposed
i n f l u e n c e f r o m A n t i o c h e n e t h e o l o g y , or a d e b t t o P a u l o f Samosata,
w h i l e L u c i a n remains an enigma
I t m a y well b e , however, that i n A l e x a n d r i a the doctrine of
eternal generation was already established ( f o l l o w i n g O r i g e n and
no doubt influenced b y Dionysius o f R o m e ) ,
so t h a t A r i u s was
u p h o l d i n g a m i n o r i t y v i e w I n other p a t r i a r c h a t e s h i s d o c t r i n e
t h a t t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n irpd xpdvcov KCLI alojvcov w o u l d h a v e been
t h o u g h t s u f f i c i e n t ; i t was e v i d e n t l y a c c e p t a b l e t o E u s e b i u s of
Caesarea, w h o w i t h o u t a g r e e i n g e n t i r e l y w i t h A r i u s nevertheless
v e n t u r e d t o take h i s side against A l e x a n d e r b e f o r e h i s p a r t i a l
c a p i t u l a t i o n at N i c a e a
W h e r e I t h i n k A r i u s is v u l n e r a b l e is t h a t h e r e l i e d so largely
o n P r o v e r b s 8:22 t a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n H i s e x p o s i t i o n o f t h i s text
was u n d o u b t e d l y c o r r e c t , i n t h a t i t r e p r o d u c e d t h e b i b l i c a l w r i t e r ' s
i n t e n t i o n s , as n o t m e a n i n g t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n ' b e g e t t i n g ' and
' m a k i n g ' , or d e l i b e r a t e l y c o n t r a s t i n g t h e i r tenses, as i n t h e L X X
eKnae
ytwa
B u t i t was a breach w i t h t r a d i t i o n ; Christian
scholars h a d l o n g p u z z l e d over t h e t e x t , a n d t r i e d v a r i o u s means
t o a v o i d e q u a t i n g t h e t w o v e r b s . T h e A r i a n a r g u m e n t s f o r equat i o n w e r e n o t n o t a b l y s u c c e s s f u l ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , their o b s e r v a t i o n
t h a t yewav can b e u s e d i n a v e r y general sense w a s taken t o p r o v e
t h a t t h e y r e g a r d e d t h e S o n as a c r e a t u r e tout court, as n o m o r e
t h a n o n e o f t h e ' d r o p s o f d e w ' ( J o b 38:28; see p 6 7 4 ) B u t
A t h a n a s i u s ' c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t s are t h e m s e l v e s i n c o h e r e n t ; he can
a r g u e t h a t G o d ' s acts o f c r e a t i n g , a n d again o f b e g e t t i n g , are
t o t a l l y r e m o v e d f r o m h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e (c. Ar. i 24, 28 i n i t . ) a n d
y e t appeal t o h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e t o p r e s e n t i t as a m a t t e r o f course
t h a t b e g e t t i n g a n d m a k i n g are t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s ( i b i d 24, 29)
I t is d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t h e goes far b e y o n d most
earlier o r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n s i n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e f r a g i l i t y a n d imper
m a n e n c e o f G o d ' s c r e a t i o n , i n o r d e r t o arouse h o s t i l i t y against
A r i u s ' c l a i m t h a t t h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e ; after a l l , t h e relative
1 7

1 8

S e c t i o n 3 has s h o w n t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e A r i a n c o n t r o v e r s y
t h e phrase I f OVK OVTLOV a c q u i r e d v a r i o u s n u a n c e s w h i c h d i d n o t
a t t a c h t o its o r i g i n a l use a p p l y i n g t o c r e a t e d n a t u r e A l l i t i n t e n d e d
t o e x c l u d e w a s , i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t e r m s , a m a t e r i a l cause; t h e m o v i n g ,
f o r m a l a n d f i n a l causes are n o t e x c l u d e d A n d t h e same w i l l a p p l y
t o t h e A r i a n L o g o s T h e o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d against h i s o r i g i n a t i o n
I f OVK 'OVTOJV are l a r g e l y p o l e m i c a l devices T h e real b o n e o f c o n t e n t i o n w a s , w h e t h e r A r i u s was r i g h t i n r e t a i n i n g t h e i n c l u s i v e sense
o f ' c r e a t i o n ' so t h a t e v e r y b e i n g a p a r t f r o m t h e F a t h e r h i m s e l f
m u s t r a n k as a ' c r e a t u r e '
4

'FROM

N O T H I N G ' : PERVERSE

OR DEFENSIBLE?

We come, then, to a controversial a n d very familiar theme I

w i l l begin w i t h a f e w generalities I do n o t t h i n k that A r i a n i s m
s h o u l d b e e x p l a i n e d as a n i n t r u s i o n f r o m a l i e n p h i l o s o p h y i n t o
Christian debate
Moreover I t h i n k i t was predominantly
a n A l e x a n d r i a n d e v e l o p m e n t . B u t t h a t does n o t i m p l y t h a t
A l e x a n d r i a n t h e o l o g y was a u n i f i e d c o r p u s O r i g e n ' s i n f l u e n c e was
o b v i o u s l y p o w e r f u l ; b u t t h e r e is reason t o suspect a n t i - O t i g e n i s t i c
currents
M o r e o v e r O r i g e n ' s o w n t e a c h i n g is many-faceted
N o t a b l y he c o m b i n e d a d o c t r i n e of eternal generation w i t h a
m a r k e d s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s m , a n uneasy c o m b i n a t i o n , b u t one f a m i l iar i n c o n t e m p o r a r y P l a t o n i s m . A r i u s w h o l l y r e j e c t e d t h e f o r m e r ,
A l e x a n d e r reacted s t r o n g l y against t h e latter M o r e o v e r t h e y w i l l
have t a k e n d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n t h e t w o
1 5

1 6

See my 'Platonism of Arius' (n 1) and 'Was A l i u s a Neoplatonist?', Studia

PatiViLita 32 (1997), 39-52 (against R D. Williams, Arms pp 181-232), and
'Platonism in Origen and Arius' (lecture at the Colloquium Origenianum Septimum,
Hofgeismar-Marburg, 1997)
See W A Bienert, Dionysius von Alexandrien, P7S, 21, (Berlin/New York,
1978)
15

16

1 9

See my 'Arius in Modern Research', (n. 7), esp. 34-36

See 'Dionysius of Rome's Letter', in C L Feltoe, Dionysius of Alexandria
(Cambridge, 1904), on the distinction between yeyewijodat and yeyavivai
See esp M Simonetti, Studi sull'Arianesimo (VS 5) (Rome, ^ 6 5 ) , pp 9-87
17

16

19

VII
684
goodness of t h e c r e a t i o n h a d b e e n a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t t o argue
against t h e M a n i c h e e s A n d h i s a r g u m e n t ( i b i d . i i . 19) t h a t i t is
l o g i c a l l y u n s o u n d t o d e s c r i b e t h e S o n as KrCop,a . dXX oi>x OJS h
Ttuv KTtojxdroiVj,

yevvrjfxa

dXX ov\ cos ev TOJV yevvyjftdrtov

is f a r

from

impressive T h e o l o g y demands an element of paradox; a n d surely

n o N i c e n e s h o u l d o b j e c t t o d e s c r i b i n g C h r i s t as dvQpomos, dXX oi>x
tbs is TWV dv8pci>7To)v, r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t f o r A t h a n a s i u s h i m s e l f h e
is b o t h dvdptoiTos a n d OVK 'dvdpojiros b y t u r n s
2 0

A t i u s , w e s a i d , r e l i e d t o o l a r g e l y o n P r o v e r b s 8:22 t a k e n b y
i t s e l f B u t w h e n A t h a n a s i u s i n r e p l y a f f e c t e d t o d e f i n e t h e 'scope'
o f S c r i p t u r e as a w h o l e , h e m u s t b e accused o f special p l e a d i n g ;
as i f t h e w h o l e B i b l e w e r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s h i s o w n f o u r t h - c e n t u r y
problems
N e v e r t h e l e s s i t is t r u e t h a t a great mass o f i m p o r t a n t
t e x t s assign a r o l e t o t h e S o n w h i c h A r i u s a p p e a r e d t o deny. T o
d e c l a r e t h a t h e was e f OVK OVTOJV w a s a p o l e m i c a l s t a t e m e n t , a n d a
tactical error. T h e u n d e r l y i n g d o c t r i n e , that t h e S o n was n o t
c o e t e r n a l w i t h t h e F a t h e r , w o u l d n o d o u b t h a v e b e e n acceptable
i n A l e x a n d r i a i n t h e t i m e o f B i s h o p D i o n y s i u s , as i t w a s i n other
patriarchates i n A r i u s ' o w n time. B u t Alexander and Athanasius
had advanced to a n e w p o s i t i o n , w h i c h they were prepared to
d e f e n d w i t h t h e u t m o s t s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , a n d w i t h c o m p l e t e lack
o f s c r u p l e t o say n o t h i n g o f C h r i s t i a n c h a r i t y i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t
o f t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . A l i u s ' ef OVK OVTOJV m a d e h i m v u l n e r a b l e N o
d o u b t h e w a s p r o t e s t i n g against c r u d e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f IK TOV
irarpds: b u t h e t h u s a p p e a r e d t o d e n y , w h a t e l s e w h e r e h e c l e a r l y
states, t h a t t h e S o n d i d o r i g i n a t e f r o m t h e F a t h e r H e r e p e a t e d
t h i s s t a t e m e n t at t h e e n d o f h i s days i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y f o r m u l a sent
t o C o n s t a n t i n e (Urk. 30, 2) B u t h i s o p p o n e n t s r e q u i r e d m o r e
t h a n h e w a s p r e p a r e d t o c o n c e d e , at t h e same t i m e a c c u s i n g h i m
of h y p o c r i s y
A p p a r e n t l y t h e o n l y w a y t o a v o i d the charge of
hypocrisy was to c o m m i t the sin
2 1

2 2

A r i u s , o f c o u r s e , was n o t w h o l l y f r e e f r o m b l a m e Y e t t h e
C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h has m u c h t o d e p l o r e i n its t r e a t m e n t o f h i m . . T h e
c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d phrases o f h i s Letter to Alexander
attracted the
same i n t e m p e r a t e abuse as h i s a d m i t t e d l y p r o v o c a t i v e
Thalia.
P e r h a p s t h e m o s t u s e f u l lesson w e can d r a w is t h e u n w i s d o m o f
b e f o g g i n g t h e m i n d s o f s i m p l e believers w i t h expressions t h a t are
better s u i t e d t o t h e l e c t u r e - r o o m a n d t h e t h e o l o g i c a l j o u r n a l

See C Kannengresser, Sur ITncarnation du Verbe (SC 199) (Paris, 1973),

pp.48-51
See my 'Athanasius als Exeget', in J van Oort and U Wrckert, (eds),
Christliche Exegese zwnchen Nicaea und Chalcedon (Kampen, 1992), 174-84, here
pp. 177 f
See Athanasius, Ep 54.2
2 0

2 1

2 2

VIII

The Aiian Controversy: A New Perspective

(Magistra, fons dulcedinis, hoc i n loco desipere liceat!)

I h e text that I shall try to introduce to y o u should i think be classed as pseudepigraphical Its historical value I judge to be slight. It is indeed written i n the name o f Alius, and
is presumably the work of an Arian writer, or at least of one who had some measure of
sympathy with the Arian cause But it cannot have been written by Arius himself, nor
indeed during his lifetime, since it clearly shows knowledge of Athanasian theology,
not simply f r o m oral tradition but as it is presented i n his writings. Its evident acquaintance w i t h the Orations against the Arians shows that the work must be dated some five
or ten years after the heresiaich's death, at the earliest; and i f it is seen to have used the
de Synodis also, this indicates a date i n the 360's as a terminus a quo. I n view of t h e
intrinsic interest o f the questions i n dispute I do not pr opose to give further attention t o
its provenance and transmission, but w i l l lay it before you at once i n the English version
which I have prepared I t runs as follows:
f he prophet of old instructed his disciple saying " M y son, if thou comest to serve
the L o r d , prepare thy soul for trials; cleave unto h i m and depart not, and endure the
vicissitudes of humiliation". Indeed the Lord himself said to his apostles " I f a man do
not take up his cross and follow me, he cannot be m y disciple".. Now we w i l l not exalt
ourselves above measure, or presume to compare ourselves w i t h the apostles; but as
followers o f them, and of the holy prophets, and of our blessed and orthodox teachers
in the Church, we have indeed suffered grievous trials at the hands of proud and selfwilled m e n who malign our persistence i n the orthodox faith For as to the blessed
Alexander, at one time our Bishop, we shall say nothing, though we grieved over his
errors; for he showed us many kindnesses, and for a time was willing to listen to us and
inquire peaceably, if by any means we could come together i n the bond of orthodoxy
But i n the end he was persuaded by evil counsellors, and those not grave and experienced men, nor many in number, but by a violent and ambitious youth whose honourable name I will not disgrace by pronouncing it, since i n every place he has promoted
violence and discord rather than the concord and fellowship which disposes to
(auavaoiav) eternal life
N o w the impious Rehoboam listened to the evil counsel of the young m e n after the
death of his father Solomon; but this new tyrant, young though he was, accepted n o
man's counsel, nor did he submit himself to the wisdom of that good Solomon while he
was alive; but stole his affections and usurped his authority, not waiting for that death

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The Arian Controversy

which was to him the opportunity for his ambition; and after the blessed Alexander fell
asleep he was secretly appointed, as he claims, by some two or three confederates, and
by specious words and gifts and promises, and by threats as well, he has corrupted the
minds of the innocent, and now persecutes and drives away the orthodox and faithful
brethren A n d in all this time we ourselves have done h i m no violence, nor have we
incited others to this effect; for not even he himself has ever alleged this; but only, it
may be, some of our brethren were provoked by his violence and injustice towards us,
or sought retaliation for the wrongs they had suffered. But we for our part have never
ceased to strive for communion and fellowship; or if the enmity shown towards us cannot be quenched, we have asked leave to occupy a place of worship where our brethren
can assemble without fear or distraction, desiring only that God's holy altar and the
sacred vessels and ministers of the sanctuary be not violated by men who are robbers,
not givers o f peace
But though so often disappointed, by God's grace we have not been idle, but have
continued to teach and expound the scriptures as our fathers have taught us. A n d those
who are free from ill-will may judge of our faith by the things we have formerly written
But since the proud man does not cease to incite oui fellow-Christians against us,
reviling us as madmen and blasphemers, we are moved by the divine Reason himself to
come to the aid of the truth, not spewing out interminable and repetitious harangues
like those of our assailant, but concisely, as Christian modesty and decency prescribe
For he has inquired in some place whether names are better than the realities they
denote, or inferior to them; and he goes on to complain at us for saying that God uses
many words to instruct us, alleging that each word i n that case must be feeble and need
the help of others to correct i t W h y then does he himself add word to word, nay rather
treatise to treatise? Should he not rather follow blessed Paul, who teaches that the kingdom of God is not i n word but in power? Should he not be ashamed of his inquiry, nay
rather his foolish conundrum which any Grecian sophist would have despised? But if
we may answer a fool according to his folly, let him learn that there are honorable
names, and also names of dishonour; for as to the word 'power', no doubt the reality is
greater than the word; but if we speak of 'powerlessness', then the word is greater; for
the word at least has power to signify, whereas the reality is a lack of any power So then
we must distinguish between word and word, as the blessed Matthew tells us: "for by
thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shall be condemned". But
you, proud bishop, or rather busybody (Moipieiroxoire), do not agree, for you contradict yourself many times over, as we shall shortly demonstrate; and i n one place you
say that we should pay careful attention to the words, observing the place and the time
and the character that is presented; and again you say that the words are things indif1

ferent and fit to be ignored when some person attends to the facts A n d you do not
accept blessed Paul when he proclaims Christ as the power of God and the wisdom of
God; for he has used two names, and thus forsooth has demonstrated the weakness of
both; and you would have him say "Christ the power of God and the power of God",
since it is power without wisdom that you covet and enjoy
But I shall not fail to expose the falsity of those words which you misuse against us.
For in the first place you traduce us as i f we had said that Christ was a mere man; and
you tax us with taking the part o f the Jews and of Caiaphas and of Paul the
Samosatene. But first of all, we have never said this, nor is there any writing of ours
which you can quote to this effect; indeed we have proclaimed him a mighty god, as
you very well know, since you quote our own words in this r e g a r d A n d we have always
taught, in accordance with St Paul, that he is the first-born of all creation, and that he
was with God as a beginning, and as Wisdom was present w i t h him, giving harmony at
the creation o f all things. We say indeed that he was in existence before the ages and
before the creation o f the heavens; and you yourself know that this is our doctrine, for
you acknowledge us, and Eusebius and Asterius too, as teaching that it was by his
means that God created all things. Y o u report our declaration that when God willed to
create originate nature, then he first, and he alone, created one, and one alone, and
called h i m Son and W o r d , that by his means all things should come into b e i n g This
then is your testimony; how then do you dare to slander us, who have called him God's
only Son and W o r d , as if we reckoned him a mere man and numbered him indifferently among the creatures?
5

I t is not on this account that we have called him a creature; for we have made clear
his own proper dignity, proclaiming him "a creature, yet not as one of the creatures, an
offspring, yet not as one of the offspring" Now that we have called h i m a creature, is
both reasonable and devout; nay, we are bound to do so, confirming to the truly theological Solomon, who proclaims in the person of Wisdom "The Lord created me the
beginning o f his ways with a view to his works; before the age he founded me in the
beginning" But you will not have it so; for you tell us that he was created, and yet was
not a creature, as if God were unable to perfect the work which he intended; and
whereas Solomon says that he was created before the age, in the beginning, you vainly
allege that he was installed in some new dignity quite recently, now at the end of t i m e ;
and after all this you revile us as if we had said that he was i n some way improved or
10

11

12

13

See Deer. 16
Ibid
Mt 12:37
Or c Ar r 54

53

10

11

11

Ibid. II 3
Or c Ar I 38, II 17; Deer 10; Sent Dion 3
Syn 15
Col 1:15, Jn 1:1, Prov 8:30
Or II. 24
Syn 16, cf. Or II 19
Prov 8:22-3
Or c. Ar. II 45
Ibid II 74

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54

The Arian Controversy

promoted during his earthly life, which is false; while you dare to uphold that very doctrine which you condemn in ourselves!
Now that he is coeternal with the Father, or shares with h i m the title 'unoriginate',
we are bound in Christian duty to deny; since we have learnt from the saints that the
Father himself is the beginning, and that there cannot be two unoriginates; for in that
case there must be a third to mediate and distinguish between them; and if a third, then
a fourth and f i f t h So we say, framing words to the best o f our ability, that he was not
before he was generated. A n d you yourself must accept this view, since it is beyond
question that the Father is prior to the Son; and even you will not be so reckless as to
say that the Son can beget himself or can beget his own Father, or (though heaven forbid such vile insinuations!) that they mutually beget one another. But we say that the
Son was begotten before all ages, for the ages themselves belong to that created nature
which the Father laid down with the presence and assistance o f his Son A n d in this you
agree, even though you tax us w i t h senseless riddles about the before and the after;
for you yourself declare that the W o r d is the Father's counsel, and again that his
counsel and purpose was made ready before the ages W h y then do you condemn us,
who have but followed the Scriptures in expounding these mysteries - why, I say, do
you condemn us when you yourself use the same expressions as we do?
1 4

15

16

17

Yet again, we have amply declared his proper dignity beyond all other creatures,
enlightened by the blessed Paul, who declares h i m made so much better than the
angels as he has inherited a more excellent name than they But this sentence does
not please you, and you give to it a sense of your own, saying that no comparison is
intended Moreover, when you wish to deny that the Son is a creature, though exalted
above all other creatures, you are not content w i t h changing the meaning of Scripture;
no, you write as if Paul had never spoken For 1 w i l l quote your very words in part, as
follows: " I f the Son were a creature, but not as one of the creatures because o f his
excelling them in glory, it were natural that Scripture should describe h i m by a comparison with the other works; for instance, that it should say that he is greater than the
archangels... But he is not in fact thus referred to " T his is what you wrote against us.
What, have you forgotten Paul's words? Or do you blame h i m for speaking incorrectly
of angels when you yourself would in your wisdom have referred to archangels? W h y
do you say that the Scripture does not compare h i m with the visible things of creation,
or praise h i m as brighter than the sun and moon, and greater than the heavens? Do
you then suppose we are ignorant of the Scriptures, that you toss them out so boldly?
18

19

2 0

21

For Job, and Solomon too, compare h i m , not even with those great lights, but w i t h
rubies, pronouncing him the better A n d the inspired Paul tells us that he saw a light
f r o m heaven above the brightness o f the sun. N o w what was that light but the L o r d ,
who spoke with h i m and gave h i m commandment? A n d that he is more honorable than
thrones we learn f r o m Daniel, who writes: I beheld till thrones were placed, and one
that was ancient of days did sit; for how shall the throne be more glorious than h i m
that sitteth upon it?
22

23

24

But here is further proof of your unscrupulous deceit Since you will not accept that
the L o r d is reverently to be called a creature in accordance w i t h Scripture, you intend
by every means to make the wor d 'cr eature' a term o f dishonour , to make it appear that
we dishonour h i m . A n d to that end you are not ashamed to disparage the works of creation; though even here you are not consistent, but contradict yourself in what you say
For we have read that God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very
g o o d A n d in part you agree; for you speak of the order and harmony of all things
which, as Wisdom tells us, indicates their maker. A n d in your writing against the
gentiles you quote David, who praises the all-embracing providence and disposition of
the W o r d , as you explain Yet again you retract and contradict yourself, alleging that
the nature of all things created is fugitive and changeable, though elsewhere y o u
affirm that each one exists and remains i n its own essence as it was made. A n d as to
mankind you say that they are corruptible by nature, since they are made out of
nothing, supposing that they are subject to some other origin and law than the will of
their Creator; and again you say that God foresaw their weakness and instability before
he created them, as i f he were a meddlesome workman whose pride forbad him t o
abandon his construction even though he knew it would be bad.
2 5

26

2 7

28

29

30

31

N o w that the rational creation is by nature changeable, o f course we shall admit; for
both men and the higher powers are capable o f turning either towards the good or to
the reverse; and what praise or merit could there be in so-called goodness i f no choice is
involved, and men obey their Creator blindly, like the winds and waves, or rest
immovable, like stocks and stones? W i t h good reason, therefore, we say that the Lord is
changeable by nature, like every rational being; for he was not dumb and insensible,
but knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good But by the resolve of his own will
he is unchangeable, as we have many times declared; moreover this good resolve of his
was k n o w n to the Father himself before all ages, and he is therefore worthy to be
22

23

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Cf. ibid II 26
Ibid. I 13
Or II. 2
Ibid 77
Hebr 1:4
Or I 55-7
Ibid II 23
Ibid

55

24

25

16

27

28

29

30

31

Job 28:18, Prov 3:15, 8:11

Acts 26:13.
Dan 7:9
Gen. 1:31.
Or II 32
Gent
Or I.
Or II
Inc 4
Or II

46
36.
19
77

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VIII
The Aiian Controversy

56

acknowledged as the true W o r d and Wisdom of the Father, who also willed to beget
h i m as Son But you make light of the Father's foreknowledge and reasonable
ordinance, as it seems; and though we have declared h i m unchangeable through his
perfection i n goodness, which G o d foreknew, you declare that these are things of no
account, and give h i m no greater authority than Peter or Paul or any other man. A n d so
because of your malice towards us, or it may be through pride at being Bishop of the
Alexandrians, you exalt yourself like Lucifer and dare to insult the wise foreknowledge
of your own Creator.
Moreover you make it a matter of complaint that we speak of two Wisdoms, one in
the Father and one i n the Son, just as they are two persons and two dignities; and
indeed we do not deny this, and have truly said that Wisdom came into being as Wisdom by the will of the wise G o d . For the Father himself is the source of Wisdom and
o f all good things, as you doubtless agree, and of this Wisdom he has given to the Son i n
surpassing measure, so that he alone among God's offspring and creatures and works is
honoured with the name of Wisdom. Yet i n bestowing this Wisdom the Father has not
deprived himself o f Wisdom, perish the thought! - but he remains unchangeably wise,
as he ever was, so that the Son converses w i t h his Father as glory w i t h glory and as Wisdom w i t h Wisdom But you do not agree; for you say that the Son is himself the essential Wisdom of the Father, so that there is nothing which the Father has kept i n his
own power, unless perhaps it be an inessential and inferior wisdom, but that he must
borrow f r o m his Son, like some needy householder. A n d though you affect to despise
the fables of the Gnostics, which we also condemn, yet you portray the Father i n the
guise of the archon falsely conceived by Basilides, who gives rise to a son who is better
and wiser than h i m s e l f Nay further, if all wisdom is found only i n the Son, by what
means does the Father know where to seek it, that he may borrow it? Perhaps, being
himself devoid of wisdom, he does not even know his own Son, but has become which heaven forbid! - like those lustful deities of the Greeks who committed adulteries w i t h impure women, whose deeds y o u have rightly condemned Into this depth
of folly, then, does your heresy lead you; nay rather, o f atheism; for to proclaim a God
who is ignorant and indigent is to acknowledge no God at a l l
32

33

34

35

Nevertheless, though sunk i n such blasphemous error, you do not cease to pour
scorn on our doctrine of Wisdom; for you complain that, as we expound h i m , he has
the name of Wisdom but lacks the reality But who gave h i m that name, we shall ask
Attend to what you have said yourself, as expressing our doctrine: "Then wishing to
create us, he then made a certain one, and thenceforth named him W o r d and Son, that
he might create us through him " Now you indeed present us as speaking scornfully of
"a certain one", before w h o m i n fact we bow; but we shall not otherwise deny this
36

Oi I 5, Syn 16
Syn 41.
Hippolytus, Ref. V I I 23 5
Gent 11-12
Or I 5

57

teaching, and we require you i n turn to uphold what you have here admitted We have
shown, you have said, that it was God, the Almighty and All-Sovereign, who gave to his
W o r d the name of Wisdom; and do you then turn back and insult that name, and say
that on our showing it was given improperly and incorrectly, and that it is a name and
nothing more - that very name which the wise G o d gave to his Only-begotten? Doubtless y o u have read, in the cosmogony of the godloving Moses, that the Lord G o d
created every beast and every fowl of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he
would call them; and whatsoever A d a m called every living creature, that was the name
t h e r e o f Do you not see that even Adam, a weak and fallible creature as you allege,
has received such authority that the names he has given persist i n truth; and do y o u
think the name which God himself has given, and not Adam, to no beast but to his Son,
should be of no account? W h y , even those names which human fathers bestow upon
their sons to this day are valid before magistrates and governors; you yourself bear the
name Athanasius; and even though you misconduct your self and abuse us i n a manner
unworthy of eternal life, yet we do not deny that that is your name; then do you think it
a light matter that the Father of all has named his Son after his own most precious possession, and has given him moreover the fullest measure of all that belongs to that
name? But if you despise our admonition, attend once more to blessed Paul, who says
that he has inherited the most excellent name; and from w h o m did he inherit, if not
f r o m the Father, who is the first and original possessor of that name?
37

38

Now we have given many instances o f your deceitfulness and double-dealing; but
we shall not prolong our discourse, for we have no desire to imitate the torrent of turbulent and spiteful words which your malice, rather than your piety, has poured forth.
Nevertheless one chapter shall be added, i n the hope that even now you may repent
and acknowledge your delusions and the injustice i n which you have indulged We o n
our part have said that the W o r d was begotten before the ages by the w i l l and determinate counsel of the Father. But this doctrine does not please you; for you say that the
Son is the offspring, not of God's will, but of his nature; and you have many times
described the generation of the W o r d , comparing it with an outpouring of (solar)
radiance f r o m the sun; and that though you yourself denounce us for comparing the
Lord with created things For consider, we entreat you, what you think of these
heavenly bodies D o you believe the sun to be a thing inanimate, as some of the Greeks
have declared him to be a fiery mass of stone? I n that case he has neither reason nor
will, and acts according to the nature that God has assigned h i m ; and how is it lawful to
imagine God's Fatherhood in the likeness of such dumb and irrational beings? Or do
you consider that luminary to be a rational and logical being, as the industrious Origen
has maintained? I n that case it is by his will that he gives forth his rays i n obedience to
his L o r d , and follows the dictates of his nature, as God has commanded, and as y o u
39

40

Gen 2:19
Hebr. 1:4.
Or III. 65-7
Ibid II 33 etc

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The Arian Controversy

yourself have asserted So then in neither case is there a conflict between will and
nature; for either there is no reason and no will, or else he wills to act according to the
nature which God has assigned h i m ; and so your comparison fails
But you, it appears, have not only spoken contrary to the plain and well-grounded
evidence of the truth; you have also, as one might expect, refuted yourself by your own
admissions For you have said, we repeat, that the W o r d is the offspring, not of God's
will but of his nature; and nature, you say, transcends w i l l Now how the matter stands
w i t h the creatures we have already explained; but w i t h regard to the L o r d of all things,
you yourself have declared that he is wholly simple and uncompounded, and is all
essence, and that there are no accidents in h i m Now if this indeed be the truth, as you
confidently declare, it must needs follow that his dignities and titles are identical one
w i t h another, and that there is in his essence no better and worse, no before and after,
but that his being consists in one equal perfection How then do you dare discriminate
between his nature and his will, saying that the one transcends the other? - when truth
and reason assure us that his nature is to will what is good, and his will is to express the
goodness of his nature? Your doctrine is manifest folly For ourselves, we do not boast
- God forbid - that we can discern the incomprehensible depths of his holiness, before
whom the very angels hide their faces; but we have learnt by faith to call him the God
ofpeace, and to know that there is no unrighteousness in h i m ; and if no unrighteousness, then no injustice, no distinction, and nothing greater or less A n d this truth you
have in part perceived, though in your haste to condemn us you have forsworn your
own sound doctrine, and blasphemously denied the indivisible unity of H i m who is all
in all.
41

4 2

4 3

44

45

Nay more, this unity itself refutes that opinion that you have lately begun to flaunt,
namely that the Son is one in essence w i t h the Father. For if that essence is simple and
indivisible, as we have shown, how can it be conveyed or distributed to another? I h e
W o r d indeed has declared " A l l things that the Father hath are mine", signifying that the
Father has given h i m full measure o f all his dignities and glories; but in so saying he has
distinguished between the Father and himself For did the blessed l o h n report him as
saying " A l l things that I have are mine"? Or did he make the Father bestow those dignities on his own person? Yet these absurdities cannot fail to follow f r o m your doctrine
If, as you say, the divine essence is one and undivided, how can there be any that shares
or partakes in that essence, so as to be coessential with the Father? For if that undivided
essence is wholly communicated to another, there will be two Fathers and two Creators
and two First Principles and two Supreme Beings, which is abhorrent to reason and
Christian piety; but if it suffers no division or distribution, then there can be no distinction of persons, but the Father himself will be Son, and the Son himself the Father,

41

42

43

44

45

Cf. Gent 40, [n illud omnia 4.

Or II 2, III 62
Deer 11, 22; Syn 35
Rev 7:11.
Rom 15:33, Hebr 13:20

59

even as the imprudent Galatian has declared them to be one and the same; and so by
your unlawful innovations you revive the heresy of the execrable Sabellius and
demolish the Church's confession of the holy Trinity - that very faith which you claim
to cherish and uphold
Reflect, we entreat you, on what we have said, beseeching the Lord to restore to y o u
a temperate and peaceable m i n d ; put away your fury and your sophistries, and accept
us even now as fellow-workers and fellow-servants. Correct what we have taught, if y o u
are able, but with judgement, remembering that both together we shall stand before
the judgement seat; or if we have spoken truly, then join w i t h us and with our orthodox
fathers in confessing the sole ingenerate, the one Eternal, the only wise God, to w h o m
Wisdom herself pays adoration

IX
K N O W L E D G E OF GOD I N E U S E B I U S A N D A T H A N A S I U S

The knowledge of God i n Eusebius and Athanasius is a subject which i n competent hands might f o r m an impressive conclusion to our conference. To do
it justice i n a single paper is quite another matter; it opens up a wide range of
enquiries, and touches on some of the most intractable problems of philosophical theology. For instance, are we to consider what can be said about God?
that is, what sort of human language can be so adapted as to describe the hidden and comprehensive reality which underlies our whole existence? O r should
we be looking for some experience of contact w i t h God which is necessarily so
remote f r o m our usual acts and thoughts that i t cannot be described i n normal
terms and has to be indicated in the language of paradox? Or again, should we
judge it a mistake to present these alternatives? I have suggested that knowledge of God may be conceived either i n terms of rational statements or of mystical consciousness; but in pointing this contrast, I am using the categories of
modern Western philosophy; we shall f i n d , I think, that our chosen authors
conceive their problem quite otherwise; their most important category being
the intellect, nous, which implies b o t h rational content and the directness o f
intuitive perception
1.. We need, therefore, to find a simple down-to-earth point of departure; and
I propose to begin f r o m a well-known passage i n the De Incarnatione, c. 12.. I n
this chapter Athanasius enumerates the various means of knowing G o d which
had been devised by his divine providence; previous to the Fall, it w o u l d seem,
and anticipating its possibility, G o d provided for man's negligence: jrpoevoTioaxo Kai rn<; au,E>.ia<; TOUTCOV, i v ' av aiieXrioaisv 8 i auTcdv TOV 0e6v
STtiyvcovai, excooi
r o v Srinioupydv p-fl ayvosiv He mentions first what we
may call ideal knowledge, which should have been sufficient for man i f he had
not sinned. Next comes the possibility of recognizing the Creator through attending to the works of his creation. Thirdly, God provided for the Law and
the Prophets, whose teaching is more accessible, since i n that case mankind
can learn f r o m other men. But since all these means were ineffective i n the face
of human wickedness, God finally adopted the expedient of renewing men
through the presence of his o w n Image, the Logos, after whom they were first
created; so the W o r d of God came down to earth i n his own person: 68ev 6
xoO eou Aoyoc; 6 i CCUTOO Ttapeyevero, c 13. 7 There are thus f o u r possible
!

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230

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS AND AIHANASIUS

ways of knowing G o d , if we may trust Dr. Meijering's analysis in Athanasius

contra Gentes, p 114; though Athanasius' treatment of the third way contains
a rather complicated resumptive clause and refers to the 'saints', o i dyiot, who
may possibly be Christian teachers distinct f r o m the Prophets, the p a K a p t o i
SiSdcKaXoi mentioned in c 1 For the purpose of this paper I intend to consider only the first item on the list; I shall t r y to examine the ways in which
Athanasius and Eusebius explain our ideal knowledge of God

231

TtptTou 7tA,ao8VTO(; dvOpcoTiouwho at first attended to God and the contemplation of God, but then at the instigation of the serpent fell away. And
this leads back to the general statement that i n their pursuit of pleasure men
began to devise vaiious forms of idolatry and vice, where there is not the
smallest doubt that Athanasius intends to describe actual practices of Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, including a reference to the Emperor

Hadrian's

favourite, Antinous
N o w of course the DI does present a rather different picture, and Dr. Louth

2. A n y treatment of the De Incarnatione w i l l naturally refer to its companion

piece, the Contra Gentes; and we must take account of a certain difference in
perspective between these two w o r k s , which compare rather differently with
the thought of Eusebius The divergence is especially marked in their early
chapters, and it prompted a young O x f o r d scholar, as he then was, Dr. Andrew
L o u t h , to draw a sharp contrast between them They d i f f e r , he maintains, in
the account they give o f the Fall of man, but also i n the assumptions they make
about our knowledge of God.. 'The Contra Gentes gives an account o f man's
fall f r o m a state of contemplation to a state subject to sensual pleasures. It is
a timeless account.. It is untypical of Athanasiusbut typical of Alexandrian
theology generallyin using allegorical exegesis. De Incarnatione
is historical, realist, and turns, not on intellectual contemplation, but on the obedience
and disobedience of man '
1

I agree w i t h D r . Meijering that this contrast is overstated I n m y o w n opini o n , neither book presents a perfectly consistent picture. The case is rather,
that i n each o f them Athanasius is drawing upon traditional themes, and
selects rather different points for emphasis. But it is certainly not the case that
the theology of one book contrasts en bloc w i t h that of the other.
First, then, the CG certainly does not begin by considering the Fall of man
in allegorical terms.. One can see this clearly if one contrasts Athanasius w i t h
Phrlo. Philo repeatedly suggests that the first man symbolizes intellect, nous,
and the first woman symbolizes sensation, aistMsis
But Athanasius does
not tell us that the first man symbolizes anything at a l l ; at most, we can say
that he treats h i m as an example of a general t r u t h He states that God's purpose was that men should enjoy uninterrupted communion with h i m , and adds
that this actually happened i n the case of 'the first man
who was called
A d a m i n the Hebrew tongue;' the only hint of allegory here is a reference to
the place which Moses figuratively called the GardenTPOTUKCSC, 7rapd5sioov
(bvoiiaosv, c. 2. Athanasius then states that men, o i dvOpomoi,neglected the
contemplation of God and sought for satisfactions close at hand, i n the pleasures o f the body; and this again is illustrated by the case of the first manTOU
2

is perfectly right in emphasizing the divine command of Genesis 2:16 and the
stress on disobedience as opposed to the neglect of contemplation and pursuit
of sensual pleasure. Indeed we could go further Many readers of the DI find
that it comes like a breath of fresh air; here at last, they think, is a straightf o r w a r d biblical account, as opposed to the foggy generalities found i n the CG
and also in Eusebius. But I think we gain this impression because we have all
been influenced by Augustine and his intense concentration on Romans, especially Romans 5:12, together of course with 1 Cor.. 15:21-2.. Athanasius does
reproduce this Pauline perspective; but this is not the view of all the biblical
writers The Book of W i s d o m , which Athanasius uses f a i r l y freely, considers
that human wickedness results f r o m idolatry; the creation o f man is mentioned
only in general terms at 2:33 and 9:2; there is no mention of A d a m b y name;
his creation appears only incidentally at 7:1, while his f a l l only comes to light
at 10:1 i n the claim that 'Wisdom delivered h i m out of his own transgression.'
Even St Paul in Romans begins w i t h a general denunciation of human wickedness and discusses the role o f the Law and the faith of A b r a h a m before coming
to Adam's transgression at 5:12-14; and this is specif ically named as 7rapaKori
first at 5:9

A n d of course there are other biblical traditions, including that

which lays the blame on Eve.

There is no call for surprise, then, if we f i n d Eusebius writing largely in the

tradition of the Wisdom writer, making general statements about human wickedness prompted by idolatry, and emphasizing

the Origenistic theme of

neglect and contempt rather than some single act of disobedience. The Laus
Constantini,
Praeparatio

so far as I can discover, consistently follows this line

The

Evanglica Book V I I begins w i t h a passage recalling the CG c. 3,

i n which mankindor rather the Gentilesare reproached for giving themselves over to bodily pleasures, and so learning to worship the sun and other
heavenly bodies on which those pleasures depend; there follows a quotation of
Wisdom 14:12, ' A p ^ f ] ydp Ttopvsac, ivoia eiScXcov, which w i l l recur in
Athanasius, i n CG 9 and 11 Eusebius occasionally refers to Adam by name,
but hardly emphasizes his role as progenitor, or his failure and disobedience;

A Louth, The Concept of the Soul in Athanasius' Contra GentesDe Incarnatione, in:
E A. Livingstone Studio Patristica 13 = TU 116, Berlin 1975, 228
2 Philo Leg. All 1 92 2.5-8. 16, 31 38 40, 70f etc
1

this only appears rather incidentally at 7.18. 8, tv 5' aBeKouaop apasi

1 lim 2:14, Justin Dial 10 Iren 1.30 7, 3 22 4, 5 19 1 (sec Massuet)

IX

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232

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS AND AIHANASIUS

TCOV KpeiTxovojv d7t07T-saTv

.. evToXfjc; oAiycapta, where the theme of neglect

233

w h e n he writes: KCLT* e i K o v a y e y o v a u x v , eaopeOa K a i KO.6' 6u.oicoaiv

But

is still prominent. A d a m , the earth-born ynysvfic,, seems undistinguished

Eusebius I think shows a f a i r l y m a r k e d preference f o r identifying the two

when contrasted w i t h the perfectly righteous Enosh; the very name ' A d a m '

p h r a s e s ; typical isPE

can symbolize TOV KOIVOV K d i TCOXUV dvOpamov (7 8 8 ) I n the

ounicoaiv 7tpo<; a u r o u xou QsoO .

Demonstrate

there is no mention o f A d a m by name, and I think only one reference to his

sage (PE

fall t h r o u g h the misuse of his free w i l l .

achieved

7.18.5, TOUTOV U.EV OUV K a i ' e i K o v a (paoiSeou K a i K a 8

u n o o r f i v a i , a n d I have found o n l y one pas-

11 27.4) w h i c h suggests that our ouoicooic, is something still to be

H o w does Athanasius appear by comparison? We can admit that there is

Very likely, theref o r e , it w a s Eusebius who taught Athanasius that A d a m al-

some contrast between the two early works; the CG shows a rather closer

ready possessed both image and likeness. Athanasius identifies these concepts,

agreement w i t h Eusebius. But the contrast is far less acute than L o u t h makes

whether he is describing the c r e a t i o n of m a n k i n d in general, as in CG

out Athanasius does not say, like Eusebius, that A d a m represents the com-

34, f| \\iu%i\ KaET otioicoaiv

y e y o v s v , a n d DI

2 and

11, 7ioii TOUTOUC, K a 9 '

m o n man. A d m i t t e d l y the CG describes the misdeeds of mankind i n general,

6u.oicociv: or that of A d a m in p a r t i c u l a r , w h o was xiXsxoc, KTio0ic;, c

rather than a specific sin of A d a m ; but these general condemnations reappear

2 66, and w h o m God w i s h e d s i m p l y to persist in his original c o n d i t i o n , CG 3,

quite frequently i n the DI; the Fall is introduced by a general statement i n 3.4;

OUTGO K a i u i v s i v fiSeXnoev, with s i m i l a r phrases at CG 34 and DI 4, There is

and although Athanasius quotes the divine p r o h i b i t i o n of Gen. 2:16, he does

no thought of opnitooic; as a further perfection still to be acquired.

not mention A d a m by name u n t i l the genealogy i n c. 35 The theme of idola-

Ar.

O n this basis, Athanasius c a n describe m a n ' s ideal knowledge o f God

in

t r y , again, is still quite prominent. Can one then see a contrast i n that Euse-

highly optimistic terms in the second chapter of CG.

bius and the CG dwell o n the Origenistic idea of neglecting the contemplation

p o i n t s : (1) Man's c r e a t i o n ensures for h i m a knowledge of God.

(2)

of God rather than the specific sin of disobedience? Certainly the reference to

knowledge resides in the s o u l , (3) or m o r e p r o p e r l y in the m i n d , nous

I n either

disobedience as such are not very prominent i n Eusebius; but the idea is f o u n d ,

c a s e , to exercize it, one m u s t t u r n a w a y f r o m bodily sensations and attend to

e.g., i n PE 2.6 12-15; again, the CG does n o t refer t o theparabasis of men,

noeta

and only once to their parakoe,

c 5 O n the other hand the theme of neglect

reflect the Logos w h o m it resembles

is well represented i n the DI

M e n are still blamed, as i n the CG,

in Eusebius, though he states t h e m m o r e fully a n d less forcefully. Athanasius

because

they failed t o devote themselves t o the contemplation of God

We m a y n o t e these
This

(4) Given this c o n d i t i o n , the soul is self-sufficient; in its p u r i t y , it can

These p o i n t s , I believe, can a l l be found

e n o r m o u s l y improves o n Eusebius; but his merit, i n dealing with o u r present

topic, lies in clarity a n d e c o n o m y of statement rather t h a n in originality of

3. This contemplation is what I have called ideal knowledge; it was enjoyed by

thought..

A d a m i n his unf alien state. Athanasius* view of A d a m is closely bound up w i t h

3.1

The first point is w e l l stated in CG 2:6 7cau.[}aaiXsuc, 0EOC 6u7tspEKiva

his exegesis of Gen 1:26. L i k e P h i l o , he explains that the eiKtbv is God's Logos

7caartc, oi>aiac, K a i dvOpaimvnc, E7n.voi.at; urtdpxcov .

himself; i n one passage, c. Ar

K a r iSiav E i K o v a rc7ioin,K K a i TCQV OVTCOV a u r o v eecopnTfiv K a i ETucTrjuova

2.49, he designates h i m t o o dXnBwoO 0EOU

. T O dv9pcimivov ysvoc,

eiKtbv KCU 6u,oicflou;, But man was created KCIT' s i K o v a K a i K a 9 ' duoicoatv,

S i d Tfjc, Ttpoc, atJTOv 6UOICOGECD<; KaTsoKVjac,

and the t w o phrases are treated as synonymous This was a long-standing prob-

diSiOTriTOC, s v v o i a v K a i yvcoaiv . We note the apparent c o n t r a d i t i o n ; God is

5oij<; auTCp K a i TTIC; tSiac,

lem of exegesis; Irenaeus, Clement and Origen all offer t w o distinct interpreta-

s a i d to be b e y o n d h u m a n a p p r e h e n s i o n , in the conventional version of Plato

tions, sometimes identifying the t w o phrases, sometimes distinguishing, so as

Rep.

to make ouoicocue, refer t o a spiritual condition which we are to achieve by our

statements c a n be f o u n d i n Eusebius; but w h e n carefully examined, Eusebius

own effort and v i r t u e . Origen puts this very clearly i n Comm

proves to be passing on two quite distinct traditions

Joh. 20.22.183,

509 b; yet he has given m a n

k n o w l e d g e of his o w n eternity

Similar

First, he reproduces the

old apologetic assertion that all m e n are really theists; this appears v e r y clearly
7

+ Ens PE 2 6.12, 7 8.8-9, 116 1015; DE 4.6.7; but cf. PE 7 18.5 cited below.
Ath D/condemns mankind generally, I I , 15, 36, 40 etc.; idolatry.. 1 If , 14, 20, 30f.,40, 46;
neglect of contemplation, 4 4, 5.1, 11 4, 12 1, 14 7.
Eixtv and uoitoic, equated: Iren 3 23 2, 4 20 1, 5 t.3, 15.4; Clement Protr 98 4, Paed
3 66 2, Str. 2 19; Origen Princ 1.2 6, 2.10 7, 11 3, 3.1.13, 4.4.10; Horn Gen. 1.13, 13.4; Horn.
Lev. 3.2; Sei. Ps. 4.3; Horn Lk. 39; Comm Jo 2 23.144; Eusebius HE 1 2.4, PE 3 10.16,
7.12.10, 17.3f , EI 1.20 8
Distinguished: Iren. 5.6.1, 16.1; Clement Paed. 1.3, Str. 2.22; Origen Princ 3 6 1, Horn Ezek
13 2, Comm Jo 20 22 183, Cels. 4 30, Orat. 27 2; Eusebius PE 11 27 (?).
5

in E 7 1 20 6, TOV SE E H I rcavxcov 0 e 6 v cpuaiKaic; Evvoiaiq ajtavTEC, 6u.oA.oyoOo i v avOpcoTcoi, w h i c h of c o u r s e c o n f l i c t s very sharply w i t h the doctrine of an
u n k n o w a b l e God, But secondly, there are relics of the tradition f o u n d in Philo
of a n ideal a n d sinless first m a n , i n c o r p o r e a l a n d asexual and naturally en-

Minucius Felix Oct 19.. Eusebius PE 2.6 I I , ET 1.20.6.

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K N O W I E D G E OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS

235

dowed with the knowledge of God So Eusebius writes, PE 1 17 3: TtovsvfjLiiv

sebius; and both authors use intellectualist terms like evvota, KaxavoEtv and

TO usv TL tpaal Gstov Kai d.9dvarov, daapKOv Trfv (puaiv Kai doojiiaxov, TOU-

XoyityaBai

TOV 8i K a i tov dX,rj0ii xuyxdvstv avSpainov, KaT' stKova 9eou K a i ounicoaiv

phors like OEGJPETV and 6copia, and the Platonic image of the nous as dufia

yYvr|LLvov: and this ideal man is sharply distinguished from the earth-born

Tfjt; \\i\jxr\c,, to which I shall return

Adam of Genesis 2 and 3. Athanasius here is simpler and more consistent;

to indicate our knowledge of God, together with associated meta-

The use of the actual word opdv is naturally rather more restricted, but it

Adam for him is morally perfect, but he is a man like ourselves, equipped with

does occur, encouraged perhaps by the quotation of Mt

a body and subject to bodily desires when he neglects his vocation of contem-

state of innocence, the mind is raised aloft, dvco HExdpcuoi; yivExai, Kai TOV

5:8, in CG 2: in its

plating God. But Athanasius again is not wholly consistent; his combination

Adyov iScbv, opa sv aurco Kai TOV TOU Adyou TTaxEpa Conversely, in a 7 the

of traditions presents us with an Adam who is supposed to be perfect, but

guilty soul is described as Kapp,vjoaaa TOV 6<p6aXu.dv 5i' oi5 TOV OEOV 6pdv

whose virtue and spirituality is in fact corruptible

Suvaxat, a biblical phrase often repeated in his later works.

3.2 Secondly, where do we possess the knowledge of God? 'In the soul,'

Athanasius thus appears to treat the nous, not only as the eye of the soul,

seems the obvious answer Athanasius is clearly affected by the idealized view

but as its only source of good impulses I think he only once refers to other

of the soul propounded in Plato' Phaedo,

which attributes true perceptions to

powers in the soul in complimentary terms. Accordingly, as Charles Kannen

This view is developed in

giesser has observed, when Athanasius comes to speak of human corruption,

the soul and makes the body the source of error

10

CG 2-4, and appears again in 31-4 God is incorporeal, and knowledge of

it is always the soul that is involved; so CG 3.4, 4 4, and DI 11 4, s96Acoaav

God depends upon our dissociating ourselves from corporeal things, CG 2 3

SauTCOv xhv yv%r)\> The soul is infected when it rebels against the guidance of

Athanasius even affirms that the body 'could not consider what is outside it-

the nous, or when it neglects to keep its attention fixed on God; but there

selfOUK dv r d sco0sv sauTou Aoyi^oixofor it is mortal and transitory,' c.

seems to be no suggestion that the nous itself can be corrupted No suggestion,

32 In c. 4 he says, more reasonably, that our bodily members can be occupied

that is, within this particular topic of discussion; in practice, when criticizing

either with reality or with unreality; our eyes can be used to admire the crea-

his opponents, Athanasius is quite ready to say that their minds are unsound,

tion, and our ears to listen to the laws of God But this point is soon forgotten;

oi>x uyiaivovTEc;, or crippled, nsjinpcopEvoi, or perverse, 6iaaTp(pa9at;

Athanasius continues to point out the religious benefits of our sense of sight

and there is a mention of the corrupt nous of 2 Tim. 3:8 in the Letter to Adel-

without reminding us that our eyes are parts of the body

phius, c I.

3 3. When Athanasius idealizes the soul, he almost invariably refers to it as

the seat of reason, nous

But the optimistic view of nous is reflected in what Athanasius says about

The notion that man perceives God through his nous

noeta; these are always presented as ideal realities and truthswhich indeed

is especially frequent in the early chapters of the CG, for instance when he

is the normal use of the term. In the CG 4 there seems to be no distinction

declares Adam K a r a TTIV dpxTjv dvaiaxovTtp Ttappncia TOV voOv saxnKsvat

drawn between

Trpdc, TOV @dv, 2 4 Eusebius takes the same view, which of course is exceed-

xpoc, xd KaXd 9ecoptac;, and both these phrases seem to be equivalent to the

dTtoaxfivai

XTJC, TCOV VOTITCOV OEtopiac, and dTtooxfjvai xfjc,

ingly common and is well represented in Philo, for instance in opif. 69, where

dTcocTpcpa6ai xfiv rtpoc, TOV 0 d v 9(opiav of DI 15 1, or indeed dicoo-

the nous takes the place of God's image in man: f| 6s ELKCOV XEA-EKTOI K a r a

Tp(pEo9ai TOV 0E6V, ibid

TOV Tfjc; yuxnc, f|yuova vouv

114

The connection of soul and mind is variously

3.4 A specially striking phrase which appears at the end of CG 2 claims that

represented; in their idealized state they can be simply coupled together; so E u -

the purity of the soul is capable of reflecting God through itself as in a mirror:

sebius PE 3 10 16, (ffu^fi XoyiKf) .

K a i vouc, d7ca6f\<;: and Athanasius al-

ludes to the Logos who sees both soul and mind, DI14

4 Sometimes the mind

seems to be conceived as part of the soul, or its directive part; so CG 34, men

ixavf| 5s f| Tfjq

(puxfit;

KaGapoTni; EOTI

Kai TOV 0EOV S t

EauTfjc,

Kaxo7txpi^a9ai. This brings together three suggestive ideas: (a) the selfsufficiency of the soul, (b) its purity, and (c), the metaphor of the mirror

can ascend, dvapfjvai, xo> vco rite viruxfic,; thus the soul consorts with angels

(a) The self-sufficiency theme recurs in c. 30, slightly modified by biblical

'confident in the purity o f its mind,' xfj TOU vou 6appouoa Ka9ap6xT|xi, ibid.

texts which limit its application to Christians, who have faith and have the

33 Much the same view can be suggested without explicit reference to the

kingdom of God wiihin them In c 2 the claim is far bolder; the context sug-

nous; the phrase \L/UX"H XoyiKii is common enough in Athanasius, as it is in EuEjufiuuia condemned CG 34 a[ ; with 9uu.6c Vit Ant 21 init; contrast Ep ad Marc 27,
PG 27, 40A
Soul corrupted. CG 3 4, 4 4, DI 11 4 Mind corrupted, Deer 21, Dion 12 3, c Ar 2
10

Op til , 64 c-67 d; cf. Eusebius PE 2 6.12t , 3.10.15.

Athanasius CG 4 4 35f., 40 fin , 45; DI 12 3, 32 1, 45 3

11

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IX

236

gests that the soul's power of rising above perceptible things, which the body
desires, and consorting with itselffeotuTcpauvcovmakes it capable of uniting with the divine and intelligible realities i n heaven, just as Adam 'associated
with the saints i n the contemplation of intelligible reality,' EV xfj TCOV vonrcov
Secopia Athanasius appears to draw no distinction between the soul's contemplation of the noeta and its contemplation of the Logos, i n whom the Father
himself can be seen..
(b) The theme of purity in the soul is of course a very common one, which
indeed Athanasius has already mentioned earlier, in CG 2.. There is a biblical
basis in Wisdom 7 : 2 4 , though strange to say the noun Ka6ap6rnc, occurs only
once in the New Testament, where it refers to the flesh, and not at all in Philo.
Purity is closely associated with knowledge; so Eusebius DE 4 8 3 , vco Siauyet
tcai yv%T} K K a 8 a p p v r j , followed by Athanasius Deer 2 4 , KaOapd rfj yuxf)
Kcti uovcp TCO vco More exactly, both authors associate purity with the socalled 'eye of the soul,' which needs to be cleansed in order to contemplate reality: the op.Lia Tfjc; y u x i k of Plato Rep 5 0 8 , 5 3 3 d Plato speaks here (and at
5 4 0 a) of redirecting or of training the eye; but the metaphor of cleansing is
used at 5 2 7 d and is again suggested when he speaks of removing accretions
from the soul, ibid 6 1 1 The metaphor is used by Eusebius at PE 2 4 . 4 and
again at 2 . 6 1 2 , Siavoidc, 6u.u.aat KEKaQappEvoic,
auvevoriaav.
Athanasius imitates this phrase with the slight rewording otpQaXpoc; Tfjc;
Siavoiac,, CG 2 7 , DI 3 0 , and the metaphor of intellectual vision is quite
elaborately developed in CG 3 4 and DI 5 7 , where Dr Meijering aptly compares Plotinus 1. 6 9 ; the eye cannot see the sun unless it becomes sunlike
(c) Athanasius associates the pure eye of the soul with the metaphor of a mirror, KdiortTpov, CG 2, 8 , and 3 4 . This has a complex history, which includes
Wisdom 7 : 2 6 , where the word is Eoorcrpov: Philo migr 9 8 , which shows that
the comparison of the soul to a mirror, KdroTcxpov, was an accepted commonplace in his day; and St. Paul, especially the much discussed phrase in 2 Cor.
3 : 1 8 , dvaKEKaXupirevcp Tcpoocorca) xfiv S6i;av TOO Kupioo KaroTirpi^op-Evoi.
Scholars have been unable to decide whether KaTOTtTpi^dtievoi means 'beholding' or 'reflecting'; the verb is something of a rarity, though it occurs in Philo
L A 3 1 0 1 , where the sense 'beholding' is the more natural. Bettter evidence
can be found in Christian authors, who are naturally drawn to the arresting
phrases of St Paul. Meijering refers to Theophilus and Clement; of whom
Theophilus undoubtedly provides the closer parallel, since he connects the mirror with cleansing our eyes so that we can see the sun (Aut. 1 2 ; cf CG 3 4 , DI
57). In my opinion, however, the most important parallels are found in Gregory
Thaumaturgus and in Eusebius. Gregory describes the soul learning to contemplate itself as in a mirror and thus beholding the divine mind: auTfic, TTjc,
vj/uxfK Eaurfiv cboTtEp EV Kai67CTpco opdv P-EXETCOOTH;, KCEI TOV BEIOV VOOV

EV saurf} KaTOTtTpi^ouivnc, (pan Or 1 1 142). Eusebius quotes a passage from

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS A N D AIHANASIUS

237

the First Alcibiades of Plato (p 1 3 3 , at PE 1 1 . 2 7 . 5 ) where the full text adds

some suggestive new touches to the comparison. The eye itself is a mirror,
since one can see things reflected in the pupil of the eye ( 1 3 3 a); in fact, says
Socrates, the eye can only see itself in some such way; nevertheless there are
better mirrors available ( 1 3 3 c); likewise, although the soul itself is a mirror in
which it can see itself, the purest and brightest mirror is the god who is present
within it. We shall criticize this reasoning a little later; for the moment, we
note that this passage suggests, more clearly than most, that there is an identity
between the observer and the reflecting medium.. I think we can conclude that
there is no point in discussing the precise significance of Kar07tTpiCEa9ai in 2
Cor., since the whole comparison turns on the claim that the soul can observe
itself as in a mirror. It follows that the soul, as observer, sees itself, but the
soul, as observed, reflects itself.. Both senses are perfectly appropriate. Cadit
quaestio..
3.5. As a footnote to what I have called the optimistic theory, we need to
note a contrasting perspective which comes into view in the DI Two points we
have noted so far are the natural purity of the soul expounded in CG 2 , and
the suggestion that the crucial move in attaining a knowledge of God is the ascent from aistheta to noeta On the first point, the DI seems to present a sharp
corrective, in cc 3 - 4 and 1 1 - 1 2 Here the whole human race is seen as handicapped by its created and its corporeal nature, which make it incapable of continuing in existence, let alone attaining a conception and knowledge of God,
without special assistance; so that their share in God's image results from an
additional act of pity (sXETiaac,) independent of their creation (TTXEOV T I
xapi^6u,vo<;, c. 3 ) . As in the CG, they have an ability which is sufficient,
aurdpKTic;, to provide the knowledge of G o d ; but in the DI this is not the
natural purity of the soul, but a special gift of grace, r\ KCIT' Eucdva xdpic, (c
1 2 ) , designed to offset its inherent weakness. A s to the second point, it seems
that in the DI Athanasius simply loses interest in the nosta; they are not mentioned; in fact there are only two further references to them, it appears, in all
Athanasius' personal output
It would be very easy to interpret this contrast as a divergence between the
two works, assuming a more Platonic standpoint in the C G , perhaps inspired
by Eusebius, as against a more biblical perspective in the DI But this would
be a serious mistake. For first, the theme of human incapacity is clearly stated
in the CG itself , in c. 3 5 : God is above all created being, whereas the human
race was created from nothing, so that they were liable to be deprived (druxsTv)
of knowledge of him.. And this theme of natural incapacity is already foreshadowed in Eusebius; see for instance DE 4 , 6 6 , the Father appointed the Logos cue, dv u,fi rcavTs^coc; fi TCOV YEVUTCOV d7r.07r.Ecot (pumc,, 5i* oiKEiav dxoviav
Kai dSuvatiiav Tfjc; dysvhjou KCC'I dxcophjou TccrrpiKftc; ooaiac, oisaTcooa
Similar teaching is found in the Lam Constantini, which of course I would not

IX

IX
KN0W1EDGE OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS

238
claim was prior to the CG; in contrast to the divine being, human nature was
it, OK vTCv TrpopepXnuivri noppcoxdxto xe ieaxcoaa K a i u-ctKpv xij; dyevVITOU (pooeco, dTteaxoiviauvri (c. 11). This contrast is a mere commonplace,
and is probably more typical of Eusebius than the theme of ideal human inno-

one cannot appreciate intelligence unless one is in some degree intelligent, or

unselfishness if one is wholly self-regarding. A n d we can appreciate the mistakes and confusions of other people, not indeed by simply sharing them, but
by intelligent reflection on our own.
Origen does indeed suggest that we can learn something about G o d simply

cence, which, we have seen, is not represented by the earth-born A d a m , and

is later displayed only occasionally by virtuous heroes like Enosh
As for the status of nota, there are favourable estimates to be found i n
Eusebius, as at PR 3.10 11, where he argues that even the works of God's creation are o u i K p d e n K a i ppaxa, xa acoLtxoi K a i voepa ociai
7iapafiaA.X6u.sva. But there are two striking passages at least where he puts the
opposite case; at 11 21. 6, expounding Plato Rep. 509 b, he claims that the
v o n x a i o a i a i derive their being f r o m the transcendent Goodness, Coxe un,
u.ooaia a x T i 8 e a 9 a i , Xk unoe yevvTiTa vou-ietv. A t 13 15.3 he complains of Plato's inconsistency, in first making the intelligibles dysvrjxou, but
then saying that they derive by emanation f r o m the first cause: o y p K
r o un. vxoc, a x yeyovvai iSvai (JouA^xai
Thus what we provisionally noted as new points in the DI are i n fact anticipated i n Eusebius. But I do not wish to argue that Athanasius introduced corrections as a result of reading Eusebius

It seems to me more likely that both

writers are inconsistent because they reproduce conflicting items of traditional

teaching w i t h o u t noticing the disharmonies that modern scholars detect..
4. We have tried to describe the teaching of Athanasius and Eusebius on our
knowledge of G o d , w i t h frequent quotation f r o m both writers. But to complete the picture, we need to stand back a little and ask ourselves how much
we have learnt, and what questions still need to be asked Granted that we have
a share in God's image, the Logos, how is this eixcov, or more properly the
state of being K a i ' eKva, manifested in our minds, and what effects does it
produce?
4 1. This teaching is clearly built on the traditional maxim that like is known
by like.. I have not yet discovered an explicit statement of this general principle

239

by reflecting on the nature of the m i n d , ex no.sirae mends contemplatione;

the

m i n d has no need of space in which to move, or of physical magnitude, or of

visible appearance (Princ

1.1.6-7)

This claim suggests a purely theoretical

consideration, a psychology, for which good moral dispositions are not required; but it is generally taken for granted that the use of the intellect implies
a detachment f r o m bodily concerns and an attachment to pure and intelligible
virtues; thus Origen continues: quod propinquitas
deum, cuius ipsa mens intellectual^

quaedam

imago sit, et per hocpossit

tatis natura sentir, mxime si expurgatior

sit a natura corporali

sit mentis ad
aliquid

de dei-

Rather simi-

lar indications are given i n Cels. 7 33

The modern critic may well be surprised to learn that the mind can apprehend theological truth by mere discursive reflection on itself and its activities;
he might argue, moreover, that the Fathers held that God is perfectly simple;
thus on the principle that like is k n o w n by l i k e , they must have recommended
some f o r m of simplification or concentration of thought such as was advocated
by Plotinus. There are indeed some passages which might allow this interpret a t i o n , such as CG 2; but on the whole I t h i n k the texts do not encourage it.
The Fathers worked mainly w i t h a fairly simple antithesis of body and mind.
I f sensual thoughts are discarded and the m i n d be occupied with itself and its
o w n proper objects, they make no further demand I have found no texts of
our period which clearly suggest that some intellectual pursuits should be
embraced and others avoided. A n d their doctrine that the Father must be approached through the Logos w o u l d seem to exclude any depreciation of expressed and formulated thought i n favour of a Plotinian simplicity of formless
contemplation..
Does the mind's likeness to God entitle us actually to describe God as mind?

either in Origen or Eusebius or Athanasius; but it is clearly presupposed by a

This was a much debated problem

phrase we cited f r o m CG 2, t xf[q Ttp axv UOIOOSJ; and it underlies

God is intellectuals

natura

O n the whole, Origen accepts this view;

simplex, Princ

1 1 6, as rendered by Rufinus

1 2

the striking illustration of DI 57, where Athanasius claims that in order to look

Eusebius is more cautious, and reveals his hesitations at PR 3.10 3 - 4 ; one

at the sun one must cleanse the eye so that it becomes bright; in the back-

must not t h i n k of God as a kind of directive m i n d residing within the world

ground is Plato's theory of vision propounded in Timaeus 45, as well as the

However at RT 2 17 4 he appeals to the commonplace that the human mind

passage cited by D r . Meijering, Plotinus I 6 9, Posidonius in Sextus 7.93, and

is mysterious, though its operations are familiar

Irenaeus 4.36.6.

surprisingly, that God's Togos is comprehensible to all men, xotq EKXOC,

1 3

This enables h i m to say,

As a theory of vision, this is plainly mistaken. Good sight requires good

clear eyes, rather than eyes which resemble their objects It is no advantage to
be dim-sighted if one is trying to decipher faded and illegible writing. But in
the intellectual and m o r a l field there is rather more to be said for the theory;

God as Mind, Origen Princ 1 1.6 a , Eus. PE 3 10 14, but cf. ibid 10 3
Mind mysterious, though its actions familiar: Philo LA 1 91, Mut Nom 10, Somn 1 30
56; Eus En
17 4
12

13

IX

IX
240

K N O W L E D G E OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS

rtdatv Ka9icnaTcu yvcopiLioc,, while he refers to the Father as xv dcpavfj Kai

p a t o v vouv. This t r a d i t i o n , however, does not make even the Father completely unknowable; as we have observed, he can be 'seen' by the transclucent
mind and soul; as Athanasius puts i t , Ka0apa r f j yv%f\ Kai uvcp rep vcp..
4.2. I f we now ask, what sort of activity will enable us to receive virtue and
wisdom, the answer w o u l d seem to be, by meditating on their celestial prototypes conceived on the modei of Platonic Forms, but also vaguely personalized and sometimes assimilated to the angels In other words, it is usually a contemplative devotion that is required, w i t h practical good works t h r o w n in as
a laudable but regretted interruption.. There is seldom any suggestion that we
might profitably imitate the Logos i n his creative and providential functions;
our authors never suggest that the artist or craftsman may gain a distinctive
knowledge of the Logos through the exercize of his professional skill; the
painter in particular remains a source of literary metaphors rather than a
respected fellow-traveller on the heavenly road Regarded i n this fight, is there
not after all something to be said f o r what we all instinctively detest, namely
the sycophantic comparisons which Eusebius draws between the Logos and
the Emperor?
14

4.3.. We have referred to the imagery of the mirror,. Athanasius teaches that
man, i n his original state of innocence, can gain knowledge of the Logos by
considering his o w n m i n d , an activity which we still refer to as reflection or i n trospection I t is of course misleading to t h i n k of self-awareness as a kind of
sense-perception; as the ancients clearly recognized, each of our senses has its
o w n distinctive sense-qualities; see for instance Origen Princ. 1 1 7 ; but selfawareness can involve them all. Sometimes, i t may be, I take notice of my own
visual experience; but alternatively, I may catch myself recalling a melody; the
idea that I see what is going on w i t h i n my m i n d is obviously absurd i n the latter
case, so it should be excluded also i n the former
O n the other hand, it was a commonplace that sight is the best of the senses;
and it is often used metaphorically for other kinds of knowledge Visual metaphors t u r n up i n the most unexpected places. One example is the statement
found in the CG that we have a cpavraata 8eo0 I n this context tpavraaia must
of course indicate a true impression, a sense which the PGL does not r e c o r d ;
it occurs five of six times i n the CG (c. 2 twice, 7, 9, 45) but elsewhere in
Athanasius only at c A T 2.78, conjoined with Trcoq, as the image of himself
which the divine Wisdom impresses on creation But I have found two examples i n Eusebius (PE 7.17.5, LC 4) and it is not uncommon i n Philo; an es15

God knowable by mind: Ens. DE 4 8 3 (?), PE 3 30.18; Ath Deer 24

Oavxaoia reliable (racer P G L ! ) : Philo Opif. 166, LA 3.61, Heres 119. Mut. Nom. 3; Eus
PE1 17 5, Z C 4 ; Alh CG 2 2 (twice), 7.3, 9 2, 45 c Ar ii 78 This usage is common in Greek
philosophy; see L SI
14

15

24)

pecially interesting parallel is Mut.. Nom 3, TO SSXOLLEVOV XT\V 0eiav cpavxao t a v TO T^c, i|/uxite SOTIV 6u.u.a, and L A 3.61 takes the self-exculpation of Eve
in Gen 3:13 to mean that the sense-qualities, symbolized by Eve, are trustw o r t h y , whereas pleasure, the serpent, is a deceiver. Visual symbolism is very
commonly used i n discussing the knowledge of G o d , and if we wish to find in
Athanasius an acceptable use of i t , we must somehow discount the misleading
implications of the idea that the m i n d sees itself Some writers indeed maintain
the opposite view, perhaps alluding to Socrates' parable of the eye seeing its
o w n reflection; for of course, although the eye can see itself reflected i n an eye,
it cannot see itself reflected in itself, unless we imagine that it is reflected three
times i n succession. Hence, it was said, the eye can see everything else, but not
itself; similarly the mind can know everything, but not itself (Philo, L A 1.91).
This tradition is reproduced in those writers w h o hold both that G o d is mind,
and that God is unknown
Nevertheless we should not underestimate Athanasius. He is admittedly
limited by the idiom of his own time; but we must not think that every inconsistency is a sign of incompetence; we must allow for deliberate paradox, or
perhaps rather the willing acceptance of traditional paradox; an example, I
t h i n k , is CG 2, where Athanasius i n effect tells us that the soul can rise above
itself by remaining w i t h i n itself: oxe 6A,oc, ECTIV [dvco] eauTco cuvcov . . TOTS
Sff . . .. ava) u.sT&paio<; yiverai..
Eusebius again tells us (PE 7.17.5) that man was created in the image and
likeness of God u.srd TVVOC, Siatpepoucmc; u7cspoxf|q, as compared w i t h the
animals: 5i6 Kai 6co0 swoiac, sic; tpavTaciav isvat ootpiac, re K a i otKaioauvnc, Kai Ttdorn; apsTfji; dvTiA.fjvEi<; 7roisio8at, and then after recalling the
story of our transgression (svTOAfjc, dXivcopia, itA.rip.u.eA.eTv, drcoocpdXXsiv) he
adds: 5i6 x p f i v a i TO Ka8ap6v au8i<; K a i TO 8eosi.KeA.ov dvaKTrjaaaSat TTIC, SV
f|m.tv vospac; ouaiac,
The basic theory of our knowledge of God is, I believe, very simple.. I t is that
in a state of innocence we have an idea of G o d , as Father or Ruler or Supreme
Being, and we possess virtues such as wisdom and justice, implanted by God's
Logos, which we also attribute to G o d , thus giving content to our basic e w o i a
But the theory is complicated, partly by the confusing influence of the notion
that the mind can see itself, and so see reflections of the divine Logos; and partly by the confusions attaching to the phrase vospd ouata For it seems that a
thing can qualify to be voepd ouoia simply by being, as we should say, mental
or psychological in character O n this interpretation, very little is gained if we
say that our human virtues are vospai ovjoiai; this could mean that they are
mere illusions But Eusebius and Athanasius w i l l think that we only recognize
these virtues by relating them to their divine archetype; hence to see them within ourselves is also to be carried beyond ourselves to the realm of noeta, the
objective and eternal Forms of all things. B u t even this is not the end of the

IX

242
story, at least for Eusebius For k is possible to see these nota as created beings,
comparable with the angels, but not homoousios with God. And Athanasius
passes quite easily from the thought of TU VOV axnKvai Ttp rv 0ev to
that of GvSicuTaSai TO, ayioiq sv if} TCV vonrcov scopta, which seems to
suggest that Unfllen man can associate with the angels in the contemplation
of a higher reality Wisdom and Justice, then, are the created prototypes of
human virtues, sometimes depicted as the trees of the first intelligible paradise; but they are also ittvoiai of the Logos himself, who is aToaoqria and
aTOLKatoouvri.
In conclusion, I return to the problem which I raised at the beginning. My
tentative opinion is that the ideal knowledge of the Logos, as described by
Eusebius and Athanasius, is not based on any recognizably mystical experience, such as we detect in Philo and much more clearly, say, in Gregory of
Nyssa The evidence, which might suggest this is, 1 think, inadequate Athanasius does of course recommend detachment from the body and its concerns;
he is an enthusiast for the solitary life, as practised by Anthony; and he endorses the traditional theme that G o d is inexpressible and incomprehensible
But he makes no reference to the divine darkness of Sinai, such as we find in
Philo and is creatively developed by Gregory of Nyssa His ideal monk is no
quietist, but is actively involved in noisy and troublesome encounters with demons. And it is interesting to note that he reinterprets Plato's maxim about
philosophers practising death
Plato thinks that philosophers should disregard the body and attend to the intelligible world, just as if they were finally
freed from the body's distractions.. Athanasius of course reproduces this idea;
but he understands Plato's maxim as an injunction to prepare for martyrdom,
which he regards almost as a social activity, so much stress is laid on the great
company of ones fellow-sufferers for Christ. The encouragment to concern
oneself with nota suggests to me, not a distinctively mystical consciousness,
but something much more like the traditional catholic practice of meditating
on the cardinal virtues And lastly, we should not build too much on his admission that the divine nature is inexpressible, for inexpressible knowledge is
more commonplace than we are apt to suppose. Origen tells us that we can distinguish between tastes, though we have no words to describe them. Indeed
even a dog can know the way to Larissa, if that is where his master lives;
though to be sure, he cannot know that it is the way to Larissa! It may, then,
be a necessary condition for knowledge of God that it be inexpressible; but it
is certainly not a sufficient condition. This estimate of Athanasius, and of
Eusebius too, may perhaps be criticized as robbing them of a distinction with
which we would like to invest them; but it has the advantage of bringing them
closer to realms of thought which we ourselves can understand.
1 6

A T H A N A S I U S '

E A R L I E S T

W R I T T E N

W O R K

I N r844 the work of J A. Mhler, Athanasius

der Grosse, was
published at M a i n z ; and o n p r 74 of that work Mhler expressed the
opinion that the letter 'Evoc, oojuaxoc, attributed to Bishop Alexander
of Alexandria was in fact drafted for h i m b y Athanasius, T h i s opinion
received favourable notice both from J o h n Henry N e w m a n and from
A r c h i b a l d R o b e r t s o n , ' and I have long considered it probable; yet it
seems not to have been widely accepted, and the letter has been
quoted as the work o f Alexander by a succession of distinguished
scholars including E d u a r d S c h w a r t z ,
Gustave B a r d y ,
Hans
L i e t z m a n n , Manlio S i m o n e t t i , John K e l l y , R u d o l f L o r e n z , and
T i m o t h y B a r n e s , to name only a few I propose to argue the opposite
case, in agreement with M h l e r ; I claim that the Athanasian
authorship of 'Evoc, acuucrcog is not merely probable, as Mhler,
N e w m a n , and Robertson affirmed, but demonstrably certain I t can
thus be regarded as Athanasius' earliest written work,
2

M y argument will take the following form. First, I shall submit that
the two letters attributed to Alexander, the encyclical 'Evoc, owiraxoc;
and the longer letter ' H (hiXaoxoc, addressed to another Bishop
Alexander, cannot possibly have come from the same h a n d ; they
differ in style, in vocabulary, and again i n their treatment of their
A r i a n opponents Secondly, it will be shown that the style, the
vocabulary, and the treatment of A r i a n i s m in 'Evoc, ocbfiaxoc, are
perfectly consonant with the undisputed works of Athanasius, while
those of ' H <tn\aoxoc, are utterly different I shall assume that ' H
(b&aoxoc, is in
work of Alexander; there is no substantial
reason to doubt this, and pro tanto it is confirmed by the doctrinal
letter produced by the S y n o d of A n t i o c h early in 325 E d u a r d
Schwartz, w h o has given us its Syriac text and made a retroversion
into G r e e k , describes it as reflecting the theology of Bishop
Alexander H e must mean that of ' H <t>iA,aQxog, as 'Evoc; acoLiatoc, is
almost devoid of positive theological statements I t is a surprising fact
that a document issued at A n t i o c h at the instance of the Western
r a c t

Newman, Historical

Treatises,

p 297; Robertson, Athanasius

GVs Sehr 3 ni=NAG

(1905), p, 265
Luden, p. 246 al
* Gesch d alten Kirche 3. o8=ET (Comtantine
to Julian)
La Crisi Anana, p 44; Studt sulT Arianesimo, p i n
Early Christian Doctrines (51h edn , 1977), p 2*4
Arius Judaizans?,
p 47
Comtantine and Eusebius, p 203

(NPNF), p. 68

no

Ges. Sehr 3. 154 However, the resemblance largely rests upon a common use of
Alexandrian credal formulae. Luise Abramowski has noted that the Antiochene letter
suppresses Alexander's allusions to three hypostases: ZKG 86 (1975)1 P 3 4 > 35
9

Phaedo 64 A , 67 E , 81 A; Ath Dl 27 3, 28 1 Cf Philo Gig 14, De/. 34, Iren. fr. I I , Clement S/r 3 17 5, 4 58 2 (which anlicipates Athanasius' literalist interpretation). 5 67 2
16

X
77

A T H A N A S I U S

EARLIEST W R I T T E N

78

WORK

B i s h o p Ossius of C o r d o b a sets o u t a t h e o l o g y t h a t is u n m i s t a k a b l y
A l e x a n d r i a n ; and t h i s can h a r d l y be e x p l a i n e d unless i t be seen as
e x p o u n d i n g t h e v i e w s of t h e P a t r i a r c h h i m s e l f .
B e f o r e d r a w i n g t h e contrasts I have m e n t i o n e d , i t w i l l be
c o n v e n i e n t to give a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e t w o letters ' H <b(A,aQxog is
r o u g h l y t h r e e t i m e s as l o n g as 'Evog oojLiaxog: i t occupies 286 lines of
t y p e i n O p i t z ' e d i t i o n , as against 92; i t is d i v i d e d i n t o 60 sections, as
against 20. I n m a k i n g t h i s c o m p a r i s o n I have, of course, i g n o r e d t h e
list of signatures a p p e n d e d t o 'Evoc; ocbuaTog T h e s t r u c t u r e of t h i s
letter is n o t a b l y c o m p a c t a n d l o g i c a l , t h a t of H d^LXaoxog rather m o r e
d i f f u s e a n d r e p e t i t i v e ; nevertheless t h e r e is some o v e r a l l s i m i l a r i t y .
E v o g acijiictxog can be be d i v i d e d i n t o six p a r t s , as f o l l o w s : (1) I n i t i a l
greetings a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e l e t t e r , 1 - 2 ; (2) D e s c r i p t i o n of the
heretics, 3 - 6 ; (3) S u m m a r y of A r i a n t e a c h i n g , 7 - 1 0 ; (4) Protest
l e a d i n g to r e f u t a t i o n , i r - r 5 ; (5) C o m p a r i s o n w i t h other heresies,
16-19; (6) Request to refuse c o m m u n i o n , 20.. T h e longer letter is
made u p as f o l l o w s : ( r ) I n i t i a l g r e e t i n g , a single l i n e o n l y ; (2)
D e s c r i p t i o n of t h e h e r e t i c s , 1 - 9 ; (3) S u m m a r y of t h e i r t e a c h i n g ,
ro-T4; (4) R e f u t a t i o n of t h e i r t e a c h i n g , 1 5 - 2 5 ; (5) Statement of
a n t i - A r i a n t h e o l o g y , 2 6 - 3 4 ; ( ) C o m p a r i s o n w i t h other heretics
l e a d i n g to f u r t h e r p o s i t i v e statements, 3 5 - 4 0 ; (7) R e f u t a t i o n of
their c r i t i c i s m s of A l e x a n d e r , 4 1 - 4 5 ; (8) C o n c l u d i n g statement i n
credal f o r m , 4 6 - 5 4 ; (9) Request to refuse c o m m u n i o n , 5 5 - 6 0
f

r r. H o w do t h e t w o letters c o m p a r e i n style? I t seems to me that

there is an o b v i o u s c o n t r a s t , w h i c h i t is s u r p r i s i n g t h a t so m a n y
scholars have o v e r l o o k e d . T h e language of 'Evog a<h\iaxoc, is n o t a b l y
spare a n d e c o n o m i c a l , w h i l e t h a t of ' H chiAxtoxog betrays a deliberate
p u r s u i t of g r a n d i l o q u e n c e H o w can t h i s be demonstrated? F i r s t I
observed t h a t ' H ctnAaQXOc, uses far m o r e p o l y s y l l a b l e s , and c o m p a r e d
t h e m s i m p l y b y n o t i n g t h e n u m b e r of syllables per w o r d i n a sample of
1,000 w o r ds, chosen so as t o give equal t r e a t m e n t to each d o c u m e n t ,
w h i c h i n fact i n c l u d e s m o s t o f 'Evog o&Liaxog, e n d i n g i n t h e m i d d l e of
1 7 , and a b o u t a t h i r d of H ctaAxxoxog, e n d i n g i n 1 9 T h i s is a crude
m e t h o d , as I shall s h o r t l y e x p l a i n ; nevertheless, the results are
s i g n i f i c a n t . I f one defines l o n g w o r d s as those h a v i n g f i v e or m o r e
syllables, ' H cpikaQypz, p r o v e s t o c o n t a i n 83 l o n g w o r d s o u t of 1,000;
t h e figure for Evog awLiarog is 36
C

I shall n o t b u i l d t o o m u c h o n t h i s r e s u l t , since t h e G r e e k language is

such that q u i t e u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d w r i t e r s o f t e n use p o l y s y l l a b i c n o u n s ,
like Evayyikiov,
or v e r b a l f o r m s , like dcbe8r|0T.aL T h e figure for the
b e g i n n i n g of St M a r k ' s G o s p e l is 45 per 1,000
M o r e o v e r , most
w r i t e r s w i l l v a r y t h e i r s t y l e ; f o r instance, the b e g i n n i n g of a treatise
o f t e n calls for a f o r m a l i n t r o d u c t i o n i n w h i c h m o r e l o n g w o r d s are
used T h u s t h e f i g u r e for t h e b e g i n n i n g of A t h a n a s i u s ' De
Incarna-

tione is 51, and t h a t f o r t h e F i r s t O r a t i o n against the A i i a n s , its

o p e n i n g s e c t i o n , no less t h a n 6 6 ; whereas a sample taken f r o m the
same O r a t i o n b e g i n n i n g at C h a p t e r Seven gives t h e figure 39, closely
c o m p a r a b l e w i t h t h e 36 of 'Evog ad>ucixog St A t h a n a s i u s u n d o u b t e d l y
v a r i e d his style i n the course of a single w o r k , as Charles
Kannengiesser has s h o w n i n h i s fine b o o k o n the Contra Ananos; i t
w i l l be m o r e p r o f i t a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , to consider t h e v o c a b u l a r y of the
t w o letters i n detail
r 2 H e r e , t h o u g h , w e can again use m a t h e m a t i c a l means T a k i n g
t h e same t w o samples of 1,000 w o r d s , I a t t e m p t e d t o d e t e r m i n e how
m a n y do n o t occur i n the u n d i s p u t e d w o r k s of A t h a n a s i u s F o r this
p u r p o s e I used G u i d o Mller's Lexicon Athanasianum,
discounting
those w o r k s w h i c h are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n a u t h e n t i c , n o t a b l y the
Contra Apoilinarem
a n d the De virginitate, w h i l e t a k i n g account of
t h e u n d o u b t e d l y A t h a n a s i a n Epistula ad Marcellinum
I f o u n d that
' H <J>LXCIQX S e x h i b i t s 36 non-Athanasian w o r d s i n t h e first 1,000; the
figure for 'Evog oriraxog is a r g u a b l y 7, a d i s p r o p o r t i o n of 5 : r
O

T h e latter list is s h o r t e n o u g h to be w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g i n detail

F i r s t of a l l , a p u r i s t m i g h t p o i n t to 4, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s describes
E u s e b i u s as casting envious glances at t h e c h u r c h of N i c o m e d i a ,
no<J)6aA,LJoag xfj exxAnaia NiTOLinojv T h i s phrase has w e l l - k n o w n
parallels i n the Apologia c Aranos, 6 and t h e Historia Arianorum,
7,
b u t t h e w o r d used t h e r e is rroct)0aA,|jiv; s t r i c t l y speaking, n:oct>0cdiieiv does n o t b e l o n g t o A t h a n a s i u s ' k n o w n v o c a b u l a r y B u t I shall
d i s r e g a r d t h i s case; a s i m p l e e m e n d a t i o n w o u l d give us jio<h8aA.u i a a g and make t h e v e r b a l parallel e x a c t ; b u t even w i t h o u t it the
agreement i n t h o u g h t seems t o m e m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t than t h e minor
variant i n wording.
T h e n e x t i t e m is t h e w o r d auvaxoAouGetv i n 1 1 . T h i s is a N e w
T e s t a m e n t w o r d , f o u n d i n M a r k 5: 37 and T4: 51, L u k e 23: 49
A t h a n a s i u s w i l l c e r t a i n l y have k n o w n i t , a n d its absence elsewhere can
h a r d l y be s i g n i f i c a n t
I n the same s e c t i o n occurs t h e w o r d auLicjwvnoLc, i n an a l l u s i o n to 2
C o r 6: 15; os ouixchcovnoLg XOLOXO) Jigog BeXiap T h i s is one
instance w h i c h c o u n t s against t h e case w h i c h I am t r y i n g to establish,
since the same P a u l i n e verse is q u o t e d i n ' H (tHA.apxog
30 B u t of
course m y s u b m i s s i o n is t h a t t w o d i f f e r e n t a u t h o r s are at w o r k ; I do
n o t have t o show t h a t there is no influence of one u p o n t h e other
a t

T h e n e x t instance is the v e r b j3eiv i n 1 2 T h i s is clearly a w o r d

w h i c h belongs to c o m m o n speech, and w h i c h any w r i t e r w o u l d use on
occasion, b u t w h i c h w i l l n o t o c c u r v e r y o f t e n I t is f o u n d i n the
S e p t u a g i n t , Ps 57: 5, and i n I g n a t i u s , Eph 9: 1 A t h a n a s i u s w i l l
u n d o u b t e d l y have k n o w n i t , a n d its absence elsewhere is easily
explained

X
79

A THANASITJS' E A R L I E S T W R I T T E N

80

WORK

T h e adjective doudo is n o t f o u n d in A t h a n a s i u s ' u n d i s p u t e d

w o r k s : h o w e v e r , its a d v e r b i a l f o r m douoLto occurs in
Contra
Gentes,
31,
T h e v e r b XQtoxoLiaxeiv also has n o p a r a l l e l , t h o u g h the adjective
Xeorotxdxo is v e r y f r e q u e n t i n A t h a n a s i u s , besides o c c u r r i n g
elsewhere i n 'Ev ocoLiato;. T h e s e t w o cases s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be
r e c o r d e d , b u t c a n n o t be o f decisive i m p o r t a n c e
I n 1 6 t h e w r i t e r uses dvajtxuaoEtv f o r his q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e
S c r i p t u r e s . T h i s again is a N e w T e s t a m e n t w o r d , o c c u r r i n g at L u k e
4 : 17
F i n a l l y , t h e w o r d EC^EXXEIV is used in 1 6 ; t h e heretics ' d r a w d o w n '
u p o n themselves t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n expressed i n Prov. r 8 : 3
'Ecbetateiv is n o t f o u n d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' accepted w o r k s ; nevertheless, a
close p a r a l l e l t o t h i s passage appears at c Ar 3. r ; t h e same text is
q u o t e d , a n d t h e heretics again i n v i t e t h e i r c o n d e m n a t i o n , t h e sole
d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g t h e use of t h e s i m p l e v e r b EXXEIV; i n 'Evogowiraxogwe
read (fiiAoveixoOvTee, el eauto <t>E?aciJom TO yeygaLiLievov, in the
O r a t i o n , ibXoveLxoav ei eauTou eXxuaai TO yeypaLiuivov. W e began
by c i t i n g ecbetateiv as a p r o b a b l e instance o f non- A t h a n a s i a n v o c a b u l
a r y ; w h a t w e have d i s c o v e r e d is a s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n of A t h a n a s i a n
authorship.
W e have n o w c o n s i d e r e d t h e s h o r t list of seven non-Athanasian
w o r d s o u t of t h e f u s t r . o o o ; some of these cases appear u n i m p o r t a n t ,
a n d one at least is c o u n t e r - i n d i c a t i v e . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g list f r o m H
cf)iX,a0xo a m o u n t s to 36, as w e r e m a r k e d : in r , <J>iUtoxo, (juXdoyupo, otatpnXaTEEv, d j i o a x i p x d v ; n 2, XOLUJIEUEIV; i n 3 t h e adverb
evctyxoc,, repeated i n 3 5 , also (pikag%ia, xpiorEUJtopia a n d abakenTO I n 4, rcpooxfjua, auvaypiv, a.pxr|0Ev, I n 5 t h e contrast
m a r k e r s TOTO LIEV . xoDxo 6e, w h i c h I t h i n k are absent f r o m t h e
A t h a n a s i a n c o r p u s , but recur here at 5 9 ; also ftEpiTpoxd^Eiv and
d y u i d . I n 7 rtapExp atviv,auvapjtdE;Lv, repeated i n 9, xprjoxoXoyia,
OTa)tijX,o, jraavayvcocotev, du.Exavr|xo I n 9, (itoudXoxog, 4>8OQojto, eytELoBa, eaexea6at, itttExxaiEiv I n 1 0 , avLordvat. I n
1 1 , ouvavaXau.|3dvtv, EJUXTIX. I n r 2 , JtpoBEtopia. I n 14,
Jtapdoraa i n t h e sense of ' s u p p o r t ' , also (t>pEvo[3Xa($rj a n d ITOOr

TO,

repeated

in

32..

In

r8,

chavxaaioiiv a n d

OULJCTI

In

19,

ouooroixog
W e c a n , of course, a d m i t t h a t t h e r e is a chance factor at w o r k ; n o t all
these instances are s i g n i f i c a n t ; I w i l l n o t b u i l d m u c h o n t h e presence
of d y u t d , n o r of t h e v e r b eyxetoeai. B u t t h e list as a w h o l e seems to
i n d i c a t e a c o n s c i o u s l y s t y l i s t i c w r i t e r . H e has a l i k i n g f o r d o u b l y
c o m p o u n d e d v e r b s : jiapExpaivEiv, i m p a v a y i v t o o x E i v , itJiexxaieLv,
t a v o r d v a , auvavaXaufidvEiv, besides ouvavcuoeiv, 1 1 , a n d ELUTOLQoivetv, 14, w h i c h have some A t h a n a s i a n c u r r e n c y : seven examples in

o u r chosen passage against one i n 'Evog atbuctxog, Eyxaxatu^cu i n 1 5 .

S o m e o f h i s w o r d s appear t o be d r a w n f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n of
anti-heretical r h e t o r i c , f o r instance oiorpTiXaxEiv, d j i o a x i p x d v , EUJiapotvetv; xpioreiUTOQta, says O p i t z , is suggested b y t h e D i d a c h e A n d
t h e r e is some significance, I t h i n k , i n h i s use of t h e v e r b jtEpixpoxd E I V , since t h i s can h a r d l y be a n y t h i n g b u t a deliber ate s t y l i s t i c variant
for JCEQITQEXEIV rUptxpEXELv is e x t r e m e l y c o m m o n i n A t h a n a s i u s , b u t
A l e x a n d e r appears t o have t h o u g h t i t u n a c c e p t a b l y c o m m o n p l a c e ; i n
7 h e avoids t h e p a r t i c i p l e ^EOLXQEXOVTEC; b y w r i t i n g Jtegi&pouaEg
XetotiEvot
I t is d i f f i c u l t t o c o n v e y t h e flavour o f a w r i t e r b y c o m p i l i n g lists of
w o r d s ; a n d I d o n o t p r e t e n d t h a t t h e c o n t r a s t i n s t y l e b e t w e e n Ev6g
owriaTog, a n d H 4>iXapxog is a b s o l u t e ; t h e f o r m e r w r i t e r does i n places
p e r m i t h i m s e l f some m o d e s t d e c o r a t i o n T h u s i n 3 he w r i t e s : EV xf\
n,LiTEQCi xoiVuv J t a p o i x i a ^f|X0ov vTJv dvSQEC. jrapdvouot x a l xeiaxoudxot Si&daxovxEg d j t o a x a o i a v , fyv etxoxcog ctv xtg Jipo6pouov xofj dvxixptaxou vmovorjosiE x a l XCCXEOEIEV : note t h e t w o parallelisms a n d the
c o r r e c t l y used o p t a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n T h e o v e r l o a d e d style of H
(tnXagxog, as I t h i n k i t , m a y b e i l l u s t r a t e d f t o m 7 : 'EjiExeipnaav 6e
jteoLdoo^cug xpdiLiEvot x a 0 ' r\\L(bv jtapex|3aLViv itpog xoiig 6uoci>povag
auXXEixoupyoiig, axTiuxxxi LIEV eiprjvrig x a l EvcooEtog d^itooiv iuioxpiVOLIEVOL, xo 6' dXrjSec; avjvapjtdoaL xivag auxcbv ig xf|v LSiav v6aov &id
XpnoxoXoytag ajrou6aovxg x a i crtro[njXd>xpa ypduurtxa jcap' axixcbv
aLxoiivxEg, i v a JtapavayivwaxovxEg a u x d xotg vn' auxcov r^Jiaxntrivoig
dixExavofixovjg E(f/ o l g Earj)dXnaav xaxaaxEudatooiv, EJuxpiPou.Evo'ug elg
doEfJeiav, tog d v cnju,i|)r(cboug auxotg x a i 6uo(bpovag EXOVXEg EJtioxojtoug.
T h e r e m u s t i n e v i t a b l y be a s u b j e c t i v e factor i n s u c h j u d g e m e n t s of
s t y l e ; b u t r e v e r t i n g f o r a m o m e n t to c a l c u l a t i o n , I n o t e that i n t h e sixty
w o r d s j u s t q u o t e d t h e r e are n i n e h a v i n g five syllables or m o r e , an
i m p r e s s i v e p r o p o r t i o n of r50 per t h o u s a n d .
c

2. I come t o m y second m a i n p o i n t A g a i n a n d again w e f i n d the

p h r a s e o l o g y o f Ev6g ocoiiaxog echoed i n t h e u n d i s p u t e d w o r k s of
Athanasius I must acknowledge m y debt to Newman's pioneering
o b s e r v a t i o n s ; b u t his case can easily be s t r e n g t h e n e d b y u s i n g m o d e r n
aids t o s t u d y . I b e g i n w i t h t h e passage j u s t q u o t e d f r o m 3, f\v slxoxcog
ctv xig JtpoSpouov xou avxixQicrroi) x)jtovor|oLE A t h a n a s i u s repeatedly
c o n d e m s A r i a n i s m as t h e f o r e r u n n e r o f A n t i c h r i s t , for instance i n
Apol
c Ar 90, xnv 'ApEi.dvr|v algeoLv XQimo^aypv
oiiaav x a l TOO
ctvxi.X9tOTOijjtg66oou.ov, S i m i l a r texts are f o u n d i n O r a t i o n , r . 1, 1 7,
de Synodh,
5, VitaAntomi,
69, a n d H i s t o r i a A r i a n o r u m , 77. N e w m a n
goes o n t o c o m m e n t o n t h e w r i t e r ' s d e c l a r a t i o n i n 4 that h e w o u l d
w i l l i n g l y have k e p t silent a b o u t t h e A r i a n s ; b u t t h e parallels adduced
b y N e w m a n are n o t v e r y close, a n d I t h i n k this sentence is a mere
literary commonplace
A n c i e n t a u t h o r s h a b i t u a l l y i n t r o d u c e their
c

X
81

ATHANASIUS'

EARLIEST WRITTEN

WORK

books b y e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be no need f o r t h e m , I t is q u i t e
o t h e r w i s e w i t h the reason t h e a u t h o r gives here f o r k e e p i n g s i l e n t , 4,
ojtcoc, uf| QUJtiboTj Tivcbv axeoaioyv xdg anode,, c o m p a r e 1 2 , anyone w h o
hears of i t stops his ears, xdc, dxode, EL UJIEQ tori u.rj xv QUJIOV xouxoov
xtov onLidxaw Tjiauaai xfjc; axo-pc, A t h a n a s i u s o f t e n uses iijtoc, and
r e l a t e d w o r d s t o i n d i c a t e t h e f i l t h of heresy, and a specific reference to
w o r d s w h i c h one s h o u l d n o t hear is f o u n d i n O r a t i o n , 3.. 28, cur6Eo8e
xryv ' A Q E L O U rravtav, tn/v XE axorpv ti^Vv xf|v ujrtoELaav d j r a xebv
Xaochfiu,a)v driudxtov dJT.ovu|>aa8. A g a i n , he o f t e n expresses c o n c e r n
for the d x E o a t o i , especially b y accusing the heretics of d e c e i v i n g
t h e m , for e x a m p l e , O r a t i o n , 2 34, i v a xdg d x o d g
xapdaatoai xtov
dxEpaiotepoov
A f t e r t h e r e m a r k a b o u t E u s e b i u s ' e n v i o u s glances at N i c o m e d i a the
a u t h o r m e n t i o n s his letters of c o m m e n d a t i o n , devised JHC, Jtootiori
t i v d g d y v o o u v t a g etg xnv a i a x i a x n v xauxryv x a i x Q o r i d x o v aioEaiv;
c o m p a r e A t h a n a s i u s ' L e t t e r to t h e B i s h o p s of E g y p t 4, 6 djtAo-Oc;
tijEooupExai xaic, Exeivarv iiEoeiatc;.
Lcrc

I n 5 w e hear of t h e A r i a n s ' arnva pnuaxa T h i s has a close

p a r a l l e l i n O r a t i o n , 1 4, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s makes A r i u s express his
6uaxrjvaQnri,dxLa'in dissolute a n d g a n g l i n g m e t r e s ' I t m a y b e , i n d e e d ,
t h a t t h e agreement is exact, since O p i t z ' s text reads T|tidxia at 1 6 , as
against Qf\\xaxa i n 5 a n d 12; a n d for w h a t i t is w o r t h , Socrates'
t r a n s c r i p t of t h e l e t t e r has pnuotxia at 5. T h e w o r d occurs elsewhere
i n A t h a n a s i u s ; see, for instance, a rather u n u s u a l l y ornate passage i n
Deer.
18.. 5, x d u.ev otiv n p o e t o n u i v a xtov X Q ^ o ^ X ^ XO.\iatty\ka
Qnudxia jtpoajiEEi^Ev 6 Xyog; A t h a n a s i u s , as I r e m a r k e d , can v a r y his
style a n d is n o t always c o n t e n t w i t h u n a d o r n e d s i m p l i c i t y ,
C o n s i d e r a t i o n of 7~ro m a y be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l w e come to
e x a m i n e t h e w r i t e r ' s t r e a t m e n t of A r i a n d o c t r i n e R e s u m i n g at r i ,
w e note t h a t E u s e b i u s ' c o m p a n i o n s are d e s c r i b e d as ajioud^ovxec,
Eyxaxatui;ai x ipEuog xf\ dXn6eia; c o m p a r e Hist Ar 41, 0X,tiaavxC,
EyxaxariL^at XT)V daEeiav. I n t h e same 1 1 comes the j i b e a b o u t the
agreement o f C h r i s t w i t h B e l i a l , one of t h e f e w g e n u i n e parallels
b e t w e e n 'Evdc, atouaxoc, a n d ' H (tfikaQxoq. I t seems, h o w e v e r , t o be a
c o m m o n p l a c e ; i t is used b y O r i g e n a n d occurs i n t h e
Serdiceme,
w h i l e t h e c o m p a n i o n clause a b o u t l i g h t and dar kness appears i n Vit
Ant
69 a n d Festal L e t t e r , 7,, 4,
I n 1 6 , a f t e r s a y i n g t h a t t h e heretics i n v i t e t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of
P r o v 18: 3, t h e w r i t e r pleasingly compares the A r i a n p a r t y w i t h
chamaeleons T h i s figure appears again i n Deer
1 and Hist. Ar 79,
a n d is p e r f e c t l y t y p i c a l of A t h a n a s i u s ; he likes to c o m p a r e his
o p p o n e n t s w i t h v a r i o u s k i n d s of w i l d beasts and r e p t i l e s , as N e w m a n
observed,,
10

l u

Robertson, op. cit., p. 371

n. 8

82

Parallels can also be f o u n d for Eusebius' x a x o v o i a , 5 ; for

aJtou&a^Eiv used of A r i a n manuvres i n r 1, and f o r jiaoaxoouELv, of
t h e i r perverse exegesis, i n 1 5 .
I f the parallels I have g i v e n are n o t already c o n v i n c i n g , let me add
t h a t a v a l i d p r o o f can o n l y be based o n c o m p a r a t i v e data. T h e r e are, of
course, parallels also b e t w e e n H <$>ka.Qxo a n d the authentic
A t h a n a s i u s ; b u t these are m o s t l y s u b s t a n t i a l p o i n t s of t h e o l o g y , where
one m i g h t expect A l e x a n d e r ' s deacon to f o l l o w his master.. E x a m p l e s
are the a b s u r d i t y o f s a y i n g t h a t G o d ' s W i s d o m was once non-existent
( 2 7 ) ; the d i c t u m t h a t he is Son b y n a t u r e , chuoEt, a n d not b y
c o n v e n t i o n , GOEL (29) ; t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the S o n cannot progress
o r be i m p r o v e d ( 3 0 - 4 ) . B u t t h e p a r a l l e l i s m b e t w e e n 'Ev, otraxo
a n d A t h a n a s i u s e x t e n d s t o u n i m p o r t a n t details o f v o c a b u l a r y and
character istic t u r n s o f phrase, w h i c h are far b e t t e r p r o o f s of i d e n t i t y of
a u t h o r s h i p E v e n w h e n A l e x a n d e r makes theological p o i n t s w h i c h
A t h a n a s i u s w i l l f o l l o w , t h e r e is f r e q u e n t l y a contrast b e t w e e n an
o r n a t e a n d a s i m p l e style. T h u s t h e p o i n t about G o d ' s eternal W i s d o m
is m a d e i n Ev auaxo 1 3 i n a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y terse Athanasian
phrase : I f t h e Son is G o d ' s W i s d o m , h o w a b s u r d t o say fjv JIOXE OXE OV%
f\v taov y p axiv axo XyEiv dXoyov x a i aoctrv jtoxe xv 8EV
A l e x a n d e r is c u m b e r s o m e b y c o m p a r i s o n
C

3. H a v i n g n o w c o n s i d e r e d t h e evidence of style and v o c a b u l a r y , I

w i s h to c o m p a r e t h e t w o letters i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t of t h e A r i a n
o p p o s i t i o n . I shall p o i n t first to a contrast of f o r m , i n t h e w a y they
present a n d organize t h e i r m a t e r i a l N e x t I shall argue for a difference
i n c o n t e n t , i n v o l v i n g their use and disuse of A r i u s ' Thalia
W e shall
t h e n consider the r e l a t i v e d a t i n g of t h e t w o letters ; t h e accepted order,
I c l a i m , presents a d i l e m m a w h i c h can o n l y be resolved b y assigning
Ev ocp.axo to A t h a n a s i u s
c

3 r. T h i s l e t t e r presents a concise s u m m a r y of A r i a n d o c t r i n e
w i t h i n a compass o f 226 w o r d s R u d o l f L o r e n z has taken i t as his
s t a n d a r d for c o m p a r a t i v e purposes, a n d d i v i d e s its contents i n t o eight
headings. T h i s d i v i s i o n , I t h i n k , is n o t p e r f e c t l y satisfactory, f o r the
headings v a r y a g o o d deal i n c o m p l e x i t y and i m p o r t a n c e . I w o u l d be
i n c l i n e d to t r e a t h e a d i n g I as a mere preface t o I I , and V I I as an
a p p e n d i x to V I ; b u t L o r e n z ' s scheme is w e l l k n o w n , a n d is quite
serviceable for our p u r p o s e L o r e n z adds a n i n t h h e a d i n g , rather
c o n f u s i n g l y , for w h i c h he quotes no evidence f r o m 'Evg ocotiaxo
T h i s deals w i t h t h e i n e q u a l i t y of t h e A r i a n T r i n i t y , for w h i c h t h e m a i n
t e x t is O r a t i o n , 1 6, w i t h p a r t i a l parallels i n Syn
i$\ b u t there is
s i m i l a r m a t t e r i n 'Evo oiiaxo under headings I I and V , w h i c h
present t h e v i e w t h a t t h e S o n is u n l i k e t h e Father i n essence, and is
strange a n d alien a n d d i v i d e d f r o m i t ; t h e w o r d s ^vo x a i XKoxpio
xfj xo JiaxQ oota aie closely paralleled i n the O r a t i o n ,

X
83

A THANASI US' E A R L I E S T W R I T T E N

84

WORK

L e t us n o w c o m p a r e t h i s s u m m a r y of A r i a n d o c t r i n e , 7~ro, w i t h
t h e rather longer p o l e m i c a l r e p l y w h i c h f o l l o w s i n 1 1 - 1 5 I find t h a t
t h e s u m m a r y a n d t h e r e p l y do n o t deal w i t h t h e same topics i n exactly
t h e same o r d e r , as i f t h e w r i t e r h a d m a d e notes of his c r i t i c i s m s a n d
t i c k e d t h e m o f f one b y o n e . O n t h e other h a n d , almost every p o i n t
m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s u m m a r y is t a k e n u p s o m e w h e r e i n the r e p l y T h i s
suggests a clear-minded a u t h o r w h o k n o w s exactly w h a t he w a n t s to
say, a n d can dispense w i t h m e c h a n i c a l m e t h o d s .
T h e facts c a n best be s h o w n b y a t a b l e , b u t w e m a y r e v i e w t h e m i n
b r i e f , L o r e n z ' s h e a d i n g I p i c k s o u t t h e A r i a n c l a i m t h a t G o d was n o t
always F a t h e r ,, T h i s is n o t t a k e n u p i n the r e p l y , t h o u g h i t was clearly
i m p o r t a n t f o r A t h a n a s i u s , w h o repeats t h i s c o m p l a i n t i n f o u r other
s u m m a r i e s of A r i a n i s m (see L o r e n z , p p 38-9)., B u t t h i s first h e a d i n g
serves t o i n t r o d u c e t h e m u c h m o t e s t r i k i n g a n d c o m p l e x h e a d i n g I I ,
i n w h i c h occur the c o n t r o v e r s i a l phrases E oit ovxcov a n d f|v TE o i w
fjv,. M y o w n analysis breaks t h i s h e a d i n g d o w n i n t o six sub-sections,
all of w h i c h receive some f o r m of a n s w e r ; n some cases q u i t e d i r e c t ,
like t h e answer t o r|v ore o i i x rjv a n d t o s= ot)x ovxcov i n r 2, sometimes
rather a l l u s i v e , l i k e t h e answer t o 6 y d o v 0E TV uf| vxa JT8JCOLT|XE,
w h e r e JiEJtoirjxe is c o u n t e r e d b y c i t i n g Ps. 4 4 : 2 a n d r 0 9 ; 3
(E|EQEi3|aTO,Eyevvrjoao), H e a d i n g I I I criticizes t h e A r i a n d o c t r i n e of
a secondary W i s d o m ; n o t a l l its p o i n t s are d i r e c t l y a n s w e r e d ; b u t , f o r
i n s t a n c e , t h e o i k s dXr|6v
Kyo x a i
aoctua, d M . ' el t v
jotr(u,dTO)v of 7 is m e t b y t h e a s s u m p t i o n i n 1 3 , el Xoyoc, xcd oo<bta
eoTL TO 9eo, a n d t h e d i r e c t d e n i a l of EL xtov JtoinridTcov i n r2, T h e
o n l y real o m i s s i o n is t h e s u p p o s e d l y A r i a n p o i n t t h a t t h e S o n is
i m p r o p e r l y called L o g o s a n d W i s d o m H e a d i n g I V , c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e
A r i a n s m a d e t h e S o n changeable, XQEJEX, is d i r e c t l y answered i n 14.
H e a d i n g V , s t a t i n g t h a t he is evo x a l aXKdxQioq, e t c , , gets a p a r t i a l
r e p l y i n 1 3 : jcc dvuooxf\ ouottTO jcotpo; H e a d i n g V I , t h a t the
S o n does n o t p e r f e c t l y k n o w t h e F a t h e r , nor see h i m , receives an
e x t e n d e d r e p l y i n 1 5 , t h o u g h t h e d e t a i l t h a t t h e S o n does n o t see the
F a t h e r is o m i t t e d ; a n d t h e p o i n t d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y L o r e n z as V I I ,
n a m e l y t h a t t h e S o n does n o t k n o w h i s o w n essence, is also l a c k i n g
F i n a l l y , t h e c l a i m set o u t u n d e r V I I I , t h a t H e was made o n our
a c c o u n t , receives a d i r e c t r e p l y : 'rjjiyEYOve is answered b y q u o t i n g
H e b r 2: 10, ' v x d Jtdvxa x a t L' oti x d j i d v x a T o s u m u p t h i s
d i s c u s s i o n , H e a d i n g s I I , I V , V , a n d V I I I receive f u l l answers; I I I
a n d V I are answered i n p a r t ; t h e o n l y headings c o m p l e t e l y passed over
are I a n d V I I , w h i c h w e have n o t e d are b r i e f s u b s i d i a r y p o i n t s m a d e i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h I I a n d V I N o t e f u r t h e r t h a t t h e 'answers' are all
c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s h o r t passage 1 2 - 1 5 ; 1 6 - 2 0 t h e w r i t e r t u r n s t o
m o r e general c r i t i c i s m s a n d t h e request t o refuse c o m m u n i o n ,
m

L e t us n o w e x a m i n e t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g m a t e t i a l i n H $ka.Q%o A s
C

TABLE I
Arianisms and replies in Evd; acbjiaTO;
7 L I Oiw &E 6 8E Jiatijg r|V
6Xk' T|V TE 6 8E Jtaurp oiix f\v
L II ow. 6ei fiv 6 TO 9EO J.yo.
tl E | oiix VTCUV VEVOVEV
6 y arv 8e TOV \i\ vra
x TO \f\ vto; iei[oir|XE
6 o xai rjv TE ovx f|v
xriana yg fori xai Jioima vio
ore E ftoo xa' ovoiav z& jcatgi fcmv
L III OVTE ftXt8tv xal I^OEI X6vo EOTV
OTC &XT|6IV] oo(ia aiTo icrv
JJ.' E TtV JtOLT||l6lDV Kttt YEVTTCV Tl,
xaraXQ*\<nvxM be Xeytxat kSyo xal oojia
YEVnevo xai aT TIJ> ip TO 8EO Xytp
xai xfi iv t(j> eiji 00$ ia
v ij xai T Jivra xai atv nso'n\xev 8E
8 L IV t xai TOEnTO far xai AU.OL<UTO TT|V <)>jjv
tb xai rava t Xoyixd [cf also 10]
L V i|vo; t xai oiAoreto *a 6IEOXOIVKJHEVO axv
6 Xyo; tij TO 8EO ovoia
L VI xai oaT OTLV 6 naTf|o vlij
OVTE yap TEUI xai xgpw yvumcEi
6 Xvo tv naia,
OTE TEXOJ 6pav aiiTv vara
L VII xoi yao xui havrov \r\v ooiav
OVK O6E\ 6 vl 6 EITTI
1 L VIII 6'f yao jsnotrta
va /n ' aiiTo
m 6' bqymov xiuf\ 6 6e6
1 0 xai ox &v >JT<7TT|
E[ (lij T([id 6 E ^ei-tOE noi)aa
i)eu)Tt]OE yov
Tocutrjvat ete

(cf. 1 3 , ?
aXoyov
note TOY Beov;)
(cf. on rtv OTE ovx. i\v below)
9: 3tu)5 i| ovx ovrtov, etc
cf 9 above.
12: Tig itKOiiiov []o. 1: ij oi KttTttyiWCTXE 1
(12 condemns E!C EOTI TWV jtoiiiiidtcuv)
13: T)
6v6noiog rfj oiioiqi TOV TOTO6; etc
cf. 1 3 : el X6yo
xai aofyia tail tov 6EOU 6 vi6q
12 condemns cig tra TOIV jiouinaTtov
v

cf. 1 2 6 1 aTO iyivETO jtdvra

and 14 t' o TO jidvra
14 j>5 E T@EJTT6 xai aU.oiuTo
{cf 1 4 : al yev|iEvo dv^mnog ox f|)AoiuTa)
13 f) jt vjoo Tfl oiotTo jtaToo; etc
15 condemns ovx OLEV TEUIO
6 ^6705 TOV jata

14 condemns f^ yEyovE

cf 14 cited against 8 above.

we observed, t h i s letter has a more complex s t r u c t u r e ; there is a

s u m m a r y of A r i a n teaching i n r o - i 4 , c o m p r i s i n g 270 words,
r o u g h l y equal t o t h e 226 o f 'Evog atoriaxog, f o l l o w e d by a polemical
r e p l y i n 1 5 - 2 5 , T h i s , h o w e v e r , leads o n t o a positive statement of
anti-Arian theology, 26-34, '
f u r t h e r theological remarks
w

i n 3 7 - 4 0 and 4 6 - 5 4
H o w does the i n i t i a l s u m m a r y compare w i t h t h a t given i n 'Evdc,
oibtraxog? W e n o t e d t h a t t h e latter records eight d i s t i n c t p o i n t s , by
Lorenz's r e c k o n i n g ; the c o r r e s p o n d i n g passages i n 'HdpiXapxog notes
o n l y f o u r ; L o r e n z ' s 11, o n t h e non-eternity of the L o g o s , is adequately
t r e a t e d ; his I V , o n c h a n g e a b i l i t y , is so m u c h expanded that i t occupies
m o t e t h a n h a l f the t o t a l space; there is a rather s l i g h t reminiscence of
V , the Son's unlikeness t o t h e F a t h e r , i n i3:ome<buaettiidc^ouTTiva
Excovl6i6xr|xa jioogauxov, F i n a l l y , a q u i t e new p o i n t is made; the Son
is n o t m e r e l y said t o be one of t h e creatures, b u t is equated w i t h 'every
m a n ' , r o , w i t h a l l G o d ' s o t h e r sons, 1 3 , and w i t h Paul a n d Peter,

X
85

ATHANASIUS

EARLIEST

WRITTEN

86

WORK

1 4 T h e r e is no m e n t i o n at a l l of L o r e n z ' s p o i n t s I , I I I , V I , V I I , or
VIII.
A r i a n s say r\v KOXB TE ovx. t|v vji TOV) 9EO, x c d yeyovev UOTEQOV
itQOxeQOv Lifj vjjtdQxtov, 1 0 , w h i c h h e f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y b y the n e w
p o i n t e q u a t i n g t h e S o n w i t h every m a n . T h e next s e c t i o n , 1 1 , b r i e f l y

w i l l a d d one other p o i n t to t h e same e f f e c t A l e x a n d e r ' s s u m m a r y of

A r i a n d o c t r i n e , i o - r 4 , and indeed h i s i n i t i a l r e p l y i n 1 5 - 2 5 ,
s i m p l y o m i t s o b j e c t i o n a b l e p o i n t s of A r i a n d o c t r i n e w h i c h he
nevertheless k n o w s a n d w h i c h a t t r a c t i n c i d e n t a l n o t i c e later o n . T h u s
he does n o t i n c l u d e L o r e n z ' s p o i n t I , t h a t G o d w a s n o t always Father.
B u t i n 26 he s u d d e n l y s w i t c h e s f r o m c o n d e m n i n g t h e i% OVK ovxcov to

r e s u m e s Lorenz's h e a d i n g I I , a s s e r t i n g that the A r i a n s consider

state dvdyxT] xov j t a T e o a d e l EIVCU j r a x E o a A n d p o i n t V I , t h a t t h e

T o e x p a n d these c o m m e n t s a little . A l e x a n d e r c o m p l a i n s t h a t the

the

S o n as made eB, ovv. OVTXOV, t h e w o r d ercoinog p r o v i d i n g a l i n k w i t h the

t e r m Jtotnita f o u n d i n 'Ev atLiato. B u t i n r r , i n t h e t h i r d sentence
of his s u m m a r y , A l e x a n d e r t u r n s to the A r i a n c l a i m , a s he believes,
t h a t t h e S o n is TOjr.Trjg tfnjoEiog. T h e r e f o l l o w s a f u l l a n d m o s t
i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o i n t , to w h i c h I s h a l l r e t u r n ; b u t this

point, Lorenz's n o I V , and the new point about o r d i n a r y manhood,

o c c u p y the w h o l e r e m a i n d e r of t h e s u m m a r y .
M o r e o v e r , h a v i n g selected t h e s e f e w p o i n t s for emphasis, A l e x a n
d e r i s b y n o m e a n s disposed to t h i n k t h a t he has said e n o u g h T h e
p h r a s e fyv TE OVK r|v, a t t a c k e d i n t h e r e f u t a t i o n , 15 and 23, is again
c o n d e m n e d i n 27, a n d i n d i r e c t l y a g a i n b y the r e f e r e n c e s to t h e Son's
e t e r n a l e x i s t e n c e i n 48 a n d 51.

T h e phrase |oxvTtov,

condemned

i n t h e r e f u t a t i o n , 1 5 , r 6 , 18, and 22, is n o t i c e d again i n 26,

i n d i r e c t l y i n 36, a n d d i r e c t l y a g a i n at 4 4 , 4 5 a n d 46. L o r e n z ' s p o i n t I V ,
t h a t t h e S o n m u s t be dTgejixog, f i r s t a p p e a r i n g i n r 1-14,

is r e s u m e d

i n 29, 30, 34, a n d 47. T h e A r i a n s ' v i e w s of t h e L o g o s are p r e s e n t e d n

v a r i o u s guises; t h e y make h i m TOtjtdLVLoov, 4 ; a m e r e m a n , r o ,
r 4 ; t h e y r e v i v e t h e e r r o r s of J u d a i s m , 4, of Paul o f Samosata, 35.
T h e i r r e a s o n i n g i s v a r i o u s l y e x p l a i n e d ; t h e y select h u m a n i z i n g texts
f r o m t h e B i b l e , 4, 37; t h e y m a k e t h e S o n changeable, l i k e e v e r y
man,

ro,

eternity,

But
10,

his c h a n g e a b i l i t y
and

presented

is b o t h d e d u c e d

as actually

taught

from
by

the

his

non-

Arians,

i o - r 4 . I a m i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t t h e reference to P a u l of Samosata
s a m e r e a r t i f i c e of c o n t r o v e r s y T h e Thalia e x t r a c t s show t h a t A r i u s
r e g a r d e d t h e L o g o s , p e r h a p s as a k i n d of c r e a t u r e , b u t a l s o as a k i n d of

g o d , a / u p o 8e, a n d c e r t a i n l y n o t a s a m e r e m a n ; b u t possibly the

P a u l i a n i s t v i e w s c o m p l a i n e d of are r e a l l y t h o s e of t h e S y r i a n b i s h o p s

m e n t i o n e d i n 37

T o r e s u m e t h e catalogue of r e p e t i t i o n s , t h e c l a i m

that Christ's goodness

is a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h itgoxojir|,

censured

in

1314, is r e v i s i t e d i n 30, 34, a n d 46, F i n a l l y , L o r e n z ' s p o i n t V ,

t h e A r i a n Son's u n l i k e n e s s to t h e F a t h e r , i n i t i a l l y s k e t c h e d i n 1 3 , is
r e p e a t e d l y r e h a n d l e d ; 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, and 37 a l l take u p t h i s
point in slightly varying terms

3. 2 I t r e m a i n s t o consider t h e t w o letters i n r e l a t i o n t o A r i u s '

Thalia
I w i s h to m a k e t h e rather precise c l a i m t h a t the m a t e r i a l
p r e s e n t e d i n 'Evog oojLtaTog is d e d u c i b l e , w i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , f r o m
t h e extracts p r e s e r v e d i n Syn. 15.
I suppose t h a t t h i s set of extracts
was assembled i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e T h a l i a was w r i t t e n , and w a s filed
a w a y , to be p u b l i s h e d some f o r t y years l a t e r a l o n g w i t h A r i u s ' Letter
t o A l e x a n d e r , O p i t z ' s U r k u n d e , 6. B u t if t h i s rather far-teaching claim
i s n o t acceptable, t h e mater i a l I present s t i l l serves t o show t h a t 'Evog
otbu-ctxog is closely r e l a t e d to t h e Thalia, whereas ' H (tnXaoxog is not
11

L o r e n z b e g i n s w i t h t h e thesis t h a t G o d was n o t always F a t h e r . T h i s

can be d e d u c e d f r o m T h a l i a 1, 21:
camxct y o i v mov) uf| ovxog 6 xaxr\Q
6Eog k m . A r i u s m a y have m e a n t o n l y t h a t t h e F a t h e r was i n existence
b e f o r e t h e S o n ; b u t t h e verse c o u l d easily b e i n t e r p r e t e d : ' W h e n the
S o n d i d n o t e x i s t , t h e F a t h e r was G o d ' , t h a t i s G o d simpliciter a n d not
F a t h e r A t h a n a s i u s r e p e a t e d l y claims t h a t the v e r y name 'Father'
i m p l i e s t h e existence of a s o n ; w i t h o u t a Son G o d w o u l d n o t be
F a t h e r . ( H o w c o n v i n c i n g t h i s a r g u m e n t was to t h e ancients, we
m o d e r n s m a y observe w i t h a s m i l e , and h o w u t t e r l y r e m o t e f r o m t h e m
was the r e f l e c t i o n t h a t to b e c o m e a f a t h e r , a l l one actually needs is a
daughter!)
1Z

L o r e n z ' s h e a d i n g I I i s c o m p l e x , as already n o t e d . I t b e g i n s : o v x d e i
r)v 6 TOO 8EO0 Xoyog A r i u s expresses t h i s q u i t e c l e a r l y i n T h a l i a 20-2;
besides t h e v e r s e already q u o t e d , see 1. 20, rj 6udg 8' OVK ryv jtotv
v m d o l n , a n d 22, koinbv

I apologize for t h i s t e d i o u s catalogue of d e t a i l s , b u t I t h i n k i t s h o w s

11

t h a t A l e x a n d e r ' s m e t h o d o r l a c k of m e t h o d i n t r e a t i n g t h e same

text

p o i n t s a g a i n a n d a g a i n w i t h o u t any o v e r all c o n t r o l l i n g d e s i g n contrasts

v e r y s t r o n g l y w i t h t h e o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d i n 'Ev >Liaxo. I

Son

has n o k n o w l e d g e of t h e F a t h e r , i g n o r e d at f i r s t , is t a k e n up i n 4 6 - 7 ;
a f t e r s a y i n g t h a t r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s , xdXoyLxd, cannot c o m p r e h e n d the
F a t h e r ' s n a t u r e , he quotes M a t t . 11: 27, oii&eig otSe 115 eoxiv 6 Ttaxr\Q,
EL Ltrf 6 uiog. I n o t h e r w o r d s , A l e x a n d e r k n o w s m u c h m o r e about
A r i a n i s m t h a n he reveals i n t h e s u m m a r y ; he s i m p l y fails t o ptesent
w h a t he k n o w s i n t h e e f f e c t i v e a n d logical place, O n c e again, t h e r e is a
r e m a r k a b l e c o n t r a s t w i t h the l u c i d a n d o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e of t h e 'Evdg
oo>u.axog.

6 v l o g OVK wv VXY\Q%E.

T h e n e x t clause i n the

See J TS xxix {19 78), 20-38 for the claim that these conform fairly closely to Arius'

I cite Bardy's lines for brevity. Line i ^ O p i t z 242. 9; line 20243.

subtract 19 to obtain Opitz's reference
Or c AT 1 33 al passim
12

13

So ^ ^
a

o r

X
87

ATHANASIUS' EARLIEST
TABLE

VvRITTEN WORK

L I oiix et 9g JTOTTIQ r\v

L H

oiix aei ijv lov Beov .yog

iX 1% ox VTJV yyovev
yp <>v 9e;

iteJionxe

Si xai fjv JIOTE ore oix

XTajia yo tm xai noEt^ia utg

L I I I OTE 6 ^oiog xai'otioav tq) JIOTO ariv
OTE aXn9iv xai 4>OEI tyog ITTIV
oixe XtiLvf) aofya afaov OTIV

L IV
L V
L VI

L VII
L VIII

X^ eis T-wv iioir|iT>v

xai yevrjTiiiv ari
xaTaxeT](nixs 6 -yerai tyo; nal ao<|Ha
yevnevog xai aiog
t(b toiw TO 6EOC Xoyip/ooitJa
v f| xai Ta nvra xai aTv JIE;IOJ]XEV 6
L *ei TQEJTT5 ori etc
vo; TE xai XXtpiog .
nai oaTg auv icatig TIU vtcu
OTE yo xe^eio; xai xotfiw; yiv6axei
OTE TEXEMO pav aitv ivatai
" a i yo xai auTofi xr\\ oaav oiix OEV
tilg dig mi
6L" f^iig yo JienoliiTai
iva fellas i' at)TO
XTOT} Beg
xai otx av firtorrj
el yr| jug 9ES T)8.|aE naifjoai

15)

21 aTixa yovv uioC (li} vrog 6 naxfio 8E; tun

4 . . 6i Tv aox>)
lx
20 ij &uag 6' oiix r|v Jtpiv (inao^n
22 uig oiix v (iiiriip^E bi 8EXr|0Ei jtaTodia)
[31. 38 are similar]
but cf 39 TV EX TtaTQOg vra: but NB also
Opitz Urk. 1 5
jtoiEiv deest, but cf, 7, TExvojionioag also
jcfiogE, i>niovr\ passim
22 oiix 6iv 7ir|o|e, also uto nf| vrog (above).
xTiaiia. XTL^EIV desunt: cf. on TEETKHTIXE above
2, 8, and esp 9 a U OE Liooiiaiog ainm
25-6 imvoeixat
aotpia
Xyog; elsewhere
ulog is used
io ao<tg e ionv 6 6eg etc
24 aoifiia iijrf|g|E ootyov deov BeKijoEt
[see on jteitoiT)XE above]
6 aoxi|v
TIV yevnTiiiv
25 EJiLVOELTai yoiiv
ooipia
xai Xyog
cf 5 (?) tv ev xpovoig yeyaia
see above, 25-6, 10, 24
12 Totg TE i' ulov xal aTw TW uicp
cf ID (?) Trjg ootfjiag 8iaaxai.og
19 |ivog 23 &XXTO105
v

11-15,

e s

ovca

' $ **P paTog

yEwiioavra yvwvai ev xaTaXf]t(iEL
11-15 esp. 14 f lioiai TE nerooig .
tEiv
37 avTg yap uig TJ)VfcauTooaiav OVK OIEV

cf 40

3: 2 a n d t h e p r e c e d e n t set b y D i o n y s i u s o f A l e x a n d r i a ; b u t , of
c o u r s e , w i t h o u t s h a r p l y o p p o s i n g JIOLELV t o ysvvav, as Athanasius d i d
T h e o r t h o d o x v i e w , i f I u n d e r s t a n d i t r i g h t , is (a) that t h e Son's
g e n e r a t i o n is t o t a l l y m y s t e r i o u s , b u t (b) i t is o b v i o u s l y not the same as
c r e a t i o n I m y s e l f can excuse A r i u s f o r b e i n g a l i t t l e less dogmatic,
15

II

Evt; oa/ftatoi and the Thalia (Syn

I 2

OTV TV

6 aox*)

v T O V u

T h e n e x t sentence, S16 x a i f|v JIOXE OXE oux f j v , is easily deducible

f r o m verses already c i t e d ; t h e n f o l l o w s x x i o t i a y a p l a x i x a i jroirjiia
T h e n o u n x x i o t i a f i g u r e s i n A r i u s ' L e t t e r t o A l e x a n d e r w i t h the
w e l l - k n o w n q u a l i f i c a t i o n b.W o u x wc, EV xd>v xxioLtaxtov; i t is coupled
w i t h yevvnita, s i m i l a r l y q u a l i f i e d , n o t w i t h jtoinLia,, A t h a n a s i u s as we
k n o w dismisses t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as v a l u e l e s s ;
b u t he is h a r d l y
j u s t i f i e d i n c l a i m i n g t h a t A r ius called t h e L o g o s EIC, xebv jioLnLtaxwv,
since Thalia 11,, 2 8 - 9 a f f i r m h i s e x c e p t i o n a l d i g n i t y n o t even G o d
can generate a n y t h i n g better, o n l y s o m e t h i n g e q u a l l y good, O n the
o t h e r h a n d , t h e next c o m p l a i n t , oi)xe Se oiiotog x a x ' ouotav, etc , is
c l e a r l y consonant w i t h Thalia, 11, 2, 8 - 9 , a n d r9, w h i c h i n c l u d e OII6E
OLioiov, ot)6e ouoouoiog, a n d ^evog x a x ' o u o t a v
16

W e next hear ( L o r e n z , I I I ) t h a t the A i i a n L o g o s is not t h e genuine

L o g o s o r W i s d o m , b u t is i m p r o p e r l y so called,, T h i s m a y w e l l b e based
o n Thalia,
1. 25, emvoeCTai y o u v LxupLaig oaaig ejuvoiaic., JtvEutxa,
o u v a u i g , aorjna: i g n o r i n g t h e h o n o r i f i c effect o f t h i s series o f titles,
A t h a n a s i u s concentrates his fire o n the single w o r d fenivoEtxai, w h i c h
h e r e p e a t e d l y takes t o s i g n i f y a baseless f a n c y , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h
was later t a k e n u p b y E u n o m i u s a n d was q u i t e p r o p e r l y c o n d e m n e d
b y Basil
Possibly t h e v e r y various w a y s i n w h i c h Athanasius
expresses t h e A i i a n p o i n t reveal that he is n o t dealing w i t h an
o b v i o u s l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e c a t c h - w o r d l i k e rjv JIOXE OTE oiix f|v. B u t the
n e x t c o m m e n t , yEv6u.vog x a i aiixog e t c , is p e r f e c t l y fair,. A r i u s
u n d o u b t e d l y d i d a c k n o w l e d g e t w o W i s d o m s , his L o g o s b e i n g the
e x p r e s s i o n o f G o d ' s i n h e r e n t W i s d o m ; see Thalia 1 24, i\ oo<tna oocf^ia
ujEfjoie a6(J>ou QEOV 8EX.r|aEi; t h o u g h p r o b a b l y w i t h o u t u n d e r l i n i n g the
p o i n t b y w r i t i n g t h e second oocfria as a d a t i v e , as i n Oration,
1.5 H e
c l e a r l y t a u g h t , l i k e A s t e r i u s , t h a t t h e S o n was t h e Father's agent i n
c r e a t i o n (see Thalia,
1 6 ctQxt|v xov v l o v ESUXE xebv yEvnxcbv 6
otvaQXog) H i s c r i t i c suppresses t h i s p o i n t , a n d substitutes t h e charge
t h a t i t was b y his o w n ' r e a l ' W i s d o m t h a t G o d m a d e b o t h the S o n and
e v e r y t h i n g else: EV f j x a i x d Jtdvxa x a i a v t o v jrEJioirixEv 6 9Eog,
1 7

'v ^Brixe t<bv VEVTITIV

l e t t e r , akX'
o i i x OVTWV yiyovex,
has n o cleai p a r a l l e l i n t h e Thalia
e x t r a c t s , a n d I t h i n k was n o t an essential A i i a n t e n e t ; A r i u s presents i t
as a d e d u c t i o n i n his L e t t e r t o E u s e b i u s , Urk. i 5, a n d t a c i t l y retracts
i t later b y a l l o w i n g t h e phrase EH jratpdc, (Thalia 39) o r EJCTOU j t c a o o g ,
T h e t h i r d clause, 6 ycto cov 8eoc, TOV IITI 6 v t a . Jtejtoirixe, raises t h e
q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r A r i u s r e a l l y d i d say t h a t t h e F a t h e r 'made* t h e S o n ,
as A t h a n a s i u s o f t e n affir m s . T h e r e is n o p r i m a r y evidence f o r t h i s ; t h e
Thalia says t h a t t h e F a t h e r b e g o t h i m (XEHVOJIOIELV, 1. 7, y E w a v , 11.. 28
a n d 4 0 ) , b u t also uses t h e n o n - c o m m i t t a l t e r m s ujifjo^Ev a n d ujceoxr|,
C r i t i c s o f A r i u s c o m m o n l y say t h a t he gave t h e t e r m ' b e g e t t i n g ' a
p u r e l y n o m i n a l , i n d e e d a n u g a t o r y sense; a n d , o f course, he does
c o u p l e yevvav w i t h MXL^EIV, 6pif;iv a n d 8eLiE^iouv i n his L e t t e r t o
Eusebius, I t h i n k h e p r o b a b l y d i d use t h e w o r d TIOIEIV, i n v i e w o f H e b
14

L o r e n z ' s H e a d i n g I V i n t r o d u c e s the w o r d s 616 x a i xQEJtxog 0x1 x a i

dXXoicoxog, T h i s is a n o t o r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h I have discussed
See W A. Bienert, Dion v Alex
(1978), p 64; D de Bruyne, Z N W , xxvii
(1928), 106-10..
Or c Ar 2. 19.
Eunomius Apologia 8; Basil c Eun 1 6-7; see T A Kopecek, A History of
Neo-Arianism 2 375-8, and refs
1S

lb

17

14

Opitz Urk. 30 2 (| atofi); cf ibid., 13, 14, 45-8, Ath Deer

19

X
89

A T H A N AS [ U S ' E A R L I E S T W R I T T E N

90

WORK

elsewhere
T h e Thalia selections do n o t say t h a t t h e S o n is changeable, and A r i u s ' l e t t e r s , Urk i a n d 6, a f f i r m e x a c t l y the opposite I t
m a y perhaps be s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i n t h i s one instance w h e r e the Thalia
p r o v i d e s n o t a r g e t , its c r i t i c s u p p o r t s his case b y an alleged conversat i o n w i t h A r i a n s , n o t necessarily i n v o l v i n g A r i u s h i m s e l f ; t h i s t h e m e
is, of c o u r s e , d e v e l o p e d at m u c h greater l e n g t h i n ' H (JuXapxog
1 8

H e a d i n g V is m e r e l y an e m p h a t i c r e s t a t e m e n t of p o i n t s m a d e i n I I ,
b u t is s u p p o r t e d b y t h e c l a i m u n d e r H e a d i n g V I , t h a t t h e S o n does n o t
k n o w t h e F a t h e r reXeiioc, xcd dxoiPwc,, nor see h i m TEXEUOC, T h i s
resembles Thalia,
r r - r 5 a n d 39-40 D e s p i t e his p r o m i s e of an
e x p l a n a t i o n , A r i u s a p p a r e n t l y does n o t make i t clear w h e t h e r t h e Son
can see the F a t h e r . T h e phrasexcpulcp ctopctxogd ovuxog, 1. iz, suggests
he does n o t , perhaps because t h e Father is i n his v e r y n a t u r e i n v i s i b l e ;
b u t A r i u s also claims t h a t t h e S o n enjoys a l i m i t e d v i s i o n , 11 14-15,
t 8 i o i o i xe iiexpotg ureoiievEi 6 v i d g I & E I V xov jtaxepa, d>g BEfitg EOTLV. T h e
w o r d vjrouEVEL, c o u l d w e l l suggest t h a t the Father's g l o r y is too
d a z z l i n g to be easily b o r n e , cf, E u s e b i u s , DE 4. 6, 2. A r i u s does say,
h o w e v e r , t h a t the S o n c a n n o t c l e a r l y c o m p r e h e n d his o w n F a t h e r ,
cnjTOv xov yevvfioccvxct yvoWai ev xaxa>.r|ij)L, 1 40.. H e r e possibly
c o m p a r e 11 32-6: t h e S o n c a n n o t e x p o u n d t h e Father's a t t r i b u t e s
c o m p r e h e n d i n g l y , x a x a xax&A.n'ijHv, b u t he does address h i m discreetl y i n h y m n s T h e a p p e n d e d p o i n t , t h a t t h e S o n does n o t k n o w his o w n
o u o i a , comes almost w o r d - f o r - w o r d f r o m Thalia,
1, 37
L o r e n z ' s H e a d i n g V I I I raises a c u r i o u s p r o b l e m w i t h whose
discussion I m u s t c o n c l u d e
O u r t e x t runs ( 9 ) : bi f|Liag yap
jtEJEoinxai, t v a finag 6C auxofj tog 61 opy&vou xxiar| 6 GEog m i ovjx av
VJIEOTT), el

%ig

6 GEOC, T|6ekT|0 Jtoirjoca

A r i u s , as w e

observed,

c e r t a i n l y h e l d t h a t t h e S o n was the Father's agent i n c r e a t i o n ; the

Thalia calls h i m ctpxT)v xdW yEvnxcbv. B u t our letter makes an ingenious
use of the fact t h a t t h a t A r i u s i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w s t h i s verse 6 b y
s a y i n g t h a t t h e F a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d h i m S o n , TOVSE XXvojtoir|aag,
w h i c h I believe i m p l i e s b e g e t t i n g , n o t a d o p t i o n
T h e writer thus
argues, post hoc, propter hoc: a n d b y c h a r g i n g A r i u s w i t h the v i e w that
t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n s i m p l y for t h e p u r p o s e of c r e a t i o n , he is able to
i m p l y , b y g o o d A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , t h a t t h e S o n , b e i n g a m e r e means,
is less valuable t h a n t h e c r e a t i o n for w h i c h he was b e g o t t e n
1 9

2 0

D i d A r i u s i n fact h o l d t h a t t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n f o r the p u r p o s e of

'The Freedom of the Will and the Arian Controversy', Platonhmm
Chmtentum ( F s . H Dorrie, ed H - D B l u m e a n d F Mann), pp 245-57, repr
Substance and Illusion (1985), X V I .

und

18

i n

'Begetting'is understood by R D Wiliiamsand S G. Hall; see R. C. Gregg (ed.),

Arianhm (Pair Monogr. r1 (1985)), pp. 9n. 4 3 a n d 4 9 n 16;'adoption by R C Gregg
a n d D E . G r o h , Early Arianhm, (1981), pp. 23, 56, 96; R Lorenz,
Anusjudaizans?,
pp. 77-8, 123
Nit Eth 1 1, 1094a 5-6

creation? W e have no evidence f r o m the p r i m a r y t e x t s ; b u t I t h i n k it is

n o t u n l i k e l y . T h e v i e w was w i d e l y h e l d i n early C h r i s t i a n t e a c h i n g , for
instance b y T e r t u l l i a n , a n d was m a i n t a i n e d i n the f o u r t h c e n t u r y by
Marcellus and by Constantine
T h e w r i t e r i n t e n d s to be seen as
a t t a c k i n g a v i e w p e c u l i a r to A r i u s ; b u t t h i s is a d e c e p t i o n
21

B u t t h e a r g u m e n t against i t , w h e t h e r j u s t i f i e d o r n o t , i n v o l v e s the
a d m i s s i o n t h a t t h e S o n p l a y e d an active part i n the c r e a t i o n . I t
m a n i f e s t l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h the charge w h i c h is m a d e elsewhere, that
A r i u s r e g a r d e d the S o n m e r e l y as etc; xcov jtOLTiLixcav B u t A t h a n a s i u s ,
if he i t i s , n o d o u b t assumed t h a t p r o v i d e d he d i d not t o o closely
j u x t a p o s e t h e t w o charges, t h e d i s c r e p a n c y w o u l d n o t be n o t i c e d I f ,
so, he was p e r f e c t l y r i g h t ; some h u n d r e d s of o r t h o d o x c r i t i c s have
r e p r o d u c e d his attacks u p o n A r i u s w i t h o u t o b s e r v i n g the c o n t r a d i c tion.
B u t to c o n v i n c e a n y o n e w h o a c t u a l l y k n e w the Thalia, t h e writer
m u s t n o t overstate his d e p r e c i a t i o n of t h e A r i a n L o g o s ; A r i u s had
after a l l d e s c r i b e d h i m as io/upg 6Eg, a p o w e r f u l phrase based on
Isa 9 : 5 , a n d as b e g o t t e n b e f o r e c r e a t i o n H i s o p p o n e n t , t h e r e f o r e , is
n o t t o o specific T h e A r i a n L o g o s , he says, is ele; xw Jtoinirdxtov and is
c o m p a r a b l e w i t h jtvxaxct tayix (8), H e does not say that t h e A r i a n s
t r e a t e d C h r i s t as a m e r e man.. T h e r e is a d m i t t e d l y some c o n t r a s t here
w i t h t h e b e s t - k n o w n w o r k s o f A t h a n a s i u s , b u t I t h i n k t h i s can be
e x p l a i n e d H i s c o n f i d e n c e no d o u b t g r o w i n g w i t h t h e r e p e t i t i o n of a
f a m i l i a r t h e m e , A t h a n a s i u s was able to charge the A r i a n s b o t h w i t h
r e d u c i n g t h e L o g o s to t h e level of h u m a n i t y and w i t h m a k i n g h i m the
means b y w h i c h h u m a n i t y was made
A n d , of c o u r s e , for a l l w e can
a c t u a l l y prove, some A r i a n s m a y have been s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n f u s e d to
accept b o t h these ideas i n c o n j u n c t i o n ; t h o u g h I h a r d l y believe this of
A r i u s h i m s e l f A t a l l events, A t h a n a s i u s does n o t t a x h i m w i t h the
contradiction.
2 2

3 3 I have t r i e d t o s h o w t h a t the a n t i - A r i a n p o l e m i c o f 'Evc.

ocLiaxog is closely based o n t h e Thalia, precisely as e x c e r p t e d i n the
de Synodis
T h e m e t h o d of H 4>&apxog is c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t
A l e x a n d e r does n o t base his accusations o n A r i u s ' w r i t i n g s ; he
d e p e n d s rather o n A r i a n u t t e r a n c e s , h e a r d or r e p o r t e d , H e c o m p l a i n s
t h a t the A r i a n s misuse t h e s c r i p t u r a l texts a t t e s t i n g our L o r d ' s
h u m a n i t y H e ignores the w h o l e n o t i o n of an assistant creator and
presses t h e charge t h a t the A r i a n s treated C h r i s t as a mere m a n
C

T h i s general character of 'H d^tXapxog was n o t e d b y B a r d y i n rg26,

a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h a t o f 'EvgaLiaxog, w h i c h he saw was based

19

20

Marcellus, see Eusebius, ET 3 3 43 Constantine, Opitz Urk 27 3 is similar,

despite the disclaimer in 1
(a)e.g c At 1. 38 (Xovv6ocJioveivaL<tnjoi.), 3 54, 55 (avepcojcovaiivtovx
Y % (b) c Ar 1 5, Ep Atg
12
21

91

ATHANASIUS' EARLIEST

W R I T T E N

on the Thalia; though he did not relate it, as I have done, precisely to
the de Synodis extracts. Bardy of course assumed that 'Evog acbuatoc,
was written by Alexander, and sought to explain its contrasting
character in terms of chronology, suggesting that ' H fyikaQxoc, was
written first, before Alexander had any knowledge of the Thalia. But
this dating is impossible; O p i t z is clearly right in arguing that ' H
(biXaoxoc, was written l a t e r , the clinching argument, surely, being
the reference to Colluthus, who appears as one of the signatories to the
deposition of A r i u s ( 2 1 ) but is described in ' H tpilaoxog as having
previously condemned the A r i a n s , but only as a pretext for his own
evil purpose, and having subsequently given them an example of
XQioTEUjiogta and disobedience to the C h u r c h
23

T h i s and other puzzles are fully resolved if we acknowledge

Athanasius as the real author of 'Evoc, otonatog. N o other writer agrees
so exactly with its style, its vocabulary, its view of A r i a n i s m , and the
controversial tactics which it employs,
I gave this paper the title 'Athanasius' Earliest Written W o r k ' But
perhaps a brief postscript is called fot; should I have added a note of
interrogation? We all know that there is a strong case for dating the
Contra Gentes and the De Incarnatione
to the 330s; but I think I have
shown that Athanasius was charged with an important task by his
diocesan at the age of little more than 20 years, and fulfilled it with
distinction.. I n this light it is clearly possible that he should have
written the works I have mentioned a year or two earlier. T h e case is
not closed; but any doubts on the score of youth and inexperience
must be banished for ever

'Die Zeitfolge des arianischen Streites',2A Wxxxiii (1934), 149. This chronology
has now been challenged by Rowan Williams (Arius Heresy and Tradition, pp 48-60)
But I do not find it easy to believe that 'Evb; oxiiyaTog was written as late as the beginning
of 325 There would surely be some allusion to Constantine's Letter, Opitz Urkunde
1 7, which is assigned to October 324
n

XI

WORK

A t h a n a s i u s

a l s

E x e g e t

Im technischen Sinn kommt Athanasius als Exeget kaum in

Betracht Er hat kein einziges Buch, ja sogar kein einziges Kapitel der heiligen Schrift fortlaufend kommentiert. Als Schriftausleger von Fall zu Fall ist er jedoch auerordentlich einflureich
gewesen; seine ausgezeichnete Kenntnis der Bibel wird immer
wieder gelobt, und die Prinzipien der Exegese, die er formuliert
hat, haben weitverbreiteten Beifall gefunden.
Zur Bekrftigung des ersten Punktes: Wir gestehen zwar zu,
da einige exegetische Traktate als Schrif ten des Athanasius gezhlt worden sind; hauptschlich die Exposiones in Psahnos,
Migne 27, 55-590. Dieser Text ist aber, wie bekannt, auf unglckliche Art interpoliert; zwar hat der italienische Gelehrte Giovanni
Maria Vian in einer wichtigen Untersuchung die Mglichkeit geboten, einen verbesserten Text wiederherzustellen (das Bchlein
erschien 1978). Fast gleichzeitig stellte sich abd heraus, da
selbst der gereinigte Text keineswegs als Werk des Athanasius
gelten kann. Erstens hat es den Anschein, da der Kommentar,
wenigstens bei den Psalmen 39 bis 41, Ausschnitte aus Didymus
und sogar aus Kyrill einschliet und deshalb nicht f rher als 440
datiert werden sollte; so Dorival und Rondeau Zweitens suchte
ich selbst zu zeigen, da die hier berlieferte Psalmenexegese zu
der zweifellos echten Epistula ad MarceVinum mehrmals im Widerspruch steht; im ganzen mu das Werk deswegen als unecht
betrachtet werden Zwar hat Vian in einem demnchst erscheinenden Aufsatz, den er mir freundlich mitgeteilt hat, solche Bedenken zu entkrften versucht; meine eigenen Einwnde sind
jedoch nicht widerlegt worden.
1

1 G . M . V i a n , Testi Inediti dal Commento

ai Sabni di Atanasio,
SEA
14, R o m 1978.
2 G. C. S t e a d , St Athanasius
on the Psalms, i n : V C h r 3 9 , 1985,
65-78.
3 G. M . V i a n , R 'De Psalmorum
Titulis'; L'Esegesi
di Atanasio
tra
Eusebio e Cirlo, i n : Orpheus 12, 1991, 3-42.

XI

XI
ATHANASIUS ALS EXEGET

Die anderen exegetischen Fragmente lassen wir vorlufig auer acht, Welche Belege bleiben uns dann noch zur Verfgung?
Zuerst erwhnt sei die genannte Epistula ad MarceUinum in
Interpretationem Psahnontm, PG 27, 12-45. Sie enthlt zwar keine fortlaufende Auslegung, obgleich smtliche Verse zitiert und
kommentier t wer den. Viel wichtiger ist die Er klr ung der Absicht
und Ntzlichkeit des Psalmenbuches als ganzen, sowie die Belehrung fr die Anwendung einzelner Psalmen zur Andacht, als
Erbauungsmittel oder auch zum Trost bei Gefahr oder Verfolgung,,
Daneben gibt es noch einige kurze Traktate ber einzelne
Texte, die sich als rtselhaft oder umstritten erwiesen; zum Beispiel In lUud Omnia, eine Auslegung von Lukas 10, 22, sowie die
letzte Hlfte des vierten Briefes an Serapion. Diese aber sind rnit
der in den Orationes und anderswo befindlichen dogmatischen
Auslegung ausgewhlter Bibelstellen vllig vergleichbar: Da diese Texte sehr gut bekannt und sozusagen unendlich diskutiert
wor den sind, ziehe ich es vor, wo mglich, die weniger bekannten
Schriften des Athanasius zu bercksichtigen, unter anderen die
Epistulae Festales, nur fragmentarisch im griechischen Urtext
zugnglich, zum Teil aber in der syrischen, zum Teil auch in der
koptischen Fassung verfgbar:
Athanasius' Kanon der biblischen Bcher ist bekanntlich in
Ep. Fest 39, samt dem griechischen Text, aufbewahrt worden.
Auf die 22 alttestamentlichen Bcher folgt eine zustzliche Aufzhlung ntzlicher Bcher, die auerhalb des Kanons bleiben;
nmlich die Weisheit Salomos und das Buch Jesus Sirach, ferner
4

4 Fr d e n s y r i s c h e n T e x t u n d d i e g r i e c h i s c h e n F r a g m e n t e i n e n g l i scher bersetzung siehe A . R o b e r t s o n , St

Athanasius,
N P N F 4,
N a c h d r u c k , G r a n d Rapids 1976 Fr d i e k o p t i s c h e n F r a g m e n t e siehe
Th., L e f o r t ( H r s g . ) , L ettres festoies et pastorales en copte, C S C O 150
( T e x t ) u n d 151 (franzsische bersetzung), L w e n 1955; m i t S u p p l e m e n t e n v o n R. G, C o q u i n / E . L u c c h e s i , Un complment au
corps
copte des lettres festoies
d'Athanase,
i n : O L o P 13, 1982, 137-142;
R G, C o q u i n , L es lettr es festoies d'Athanase CPG 2102 Un nouveau
complment:
le manuscrit IFAO
copte 25, i n : O L o P 15, 1984, 133-158
( T e x t u n d franzsische bersetzung) Auerdem: P.
Merendino,
Osterfestbriefe
des Apa Athanasius.
Aus dem Koptischen
bersetzt
und erlutert, Dsseldorf 1965 ( m i r n i c h t zugnglich)
5 P G 2 6 , 1435-1440
175

Esther, Judit, Tobias, aber auch die Didache und der Hirt des
Hermas Von den Makkaberbchem wird nichts gesagt, noch
werden sie berhaupt einmal zitiert Die anderen genannten
Schriften werden nicht als Apokryphen bezeichnet Als Apokryphen, oder sogar Apographen, werden geflschte Bcher des
Henoch, des Jesaja und des Mose erwhnt: "Die Apographen
sind Geschwtz; es ist vergeblich, jene zu beachten, da sie nutzlose und abscheuliche Aussagen sind " (Ep, 39, koptisch bei Lefort),
Wir bemerken hier erstens: die Grenzen des Kanons der heiligen Schrift sind hier nicht vllig erklrt worden, Die Anzahl von
22 kanonischen Bchern ist zweifellos herkmmlich; sie kommt
bei Josephus c. Apionem vor, und die zitierte Liste stimmt ungefhr, wenn auch nicht vllig, mit dem hebrischen Kanon berein
(Nebenbei sei bemerkt, da Athanasius nur gehr t" hat, da das
hebrische Alphabet gleichfalls aus 22 Buchstaben besteht; offensichtlich hat er keine Kenntnis der hebrischen Sprache. Ferner, whrend Eusebius die verschiedenen griechischen Versionen
des Alten Testaments regelmig zitiert und vergleicht, ist Athanasius ausschlielich mit der Septuaginta vertraut, die so selbstverstndlich als Bibel der Kirche identifiziert ist, da selbst eine
Ver weisung auf die eSoririxo-uxa nur in der Exposio Fidei einmal
vorkommt ) - Zweitens zhlt Athanasius andere Bcher auf, "die
nicht kanonisiert werden, die aber von den Vtern den Neugekommenen zum Lesen vorgeschrieben (xeTUTtwuiva) worden sind"
usw. Die "Vter" werden nicht namentlich identifiziert, und allem
Anschein nach bezieht sich Athanasius auf die Praxis der alexandrinischen Kirche, die offensichtlich nicht aligemeinglg
war; man beachte die Einbeziehung der Didache und des Hermas - Drittens, obgleich er keine Kommentare hinterlassen hat,
scheint Athanasius mit dergleichen gut vertraut zu sein; als Zeichen dafr vermerken wir, da er ber eine reiche Flle technischer Ausdrcke verfgt, wie etwa aXXriyopeiv, T7IOQ, Ttpoxetpoc,
Xeic,, adsia Stavoia usw., - von denen nur wenige hufig vorkommen, die aber als Gesamtheit auf tiefgehendes Studium verweisen. - Und vier tens, als Exeget hat Athanasius den Vor teil, da er
die Regeln der Schriftauslegung bedacht hat
6

6 C Ap

1 38 ,
176

XI

XI
ATHANASIUS A L S EXEGET

Eine Skizze seiner exegetischen Prinzipien wurde von T E .

Pollard 1959 geliefert und hat zum Beispiel bei H. I. Sieben (1974)
und Bertrand de Margerie (1980) Beifall gefunden Pollard zhlt
sechs Prinzipien auf: (I) die Suffizienz der heiligen Schrift, (II)
die Abzweckung, dxomSc,, derselben, (HI) ihre Gewohnheit, EOQ,
womit (IV) der Sinn der Schrift beinahe zusammenfallt sowie (V)
der sogenannte "Stil" derselben, womit das griechische Wort
iSiwtxa bersetzt wird, und (VI) die Notwendigkeit, den Kontext
des jeweiligen Passus zu beachten, mit Hinweisen auf die wohlbekannte Formel xcapoc,, Ttpojrtov, Jipyua.
Diese Pr inzipien sind, meines Erachtens, sehr unterschiedlich
wichtig. Das erste, die Suffizienz, ist zweifellos wesentlich; so
auch das letzte; doch wird die Suffizienz der Schrift als Tatsache
behauptet, die Beachtung des Kontextes dagegen als Aufgabe
gefordert Im Gegensatz dazu sind der sogenannte "Sinn" und
"Stil" der Heiligen Schrift nur je einmal erwhnt Und wenn
Athanasius wagt, das Ziel, O-XOKOC,, der heiligen Schrift als ganzer
zu erklren, so fhle ich mich, wie oft, ein bichen skeptisch gesonnen
Ganz anders Sieben und de Margerie, die beide den einschlgigen Passus mit Begeisterung hervorheben; und zwar Or 3 29:
"Dies aber ist die Bedeutung und das Kennzeichen der heiligen
Schrift (xoTtc, xoivuv xoct yjzt\a.-xxr\o xrjc; OVYICXC; YpoupTjc,), Wie wir oft
gesagt haben, da das Evangelium des Heilands, das sie enthlt,
zweierlei ist, nmlich da er ewig Gott war und Sohn ist, und da
er unsertwegen Mensch geworden ist" Da diese zweifache
Kenntnis der Kern oder Hhepunkt der heiligen Schrift sei, mu
nicht verneint werden; selbstverstndlich jedoch ist die gttliche
Absicht der Schrift mit diesem Bekenntnis nicht erschpft; wozu
sonst die zehn Gebote? Mit der sogenannten "Bedeutung" der
heiligen Schrift weist Athanasius auf ein Theologumenon, das
sich seinerzeit als wesentlich erwies, und der Kirche berragend
1

7 T E P o l l a r d , The Exegesis
of Scripture
and the Arian
Controversy, i n : B u l l e t i n o f t h e John Rylands L i b r a r y 4 1 , 1959, 414-429 H . J.
S i e b e n , Hermneutique
de l'exgse dogmatique d'Athanase, b e i C
Kannengieer ( H r s g . ) . P o l i t i q u e e t T h e o l o g i e chez A t h a n a s e d ' A l e x a n d r i e , T h H 27, Par is 1974, 195-214. B de M a r g e r i e , Introduction
l'histoire de Vexgse, Paris 1980,1983.
8 Sieben S. 2 0 6 , de M a r g e r i e S 139.
177

wichtig geworden ist Allerdings mit gleichem Recht konnte etwa Irenaus die Einheit Gottes als Schpfer und zugleich als Vater oder Augustinus die Notwendigkeit der gttlichen Gnade fr
den sndigen Menschen als Ker n und Kennzeichen der heiligen
Schrift betonen..
Diesen einleitenden Bemerkungen fge ich nur folgendes hinzu: Es gengt nicht, die Prinzipien der Schriftauslegung, wie sie
Athanasius angibt, aus seinen Schriften zu sammeln; es mu
darber hinaus untersucht werden, inwieweit er tatschlich jenen Prinzipien gefolgt ist Diese Aufgabe, die bisher ein wenig
vernachlssigt worden zu sein scheint, will ich im folgenden bedenken
(1) Die Suffizienz der heiligen Schrift wird oft behauptet; so
bekanntlich Contra Gentes 1, De Synodis 6, dazu Ep.. Fest

39,

koptisch bei Lefort: "Also, da es auf der Hand liegt, da das

Zeugnis der Apogr aphen berflssig sowie belanglos ist - da die
Schrift in jeder Hinsicht vollkommen ist -, soll der Lehrer nach
den Worten der Schrift unterrichten". In der Tat lehrt jedoch
Athanasius nicht, da die Worte der Schrift ohne weiteres hinreichen, die Wahrheit mitzuteilen Pollard und Sieben haben r ichtig
bemerkt, da er keine Konkurrenz zwischen den Worten der
Schrift und ihrer herkmmlichen Auslegung kennt; vielmehr ist
mit der Schrift die kirchliche Exegese derselben - und das heit
natrlich, die der zeitgenssischen alexandr mischen Kirche mit einbezogen . "Diese Kennzeichen" - nmlich der heiligen
Schrift - "kommen von den Aposteln durch die Vter", sagt er
Ep.. Serp.. 2.8.. Die Hretiker gehen in die Irre, weil sie, vom
Teufel verleitet, Stze der Schrift behaupten, den Sinn der
Schrift als ganzer dagegen mideuten. Ad Ep. Aeg 4: 'Also der
Glubige (TUXOC.), der die Gnade besitzt, die geistlichen Dinge zu
unterscheiden (xo Staxpt-uetv xa 7rveuuaxixa), steht fest usw ; der
Einfltige dagegen, der nicht grndlich katechisiert worden ist,
da ein solcher nur die gespr ochenen Wor te versteht und der Bedeutung nicht inne wird, wird zugleich von ihren Rnken (ue&oSeiaic.) verfhrt", ebenda. In der oben zitierten Ep Fest. 39 fhrt
10

9 V g l . Ep.. a d M a r c . 2-5: D e r Psalter r e k a p i t u l i e r e d i e ganze

Schrift, Christologische Auslegung w i r d jedoch erst i n c 5 angedeutet..
10 E p E n c . 1 a d f i n .
178

XI

XI
ATHANASIUS A L S EXEGET

Athanasius fort: "Es geht nicht an, denen, die als Katechumenen
mit ihrem Unterricht anfangen, die Worte der Schrift, die wie
Mysterien verhllt sind, auszulegen, diejenige Lehre dagegen, die
sie bentigen, zu bergehen."
Die Sehr ift und ihre Auslegung bilden damit ein geschlossenes
System Im Vergleich zu Origenes finden wir Athanasius viel weniger bereit, auswrtige oder neugefundene Exegesen zu bercksichtigen, geschweige denn zu akzeptieren Die Wahrheit
ist ein fr allemal berliefert worden; ein tieferes Verstndnis
derselben - auxepa Stavota - kann zwar gesucht werden; korrigiert oder sogar erweitert werden kann sie nicht.
Aus der Suffizienz der Schrif t scheint zu folgen, da die hellenische Weisheit dem christlichen Glauben keinen Beitrag liefern konnte Und in der Tat kann Athanasius die bliche Kritik
an den Philosophen, als sich widersprechend, bernehmen; so
Decr 4. Und bekanntlich hlt er es fr ntzlich, die griechischen Mythen zu rgen; so besonders in Contra Gentes. Seine
Kritik ist jedoch betrchtlich von den Philosophen beeinflut.
Diese - und hauptschlich Piaton - werden gelegentlich zitiert
(so z. B Politikos 27.3 bei De Inc 43) ; oder nachgeahmt. In Ep.
ad Marc 27 wir d die dreiteilige Seele erwhnt, worber die heilige Schrift natrlich schweigt . Viel wichtiger ist meines Erachtens der Gegensatz zwischen aio^zd
und vonta, der so tief in der
alexandrinischen Tradition verwurzelt ist, da er vermutlich ohne
jedes Bewutsein von seinem heidnischen Ursprung bemht
werden kann. Die Schrift kennt zwar den Gegensatz zwischen
Himmel und Erde, zwischen Sichtbarem und Unsichtbarem, ferner zwischen dem wrtlichen Sinn ihr er Ausdrcke und ihr er hheren Bedeutung - vgl. die Verwendung der Allegor ie bei Paulus.
Solchen Gegensatz versteht Athanasius ohne jedes philosophische Gerst zu erklren; so Oy 3.18: "Es ist die Gewohnheit der
gttlichen Schrift, die natrlichen Wesen als Bilder und Beispiele
fr die Menschen zu nehmen, damit die freiwilligen Handlungen
derselben gezeigt werden knnen. " Aber er scheut sich nicht,
denselben Gegensatz mit Hilfe recht platonischer Wendungen zu
benennen Der Christ soll sich mit awuaxa beschftigen (Or
11

11 V g l . Eus P. E. 11. 3 4 . 4, genaue Z i t i e r u n g , b e i A t h a n a s i u s v i e l leicht auswendig wiedergegeben

179

3.1) Gott selbst ist aXoc, xai awuaxoq (Decr. 10 5) Solche philosophischen Ausdrcke knnen gelegentlich mit Untersttzung
der Schrift benutzt werden; z B vorjxuc, VOELV xa nagaxidi\ivcx
wird Sprche 23, 1 als Regel des Tischbenehmens, Syn 42 und
Ep. Marc. 17 dagegen als Prinzip der Schriftauslegung verstanden Die Schrift aber lehrt nicht, den Sndenfall als aTtocxaic, xrje,
xwv vorjxwv dEtopiaq, wie Contra Gentes 4, zu betrachten
(2) Die Konsequenz der Heiligen Schrift im allgemeinen wird
meines Wissens nur zweimal behauptet, und zwar Ep. Marc. 9
und Ep Fest 19.. 3; die beremstirnmung des Alten und Neuen
Testaments dagegen kommt hufig zum Ausdruck Die vieldiskutier ten Diskrepanzen der Schrift - so z. B. im Stammbaum des
Heilands - werden anscheinend nicht beachtet. Als Beispiel solcher Errterung darf jedoch folgendes mitgeteilt werden. Im allgemeinen - und das wieder im Gegensatz zu Origenes - kommt
es nur selten vor, da Athanasius seine persnliche Auffassung
eines biblischen Textes vor fhren will. Das tut er jedoch in Ep..
Fest. 39, koptisch bei Coquin (1984) "Der Heiland ", schreibt er,
"hat es befohlen: 'Ihr sollt euch nicht Lehrer nennen lassen' (Mt.
23, 10); der heilige Jakobus dagegen mahnt: *Es sollen nicht zu
viele von euch Lehrer werden' ''woraus natrlich gefolgert werden kann, da es einigen gestattet sei, Lehrer zu heien; ferner
nennt sich Paulus "Lehrer der Heiden in Glauben und Wahrheit"
Athanasius schreibt dazu: "Da ich dieses durchdachte, kam mir
ein Einfall in den Sinn, den ihr prfen sollt" - worauf er erklrt,
da die sogenannten christlichen Lehrer eigentlich auch Jnger
sind; sie hren die Worte des einzigen wahren Lehrers, um sie
mitzuteilen.
Wie bekannt, pflegt Athanasius die Arianer zu tadeln, "weil sie
sorgfltig ausgewhlte Texte aus deren Kontext absondern, die
sie dann buchstblich auslegen, deren Kontext jedoch samt der
allgemeinen Lehre der Scrrrrft vernachlssigen" ; so Pollard 416
Athanasius selbst sucht diesen Fehler dadurch zu vermeiden,
da er eine ganze Reihe von ver wandten Texten anfhr t, die einander besttigen sollen (Als Beispiel finden wir im ersten Brief
an Serapion 55 Zitate aus 10 Bchern des Alten und 16 Bchern
12

1 3

12 Siehe j e d o c h E p . Fest. 19 (unten) u n d E p Ser. 4 11

13 Siehe A n m 4
180

XI

XI
ATHANASIUS ALS EXEGET

des Neuen Testaments gesammelt) Ob die Arianer dieses Verfahren tatschlich nicht nachzuahmen verstanden, darber kann
nichts sicher behauptet werden
Fr agen wir doch: Hlt sich Athanasius an seine eigenen Prinzipien? - nmlich da biblische Texte nicht abgesondert behandelt werden sollen? Im groen und ganzen neige ich dazu, dies
zu bejahen Trotzdem sei folgendes Beispiel beachtet Athanasius zitiert dr eimal Jesaja 1 , 1 1 TtX-ripnc, elut, dem Kontext zum Trotz,
als Ausdruck gttlichen Reichtums Das Vorbild steht mglicherweise bei Origenes in einem Katenenfragment des verlorenen fnften Buchs des .Johanneskommentars (Preuschen S. 4 9 1 ) ;
andere Fxegeten - Ps Barnabas, Athenagoras, Irenaus und Clemens deuten es richtig: Gott sei der Opfer satt.. Athanasius
knnte jedoch er widern, da er .Jesaja dem Sinn der Schrift gem gedeutet hat; lesen wir nicht, Epheser 1, 23, "die Flle dessen,
der alles in allem erfllt"?
Als weiteres Beispiel erwhnen wir die Exegese von Ps. 105,
15, "Tastet meine Gesalbten nicht an ". Mit dieser Bibelstelle tadelt Athanasius die Meletianer, die anscheinend die Leichname
der Heiligen ausgraben wollten, um sie mumifizieren zu
lassen
Diese Anwendung jenes Passus ist vermutlich in der
ganzen christlichen Literatur ohne Parallele.
Hieraus leuchtet ein, da Athanasius ein idealisier tes Bd von
der Tragweite der Schrift besitzt Natrlich hat er keine Ahnung
davon, da ihre Worte mit Rcksicht auf die Umstnde und die
Sprechweise der einzelnen Schriftsteller ausgelegt werden mssen..
(3) Den Kontext jedes einzelnen Passus der Schrift zu beachten, kommt daher als Aufgabe in Betracht, die mit der Behauptung ihrer jeweiligen Tragweite verbunden ist. Laut Athanasius
zitieren die Arianer ihre Beweistexte ohne Rcksicht darauf;
man sollte dagegen jedesmal "das Ziel, die Person, die Sache",
bzw. "die Absicht" erforschen. Die genannten Formeln sind von
Sieben mit Hinweis auf Tertullian, Origenes und Hilarius ausfhrlich diskutiert worden. Ich bin selbst dazu geneigt, den Ursprung derselben in den rhetorischen Lehrbchern zu suchen,
1 4

1 5

14 Or. 2.. 2 9 , Ep. Ser. 3. 6, E p . Fest.. 19.. 2.

15 Ep. Fest.. 4 1 , S. 43 L e f o r t .
181

die die Themen, xctet, des Redners verschiedenartig aufzhlen;

typisch ist die sptere lateinische Formel: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus
auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando. So finden wir Or. 1 . 5 4 xcapo,
TTpoomov, Trpaytia, d.h. quis, quid, quando; ebd. 2 8 S t a v o t a , xcupo, Trpoamov, ungefhr entsprechend Beer
1 4 x a t p o , jrp6a)7cov,
xpeta, d.h. quis, cur, quando Hier allerdings ergibt sich eigentlich keine 'triade hermneutique', kein Prinzip der Schriftauslegung im allgemeinen, wie es Sieben sehen will. Die genannten
Kriterien werden ausnahmslos dazu benutzt, die arianische Bibelauslegung zu entkrften, d.h. den Befund der Schrift mit der
kirchlichen Doktrin der Menschwerdung in Einklang zu bringen.
Wenden wir uns abschlieend von den Pr inzipien der Bibelauslegung ab, um die Praxis des Athanasius, die von der Theorie
manchmal abweicht, kurz zu skizzieren Es besteht meines
Erachtens ein erheblicher Unterschied zwischen der Behandlung
der geschichtlichen und derjenigen der prophetischen Bcher
des Alten Testaments Hinsichtlich der erstgenannten herrscht
weitgehend ein geschichtlicher Realismus. Athanasius pflegt
zum Beispiel die Patriarchen aufzuzhlen: Sie zeugten Shne
{Inc. .35), sie besuchten die Wste (Ep Fest 2 4 ) , sie litten (ebd..
2 9 ) , sie starben und wurden begraben (ebd. 41). Eine chronologische Beweisfhrung - und das wieder einmal als persnliche
Erwgung angefhrt - finden wir in Ep Fest.. 19.. Anfnglich
wurden die moralischen Gebote am Berg Sinai bergeben; erst
spter, als das Volk die Gtzen zu verehren anfing, wurden Opfer
gefordert. Die scheinbare Diskrepanz, etwa bei Jesaja 1, 12, wird
damit gelst.. Die Geschichte des Sndenflls wird nicht - wie
gelegentlich behauptet wir d - allegor isiert: Adam wir d nicht, wie
bei Philon, als Symbol des menschlichen Geistes betrachtet, sondern als idealisierter' Platoniker dargestellt Sein Verbrechen ein Mangel, freilich, an Theoria - bleibt geschichtliches Er eignis;
der Heiland hat das Tor des Himmels geffnet, das, seit er Adam
aus dem Garten vertrieben hatte, verschlossen war, so Ep. Fest,
1 6

4.3.17
16 V g l a u c h Or. 1. 55, u n d krzer e b d 2, 7 (TTOXE, 7ip6q xO, Sent.
Dion.. 4.. 4
(xocipoq,
TcpotoTtov).
Quelle
vielleicht
Origenes
P r i n c 1.1. 4; v g l . a u c h C l e m e n s Paed.. 2.14.. 4, Str.. 2.. 137. 3.
17 Gr. T e x t ( K o s m a s ) b e i L e f o r t S. 5 2 ; v g l a u c h S . 2 0 A n m ' E t
p o s t alia ..
5

182

XI

XI
ATHANASIUS ALS EXEGET

Mit geschichtlichem Realismus meinen wir natrlich nicht,

da Athanasius die Geschichte skularisiert Selbstverstndlich
sieht er den gttlichen Logos in den Ereignissen ttig "Dieser
ist es, der ehedem das Volk aus gypten holte, der aber nachher
uns alle erlst hat" - so in Ep. Fest. 10. Meist ist die Exegese
im strikten Sinn typologisch; der Unterschied zwischen Typ oder
Schatten und Wahrheit kommt in den Epistulae Festales besonders hufig zum Ausdruck Die Ereignisse jedoch, die als Typ
oder Schatten beschrieben werden, kamen wirklich vor Als Beispiel vergleicht Athanasius den Schall der Festtrompeten mit der
christlichen Verkndigung; es wird aber niemals angedeutet, da
sie keine wirklichen Blasinstrumente waren. Die berlegenheit
des Evangeliums besteht gerade darin, da es ein geistliches
Faktum ist.
Eigentliche Allegorisierung kommt also verhltnismig selten vor Als Beispiel zitieren wir folgendes, aus Ep Fest 24:
"Der groe Mose, als er sich von gypten entfernte - das heit
aber von den irdischen Wer ken, die uns in der Finsternis halten sprach mit Gott von Angesicht zu Angesicht"..
Mit der Auslegung der Prophetenbcher steht es etwas anders, und das natrlich, weil bildhafte Ausdrcke bei den Propheten hufig benutzt werden. Freilich ist die prophetische Einsicht
auch auerhalb dieser Bcher zu finden So Ep.. Fest 6: Abraham, 'Verehrte, als er seinen Sohn opferte, den Sohn Gottes; und
als er dar an gehindert wurde, Isaak zu opfer n, sah er den Messias in dem Widder" In Ep Fest 1 finden wir eine Weiterentwicklung der Allegorie der Sprche 9, 1-5: "Kommt, esset von
meinem Brot und tr inkt von dem Wein, den ich gemischt habe",
samt Hinweis auf Jon 6, 48: "Ich bin das Brot des Lebens" Auch
wird das Gesetz allegorisiert; ein auffllendes Beispiel bietet
sich in demselben Brief. Die Snder "begraben die Seele in
Snden und Torheiten, indem sie sich mit toter Nahrung sttigen
die das Gesetz verboten hat, indem es figrlich mahnt: 'Ihr
sollt nicht den Adler essen, samt jedem toten Vogel, der Leichname it' ".. Mit dieser ziemlich freien Wiedergabe von Leviticus 11

werden eher die Genumenschen getadelt als, wie blich, die Angriffslustigen. Hchstwahrscheinlich denkt Athanasius an den
Paidagogos des Clemens, der mit Hinweis auf dieselbe Bibelstelle
jene zwei Laster unmittelbar nacheinander verurteilt
Mittels Allegorese wagt es Athanasius sogar, den Patriarchen
Issaschar als seinen Vorlufer in der exegetischen Arbeit zu feiern In Ep Fest 13 wird Genesis 49,14 zitier t: "Issaschar hat das
Gute begehrt, da er zwischen den Erbgtern (x\r]po<;)
ausruhte Da er nmlich von gttlicher Liebe verwundet war,
so wie die Braut im Hohenlied, hat er aus der heiligen Schrift
Wohlstand gesammelt; denn sein Geist wurde nicht lediglich vom
alten, sondern von beiden Erbgtern bezaubert. Daher, als er
seine Flgel sozusagen ausbreitete, sah er von ferne die himmlische Ruhe. Und da das hiesige Land aus solch schnen Werken
besteht, um wieviel mehr soll wahrlich das himrnlische aus solchen bestehen, da es immer neu ist und nimmer alt wird."
Eine halbe Stunde gengt nicht, um die Exegese des Athanasius hinreichend zu erlutern. Ich hoffe, wenigstens gezeigt zu
haben, da diese Aufgabe der Mhe wert ist.

18 Vgl.. E p . , 4 1 , C o q u i n 1984 S 156: 'Es w a r n i c h t das B l u t des L a m m e s selbst, das den Verderber v e r h i n d e r t e u n d das V o l k aus gypten
freilie, s o n d e r n es i s t der H e i l a n d , der i m B l u t w a r , der dies g e t a n
hat '

19 Z u G e n 4 9 , 14-16 l i e f e r t d i e B i b l i a P a t r i s t i c a b i s a u f Epiphanius
k e i n e w e i t e r e n Z i t i e r u n g e n . D a s W o r t x X i j p o i i m S i n n der z w e i Testam e n t e k o m m t i n Eus Ps. - K o m m . P G 2 3 , 700 vor. D e r d o r t v o r l i e g ende T e x t , Ps. 67, 14 L X X , w i r d b e i A t h a n a s i u s n i c h t z i t i e r t .

18

183

1 9

184

XII

I H E S C R I P T U R E S A N D T H E S O U L OF C H R I S T

IN

ATHANASIUS

No

general agreement

has yet been reached a b o u t

Athanasius'

teaching, or absence o f teaching, o n the soul of C h r i s t The great maj o r i t y of scholars n o w agree t h a t the t w o b o o k s against A p o l l i n a r i s are
n o t f r o m his h a n d ; so those w h o u p h o l d the t r a d i t i o n a l o p i n i o n that
A t h a n a s i u s d i d n o t f a i l t o a t t r i b u t e a soul t o C h r i s t are faced w i t h the
d i f f i c u l t y t h a t he never makes a direct a v o w a l of i t ; the nearest approaches are a passage i n the Tomus

ad Antiochenos

d i n g the confession t h a t ou awu/x a4> X

u

o f 362, c 7, recor-

avaiaOrj-cov oo' avo^-rov dyw 6

0V

2toTT]p, since he b r o u g h t salvation n o t o n l y t o the b o d y b u t t o t h e soul;

a n d a passage i n the ad Epictetum

7 w h i c h repeats the latter p o i n t . I t is

noted t h a t n o n o u n is used f o r the soul of C h r i s t , a n d t h a t the phrase oux

aci>uxov c o u l d mean s i m p l y ' n o t lifeless'; a n d f u r t h e r , t h a t Athanasius*
1

n o r m a l way o f describing Christ's incarnate l i f e persists unaltered i n his

latest w o r k s ; he conceives the L o g o s b e c o m i n g , or assuming, aapi;, and
locates his h u m a n emotions a n d experiences i n that cap!;
V a r i o u s replies have been m a d e t o these objections O n the one hand
i t has been explained ( r i g h t l y ,

I t h i n k ) t h a t Athanasius

h a b i t u a l l y t h i n k o f aapi; as just one element i n the h u m a n

does

not

compositum;

m o s t c o m m o n l y i t means, r a t h e r , ' h u m a n i t y ' . I n t h a t case the cap!; of

C h r i s t is n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h , or e x c l u d i n g , a CJ>OXT);
i n d e e d , i t is added, A t h a n a s i u s ' w h o l e understanding of the h u m a n i t y
assumed b y the Logos implies the presence o f a soul.. B u t i t remains diff i c u l t t o see w h y , o n this s h o w i n g , Athanasius d i d n o t make the implicat i o n clear O n the other h a n d i t has been argued ( w r o n g l y , I t h i n k ) that
the question of C h r i s t ' s soul was n o t a matter of debate before 362, or at
least t h a t i t was eclipsed b y the m o r e pressing question o f his d i v i n i t y

It

has also been c l a i m e d ( m o r e j u s t i f i a b l y ) t h a t t o a t t r i b u t e a h u m a n soul

to C h r i s t w o u l d have been a n embarrassment;

either as recalling

Origen's d o c t r i n e a n d suggesting a separate personality l i n k e d w i t h the

XII

XII
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

234

235

L o g o s by a merely m o r a l u n i o n ; or as a c c o u n t i n g f o r Christ's thoughts

v i v e d ; and the most considerable o f these, the Expositiones

a n d actions i n terms of a complete h u m a n i t y , so t h a t the operation o f

has n o t come d o w n t o us i n a complete and reliable text Nevertheless we

the Logos is reduced to a mere external i n s p i r a t i o n a f a u l t alleged

can and s h o u l d i n q u i r e h o w Athanasius treated the texts i n scripture

against Paul of Samosata and later against Marcellus. This argument,

which

however, is two-edged; i f i t explains w h y Athanasius was reluctant to

christological significance.

profess such a belief, m i g h t i t n o t also suggest t h a t he was reluctant to

speak

of

a fyuyr\

a n a

have,

or

were t h o u g h t

in

to

Psalmos,

have,

I n the N e w Testament the ' s o u l ' of C h r i s t , his c ^ r i , is m e n t i o n e d in

t h i r t e e n places. N o t all of these are significant f o r our purpose; at M t

h o l d it?
M o s t recent discussion has been i n f l u e n c e d b y the w o r k of

M.

2:20 oi CriTouv-cei; TT)V <|>uxr)v xou TicaSiou c o u l d arguably be discounted, since

R i c h a r d a n d A . Grilfmeier R i c h a r d considered A t h a n a s i u s ' reply t o the

it is n a t u r a l l y rendered 'those w h o sought the y o u n g child's l i f e ' (cf i l l

A r i a n argument that the h u m a n emotions a n d experience of C h r i s t p r o -

Kings

ve h i m i n f e r i o r t o the Father; A t h a n a s i u s , he p o i n t s o u t , never makes

duplicate corresponding texts i n M a t t h e w ; and i n J o h n 10:11-18 four

the obvious r e p l y b y saying t h a t these experiences attach t o the soul of

references t o Christ's c|>ux"n appear w i t h i n a single context of thought.

C h r i s t a n d n o t directly t o the L o g o s , a l t h o u g h Eustathius is k n o w n t o

This leaves us w i t h a m i n i m u m

have used this argument a n d Athanasius can h a r d l y have been i g n o r a n t

20:28 = M k

of i t . G r i l i m e i e r showed t h a t A t h a n a s i u s pictures the death o f Christ as

15:13; A c t s 2:27 ( f r o m P s a l m 15:10 L X X ) ; and I J o h n 3:16 These texts,

a separation o f the Logos f r o m his flesh, the Logos descending t o the

again, are n o t w h o l l y independent,

u n d e r w o r l d , the flesh discarded, the soul i g n o r e d . Grilimeier however

Jesus t r o u b l e d i n his 4>ux"n ( M t . 26:38 parr , J o h n 12:27); (ii) H i s sur-

concludes w i t h w h a t looks like a 'crossbench' p o s i t i o n , h o l d i n g t h a t for

render and recovery o f his 4)uxii ( M t . 20:28 parr , J o h n 10:11-18, 15:13,

Athanasius the soul of C h r i s t is n o t a ' t h e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r ' b u t is perhaps

I J o h n 3:16); ( i i i ) The deliverance of his c^ux^U Acts 2:27

a 'physical f a c t o r ' I t is n o t necessary for his p i c t u r e o f the person and

19:10 L X X ) ; t w o references i n M a r k (10:45, 14:34) merely

list of seven passages, namely

Mt

10:45; M t . 26:38 = M k . 14:34; J o h n 10:11-18, 12:27 and

but e m b o d y three t r a d i t i o n s : (i)

H o w does Athanasius treat these texts? W e may begin by considering

A n d certainly

the w o r k s most c o m m o n l y studied, viz.. those indexed by M i i l l e r f r o m

Athanasius was n o t t h o u g h t t o have excluded i t ; the c o n d e m n a t i o n of

P G 25 a n d 26, deducting (as I t h i n k we must) the F o u r t h O r a t i o n , the de

A p o l l i n a r i s i n n o way d i m i n i s h e d the h i g h regard i n w h i c h Athanasius

Incarnatione

was held b y b o t h A l e x a n d r i a n a n d A n t i o c h e n e theologians.

Sermo

w o r k of C h r i s t ; o n the other h a n d i t is n o t excluded

Never-

theless attempts are still being m a d e t o rescue Athanasius f r o m the u n -

Maior,

et c. Arianos,

the t w o b o o k s against A p o l l i n a r i s a n d the

besides some smaller pieces, and also the de

virginitate

p r i n t e d i n T U 29. This still leaves a large corpus e m b o d y i n g w e l l over

f a v o u r a b l e l i g h t i n w h i c h R i c h a r d a n d Grilimeier are t h o u g h t t o have

1000 N e w Testament q u o t a t i o n s i n a l l B u t o n l y t w o of our seven texts

placed h i m .

are ever q u o t e d w i t h the w o r d CJJUXTI i n c l u d e d , and they are q u o t e d only

I n this complex debate, i t seems t o me t h a t t o o l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has

been p a i d t o the possible relevance o f A t h a n a s i a n

exegesis.

Some

i n controversy w i t h the A r i a n s over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Passion.

J o h n 12:27 appears i n a list of texts used b y the A r i a n s at c Ar.

3.26,

scholars have even appeared t o suggest t h a t exegetical texts p r o v i d e no

a n d reappears i n A t h a n a s i u s ' r e p l y , i b i d 54 and 57; and J o h n 10:18,

evidence for the w r i t e r ' s real views. I n a n a d m i r a b l e piece of research

p r o c l a i m i n g Christ's a u t h o r i t y over his fyuyj\, is used as a k i n d of

H e n r i de R i e d m a t t e n showed t h a t Eusebius never mentions a soul i n

counterweight t o the other i n t h e same t w o chapters.. The use o f John

C h r i s t except i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s c r i p t u r a l texts; b u t he has been inter-

12:27 by the A r i a n s is w o r t h n o t i n g , i n view of the communis

preted as s h o w i n g t h a t Eusebius denied C h r i s t a soul.. C l e a r l y one needs

t h a t they denied C h r i s t a soul.

opinio

t o determine h o w Eusebius understands the relevant texts i f one is to see

A few m o r e such q u o t a t i o n s can be f o u n d , however, i n some less

w h y he makes n o dogmatic use of them. A n d the same can be done for

f a m i l i a r texts. M t . 26:38 is q u o t e d i n Festal Letter 6 7 (Syriac version,

A t h a n a s i u s , t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y the m a t e r i a l is less a b u n d a n t ; for t h o u g h

translated at P G 26, 1387A) a n d 24 ( C o p t i c version, p. 41 = p. 13 of

one can f i n d some relevant comments o n scripture i n the w o r k s most

French translation).

c o m m o n l y consulted, m u c h less of his p u r e l y exegetical w r i t i n g s has sur-

quotes J o h n 10:11 c o n f l a t e d w i t h 15:13 ( i b i d p. 111 = 89 of F T ). There

The C o p t i c h o m i l y O n C h a r i t y and

Temperance

XII

XII
236

THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

237

is a n a l l u s i o n , t h o u g h n o t a direct q u o t a t i o n , t o J o h n 10:11 also i n the

saidGei'xwi, he observesdljouaiav e'xw Belvai TTIV fyvyip LCOU etc. S h o r t l y

Expositiones

a f t e t w a r d s he quotes Ps,

in Psalmos,

o n Ps. 46:5 ( P G 27, 217 C 3 ) ; a n d l o h n 10:18

is quoted o n 87:5, i b i d 380 C

remarked, by Richard

W e can enlarge our f i e l d o f v i e w , however, b y considering some O l d

15:10 complete; b u t i t has of course been

and others, t h a t his comments

o n a l l these

passages, w i t h one e x c e p t i o n , ignore the w o r d c]>ux*l> assign the ' t r o u b l -

Testament texts w h i c h were i n t e r p r e t e d i n a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense. M o s t

ing' t o his flesh,

o f these occur i n the Psalms; i n f a c t I have n o t been able t o t h i n k o f any

w i t h his flesh or his b o d y ; so TO LIEV yap TapavteaScii vr\<; aapxo? iSiov rjv (!),

other such text c o n t a i n i n g the w o r d

TO Se ouaiav I'x&iv Setvai xcd Xa[3eTv, oxt POUX&TOCI, TTJV tyuyrp, ouxe-ci xoOxo

except Is 53:11-12 a n d 61:10.

and t a l k simply o f the u n i o n and r e u n i o n of t h e

Logos

Athanasius does n o t appear to quote either o f these, t h o u g h (as one

iSiov avGpcimojv ... "AvBptoxo? yap

w o u l d expect) he uses is. 53:1-8; perhaps v. 10a m a y have presented a

aGavaTO; a i k o ; wv, aapxa Be BvrjTnv e'xcov, eV s^oudia? EIXEV . . 710 aeo|xaTos

dif f i c u l t y w h i c h discouraged h i m f r o m c o n t i n u i n g the q u o t a t i o n , since i t

XiopiaOrjvai xai TOUTO TudXiv avaXapEtv ,,, A n d after the q u o t a t i o n o f Ps

c o u l d suggest t h a t the Father must 'cleanse' the S o n , presumably f r o m

15:10 he adds: "E7rpe7rE yap y(iapxr\v ouaav TT]V aapxa , 81a T6V IvSuaajxevov

some m o r a l i n j u r y ,

auxfjv Aoyov a<p0apTov BiauivEiv. O n e can see t h a t such passages j u s t i f y the

There is, t h e n , a g r o u p of passages i n the Psalms i n w h i c h the w o r d

... \ir\ OeXcov a7to0vr|(jxei 6 hi xupio;,

c o m m e n t t h a t a l t h o u g h he uses s c r i p t u r a l references t o the <\>i>xn of

fyuxh is used, a n d w h i c h were c o m m o n l y read i n a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense,,

C h r i s t , Athanasius r e a d i l y slips back i n t o a 'Logos-sarx' descriptive

B y far the most i m p o r t a n t is Ps, 15:10 ( L X X ) , o n w h i c h a christological

scheme

significance is already imposed b y St, Peter's use o f i t i n A c t s 2:27

The case is perceptibly d i f f e r e n t , however, i f we t u r n to his

( t h o u g h i n the r e p e t i t i o n at 2:31 the w o r d fyuxr) disappears), This psalm

tiones

is also the o n l y one o f the g r o u p t o be used i n A t h a n a s i u s '

w o r k s ; a n d t h a t i n t w o contexts

I t appears

paraphrase o f Peter's speech i n c Ar

twice i n a

10

in Psalmos.

Exposi-

This w o r k has been relatively l i t t l e used because o f its

dogmatic

p o o r text, I t has n o t been t r a n s m i t t e d i n a direct t r a d i t i o n , b u t only

developed

t h r o u g h a n u m b e r e d series o f extracts preserved i n catenae.. T h e stan-

2.16, designed t o show, against

d a r d e d i t i o n o f the Greek extracts b y M o n t f a u c o n , reproduced i n

the A r i a n s , t h a t C h r i s t is n o t a mere m a n as the Jews supposed. I n each

M i g n e , contains m u c h extraneous matter a n d has l o n g been recognized

case the correct L X X w o r d i n g is r e p r o d u c e d ; a n d after the first quota-

as inadequate,

t i o n Athanasius says expressly t h a t this verse, w i t h some other texts, ap-

some 150 f u r t h e r Greek fragments ( t h o u g h m a n y o f them are quite

plies n o t t o D a v i d b u t t o C h r i s t ; cf A c t s 2:25a a n d 31 For A t h a n a s i u s ,

b r i e f ) a n d , perhaps m o r e i m p o r t a n t , provides a list o f passages p r i n t e d

therefore, the phrase ' m y s o u l ' indicates Christ's s o u l , u n d e r s t o o d as a

i n M i g n e w h i c h are n o t t o be assigned t o Athanasius, Some help can be

personal e n t i t y descending t o , a n d delivered f r o m , the u n d e r w o r l d ;

g o t f r o m the Syriac versions, w h i c h V i a n has o f course employed; there

t h o u g h at the second q u o t a t i o n , where o n l y the c r u c i a l f i r s t h a l f of the

is a version in extensoi

verse is used, we f i n d a characteristic m o d i f i c a t i o n ; he avoids the w o r -

excerpts, t h o u g h n o t o f the w h o l e w o r k as i t once existedof w h i c h un-

H o w e v e r , a recent p u b l i c a t i o n b y G , M , V i a n " adds

e a n o r i g i n a l l y complete version of t h e Greek

d i n g o f A c t s 2:24 and 32 t h a t ' G o d raised u p ' Jesus (chtovr\at\>), w h i c h no

f o r t u n a t e l y something between one-eighth a n d one-sixth alone survives,

d o u b t he t h o u g h t c o u l d be useful t o the A r i a n s , a n d a f f i r m s the

a n d a n abbreviated version preserved c o m p l e t e ,

sovereign power

v e r s i o n also helps t o c o n f i r m the a u t h e n t i c i t y o f the A t h a n a s i a n t e x t s

of

C h r i s t himself:

Christ not

o n l y rose

himself

(e^avaaTfjvaO b u t roused (dyetpai) f r o m the tombs t h e m e n w h o h a d been

l o n g dead

H e r e t h e n , ' m y s o u l ' carries a sense w h i c h is n o t easily

distinguishable f r o m ' m y s e l f .

12

A f r a g m e n t a r y Coptic
1 3

W e shall consider A t h a n a s i u s ' comments o n the f o l l o w i n g verses: Ps,

15:10; 17:5; 21:21 a n d 30; 34:11 and 17; 46:5; 54:17-19; 56:2 and 5;
68:2,

1 1 , 19 a n d 2 1 ; 87:4 and 5 ( a l l L X X references),, Ps,, 15:10 has pride

3 57 a rather d i f f e r e n t i m -

o f place a n d w i l l be l e f t t i l l last, For these verses the Syriac longer ver-

pression is made. Athanasius has been a r g u i n g against the view t h a t the

sion is l a c k i n g , a n d the shorter version I consider u n h e l p f u l , except for

h u m a n experiences o f the Logos p r o v e h i m less t h a n f u l l y d i v i n e H e has

Psalms 68 a n d 87, O n the other h a n d a g o o d deal o f help can be gained

W h e n the psalm verse reappears at c. Ar.

j u s t m e n t i o n e d J o h n 12:27 (vuv rj cj>ux*i M- xETapaxxai,) as said av9ptoxivto?

b y considering parallels i n Eusebius' C o m m e n t a r y o n the Psalms w h i c h ,

b y the Saviour,

i t w i l l be s h o w n b e l o w , was used b y Athanasius

ou

a n d balanced

it by

lohn

10:18, where the L o r d

XII

XII
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

238

239

17:5 deserves o n l y passing m e n t i o n , since Athanasius takes i t t h a t

Eusebius here is less systematic; he tends t o t h i n k o f D a v i d describing

D a v i d is speaking f o r himself a n d t h a n k f u l l y describing his deliverance

his o w n t r o u b l e s , b u t b y an a f t e r t h o u g h t a t p. 305 A he attributes verse 3

Ps

f r o m his enemies; a prophecy o f the 'descent' o f t h e L o r d (Christ) ap-

t o t h e Saviour xaxd TO avSpwrcivov, i n c l u d i n g a reference t o h i s ^uyt]:

pears f i r s t a t v. 8 However t h e c o m m e n t is w o r t h n o t i n g , as showing

Elnov

one o f t h e ways i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s w i l l use cjiuxfy riegteoxov

the Father

davdxov.

fie (hhtveq

OUSEVO?, cprjuiv, VraG9cc TCOXEU-OU QvTjxou fi.euvT)xai, dXXa 8uvau.ecov

acpavwv, evSov X7]v c[iuxfy auxou xuxXouawv. A t h a n a s i u s

n o r m a l l y takes

xfj tpvxfj fiov

Eco-zngia GOV eifii eyed, a prayer o f course addressed t o

So also verse 12, he t h i n k s , can be a t t r i b u t e d either t o D a v i d

(301 D ) or t o t h e Saviour (305 D ) A t h a n a s i u s clearly refers verse 12 t o

C h r i s t , b u t his c o m m e n t

appears t o i g n o r e tyuxh, w h i c h Eusebius

'enemies' t o m e a n o p p o s i n g p o w e r s , or demons; a n d the ' s o u l ' here i n -

repeatedly m e n t i o n s ; a t most one m i g h t say t h a t i t helps t o f i x t h e sense

dicates, n o t a b i o l o g i c a l l i f e - p r i n c i p l e , b u t t h e i n w a r d m o r a l

o f t h e w o r d dxexvi'a. A t h a n a s i u s

nature

dyadtov xai dxexviav

w h i c h is exposed t o their assaults

Psalm 21 is o f course regularly i n t e r p r e t e d o f the Passion o f C h r i s t
A t verse 21 we have a laconic c o m m e n t i n w h i c h t h e w o r d 4>ux*l * i g s

n o r e d : 'Pvuat and Qoiupaiac; zijv ipvxi)v fiov- TTJV xocxiccv TG>V TouSaiwv xcd
xr)v civotav Sid TOUTWV aTj[JLatv.i 8 i a poLKpaia? xai x P<H xuvo? x a i Xeovxo? x a i
ei

XEpaTcuv LLovoxEptoTtov.
M u c h t h e same is f o u n d a t 21:30-1: Kai r\ ipvxt) fiov fj, xai TO onegfia
fiov

oovlevoei

avrcp

' A y i a yap x a i au.wfjL0<; rj Xpiarou yeyove far], 'r)v

101 novqqa.

has: 'Avxanehihoadv

dvri

TOUTO cp^at Sid TO avajftou^ auxou^ 6q>6f;vc(i

TOU xXriGfjvai Texva 0EOC 6'jrep [xdXtoTa eyvcopi^ev aux6? xaxd TO, rioadxii;
( M t . 23:37) . Eusebius discusses t h e sense o f dxexvia as lack o f spiritual
c h i l d r e n at 301 A B , 304 A , 308 A , n o t i n g t h a t the verse can be assigned
either t o D a v i d (304 A ) or t o C h r i s t (.305 D-.308 A ) , a n d i n t r o d u c i n g M t
23:37 i n the latter passage
A brief c o m m e n t o n verse 13 is p r i n t e d b y M i g n e a t p.. 172 B 6; b u t
t h i s , i t appears, is n o t by A t h a n a s i u s

7C7C0LT]xaL |i&xa aapxoq em yfj^ Movo? yap auxo^ oux e7cor]aev auapxtav xaixoi

Athanasius'

x a 9 ' TiLta? ysyovai?, xai adpxa Xa[3wv xfiv 91Xau.apTrju.ova

'Anoxaxdozrjoov

( N . B . ) SxEpu-a 8E

TJJ ysvxfj fiov

surviving

comment

(Vian p

is t o o brief

68), A n d a t verse 17
t o be i n f o r m a t i v e :

xijv ipvx^v fiov and tfjc; xaxovgyiac, avxwv

liavxa oaa Ttdax-

eou VOTISEIEV av oE 8 i ' aikou xsxXr][xevoi Bid T?K mateoi?.. T h e comments

EL r\ Xey&i, uxip z% Tju-ETEpas a(OTripia<; TtoieX, stopping there according t o

c o u l d easily suggest t h a t A t h a n a s i u s deliberately refrains f r o m t a k i n g u p

Vian,, Possibly he t h i n k s o f t h i s verse as a m o d e l prayer uttered by

the i n d i c a t i o n o f a $uyj\ i n C h r i s t , a n d t h a t o n 21:30 i n i t . l o o k s l i k e a

C h r i s t o n behalf o f h u m a n i t y , or perhaps o f the believer, as i n Eusebius,

classic f o r m u l a t i o n o f Logos-sarx c h r i s t o l o g y Nevertheless there is the

p, 216 A , where C h r i s t 'recites t h e w h o l e psalm w i t h reference t o every

possibility t h a t fj c]>uxii u-ou is s i m p l y t a k e n as a periphrasis f o r iyd>, as we

soul t h a t is dedicated t o h i m ' ; i n w h i c h case ' m y soul' w o u l d be

should say T m y s e l f ; this is clearly the case i n at least t w o non-

u n d e r s t o o d t o refer t o the soul o f the believer

christological passages Thus at 10:1 ( p 93 A ) ncbg egetre TT} tpvxfjfiov,

glossed row; u,oi EpEixe; a n d at 102:1 ( p 432 B) EvXdyei,
Kvgiov

is

rj yvxy fiov, tov

is explained Auxo? lauxov Im. TOV iiuvov Sieyeipet, t h o u g h c u r i o u s l y

At

46:5 t h e w o r d c^uxri does n o t appear i n t h e L X X t e x t , but

A t h a n a s i u s attributes i t t o C h r i s t by a n a l l u s i o n t o J o h n 10:11, as noted

above ( p , 2 3 6 ) : Tijv xaXXovwv

Yaxoj/? r\v j)ydni}oev

Tfjv xaXX6vr]v Taxwp

enough a t 103:1 ( p 463 A ) t h e very same phrase is t a k e n d i f f e r e n t l y :

yrjai xr|V 7tpocpr|TEiav TT}V Ttept xoiv eOvoiv ,,, ( G e n 49:10),, K a i TWI i\ycmf\\ivjr\ r]

AiBdaxei x a i ini T?) [xeydXr] 7tpovoia xou @EOU euXoyeiv xfj fyuyjQ TOV eov,

Tto TTJV ^uyr\v aikou TE0EIXOXI uizip a u x i ^ ; The rendering ' l i f e ' o f course easi-

where xfj fyuxti

l y suggests itself; b u t (|wx*l is n o t quite equivalent t o Cwri, for faty Geivai

1 S

i n s t r u m e n t a l phrase, i m p l y i n g p r e s u m a b l y a con-

scious a n d deliberate act o f w o r s h i p rather t h a n something f o r m a l a n d

sounds u n n a t u r a l ; w h i c h perhaps suggests t h a t fyvxh

mechanical.

substantive sense: n o t merely ' l i f e ' , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f life,

T h e v a r i a t i o n m a y w a r n us against expecting t o o m u c h

m e t h o d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' use o f cjwx !

1

P s a l m 34, says A t h a n a s i u s , is w r i t t e n f r o m t h e character (EX jtpotxorcou)

rather more

P s a l m 54 yields some c o m m e n t s w h i c h are most i n s t r u c t i v e , p r o v i d e d

t h a t t h e rather delicate problems o f inter p i e t a t i o n c a n be c o n v i n c i n g l y

o f t h e believer t e m p t e d b y s p i r i t u a l enemies; b u t i t also introduces the

resolved, The psalm n a t u r a l l y suggests t h e Passion o f Christ; b u t there

' p e r s o n ' o f C h r i s t a n d his sufferings. H e notes this a t t r i b u t i o n as begin-

are phrases w h i c h resist this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n o t a b l y t h e reference t o the

n i n g at verse 1 1 , so t h a t a c o m m e n t o n verse 7 restored b y V i a n ( f r . 2 4 ,

speaker's 'foolishness' (dSoXtsxEa) i n v 3 a n d t o his dismay a n d terror

p 22), w h i c h mentions 4^XT)> cannot be given a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l reference.

(especially SEiXia Bavdxou) i n v. 5 Eusebius, i n a somewhat

involved

XII
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

240

discussion, explains t h a t D a v i d c a n n o t
periences t h r o u g h o u t ;

he r e c o u n t i n g his o w n ex-

he foresees the Passion;

and

i t is he,

'the

241

u.ou is u n d e r s t o o d as T myself',. B u t at v, 5 the clause eppusaxo xrjv ^M%f\v

[xou ex Lteaou axuuvtov receives t h e c r y p t i c c o m m e n t axuuvtov x w v vorjxiov

p r o p h e t ' , w h o feels h o r r o r a n d c o n f u s i o n ' w h i c h he calls foolishness' i n

8T[XOV6TI: this I t h i n k means ' s p i r i t u a l lion-cubs', i.e. demons, rather

view of the sufferings o f C h r i s t (p. 4 7 6 A ) . A t h a n a s i u s takes a similar

t h a n s i m p l y ' m e t a p h o r i c a l lion-cubs' w h o c o u l d be physical assailants;

line i n c o m m e n t i n g o n these verses; he makes the ' p r o p h e t ' refer t o the

here, t h e n , the sense o f 'fyuxh inclines to ' s o u l ' rather t h a n ' l i f e ' ; b u t once

Saviour i n the t h i r d person (p. 252 A 6, B 10-12, 15-16), a n d i t is his

again we have a m o d e l prayer a p p r o p r i a t e t o h u m a n i t y rather t h a n a

foreseen experiences w h i c h strike the p r o p h e t w i t h h o r r o r and dismay,

personal profession b y C h r i s t himself.

B u t he has also said, at 252 A 12-14, t h a t the p r o p h e t speaks,for the

P s a l m 68 was r e g u l a r l y a p p l i e d t o the Passion, a n d is so n o t e d i n the

Saviour: Tldvxa yap xd xaxd xou Eioxfjpos auufidvxa itpos xo oixeiov dva^epei

Epistle t o M a r c e l l i n u s , c 26 F o u r verses m e n t i o n a tyuxh w h i c h is at-

r:p6ato7iov; this seems to m e a n t h a t he describes the S a v i o u r ' s experiences

t r i b u t e d t o C h r i s t ; a n d here we have the help of the longer Syriac ver-

as i f they were his o w n , using the f i r s t person; thus ' m y f a m i l i a r f r i e n d '

sion

in v

A t h a n a s i u s ' w o r k closely resembles the extensive treatment o f Eusebius,

14 refers t o Judas; we m i g h t ( a l t e r n a t i v e l y ) say t h a t t h e verse is

spoken ex persona

T w o general p o i n t s are t o be n o t e d . F i r s t , here as elsewhere,

w h i c h at this p o i n t is preserved i n f u l l , a n d o f t e n a f f o r d s clues to the

Christi

P r o b a b l y , t h e r e f o r e , the same is t r u e o f w ,

17-19, where there are

m u c h briefer s u r v i v i n g r e m a r k s of Athanasius

Secondly,

however,

three references t o ux?\ i n A t h a n a s i u s ' c o m m e n t s , the first t w o based o n

A t h a n a s i u s i n his H y p o t h e s i s describes t h e psalm as c o n t a i n i n g a prayer

the text o f v 19 L X X ; v, 19b t h e n means t h a t C h r i s t is assailed, whereas

ex 7tpoc:co7uou xfjt; dv9p6>x6x7]xo? xpoacpepojxevriv, w h i c h i n this context has t o

Athasasius nowhere suggests t h a t the ' p r o p h e t ' s ' l i f e is i n danger

m e a n ' o f f e r e d i n the person o f h u m a n i t y ' , not ' o f h i s , the S a v i o u r ' s ,

then i n vv

I f so,

17 and 18 we have C h r i s t appealing t o the Father for help

humanity'

This appears clearly i n the e x p o s i t i o n o f verse 3, 'Ev7udyriv

XuxpwQfjvai xr]v fyuyrp auxou Coco xwv OnxoSvxtov drcoXeaat aikriv, a n d praising

ei? uXrjv puOou, xai oux e'cxtv uTioaxaan;. Eusebius attributes these words

G o d oxi STJ eioaxoiiaa? XeXuxptoaai TTJV fyuxfo ! ^

A n d b o t h these w i l l be

directly t o C h r i s t , recalling the parallel o f Jonah (2:6-7, cf M t . 12:40)

cases where Athanasius has i n t r o d u c e d a reference t o the cjmx ! o f C h r i s t

a n d r e f e r r i n g t h e m t o C h r i s t ' s descent i n t o h e l l Athanasius here takes a

w h i c h is n o t d i r e c t l y i m p o s e d b y the t e x t of the psalm,

d i f f e r e n t l i n e , since the phrase dq u'Xrp [3u9ou suggests a relapse i n t o sin

ou

I n these verses i t is n o t q u i t e clear whether A t h a n a s i u s has physical or

s p i r i t u a l enemies i n view; b u t he generally prefers the latter i n t e r p r e t a t i o n wherever possible, a n d the use o f Xikpcooai f i t s i t w e l l ; i n w h i c h case
the w o r d fyvxh leans rather t o w a r d s the m e a n i n g ' s o u l ' (as liable t o tempt a t i o n ) rather t h a n ' l i f e ' ,

The c o m m e n t o n 19b, h o w e v e r , is "Oxi oi

7uoXXot ouvieaav xax' euou pouX6u.voi xrjv cjiux^v u.ou eEjaipeiv, w h e r e ' l i f e' is a

( a n y commerce

w i t h u'Xri b e i n g regarded as s i n f u l ! ) ; his

56 A t h a n a s i u s f o l l o w s the preface i n r e f e r r i n g t o D a v i d ' s o w n

comment

t h e r e f o r e is T a u x a yap rj dv9p(07ceia 9601? 7re:i;6v9ei, xaxevex9eicja wuo xiji;

au.apxa? dq Gdvaxov etc.. I n other w o r d s , D a v i d represents the Saviour as
u t t e r i n g w o r d s a p p r o p r i a t e , n o t t o h i m personally, b u t to t h e h u m a n
race t o w h i c h , as m a n , he belonged
A t 68:2, however, this c a u t i o n clearly does n o t apply: Ucoadv fie, 6
Oedg, on etorjXdooav vSata

possible rendering,,
I n Ps

xn

dveXa^e,

TCE.pl fifxaiv

Uwq ipv%fjc, fiov

dSuvaxar

'ExeiBrj xd? du.apxias riuwv

eixoxco? xat rcpoaeuxexai pua9fjvai

ex xuv

adventures i n the cave, b u t r e m a r k s t h a t the p s a l m can also a p p l y

7ceipaautov, xeiudp'pou hixr\v xuxXcoaavxcov auxou xrjv <I>uxr)v.. Syriac: Because

to Christ, However

ex icpoo-omou xfj?

he t o o k our sins u p o n himself a n d for our sake was sad (Is, 53:4), f i t -

dv0pwjc6xrixo; C h r i s t t h e r e f o r e utters a prayer w h i c h is really a p p r o p r i a t e

t i n g l y also he prays t o be saved f r o m the trials t h a t s u r r o u n d e d his soul

t o a human

l i k e a t o r r e n t (op

verse 2,

he says,

is spoken

p e t i t i o n e r , a n d indeed at p. 2 5 7 D i t is half i m p l i e d t h a t the

address is made to C h r i s t , n o t t o the F a t h e r , since there is a reference t o

cit

p. 109).

H e r e there is n o a t t e m p t t o evade the suggestion o f a soul i n Christ;

I n t h i s case, t h e n , i t w o u l d

a n d {JJUX^I i i n t e r p r e t e d , not i n t h e sense o f physical l i f e , b u t o f personal

seem t h a t the t w o f o l l o w i n g references t o tyuxn s h o u l d n o t be pressed as

consciousness, as assailed by t e m p t a t i o n Athanasius must sur ely be i n -

evidence for a soul i n C h r i s t ; i n any case the clause ev oot iteicoiOe r) t|)ux^

fluenced here b y Eusebius, w h o introduces the w o r d x ^ d ^ p o u i ; , f r o m

uou is explained lm xfj cfj porjQeia TT\V eXrciBa e'xco Thus i t seems t h a t r\ c^ux^

Ps. 123:4, as a s y m b o l of t e m p t a t i o n , a n d gives a catena o f passages

C h r i s t ' s o f f e r of p r o t e c t i o n i n M t . 23:37

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XII
242

THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

243

r e f e r r i n g t o the soul of Christ ( J o h n 10:18, 10:15, 12:27, M t . 26:38) . W e

L o g o s ; i t is something over w h i c h death m i g h t have power. W i t h TOU

shall r e t u r n later t o this theme o f the Saviour's t e m p t a t i o n a n d grief f o r

xaxaoxovxoi;, perhaps compare the f i g u r a t i v e use of xaxexeiv at DI15:

our sins, w i t h the use o f Is, 53:4 (outo? xd$ au-apxiat; f)[i.<Sv <pepei xai xce.pl

hi xat et? vexpou? T\OT\ TOUXOJV fjv 6 vout; xtxxaax^k

riu-wv 68uvaxai), w h i c h recurs at Ps

does not m e a n that t h e Saviour needs t o be rescued f r o m moral

87:4,

The next occurrence o f tyvxh is at verse 1 1 ; b u t A t h a n a s i u s '

comments

El

B u t Athanasius clearly
death

Last i n this series comes 6 8 : 2 1 , also w i t h the briefest of comments

are better u n d e r s t o o d i f v.. 10 is also q u o t e d : "On 6 tfikoq xov oixov aov

'Oveibtofibv

xaxiyayi

are^el? auxou? yevouivoui;

aacp&i; xat oi EuayyeXicrrai SiTiyriaavTo. Syriac: M y heart expected op-

7iepi xov olxov xov c6v AirjyeTxai Se TTJV Earoptav tracpcos 6 IcoavvTii; (ref,, t o J o h n

p r o b r i u m a n d misery ( q u o t a t i o n continued). Here he tells o f the pas-

fie. 'Hpvriaavxo \it, cprjciv, ETietBr) r\kzyx

ov

2:13-17),, ( C o m m e n t o n v. 10 b o m i t t e d ) , Kai ovvExdXvya

ev vnoxEta TJ)V

y)v%rjv fiov. 'AXywv, cpT|ai, Sid xr)v iao\Uvr\v auxtov axcoXeiav xcov (Jn>xcov, XO xat
TO IxoioGv. Oi 84 \mip a>v xauTa eSpwv, ev Ttavxi xaipt xai xo7ca) iid axoLtaxo?

TiQOOE&oxTjoev Tj ipvxf] fiov. 'EvxeuGev ri[xtv TO Tcd9o SiriyeTrat 6

s i o n , w h i c h the evangelist also clearly relates to us (lot

Since the Passion

has been

cit ).

i n view t h r o u g h o u t , this particular

reference t o i t seems puzzling; unless, of course, this c o m m e n t is drawn

eu.e ecpepov, a? \>nip auxoov e7toio6fJiT]v xaxoicaQet'ai; oveiBi'iovTEc u.e. Syriac: For

f r o m some other w o r k of A t h a n a s i u s ; b u t the compressed style is quite

t h e zeal o f your house has consumed me. They denied me because I

t y p i c a l of this w o r k , Eusebius here reads xapBia fortyx>yj\(compare the

r e p r o v e d t h e m for being i m p i o u s i n y o u r house. T h e evangelist tells the

Syriac), b u t is perhaps h e l p f u l w h e n he explains t h a t Symmachus and

story clearly ... , ( T h e version gives v.. 10 b a n d c o m m e n t , a n d continues

A q u i l a p r o v i d e clearer versions, r e c o r d i n g a n event rather t h a n expecta-

t h e psalm q u o t a t i o n t o v . 13): (v. 13) A n d those w h o sit at the gate

t i o n ; thus A q u i l a : 'OVEIBICU-OS cruvexpLc};e xr\v xapBtav u.ou

t h o u g h t of m e and those w h o d r i n k w i n e h y m n e d m e , w h i l e I grieved

over the destruction t h a t w o u l d b e f a l l their souls, I d i d g o o d things; b u t
they i n r e t u r n f o r m y d o i n g such things at a l l times a n d i n a l l places were
bearing me o n their m o u t h s , a n d m o c k e d the evil things I e n d u r e d for
their sake (op. tit. p

110)

P s a l m 8 7 is regularly taken as a prophecy of the Passion

we have: 'On Enkr\oQr\ xaxtov r) ipvxv fiov

A t verse 4

Ei xat aik6<; xac; du-apxCa? r\\L&v

epdaxace xai xepi TjLiajv oBuvaxai, eixoTtos xai xaxtov EfX7re7cXrjCTai cpTjai
The Syriac long version fails at this p o i n t , but the short v e r s i o n has:
For he b o r e our sins a n d e n d u r e d s u f f e r i n g for out sake A n d this he i n -

The curious phrase TO xai TO exoiouv (where the Syriac translator p r o -

dicates by saying (v., 4) M y soul is sated w i t h evil (op. cit p.. 57),

b a b l y read TO xaXov) perhaps picks u p some previous reference t o the

This verse presents m u c h t h e same p r o b l e m s as 68:2: H o w c o u l d the

Saviour's activities w h i c h has n o t been preserved. H o w these were

e m b o d i m e n t o f goodness h a r b o u r evils i n his soul? Eusebius here offers

represented becomes clear i f one compares the phrase a? imep aikwv

three possible explanations

eiioiou[xr|v xaxo7:a9eia? w i t h Eusebius ( P G 2 3 , 740 B-745 C ) , w h o relates

enemies' wickedness, or our sins w h i c h he t o o k u p o n himself; a n d here

t h a t Jesus, distressed a t the sacrilege i n the Temple, p u t o n sackcloth

he quotes Gal, 3:13 (yevoLtevo? orcep fiu-wv xaxdpa), Athanasius then ac-

a n d fasted as the Psalmist f o r e t o l d , w h i l e his enemies m o c k e d h i m w i t h

cepts the t h i r d e x p l a n a t i o n , except that he quotes, instead of Galatians,

d r u n k e n songs; C h r i s t is represented also as dbcoxXatoLtevoi; auxwv TTJV

Isaiah 53:4; b u t an allusion t o Galatians 3:13 appears soon after, at

a7ca)XeLav, 741 A , cf.. 741 C, a n d 745 A B : Tds u.ev yap Xoma? xcov avSpamcov

87:8

<JJUX? xaxemev 6 QavaTo;,

' E x ' eu.ou hi LIT] yevoiTO TOUTO, S O far as I can see,

neither Athanasius nor Eusebius i n this case q u i t e directly t a k e u p the

reference t o the <]>uxr| o f Christ.
a n d Eusebius appears t o a f f o r d n o l i g h t : ZTpdo^eg xfi ipvxfj fiov, xai AVTQ~
ex xou xaxaaxovxoi;, SrjXovoxL xou 9avaTOu. Syriac: L o o k o n m y

soul and rescue i t c l e a r l y f r o m death t h a t held i t (op, cit

I n his c o m m e n t , Athanasius has so far avoided t h e w o r d fyvxr) which

appears i n the text; b u t this does n o t seem t o indicate a strong disinclinat i o n , since his remarks o n the next verse, 87:5, w h i l e generally similar t o

A t 68:19 Athanasius's s u r v i v i n g comments are laconic i n the extreme,

tooai avxr)v

o f xaxtov; either his sufferings, or his

p.. 111)..

Perhaps a l l t h a t can be said is t h a t i n this case Athanasius clearly does

not understand T r ^ u x x i u-ou as a mere periphrasis f o r 'me m y s e l f , i.e. the

those of Eusebius, i n t r o d u c e J o h n 10:18, w h i c h Eusebius has n o t used,

W e r e t u r n then t o t h e p r o b l e m s of P s a l m 15:10, Here M o n t f a u c o n ' s
text gives o n l y the briefest o f c o m m e n t s : Ovx EyxaxaXet^Etc:
fiov

xr)v yv%riv

AUTOS & V COT) xat too7toid<;, e^cooTioieiaSai Xeyexai 7tapa TOU ITaTpos Bla

TTJV oixovoLiiav
f r a g m e n t s : "En

B u t there is a surprise a w a i t i n g us i n V i a n ' s

oe xai i) odo\ /xov xaraoxrjvcboEi

in

new

eXniht (9c) on ovx

XII

XII
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

244

iyxaTaXet'ipeig
bta(p8oQ&v.

tr)v

Mexpi

ipvxrjv

a&Tjv

fJ-OV eig

TOU ISETV htatpdoqdv

OVSE

xat xoia

t&Etv

W h a t deductions are t o be d r a w n f r o m these findings? I n the first

eXm? TT]? aapxog auTou

place, the p o o r t e x t u a l transmission makes i t precarious t o b u i l d t o o

OOJOBCC; TOV
xiq r]v r\

245

b'oiov

oov

m u c h o n isolated passages; a n d i t has t o be a d m i t t e d that V i a n ' s f r a g -

r) o n avaXf]t}6Tai xr)v a7roTe8&iaav (JJUXTIV;

The Syriac longer version is n o t preserved at this p o i n t ; b u t the
shorter version c o n f i r m s the Greek text j u s t q u o t e d : Therefore he also

m e n t 13 is the only text i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s ' c o m m e n t couples together

t h e Saviour's flesh w i t h his ' s o u l '

O n t h e other h a n d , any reference t o

says to h i m : (v, 9) M y flesh w i l l reside i n hope.. The hope, t h e n , is that

J o h n 10:11-18and we have seen that there are t w o or three besides the

his flesh w i l l again assume the soul w h i c h was constituted, (v

10) F o r

veiled one i n this passage,if pursued w i t h any a t t e n t i o n , is enough t o

his soul was n o t left o f Sheol, n o i d i d his b o d y see the c o r r u p t i o n of the

exclude the n o t i o n t h a t thety\>yj\o f the Saviour s i m p l y is the L o g o s seen

grave (op

i n a certain c o n t e x t , rather as the owner o f a ship m a y , i n a c e r t a i n con-

at

10)

The order is slightly changed, and the phrase ' w h i c h was c o n s t i t u t e d ' ,
if c o r r e c t l y translated, suggests a d i f f e r e n t Greek w o r d i n g ; possibly,
however,

omoTeSeToccv

was

simply

mistranslated

into

Syriac,

the

translator t h i n k i n g of axo-ceXea0e.Taav B u t the general impression given is

surprising; so far f r o m the death o f C h r i s t being represented as a simple
departure of the Logos f r o m his b o d y or f l e s h w h i c h , i t is argued, is

t e x t , also be its c a p t a i n

I n the J o h a n n i n e text, o n t h e other h a n d , c[>ux^

can be tendered ' l i f e ' t h e p o w e r or p r i n c i p l e o f l i f e rather t h a n some

separable c o m p o n e n t o f the l i v i n g being; b u t i t is n o t easy t o g i v e it this
sense i n the f r a g m e n t o n 15:10; a capacity m i g h t be ' r e c o v e r e d ' , b u t
c o u l d h a r d l y go t o , or be left i n o r not be left i n t h e u n d e r w o r l d ,
Athanasius'

other

allusions

t o a fyuxh i n C h r i s t are rather

cases

<\>\>xn

other m e n , discarding his soul w h i c h descends t o Hades a n d w i l l later be

p e r i p h r a s i s ' m y s e l f ; so perhaps at 2 1 : 2 1 , 21:30, possibly a t 34:17,

'recovered' b y his flesh

68:19

No

12 i n V i a n ' s c o l l e c t i o n , s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t the Saviour is not

and

68:21.

r\

This leaves

could

five passages o f

be

little

less

A t h a n a s i u s ' n o r m a l v i e w h e seems t o be represented as d y i n g l i k e

I t m a y be added that the previous fragment,

In

some

clear-cut.

l 4

somewhat

more
greater

significance, where the CJJUXTI is associated w i t h ( f r u s t r a t e d ) s p i r i t u a l i n -

s i m p l y speaking ' i n the person of h u m a n i t y ' and thus expressing the

fluence (34:11), w i t h t e m p t a t i o n (54:17 a n d 18, 68:2) and w i t h spiritual

hope that men should feel ( w h i c h is i n a n y case u n l i k e l y i n view of TOV

exercizes (68:11),

outov sou). The t w o fragments read l i k e a c o n t i n u o u s t e x t , and i n f r 12 i t

is ' G o d '

w h o speaks, r e j o i c i n g over the salvation o f the l o s t , and

because the Father

has been gracious t o m e n . The speaker, t h e n , must

The question n a t u r a l l y suggest itself whether A t h a n a s i u s was f o l l o w U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t is d i f f i c u l t t o answer, since

Eusebius' c o m m e n t o n Psalm 15 has been lost after verse 8, a n d not

m u c h can be gathered f r o m such other scattered references as I have
traced (Comm
87:6; Dem

in Ps P G 2 3 , 106 C , o n 4:4, 744 D , o n 68:14,1056 C, o n

Ev, 3 2.70, GCS p

107 14; Quaest

et Sol

5 1) I can only

give the general v e r d i c t that Eusebius is noticeably m o r e inclined t o

speak of the soul o f C h r i s t t h a n Athanasius.. Thus at 1056 B he gives a
christological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Ps 29:4 (Kupte, avr^yayEs ei; aSou xyjv tyvyfy
aou),

though

when

commenting

ad

loc , 260 A ,

he

agrees

with

A t h a n a s i u s i n assigning the verse t o David.. B u t our e x a m i n a t i o n has, I

t h i n k , s h o w n t h a t the new text o f c o m m e n t o n Ps
entirely alone

m u c h less f r e q u e n t l y t h a n Eusebius, w h o m he o f t e n f o l l o w s . T h i s has

n o t prevented some scholars f r o m i n t e r p r e t i n g Eusebius' l i m i t e d use o f

be G o d the L o g o s , i n his o w n p e r s o n , as d i s t i n c t f r o m 'the lost'

i n g Eusebius at this p o i n t

I t appears, t h e n , t h a t A t h a n a s i u s does occasionally speak o f aty\>xt\i n

C h r i s t ; t h o u g h o n l y i n direct e x p o s i t i o n o f s c r i p t u r a l passages, and

15:10 does n o t stand

t h e t e r m as evidence t h a t 'he denied C h r i s t a s o u l ' w h i l e

strenuous e f f o r t s , w i t h m u c h less evidence, t o d e f e n d A t h a n a s i u s

making
Both

m e n , no d o u b t , felt t h a t such language was open t o misunderstanding;

neither can have h a d m u c h s y m p a t h y for the b o l d development given i t
b y O r i g e n , w h o b y b r i n g i n g i n a created soul w h i c h attaches i t s e l f to the
L o g o s by an act of w i l l appears t o suggest a d o c t r i n e of t w o Christs I n
general, i t remains t r u e t h a t A t h a n a s i u s sees the W o r d as t h e t r u e subject o f the acts a n d experiences o f C h r i s t , except w h e r e these a r e clearly
subject t o h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s a n d so ate assigned t o his ' f l e s h ' ; and even
t h e n i t is the W o r d himself w h o adopts t h e m , as proper t o t h e flesh
w h i c h H e has assumed

I n this perspective, to b r i n g i n a h u m a n soul

w o u l d seem t a n t a m o u n t t o i n t r o d u c i n g a second p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n
Nevertheless, A t h a n a s i u s does n o t consistently e l i m i n a t e , or explain
a w a y , the s c r i p t u r a l texts w h i c h speak o f a cjnjx^ i n Christ.. Occasionally

than

XII

XII
246

THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

247

he can use such texts, i n t e r p r e t i n g <\>uxh n o t simply as a physical principle

Saviour's earthly

i n the n a r r o w sense, as a basis o f n a t u r a l l i f e , b u t also as the locus of

elsewhere o n l y at DI 33, p. 153 A ; (3) the use of evavGpomTicus, w h i c h oc-

feeling, teaching, a n d s p i r i t u a l e f f o r t H e can h a r d l y be said t o exploit

curs eight times i n DI,

such language to i n t e r p r e t the w o r k of our s a l v a t i o n ; for instance, he

c o n d a n d once i n the Tomus

does n o t depict the divine W o r d as accepting, assimilating a n d p u r i f y i n g

frequency'

b i r t h (reading 68 A 13 at her p.. 423 1. 17), f o u n d

three times i n the f i r s t O r a t i o n , twice i n the Sead Antiochenos,

and so ' w i t h decreasing

a h u m a n soul i n the same way as H e accepts and p u r i f i e s h u m a n flesh.

I t h i n k these arguments can be supplemented a n d c o n f i r m e d , As t o

Nevertheless soteriological content is n o t entirely l a c k i n g , i f we attach

Eusebius, M i l e R o n d e a u is disinclined t o accept arguments based on a

f u l l significance to the c o m m e n t o n Ps, 68:2, w i t h its description o f the

comparison

L o r d ' s t e m p t a t i o n a n d the use o f Is. 53:4, w h i c h recurs at Ps. 87:4, for

clesiastical

his t e m p t a t i o n a n d grief are p a r t o f the vicarious sufferings w h i c h he

p r o v e a similar date f o r the Commentaria);

undergoes for our sake

a n exegetical a n d a p o l e m i c a l w o r k , she argues, 'ne p a r a i t pas de nature

B u t we need t o relate these f i n d i n g s t o our general estimate of

Athanasius'

t h o u g h t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the context o f the theological

fonder

o f style and t h o u g h t w i t h the c

Theology

une

Marcellum

and

o f 336-7 ( t h o u g h i n f a c t these were designed t o

chronologie

relative'.

17

such a c o m p a r i s o n between
Nevertheless

significance i n the f a c t t h a t Eusebius i n the Commentaria

see

developments o f his l i f e t i m e I t w o u l d o f course be most f o r t u n a t e f o r

freely t o a c^ux?) i n C h r i s t , a n d t h a t he does so also i n the Eclogae

pheticae

and

the Demonstrate

Evanglica,

some

refers quite

the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t case i f we c o u l d p r o v e t h a t the Expositiones

were

Ec-

as de Riedmatten

Prohas

a m o n g his later w o r k s , perhaps even r e f l e c t i n g some lessons learnt at

pointed out;

A l e x a n d r i a i n 362 B u t i n m y j u d g e m e n t this cannot be done; there is

Laus Constantini,

g o o d evidence for d a t i n g the w o r k m u c h earlier i n A t h a n a s i u s ' career.

none o f his later w o r k s . A n d w h e n de Riedmatten remarks, m o s t per-

I n a n impressive paper M.-J

t i n e n t l y , t h a t Eusebius never refers to a soul i n C h r i s t except i n connec-

Eusebius' Commentary

R o n d e a u has discussed the influence of

on the Psalms

u p o n Athanasius a n d devotes a

page or t w o to discussing the question o f dates.

1 s

A l t h o u g h the t w o

18

b u t n o t i n the w o r k s directed against M a r c e l l u s ; nor i n the

nor the Theophaneia,

as he observes; and therefore i n

t i o n w i t h some passage o f S c r i p t u r e , this surely s h o u l d not m e a n that

such references are t o be discounted as merely inadvertent or irrelevant

w o r k s o f t e n diverge, there are a great m a n y passages i n w h i c h the agree-

I w o u l d be i n c l i n e d , t h e r e f o r e , t o m a k e the Commentaria

ment i n t h o u g h t a n d phrasing is extremely close; s u f f i c i e n t , i n fact, to

t e m p o r a r y w i t h the Demonstrate,

exclude any t h e o r y o f mere c o m m o n dependence o n a t h i r d source; and

possibly antedating i t , and a t t r i b u t e t o Eusebius a definite change o f

if one of these writers d r e w u p o n the o t h e r , i t is a b u n d a n t l y clear that i t

mind

is n o t Eusebius

w o r k On the Soul oj Christ,

w h o expands A t h a n a s i u s ,

b u t Athanasius

who

ab-

dated c

318-20, or

This c o u l d w e l l have sprung f r o m a hostile reaction t o Eustathius'

presumably t o be dated some t i m e i n the

320's; since we k n o w t h a t the t w o writers were i n c o n f l i c t s o o n after

breviates Eusebius
A s t o the d a t i n g , the p o s i t i o n is c o m p l i c a t e d b y the fact t h a t Eusebius'
w o r k is said t o have circulated i n t w o editions; b u t i t has generally been
dated i n the years 330-337.

commonly

r o u g h l y con-

16

H o w e v e r , there are references t o the

desolation of the h o l y places o f Palestine w h i c h suggest a date p r i o r t o

Nicaea

19

A s regards A t h a n a s i u s , I w o u l d accept M i l e . Rondeau's arguments

f o r an early date, a n d extend t h e m as f o l l o w s :
(1) B o t h Eusebius a n d Athanasius use the rather

Platonic-sounding

Constantine's restorations; a n d i n the end M i l e . R o n d e a u leaves the

terms avapiwvai, vapcocis for C h r i s t ' s r e s u r r e c t i o n , noted b y Mile.

question o p e n , apart f r o m r e q u i r i n g a date 'after the peace o f the

R o n d e a u o n p,

C h u r c h ' , A s t o A t h a n a s i u s ' Expositiones,

a m p l i f i e d , as f o l l o w s : PG 27, 84 B ; add 105 B (of the saints); 280 D 8

she gives reasons for t h i n k i n g

t h a t this w o r k belongs t o the same p e r i o d as the Contra

Gentes a n d the

sec

429; and

f o r Athanasius

her list can be slightly

ms ; 300 C 14; 320 D 1 1 ; 388 D 9; a d d 420 B 6 ( o f the h u m a n race).

w h i c h , however, she is prepared t o assign t o the 330's.

A s she notes, Athanasius does n o t use these terms i n his other works.

The reasons are (1) the use o f terms f o r m e d f r o m yaivto t o denote the I n -

H o w e v e r the related w o r d v>)a occurs once, and t h a t i n DI 3 1 , p 149

c a r n a t i o n (&7Ti!pdvt.a, Oeocpaveia, EU-cpaivetv); thus ETcupdveia so used occurs

D6.

De Incarnatione,

ten times i n the DI and nowhere else; (2) the use o f y e w r ^ ? t o denote the

XII

xn
248

THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS

( 2 ) i n the Expositiones
q u o t e d by Eusebius

2Q

Athanasius

makes use o f Is

5 3 : 4 , often

The clause Ttepi TJU-WV SUVCCTC stands at 3 0 5 C 4-5

249

o f agreement i n v o c a b u l a r y a n d t h o u g h t about the Passion o f Christ,

w h i c h I have n o t been able t o explore i n detail
By

and 3 8 0 B 7-8 (on Ps 6 8 : 2 , 8 7 : 4 ) , and the general theme of the Saviour's

the

time

he

came

to

w r i t e against

Marcellus,

Eusebius'

grief for our sins is f o u n d at 1 3 3 C 6-8, 1 7 2 B 2-4 a n d 1 5 , 3 0 8 D 5-6, 3 8 1

christological ideas h a d perceptibly changed

A 5-8 a n d 4 6 0 A 1-2 So far as I can discover, this theme w h o l l y disap-

any r e c o g n i t i o n of a h u m a n fyuxh in C h r i s t was b o u n d u p w i t h a

pears i n A t h a n a s i u s ' other w o r k s , a p a r t f r o m one b r i e f reference at Ep,

t h e o l o g y t h a t he h a d come t o d i s t r u s t , a r e v i v a l of t h e heresy o f Paul o f

Eest

Samosata (as he conceived i t ) w h i c h denied the substantial r e a l i t y of the

2 0 . 1 ; he does indeed quote Is. 5 3 : 3 - 8 i n DI34,

b u t his o n l y c o m -

It n o w seemed t o h i m that

ment here refers t o the Saviour's d i s h o n o u r , n o t t o his grief; a n d a par-

Logos a n d his substantial u n i o n w i t h the flesh of C h r i s t By this t i m e ,

t i a l q u o t a t i o n o f v. 4 i n c, A T 3 . 3 1 (missed b y Mller) omits the clause

we have argued, i t was h a r d l y possible t h a t Athanasius s h o u l d have

openly paraded a debt t o Eusebius; moreover his theology h a d m a t u r e d

i n question
( 3 ) I n his Expositiones

A t h a n a s i u s , l i k e Eusebius, makes positive a n d

a n d developed resources o f its o w n . B u t it is perfectly possible that he

u n f o r c e d use of P h i l 2 : 8 , especially the phrase vntpiooq xxpi Qavxou; see

f o l l o w e d a similar course t o the extent o f realizing t h a t insistence o n the

1 0 4 B 1 0 , 1 3 7 A 1 1 - 1 3 , 2 6 0 C 1 1 , 3 0 8 A 1 0 - 1 1 , 3 8 4 A 4-5 and 4 6 4 C

Saviour's fyuxh, even i n the t e n t a t i v e , s c r i p t u r a l manner of his e a t l y com-

1-2

I n his other w r i t i n g s this i m p o r t a n t verse is o n l y cited i n order t o refute

m e n t a r y , c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a gesture of sympathy towards a

A r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f it

t h e o l o g y w h i c h d e s p i t e his personal regard for M a r c e l l u s h e

( 4 ) A s already n o t e d , Athanasius f o l l o w s Eusebius i n speaking o f the

b o u n d t o distrust, a n d for m u c h the same reasons

was

I n his treatment o f

This theme seems t o be l a c k i n g in the

Christ's Passion he was led t o develope this p o s i t i o n i n a manner which

other w o r k s , w h i c h ignore the f o r t y days i n the wilderness a n d d o n o t

Eusebius never envisaged, a t t r i b u t i n g the h u m a n passions t o ' t h e flesh',

represent the Passion as a nzipcta\Lt;. The L o r d ' s v i c t o r y over the demons

w i t h w h i c h the d i v i n e W o r d was directly i n contact I t may s t i l l be possi-

is always seen as completed.

ble t o defend this t h e o l o g y as a prudent a n d realistic a c c o m o d a t i o n to

L o r d as encountering t e m p t a t i o n

M o r e o v e r there is the general c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t i n the

Expositiones

the exigencies o f his time.

Athanasius imitates a n d adapts Eusebius' w o r k far m o r e extensively

t h a n he does i n the DI,
the Demonstrate

where there are demonstrable b o r r o w i n g s f r o m

Evanglica

use o f the Theophaneia

in c

I cannot t h i n k i t l i k e l y t h a t Athanasius w o u l d

have published a w o r k whose debt t o Eusebius was unmistakeable aftet

the latter had p u b l i c l y declared his s u p p o r t f o r A r i u s . This suggests that
the Expositiones

were published at the latest c 3 2 0 , and m a y well be

earlier t h a n the CG a n d DI;

thus I a m inclined t o t h i n k they reflect the

impression m a d e u p o n Athanasius b y Eusebius w h e n the latter visited

Alexandria c 3 1 1 A D

31

NOTES

1 7 besides the possible or supposed

Athanasius w o u l d then have been a b o u t 1 5 ,

Eusebius a b o u t 5 0 , w i t h a n established a n d g r o w i n g r e p u t a t i o n as a
scholar and teacher.. M o r e o v e r Eusebius apparently s u f f e r e d i m p r i s o n -

See A Grillmeier, S J , Christ in Christian

Cf I A Dorner, DieLekrevon

History

Tradition'- p 324 n 84 = 'p

der Person Christi,

Stuttgart, 1845-56, vol

of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Edinburgh, 1862, 1 2 p 259; G

' L a doctrine christologique de S. Athanase', RHE

Alhanase et Tame humaine du Christ', Greg
M

Ortiz de Urbina,

20 (1954) p 43.

Richard. 'Saint Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens', MSR

p 231 11 = P G 83, 285

1

Grillmeier, 'Der Gottessohn im Totenreich', ZKTh

marized op cit pp

71 (1949) 1-53, 184-293; sum-

315-17 (203-5)

'

Op

had got of f t o o l i g h t l y , " i t does n o t at all f o l l o w t h a t Athanasius w o u l d

'

I am indebted to Dr

have seen the matter i n the same l i g h t ; Eusebius h a d at least p u t himself

research, though to save space I have given here only a condensed account

of

deliberate p r o v o c a t i o n ; i t is clear t h a t his r e p u t a t i o n was n o t generally

i m p a i r e d . I n tetms o f this r e l a t i o n we can e x p l a i n t h e very large measure

(1947) 5-54 For Eustathius see fr 15 Spanneut - Theodoretra/"s/esed. G. H. Ettlinger

ment for his f a i t h ; a n d t h o u g h P o t a m m o n was later t o c o m p l a i n t h a t he

at r i s k , a n d possibly owed his release merely t o an avoidance

847 =
Voisin,

1 (1900) 230-1, 247; P. Galtier, 'S

36 (1955) 582-3; I

'L'anima umana di Christo secundo S Atanasio, OCP

5

214 n 1
lp

'

cit 310,321-2,325-6 (196,210-11,215-17)

Alvyn Pettersen of Cambridge for a careful survey of recent

H. de Rtedmatten, Les actes du proces de Paul de Samosate,

Griilmeierop cit , iirst edn , pp

pp

68-81, esp 78; cf

180-1,195 The treatment of Eusebius in the second edi-

tion is much expanded and revised; but see e g p

soul in his Christ', which seems accurate

178, 'Eusebius cannot use any human

XII

XIII

250
' S Athanase, Lettres festoies et pastorales en copte, ed. L.-Th, Lefort, C S C O 150-1 =
Scr. Coptici 19-20 (text and translation)
Op. tit pp 35-7
It should of course be remembered that our habit of rendering 4ux^ 'soul' imposes
a rather precise sense and makes the transition seem more abrupt than it would to a Greek,
for whom the word has a range of senses roughly corresponding to 'life', 'soul', 'consciousness' and 'self

10

o v

"
Testi inediti dal Commento
nianum" 14), Rome, 1978

ai Salmi di Atanasio

(Studia

Ephemeridis

ST

A T H A N A S I U S ON T H E

PSALMS

"Augusti-

Athanasiana Syriaca, ed R. W Thomson, Part I V : C S C O 386-7 = Scr Syri 167-8

(text and translation) In the longer version, the following psalms are preserved complete,
or nearly so: 23-4, 70-2,76, 79, 100-104, 106-8, 111-16, 149, 150, with a large portion of 68
and remains of numerous others
l !

11

Cf. n 4 above

b y the Expositiones

in Psalmos,'

a r e l a t i v e l y neglected w o r k w h i c h has

recently been made available f o r study b y the labours of Dr

" See e g 305 A , 308 B C , 724 D-725 C , 1053 D-1056 C , 1065 D-1068 A.
"
'Une nouvelle preuve de l'influence littraire d'Eusbe de Csare sur Athanase: l'interprtation des psaumes', Rech Se Rel 56 (1968) 385-434
Rondeau, op cit. p 421 n. 64, and p 420 n 60.
"
Op. cit. p 422
16

18

N o t m a n y m o n t h s ago I w r o t e f o r this j o u r n a l , a t t e m p t i n g t o examine

the evidence f o r St. A t h a n a s i u s ' teaching o n the soul o f Christ p r o v i d e d

Les actes du procs de Paul de Samosate (Paradosis

6) p 78 n 75

"
"

Socrates, H E 1 23; Sozomen, H E 2.18

See P G 23, 308 B, 736 A , 756 D, 1060 B, 1065 A , 1068 A

"
"

Cf F L Cross, The Study of St Athanasius,

Epiphanius, Haer 68.8

Oxford, 1945, p. 15

Vian.

I s h o u l d have realized at t h e t i m e t h a t Dr

recently published a p a p e r

Gilles D o r i v a l had

w h i c h raises serious doubts as t o the

a u t h e n t i c i t y o f this piece. There is n o need t o question its overall u n i t y ,

w h i c h Dr

V i a n has m a i n t a i n e d ; b u t i f D r , D o r i v a l is r i g h t i n his

assessment o f the c o m p l e x t e x t u a l t r a d i t i o n p r o v i d e d b y the Catenae,

the author has b o r r o w e d m a t e r i a l n o t o n l y f r o m Eusebius of Caesarea
(as n o t e d some years ago by Mme.. M.-.J.. R o n d e a u ) but also f r o m
4

O r i g e n , A p o l l i n a r i s , D i d y m u s , a n d even C y r i l of A l e x a n d r i a
a u t h o r t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t possibly be A t h a n a s i u s , and D r

This

D o r i v a l thinks

o f a n A l e x a n d r i a n writer at w o r k somewhere between 440 and 500 A D

F u r t h e r p u r s u i t of this q u e s t i o n w o u l d i n v o l v e detailed study o f the
manuscripts a n d o f the w h o l e Catena t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h at present I have
n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o undertake, B u t D r

D o r i v a l ' s paper has p r o m p t e d me

to t a k e a second l o o k at the w o r k , and I t h i n k i t m a y be w o r t h w h i l e to

set d o w n some impressions of its style and m e t h o d , c o m p a r i n g i t i n particular w i t h t h e one A t h a n a s i a n
Psalms

whose

Marcellinum.

w r i t i n g specifically devoted t o the

authenticity cannot

be

doubted,

the Epistula

ad

I n any case I s h o u l d p r o m p t l y acknowledge the question-

m a r k w h i c h m u s t n o w be attached t o m y earlier paper.

The Epistula

ad Marcellinum

is usually considered t o be a w o r k of

A t h a n a s i u s ' m a t u r i t y I t s a t t e s t a t i o n is unusually g o o d , since a p a r t f r o m

n u m e r o u s A t h a n a s i a n m a n u s c r i p t s i t is t r a n s m i t t e d b y the Codex Alexa n d r i n u s o f the B i b l e , w h i c h dates f r o m t h e beginning o f the f i f t h cent u r y , and so f r o m n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n f i f t y years after the p r o b a b l e
date o f w r i t i n g , N o m o d e r n c r i t i c a l text is available, b u t the text p r i n t e d
i n M i g n e m a y be t a k e n as generally reliable

The w o r k has been con-

sidered i n a n excellent study p u b l i s h e d b y M m e

R o n d e a u i n 1968, and
5

XIII

XIII
66

ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

there is also a g o o d description a n d analysis b y H

67

J. S i e b e n . 1 w i l l of fer

treated t w i c e ; indeed Nos.. 9 a n d 106 appear three t i m e s ; o n t h e other

m y o w n brief analysis, w h i c h is n o t based o n Sieben's w o r k a n d w h i c h I

h a n d nineteen psalms are not m e n t i o n e d at a l l , i n c l u d i n g the v e r y sur-

hope does n o t t o o o b v i o u s l y duplicate i t , as a basis f o r the argument

p r i s i n g omissions o f N o s

that follows.

Section

The w o r k divides i n t o 33 chapters; b u t i t w i l l be convenient to group

these i n t o six m a i n sections..
Section

Chapters

23 a n d 50.

1.5-26, is a l o n g section o n w h a t m i g h t be called

the d e v o t i o n a l use of the Psalter. The basic plan adopted here is very
simple; Athanasius m e r e l y goes t h r o u g h the psalms i n order, sometimes

1, is an address t o M a r c e l l i n u s , praising h i m for his

a d d i n g a few psalms o f a similar character t o the one he has reached,

c o n d u c t d u r i n g the present persecution, i n w h i c h he suffered greatly,

occasionally t a k i n g one or m o r e o u t of t u r n , and f a i r l y o f t e n o m i t t i n g

a n d his study of the Scriptures after a recent illness, or conceivably a

one or more. I f I have counted r i g h t , n o less t h a n ninety-five psalms

general epidemic, Athanasius undertakes t o repeat a discourse o n the

appear i n the m a i n sequence, t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y the f i f t e e n 'psalms of

Psalter, w h i c h he says he heard f r o m a <piX67uovoc; yspwv..

ascents' are t a k e n as a g r o u p B u t twenty-five are passed over e n t i r e l y , if

Section

I, Chapter

IV,

II,

Chapters

2-13, considers the u n i q u e advantages o f the

the p r i n t e d text is reliable These are m o s t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the nineteen

Psalter. Athanasius f i r s t shows, i n cc 2-8, h o w the Psalter recapitulates

o m i t t e d i n c. 14; b u t t w o , Nos 86 a n d 135, escape notice altogether. N o t

a l l the m a i n b o o k s o f the B i b l e ; a n i m p o r t a n t passage to w h i c h I shall

surprisingly, the w i s d o m and d e v o t i o n a l value of this section are not

return.. I n c 9 he says that conversely the Psalter is echoed i n all the

m a t c h e d b y a n y literary elegance or even efficiency, since the reader is

other b o o k s ; there is one S p i r i t i n all. Cc

10-12 e x p l a i n that t h e Psalter

k e p t j u m p i n g f r o m subject t o subject.. However i n c. 26 Athanasius

has the special d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t each m a n f i n d s i t expresses the emotions

concludes b y g r o u p i n g together t h e psalms w h i c h prophesy t h e L o r d ' s

(jcLVTiLtaxa) o f his o w n soul. Thus i t n o t o n l y e n j o i n s , b u t invites a n d ex-

I n c a r n a t i o n ; this covers m u c h t h e same g r o u n d as cc. 6-8 already

presses, repentance, endurance

a n d t h a n k s g i v i n g , so t h a t each

man

described, b u t the t r e a t m e n t is b r i e f e r , since only the numbers o f the

adopts its language as his o w n . I n c 13 Athanasius returns t o the theme

psalms are i n d i c a t e d , whereas the earlier section quotes the significant

already handled i n cc

7-8, namely t h a t the Saviour's i n c a r n a t i o n is

verses I n eight cases t h i s chapter f ills i n gaps w h i c h have been l e f t i n the

already foreshadowed i n the Psalms.. This chapter is o f interest i n that i t

previous series; b u t the r e m a i n i n g four psalms have already been men-

introduces our L o r d ' s m o r a l example as w e l l as his teaching, a facet of

t i o n e d , so t h a t once again there is l i t t l e evidence o f c a r e f u l design,

his saving w o r k w h i c h is n o t m u c h emphasized i n A t h a n a s i u s ' dogmatic

w r i t i n g s , t h o u g h there are parallels to be f o u n d i n t h e Festal Letters
Section

III,

Chapter

Since I shall n o t discuss this section i n d e t a i l , I w i l l give a brief

specimen f r o m c 20: ' B u t y o u have sinned, a n d i n your shame y o u re-

14, begins b y representing the Psalter as a guide

pent and call f o r mercy: y o u have the w o r d s of confession a n d repen-

t o the m o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l l i f e ; b u t this leads almost at once i n t o a

tance i n N o . 50 B u t i f y o u were slanderously accused before a wicked

classification of the psalms b y their l i t e r a r y type a n d subject-matter

k i n g , and see the slanderer t r i u m p h i n g , t h e n retire a n d yourself say No.

The list begins by n o t i n g t h i r t e e n psalms composed iw BLriyrju-aTi, i n nar-

51.. B u t w h e n y o u are persecuted and people slander y o u , w i s h i n g to

r a t i v e f o r m . Perhaps i t is characteristic o f Athanasius t h a t the chapter is

betray y o u , as the Z i p h i t e s and t h e Philistines d i d to D a v i d , do n o t des-

n o t really systematic, either i n t h e classification a d o p t e d or i n the way i t

p o n d , b u t t r u s t i n the L o r d and say 53 and 5 5 ' . I t w o u l d be t e m p t i n g , no

is carried out. Thus the n a r r a t i v e psalms include N o

106 b y the L X X

d o u b t , t o take the ' w i c k e d k i n g ' as a reference to Constantius, or less

n u m e r a t i o n ( w h i c h I shall a d o p t f r o m n o w o n ) ; b u t one looks i n v a i n for

p r o b a b l y J u l i a n , w h i c h m i g h t help t o f i x a date for the Epistle; b u t the

the t w o preceding psalms, w h i c h we s h o u l d p r o b a b l y r e c k o n as nar-

c o n t e x t shows t h a t Athanasius is t h i n k i n g o f Saul M a n y of the psalms,

r a t i v e psalms par

these t w o come u p soon a f t e r , together

however, are treated as conveying general m o r a l lessons, or as advising

w i t h 106, as examples of ^oLtoXo-frjais, t o be u n d e r s t o o d as " t h a n k s -

the c o n t e m p o r a r y C h u r c h ; so clearly Ps 75, w h i c h is made t o refer to

g i v i n g ' ; a n d shortly a f t e r w a r d s 105 and 106, b u t n o t 104, appear i n a list

Greeks and heretics; a n d some others are r e c o m m e n d e d for use o n par-

of

ticular days of the C h r i s t i a n week; but a reference back to D a v i d is

psalms w h i c h

excellence;

combine

narrative w i t h

thanksgiving.

headings o v e r l a p , a n d are n o t consistently applied

Thus

the

Several psalms are

made also f o r Pss. 7, 143 and 144.

XIII

XIII
S7 ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

68

Section

V, Chapters

27-29, discusses the reasons for the verse and

melody of the Psalter

Some simple-minded Christians believe that it is

intended t o make a sweet sound and delight the hearing B u t that is u n t r u e ; the Scriptures are not meant to give pleasure
reasons

There are i n fact t w o

F i r s t , i t was proper t h a t G o d ' s praises s h o u l d be set f o r t h i n

69

w h i c h he approves: 'Reading t o a chant is a symbol o f the r h y t h m i c a l

a n d t r a n q u i l c o n d i t i o n of the m i n d ' (xcu f\ [.\itXr\q hi dvdyvwon; ciVPoXov
eon Ti\t; upu6u,ou xai dxeiu-dcTOU xaTacndcietoi; rfjs otavoiac,).
The c o n c l u d i n g Section

VI, Chapters

30-33, begins w i t h a recapitula-

t i o n o n the m a n i f o l d usefulness o f the Psalter; this leads, i n c 3 1 , to a

Scripture not o n l y i n prose b u t i n verse, so t h a t m e n m i g h t love the L o r d

w a r n i n g against t r y i n g to i m p r o v e its w o r d i n g

w i t h all their strength and a b i l i t y , Swdu-Eto;.. Secondly, the d i f f e r e n t

w o u l d wish t o do this? C o u l d i t be a veiled reference to the activities of

B u t , one asks, who

xivriuaTa i n men's soul need to be b r o u g h t i n t o h a r m o n y

I q u o t e : 'Since

A p o l l i n a r i s a n d his father i n the t i m e of Julian? There is a slight sugges-

various m o t i o n s appear i n the soul, a n d i t contains b o t h reason (TO

t i o n p o i n t i n g this w a y i n c 32: ' I f a m a n is oppressed w h e n he says these

Xoyt'CtaQaO a n d desire (TO exi9uu.eiv) a n d impulse (TO 0uu.6et.5ec;), and i t is

w o r d s , he w i l l see t h e great c o n s o l a t i o n t h a t is i n t h e m ; or i f he is

f r o m their m o t i o n t h a t the physical a c t i v i t y of t h e b o d y is also c o n -

t e m p t e d a n d persecuted w h e n he sings the psalms t h u s , he w i l l appear

d u c t e d , so reason (or 'the L o g o s ' ) requires t h a t a m a n s h o u l d not be

the m o r e a p p r o v e d a n d be p r o t e c t e d by the L o r d ' . I t is n o t impossible, I

discordant w i t h h i m s e l f , so as t o reason a d m i r a b l y b u t act b a d l y o n i m -

t h i n k , to take this as m e a n i n g t h a t a m a n m i g h t be persecuted

p u l s e ' l i k e P i l a t e , or the eiders w h o p l o t t e d against Susanna, or the

he says the actual w o r d s of the Psalter, a n d c o u l d have escaped b y using

wavering believers m e n t i o n e d b y St James. So far as 1 am a w a r e , this

a paraphrase

piece of P l a t o n i c psychology occurs n o w h e r e else i n A t h a n a s i u s ; t h o u g h

this i n t e n t i o n ? A p o l l i n a r i s ' paraphrases were intended as a substitute

one doubts i f it is very c a r e f u l l y a p p l i e d , since he attributes Pilate's

f o t the classics o f pagan l i t e r a t u r e , not as a replacement of the biblical

because

B u t have we any evidence f o r paraphrases w r i t t e n w i t h

failure t o his 0uu.6;, whereas a n authentic P l a t o n i s t w o u l d presumably

b o o k s A n d i n the f i n a l chapter A t h a n a s i u s ' elderly mentor is recalled as

say that it was precisely the lack of 0uu.6$, the lack o f courage and self-

g i v i n g a rather d i f f e r e n t w a r n i n g against revisers of t h e sacred text

'He

respect, w h i c h a l l o w e d h i m to disobey his reason a n d conscience

used t o say t h a t those m e n deserved every sort o f c o n d e m n a t i o n

who

But

perhaps this marks a difference between P l a t o and the Neoplatonists of

abandoned

Athanasius' time

phrases f r o m other sources a n d thereby called themselves exorcists.' I n

The section continues by c l a i m i n g t h a t the m e l o d y of the Psalter is a

s y m b o l of the c o n c o r d w h i c h should r u l e i n our souls, c o n t r o l l i n g our
passions a n d d i r e c t i n g our b o d i l y movements.

There is a w o r d of

r e p r o o f for irresponsible musicians, w h o p e r f o r m for pleasure, and an

example d r a w n f r o m D a v i d , w h o pleased G o d by his m u s i c t h e w o r d

these ( w o r d s ) a n d

composed

for themselves attractive

the authentic words o f the Psalter the L o r d is present; and those who
care f o r sufferers are t o say these w o r d s a n d no o t h e r ; they w i l l thus
b o t h benefit the sufferers and g a i n G o d ' s a p p r o v a l f o r their f a i t h and
his help for those w h o need i t .
L e t us n o w t u r n t o the other professedly A t h a n a s i a n w o r k , the Ex-

used is xaTocc|>aAAcovas well as expelling Saul's c o n f u s i o n a n d madness.

positions

Despite D a v i d ' s example, i t does n o t seem t h a t A t h a n a s i u s approves the

t i o n ; i t is k n o w n o n l y t h r o u g h the catenae,

use of musical instruments: ' P r a i s i n g G o d ' , he w r i t e s , o n resounding

1698 was based o n f o u r Paris manuscripts; some other

cymbals

in Psalmos

This has n o t come d o w n t o us i n a d i r e c t t r a d i M o n t f a u c o n ' s e d i t i o n of

fragments

published later by M o n t f a u c o n , a n d others again edited by B a r b a r o and

symbol'0-uu.poXov TtaXtv r j v ' a n d an i n d i c a t i o n of the members o f the

C o r d i e r have been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the text p r i n t e d by M i g n e . I t has

b o d y being d u l y co-ordinated l i k e strings and the thoughts of the soul

l o n g been realized t h a t this text is u n r e l i a b l e ; i t o m i t s some fragments

and

on

the

harp

and

the

ten-stringed lute was

thus

b e c o m i n g l i k e cymbals, a l l conducted b y the voice and c o m m a n d of the

that

S p i r i t , so that the i m a g i n a t i o n is quickened by t h e vision o f f u t u r e

A t h a n a s i u s a large number of comments w h i c h are k n o w n to have come

goods'

A t h a n a s i u s ' exegesis here is, we may say, t y p o l o g i c a l ; he does

have

from

since

other

been

writers..

found,
In

recent

but,

more

years a

serious,

much

it attributes to

better c r i t e r i o n

for

not d o u b t that the sacred b o o k describes real h i s t o r i c a l events, w h i c h

r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the text has been d i s c o v e r e d , namely the M S

however convey s y m b o l i c i n s t r u c t i o n s ; the phrase he uses contrasts w i t h

Graecus

the i m m e d i a t e l y preceding sentence describing the present practice

sources; b u t these can still be distinguished because their series of

754

Vaticanus

This M S . clearly presents a c o m b i n a t i o n of t w o older

XIII

XUI
ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

70

fragments

are

numbered

on

two

d i f f e r e n t systems

One

series,

There f o l l o w s the c o m m e n t a r y

71

' H a v e mercy u p o n me, O G o d , ac-

n u m b e r e d i n minuscule letters w i t h a fresh start for each p s a l m , has

c o r d i n g t o t h y great goodness ' H e begs t o gain the great meicy o f G o d ,

been shown to derive f r o m Evagrius; the o t h e r , n u m b e r e d i n uncial let-

seeing it is for a great offence ' A n d a c c o r d i n g to the m u l t i t u d e of thy

ters a n d r u n n i n g o n f r o m psalm to psalm to begin again a f t e r each

mercies b l o t o u t m y o f f e n c e ' For o n l y the mercies o f G o d can cleanse

complete h u n d r e d , claims to come f r o m Athanasius

the murderous hands

' W a s h me t h o r o u g h l y f r o m m y i n i q u i t y : ' he

enabled

means that o f the murder

source

adultery

'For I acknowledge m y i n i q u i t y : ' this again refers t o the

There are also some fragments preserved i n C o p t i c , a n d t w o Syriac ver-

murder

' A n d m y sin is ever b e f o r e me ' Over and over he t u r n s the

sions, an abbreviated version preserved c o m p l e t e , a n d a longer version

recollection of the sin c o m m i t t e d i n his a d u l t e r y

The i n f o r m a t i o n collected f r o m this

Vatican

MS

has

scholars to i d e n t i f y other witnesses to the same A t h a n a s i a n

' A n d cleanse me f r o m m y sin ' That is the

o f w h i c h o n l y a b o u t 1 5 % survives.. The Greek text itself consists of f a i r -

This is n o t quite the A t h a n a s i u s we k n o w ; i t gives the impression of a

ly brief scholia, and m i g h t itself be derived f r o m a still longer w o r k , for

tidy-minded and rather prosaic w r i t e r I t is perhaps u n f a i r to j u d g e h i m

we have no reason t o t h i n k t h a t a l l the missing fragments have n o w been

f r o m such b r i e f comments ( w h i c h however can h a r d l y be the e p i t o m e of

recovered; b u t t h i s , i f i t ever existed, is n o w completely lost; the longer

a longer t r e a t m e n t ) ; b u t when he writes at greater l e n g t h , the results are

Syriac version corresponds w i t h the extant Greek text

U s i n g all this evidence, Dr . G

n o t always enlivening

V i a n has been able t o p r o d u c e , not

Here is a specimen f r o m the previous psalm,

4 9 : 2 1 : ' T h o u thoughtest w i c k e d l y that I shall be l i k e thee ' For a long

indeed an e d i t i o n , w h i c h is still a w a i t e d , b u t a h a n d b o o k t o the

Exposi-

t i m e , he says, I have been p a t i e n t , b u t I w i l l be so n o longer; f o r I w i l l

tiones

entitled Testi Inediti

Rome,

produce your sins to reprove y o u , sins w h i c h y o u t h o u g h t were no

1978

This b o o k prints 158 new f r a g m e n t s , f o l l o w e d by an elenchus

dal Commento

ai Salmi di Atanasio,

longer i n existence and w o u l d n o t be remembered by anyone

B u t 1, as

s h o w i n g w h i c h passages are to be discarded f r o m the M i g n e e d i t i o n I n

being G o d , w i l l b r i n g t h e m to l i g h t and they shall be exhibited before

the great m a j o r i t y o f cases D t

V i a n is able to indicate the name o f their

y o u ; not concealing t h e m as y o u d o , and becoming l i k e yourself But I

a u t h o r ; a n d quite a large p r o p o r t i o n t u r n o u t to have been already

w i l l produce t h e m , so that by revealing t h e m I w i l l pour shame upon

p r i n t e d elsewhere i n M i g n e ; f o r instance those by Evagrius p r i n t e d

you

under the name of O r i g e n i n V o l

the Psalmist tells us t h a t G o d spoke once; the commentator makes him

12, and those by Theodore o f Mop-

suestia to be f o u n d i n V o l . 80.. The scholar equipped w i t h V i a n ' s w o r k ,

w i t h photostats of the M i g n e t e x t , a n d w i t h a serviceable blue pencil,
can n o w at last m a k e a sound beginning i n his study of the
L e t us t r y t o give a general impression o f the w o r k
given a p r o l o g u e , called hypothesis,

Expositiones
Each psalm is

w h i c h b r i e f l y explains its theme,

generally f o l l o w i n g the Septuagint t i t l e f a i r l y closely

The writer then

This c o u l d have been p u t m o r e b r i e f l y a n d effectively, one feels;

repeat himself six times over

Further study w i l l disclose a fascinating p r o f i l e , w h i c h c e r t a i n l y has
some features w h i c h are characteristic o f Athanasius. For instance, the
writer is clearly c o m m i t t e d to the monastic i d e a l , and his s p i r i t u a l i t y has
some f a i r l y close parallels w i t h the Vita Antonii

B u t this is n o t a safe

c t i t e r i o n ; the Vita soon became p o p u l a r , a n d any w r i t e r w i t h monastic

quotes the p s a l m clause b y clause, o f t e n g i v i n g a separate c o m m e n t for

sympathies a generation or m o r e later t h a n Athanasius could w e l l have

each

been i n f l u e n c e d b y i t (The same p r o b a b l y goes for the de

M a n y o f these comments are telegrammatic i n the extreme; as a

Incarnatione,

specimen 1 w i l l take the 50th p s a l m , where the L X X title runs: 'For the

a n d m i g h t explain some resemblances n o t e d by M m e . R o n d e a u )

end

other times I seem t o detect a writer of rather l i m i t e d m e n t a l i t y , who

A psalm o f a song by D a v i d . W h e n N a t h a n the prophet came t o

At

hypothesis

takes some genuinely A t h a n a s i a n themes a n d w o r k s t h e m to d e a t h ; for

runs as f o l l o w s : ' H e sings this psalm w h i c h contains the confession o f

example, the Psalter's rich v a r i e t y o f imagery d r a w n f r o m Israel's

h i m , when he went i n to Bathsheba ' The c o m m e n t a t o r ' s

He

h i s t o r y , the n a t u r a l a n d created w o r l d , a n d the arts o f music a n d dance

also introduces a prophecy o f the general r e d e m p t i o n of sins t h a t is to

is reduced by a relentlessly stereotypic exegesis t o a few endlessly

come a b o u t t h r o u g h h o l y b a p t i s m , a n d i n s t r u c t i o n a b o u t w o r s h i p i n the

repeated lessons o n the s p i r i t u a l c o m b a t a n d o n life i n the C h u r c h

spirit

such impressions can o n l y be subjective A better c r i t e r i o n , I t h i n k , is to

t w o crimes, the murder o f U r i a h a n d the adultery w i t h Bathsheba

But everywhere y o u w i l l f i n d h i m deprecating his t w o offences'

But

XIII

xm
72

ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

take the Epistula

ad Marcellinum,

w h i c h is u n d o u b t e d l y genuine, and

73

prophecy. O n Ps 104:26 f f , ' H e sent M o s e s ' , there is no disagreement;

consider the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f texts f r o m the psalms given i n cc. 6-8, and

b u t f o r Ps

in other contexts where available, for c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the interpreta-

d i f f e r e n t a n d surprising: ' B r i n g u n t o the L o r d , ye sons of G o d '

tions given i n the

of G o d ' refers t o the h o l y A p o s t l e s , f o r he taught t h e m t o say 'Our

Expositiones.

Athanasius, we have seen, explains t h a t the Psalter recapitulates the

w h o l e Bible

The creation is praised i n Psalm

28:1 the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given b y the Expositiones is quite

'Sons

F a t h e r ' . . . ' B r i n g u n t o the L o r d t h e sons o f rams'. 'Sons of r a m s ' means

18:2, ' T h e heavens

those w h o were called b y t h e m o u t of the Jewish n a t i o n t o f a i t h in the

declare', and i n 2 3 : 1 , ' T h e earth is the L o r d ' s ' . The exodus appears at

L o r d , E u s e b i u s also refers this verse t o the A p o s t l e s , b u t takes the

113:1-2, In exitu

sons of rams t o be converts f r o m paganism, so designated because of

Israel,

a n d 104:26-31, ' H e sent Moses his servant';

w h i l e 2 8 : 1 , ' B r i n g y o u n g rams u n t o the L o r d ' , recalls the w o r s h i p at the

tabernacle.

Judges inspires t w o texts f r o m Ps

106, namely vv

36-7,

their lack of reason

P s a l m 106 is taken by A t h a n a s i u s in a h i s t o r i c a l sense, as we saw, w i t h

'They planted cities', a n d v. 6, ' T h e n they cried u n t o the L o r d ' . ( H e r e

an exception at verse 20 The Expositiones

we should note t h a t Athanasius is not always consistent i n his exegesis,

cernedsee V i a n ' s new fragment 55; b u t m u c h o f t h e psalm is taken i n

since we later f i n d verse 20 o f the same psalm taken o u t o f its context in

a generalized and spiritualized sense; t h o u g h at verse 21 we read 'He

agrees where verse 6 is con-

Israel's h i s t o r y : ' H e sent his W o r d a n d healed t h e m ' is referred to the

transfers his account t o the H o l y A p o s t l e s ' w h o after all d i d recount

I n c a r n a t i o n ; so also de Inc

the marvellous w o r k s o f the L o r d , and d i d go d o w n t o the sea i n ships

40, c Ar.

n 32 and Ser. i i 8 ( t h o u g h the

last-named is a paraphrase g i v i n g a m o r e general, cosmological sense)

B u t verse 36, o n sowing fields a n d p l a n t i n g vineyards, is taken t o mean,

N o d o u b t this was a t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n i u m

The B o o k of Kings is

quite c o n t r a r y t o A t h a n a s i u s , t h a t they sowed the w o r d and established

19:8, 'Some p u t their t r u s t i n chariots and some i n

the C h u r c h , Eusebius also refers t o the s t i l l i n g of t h e s t o r m , b u t incor-

reflected i n Ps

horses'; and Esdras i n t w o Psalms of Ascents, Nos 125 a n d 121

Thus

far o n the O l d Testament

porates verses 36-7 i n t o a c r i t i c i s m of the spiritual

husbandry of the

Jews, One disagreement remains a m o n g the O l d Testament passages;

H o w are these verses treated i n the Expositiones'}

O n the f i r s t text,

whereas Athanasius

refers the verse a b o u t t r u s t i n g in chariots and

' T h e heavens declare', there is f a i r l y close agreement; t h o u g h the Ex-

horses t o the B o o k o f K i n g s , i n the Expositiones

positiones

P h a r a o h ' s o v e r t h r o w at the Red Sea; this exegesis also agrees w i t h

characteristically represent this as i n t r o d u c t o r y teaching

i t is connected w i t h

given by the Apostles t o the people, w a r n i n g t h e m n o t t o w o r s h i p the

Eusebius.

heavenly bodies. This latter p o i n t has a g o o d A t h a n a s i a n parallel at c

s i g n i f i c a n t disagreement over the Psalms o f Ascents A p a r t f r o m these,

Gent

in the eight O l d Testament passages actually quoted there is agreement

27

But at Ps

Expositiones

2 3 : 1 , ' T h e earth is the L o r d ' s ' , the w r i t e r of the

takes a line of his o w n

The hypothesis states, quite

This p o i n t has clearly l i t t l e evidential value; and there is no

between the Epistula

a n d the Expositiones

i n only three cases, the other

reasonably, that the psalm is concerned w i t h the L o r d ' s ascension and

five being d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t ; there are complete or partial parallels

the teaching of the Gentiles. B u t verse 1 is r e f e r r e d , n o t to the c r e a t i o n ,

w i t h Eusebius i n f o u r cases o u t of eight

but t o the sovereignty o f the only-begotten W o r d over the Gentiles i n

T u r n i n g t o the N e w Testament, Athanasius cites nine psalm-texts

consequence of his I n c a r n a t i o n ; reference to the c r e a t i o n only appears

w h i c h refer t o the I n c a r n a t i o n a n d the a c t i v i t y of C h r i s t , six w h i c h refer

at v 2, where i t is presented i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the o p i n i o n of 'enemies',

t o the Passion, and nine w h i c h forecast the Ascension, t h e c o m i n g

possibly M a r c i o n i t e s , w h o supposed t h a t the earth o r i g i n a l l y belonged

Judgement a n d the c a l l of the Gentiles

to Satan

sion texts there is no s i g n i f i c a n t disagreement; b u t I w i l l discuss one or

C o m i n g t o the Exodus passages, Ps

the Expositiones

1 1 3 , / exitu Israel,

is treated i n

n o t as h i s t o r i c a l b u t as p r o p h e t i c ; i t again refers t o the

calling ot the Gentiles

H e r e perhaps a clue can be f o u n d i n Eusebius, i f

O n the deeply t r a d i t i o n a l Pas-

t w o interesting divergences i n the first a n d t h i r d groups.

P s a l m 49:2-3, 'Our G o d shall come a n d shall n o t keep silence', clearly
p e r m i t s t w o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; Athanasius takes i t of t h e I n c a r n a t i o n , the

the p r i n t e d text is s o u n d ; Eusebius (1353 B) suggests t h a t either inter-

Expositiones

p r e t a t i o n is possible; Athanasius opts for h i s t o r y , the Expositiones

C o m m e n t a r y , p 436 A , b u t elsewhere w i t h A t h a n a s i u s , e g D E

for

of the Second C o m i n g ; Eusebius agrees w i t h this in his

vi.3

XIII

XIII
ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

74

Psalm

44:11,

'Hearken,

Athanasius i n the Epistula

daughter,

and

consider',

is t a k e n

by

t o denote G a b r i e l ' s message t o the V i r g i n , I i

Mme.. Rondeau is r i g h t , this is a n early example of a n exegesis w h i c h

9

one

is

missing

And

where

Athanasius of the Epistula,

the Expositiones

75

disagrees

with

the

m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t i t agrees w i t h Eusebius

Was the writer o f the Expositiones

Athanasius? Q u i t e apart f r o m Dr

became popular m u c h later; the usual t r e a t m e n t was t o m a k e i t a p p l y t o

D o r i v a l ' s arguments, w h i c h I c a n n o t v e r i f y , I have come t o t h i n k t h a t he

the C h u r c h , as the B r i d e o f C h r i s t ; a n d this is w h a t we f i n d i n the Ex-

was n o t

positiones

253 A , 401 C,

themselves, l i k e the w r i t e r ' s use o f the w o r d xayu.axafive instances at

v,2), B u t the m o s t interesting case of this g r o u p is Psalm 109:3c,

l e a s t a n d the theologically significant n o u n xEvcotnc,, b o t h absent f r o m

D E

a n d at least three times i n Eusebius (Comm.

There are differences i n v o c a b u l a r y , m o s t l y u n r e m a r k a b l e i n

' F r o m the w o m b before the day-star I have begotten thee', A t h a n a s i u s

M u l l e r ' s L e x i c o n , a n d the f a i r l y f r e q u e n t use of xrjpuS; to denote an

quite regularly refers this t o the begetting o f the Son b y the Father

apostle M o r e i n s t r u c t i v e is the w r i t e r ' s use o f the w o r d s yeveais/yevvriaii;

before a l l c r e a t i o n ; indeed i n Deer. 26 he cites D i o n y s i u s o f R o m e , w h o

a n d their cognates, Prestige a n d R o n d e a u have s h o w n that Athanasius

connects i t w i t h C o l

is particular a b o u t the use o f these w o r d s ; yiwr\ai<;, begetting, is never

1:15

B u t i n the Expositiones

h o w the Father appropriates the human

the c o m m e n t is: 'See

b i r t h o f the only-begotten':

used o f our L o r d ' s h u m a n b i r t h , w i t h the single exception of de Inc

33,

"'Opa Ttw? oixeiouxai xrvv xaxa apxa ywr\aw xou MovoyevoG?, N o w this

despite the example of Psalm 86:5, Gal, 4:4, etc ; m u c h m o r e em-

agrees w i t h w h a t Eusebius writes i n his C o m m e n t a r y , p. 1344 A , i f the

p h a t i c a l l y , yeveaig is n o t used o f his divine Sonship, a n d the A r i a n s are

text is reliable; b u t i t is also a d o p t e d b y M a r c e l l u s o f A n c y r a (fr 26 =

e x p l i c i t l y condemned for speaking thus, The writer o f the

31), a n d i t is rejected

against

does n o t share this p r e c i s i o n ; he uses the w o r d yivvquK; at least seven

w h i c h was w r i t t e n m a n y

times of the L o r d ' s h u m a n b i r t h , and the verb yewav at least three

b y Eusebius,

M a r c e l l u s , b u t i n his Demonstrate

n o t o n l y i n his w o r k

Evanglica

years p r e v i o u s l y ; see D..E

i v 15.53, 16 7, 16 56, v.3,.1, 3 7; c.

ii.3 30

something

Does this t e l l us

about

the date

of

Marc

Eusebius'

Commentary?

times,

10

Expositiones

Even m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t , i f we can t r u s t the p r i n t e d text, is the use

of yivoum f o r his divine b i r t h at p.. 208B 11-12, o n P s a l m 44:2, yeyEvriTai

yap @eo? ex sou, an A r i a n i z i n g phrase w h i c h w o u l d have astounded

T u r n i n g t o the post-resurrection g r o u p o f texts, there is fair agreement i n six cases; i n one case the Expositiones

c o m m e n t has n o t sur-

v i v e d ; b u t this h a r d l y m a t t e r s , since a second passage i n the Epistula

(c

Athanasius!
This usage c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d , after M m e , R o n d e a u , as characteristic
of A t h a n a s i u s ' early w r i t i n g s , t h o u g h later abandoned by h i m , " But

26, 37 C ) shows t h a t A t h a n a s i u s is p r e t t y f l e x i b l e i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

there is one phrase w h i c h occurs repeatedly i n the Expositiones

Psalm 7 1 , H o w e v e r i n c, 8 'Give j u d g e m e n t t o the K i n g ' s S o n ' is t a k e n

t h i n k this e x p l a n a t i o n cannot a p p l y , and w h i c h proves that its author is

as f o r e s h a d o w i n g the Last Judgement; i n the Expositiones

i t refers t o

not Athanasius

where I

A s is w e l l k n o w n , he deals w i t h the L o r d ' s self-imposed

the I n c a r n a t i o n and the Passion; Eusebius also relates i t t o the I n c a r n a -

l i m i t a t i o n s i n his I n c a r n a t i o n , a n d especially the expressions o f grief and

t i o n (Comm

789D-792A, and so p r o b a b l y D E. viii.1.52-4, ix.13 10,

distress d u r i n g the Passion w h i c h were recalled by the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l ex-

17 16);

Athanasius

Finally,

egesis of such texts as Psalm 37:9, ' I r o a r e d o u t of the g r o a n i n g o f m y

A t h a n a s i u s sees the Last Judgement prophesied i n P s a l m 8 1 : 1 , ' H e is a

h e a r t ' , 54:4, the B&iXia Qavaxou, and 68:5, ' L o r d t h o u k n o w e s t m y

judge a m o n g g o d s ' ; the Expositiones

connects this verse w i t h the I n -

foolishness', A t h a n a s i u s explains these expressions i n t w o d i f f e r e n t

c a r n a t i o n , t a k i n g 'gods' as a reference t o the Jewish a u t h o r i t i e s ; this

ways, One is t o say t h a t the L o r d had t a k e n a h u m a n b o d y a n d h u m a n

again agrees w i t h Eusebius, 9 8 4 A

flesh, so t h a t he speaks h u m a n l y a n d suffers the things w h i c h n a t u r a l l y

and

also,

in

illud

omnia

2,

213A,

T o sum u p this discussion: of the ten psalm-texts w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s

belong t o the b o d y a n d the flesh (c Ar

h i 55-8) A n o t h e r , w h i c h he

connects w i t h the O l d Testament, there is agreement i n f i v e cases w i t h

shares w i t h Eusebius, is to appeal to G a l , 3:13, ' C h r i s t has become a

the Expositiones,

curse for u s ' , w h i c h explains w h y C h r i s t should utter words w h i c h are

and disagreement i n five, O f nine texts o n the i n c a r -

n a t i o n , four agree and three disagree, w i t h no c o m m e n t o n t w o O f six

really a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y to sinful

texts o n the Passion, p r o b a b l y five agree, none disagree, a n d one lacks

f i n d these w h o l l y A t h a n a s i a n ideas conveyed i n a phrase w h i c h is never

comment

used by the real A t h a n a s i u s a n d

O f nine post-Resurrection texts, six agree, t w o disagree a n d

humanity

B u t i n the Expositiones

we

so far as I have observed, not by

XIII

XIII
76

ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS

Eusebius either; C h r i s t is said t o speak ex Tcpoawrcou -ufj? av9pw7roTfVcoc;.. I

have counted nine examples, at Ps. 1 5 : 1 , 15:9, 21 Hyp
40:12, 56:2, 68 Hyp

, 69 Hyp

, besides 142 Hyp.

, 21:2, 2 1 : 1 1 ,

w h i c h uses a similar

Next,

can

we a t t e m p t

to

construct a

profile of

77

the

w r i t e r ? a s s u m i n g , as I t h i n k we m a y , t h a t the Expositiones
work

unknown
is a u n i t a r y

A s already n o t e d , he repeatedly f o l l o w s Eusebius; but he never

f o l l o w s h i m i n c o m p a r i n g the d i f f e r e n t versions of the Greek t e x t ; he is

phrase b u t is n o t given a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense.

and

interested o n l y i n the L X X ; D r . Vian's elenchus has n o w m a d e this

r e m a r k e d that i t c o u l d refer either t o h u m a n i t y as a w h o l e , or t o the

clear. N e x t , he is s t r o n g l y interested i n the ascetic i d e a l ; t h o u g h I have

personal h u m a n i t y of C h r i s t I n f a c t the f i r s t sense is perfectly clear a n d

n o t n o t i c e d any passage w h i c h clearly p o i n t s either t o solitary d e v o t i o n

explicit i n several cases; a t y p i c a l example comes at Ps

or t o c o m m u n i t y l i f e

W h a t exactly does i t mean? M m e . R o n d e a u n o t i c e d i t b r i e f l y

me

1 2

1 5 : 1 , 'Preserve

O L o r d , for i n thee have 1 p u t m y t r u s t A s s u m i n g the c o m m o n

T h i r d l y , he shows n o clearly-marked d o g m a t i c

interests H e is clearly a Nicene; he once uses the t e r m 6u.oouai.oi;, at 21:2,

so t o speak, o f h u m a n i t y , he addresses G o d and the Father;

a n d once m e n t i o n s the T r i s a g i o n , at 26:6; b u t he does not appear t o be

not really o n his o w n account, b u t for us a n d o n our account, as being

greatly w o r r i e d b y A r i a n i s m , a n d when he explains that the L o r d is

one

superior t o the heavenly p o w e r s , at 88:7, the passage turns o u t t o be

prosopon,
of

us

through

the

economy'

( T o xotvov coorcep xpoawrcov xfje;

dvOpcoTtOTiqxoi; cxvaXapwv xov<; npdc; eov xca FEaxepa Troieirai Xoyou? oux vrcip

b o r r o w e d f r o m Eusebius

ye [xaXXov eauxou, 8 i ' r\\La<; hi x a i uxep T[u.cov CO; el<; ei; r\[Lto\> Sia xrjv

sions t o a s o u l i n C h r i s t , b u t does n o t i g n o r e t h e m altogether; this is a

H e tends t o p l a y d o w n t h e Psalmist's a l l u -

oixovoixiav) A g a i n at 40:12, ' t h a t m y enemy m a y n o t t r i u m p h against

p o s i t i o n w h i c h I f o r m e r l y t h o u g h t was once adopted b y A t h a n a s i u s 1

m e ' , we f i n d a contrast: ' I f C h r i s t says this f r o m the prosopon

of

can f i n d n o clear i n d i c a t i o n o f either m o n o p h y s i t e or diphysite sym-

h u m a n i t y , the enemy w o u l d mean h i m w h o devised our d e a t h ' (sc. the

p a t h i e s w h i c h seems unexpected i f w i t h D o r i v a l w e make h i m an

d e v i l ) ; ' b u t i f i t comes as f r o m C h r i s t h i m s e l f , he means the rulers of the

A l e x a n d r i a n w r i t i n g i n the half-century after C y r i l ' s death. The phrase

Jews'

TO jtpoacoTTov x r i i avBpcoTcoTrjTO? m i g h t seem t o have an A n t i o c h e n e f l a v o u r ;

A g a i n i n Ps. 68 Hyp.

the phrase ex rcpoaomou -zf\c, av0ptor:6x7]xoi; is

paralleled a few lines b e l o w by ex xpoatimou xr)<; avQpanrou cpuaetoc,. M m e .

b u t as we have seen, i t does n o t d i s t i n c t l y refer t o a personal

Rondeau's second p o s s i b i l i t y , a reference t o the m o r e sophisticated n o -

C h r i s t , t h o u g h again i t does n o t exclude i t ; a n d i t is n o t m a t c h e d b y any

t i o n o f C h r i s t ' s o w n personal h u m a n i t y , is never q u i t e u n a m b i g u o u s l y

c o r r e s p o n d i n g phrase o n the lines o f t o rcpoacoxov xrjc; 9e6xr|xoi;.

expressed, b u t i t is p r o b a b l y present at 2 1 : 1 1 , ' I was cast u p o n thee f r o m

humanity in

W e seem, t h e n , t o have a w r i t e r w h o is strongly c o m m i t t e d t o the

the w o m b * ... ' H e prays again f r o m the person of (his) h u m a n i t y . For

monastic i d e a l , b u t is n o t a b l y uninterested i n d o g m a t i c

indeed the b a n d of disciples had deserted h i m . ' The w r i t e r , t h e n , is

least, i n those w h i c h p r o v o k e d the m a j o r crises of the f o u r t h a n d f i f t h

clearly aware of t w o d i s t i n c t possibilities, b u t m a y n o t have n o t i c e d the

centuries. H e is clearly w e l l g r o u n d e d i n the t r a d i t i o n a l exegesis o f the

possible a m b i g u i t y o f this actual phrase .

Psalter; i f D o r i v a l is r i g h t , besides Eusebius he uses O r i g e n , A p o l l i n a r i s ,

I f our a r g u m e n t is accepted, w h a t f o l l o w s ? F i r s t , i t perceptibly

disputesat

D i d y m u s a n d C y r i l ; b u t he makes his o w n characteristic selection

changes our p i c t u r e of Athanasius.. I t counters the impression g i v e n ,

Despite his massive debt t o Eusebius, he is really not m u c h interested i n

e.g., b y Quasten, w h o writes ( i i i . 38) ' I t is evident t h a t A t h a n a s i u s had a

establishing the o r i g i n a l meaning of the t e x t ; his concern is t o i n t e r p r e t

p r e d i l e c t i o n for the allegorical a n d t y p o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the

the Psalter i n terms w h i c h bear o n the C h u r c h ' s l i f e ; and here a n all-

Psalter i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o the m o r e j e j u n e exegesis p r e d o m i n a n t i n

p e r v a d i n g emphasis is t h a t o n evangelism, i n c l u d i n g the conversion of

his

dogmatico-polemical

writings'

Certainly,

as

we

have

seen,

lews as well as Gentiles. Perhaps some scholar better acquainted t h a n I

Athanasius treated some texts f r o m the Psalter as p o i n t i n g f o r w a r d t o

w i t h the post-Athanasian C h u r c h c a n use these clues t o t h r o w m o r e light

the i n c a r n a t i o n and

u p o n his i d e n t i t y .

the C h u r c h ; b u t i n others he is p r e p a r e d t o

recognize a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d h i s t o r i c a l sense, n o d o u b t r e f l e c t i n g the

r e a c t i o n against Origen's allegory w h i c h we are t o l d was set o n f o o t by
Bishop Peter of A l e x a n d r i a

XIII

XIV
NOTES
1

'The Scriptures and the Soul of Christ in Athanasius', Vig Christ.

See p 70

'Athanase ou Pseudo-Athanase', RSLR

'L'ptre Marcellinus sur les psaumes', Vig Christ

See n 4, and cf her recent book Les Commentaires

36 (1982) 233-250.

16 (1980) 80-89
22 (1968) 176-197
Patriotiques

du Psautier,

W h y N o t Three Gods?

Vol I

(Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 219). Rome 1982

6

'
8

"
10

"

'Athanasius ber den Psalter

48 (1973) 157-173.

Op cit , 189, 192-3

C f Eusebius HE

.2 8, D

v 5.1, 7 4.

Op cit , 180
YW)I: 84A, 124A, 384A, 384D, 461B, 461C, 461D I-EWSV, 128C, 388C, 461D
'Une nouvelle preuve de l'influence littraire d'Eusbe de Csare sur Athanase',

RecSR
II

T h e Logic o f G r e g o r y o f Nyssa's T r i n i t a r i a n D o c t r i n e

', Theologie und Philosophie

56 (1968) 385-434; esp 404-409; Vig. Christ

RecSR

op cit , 423

22 (1968) 184-185

G r e g o r y o f Nyssa's treatise 'On N o t T h r e e Gods' is an a t t r a c t i v e

a n d i n f l u e n t i a l w o r k , a n d I m a k e no apology f o r r e f l e c t i n g o n i t once
a g a i n , together w i t h some companion pieces I h a v e come t o t h i n k
t h a t i t resembles a n accomplished c o n j u r i n g t r i c k m o r e n e a r l y t h a n a
v a l i d theological d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; b u t I t r u s t t h a t i n p r e s e n t i n g this
v i e w I s h a l l n o t disconcert our g r e a t l y respected colleague a n d deai
f r i e n d , w h o has a l w a y s c o m b i n e d a dedicated p u r s u i t of t o t a l accu
r a c y w i t h g r e a t k i n d n e s s t o w a r d s less g i f t e d scholars
Gregory's essay is c o n v e n i e n t l y accessible i n F M i i l l e r ' s e d i t i o n ,
as are t w o other w o r k s w h i c h o f f e r u s e f u l comparisons, the Ad Eustathium de sancta trinitate, a n d t h e Ad Graecos (ex communibus
notionibus) I s h a l l also refer, t o 'Basil's' Letter 38, assuming i t was w r i t t e n by
Gregory .
1

These f o u r pieces appear t o divide i n t o t w o groups a c c o r d i n g to

the s t a n d p o i n t adopted. T h e t w o l a t t e r argue i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l style
t h a t t h e confession o f t h r e e d i v i n e hypostases is n o bar to t h e accept
ance of t h e single d i v i n e substance, ouotoc, p r o c l a i m e d i n the Nicene
Creed; w h e n c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d , vnoaxaou;
r e f e r s to i n d i v i d u a l s ,
ouotot to t h e c o m m o n n a t u r e t h e y share; a n d i t is t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d
t h a t t h e w o r d 0e6c. indicates t h i s d i v i n e substance or n a t u r e ; thus
t h e r e are t h r e e Persons b u t one G o d T h e other t w o essays p u t their
case m o r e i n f o r m a l l y ; t h e ires dei presents i t t h u s : i f each of t h e d i
v i n e Persons is t o be called G o d , w h y s h o u l d we p r o c l a i m o n e God
r a t h e r t h a n three? I n these t w o pieces G r e g o r y is s t i l l p r e p a r e d to
discuss the v i e w t h a t t h e w o r d 8oc, r e f e r s t o t h e d i v i n e substance or
n a t u r e ( o u o t a , (puotc), b u t he p r e f e r s t o t a k e i t as i n d i c a t i n g t h e d i
v i n e a c t i v i t y of p r o v i d e n t i a l o v e r s i g h t , 8eu>petv; h i s a r g u m e n t being
t h a t God's n a t u r e is m y s t e r i o u s , a n d so cannot be s i g n i f i e d b y any
w o r d , a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t by the w o r d Qzoc? I n the De Trinitate, more2

Tres dei: GHO III/I 37-57; trim ib. 3-16; c o m not: ib. 19-33. Ad Petrum
differentia
essentiae
et hypostaseos
- BAS ep 38 (I 81-92 COURTOHNE)
1

See e g comm not (GNO I I I / I 22,11-24)

liin

(GHO III/I 14,5 ff ); tres

dei (GFO III/I 42,13 ff )

fiatrem

de

XIV

XIV
150

Why Sot Three Gods?

over, a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y is m e n t i o n e d , t h o u g h not w a r m l y a p p r o v e d ;
n a m e l y t h a t 0eo? is s i m p l y a t e r m expressive of supreme v a l u e B o t h
these w o r k s , however, argue t h e case f o r d i v i n e u n i t y i n t e r m s o f the
a t t r i b u t e s , o r t h e operations, w h i c h are c o m m o n to t h e t h r e e Persons;
a n d w h e n t h e y w i s h to s u m m a r i z e , p r e f e r t h e less f o r m a l t e r m (puoic,
as against the m o r e t e c h n i c a l , a n d m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l , ouatcc, unoaxotoic, a n d Tcpocrconov A t a b l e s h o w i n g the f r e q u e n c y o f these f o u r nouns
w i l l b r i n g o u t the c o n t r a s t
4

comm. not
ouata

96

Ttoaxaat.
rtpoactov
cpuot

35
58
6

ep 38
19
32
3
11

bin

h es dei

3
6
1
30

4
11
4
62

T h e t w o f o r m e r w o r k s , I t h i n k , were w r i t t e n a t a t i m e w h e n t h e
Nicene Creed i t s e l f was the focus o f intense debate; R H i i b n e r ' s suggestion of 379-80, s h o r t l y before t h e C o u n c i l o f C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , seems
e x t r e m e l y p r o b a b l e T h e other t w o pieces no d o u b t came l a t e r , w h e n
i t was less easy to present a f o r m a l challenge to Nicene theology, h u t
w h e n Gregory's o w n o r t h o d o x y m i g h t be q u e s t i o n e d His observations o n t h e w o r d 6e6c, m i g h t w e l l be a c o r r e c t i o n o f his f o r m e r v i e w ;
moreover i n tres dei (37,8), t h e r e is a reference to his o l d age.
5

151

t h e m Macedonians; w h i l e i n t h e i i eyes Gregory's confession o f a

single D i v i n i t y a m o u n t s to S a b e l l i a n i s m
T h e tres dei represents h i m as c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a s i m i l a r , t h o u g h
not i d e n t i c a l , d i l e m m a T h e F a t h e r is God, the Son is God, a n d the
H o l y S p i r i t is God. I t w o u l d seem to f o l l o w t h a t t h e r e are t h r e e Gods;
i f however one m a i n t a i n s a b e l i e f i n one God, t h i s appears t o mean
accepting t h e d i v i n i t y of the Father w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t of the Son and
Spirit
G r e g o r y t h u s presents h i m s e l f as faced w i t h a choice between
t r i t h e i s m a n d e x t r e m e A r i a n i s m His correspondent puts the p r o b l e m
i n t h i s f o r m : Peter, James a n d J o h n , t h o u g h t h e y share t h e same
m a n h o o d (v urge VXE xy\ av6pu>Tc6x7)xt) are spoken o f as t h r e e men
I f t h e n we acknowledge three d i v i n e Persons (onoaxctaei) u n i t e d i n a
single n a t u r e a n d single d i v i n i t y , w h a t r i g h t have we to reject a doct r i n e of t h r e e Gods? I t is t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m t h a t leads
G r e g o r y t o develope t h e elegant a n d c a p t i v a t i n g t h e o r y characteristic
o f t h e tres dei; n a m e l y t h a t i t is o n l y a loose use of language t h a t perm i t s us to describe t h e aforesaid saints as t h r e e m e n ; p r o p e r l y speaki n g , since t h e i r m a n h o o d is i d e n t i c a l , they are a l l one m a n T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t a correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the h u m a n s i t u a t i o n w i l l
resolve the theological p r o b l e m o f the T r i n i t y
10

1 1

12

T h i s a r g u m e n t goes beyond t h e w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n between

u n o x a a i a n d o u a t a presented elsewhere, f o i instance i n 'Basil's'
Letter 38; f o r t h a t w o u l d a l l o w us to t r e a t o o i a s i m p l y as a generic
t e r m f o r t h e c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e of d i v i n i t y w h i c h is shared b y three
d i v i n e i n d i v i d u a l s T h e r e s u l t w o u l d be a l u r i d b u t u n d e m a n d i n g p l u r a l i s t i c d o c t r i n e , w h i c h a d m i t t e d l y G r e g o r y w i l l seek to c o r r e c t i n
other ways T h e tres dei d i f f e r s ; b u t its r e a l l y s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e , i f I
j u d g e c o r r e c t l y , is not the c l a i m t h a t i t is a n i m p r o p e r use of language
to speak o f t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s as 'three m e n ' W e c o u l d a v o i d
t h e p u r e l y v e r b a l d i f f i c u l t y b y means w h i c h G r e g o r y h i m s e l f suggests, b y s p e a k i n g o f 'three h u m a n persons' or 'instances o f t h e one
m a n ' , as i n coram not 29: rtoXXoct nocrroet xo v vDpwnou m u c h as we speak o f 'three loaves of bread' or 'three golden c o i n s '
A p p l i e d to theology, t h i s p r i n c i p l e w o u l d a l l o w us to a v o i d t h e expression 'three Gods' w h i l e p r o c l a i m i n g t h r e e d i v i n e Persons w h o i n
1 3

1
G r e g o r y e x p l a i n s his general s t a n d p o i n t i n trin pp. 5-7 His c r i t i c s ,
he says, c o m p l a i n t h a t w h i l e he recognizes three d i s t i n c t hypostases
i n t h e Godhead, he speaks o f o n l y one Goodness, P o w e i , a n d D i v i n i t y I t appears f r o m t h e n e x t page t h a t these c r i t i c s are p l u r a l i s t s ,
w h o themselves confess, n o t o n l y t h r e e hypostases, b u t t h r e e Bubstances ( o u a i a t ) ; t h o u g h according to G r e g o r y t h e y t r e a t o n l y the
F a t h e r a n d the Son as t r u l y d i v i n e I f t h i s is c o r r e c t , we w o u l d c a l l
7

14

10

I / i n (15,7

ff)

See R. H HUBHER, Ep 38, 490

liin

(3,11-7,15); cf tres dei (37,3-10)

Tiin

(5,17-19)..

lb

6,14 f

lb

7,8-15.

lb. 5,10 f

11

Tres

18

lb

dei (38,3- 7)
38,8 f

The phrases 'generic identity', 'generic unity', seem often to be used rather loosely, to include unity of species (e. g of Peter and Paul, who are both men) as well as
unity of genus, where the species may differ (e. g. of this man and that horse, who
aie both animals) I have not tried to correct this imprecision
1 3

"

Tres

dei (53 f )

XIV

XIV
Why Hot Three Gode?

152

f a c t m i g h t d i f f e r e x t r e m e l y i n r a n k a n d goodness T h e m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e ties dei is t h a t i t seems to argue f o r a u n i t y o f n a t u r e i n t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s w h i c h goes beyond the generic u n i t y

w h i c h is c o m m o n l y a d m i t t e d I t is t a n t a l i z i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e
w h a t G r e g o r y has i n m i n d ; b u t he lets i t appear t h a t i f t h e h u m a n
s i t u a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d i n t h i s f r e s h a n d c h a l l e n g i n g w a y , i t presents
a close a n a l o g y f o r t h e H o l y T r i n i t y .
W e m a y pause at t h i s p o i n t t o consider a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Gregory's v i e w w h i c h I a m sure s h o u l d be dismissed. P r o p e r l y speaking, he
says, the phrase ' m a n y m e n ' is e q u i v a l e n t to ' m a n y n a t u r e s o f m e n '
(reoXXoct tpuoEti; a v O p u n t v a t ) , a phrase w h i c h he c l e a r l y t h i n k s absurd
C o u l d we i n t e r p r e t his d i c t u m , t h a t the saints are a l l one m a n ,
as i n t e n d e d s i m p l y t o exclude t h i s idea b y asserting, n o t t h e i r mere
i d e n t i t y 'as m a n , b u t t h a t t h e y are a l l t h e same kind o f man? W e o u r selves m i g h t f i n d t h i s a t t r a c t i v e , as we now recognize t h a t t h e r e have
been d i s t i n c t types o f m a n ; at one t i m e homo sapiens a n d N e a n d e r t h a l
m a n l i v e d side b y side, e x h i b i t i n g n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n physique a n d
w a y o f l i f e , a l t h o u g h t h e y belonged to the same species b y the accepted c r i t e r i o n t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n t e r b r e e d . S i m i l a r l y we m i g h t say
t h a t J a c k y , Joey a n d P o l l y are ' a l l the same m o n k e y ' , m e a n i n g j u s t
t h a t t h e y are a l l chimpanzees B u t G r e g o r y c a n n o t possibly have
m e a n t a n y t h i n g l i k e t h i s He f i t s h u m a n i t y i n t o t h e t h r e e f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n established b y A r i s t o t l e , n a m e l y genus, species a n d i n d i v i d ual
'Such-and-such a n a n i m a l ' (itpov toiovoe) is m a n simpliciter, i n
c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e h o r s e ; 'such-and-such a m a n ' (xoi6aoe avupwrtoc,)
is suggested as a phrase w h i c h m i g h t s i g n i f y a n i n d i v i d u a l , Peter or
Paul
G r e g o r y t h i n k s t h i s i m p r o p e r ; b u t t h r o u g h o u t his discussion
t h e r e is no question o f t h e phrase i n d i c a t i n g s i m p l y a t y p e or v a r i e t y
of man
15

1 6

excusable to t a l k of t h r e e m e n w h i l e i t r e m a i n s i n c o r r e c t to r e f e r to
t h r e e Gods T h e r e is a v a l u a b l e p o i n t made here, w h i c h corrects the
r a t h e r s u p e r f i c i a l assumption w h i c h dominates t h e ires dei; we should
indeed give serious a t t e n t i o n t o t h e disanalogies between t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h e d i v i n e Persons o f our t r i n i t a r i a n confession
I t is q u i t e o t h e r w i s e w i t h the arguments o f f e r e d t o show t h a t our
t a l k o f ' m a n y m e n ' , etc., r e f l e c t s h u m a n c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h do n o t app l y t o God. These are q u i t e u n c o n v i n c i n g , a n d can be b r i e f l y dismissed:
(i) W e speak o f ' m a n y m e n ' because t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f m e n is
n o t constant, o w i n g t o deaths a n d b i r t h s
2 2

(ii) M e n have d i f f e r e n t o r i g i n s (sc parents), whereas t h e T r i n i t y

has o n l y o n e
2 3

( i i i ) W e speak of ' m a n y o r a t o r s ' , e t c , because each o f t h e m w o r k s

1 7

18

1 9

W e m a y t h e r e f o r e discount t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I t is h u m a n i t y as
such, p a r a d o x i c a l l y described as 'one m a n ' , w h i c h G r e g o r y p u t s f o r w a r d aB a n analogy f o r t h e T r i n i t y B u t t h e r e is a n a l t e r n a t i v e l i n e o f
a r g u m e n t , w h i c h is represented i n t h e ires dei , b u t is m u c h m o r e
f u l l y developed i n the ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' ; n a m e l y t h a t t h e r e are i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e l i f e w h i c h m a k e i t
20

21

40,8 f

15

Ib

1 6

Cf ib

1 7

See comm not (29-31), where he gives ^uov, 'animal', as an example of a genus.

18

Ib

18

Ib

2 0

Ties

21

Comm not (23,21 f f )

independently

2 4

(iv) M o r e g e n e r a l l y , o n l y s p a t i a l a n d m a t e r i a l t h i n g s a r e n u m bered
T h i s last c o n t e n t i o n is c l e a r l y false; we can say, 'two two's are
f o u r ' , or e n u m e r a t e t h e f o u r - a n d - t w e n t y elders o f t h e Apocalypse
A n d i t s f a i l u r e s u f f i c e s to r e f u t e the others M o r e o v e r , as to ( i ) , one
suspects t h a t G r e g o r y has become confused T h e f l u c t u a t i n g n u m b e r
o f h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s is a good r e a s o n f o r c a l l i n g t h e m 'many' r a t h e r
t h a n s u g g e s t i n g a n e x a c t n u m b e r ; i t gives us no good g r o u n d for
a v o i d i n g all p l u r a l designations a n d c a l l i n g t h e m 'one' As f o r ( i i i ) , we
o f t e n e n u m e r a t e p a r t n e r s i n a c o m m o n e n t e r p r i s e , l i k e the T w e l v e ;
a n d as f o r ( i i ) , we c o u l d meet G r e g o r y w i t h t h e r e p l y t h a t a l l m e n are
descended f r o m A d a m ; b u t i f t h e p o i n t at issue is t h e i r immediate o r i g i n , o n l y the Son is immediately (rcpocextocj d e r i v e d f r o m the F a t h e r
2 5

2 6

W e have been describing t w o a l t e r n a t i v e lines o f a r g u m e n t w h i c h

c a n n o t easily be c o n j o i n e d T h e f i r s t we h a v e described as a n argum e n t by analogy; i f we u n d e r s t a n d the case of m e n c o r r e c t l y , Kotxa
x6v e m a x T j i i o v i K d v Xoyov, we can solve t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e T r i n i t y
T h e s e c o n d a d v e r t s t o d i f f e r e n c e s between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e l i f e
w h i c h m a k e i t a l l o w a b l e to speak o f t h r e e m e n , t h o u g h we m u s t not
speak o f t h r e e Gods B u t perhaps we have already misdescribed the
f i r s t a r g u m e n t G r e g o r y m e n t i o n s t h r e e m e n because i t is a c o n v e n i e n t a n d f a m i l i a r e x a m p l e , a n d indeed h a d a c t u a l l y been suggested;

53,6 f
22

lb. 24,1-14.

29,13 f

23

Ib. 24,26-25,4

31,20 ff.; 32,12 ff

24

Tres

25

Ib

dei (53,6

ff)

153

26

dei (47,11 ff )
53,9

See ires dei (56,5 f }

XIV

XIV
154

Why Hot T h r e e Gods?

b u t his reasoning takes no account o f a n y d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f h u m a n l i f e ; i t is based o n the logic o f genera a n d species as such, a n d i n
the ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' we f i n d G r e g o r y a p p l y i n g i t t o dogs a n d horses
i n e x a c t l y t h e same w a y as he does to m e n .
2 7

T h e p o i n t he is m a k i n g , t h e n , is t h e p e r f e c t l y g e n e r a l one: i f ' x '

names a class or species, e g m a n , i t is never c o r r e c t t o use i t t o n a m e
a member o f t h a t class, e g. P a u l . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h e n s p e a k i n g corr e c t l y , we s h o u l d never use ' m a n ' i n t h e sense o f A r i s t o t l e ' s o xtc, ov8pu>7Toc, to n a m e a n i n d i v i d u a l ; a n d i f S c r i p t u r e does t h i s , i t is not h i n g b u t a k i n d l y accomodation to o u r slipshod h a b i t s
I t s h o u l d of
course be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t G r e e k has n o t h i n g w h i c h precisely c o r r e sponds to o u r i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e ; one has to say, so to speak, ' P a u l is
m a n ' B u t G r e g o r y k n o w s the A r i s t o t e l i a n usage, t h o u g h as a good
P l a t o n i s t he p r e f e r s the phrase pepiKT) or IOCKT) ouoioc w h i c h c o u l d
n o t suggest, l i k e TCpwTn ouoioc, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l is t h e p r i m e r e a l i t y A r i s t o t l e ' s o TIC. ocvSpuTcog is r e c a l l e d i n Letter 38 b y t h e r e f e r e n c e
to Job 1:1, avepwrtoc, TIC; T)V, a n d b y the phrase ev Ttp x t v i r r p a y i i a T t .
G r e g o r y is t h u s p e r f e c t l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e use o f av0p(OTtoc. t o m e a n
'a p a r t i c u l a r m a n ' ; his p o i n t is t h a t w h e n s p e a k i n g c o r r e c t l y one
s h o u l d use t h e phrase ' h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l ' ( T o t a v o e urtooTcxotv dvOpcor c o u ) ; t h o u g h u n d e r s t a n d a b l y he does n o t a l w a y s f o l l o w t h i s r u l e ,
b u t is c o n t e n t to say, e g , ' L u k e or Stephen is m a n ' , acv8pt>i7ioi; y a p 6
2 8

29

30

AOUKCKC, r j 6 ETecpavoc .
31

I n p r e v i o u s l y p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t s o n Gregory's v i e w , I s t a t e d t h a t
his a r g u m e n t is p e r f e c t l y general; so t h a t i f he m a i n t a i n s t h a t Peter,
P a u l a n d B a r n a b a s are o n e m a n , t h e same c o u l d be said o f a n y
g r o u p of m e n ; i t should also be t r u e t h a t Moses, A r i s t o t l e a n d Jezebel
are a l l one m a n
T h e a r g u m e n t t h u s f a i l s because i t s consequences
a r e p l a i n l y a b s u r d T h i s c r i t i c i s m , I s t i l l t h i n k , is v a l i d as f a r as i t
goes; b u t I c o u l d have p o i n t e d o u t , f i r s t , t h a t G r e g o r y does n o t a l w a y s
argue on p u r e l y l o g i c a l grounds; b u t secondly, t h a t w h e n he does so,
h i s r e a s o n i n g is -perfectly g e n e r a l ; i t is n o t concerned w i t h m e n as
such, b u t w i t h w h a t he alleges is the c o r r e c t n o m e n c l a t u r e f o r any
system of genera, species a n d i n d i v i d u a l s .
3 2

3 3

27

Comm not (29 ff )

2 8

See e. g ib. 27,4 ff.

29

Ib 23,4 ff

30

Ib 29,9

31

lies

32

Comm not (23,14)

T h i s becomes clear i f we consider the discussion w h i c h begins at

p 28 9 i n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' . G r e g o r y t u r n s t o some u n n a m e d
c r i t i c s w h o object to his a r g u m e n t as f o l l o w s . A hypostasis, t h e y say,
does n o t d i f f e r f r o m a hypostasis qua hypostasis; b u t t h a t does not
m e a n t h a t a l l hypostases a r e one hypostasis T h e same can be s a i d of
o u o t a , So also a g a i n , t o say t h a t one d i v i n e being, as such, does not
d i f f e r f r o m another (Geo? 8eou, h 8e6c., ouoev otoctpepet) does n o t establ i s h the d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e y are one God; j u s t as to say t h a t m a n does
n o t d i f f e r f r o m m a n qua m a n does not d e n y t h e f a c t t h a t P e t e r , P a u l
a n d B a r n a b a s are t h r e e m e n 'For ouoioc d i f f e r s f r o m ouoioc, n o t qua
ouoioc, b u t qua such-and-such a n ouoioc' ( a n d so also w i t h urcoaTocatc);
' s i m i l a r l y m a n ( d i f f e r s ) f r o m m a n qua such-and-such (a) m a n , and
again god f r o m god qua such-and-such a god' (Stoccpepei yap ouoioc ouaicxc, ou KOC6O ouoioc, acXXde KocSd xoiaoe oOoia .. GJOOC6TUC, KOK acvGpwrcoc.
avGptimou, f i xoi6aoe acv6pwTioc,, m i naXtv 6E6C, 0eou ft TOIOOOE 6e6c, TO
8e xoioao r\ TOIOOOE kid Suo r\ xocl rtXetovuv Etw8e XEyecOaci) T o paraphrase t h e l a s t clause, p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g expressions l i k e 'such-andsuch' i m p l y t h a t t w o or m o r e instances o f a class are b e i n g considered
Gregory's r e p l y shows t h a t he is a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d i n the
t e r m i n o l o g y o f logic; b u t w h e n c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e d i t reveals t h a t
o n l y the last clause is e f f e c t i v e l y considered A n d t h e discussion takes
a s u r p r i s i n g f o r m , G r e g o r y says t h a t we a t t a c h the w o r d 'such-andsuch' to a w o r d d e n o t i n g a genus, t h e r e b y p i c k i n g o u t a p a r t i c u l a r
species . One w o u l d expect h i m to c o n t i n u e , o n t h e same p r i n c i p l e ,
'and we a t t a c h t h e wor d 'such-and-such' t o a w o r d d e n o t i n g a species,
so as t o p i c k o u t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ; s a y i n g f o r instance, ' P a u l is
a grey-eyed man'. B u t t h i s is n o t w h a t G r e g o r y says; he argues t h a t
since t h e p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g characteristics belong to t h e i n d i v i d u a l , the
p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t be a t t a c h e d to the w o r d UTIOOTCIOIC.,
' i n d i v i d u a l ' , a n d n o t t o the class-name 'man . W e can t h u s describe
P a u l as a grey-eyed i n d i v i d u a l , b u t n o t as a grey-eyed m a n . O n this
g r o u n d he c l a i m s t h a t his critics* case collapses He is not f o r c e d to
d e n y the obvious f a c t t h a t t h e r e are m a n y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s ; what
he claims is t h a t t h e y are o n l y one m a n ; a c c o r d i n g l y , he says, we ack n o w l e d g e t h r e e d i v i n e hypostases, b u t confess one God (roXXac. yap
UTtooTaoeic, x o u Evdc. dvOpurcou KOU Tpsic, UTtoaTaoEic, TOU evdc, 8eo0
34

CpOCUeV OlKQCtGiC,) ,
35

dei (40,21 f )

STEAD, Personality 190; reprinted in my 'Substance and Illusion in the Christian

Fathers'
3 3

155

E g comm not (29,13): 'man is such-and-such an animal ; cf ib. 30,11-14, where

the particularizing characteristics are explained, and 31,14-16.
3 4

35

Ib (29,9 ff )

XIV

XIV
156

Why Hot T h r e e G o d s ?

157

I n his r e p l y , t h e n , G r e g o r y has s i m p l y m a i n t a i n e d his insistence

t h a t i t is i n c o r r e c t t o use a w o r d w h i c h p r o p e r l y denotes a species to
p i c k o u t a member o f t h a t species, as w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s o TIC, av0pw;r,oc,,
'such-and-such a m a n ' Note t h a t G r e g o r y does n o t generalize t h i s
r u l e , as we m i g h t expect; we are a l l o w e d t o say 'an a n i m a l ' i f we w i s h
to r e f e r to t h e l i o n , or to m a n ; b u t we m u s t n o t say 'a m a n ' i f o u r i n t e n t i o n is t o indicate P a u l B u t G r e g o r y has neglected p a r t o f his opponents' case; a n d the consequences f o r his o w n v i e w s are embarrassi n g He has acquiesced i n t h e i r use o f p u r e l y l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s , ass u m i n g a n exact analogy between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e c o n d i t i o n s I t is
i n c o r r e c t , he says, to r e f e r t o P a u l as 'such-and-such a m a n ' . Can we
indeed c a l l h i m 'a m a n ' , as opposed to 'a hypostasis o f man'? I f n o t , i t
w o u l d seem t o f o l l o w t h a t we are n o t p e r m i t t e d to say 'the Father is
God ; b u t i n a n y case, i f t h e a n a l o g y holds, we cannot c a l l h i m 'a m e r c i f u l God'.. A n d a l t h o u g h we have h e a r d some sort o f case f o r describi n g t h e t h r e e Persons as one God, i t a l l o w s o f a disastrous w e a k e n i n g
o f t h e sense, b o t h o f ' G o d ' a n d o f 'one'; so f a r as t h e a r g u m e n t goes,
i t m a y be t h a t t h e t h r e e Persons are one God i n n o m o r e r i g o r o u s
sense t h a n P a u l a n d Jezebel are one m a n .

t e n assumed t h a t a thing's proper n a m e served n o t o n l y to designate

i t b u t also t o r e v e a l i t s n a t u r e . B u t perhaps we s h o u l d a l l o w h i m to
suggest, i n c o n s i s t e n t l y no d o u b t , t h a t t h e r e m a y be aspects o f t h e d i v i n e n a t u r e w h i c h cannot be a p p r o p r i a t e l y h a n d l e d b y our o r d i n a r y
classifications of genera a n d species; a n d conceivably also, t h a t there
m a y be some c o m m o n l y disregarded u n i t y i n t h e h u m a n species
w h i c h m a y o f f e r some analogy t o t h e u n i t y o f God.

M o r e o v e r , his critics are s u r e l y e n t i t l e d to r e p l y : ' B u t t h i s "correct

usage" o f y o u r s is a most u n u s u a l c o n v e n t i o n , to w h i c h , y o u a d m i t ,
the B i b l e does n o t a l w a y s c o n f o r m N o t a g a i n , we observe, does y o u r
o w n usage. S u r e l y f o r a l l n o r m a l purposes we needn't be so fussy; a n d
y o u s h o u l d a l l o w us to c r e d i t y o u w i t h a belief i n t h r e e gods' I do n o t
k n o w w h a t m y readers w i l l t h i n k o f t h i s r e p l y ; i n m y o w n o p i n i o n , i t
is q u i t e a good one

B u t w h a t we h a v e called t h e 'disanalogy' p a r t o f his a r g u m e n t

does t a k e account o f t h e status of h u m a n i t y ; G r e g o r y contrasts h u m a n a n d d i v i n e e x i s t e n c e ; a n d he doesn't a l w a y s present t h e cont r a s t as one of sheer o p p o s i t i o n ; i n t w o passages a t least he argues
t h a t i f h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s e x h i b i t a single u n d i v i d e d n a t u r e , 'how
m u c h m o r e ' (rtoacp uctXXov) m u s t t h i s be t r u e o f t h e d i v i n e P e r s o n s
H e r e , t h e n , is t h e suggestion - m u c h v a g u e r , m u c h less f u l l y developed, b u t s t i l l detectable - t h a t the 'one m a n ' a t t r i b u t e d t o Peter,
James a n d J o h n stands f o r some sort o f i d e a l h u m a n u n i t y , so t h a t
t h e i r f e l l o w s h i p r e f l e c t s , o n t h e h u m a n l e v e l , the u n i t y of t h e three
d i v i n e Persons i n one God Unless I a m g r e a t l y m i s t a k e n , i t is this
aspect o f Gregory's teaching t h a t has encouraged a u t h o r i t i e s l i k e
Prestige a n d K e l l y t o i n s i s t t h a t ' f o r these w r i t e r s ' - t h e Cappadocians
- 'the ousia o f the Godhead was n o t a n a b s t r a c t essence b u t a concrete
reality' .

36

2,
So f a r , however, we have g i v e n a r a t h e r one-sided i m p r e s s i o n o f
Gregory's case, d r a w i n g h e a v i l y o n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' a n d pres e n t i n g h i m as a r g u i n g i n t e r m s o f a b s t r a c t logic. I n f a i r n e s s , we
s h o u l d r e c a l l t h e p o i n t made i n his t w o later essays, to t h e e f f e c t t h a t
the d i v i n e n a t u r e is m y s t e r i o u s I do n o t t h i n k he is r i g h t i n i n f e r r i n g
' t h e r e f o r e i t c a n n o t be named', since m a n y m u c h m o r e down-to-earth
r e a l i t i e s have been g i v e n names a t a t i m e w h e n almost n o t h i n g was
k n o w n o f their n a t u r e ; t h u n d e r , f o r instance, or e l e c t r i c i t y . I t h i n k
G r e g o r y m a y have been m i s l e d b y u n t e n a b l e n o t i o n s a b o u t t h e
'proper name', K u p t o v ovopot , since a n c i e n t theories o f language of37

3 6

Tiin

(9,8

37

ff)

Ties

dei (42,17)

3 8

L e t us t h e n consider t h i s other side o f Gregory's a r g u m e n t Once

again i t is n o t q u i t e w h a t i t appears a t f i r s t sight. I said e a r l i e r t h a t
G r e g o r y sometimes argues as i f t h e r e were a n exact analogy between
h u m a n a n d d i v i n e r e a l i t i e s , sometimes d r a w s a t t e n t i o n to f u n d a m e n t a l differences. W e have n o w q u a l i f i e d t h e f i r s t p o i n t ; G r e g o r y does
assume such a n a n a l o g y ; b u t t h a t is because he f r a m e s his a r g u m e n t
i n t e r m s o f abstract logic Besides m e n , he uses dogs and horses as
e x a m p l e s ; t h o u g h , to be sure, n o t n a m e d i n d i v i d u a l horses or dogs,
l i k e Bucephalus or A r g u s ; a n d , so f a r as I can see, t h i s p a r t o f his arg u m e n t is u n a f f e c t e d b y considerations o f status or value; i t w o u l d
a p p l y e q u a l l y w e l l to angels a n d to m i n e r a l s , to d i v i n i t y a n d t o demons
39

40

41

4 2

3 S

See my p a p e r ' L o g i c a n d t h e A p p l i c a t i o n of Haines to God'

3 9

Comm not

(29,14-30,0

4 0

E g

dei (41,18 f f )

4 1

Comm not

4 2

K E L L Y , E a r l y C h r i s t i a n D o c t r i n e s 268

tres

(22,18 f f ; 32,21

ff.)

XIV

XIV
158

Why Hot T h r e e Gods?

K e l l y q u i t e r i g h t l y brings i n other evidence t o s u p p o r t his j u d g e m e n t , n o t a b l y t h e Cappadocians' b e l i e f i n t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f God. B u t

i t w o u l d need some close analysis t o discover w h a t k i n d o f s i m p l i c i t y
is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a belief i n t h r e e d i v i n e P e r s o n s
Letter 38 relates
t h e m t h u s : 'As t o t h e i r being i n f i n i t e a n d i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d u n created a n d n o t positioned i n space a n d a l l other such ( a t t r i b u t e s ) ,
t h e r e is n o v a r i a t i o n i n t h e l i f e - g i v i n g n a t u r e , I m e a n t h a t o f t h e F a t h e r , t h e Son a n d the H o l y S p i r i t , b u t a c e r t a i n c o n t i n u o u s a n d u n b r o k e n c o m m u n i t y is seen i n them'. G r e g o r y does not seem t o be a r g u i n g
for d i v i n e s i m p l i c i t y i n t h e r a d i c a l sense, i m p l y i n g t h a t a l l t h e d i v i n e
a t t r i b u t e s w h i c h we d i s t i n g u i s h b y separate names a r e i n f a c t i d e n t ical
O n t h e other h a n d i t appears f r o m t h e c o n t e x t t h a t t h e w o r d
j u s t t r a n s l a t e d as ' c o m m u n i t y ' (xotvwvia) stands f o r t h e ' c o m m o n
o w n e r s h i p ' o f these a t t r i b u t e s , r a t h e r t h a n a m o r e d i s t i n c t l y social
' f e l l o w s h i p ' w h i c h m i g h t be p a r a l l e l e d b y h u m a n society at i t s best. I n
a n y case, n e i t h e r t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' nor t h e ' T h r e e Gods' a f f o r d s
m o r e t h a n f a i n t a n d elusive i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h i s l a t t e r v i e w
43

4 4

T o e x p l a i n t h e i r t e a c h i n g , we m a y consider t h r e e conceptions
w h i c h G r e g o r y does o u t l i n e w i t h some c l a r i t y :
(1) T h e tres dei t r e a t s o f cpuatc,, n a t u r e , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h urccrtaoic,, as e x e m p l i f i e d b y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e L u k e a n d Stephen ' Y e t
the n a t u r e is o n e , u n i t e d i n i t s e l f , a m o n a d c o m p l e t e l y i n d i v i s i b l e ,
w h i c h is n e i t h e r increased b y a d d i t i o n nor d i m i n i s h e d b y s u b t r a c t i o n '
e t c . . I t is p r e t t y clear t h a t G r e g o r y is t h i n k i n g o f t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m
or Idea; t h i s is s t r o n g l y suggested b y t h e c o n c l u d i n g w o r d s ' n o t d i v i d e d b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o par ticipate i n i t ' a n d b y t h e emphasis o n
its u n i t y ; t h e reference t o i t as ' i n d i v i s i b l e ' (ctaxtoxoc) m a y w e l l be a
P l a t o n i c v e r s i o n o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e t h a t substance has n o
degrees; the F o r m is indeed distributed a m o n g its v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s ,
b u t i n each o f t h e m i t is present i n f u l l
For a P l a t o n i s t , such a F o r m
is a concrete r e a l i t y ; i t is n o t abstract, i n t h e sense o f being m e r e l y
one aspect of s o m e t h i n g else; b u t i t is t r a n s c e n d e n t , n o t p a r t o f o u r
45

4 6

See K f t l V O C H E I H E . I h a v e b e e n a b l e to consult t h i s p a p e r t h r o u g h t h e u s e f u l s u g g e s t i o n s a n d h e l p provided b y Professor C o r n e l i u s PLAHTINGA; see h i s p a p e r ' G r e g o r y of K y s s a a n d t h e S o c i a l A n a l o g y of t h e T r i n i t y '

4 3

I n G r e g o r y ' s view, God a l o n e i s u n c r e a t e d ; b u t other t h i n g s , s u r e l y , must be non

s p a t i a l ? I f so, t h e properties named by 'uncreated' a n d ' n o n - s p a t i a l ' c a n n o t be
identical. C f . trin (8,8 f f . ) , w h e r e h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e v a r i o u s d i v i n e t i t l e s a l l r e f e r
to t h e same s u b j e c t (noKefZEVov); he does not c l a i m t h a t t h e y a l l h a v e t h e same
sense, i . e. t h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s t h e y name a r e identical He d e n i e s t h i s explicitly a t
ties dei (43,9 f f )
4 4

Ties

dei (41,2 if)

C f PARMEH 131 b (I 171 D I E L S ) . B u t tres dei

d i f f e r e n t point t h a t t h e ' n a t u r e ' i s a l w a y s singular,
number

4 0

(53,6-9) suggests t h e r a t h e r
though i t s instances v a r y i n

159

e v e r y d a y w o r l d U n f o r t u n a t e l y G r e g o r y confuses this a p p a r e n t l y
clear p i c t u r e b y going o n t o m e n t i o n 'a people . a n a r m y ' , etc. (Xac,,
STUO;, axpxeuuac, EKKATIOOC) as examples o f t h i n g s w h i c h h a v e singular names a l t h o u g h t h e y comprise a m u l t i t u d e o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; f o r i t is
a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t peoples a n d a r m i e s can g a i n i n c r e m e n t s and
s u f f e r losses
(2) T h i s postscript t h e r e f o r e introduces a second conception,
w h i c h G r e g o r y developes i n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' . 'The d e f i n i t i o n
o f ' m a n ' is n o t a l w a y s perceived i n t h e same i n d i v i d u a l s ' : Spot; xo
tv0pc7rou OK a s i v rote, acTOtc, cxpoic, TiyoCv rEpoc&Ttotc. OeupeTOi
M e n die, a n d others a r e b o r n , so t h a t t h e h u m a n race is c o n s t a n t l y
v a r y i n g i n n u m b e r ; i t is f o r t h i s reason, so G r e g o r y alleges, t h a t we
speak o f ' m a n y m e n ' (p. 153 above). I n t h i s case we have a r e a l i t y
w h i c h is assuredly concrete, a n d is also perceptible; b u t i t is n o t i n d i v i s i b l e or singular l i k e the ' f o r m ' or ' n a t u r e '
47

(3) T h i r d l y he r e f e r s t o t h e d e f i n i n g properties o f substances, x a

Xotpo!KTTjpiCEtv oaac, Ew0xa, a n d says t h a t b y speaking o f ' s u c h and-such a substance' we a l l u d e t o t h e s e
T h u s b y s p e a k i n g of a
f o r m or substance (elooc,, ooct) one conveys t h e n o t i o n , e g., of 'a
being t h a t is i r r a t i o n a l , m o r t a l , a n d l i a b l e t o n e i g h '
This, w e would
s u r e l y say, is a n a b s t r a c t i o n ; i t p i c k s o u t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f horses,
such t h a t n o other being possesses a l l o f t h e m together; b u t i t is f a r
f r o m g i v i n g a complete d e s c r i p t i o n o f horses T h e horses themselves,
of course, are b o t h concrete a n d perceptible
48

4 9

W e ourselves c o u l d easily e x p l a i n h o w a h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , say

P a u l , i s r e l a t e d t o each o f these conceptions. He imitates^ or p a r t i c i pates i n , t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m , assuming we a l l o w such e n t i t i e s a n d can
u n d e r s t a n d t h e u n i q u e r e l a t i o n w h i c h is said to connect t h e f o r m s
w i t h their instances or copies B u t P a u l belongs to, or is a member o f ,
the h u m a n race. A n d he exhibits the f e a t u r e s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n . W e c a n t h u s a v o i d m a n y o f the confusions w h i c h arise f r o m aski n g w h a t Peter a n d P a u l 'are'.
G r e g o r y does n o t d r a w these clear d i s t i n c t i o n s W e have seen t h a t
he gives every appearance o f c o n f u s i n g t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m o f m a n
w i t h t h e h u m a n race, whereas even such a loose t h i n k e r as Philo
c o u l d sometimes d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m
N o d o u b t Gregory's c o n f u s i o n
arises p a r t l y f r o m m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e v e r b ' t o be', w h i c h we
5 0

47

Comm

not (23,21 f f )

4 8

lb. 30,8 f f

4 0

lb 31,7

See post 105 (II 23,7-12 WERDLAHD); Mas II 127 ( I V 229,20-230,7 COHH); spec
(V 79,15-20 COHH)
5 0

I 329

XIV

XIV
160
have d e l i b e r a t e l y r e m o v e d f r o m our l a s t f e w paragraphs. A g a i n , we
noted t h a t G r e e k has no i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e G r e g o r y t h u s uses expressions w h i c h seem l i k e 'Paul is man'. B u t r e m e m b e r i n g a g a i n i t s l a c k o f
c a p i t a l l e t t e r s , t h i s looks m u c h l i k e ' P a u l is Saul'; i t seems t o i d e n t i f y
P a u l w i t h some e n t i t y c a l l e d 'man', w h i c h appears to be single since i t
is designated b y a singular n o u n . N o t t h a t t h e v e r b 'to be' is a l w a y s
expressed; a n d i n a n y case he o f t e n says, e. g. ' P a u l is-called m a n ' ,
XeyeTQii, n o t eaxtv. B u t 'is-called' does n o t h e l p h i m t o d i s t i n g u i s h the
senses o f ' m a n ' i n t h e w a y we have t r i e d to suggest.
U n d e r l y i n g Gregory's c o n f u s i o n is t h e t h o u g h t t h a t i d e a l h u m a n i t y , t h e h u m a n race a t i t s best, w o u l d p r o v i d e a n a n a l o g y f o r t h e h o l y
T r i n i t y . He is d r a w n t o w a r d s t h i s v i e w b y t h r e e c o n v e r g i n g a r g u ments T h e r e is f i r s t t h e p o i n t o f p u r e logic, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t c l a s s names s h o u l d n o t be used f o r i n d i v i d u a l s , because i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r
whereas t h e class t h e y belong t o is o n e a n d t h e same. Secondly he
uses, m o s t l y t h o u g h n o t a l w a y s , t h e e x a m p l e o f t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d uals, a r g u i n g t h a t these, qua m a n , are a l l one m a n . A n d t h i r d l y , his
h u m a n examples are a l l sets o f New T e s t a m e n t saints; i t is t h e r e f o r e
some s o r t o f i d e a l f o r m a n w h i c h is suggested b y t h e 'one m a n ' w h i c h
t h e y a l l are.
Can we e x p l a i n this last phrase? I d o u b t i f we can f i n d a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h is b o t h coherent a n d reasonably consistent w i t h
Gregory's o w n w o r d s B u t as a f i r s t step, I suggest t h a t we s h o u l d disc o u n t t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m , a t a n y r a t e as p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c s o f Plato
n o w u n d e r s t a n d i t , a n d opt f o r s o m e t h i n g m o r e l i k e 'the h u m a n race
as God i n t e n d e d i t to be'; observing, however , t h a t C h r i s t i a n Platonists o f Gregory's t i m e had a l r e a d y m o v e d f a r i n t h i s direction.. F o i i f
we t r y t o i n t e r p r e t Plato's o w n t h e o r y , i t is h a r d t o escape t h e conc l u s i o n t h a t i d e a l m a n h o o d excludes p l u r a l i t y ; a n d i f we t h i n k m o r e
concretely o f 'the i d e a l m a n ' , i t seems t h a t t h e r e m u s t be o n l y one
such being, a 'one over m a n y ' , w h i c h w o u l d r u l e o u t a l l p e r s o n a l dist i n c t i o n s . A n d we s h a l l soon i n v o l v e ourselves i n a l l sorts o f d i f f i culties a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e
Forms. I s t h e I d e a l M a n i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e I d e a l A n i m a l , or distinct?
Is he - or are t h e y - o n social t e r m s w i t h the I d e a l Ox? T h e p r o b l e m s
are insoluble. B u t C h r i s t i a n Platonists h a d l a r g e l y by-passed these
problems; t h e y saw n o d i f f i c u l t y i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e F o r m s as v o n t a ,
a n d conceiving these as a heavenly p o p u l a t i o n , c o m p r i s i n g v a r i o u s
orders o f beings, i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h t h e angels a n d archangels o f C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . I t d i d n o t t h e n seem t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be o n l y one o f
each k i n d . ( M e d i a e v a l t h e o r i s t s , we k n o w , w o u l d settle t h e p r o b l e m
by s a y i n g t h a t each o f t h e angels is a d i s t i n c t species; b u t t h i s r e a l l y

Why Mot T h r e e G o d s ?

161

a m o u n t e d t o saying t h a t , since angels are i m m a t e r i a l , the d i f f e r e n c e s

between t h e m m u s t be d i f f e r e n c e s o f f o r m , thus e s t a b l i s h i n g a m u l t i t u d e o f sub-species w i t h i n t h e species o f angels T h e r e was t h e n n o
d i f f i c u l t y i n i m a g i n i n g 'choirs o f angels').
G r e g o r y r e t a i n s some elements o f t h e o r i g i n a l P l a t o n i c concept i o n ; f o r instance, i n c l a i m i n g t h a t h u m a n n a t u r e is i n d i v i s i b l e ,
acxioToc, B u t i n saying t h a t Peter, James a n d J o h n are 'one man', he
makes i t clear t h a t t h e y do n o t cease t o be t h r e e i n d i v i d u a l s m a r k e d
o f f f r o m each other b y i n d i v i d u a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; a n d n o t a l l o f
these p u r e l y p h y s i c a l , since t h e y i n c l u d e ' f a t h e r h o o d ' and 'sonship' .
T h e i r c o m m o n h u m a n i t y m u s t t h e n p r e s u m a b l y be i n t e r p r e t e d i n
t e r m s o f h u m a n s y m p a t h y , agreement, c o m m o n purpose, a n d t h e
l i k e A n d i t is, a f t e r a l l , n o t a n a b s u r d suggestion t h a t h u m a n l a n guage s h o u l d r e f l e c t the c o n d i t i o n o f t h e h u m a n race, not as i t is, b u t
as God m e a n t i t to be
51

W e can n o w a t last p r o n o u n c e o n t h e o p i n i o n t h a t G r e g o r y understood t h e u n i t y o f t h e d i v i n e Persons i n a concrete sense Those who

t h i n k he d i d so c a n o f course appeal t o evidence outside t h e four
w o r k s w h i c h I have considered B u t t h e y o f t e n r e l y o n his a r g u m e n t s
about t h e u n i t y o f t h e h u m a n race O n e cannot always i d e n t i f y the
v i e w w h i c h t h e y a t t r i b u t e t o h i m ; are t h e y t h i n k i n g o f a u n i t y w h i c h
holds good notwithstanding a d m i t t e d i n e q u a l i t y a n d c o n f l i c t among
m e n , or o f some i d e a l u n i t y w h i c h applies, not t o h u m a n i t y as i t is,
b u t t o its d i v i n e l y i n t e n d e d p e r f e c t i o n ? B u t i n m y j u d g e m e n t there is
a step t o be t a k e n b e f o r e we can even discuss t h i s p o i n t ; we need t o
d i s t i n g u i s h between Gregory's i n t e n t i o n s a n d t h e logic o f h i s a r g u m e n t I f we ask w h a t Gregory's logic a c t u a l l y establishes, t h e answer
m u s t be t h a t i t gets us n o f u r t h e r t h a n generic u n i t y F a t h e r , Son and
S p i r i t c a n each be e n t i t l e d 'God'; t h o u g h t h e m e r e use o f t h i s t i t l e
guarantees v e r y l i t t l e ; the genus o f gods includes some disreputable
members B u t i f t h e question is, w h a t d i d G r e g o r y seek t o establish,
a n d t h i n k he h a d established, we can b r i n g i n t h e much less clearly
a r t i c u l a t e d a r g u m e n t f r o m disanalogy; h u m a n l i f e a t its best provides
some sort o f i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e m u t u a l e n j o y m e n t a n d self-giving o f
the d i v i n e Persons A n d h u m a n social l i f e , I w o u l d agree, is a concrete r e a l i t y T h e r e is n o need t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t h u m a n beings t h e m selves are concrete, b u t the t h i n g s t h e y do together are not. A n a c t u a l
c o n v e r s a t i o n is a concrete r e a l i t y , t h o u g h i t is n o t a t h i n g b u t a
shared a c t i o n ; a b s t r a c t i o n comes i n w h e n we characterize i t b y some

51

Comm not (30,24)

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XIV
162

Why Kot T h r e e G o d s ?

selected f e a t u r e , describing i t v a r i o u s l y as a c o n v e r s a t i o n , a n a r g u m e n t , a r e l a x a t i o n , or w h a t y o u w i l l
T h i s of course w i l l not solve a l l our problems c o n c e r n i n g t h e doct r i n e of God T h e u n i t y t h a t we l o n g f o r is neither s o l i t u d e n o r u n i f o r m i t y , b u t a u n i t y secured i n t h e face o f i n e q u a l i t i e s o f t a l e n t , t e m p e r a m e n t a n d education I t is possibly no m o r e t h a n a misnomer f o r
c h a r i t y A n d m a n is a social c r e a t u r e ; to a n e x t e n t w h i c h we seldom
consider, our f i n e s t v i r t u e s are adapted to social f a i l i n g s . I t is our
c a l l i n g to exercize s y m p a t h y as w e l l as i n t e l l i g e n c e , f o r b e a r a n c e as
w e l l as courage H o w can we imagine a d i v i n e l o v e a n d m u t u a l s e l f g i v i n g w h i c h is n e i t h e r tested b y a d v e r s i t y nor e n l a r g e d b y f o r g i v e ness? B u t a t this p o i n t I w o u l d c l a i m t h a t m y l i m i t e d u n d e r t a k i n g has
been discharged W e cannot scale t h e peaks w i t h o u t t r a v e r s i n g the
f o o t h i l l s ; a n d I have a t t e m p t e d no m o r e t h a n to clear a p a t h t h r o u g h
some o f the t a n g l e d t h i c k e t s t h a t o b s t r u c t o u r approach t o t h e h o l y
mountain.

Resmee
Gregor v o n Nyssa e n t w i c k e l t seine Trinittslehre i n zwei Paaren
v o n A b h a n d l u n g e n . I m ersten v e r t e i d i g t er die k a p p a d o k i s c h e Lehre
der d r e i Personen (uTtoaxaagtc,), die i n einer Substanz (oata) geeint
s i n d , so wie d r e i menschliche I n d i v i d u e n a n einer gemeinsamen
M e n s c h h e i t t e i l h a b e n , whrend seine K r i t i k e r m e i n e n , er berbetone
die gttliche E i n h e i t . I m zweiten Paar b e a n t w o r t e t er den E i n w a n d :
"Aber w i r sprechen ohne weiteres v o n d r e i Menschen; w e n n deine
A n a l o g i e g i l t , s o l l t e n w i r a u c h v o n d r e i Gttern sprechen". Das ist
natrlich e i n S t r e i t p u n k t ; diese Gegner g r e i f e n Gregor's L e h r e der
d r e i Hypostasen a n , die i h r e r M e i n u n g n a c h die gttliche E i n h e i t v e r dunkelt
Gregor ver wendet zwei H a u p t a r g u m e n t e
(1) I m e i g e n t l i c h e n
Sinne ist es u n g e n a u , v o n d r e i Menschen zu sprechen; d e n n da i h r e
Menschheit eine i s t , sind sie a l l e e i n Mensch Dieses A r g u m e n t ist
v e r w o r r e n ; Gregor g i b t v o r , eine l e d i g l i c h allgemeine Aussage ber
die L o g i k v o n K l a s s i f i z i e r u n g e n zu machen: w e n n X eine A r t bezeichnet (z B Mensch), ist es n i e m a l s k o r r e k t zu sagen " e i n X " , u m e i n
G l i e d dieser A r t zu bezeichnen (z. B " e i n Mensch"). Dies ist a l l e r d i n g s
eine unrealistische F o r d e r u n g , u n d Gregor v o n Nyssa h l t sich selbst
n i c h t d a r a n . Sein A r g u m e n t erscheint n u r p l a u s i b e l , w e i l er als t a t schliches Beispiel d r e i gleichgesinnte Heilige n i m m t , die als " e i n
M e n s c h " h a n d e l n a u f g r u n d i h r e r gemeinsamen c h r i s t l i c h e n B i n d u n g

163

Aber i n d e m er e i n gnstiges B e i s p i e l a n f h r t , o f f e n b a r t er das Versagen seines A r g u m e n t s als allgemeines P r i n z i p

(2) Das zweite A r g u m e n t besagt: W e n n das menschliche L e b e n i n
seiner besten F o r m Hinweise a u f eine u n g e t e i l t e menschliche N a t u r
g i b t , " u m w i e v i e l m e h r " m u d a n n die gttliche N a t u r u n g e t e i l t sein
Das ist berzeugender. Aber Gregor erklrt n i c h t d e u t l i c h , w i e die
E i n f a c h h e i t u n d E i n h e i t Gottes zu v e r s t e h e n ist Er v e r g l e i c h t sie m i t
der einen p l a t o n i s c h e n F o r m der M e n s c h h e i t , die a l l e n M e n s c h e n gem e i n s a m i s t , m i t der v e r m u t e t e n E i n h e i t der menschlichen Rasse u n d
m i t der D e f i n i t i o n des Menschseins Diese A l t e r n a t i v e n s o l l t e n d i f f e r e n z i e r t w e r d e n , was aber n i c h t geschieht. Daher b l e i b t V e r w i r r u n g ;
u n d whrend Gregor s i c h e r l i c h recht h a t , w e n n er d a r a u f besteht,
da die gttliche N a t u r ein Geheimnis i s t , ist er, a u f g r u n d v o n verm e i d b a r e n F e h l e r n , n i c h t h i l f r e i c h , ihr n h e r z u k o m m e n

XV
Augustine's Philosophy of Being
Augustine's philosophy of b e i n g , t h e subject of my lecture, m i g h t be
approached i n t w o ways I n t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m s , we m i g h t consider the
question quid est esse, or alternatively t h e question quaenam
sunt
T h i s latter question is easily explained; i t means, roughly speaking,
what does the real universe contain or comprise, i n a large and general
sense. M a t e r i a l objects, of course, we can all accept; b u t what should be
said about m i n d s and spirits a n d the t h i n g s w i t h w h i c h they are concerned? T h e other question is m o r e d i f f i c u l t to explain i n simple terms
Suppose we translate i t 'What is being?', w e may seem to be asking a
question about the w o r d 'being'; what is t h e sense w h i c h Augustine
gives to this word? B u t i n fact w e shall discover a whole spectrum of
senses 'Being', for A u g u s t i n e , sometimes appears to express the purely
m i n i m a l n o t i o n of mere existence; b u t he also uses i t as a p o w e r f u l
symbol t o f o r m u l a t e his deepest reflections o n the spiritual life a n d the
nature of G o d .
I w i l l therefore tackle the easier question first B u t before I d o so,
there must be a prelude Augustine's philosophy so closely reflects his
o w n personal hopes and concerns that we have to consider h o w i t was
influenced b y the successive changes i n his way of life, and not least by
the new responsibilities w h i c h he assumed w h e n he became a Christian
bishop at the age of fotty-one I m u s t therefore spend a few minutes i n
recalling the chief events of his career; and i f some of m y audience f i n d
this a f a m i l i a r tale, t h e y w i l l be the first to a d m i t that i t needs to be t o l d
Augustine was b o r n i n A D 354 at Thagaste, a moderate-sized pr ovincial t o w n i n N o r t h A f r i c a , near the eastern boundary of m o d e r n
Algeria. H i s mother was a devout C h r i s t i a n , his father a pagan, w h o
soon recognized the potential of his gifted son and took steps to give him
a good education Augustine's inter est i n philosophy was aroused b y his
reading Cicero's exhortation t o philosophy called the Hortensius. L i k e
many others of its t y p e , this book recommended the quest for w i s d o m
as preferable to all sensual delights and w o r l d l y successes.
Augustine's next step, however , seems d i f f i c u l t to explain; he joined
the extremist semi-Chiistian sect of the Manichees. N o doubt he was
reacting against the rather u n i n s p i r i n g b r a n d of catholic Christianity
w h i c h he f o u n d at Thagaste, and later at Carthage. T h e Manichees held
out an ideal of ascetic l i v i n g , w h i c h intensified Cicero's message; and

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A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g

they d i d at least profess to set their ethical teaching w i t h i n a comprehensive theory of the w o r l d and its good and evil constituents,
Augustine remained w i t h t h e m for ten years, a surprisingly l o n g time if
one considers that he still saw himself as a rising orator and statesman;
not to m e n t i o n the r i n g i n g tones i n w h i c h he later denounced their
teaching as pretentious nonsense.
H e seems to have escaped f r o m their influence b y adopting a sceptical philosophy w h i c h t h r e w d o u b t on the v a l i d i t y of all positive convict i o n s ; actual knowledge, i t was h e l d , is unattainable; the best we can
attain is a set of probable beliefs. Sceptical views of this k i n d had been
urged b y the Platonist philosopher Caineades i n the second century
B C , and a sceptical t r a d i t i o n had persisted among Platonists d o w n to
Augustine's t i m e . B u t the m a j o r i t y of Platonists had reverted to a
positive tr anscendental p h i l o s o p h y ; Augustine soon adopted their posit i o n , and later wrote a treatise Against the Academics, arguing that i n
some cases at least i t is indisputable that we really know.. Even i f I am i n
d o u b t , I can be cer tain that I am d o u b t i n g , and a fortiori that I exist..
T h i s argument, of course, resembles that later adopted by Descartes:
Jepen.se, done je suis
Scholars have given m u c h t i m e and t h o u g h t to e n q u i r i n g what
exactly was the f o r m of Platonism w h i c h had such a p o w e r f u l appeal for
A u g u s t i n e ; i n particular, they have asked whether he was influenced
m a i n l y by Plotinus or b y P o r p h y r y T h i s question, I believe, largely
misses the p o i n t A u g u s t i n e , i n his early w r i t i n g s at least, represents the
Platonists as c o n f i r m i n g many of the doctrines of Christianity. T h e i r
concept of three divine principles, 01 hypostases, seemed to h i m a good
a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the Christian T r i n i t y ; their belief i n intelligible
realities, derived f r o m Plato's theory of Ideas, needed scarcely any
m o d i f i c a t i o n ; the t w o m a i n faults he alleges are f i r s t , their failure to
envisage any d i v i n e I n c a r n a t i o n , and secondly, their lack of h u m i l i t y i n
r e l y i n g on h u m a n reason as against divine revelation i n prophecy and
scripture (Civ. Dei 10 .29; Conf 7 9 14) B u t a m o d e r n reader of either
P o r p h y r y or Plotinus w i l l judge that they are separated f r o m Christian
o r t h o d o x y b y a m u c h w i d e r g u l f ; P o r p h y r y wrote as a determined
opponent of C h r i s t i a n i t y ; Plotinus before h i m shows no sign of having
encountered main-stream C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h o u g h he w r o t e against Christian Gnostics w h o had some resemblance to Augustine's Manichees
Plotinus usually described his three supreme hypostases as U n i t y ,
M i n d and S o u l ; and these were i n no sense coequal; o n the contrary,
the second and t h i r d principles reflect the first i n a descending scale of
p u r i t y and value A n d i n t r e a t i n g of the first hypostasis Plotinus gives
great weight to the Platonic p r i n c i p l e that pure goodness must be
'beyond m i n d and b e i n g ' ; i t is an u l t i m a t e u n i t y w h i c h has the potential
to produce all ordered m u l t i p l i c i t i e s , beginning w i t h M i n d or Intel72

ligence, b u t remains itself undifferentiated.. Thus i t cannot be construed as a personal d i v i n i t y w h o could t h i n k ot be conscious, because
t h i n k i n g entails a d i s t i n c t i o n between a t h i n k i n g subject and the object
of t h o u g h t ; the One, for Plotinus, does n o t even k n o w itself; i t only
generates knowledge of itself i n the cosmic M i n d N o r , strictly speaki n g , can i t be described, since description w o u l d i d e n t i f y it w i t h somet h i n g distinct f r o m itself. A n d although i t is the source of all being,
Plotinus cannot envisage any creative design or i n t e n t i o n , but o n l y an
eternal o u t f l o w of b e i n g w h i c h descends progressively t h r o u g h m i n d
and soul to its humblest embodiment i n matter
A l l this seems foreign to A u g u s t i n e , w h o accepted as part of his
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h the Nicene doctrine of a T r i n i t y of equal Persons. Can
we then f i n d any closer approach i n Porphyry? P o r p h y r y is said t o have
softened the distinctions between the three hypostasesor 'telescoped'
t h e m , i n Professor A C L l o y d ' s graphic phrase; b u t he seems to have
agreed w i t h Plotinus i n detecting a p r i n c i p l e 'beyond m i n d ' , w h i c h is
also contemplated ' i n a suspension of t h i n k i n g that is better than
t h o u g h t ' (Sent
25) A n d Augustine's philosopher f r i e n d M a r i u s Vict o r i n u s also spoke of a p r i n c i p l e 'prior to b e i n g '
I t is clear, t h e n , t h a t Augustine's philosophy was largely independent of these great Neoplatonists So far as I can discover, he does not
describe G o d as 'beyond b e i n g ' ; on the contrary, he tells us, Deus est
esse A n d although he takes perfect u n i t y to be an essential feature of
divine being, he sees i t as a u n i t y of positive a t t r i b u t e s ; thus God's
w i s d o m is w h o l l y good, and his goodness is w h o l l y w i s e ; but we do not
misrepresent
G o d i f we call h i m wise o i good. Moreover Augustine is
content to refer to G o d as M i n d ; he does not t h i n k that mental operations begin w i t h the second Person, the d i v i n e W o r d . A n d he speaks of
God's l o v i n g care for his creation. A l l these doctrines correspond w i t h
an older t r a d i t i o n of Platonic t h o u g h t w h i c h saw no d i f f i c u l t y i n
describing G o d as M i n d , and w h i c h c o u l d envisage the divine act of
creation suggested b y a more literal reading of Plato's Timaeus. I t
seems, t h e n , that Augustine was influenced more t h a n he admits by
older Platonist writers such as A p u l e i u s , and was therefore encouraged
to read Plotinus and P o r p h y r y attending m o r e to their c o n t i n u i t y w i t h
earlier Platonism t h a n to the distinctive features identified by modern
scholars.. I t was for t h i s reason that Platonism appeared to offer an easy
approach to C h r i s t i a n i t y .
1

T h e rest of Augustine's philosophical development can be briefly

t o l d , We soon f i n d h i m at M i l a n , p r o f o u n d l y impressed by the sermons
of the eloquent Bishop A m b r o s e , b u t also by the example of self
]

Ad Candidum

Mot.

Eccl

2.28, 3.7, 18.2 (Migne, P.L. 8, 1021a,c, 1028b)

2 1.1, cf. En Psalm

134.4, Trin

5 2.3.
73

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XV
A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of

sacrifice and devotion presented b y m u c h humbler Christians. H e

r e t u r n e d to the B i b l e , and especially St Paul W r i t i n g later o n , i n the
Confessions, he represents his conversion as an inspired resolve to f u l f i l
the obligations w h i c h his intellect had already accepted; to s u b m i t to
the a u t h o r i t y of God's w o r d i n S c r i p t u r e , and to renounce for ever all
t h o u g h t of sexual satisfaction. I t is s o m e t h i n g of a surprise to discover
that most of his w r i t i n g s d u r i n g the next few years prove to be essays i n
Platonist philosophy B u t the explanation has already been given.. T h e
final step towards C h r i s t i a n discipleship lay i n acceptance of the Bible
and of the ascetic life r e q u i r e d of an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g Christian. For its
intellectual substructure he was still content to r e t u r n to Platonism.
Augustine's philosophical a c t i v i t y was b y no means over ; indeed its
most b r i l l i a n t achievements were yet to come B u t they wer e channelled
i n t o a peculiar course by the necessity of reconciling his Platonist
assumptions w i t h a C h r i s t i a n obedience to w h i c h his attitude was i n
some respects u n c r i t i c a l H e was hamper ed at times b y an over-submissive acceptance of C h u r c h t r a d i t i o n s and b y a literalistic reading of the
N e w T e s t a m e n t , not always proof against actual mistranslation; b o t h
these factors c o m b i n e d , for instance, to b r i n g h i m to the abominable
doctrine that unbaptized infants w i l l inevitably suffer eternal punishment I t is h a r d to imagine the intellectual agony i n w h i c h such a belief
imposed itself o n one whose belief i n God's all-embiacing mercy was so
p r o f o u n d . B u t his philosophical enterprise and resourcefulness were
irrepressible; he remains b y far the most o r i g i n a l and wide-ranging
thinker of later a n t i q u i t y , and o n l y a m i n o r i t y of critics have ever
supposed that his C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i n some way disqualifies h i m f r o m
b e i n g recognized as a philosophical colossus .
L e t us t h e n consider Augustine's p i c t u r e of the universe W h a t sorts
of things does i t contain? L i k e the m a j o r i t y of ancient thinkers
A u g u s t i n e makes a p r i m a r y d i v i s i o n i n t o material and i m m a t e r i a l reali t y , w h i c h r o u g h l y corresponds to the b i b l i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the
visible and the i n v i s i b l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , he often speaks of the w o r l d , the
soul and G o d T h i s makes the useful p o i n t that the h u m a n soul acts as a
bridge between the physical universe and the higher sphere; on the
other hand i t fails to m e n t i o n the invisible part of God's creation, that
is, created spirits or angels, w h i c h were f i r m l y established i n the
Jewish-Christian t r a d i t i o n , supported b y the 'created gods' of Plato's
Timaeus 41a, as i t was c o m m o n l y i n t e r p r e t e d
B u t i f we look more closely at the contrast of material and immater ial,
we discover a very curious fact. A u g u s t i n e has a clear and consistent
3

Being

view of material beings, w h i c h appears several times i n his

CttyofGod;
there is an ascending scale of value, w h i c h embraces 'stones, plants,
animals and intelligent beings', as he puts i t at 5 : 1 1 , the latter class
i n c l u d i n g b o t h men and angels, and thus i m p i n g i n g on the higher
sphere B u t i f we look f o r a similar brief o u t l i n e of this higher w o r l d , we
shall be d i s a p p o i n t e d ; we discover only a m u l t i t u d e of elevated b u t
c o n f l i c t i n g suggestions T h e reason for t h i s is that for the material
w o r l d A u g u s t i n e can d r a w u p o n a well-established t r a d i t i o n of a scala
naturae w h i c h goes back to A r i s t o t l e , and sees the natural w o r l d as
arranged i n a series of levels, each of w h i c h enjoys all the advantages of
its inferiors b u t possesses some distinctive power of its own. T h u s
physical substances are distinguished by t h e i r consistency, hexis; l i v i n g
creatures b y phusis, the power to nourish themselves and grow A n i mals also possesspsuche, soul, w h i c h gives t h e m perception and movem e n t ; and the next level is m a r k e d by reason, w h i c h belongs to man,
b u t also to i m m o r t a l spirits
s

B u t if we look for a similar diagram of the higher w o r l d , we f i n d no

such consistent scheme. G o d , the universe itself, the divine Ideas, the
soul of the w o r l d , star-gods, demons, angels, demi-gods and heroes,
appear and disappear i n a b e w i l d e r i n g v a r i e t y of combination For a
brief example, we may t u r n to A p u l e i u s , whose w o r k on Plato was
k n o w n to A u g u s t i n e , and w h o presents us w i t h three totally unrelated
schemes i n t w o chapters, 6 and 1 1 , of Book I . I n Chapter 6, the p r i m a r y
f o r m s of b e i n g are the supreme G o d or M i n d , the F o r m s of things, and
the world-soul; this already conflicts w i t h Chapter 5, where the i n i t i a l
principles are G o d , the F o r m s , and matter Chapter 11 offers a scheme
based o n the four elements, w h i c h crosses the boundary between earth
and heaven; there are fiery beings, the star-gods; airy beings, the
demons; and those allied to water and earth, namely land-animals and
plants. I n the same chapter he mentions three classes of gods; the
supreme G o d , star-gods, and local deities
6

I t seems, t h e n , that i n Augustine's t i m e there was no c o m m o n l y

accepted map of the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d ; and the reason probably lies i n
the perplexities of Platonist philosophy. T h a t venerable construction
w h i c h we k n o w as Plato's t h e o r y of Ideas had left behind so many
discrepancies and loose ends t h a t the later Platonists could never
achieve what they so greatly desired, namely to b r i n g together a l l their
master's inspired pronouncements into a consistent scheme.
L e t me t r y to indicate the p o s i t i o n i n a m u c h over-simplified sketch
Plato was t r y i n g to solve several problems w h i c h he d i d not clearly
5.11, 8 6,11.16.
See for instance Xenocrates ft 15 ( i n H . Diels, Doxographi Graeci, 304);
cf.. Eusebius, Demomtr Evang. 4 5.12
5

^C.Acad
3 17.37;?; Dei, see n 5
*Mor. Ecd 1.5 7-6 10,Div Quaest 83,45.
74

75

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XV
A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g

distinguish Amongst other questions, he reflected o n the nature of a

t e r m like 'justice' T h i s does not seem to refer to a particular t h i n g , in
the way that the name 'Socrates' indicates a particular man, or 'Crete' a
particular island 'Justice' seems to be an inclusive t e r m w h i c h designates a whole n u m b e r of possible just actions O n the other hand, i t
seemed likely that these just actions are so named, and f o r m a coherent
class, as a p p r o x i m a t i n g to an ideal standard of justice; after a l l , if a r i n g
or a b u i l d i n g are described as circular, this means that they conform to
the geometrical pattern of a perfect circle Plato thus envisages a system
of classes, each one defined b y its perfect exemplar; his difficulties
begin w h e n he sees that there are some classes where no perfection
seems to be possible. M u d is no less real than justice; b u t what sense is
there i n i m a g i n i n g a perfectly m u d d y m u d , or for that matter a perfect
all-disabling disease, or a perfect standard of injustice}
Plato himself developed his theory along several different lines w h i c h
c o u l d not be b r o u g h t i n t o agreement F i r s t , regarding his Ideas mainly
as class-concepts, he sought to arrange t h e m i n a rational h i e r a i c h y , i n
w h i c h the more inclusive Ideas were superior. B u t this is only possible
if they are reduced to concepts considered in abstracto
Obviously the
class of animals is larger t h a n the class of horses; but what k i n d of
creature is the animal-as-such? A n d w h a t sort of qualities w o u l d the
ideal animal possess? Even the ideal horse is none too easy on the m i n d ;
can we seriously picture a beast w h i c h combines the virtues of a racehorse and a cait-horse? T h e alternative, i t seems, w o u l d be to say that
their virtues are not virtues at a l l ; one is strong and the other is speedy
because they b o t h fail to reproduce the qualities of an ideal hoise w h i c h
is neither! B u t despite such problems, many Platonists continued to
t h i n k of the Ideas as a population of real and co-ordinate beings.
Secondly, Plato presented his Ideas as objects of t h o u g h t ; he rejected
the view that they were merely thoughts, or patterns of t h o u g h t ; b u t he
left i t unclear whether the Ideas themselves exercise t h o u g h t ; whether
they are intelligent as w e l l as intelligible T o be sure, i t is hard to believe
t h a t , say, a perfect circle can t h i n k ; b u t there are several considerations
w h i c h favour the theory of intelligent Ideas F o r one t h i n g , Plato
himself declared that the soul was 'akin to the Ideas'; we can then
deduce correctly that the Ideas are akin to souls. Secondly, if one
accepts the o l d n o t i o n that like is k n o w n b y like, i t follows that the Ideas
must resemble the m i n d that knows t h e m T h i r d l y , i t appears that some
Ideas at least should be i n t e l l i g e n t ; if intelligence is a v i r t u e , then the
ideal man should be intelligent F o u r t h l y , we are t o l d that Plato came to
t h i n k of the Ideas as definable i n terms of number, 01 of some quasinumerical p r o p e r t y such as harmony or p r o p o r t i o n ; and Plato's disciple
Xenociates u n d o u b t e d l y defined the soul in similar terms Some
thinkers, a d m i t t e d l y , treated b o t h numbers and souls as intermediate
76

beings, r a n k i n g below the Ideas b u t above material things B u t if

intelligence is good, there is something strange in the doctrine t h a t the
highest reality cannot be intelligent.
O n the other hand, a salient fact about souls, or personalities, is that
they ate strongly i n d i v i d u a l i z e d ; no t w o souls are alike. T h u s any
attempt to assimilate Ideas and souls w i l l conflict w i t h the notion of the
Idea as a class-concept, a 'one over many'.. Nevertheless even Plotinus,
w h o did not in p r i n c i p l e set m u c h value on diversity, came to t h i n k that
there must be i n d i v i d u a l Ideas corresponding to each human i n d i v i d u a l ; and less professional w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g many Christians, made this
equation w i t h o u t any d i f f i c u l t y ; h u m a n souls in their unfallen state,
before they enter the b o d y , s i m p l y aie Ideas; and there are similar but
purer beings w h o are not attracted by b o d i l y pleasures and r e m a i n in
the ideal w o r l d ; these are i d e n t i f i e d as 'demons' i n the pagan t r a d i t i o n ,
and as 'angels' by Jews and Christians
F i n a l l y , we should consider Plato's m y t h of the world's creation in
the Timaeus
A divine craftsman makes the w o r l d of space and time
according to an eternal model I t m i g h t seem, t h e n , that he simply
copies patter ns of perfection w h i c h exist outside and above h i m B u t an
alternative theory was developed very early, perhaps by Xenocrates;
namely that the d i v i n e craftsman himself imagined these patterns
w i t h i n his o w n m i n d before p u t t i n g t h e m into concrete f o r m T h i s
retains something of the old belief that the Ideas are simply thoughts;
b u t it gives then objective v a l i d i t y , as being the archetypal thoughts of
the divine creator T h i s view was no doubt more acceptable to religious
m i n d s ; and i t is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t the devout but anti-Christian Porp h y r y came r o u n d to i t under the influence of Plotinus, agreeing w i t h
his master that 'the Ideas are n o t outside the Intellect'
I f we now r e t u r n to A u g u s t i n e , we can f i n d most of these conceptions
reproduced i n his w r i t i n g s . H e gives a blanket approval to Plato's
doctrine of an i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d , revealed b y dialectics. I n particular he
pictures the Ideas as patterns of m o r a l v i r t u e s , and again as archetypes
for God's creations existing eternally i n his m i n d . I n d e e d , like many
C h r i s t i a n Platonists, he believes that the m i n d is so m u c h superior to
the body that intellectual a c t i v i t y as such is the first step towards
heavenly v i r t u e , and that t r u t h a n y t r u t h whatsoeverhas divine
a u t h o r i t y over our m i n d s H e finds i t h a r d to admit that any mental
operation m i g h t be merely pointless or misdirected, Fortunately he is
enough of a C h r i s t i a n realist to correct this intellectualist bias on
occasion H e notes, f o r instance, that not all mathematicians are w i s e ;
7

Div

Quaest.83,46

*Lib Arb. 2 6.14ff.,esp 2.12.33-4.

Ibid 2 11 30f ; Gen ad Lit 2 17 37
9

77

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XV
A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g

he believes that the demons are clever, b u t not g o o d ; and of course he

recognizes the importance of material symbols as presented i n the
sacraments
B u t if Augustine sees the Ideas as archetypes for all God's created
w o r k s , does he t h i n k there is an archetype for each i n d i v i d u a l creature?
Scholars have alleged that this is s o ; b u t I do not f i n d their evidence
convincing. 'Each single t h i n g is created b y its o w n p r i n c i p l e ' , says
A u g u s t i n e : singula propnis
sunt creata rationibus
(Div
quaest
8.3,46 2) B u t the context implies that 'each single t h i n g ' should be
understood as 'each species'; Augustine has just used the standard
examples of 'man' and 'horse' I n any case, the t h e o r y of i n d i v i d u a l
archetypes is hardly attractive except as applied to intelligent beings; i t
seems absurd to suppose that G o d has an ideal specification for each
i n d i v i d u a l flea and every g r a i n of sand, W i t h h u m a n individuals i t may
be otherwise Plotinus t h o u g h t so; and Augustine's G o d m i g h t reasonably have an i m m u t a b l e idea of w h a t each of us should be, distinct of
course f r o m our all-too-changeable soul
T h e question of intelligent Ideas is also d i f f i c u l t to resolve Some of
the Platonic arguments should appeal to A u g u s t i n e ; thus ideal f a i t h or
ideal w i s d o m can har d l y exist w i t h o u t intelligence; b u t perhaps he d i d
not t h i n k of these virtues as distinct intelligent beings; more probably
he saw t h e m as God's o w n l i v i n g and creative thoughts w h i c h interpenetrate each other A u g u s t i n e does of course believe i n distinct
created intelligences, w h i c h correspond to the spirits or demons of later
Platonism. B u t he usually describes t h e m i n biblical and Christian
t e r m s ; he recognizes good angels and w i c k e d demons, b u t denounces
the m o r a l l y intermediate demons described b y A p u l e i u s .
I have so far presented A u g u s t i n e i n fairly conventional terms B u t a
different, and rather s t a r t l i n g perspective emerges i f we t r y to regard
h i m , not as a Platonizing C h r i s t i a n theologian, b u t as a renegade
C h r i s t i a n i z i n g Platonist. Plotinus had seen the universe as an ordered
c o n t i n u u m i n w h i c h pure spirit eternally reflects itself i n lower orders
of being. A u g u s t i n e adopts the C h r i s t i a n belief i n a divine act of
creation inaugurating a w o r l d of t i m e and space, and pictures i n t e l ligent spirits i n transit between the eternal and the spatiotempoial
realms ." Theologians have of course defended this concept of creation
as essential f o r establishing the u n i q u e and personal d i g n i t y of G o d ;
and I shall not dispute this verdict Nevertheless one has to reckon w i t h
the complications i t introduces i n t o an already complex and tangled
metaphysical scheme.
10

J.. Meyendorff,NewSckol 16 (1942), 36; V J. Bourke, Augustine's View

of Reality, S, n 21.
Civ. Dei 8-9, passim
10

II

78

F i r s t , we have noted Augustine's belief i n the divine archetypes of

m o r a l virtues. These archetypes clearly f u n c t i o n as ideals to w h i c h
things ought to c o n f o r m ; b u t s h o u l d we c r e d i t t h e m w i t h some sort of
dynamic f u n c t i o n as well? Heavenly f a i t h , we m i g h t say, is the t o u c h stone of earthly f a i t h , or its f o r m a l cause; b u t do we see i t also as an
inspir ation w h i c h moves us thr o u g h our love for it ? A n d i f so, do we also
see the heavenly right-angled triangle as t h r i l l i n g us w i t h the desire to
study mathematics? H o w e v e r t h i s may be, Augustine introduces
another set of m o v i n g causes, the so-called seminal reasons, w h i c h
originate i n Stoic rather t h a n i n Platonic philosophy, and are principles
of g r o w t h and development at t h e physical level
Whatever be the case w i t h the d i v i n e archetypes, i t must be that these
seminal reasons act o n each i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g ; indeed t h e y are p i c t u r e d
as present w i t h i n i t . A n d there is another l i n k between G o d and his
i n d i v i d u a l creatures, namely his complete and perfect knowledge of
t h e m T h i s knowledge relates to creatures i n space and t i m e , b u t i t is
itself eternal and unextended. I t is t e m p t i n g to describe it as a c o m p o u n d of perfect perception, perfect m e m o r y , and perfect foreknowledge; b u t i f G o d is eternal, we cannot credit h i m w i t h these three
distinct powers
I n a sense, of course, G o d knows when t h i n g s
h a p p e n ; he is aware t h a t Judas betrays Jesus on a certain T h u r s d a y
evening, perhaps i n 33 B C ; b u t he can never know that this is going to
happen, or t h a t i t has happened. B u t he can, I t h i n k , k n o w what i t feels
like to k n o w these t h i n g s , since he knows w h a t goes o n i n the m i n d s of
his creatures Indeed i n his Confessions (11 13 I S f f . ) Augustine was
pr epared to define t i m e itself i n psychological terms: the past is w h a t we
remember, the f u t u r e is w h a t we foresee. O n this t h e o r y , i f God knows
h o w the experience of r e m e m b e r i n g differs f r o m that of foreseeing, he
knows all that can be k n o w n about the lapse of time. B u t i n later life
Augustine d i d not insist on this peculiar theory
God's knowledge, of course, raises m o r a l problems, which can be
mentioned o n l y i n passing. T h e r e is, first, God's knowledge of h u m a n
s i n ; how can G o d understand s i n f u l thoughts w i t h o u t i n some sense
a d m i t t i n g them? I f G o d is a perfectly simple being, as Augustine holds,
we cannot say that he understands sinful thoughts b u t disowns t h e m ,
for that w o u l d i m p l y a c o n f l i c t between sympathy and repugnance. B u t
perhaps the n o t i o n of absolute divine s i m p l i c i t y needs t o be
reconsidered
Moreover, if G o d creates a w o r l d i n w h i c h he knows t h a t the m a j o r i t y
of rational creatures w i l l sin and thus be consigned to eternal p u n i s h m e n t , how is he himself to be cleared of blame? Augustine holds that
G o d intends to maximize the a m o u n t of goodness i n the w o r l d , and
12

12

Tnn

15 7.13.
79

XV

XV
A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g

does so b y i n c l u d i n g beings of lessei value, w h o are therefore b o u n d to

sin B u t this policy is hardly j u s t i f i e d b y its results A second answer is
to say that G o d acts justly towards all his creatures, b u t shows
undeser ved met cy to some T h e objections t o this view are obvious, b u t
h a r d l y belong to our subject; b u t we m a y b r i e f l y notice one subsidiary
point.. I t m i g h t appear that if G o d foreknows that X w i l l sin, t h e n i t is
inevitable that X w i l l s i n ; and i f i t is inevitable, then X is not free and
cannot be blamed Augustine replies, i n his w o r k On Free
Choice
(3 4.9-11), that G o d does not cause X to sin b y f o r e k n o w i n g i t ; w h a t
G o d foreknows is that X w i l l freely choose to sin, and his foreknowledge depends on X's choice. I n t w o later w o r k s he takes a
different line, suggesting that G o d does indeed contrive that some
individuals shall sin, and sin of their o w n free choice; he does this by
o m i t t i n g to supply the grace to overcome t e m p t a t i o n (Qu. Simp 2 13;
Sp. et Lit 34 60) .. I do not t h i n k this i n the least acceptable as a way to
vindicate God's goodness N o r do I t h i n k A u g u s t i n e gives an adequate
account of h u m a n freedom. B u t he does m a i n t a i n , consistently, that
G o d does not cause f u t u r e events merely b y f o r e k n o w i n g t h e m
We should r e m i n d ourselves t h a t h u m a n beings are not the only
rational m o r a l agents. T h e r e are also created spirits, w h i c h exist apart
f r o m space and t i m e , b u t are i n some sense capable of change I n
practice Augustine divides t h e m i n t o t w o opposing classes. T h e better
sort, the angels, choose to attach themselves to G o d , and so enjoy a
share i n his i m m u t a b i l i t y ; b u t t h i s is p r o p e r l y a m o r a l constancy,
resulting not f r o m nature b u t f r o m choice Contrasted w i t h these are
the devils, w h o seem to practise a k i n d of negative i m m u t a b i l i t y i n the
f i x i t y of their self-assertion and destructive intent
A second order of intelligent beings are destined to enjoy a brief
existence i n space and t i m e ; namely, our h u m a n selves. Augustine does
not t h i n k , w i t h Plato, that our souls exist i n t i m e before they animate
our bodies; indeed he is notably unsure about their o r i g i n T h e y are, he
a f f i r m s , God's creatures, and destined for eternal existence; b u t the
only eternity we can be sure that they enjoy is one qualified b y their
thoughts and actions i n their earthly lives. I t is therefore outside t i m e ,
b u t we can only conceive i t as beginning after their lives at e completed
H o w t h e n does h u m a n life begin? I t seems that G o d eternally p u r poses to create h u m a n souls, or at least to introduce t h e m , i n a vastly
complicated t e m p o r a l succession T w o points about this divine p r o cedure may be m e n t i o n e d as especially strange F i r s t , these created
intelligences begin to act w i t h i n the w o r l d at moments w h i c h G o d
allows the h u m a n animals to determine i n response to their o w n sexual
passions. A n d secondly, although the souls proceed i n p u r i t y f r o m the
creative hand of G o d , they ar e immediately t h r o w n d o w n into a tainted
e n v i r o n m e n t , so that before they have a chance to prove themselves
SO

they incur and deserve the i n d i g n a t i o n and righteous vengeance of

God.. A n d this apparent f r u s t r a t i o n of God's creative w o r k results f r o m
the disobedience of A d a m and E v e , that is, of only t w o among the
myriads of h u m a n spirits I t is the measure of Augustine's greatness
that he c o u l d w i n widespread approval for a theory w h i c h t o all
appearances is so i m p r o b a b l e , inconsistent, and i m m o r a l
So m u c h , t h e n , f o r the realities named b y the t e r m 'being' i n
Augustine's philosophy We must n o w conclude w i t h some remarks on
the more abstruse question quid est esse; i n other w o r d s , how does
Augustine i n t e r p r e t the t e r m 'being' itself
A convenient starting-point is a passage i n his Letter X I to
N e b i i d i u s , w h i c h tells us that there are three aspects of being: primo ut
sit, deinde uthoc velillud sit, tertium utin eo quod est maneat
quantum
potest; that is to say, 'being itself, being this or that, and c o n t i n u i n g to
be'. Augustine tells us that these three aspects are distinct but inseparable, like the Persons of the T r i n i t y T h e r e are several similar f o r m ulations, some of t h e m using the technical t e r m 'species' in place of
'being this or that' A n o t h e r series of passages expounds the biblical text
' T h o u hast made all t h i n g s b y measure, number and w e i g h t ' ( W i s d o m
11:21), w h i c h A u g u s t i n e tries to interpret along the same lines. T h i s
is not an easy task; i n particular the t e r m 'measure', mensura, does not
seem an obvious equivalent for the apparently abstract notion of being
itself W i t h the second t e r m , 'number', he is more fortunately placed,
since i t recalls the Platonic t h e o r y that species can be explained i n
mathematical t e r m s ; so he w r i t e s , numerus omni ret speciem praehet
(Gen. ad Lit 4.3 7) H i s treatment of pondus, 'weight', is extraord i n a r i l y ingenious and varied, t h o u g h the details h a r d l y belong to a
philosophical lecture; i t stands for the a b i l i t y of things to f i n d their
proper level; for the tendency of the rational w i l l to go where i t belongs;
and also for a thing's internal coherence, and so for its permanence,
w h i c h for Augustine is a mark of value
L e t us ask Augustine a few questions about his threefold scheme,
along the lines of Aristotle's Categories F i r s t , how w i d e l y does i t apply ?
For he sometimes uses the phrase ' E v e r y t h i n g that is', b u t sometimes
speaks of 'every nature or substance', thus referring especially to t h i n g s ,
or what A r i s t o t l e calls substances, rather t h a n to qualities or relations.
Augustine does I t h i n k have substances chiefly i n m i n d , w h i c h is
natural enough, b u t sometimes misleads h i m ; on the other h a n d he
notes the eternal patterns of some qualities, such as virtues, a n d of
13

14

15

16

Div
Quaest 83,18; Ver Rehg
Gen. ad Lit. 4 3 7ff.
C. Faust. Manich. 20. 7.
Gen ad Lit 4.4 8

7.13

14

15

16

81

A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g

quantities or n u m b e r s ; and of course he uses relative terms like 'Father'

and 'Son' to denote divine realities So he recognizes the four p r i n c i p a l
Aristotelian categories. H e may perhaps have adopted the Neoplatonic
t h e o r y that i n the intelligible w o r l d all terms are substantial; but even
A r i s t o t l e noted that some things can be b o t h substantial and r e l a t i v e .
N e x t , A r i s t o t l e w o u l d like us to ask A u g u s t i n e , does he t h i n k that
being is capable of degrees? Can one be intensely, or feebly? Certainly
Augustine speaks of greater and less being, and of supreme being
(magis esse, minus esse, summe esse, Civ. Dei 12.2.9, Ver
Relig
18.35); b u t does this apply to all aspects of being? W i t h regard to the
t h i r d of these, permanence, the answer is clear; obviously things can be
m o r e and less permanent. B u t to say that one can possess a specific f o r m
m o r e and less completely sounds i m p r o b a b l e , and is certainly a direct
contradiction of A r i s t o t l e ; w h i l e c o m m o n sense insists that either a
creature is a horse, or i t is not B u t A u g u s t i n e clearly d i d believe that a
specific f o r m , for instance h u m a n i t y , can be more and less perfectly
realized; and this belief is l i n k e d w i t h his t h e o r y of evil as a defect of
being W e cannot stay to examine this t h e o r y , t h o u g h I myself distrust
it. A t the very best, i t needs a good deal of elaboration to make i t even
plausible Physical d e f o r m i t y , mental deficiency, and m o r a l o b l i q u i t y
can all stand under the broad u m b r e l l a of defective humanity.. N o
d o u b t all are b a d ; b u t they are bad i n very different ways
17

W h a t about the first t e r m of the t r i a d , namely being as such? H e r e I

t h i n k Augustine is imprecise. Sometimes his words i m p l y something
very like our n o t i o n of bare existence; he uses the phr ases utrum omnino
sit and quo constat (Div quaest 83,18), w h i c h recall the language of
the law-courts, where one has to establish that a piece of property does
actually exist before d i s p u t i n g its o w n e r s h i p . Here there is a straight
contrast of the real w i t h the f i c t i t i o u s I n another passage (Civ. Dei
11.27) Augustine uses the phrase ipsum esse to mean the mere existence, or life, w h i c h all creatures t r y to preserve; this makes a rather
different p o i n t , for real creatures obviously do not struggle to prevent
themselves f r o m becoming f i c t i t i o u s ! But yet again, this same phrase
ipsum esse is used to indicate divine being. T h i s has some analogy w i t h
mere existence, as i t is i n some sense u n q u a l i f i e d ; G o d clearly does not
belong to any created species B u t w h a t exactly is meant by referring to
G o d as pure being?
I n fact A u g u s t i n e declares that G o d is the source of measur e, number
and w e i g h t o r their various equivalentsbut is superior to all of
t h e m O n the other h a n d , as we n o t e d , he can say, Deus est esse; he
does not appear to have pronounced that G o d is beyond being B u t I am
18

17
18

82

Plotinus, Enn 6 1 3; Aristotle, Categ

Cf. Quintilian, Imt 7 6 36.

inclined to t h i n k that he has t w o different conceptions in view. H e

reproduces the t r a d i t i o n a l Platonic-Christian concept of a creative
intelligence w h i c h foreordains w h a t variety of things are to exist i n the
w o r l d , because i t is best that i t s h o u l d be so B u t beside this appears the
m o r e d i f f i c u l t , and more characteristic idea of the One as a source of
b e i n g , pure b e i n g , f r o m w h i c h the distinct varieties of being descend b y
a process of d i m i n u t i o n , rather like the refraction of white l i g h t to
produce the various c o l o u r s . Pure being, i n this sense, is an intensely
p o w e r f u l reality; Augustine describes i t as t h e source of life, sensation
and purposive m o t i o n (c. Faust Man. 2 0 . 7 ) ; elsewhere he associates i t
w i t h u n i t y , goodness, and t r u t h . B u t he offers us the paradox t h a t the
highest f o i m of life is f o u n d i n a B e i n g w h i c h lacks all the characteristics
w h i c h we associate w i t h life, unless u n i t y , goodness and permanence
can provide some sort of b r i d g e ; and the approach t o such a b e i n g
s h o u l d be to lay aside n o t only action b u t t h o u g h t , indeed e v e r y t h i n g
that is regulated b y n u m b e r and p r o p o r t i o n , and to lose oneself i n the
contemplation of the absolute One.
19

I t h i n k , t h e n , that the alternative conception better expresses the

Christian doctrine of creation, indeed of d i v i n e b e i n g ; and it should
also be more acceptable t o us moderns, impressed as we are by D a r w i n ian theories of e v o l u t i o n ; for we n o r m a l l y t h i n k that new species have
evolved b y developing new positive capacities w h i c h enable t h e m to
compete and survive, rather t h a n by t h e self-restriction of an
undifferentiated source of being
B o t h these theories, however, presuppose an optimistic view of the
universe, as expounded b y many Stoics and Platonists; and b o t h are
d i f f i c u l t to reconcile w i t h Augustine's vision of a universe w h i c h G o d
knows f r o m all eternity w i l l be darkened and corrupted by sin T h e
p r o b l e m w o u l d be eased i f we c o u l d believe, w i t h J o h n Lucas, that
God's foreknowledge is n o t absolute, so that there was at least a chance
t h a t A d a m w o u l d not s i n ; or better s t i l l , if we c o u l d per suade A u g u s t i n e
that man's absolute need of God's grace need not i m p l y an absolute
entanglement i n c o r r u p t i o n . A s i t is, I suspect that he has i n v o l v e d
himself i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m w h i c h even his o w n masterful i n g e n u i t y
c o u l d f i n d no way of escape
I w i l l conclude w i t h some f u r t h e r remarks o n the subject of p e r m a n ence ; for permanence is a characteristic w h i c h Augustine values h i g h l y ;
he thinks i t an essential m a r k of true goodness and of God's being B u t
the connection between permanence and value is n o t immediately
obvious. A r i s t o t l e indeed challenged Plato o n this p o i n t , o b s e r v i n g
perhaps not very seriouslythat a w h i t e post that lasts a long time is no
whiter than one w h i c h lasts for a day (NE 1096b, 4) We m i g h t of course

7, 8 a 13ff
19

Civ

Dei 8 6, 12.2; cf Nat

Bon

3
83

XV

XVI
object that this is not a good analogy for moral qualities i f we call a m a n
generous, we mean that he has a permanent disposition towards
unselfish g i v i n g T h u s an isolated impulsive action cannot count as
generosity; to quote A r i s t o t l e again, i t is v i r t u o u s o n l y i f i t proceeds
f r o m a f i x e d i n t e n t i o n ( i b i d 1105a, 34) B u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y for this
argument, i t applies to vices as w e l l as to v i r t u e s ; and just as a throwaway largesse doesn't prove a m a n generous, so a momentary panic
doesn't b r a n d h i m a cowar d Augustine is obviously captivated b y the
old Platonic doctrine that i n s t a b i l i t y is a m a r k of vice, and per contra,
that stability is necessary for v i r t u e ; b u t once again, he is not consistent; he can insist that some m e n acquire a habit of self-assertion and
wrong-doing w h i c h determines all their actions (Gr Xti. 1 8 f ) . Itseems
to f o l l o w that stability or permanence is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of m o r a l
goodness; b u t i t cannot possibly be a sufficient c o n d i t i o n
I n dealing w i t h G o d himself, A u g u s t i n e introduces the m u c h
stronger n o t i o n of i m m u t a b i l i t y , w h i c h we cannot discuss at this stage
B u t even the requirement of stability poses problems f o r the m o r a l i s t ;
how can one acquire i t w i t h o u t becoming inflexible and insensitive?
A n d per contra, w h a t can a philosopher make of those d e l i g h t f u l acts of
spontaneous generosity w h i c h we associate w i t h the alabaster cruse of
o i n t m e n t and w i t h St Francis of Assisi? N o d o u b t the answer s to such
questions are i m p l i c i t i n Augustine's w r i t i n g s ; b u t he does not present
t h e m i n woiked-out f o r m A n d the happy t r i b e of A u g u s t i n i a n scholars
w h o quote the master's words w i t h placid approval have seldom
explored these problems, and give us little help towards their solution.
T h e m o r a l , I t h i n k , is that i t is more i m p o r t a n t to be stimulated and
inspired b y Augustine t h a n to p u t together an A u g u s t i n i a n system.
Augustine is a fascinating character; devout, yet ingenious; a u t h o r i tarian, yet sympathetic. A s a philosopher he has one outstanding
weakness, namely his u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of a C h u r c h t r a d i t i o n that
had been f i x e d t h r o u g h the labours of lesser m e n ; and this of course
includes an approach to the Bible w h i c h we moderns have been forced
to discard B u t no one can w h o l l y free himself f r o m the influence of his
predecessors Augustine is not o n l y a saint, b u t an innovative genius
whose w o r k w i l l h o l d a permanent appeal

The Intelligible World, in Platonic

Tradition, Marius Victorinus and
Augustine
In his Literal
Commentary
on Genesis (12 10 21) Augustine has a short
passage i n which he discusses the meanings of the words 'intelligible' and
'intellectual' The latter, we would suppose, denotes 'that which can t h i n k ' ;
the other, 'that w h i c h can be thought' But rather surprisingly Augustine
declares that they have the same meaning; whichever word we use, hoc idem
signiftcamus
Does he mean that the t w o words are strictly synonymous, or
merely that their reference is the same? He does not make this at all clear
But he notes that some thinkers draw a distinction Everyone, says Augustine,
admits that intellect is perceived only by intellect: mens quippe non videtur
nisi mente But can there be anything that is intelligible but does not itself
think? This, he says, is a question, w h i c h he is not prepared to discuss; he
w i l l treat the two terms as equivalent: nunc intellectuale et intelligibile sub
eadem significatione
appellamus
This is a surprising doctrine. It conflicts w i t h our own usage, and indeed
w i t h that o f the Greek words voEpoc, and voryros, which are very rarely confused We would suppose that intellectualis refers to an active power, intelligibilis to a passive suitability Not that intelligibilis exactly corresponds to
the English w o r d 'intelligible' It certainly does not suggest 'easily intelligible'; i t has, rather, a restrictive sense: 'accessible, i f at all, only to the
mind'. We might agree that Einstein's theory is intelligibilis when we could
hesitate to call i t intelligible
What then is to be counted as intelligible? Augustine's position, I think, is
confused He clearly accepts the commonplace distinction between thinking
and unthinking beings, and again that between sense and thought w i t h their
respective objects But he also holds that intellect plays an essential part in
sense perception, which distinguishes i t from mere sensation But i f so, then
1

Lib Arb 2 3.9; Conf. 7 17.23, 10 6 9; Gen Lit 12 10.24. Ihe doctrine of course is known
earlier; see e g Cicero Acad 1 40; Sextus Empiricus adv Math 7 297. 11 226; Porphyry in
1

84

Stoic

Vet Frag

274

XVI

XVI
2

I HE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C TRADITION

T H E I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C I R A D I I I O N

everything we know is i n some sense intelligibile; and i f we equate the two

terms, is i n some sense intellectuale
This does not establish that every m i n d
can be known; but i t does seem to i m p l y that everything that can be known is
a mind

notion of value comes to the fore; the Idea is the standard of perfection to
w h i c h its counterparts approximate This seems to i m p l y that there can
be no Ideas of indifferent or worthless things Yet again, the Idea is conceived as conferring either distinctive character or distinctive value on its
participants, as twoness makes things two, an aspect which Aristotle
describes as the 'formal cause'; on this score i t has analogies w i t h the
soul, traditionally regarded as the source o f movement and life
(2) I t w i l l not be possible to chart all these conflicting traditions; but one
axiom which is particularly important as assimilating the intellectual soul
w i t h its objects is the commonplace that l i k e is k n o w n by like This
dictum seems to have gained prestige w i t h the passage of time Aristotle
refers to Plato for the doctrine yivcbaKEoocu xcpouoicp T O o u o i o v , but
himself develops the theory w h i c h goes by the name of 'the identity of
the mind w i t h its object' A n d whatever qualifications Aristotle may
have envisaged, the dictum is quoted w i t h surprising assurance by
Plotinus and Porphyry a l i k e

Augustine's ontology clearly builds on his Platonism; the problem has

been studied i n depth, notably by Pepin, Hadot, Kramer and R i s t Such
scholars have tended to consider not simply the relation of the Platonic Ideas,
to the m i n d , but i n particular their relation to a supreme m i n d , the Craftsman,
the Demiurge or God, or again to the anima mundi which Plato conceives as
a soul partaking i n reason, Timaeus 36e B u t i f we intend to explore the background o f Augustine's dictum i n fairly brief compass, it w i l l be preferable,
and I think allowable, to take a democratic line and speak only o f the minds
and souls w i t h w h i c h we are acquainted
2

(1) Plato several times declares that the soul is akin to the Ideas The Ideas are
intelligible par excellence; the soul's most distinctive activity is that of
thinking, vous or vosiv I n what ways does the soul resemble the Ideas? I t
is not-composite, invisible, and at least relatively unchanging, aei
cbaauxcbs X
d thus akin to the divine These descriptions are
drawn from the Phaedo; but i n a much later work, Laws 10, 898e, Plato
declares i t intelligible to the mind alone, voryrv S'sivat vcp u v c o
o u o a

Such a manner of thinking is so remote f r o m our own that i t is d i f f i c u l t

to perceive the tacit qualifications that must have governed its use In
some sense, clearly, i t is the m i n d that knows the way to Larissa - as
Augustine w i l l agree But we do not think the mind is long and rough
and stony Mathematics, moreover, is a purely intellectual pursuit; but in
learning the multiplication table our mind entertains or acquires its particulars, but remains distinct W e do not teach the multiplication table by
causing i t to understand us! Aristotle does indeed suggest that teaching
and learning are the same process, though differently conceived (Phys
3 2, 202 a 20) But one can learn without being taught; i t cannot then be
argued that learning must involve contact w i t h an intelligent being
M o r a l knowledge is perhaps more significant; to love is a sine qua non
for understanding what love is B u t whatever our own reserves, i t is plain
that the axiom was much respected i n antiquity, and that i t influenced
Augustine

a n

B u t as we all know Plato soon developed his views both of the soul
and of the Ideas I n the Republic and the Phaedrus we move f r o m the
Idealized soul of the philosopher to the diversified and self-conflicting
souls of men at large, w i t h the proviso, of course, that intelligence
remains their most distinctive and most valuable attribute or activity,
though not always the most effective. As for the Ideas, Plato clearly
began by thinking o f them as principles of explanation; they are often put
forward in answer to the question 'What is so-and-so?', as applied to a
general name denoting some moral quality or virtue B u t they soon come
to embody a large variety o f interests, both for Plato himself and still
more for his successors Considered as principles o f explanation, Plato
seems to have maintained the belief, despite all difficulties, that there is
an Idea corresponding to every general n a m e In other contexts the
4

J. Ppin Une curieuse dclaration idaliste de Saint Augustin , Rev. d Hist et Phil. Rel 34
(1954). 373-400; P Hadot, tre, Vie, Pense chez Plotin et avant Plotin '. Les Sources de Plotin,
Entretiens Hardt 5 (1960), 105-41; H J Krmer Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik
(Amsterdam 1967); J. Rist Eros and Psyche (Toronto 1964) pp 61-7, Plotinus the Road to
Reality (Cambridge.. 1967). pp 85ff
Cf n 1.
W D Ross Plato s Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951), pp 79, 141 172; cf G. Vlastos,
Degrees of Reality in Plato', pp 7. 8 n 1 in R Bambrough (ed ) New Essays on Plato and
Aristotle (London 1979)
2

(3) Quite apart f r o m these general considerations, i t must appear that some
Ideas at least are intelligent, especially the Ideas of rational beings,
whether men or demons Plato's argument i n Sophist 248e points the
way; i t is phrased i n abstract terms, contending that movement, l i f e and
thought are present i n absolute reality, rep TravxeAcos o v x i , but the
latter phrase is explained by an earlier statement (246 b) that real being

Parmenides 130 d
Phaedo 101 c; cf Aristotle s criticism, Gen & Corr 2 9 esp 335 b 18; my axe illustration below suggests an answer, without discounting other causes
De Anima 1.2,404 b 16; 3 7. 431 a l ; c f n 9 and J Ppin, op cit, pp 393-5
Enn 5 3 5-6; Sent 44: Alex Aphr Mantissa p 108 Bruns
5

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N

I HE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD TN PLATONIC TRADITION

consists in intelligible and, incorporeal Forms: v o r y r d

OCTTCC K O I

ei5r) TT\V dAr|6ivr]V o u a i a v e i v a i Intelligence is part o f

docbuccxa

things, y e v r y r d , i t w i l l operate over a period, and its influence w i l l have a

beginning I f I split a log into two parts, the Idea of twoness w i l l come into

human perfection; i t must, therefore, attach to the Idea of man B u t this

play the moment the axe falls B u t suppose, instead, that I beget a c h i l d ; in

reflection, as we shall see, leads us away f r o m conceiving of the Ideas as

this event part of his mother's body becomes informed by the Idea of

inclusive concepts arranged i n a hierarchy Our ordinary systems of clas-

humanity, or of a humanity; but also, the Platonist w i l l believe, a soul enters

sification lead us to think that a l l members of a species belong to i t

this body f r o m another realm A r e we to think that these are two distinct

equally; Thersites is a man no less than Achilles B u t the theory o f Ideas

events w h i c h m i g h t occur at different times? I shall offer some evidence that

assumes a connection between generality and value such that a species is

there were M i d d l e Platonists who drew no distinction

more truly embodied i n its best members than i n the average; while even

1 0

One source that must certainly be examined is Philo of Alexandria So far

the best fall short of the Idea itself Nevertheless we only experience

as I can discover, he does not assimilate the words voEpoc, and voryros He

intelligent thinking as an activity of individuals; and there is something

knows the m a x i m that like is known b y like {pet 164) and argues f r o m i t that

impenetrably strange to us i n the notion that the most intelligent man can

mind is k n o w n by m i n d (Gig 9) Hence he concludes that we have intellec-

be out-performed by the Idea of the animal as such.

tual knowledge of cosmic intelligences; but not, I think, that everything

known to the m i n d is intelligent Does he then assimilate souls with Ideas? I

W e have given a brief sketch of some of the problems that are suggested
by Plato's thought; we must turn to his successors O f these Aristotle, at least

think I sense a certain hesitation, w h i c h is disguised by his habit of giving

symbolical meaning to biblical texts Thus when he states that Abraham and

the mature Aristotle, stands largely aside f r o m the development we wish to

Sarah represent Ideas (Qu Gen 4 8) we ought not to conclude that the Ideas

explore; he rejected the notion o f transcendent Forms, and redefined the soul

resemble humans, and are conscious intelligences

as the f o r m o f the body, leaving i t a directive function as controlling the

appear to link the Ideas w i t h angels;

13

There are texts which

but most of these involve the terms

body's development, and recognizing intelligence as the peak of human

A o y o i and 5uvduEi$, w h i c h are too variable i n meaning to support certain

excellence, but locating superhuman intelligence in the moving principles of

conclusions Rather more definite is Qu Ex 2 114, where Philo states that the

the heavenly bodies, and i n a supreme directive intelligence who, we note,

patriarchs are immortalized as souls or Ideas; but so far I have discovered

contemplates himself not only on the general ground of the identity of the

only one text w h i c h clearly states that Ideas are intelligent, at Qu Ex 1 63, a

mind w i t h its object, but because the best m i n d must think that w h i c h is best,

passage w h i c h fortunately survives i n a Greek fragment:

namely himself.

Aristotle's contemporaries Speusippus and Xenocrates w i l l have to be

"ESEI

briefly dismissed; the programme that I have outlined allows us to by-pass

two famous definitions o f soul, as, ihia

T O U Trdvxfl S i a a T a x o G

yp

Trptbxa

xo

"OVTO

SuvuEit;

iSsas

ISECV

Trapxooa, xfjs Kd6apcjTQTT] KC uiyo <a\ xiuaTupEaTxris

Kai TTpoaETi xfj mcrrnuoviKcoxxri cpoEC uETaXaXEv

and as

d p t o u o s EOCUTOV KIVCOV These, I take it, are primarily concerned w i t h the

cosmic soul of the Timaeus;

but their application may well have been

extended Xenocrates identified Plato's ideal numbers w i t h ordinary mathematical numbers; thus his definition identifies souls w i t h at least one class of
Ideas; and i t becomes less paradoxical i f we recall that d p i 6 u 6 $ can easily

Strictly speaking, of course, this applies to an lite class of Ideas; but it

w o u l d be unlike Philo to provide that the common run of Ideas are excluded
We can turn now to the M i d d l e Platonist Calvenus Taurus, writing i n the

denote any collection or structure that embodies a computable plurality, as

early second century A D , w h o states that 'souls are sent b y the gods to earth

the soul obviously does. I t seems natural, then, to see Xenocrates as an

(perhaps) in order that there may be as many l i v i n g beings i n the cosmos as

important source for a view w h i c h certainly circulated among the M i d d l e

there are in the intelligible realm'

Platonists and which, discounting a mass o f complications and objections,

vidual beings', because i f i t meant simply 'species', one human soul would

makes a straightforward identification o f souls and Ideas

suffice Taurus' view resembles that found in Plotinus: when the souls are

' L i v i n g beings' here should mean 'indi-

In some ways, of course, this identification can be made extremely plausible Suppose we see the Idea as a formal cause, then i n the case o f transient
But not main-stream Platonists, for this possibility is ignored in the conspectus in Porphyry
ad Gaurum; F T in Festugiere Rev Herm Trism 3 267-9
Somn 1 127; Spec Leg 1 46-8 329; Qu Gen 3 11
1 0

11

Metaph

A 9 1075 a 5; 1074 b 34

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC TRADITION

THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N

sent down, theii place i n heaven is not vacated, but remains occupied by their
THE P O R P H Y R Y TREE

intelligible counterparts This view contrasts w i t h one found i n Philo, i n the

Gnostic teacher Basilides,

12

and i n other Gnostic systems we shall now con-

sider, w h i c h postulates a straightforward descent and reascension of souls or

A f u l l diagram is given by Philo agr

139, Seneca Ep 58:

Ideas
"OVTCC

Hippolytus describes a number of sects w h i c h expound a mixture of

Quod est

popular Platonism w i t h unorthodox exposition of the Bible I h e Peratae, we

are told, conceive o f the Son, or Logos as a cosmic serpent who glides up and

daebiiCCTCt

acbpara

incorporalia ^corj)Malia

down, and derives f r o m the Father the 5uvduii<;, iSecu or x P K T n p e s

a

duyuxa

which he then embodies i n matter (5 16 25) These must be individual ideas;

for the account continues: ' I f anyone

EU^A/XO:

inanimata

animata

has the strength to comprehend that

ctXoycc

he is a character of the Father brought down f r o m above and embodied i n the

XoyiKCt

[plants] 'solo affixa'

animalia

world, he becomes consubstantial w i t h the Father i n heaven and ascends to

8vryTd

that place' Shortly afterwards we hear of the Logos 'carrying up f r o m below

6ETO

mortalia

immortalia

those who have awakened and become characters of the Father' The Peratae,
Stoic influence is seen i n the primary division; the incorporalia

of course, were not the first to adopt the m a x i m 'Werde was du bist'
Very similar teaching appears i n Hippolytus' account of the Docetists i n

comprise

only grammatical and logical concepts, everything else is corporeal; so

Book V I I I W e hear of ideas or characters coming down f r o m above, and

Philo agr.

being insulted by the Demiurge and imprisoned i n material bodies, though

Ideas incorporeal

1 4 0 f , whereas he normally makes God , the Logos and the

not without some error (rrXavri) on their o w n part; thus 'the ideas are called

The two f o l l o w i n g tables (a) omit this division, so giving more scope

souls, because they have cooled off f r o m the things above and continue i n

for incorporeal beings; (b) pronounce the right-hand classes superior at

darkness', using the word-play y u x n >

each stage, thereby giving the appearance of a scala

S 0 U 1

> 6 X P S ' hd (8 10 1)
U

metaphor of cooling is also found i n Origen (Princ

The

naturae:

2 8 3, cf M t 24:12; but

he speaks, of V6E$ 'minds', or Xoyitcoi, 'rational beings', rather than Ideas,

which he interprets unsympathetically as mere mental concepts

Maximus Tyrius 11 8, p 138 H

Augustine C D 11 16 1 *

(Princ
a Deo facta

"Ovra

2.3.6)
So much for the thinkers who assimilate Ideas w i t h souls But there is a
contrasting tradition at w o r k w i t h i n M i d d l e Platonism w h i c h carries on the
project begun by Plato i n the Sophist
Politicus

and continued i n the Philebus

ayuxa

non viventia

ufuxcc

viventia

and

to arrange the Ideas i n a rational order, i n which the more compre-

cpuriKv

aiaoxiKv

non sentientia
[arbores]

hensive take precedence over the more nearly individual This undertaking

sentientia
[animalia]

presumes that the Ideas are unchanging, and that each of them is a one-overmany, so that the table culminates i n the most comprehensive and to our

Xoyov

XoytKov

non intelligentia

intelligentia

thinking the most abstract o f all Ideas, namely that of being itself This
mortale

diagram is known as the 'Tree o f Porphyry', and examples are found i n

immortales

Aristotle and the Stoics, i n Philo, Seneca, Albinus and Maximus of Tyre, and
in Basil and Victorinus as w e l l as Augustine

* I n his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo

1 3

It should not be confused w i t h another diagram, commonly known as a

scala naturae, w h i c h attempts to classify the main types of being i n an order

facta sunt, praeponuntui viventia non viventibus

et i n his, quae vivunt,

praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia; et i n

his quae sentiunt, praeponuntur

intelligentia non intelligentibus, sicut

homines pecoribus; et i n his, quae intelligunt, praeponuntur immortalia

Basilides (Hippolytus Ref. 7 22 7ff) uses the term uioxns (not in IS)); yvxh
10; i6ea perhaps only in a general sense. 7 21 5
W Theiler Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatoni sinus (Berlin, 1930), pp 3-7
12

13

is implied at

mortalibus, sicut angeli hominibus

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN P L A I O N I C I R A D I I I O N

THE I N I E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N

based on increasing value and rationality Thus Aristotle divides the natural
world into inanimates, plants, animals and rational beings; and attempts were
later made to extend the scheme above the human level, though w i t h much
less prospect of securing agreement; i t might, for instance, include demons
and star-deities, as i n Apuleius Augustine, on Psalm 148, formulates i t w i t h
convenient brevity thus: angeli, homines, animalia, arbores et lapides
laudunt Deum A n d a late and elaborately christianized version appears i n the
heavenly hierarchies o f Dionysius the Areopagite.

need the assistance of the f o r m of animal life, which might ensure, say, that a
mare w i l l not give birth to a mushroom I t does not seem to me that the
ancient Platonists grasped this point; they held that the move from individual
to species was a step up i n terms of dignity and effectiveness, and assumed
that the same w o u l d apply to the transition f r o m species to genus, and so on
I f I have argued correctly, this view was mistaken
W e can now turn to Marius Victorinus, w h o m I see as a pagan philosopher
turned Christian, who defends Nicene theology w i t h the simple conviction of
a convert, but is still searching for a philosophical substructure i n the
Neoplatonist doctrines which he has absorbed, and is far f r o m establishing a
coherent system I n his first philosophical w o r k , the ad Candidum,
he
explains in some detail that intelligibilis and intellectualis apply to different
orders of reality; he may therefore be the dissident whom Augustine indicates
by the tactful plural quidam
There are, he declares, four orders of reality:
quae vere sunt, quae sunt, quae non vere non sunt, quae non sunt
To get
the priorities right we have to read the third clause w i t h a cancelling double
negative: 'things that are not absolutely unreal' A n d even the fourth class
turns out to have some measure of being; it is distinguished from quae vere
non sunt, which he says 'have no claim to exist' ad id ut sint locum non
habent

14

It should be clear that i n theory these t w o classifications are quite distinct

The Porphyry Tree unfolds i n an order of decreasing generality; the Ladder i n
an order of increasing value, taking rationality as the criterion, and comparing
co-ordinate species or genera I n the Porphyry Tree the species man is placed
next above the genus of animal-in-general, T O COOV, to which he belongs; i n
the other scheme man comes, next above irrational animals But confusion
arises because i t is d i f f i c u l t to reflect on the Porphyry Tree without introducing some notion of comparative value I f we compare the species man
w i t h the genus animal, T O toov, we are likely to think that man is superior;
for the genus T O QCOOV defines a mixed population i n which irrational
animals predominate, whereas all men are presumed to be rational Indeed we
still import notions of value into our class-terms There are good grounds for
claiming that Thersites is a man no less than Achilles; but how natural i t is to
say that Achilles is more of a man than Iher sites
Let us approach the problem f r o m another angle The system of classification sketched out by Plato i n the Sophist considers the ideas mainly as classconcepts What w i l l be the result i f we emphasize the other aspects o f the
Ideas as mentioned above, and think of them as ideal or alternatively as
formal causes?
Obviously there is no objection i n principle to defining a class i n terms of
approximation to an ideal standard; we constantly do this when we describe
everyday objects as circles or triangles But i f we do this, we cannot work
w i t h a simple concept of participation; we have to think of approximation i n
various degrees A n d this w i l l apply at all levels A m o n g the various species
of animals, i t is plausible to hold that the most rational is best, namely man;
and among men, the best w i l l be the man who most nearly approaches ideal
humanity But this means that there is no w o r k to be found for the ideal
animal-as-such; its role w i l l be taken over by the ideal man
M u c h the same argument applies i f we think of the Ideas as formal causes.
Aristotle was able to see the f o r m of the species as playing an important part
in the development of l i v i n g organisms; i t ensures, for instance, that a mare
w i l l give birth to a foal and not to a calf B u t i f i t does this job, it w i l l not

Numerous examples are given by A S Pease Commentary on Cicero. De Natura Deorum

1 5

16

The four classes can be identified as follows: first, Ideas or intelligibles,

secondly souls, which are intellectualis, thirdly souls embedded i n matter,
and fourthly matter itself I n this passage, then, intellectualis refers to a
power o f understanding w h i c h may or may not be exercised; indeed w e hear
of animarum in natura intellectualium
nondum intellectum habentium But
there is no consistency; shortly afterwards the power of G o d is called intellectualis as well as intelligibilis; and since God is simplex, this cannot denote
a lesser perfection, let alone an imperfection
Turning to the broader question, we find that Victorinus gives a confused
impression of the intelligible w o r l d , largely, I think, because he has not
appreciated the fundamental distinction between the Tree and the Ladder to
which I referred He is familiar enough w i t h a christianized version of the
scala naturae; a simple example, given in descending order of value, runs as
follows: Deus, Iesus, Spiritus, nous, anima, et deinde corporalia omnia (adv
Ar. 1 2 , 5 ) A rather similar passage (ibid 1 4 4 ) enlarges on the orders of
angels i n language drawn f r o m Eph 1:21 and C o l 1:16: and a third exam-pie
(1 60) begins w i t h the Father and the Son, as mutually indwelling, but continues i n philosophical terms, omitting the Spirit and reverting to the four
orders of reality mentioned above: G o d is praeprincipium
omnis sub.stantiae,

15

See however A H Armstrong (ed ) Later Greek Philosophy 297f on Iambiichus

1 6

See F W

2 32^10

Kohnke.

Plato's Conception of TO OUK OVTCOS OUK 6V' Phronesis (1956)

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC TRADITION

intelligibilis
hyle

et intellectualh

et animae

et hylicae et univer.sae substantiae

in
!

Victoiinus has p r e v i o u s l y explained the highest of these four orders, the

things quae vere sunt et omnia supracaelestia
He begins, apparently, w i t h its
less distinguished members: ut spiritus, vou$, anima, cognoscentia, disci
plina, virtutes, X o y o i , opiniones, perfectio, existentia, vita, intelligentia
This
is a perplexing catalogue; one w o u l d say, surely, that spiritus, vou$, and
anima claim to be substances, while the next six look more like attributes or
activities which they are supposed to display (and i t seems odd to f i n d opiniones in such distinguished company); whereas existentia, vita and intelligentia are nominalized forms of the familiar triad esse, vivere,
intelligere,
which can either be sharply distinguished, as marking off three orders of
creatures by their highest potential - perhaps stones, plants and men - or
identified as belonging to the supreme being and presupposing one another
We have taxed Victorinus w i t h confusing the categories; so perhaps we
should hear his reply, which conveys standard Neoplatonic doctrine, but has a
certain vividness and poetic appeal; he contends that in the intelligible w o r l d ,
everything that exists in a substance, and is a l i v i n g and thinking being:
Etenim in supernis aeternisque, id est in intellectibilibus
atque intellectualibus nihil accidens, nihil qualitas, nihil geminum, vel cum altero, sed omnia
viventes sunt intelligentesque substantiae, purae, simplices, unius modi, hoc
ipso quo sunt, et vivunt et intellegunt, conversimque, quo vivunt, quo intellegunt, hoc ipso etiam sunt
His conclusion, I think, is rather less impressive:
Vivit igitur ac vita una substantia est This to make time a mere negation of
enduring life rather than as a stage in which to act
17

1
l

18

B u t I have not finished w i t h Victorinus' catalogue He goes on to mention

two higher sorts of reality: et adhuc superius, existentialitas, vitalitas, intelli
gentitas, et supra ista omnia, ov solum istud ipsum quod est unum et solum
ov But what on earth is the place of these abstracta, 'existentiality, vitality
and intelligentity' as distinct f r o m 'existence, life and intelligence', in a
scheme o f being which, we have just heard, begins with the Holy Trinity and
continues w i t h vous and anima and the divine creations?
I suggest that Victorinus has been misled by a faulty theory o f meaning
He assumes that all nouns are names; he considers existentia and existentialitas two distinct significant words, and infers that they denote two separate
things I n this reasoning he overlooks the vital fact that existentia itself has
more than one meaning i t can have a collective sense, indicating all that
exists, or some part o f it It can also be used abstractly, to indicate the state or
condition which existent things as such possess But in this second sense it
seems precisely equivalent to existentialitas; the longer term might perhaps

Ad Cand 7.
Adv AT 4 2

be useful as excluding an ambiguity w h i c h existentia permits; but that gives

no reason to construe i t as a name for a distinct and higher order of reality
One might of course argue that existentialitas conveys a more pronounced
suggestion of abstraction; i t seems further removed from the concrete and
particular, and so, on Platonic assumptions, more sublime B u t if so, w h y stop
there? W h y not speak of existentialitas
as something higher still? Irenaeus long ago had castigated charlatans who played this game
Meanwhile, let us note that existentialitas is something of a bogus universal;
it does not, like most universals, have the dignity of greater comprehensiveness, as the genus animal is more comprehensive than the species man; for
existentiality, i f i t is a property at all, is a property which can attach only to
existence
This argument could be extended, i f time allowed, to include Victorinus'
treatment o f God himself Sometimes he uses concrete terms borrowed from
everyday life; he is particularly fond o f describing God's substance as spiritus and lumen; or again, unlike Plotinus, as a thinking m i n d that is conscious
of itself A t other times he accumulates abstracta; God is not only o v , but
Trpoov; or more elaborately, omnium principiorum praeprincipium,
omnium
intelligentiarum praeintelligentia,
and so on
I would venture to argue that
even the well-tried description of G o d as esse purum harbours confusions It
appeals to esse as the most abstract of universals, having the least positive
significance, to express the transcendence of God, or his remoteness from
ordinary descriptions Y e t at the same time esse must express his creativity;
and here one appeals to the infinite variety of positive content, when esse can
stand for the distinctive manner of life and existence possessed by so many
different kinds o f created beings B u t this is a radically different use of esse;
the distinctive esse of the hyena may perhaps be seen as a product o f God's
creative intelligence, but i t is not in any sense an aspect of his nature Y e t this
apparently sensible caution is ruled out by the traditional reasoning that God
is a perfectly simple being, so that all aspects of his esse must coincide This
argument is not for me.
W e turn at last to Augustine, who like Victorinus attempts a synthesis of
Platonism w i t h Nicene Christianity, and whose notions o f the intelligible
w o r l d have much in common w i t h his Augustine is by far the more versatile
and penetrating thinker He is not captivated by Neoplatonist systematics; he
has absorbed the Christian doctrine of creation, including the biblical view
that 'God created man f r o m the dust of the earth', and of course the earth
itself He therefore sees God as creating beings quite unlike himself, as well
as those who can achieve some likeness through their intelligence and their
independence of matter He can, therefore, accommodate intellectual spirits
1 9

11

1 9

Ibid 1 49

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD TN PLATONIC IRADITION

in the Platonic style; but he has no special reason to see the supreme Unity
founding a series of intelligent beings who diminish only gradually f r o m
himself. I h i s I think needs saying; for scholarly research has tended to call
attention to the echoes of Plotinus in Augustine His independence, therefore,
also needs to be stressed
It seems, then, that he approaches the intelligible world by three different
routes First, it contains the patterns or prototypes of all created beings Next,
it contains all those concepts and relations o f which we have intellectual
knowledge; these are more various then we might expect, and figure in mathematical, logical, moral and aesthetic theory Thirdly it has to include those
concepts that can be predicated per analogiam of God himself, and i n soon
sense identified w i t h him
I h e first heading can be simply treated In the Diverse Questions, number
46, Augustine has a straightforward Platonist account of the rationes rerum
stabiles atque incommutabiles,
quae in divina intelligentia continentur
He
does not, in this passage, assign them to the divine Wisdom or Logos in particular; and he does not, I believe, include ideas o f individual beings, though
this has sometimes been asserted. A n d there is no suggestion that I can discover that the Ideas are intelligent beings The pure and rational mind, he
says, excels by its intelligence istas rationes, quarum visions fit beatissima;
and the treatise On Free Will describes the Forms of bodies at least as inferior
to the powers of the soul, which in turn are inferior to the virtues thems e l v e s Thus the value o f those Forms in proportional, not to the divine
intelligence that conceives them, but to the degree o f goodness which the
Creator intends them to realize in their embodiments A n d the rationes that
inspire the intelligent m i n d are not themselves described as intelligent
Secondly, the intelligible w o r l d includes all those things that are k n o w n by
the m i n d ; though no doubt we should add the qualification 'without the aid of
the senses', for we must not encumber the intelligible world with the road to
Larissa W i t h i n this wide-ranging class we can identify Forms of substances,
for corporeal Forms appear again under this heading; of qualities, especially moral qualities; and o f relations, for 'likeness' is mentioned i n ver
relig 36 66, along w i t h unity and truth Here again, so far as I can see, there
is no mention of individual Forms, and no claim that the Forms are intelligent, thinking beings Certainly there is no tendency to assimilate the Forms
w i t h souls; for even the angels are conceived as created beings, and in principle subject to change, though capable o f achieving immutability in virtue
20

21

THE I N I E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N

13

known passage of the City of God, 8 6, he represents the Platonists as

teaching that 'whatever exists is either matter or life, and that life is superior
to matter, that the Form of matter' - surprisingly - 'is accessible to sense,
that the Form of l i f e is accessible to intelligence' ' L i f e ' is clearly to be taken
in an inclusive sense, for Augustine has just declared that its ideal Form is
realized in the divine intelligence A n d he goes on to explain intellectual
knowledge by considering three kinds of beauty, the physical, the conceptual
and the ideal beauty, the last being raised above the level of our intellect
through its unchanging perfection. A n even more spectacular description of
intellectual knowledge is found in the Literal
Commentary on
Genesis,
12 24 50, where he sees i t apprehending the Christian virtues enumerated by
St Paul: 'How else can the intellect itself be seen except by intellection? In
this way also we see "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith,
gentleness, self-control" and the rest, by which we draw near to God, and
finally God h i m s e l f
23

I n this bold synthesis of Platonic and Christian tradition i t appears that

there are philosophical puzzles w h i c h I have neither the time nor the skill to
disentangle. Augustine can readily accept the Platonic Forms of man and
horse, existing in the divine mind as prototypes of things to be created But
there seems no place i n his thought for the F o r m of the living creature as
such; he speaks rather of life itself; and this is not part o f God's design for
creation, but an aspect of his own being, included in the triad esse-vivereintelligere which, like Victorinus, he can declare to be inseparable one from
another, as essential aspects of God's own being
In much the same way the
notion of perfect intelligence appears, especially in the Soliloquies, to merge
w i t h that o f perfect truth, an echo, perhaps, of the claimed identity of the
knowing mind w i t h its object; and there is not very lucid transition f r o m truth
at its lowest, as seen in the truism that three threes are nine, or that wise men
are better than fools, to truth as realised in perfect understanding and intelligence, a truth identical w i t h the being of God
2 4

22

But this sketch of Augustine's views has so far been one-sided I n a well-

When approaching God's being in philosophical teims, Augustine puts

him at the summit of the intelligible world. A s an ardent Nicene, Augustine
could not accept the formula found i n some earlier Christian Platonists, that
God the Father creates pure being God the Son confers on things their distinctive character: for uncharacterised existence is a logician's phrase:
nothing can exist unless i t is so-and-so Thus when Augustine speaks of esse
purum, he cannot refer to such existence; cf p 11 It may perhaps be

C D 8 6. D Knowles translates speciem corporis as the form of matter and the meaning
Form' is indeed suggested earlier in the chapter. Physica! beauty' seems less likely as
Augustine goes on to refer to beauty as pulchritudo But species could have a very general sense,
contrasting the corporeal 'order' or realm' with the intelligible
Ibid Cf Victorinus adv Ar 3 6 ad fin
2 3

J. Meyendorff, New Scholasticism 16 (1942) 36; V J Bourke. Augustine s View of Reality

5 n, 21
2 19 50; cf C D 8 6
Op cit 2 19 49
2 0

21

2 2

2 4

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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C

XVII

TRADITION

approached in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics God has no accidents, i n the

commonly accepted sense; he is never surprised by events To say 'God is
perfect justice' perhaps expressed this point But Augustine interprets this 'is'
as an 'is' of identity, so reaching the conclusion that all God's attributes are
identical w i t h him, and thus identical w i t h one another I t is difficult to make
sense of this doctrine I t may be possible, for instance, to conceive a perfect
union of justice and mercy; but a synthesis of all God's attributes must escape
human comprehension A n d even i f i t were possible, such a scheme might do
justice to God's majesty, but could not comprehend his love This must be
infinitely adaptable i f , as we believe, God loves both the severe moralist and
the warm-hearted undiscriminating open heart which has a welcome for all
He loves us, not merely for our likeness to him, but in our inevitable difference, as created beings
Augustine, therefore, has not succeeded in presenting an integrated version
of Platonic metaphysics, Nevertheless his services to philosophical theology
are very great Despite his evident indebtedness to Platonism, he has presented a much more credible version of divine unity, and of God's action i n
the w o r l d For all his debt to Plotinus (well recorded i n Henry Chadwick's
notes to his translation of the Confessions)
Augustine is worlds away f r o m a
system in which the unity of the supreme One excludes all multiplicity, to the
extent that such a being i n his own person cannot either know or be k n o w n ,
and his action on the world is an eternal dispersal and dissipation of the original unity; where there is indeed a contrary tendency to return to the One, but
a return which promises nothing but Nirvana Augustine, again, has quietly
avoided the glorification of abstract concepts which entangled Victorinus
A n d it should never be forgotten that his philosophical work, important as it
is, occupied only a fraction o f his time and energy Augustine was tirelessly
active as a preacher, as an exponent of the Scriptures, as a pastor, as a
diocesan administrator, and not least as an expositor of Christian orthodoxy
as he conceived i t , w i t h which his philosophy must not conflict No other
man has exercised so great an influence on the thought and action of the succeeding millennium

Augustine's Universe
(read at O x f o r d on 22nd M a y , 198 7
to a group entitled 'The Theological W i n e ' )
St Augustine is beyond question the greatest m i n d and the rarest spirit of late
antiquity; capable both o f calming our inquietudes by the profound assurance
o f his faith and of whetting our curiosity by the penetrating ingenuities of his
reasoning; no subject he touches can fail to interest his many admirers But
there is hardly a subject, it must be said, i n which Augustine himself professed so plain a disinterest as the structure of the physical world; a disinterest, however, which brings some advantage
The student of Augustine is too often bewildered by the horrifying industry
of his fellows But the enormous b u l k of Augustine literature has seldom
attempted to describe i n simple terms the f o r m which the cosmos assumed in
the saint's imagination It may be that scholars have followed then master in
thinking this a matter of little moment Here, then, i t seems, we have a
subject on which, without enormous efforts of mental abstraction or relentless
pursuit of insignificant detail, some new light can be thrown
I spoke of disinterest It is easy to show that Augustine has - or affects to
have - no interest in cosmology for its own sake. 'It is frequently asked', he
writes, 'what our belief must be about the f o r m and shape of the heaven
according to Sacred Scripture Many scholars engage in lengthy discussions
on these matters; but the sacred writers w i t h their deeper wisdom have
omitted them Such subjects are of no profit for those who seek beatitude,
and, what is worse, they take up very precious time that ought to be given to
what is spiritually beneficial What concern is i t of mine whether heaven is
like a sphere and the earth enclosed by it and suspended i n the middle of the
universe, or whether i t is like a disk above the earth, covering it over on one
side?'
1

Gen ad Lit 2 9 20 All references are to this work, unless otherwise noted I am greatly
indebted to the admirable translation by J.H Taylor S J (Ancient Christian Writers 41-2) which
I have used with only minor changes It has some enterprising but unobjectionable, expansions
of Augustine's Latin
1

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2

AUGUSIINE S UNIVERSE

AUGUSTINE S UNIVERSE

'But' he goes on, 'the credibility of Scripture is at stake'; and in a previous

passage he explains why a Christian teacher ought to be grounded i n the rudiments o f this apparently frivolous pursuit. 'Usually, even a non-Christian
knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this
world
. about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon
about the
kinds of animals, plants, minerals and so forth, and this knowledge he holds
to as being certain f r o m reason and experience N o w it is a disgraceful and
dangerous thing for an individual to hear a Christian, while ostensibly giving
the meaning of Holy Scripture, talk nonsense on these topics; and we should
take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, i n which people
show up enormous ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn
If they
find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know w e l l , and
hear h i m basing his foolish opinions on our books, how are they going to
believe those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the
hope of eternal life and the kingdom o f heaven
. ? Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their
wiser brethren when they are detected in one of their mischievous fallacies
and are taken to task by those who do not accept the authority of our sacred
writings. '
This extremely prudent and sensible warning might perhaps suggest that
Augustine accords to the natural reason an authority comparable to that of
Scripture - a notion which w o u l d be pleasing to literal-minded empiricists
But on the whole this notion is delusive Augustine w i l l make great efforts to
dispel apparent conflicts between Scripture and science; but i f no solution can
be found, the inerrancy of H o l y Scripture is the rock on which he stands In
his Literal Exposition of Genesis he protests against the complaint that he has
involved himself too deeply i n matters o f no spiritual importance. He replies,
in effect, that w i t h practice i t becomes easy to refute the unbeliever 'When
they are able, f r o m reliable evidence, to prove some fact of physical science,
we shall show that i t is not contrary to our Scripture But when they produce
from their books a theory contrary to Scripture, and therefore contrary to the
Catholic Faith, either we shall have some ability to demonstrate that i t is
absolutely false, or at least we ourselves hold it so without any shadow of
doubt A n d so w i l l we cling to our Mediator, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. '

anxieties. B u t there is the countervailing theme that the exercise of human

reason is of its very nature a noble task, a theme that was voiced in
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound and was eloquently developed by Sophocles
Augustine therefore has no difficulty in adopting f r o m Tertullian or Basil the
well-worn argument that the dissensions of the philosophers demonstrate the
futility o f their studies; but he can also write w i t h approval of the astronomers
and their w o r k ; 'for they investigate these matters by the natural light of the
m i n d which Thou hast given them, and discover many secrets; they predict
many years in advance the eclipses of the sun and of the moon, and the
events accord w i t h their predictions; they have even set down rules w h i c h can
still be read, by which one can make [such] forecasts; and i t comes to pass as
it was foretold '

I w o u l d not maintain, however, that Augustine is wholly consistent For all

his brilliance and original genius, he is prone to make use of customary
themes, or topoi, many of which were adapted by Christian tradition f r o m
earlier pagan thought. We can trace back to Epicurus the notion that physical
research is a waste of effort unless it brings the spiritual benefit of removing

1 19 39
1 21 41 My italics

Augustine had evidently given thought to cosmology as a young man interested in acquiring a general education; and he emphasised the reliability of its
sober-minded exponents, contrasting i t w i t h the extravagant fables of the
Manichees, to whose company he was later attracted His tolerance, of
course, does not extend to the astrologers, w h o m like almost all the Fathers
he denounces Some events, no doubt, can be rationally predicted; but the
astrologers assume a total determinism which abrogates human free w i l l , and
thereby makes moral judgments absurd and moral conduct impossible
In his treatment of the Scriptures Augustine is of course far removed from
the modern critic who thinks of a collection of books originally written by a
number of authors of different mentalities at different times He assumes, i f
not unity of authorship, at least a common m i n d and agreement o f teaching
A n d he is right to this extent, that the cosmology of the many different biblical writers is not remarkably dissimilar, just as it was not strenuously
thought out B u t it does, of course, differ profoundly f r o m the much more
sophisticated theories of the Greek philosophers Augustine therefore has a
problem on his hands whose f u l l extent he could not perceive, partly because
he was unable to study the O l d Testament writers in their Hebrew original;
for the translators had already gone some way towards obscuring the more
archaic features of biblical thought A s a sample, we may take the Hebrew
assumption that light is an effect w h i c h comes and goes without the need for
a source of light - as might be supposed by a child brought up on the fogbound coasts of Newfoundland L i g h t thus existed before the sun and stars,
which were created only to serve as indicators Augustine, as we shall see,
can evade the drawbacks of this crude assumption; but only by appealing to
the Greek usage which could understand the word 'light' in terms o f discovered truth or mental illumination
Hebrew cosmology can be found in various books of the Bible; in the
4

P.V

Confessions

436-71;

Antigone
5 3 4

332-75

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AUGUSTINE'S U N I V E R S E

AUGUSTINE S U N I V E R S E

second Isaiah, i n the Wisdom literature, i n some of the Psalms; but i t is o f

course the opening chapters of Genesis that provide the richest evidence and
pose the most awkward problems Augustine himself devoted three separate
commentaries to the beginning of Genesis, of which I have already drawn
upon the most extensive, the Literal Exposition;
and there are important discussions of particular points both i n the Confessions and i n the City of God
The problems presented by Genesis to a literalist expositor do not f o r m part
of my subject, on a perfectly strict definition; but I w i l l mention them briefly,
to give some notion of the scriptural constraints which bear on Augustine's
thinking Rather than f o l l o w the purely logical order, I w i l l begin w i t h the
point most familiar to ourselves

but to that w o r k of God which takes place w i t h the unfolding of the ages as
He works even now'

To the modern reader i t is clear enough that we have two accounts of the
creation, o f which the second, beginning at Genesis 2:4, is plainly the more
primitive; i t has been well observed that Genesis 1 stems f r o m Mesopotamia,
where the first requisite for ordered life is to gain control of the flood-waters,
while Genesis 2:4ff reflects the experience of the desert-dweller, for w h o m
nothing w i l l grow until i t begins to rain Augustine observes the duplication
when dealing w i t h 2:7, which gives a second account of the creation o f man
'We must see', he says, 'whether this is a restatement intended to describe
the manner i n w h i c h man was made; for we have read already that he was
made on the sixth day' He decides against this view, for he has akeady concluded that the first creation account does not describe an operation spread
out over six actual days, appealing to the text of Ecclus 18:1, 'He created all
things together'; whereas in Genesis 2 the man gives names to the animals
and to the woman, and (says Augustine) 'whatever syllables were used i n
speaking these words, no two syllables o f the utterance could have sounded
together'. I n short, this second account records events which need time for
their completion But i n any case i t could not have been a mere continuation
of the first account, since Genesis 2:1 declares that God had finished his
work
The problem of the two creation accounts was of course a long-standing
puzzle Philo of Alexandria had solved it i n Platonic terms, making Genesis 1
describe the creation of the ideal forms of things, which were later to be
embodied i n physical realities But this solution is not available to Augustine,
in whose view the ideal forms could not be created, since they must inhere i n
the eternal Wisdom of God His solution is to invoke a Stoic conception;
Genesis 1 describes the creation, not of things themselves, but of their animating principles or 'seminal reasons'; whereas 'the work whereby man was
formed f r o m the slime of the earth and a w i f e was fashioned for him f r o m his
side belongs not to that creation by which all things were made 'together' .
6

A second problem has been touched on already How can we reconcile the
narrative of a creation i n six days w i t h the doctrine that God's w i l l to create
needs no time at all for its execution? Augustine, we saw, quoted
Ecclesiasticus to this effect; more familiar to us is Psalm 33:9, 'He spake and
it was done; he commanded and i t stood f a s t ' Instantaneous creation, I
believe, also figures i n the early Greek tradition; intended, no doubt, as a
reply to objections against crudely conceived creation theories which pictured
God at w o r k i n the manner of a carpenter or a potter Augustine here simply
develops a position already sketched by Philo; God has no need of six separate days i n which to complete his work, but our minds cannot f o l l o w the
process unless it is exhibited to us i n distinct stages. This resembles the arguments used by Platonists to suggest that the creation narrative i n Plato's
Timaeus does not really contradict the view that the w o r l d has existed for
ever. But Augustine supplements his argument by a fanciful and, to m y mind,
unneeded explanation o f the words 'evening' and 'morning' by which the six
days are defined Ihese cannot be successive events; they refer, instead, to
two manners i n which the angels contemplate the works of their Creator
They can intuit either the prototypes which inhere i n the divine Word, or their
earthly counterparts Thus 'there is a vast difference between knowledge of a
thing i n the W o r d of God and knowledge of the same thing i n itself The first
kind of knowledge can be compared to day; the second kind, to e v e n i n g '
'This knowledge, being of a lower order, is rightly designated by the term
evening ' I do not f i n d i t easy to l i k e this bold and imaginative exegesis; it
implies that the execution of God's designs is inferior to the designs themselves Either, then, the designs were impractical, or the execution was defective But possibly the difficulty is one that attaches to all creation doctrines;
for a God who is ex hypothesi unequalled cannot give rise to creatures whose
dignity matches his o w n
9

1 0

Thirdly o f course there is the problem of the first three days of creation,
w h i c h are taken for granted as existing before the heavenly bodies were made
to define them; and the related problem that God began his work by saying
'Let there be light' 'Why, then', says Augustine, 'was the sun made to rule
the day and shine upon the earth i f that other light was sufficient to make the
day? D i d that light illumine .
only the higher regions far f r o m the earth
so that a sun was needed [for] the lower regions?' Or d i d the sun, when it
was created, merely increase the brightness of the day? Augustine does not
11

6 l l
634

1 0

11

6.3 4
Cicero Nat. Deor
4 23 40; 4 22 39
1 11 23

I 9 22

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AUGUSTINE S U N I V E R S E

AUGUS TINE S UNIVERSE

answer this question, but passes on to a still more awkward problem; i f God
began his creative w o r k by saying 'Let there be light', what sort of restraint
could obstruct i t and so give rise to an alternation of day and night? He suggests, though not very confidently, that perhaps the primeval light was localized and actually travelled round the unformed earth: 'Although water still
covered all the earth, there was nothing to prevent the watery sphere f r o m
having day on one side by the presence of light, and on the other side night
by its absence Thus in the evening, darkness would pass to that side which
the light was vacating by turning to the other ' The obvious objection to this
view is that i t makes the primeval light behave so exactly like the sun that
one cannot see w h y the sun is needed to replace i t Moreover i t makes nonsense of the view that the succession of days is merely a teaching device to
exhibit the complexity of what is really an instantaneous act Augustine
himself does not seem to have been satisfied by his suggestions; in the end he
falls back on the view that the primeval light must have been the spiritual
illumination enjoyed by the angels, w i t h the alternation of higher and lower
knowledge which we have already described He does, however, allude to an
alternative view put out by St Basil, who writes as follows: 'Ever since the
creation of the sun there is day, namely the air illuminated by the sun when it
shines in the hemisphere above the earth; and night, the shadow cast on the
earth when the sun is hidden But in the beginning it was not the sun's movement, but the diffusion of that primeval light, and its ensuing withdrawal at
the moment God appointed, which made the day come and the night succeed
it'
Augustine himself refers to the theory that light is illuminated a i r ,
derived perhaps f r o m Aristotle, who holds that light is an activity of transparent media, like air or w a t e r ; but i t may have formed part of a scholarly
attempt to rehabilitate the biblical notion of light as an effect which needs no
particular source; Basil could have taken i t f r o m the lost Commentary on
Genesis by Origen, and Origen, as we know, discussed the Scriptures w i t h
learned Jewish rabbis But there is an alternative possibility, which I w i l l
explain in due course

objects at a distance. B u t when i t is pulled i n , i t does not altogether stop

seeing distant objects, although o f course i t sees them more obscurely than
when i t focusses its gaze upon them. Neverthless the light w h i c h is in the eye,
according to authoritative opinion, is so slight that without the help of light
f r o m outside we should not be able to see anything Moreover; since i t cannot
be distinguished f r o m the outside light, it is difficult, as I have said, to f i n d an
analogy to prove a diffusion of light to make the day and a contraction to
make the n i g h t '
This passage calls for explanation Ancient theories of vision were often
dominated by the axiom that like is known by like On this assumption, the
eye sees because i t is bright; and the theory developed by Plato suggests
that the eye is the source o f a 'visual ray', that is, of a stream of light directed
towards the object i t seeks to discern But it cannot do its work unaided;
vision is achieved only when the ray f r o m our eye meets w i t h more powerful
rays o f light which proceed f r o m the object in view. Plato's theory succeeds,
though rather clumsily, i n meeting an obvious objection to the theory of
visual rays. Since ex hypotheu they are luminous and resemble the light they
apprehend, w h y do we not see these rays of light shooting out f i o m other
people's eyes, even i f understandably we cannot perceive our own? The
answer - a rather feeble and face-saving answer as I think - is that the rays
are i n fact luminous, but too faint to be ordinarily visible; we see by means of
them, but we do not see them
Augustine has evidently adopted the Platonic theory; but unless I am mistaken, there are traces also of a totally different theory of light and vision
deriving f r o m the Stoics. The Stoics, or some of them, regarded rays of light,
not as an outgoing stream, but as a sort of tentacle, a static extension of the
luminous object, which is at once retracted when a cloud or solid body blocks
the direct path to earth (It has to be retracted, of course, because we never
come across detached fragments of sunbeam glowing among the flowerbeds) This Stoic theory is mentioned by Marcus Aurelius, and seems to be
vaguely familiar to several Christian writers, who remark that the divine
Logos is indeed related to the Father as the sun's radiance is to the sun; but
we must not think of a radiance w h i c h is put forth and withdrawn; the Logos
exists eternally But the Stoics, like the Platonists, appear to have drawn a
parallel between illumination and vision; for we learn of a really bizarre
theory, by which the eye is said to compress the adjacent air and make of it a
kind of antenna, so that we feel for the distant object as if w i t h a stick For

1 2

1 3

14

15

Augustine's criticism of Basil is brief and perfunctory; perhaps he d i d not

fully understand his colleague's proposal B u t the passage is worth quoting,
since it leads us on f r o m the theory of light to the theory of human vision.
'No analogy can be offered', he writes, 'to prove such a diffusion and contraction o f the light as w o u l d account for the succession of day and night The
shaft of rays f r o m our eyes, to be sure, is a shaft of light It can be pulled in
when we focus on what is near to our eyes, and extended when we f i x on

1 6

17

1 8

1 9

2 0

1.1631
Timaeus 45b-46c
See my Divine Substance (Oxford 1977). p 196 adding Letter to Rheginm p 45 36-8 (ed
M L . Peel p 31)
Epiphanius. haer. 62,1 8.
Stoic Vet Frag 2 865-7
1 6

17

12

13

1 4

15

1.12 25.
Hex 2.8 MignePG 29,48 B C
8 12 26
De Anima 2 7,4i8b 3 ff ; cf Didymus on Genesis 1 8; Sources chrtiennes 233 p 68, 19-21

1 8

19

20

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AUGUSTINE S U N I V E R S E

all its crudity, this theory does offer some sort of account of our ability to
focus our eyes at varying distances; and I think Augustine probably has this
theory in mind when he talks of the diffusion and contraction of light B u t it
is also probable that he has misunderstood St Basil There is no suggestion of
Stoic doctrine in Basil's Second H o m i l y ; more probably the Hebrew notion
of light has somehow come down to h i m Basil was no great scientist; but he
was surely acute enough to see the absurdity of trying to explain darkness in
terms of unfocussed vision
Augustine's account of sight has the special interest that i t implies an
instantaneous process w i t h i n which, nevertheless, one can establish an order
o f priorities; and he himself compares i t w i t h creation, understood as an
instantaneous act which can nevertheless be described as a set of successive
stages Thus 'when we look at the sun rising, i t is evident that our gaze could
not reach i t without passing over the whole expanse o f earth and sky that lies
between' Our sight, he explains, has to pass through the air spread out over
various lands and above the enormous ocean on its way to the sun Yet ' i f we
close our eyes and turn towards the sun
there w i l l seem to be no lapse of
time between the moment we open our eyes and the moment our gaze meets
its object. N o w this is certainly a ray of material light that shines forth from
our eyes and touches objects so remote w i t h a speed that cannot be calculated
or equalled I t is clear that all those measureless spaces are traversed at one
time in a single glance; yet i t is no less evident what part of these spaces is
penetrated first and what part later '

an inflated ball are both made of skin * I am afraid this looks more l i k e an
attempt to save the consistency of Scripture than to follow the writer's intention; but it is fairly evident that in practice Augustine declares for a spherical
heaven

2 1

So much for our vision N o w , what does it disclose? 'Heaven and earth',
we might answer in brief But what is their f o r m , and what is the substance ol
which they are made? Augustine, we noted, has airily dismissed all enquiries
into the f orm or shape o f heaven; but in the immediate sequel he has to admit
that the problem needs discussion. For the Scripture itself, at least in its Latin
version, makes two conflicting impressions; Isaiah 40:22 describes God suspending the heavens like a vault, whereas the 104th Psalm has him stretch
them out like a skin. Augustine perhaps conceives the 'skin' - and rightly as the flattened roof of a rectangular tent, which in practice of course would
be slightly concave 'For what can be so different and contradictory as a skin
stretched out flat', he says, 'and the curved shape of a vault?' He goes on to
say that the picture of heaven as a vault does not contradict the view that
heaven is a sphere; Scripture simply meant to describe that part which is over
our heads 'If, therefore, i t is not a sphere, i t is a vault where i t covers the
earth; but i f i t is a sphere, i t is a vault all round ' But the text comparing it to
a skin is much more puzzling Augustine's answer is that 'If a vault can not
only be curved but be also flat, a skin can surely be stretched out not only on
a flat plane but in the form of a sphere Thus for instance a leather bottle and

22

He also accepts that the earth is a sphere, though without pushing this
opinion; no doubt he was u n w i l l i n g to provoke a controversy on such a point,
since his view was by no means universal among Christians Lactantius had
declared that the earth is flat; and the literalist expositors of the Antiochene
school thought i t rectangular, no doubt inferring this from biblical texts about
the four corners of the earth; and the same picture reappears in the Christian
Topography of Cosmas Indicopleustes Augustine's opinion leaks out, so to
speak, in a passing reference to 'the massive watery sphere' o f the primeval
earth, or the 'globe of tempestuous air' that surrounds it; or indeed f r o m his
remark that 'for the whole twenty-four hours of the sun's circuit there is
always day in one place and night i n another'
It can also be inferred from
his discussion o f the Antipodes i n the City of God
He cannot believe that
these people exist, since (assuming the torrid zone to be uninhabited) this
would divide the human race into t w o disconnected halves But any belief
that the earth was flat w o u l d dispose of the Antipodes at once, for it necessitates an absolute up and down for f a l l i n g bodies; the Antipodes would simply
fall o f f the underside of the earth - unless, indeed, they had sticky feet, like
the flies that walk on our ceilings; and they would need six feet, or five at the
least, i f they were to conduct their affairs w i t h tolerable convenience I am
not quoting Augustine here; but I offer this as a fair parody of his style of
argument
2 3

24

Augustine's views on the substance of the earth are fairly conventional He

accepts the theory of four elements, earth, air, fire and water, each constituted
by the imposition of a pair of qualities on a primary indeterminate matter;
thus earth is cold and dry, whereas water is cold and wet, and so on By
reason of the qualities they share, the elements can be transformed one into
another The heavier elements tend to f a l l towards the centre of the universe,
the earth, whereas the lighter ones tend to move upwards and outwards. He
describes a conflict between the tendencies of air and water in a passage
which seems to recall his early scientific studies: ' A jar placed upside down
into water cannot f i l l up, thus clearly showing that air by its nature seeks
a higher place The jar seems to be empty, but it is obvious that it is f u l l of
air
Then finding no outlet in the higher part of the vessel, and being
unable by its nature to break through the waters below
the ah fills all the
25

2 2

2 3

2 1

4 34 54

2 9 21-2
I J 2 25;2 1327;1 1021

2 4

City of God

2 5

225

16 9

XVII

XVII
AUGUSIINE S UNIVERSE

AUCUSIINE S UNIVERSE

vessel, withstands the water and does not allow it to enter But place the jar
so that the mouth is not downwards but to the side, and the water w i l l flow in
below while the air escapes above. '
This theory of natural places - where we w o u l d think of specific gravity leads to some difficulties in dealing w i t h a text like Psalm 136:6, 'He established the earth above the waters', and even more w i t h Genesis 1:6, 'God
said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters ' We w i l l come to
the firmament presently; meanwhile there is time for a word on the heavenly
bodies which circulate in the space between earth and heaven On this subject
Augustine is usually content to speak at second hand and quote the opinions
of others. He has a certain amount o f sound astronomical knowledge He
does not decide for certain whether the moon provides its own light or
whether it reflects that of the sun; but on either supposition he can give a
correct account of its phases On the former view, the moon is particoloured
and, as he says 'is always f u l l ' - viz f r o m some point o f view - 'though i t
does not always appear so to people on earth' But i f i t shines by reflected
light, then 'when i t is near the sun i t can only appear in the shape of a horn,
because the rest of i t , which is fully illumined, is not facing the earth so as to
be seen f r o m here. '

w h o m he does not name attempted 'to refute those who say that the relative
weights of the elements make it impossible for water to exist above the starry
heavens'; the pagans, that is, who object to the biblical notion of waters
above the firmament It is apparently agreed by both parties that 'Saturn is
the coldest star, and that i t takes thirty years to complete its orbit in the
heavens', whereas 'the sun completes a similar orbit in a year, and the moon
in a month, requiring a briefer time, they explain, because these bodies are
lower in the heavens; and thus the extent of time is in proportion to the extent
of space ' I n other words, i t is assumed that all the heavenly bodies move in
their orbits w i t h the same velocity

10

2 6

On the other hand Augustine apparently does not know, or fails to appreciate, the mathematical methods by which astronomers ttied to calculate the
relative sizes and distances of the sun and other luminaries One interesting
passage refers to a view that perhaps all the heavenly bodies 'are in themselves equally bright, on the supposition that their unequal distances f r o m the
earth may cause them to appear w i t h greater or less brilliance to our eyes '
The advocates of this theory no doubt treated the moon as an exception,
holding that it is not self-luminous; but 'concerning the stars', says
Augustine, 'they go so far as to maintain that many of them are the size of the
sun, or even larger, but that they appear small because of their greater distance ' This view, we may note, was still maintained by Sir W i l l i a m Herschel
at the end of the eighteenth century It has two remarkable implications,
though i t is hardly probable that Augustine discerned them First, the socalled 'fixed stars' would then be at enormously different distances f r o m the
earth, to account for their differing brightness, as opposed to the conventional
view which saw them as uniformly disposed on the outermost sphere of the
heavens Secondly, on any reasonable computation of the sun's distance, the
universe would have to be very much larger than any magnitude commonly
assigned to it
But a quite different picture is given by a bizarre piece of argumentation
which Augustine reports without apparent disbelief Some Christian writers
27

The Christian writers now object, how can Saturn possibly be cold, on this
assumption? The pagans have attended only to its proper motion; they forget
that Saturn travels round the earth once every twenty-four hours; and 'the
greater the speed o f an object, the greater its heat' Now Saturn must travel
very fast indeed, since i t describes so large a circuit round the earth; and i f it
really is cold, the reason must be that ' i t is cooled by the waters that are near
it above the heavens' I f we can permit ourselves a little mathematics, this
w o u l d mean that Saturn's distance above the earth would be 360 times that of
the moon; and assuming the moon's distance were correctly determined,
Saturn would be about as far from the earth as we now know the sun is, and
the sphere of the fixed stars only a little more distant, thus giving the universe
a radius of about 100 m i l l i o n miles B u t such calculations are by no means in
the spirit of Augustine, w h o protests i n his most repressive m o o d that 'it is
neither necessary nor fitting to engage in subtle speculations about the distances and magnitudes of the stars or to give to such an enquiry the time
needed for matters weightier and more sublime '
29

The firmament, however, must be explained Is i t the same as the 'heaven'

mentioned in verse 1 of Genesis? A n d how can there be waters above the firmament i f water, a heavy element, has its natural place below the air? In
reply, Augustine argues that the theory of natural places does not hold good
universally; he comments on the Psalmist's text 'He established the earth
above the water', and shows that this is possible by commonplace examples;
for instance 'the promontories that tower over the water
or again, the
roofs of caverns that rest on solid supports and overhang the waters b e l o w ' .
A n d water, also, can be found above the air; Augustine adapts an argument
found in St Basil Basil himself had rejected the conventional view of the firmament as a solid crystalline vault, and supposed that it was some sort of
consolidated a i r , appealing to Amos 4:13, 'He consolidates the thunder'; air
is consolidated in cavities within the clouds, and bursts out to produce the
30

31

2 8

1 9
2 6

2 7

2 8

2 15 31
2 1 6 33
259

11

3 0

31

2 16.34
2.1 4
Hex 3 4 P G 61 A

XVII

XVII
AUGUSTINE'S U N I V E R S E

AUGUSTINE'S U N I V E R S E

violent crashing we hear i n thunder-storms Augustine I think does not refer

to thunder, and is rather less dogmatic about the firmament itself; he w i l l not
decide whether i t is mobile or stationary; the name, he says, indicates 'not
that i t is motionless but that i t is solid, and that i t constitutes an impassable
boundary between the waters above and the waters below ' He takes f r o m
Basil the distinction between 'water i n a vaporous state and water i n a denser
state that flows to earth' A n d water-vapour, of course, can be found without
penetrating the firmament: 'the clouds', he says, 'according to the testimony
of those who have walked through them i n the mountains, have this vaporous
appearance', but ' i f further condensation takes place, so that one drop is
formed out of many small ones, the air, unable to support i t , yields to its
weight as i t travels down, and this is the explanation o f rain
Rather surprisingly, Augustine asserts the infinite divisibility of matter, which is clean
contrary to the dominant Platonic view, and makes i t harder to explain the
unequal densities of the four elements; but i t does enable h i m to argue that
there is no problem i n the waters above the firmament; 'if water, as is
obvious, can be divided into drops so small that i t moves up i n vapours above
the air
. why could i t not exist also above that purer heaven on high i n still
smaller drops and lighter m i s t s ? '

bodily likenesses' - an example might be St Peter's vision of the dish let

down f u l l o f various animals; 'the third, as the objects seen by the m i n d when
it has been carried out o f the senses
through the love of the Holy S p i r i t '
'In this way we see also love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness,
faith, meekness, temperance,and the rest, by w h i c h we draw nearer to God;
and finally God himself, f r o m w h o m are all things and i n whom are all
things'
Returning f r o m these heights, as we must, we can see that for Augustine
only the lowest, or visible, heaven is conceived as located i n space I t seems
also that it is by figurative language that hell is described as the underworld;
Augustine does not seriously intend, l i k e M i l t o n , to place i t at the centre of
the earth; though i n his Retractations, written towards the close of his life, he
seems to think he should have done so

12

, 3 2

3 6

3 7

However that may be, a society of academics must surely warm to the
prospect of a heaven i n w h i c h the exercise of the intellect is our only duty
and our unending joy B u t I myself would like i t to include, in some appropriate f o r m , the enjoyment of theological wine

33

I n the passage just quoted Augustine has identified the firmament w i t h

heaven; but he by no means always does so 'Heaven' is for Augustine a
word of many senses Thus we are told that 'the birds f l y i n heaven - but i n
this heaven near us'; however when Scripture refers to 'the winged creatures
of heaven', they are alleged to f l y along, or near, the firmament, not to be i n
the firmament
A n y such explanation of course conflicts w i t h any possible
estimate that makes the firmament 360 times more distant than the moon; in
cosmology we f i n d that Augustine solves his problems piecemeal; he has no
synoptic view; and such incoherence is the penalty he pays for his dismissive
attitude to physical science. I n any case, for his more considered view of
heaven Augustine, like many of the Fathers, draws on St Paul's description of
the vision whereby he was 'caught up into the third heaven', 2 Cor 12:2
Three heavens, then, there must be; and Augustine is inclined to think that
this is their total number, though he knows that some theologians recognise
seven, or even as many as t e n He supports his total o f three by an appeal to
psychology, where there is a graduation f r o m sense-perception to what we
might call imagination, and thirdly to the pure intellect Thus we understand
'the first heaven as this whole corporeal heaven, namely all that is above the
waters and the earth; the second, as the object of spiritual vision seen i n
3 4

3 5

3 2

3 3

3 4

3 5

247
2 4 8.
3.7 10
1 2 29 5 7

13

3 6

3 7

1 2 3 4 67
12 24.50

XVIII
Augustine's De Magistro: a philosophers view

A u g u s t i n e ' s De Magistro q u i t e p r o p e r l y counts as one o f his minor

w o r k s ; y e t i t was i n f l u e n t i a l i n the M i d d l e Ages and has a t t r a c t e d some
interest a m o n g m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r s . C e r t a i n l y i t is b y n o means a n e g l i gible p r o d u c t i o n For one t h i n g , i t has l i t e r a r y m e r i t I t was w r i t t e n at
Thagaste i n 389, a n d p u r p o r t s t o r e c o r d an actual c o n v e r s a t i o n between
A u g u s t i n e a n d his g i f t e d son A d e o d a t u s , w h o died at the age o f sixteen
or so i n t h a t year or t h e next O n e c a n n o t be c e r t a i n , o f c o u r s e , h o w
closely the c o n v e r s a t i o n was f o l l o w e d , if s o ; b u t at a n y rate t h e style of
an actual discussion is v e r y w e l l caught. A p a r t f r o m a l o n g c o n c l u d i n g
address b y A u g u s t i n e , t h e t w o speakers deliver their c o n t r i b u t i o n s in a
b r i s k e x c h a n g e ; and u n l i k e m a n y dialogues - even Plato's dialogues - i n
w h i c h the m i n o r characters act o n l y as a s o u n d i n g - b o a r d for t h e leader,
it represents A d e o d a t u s as m a k i n g proposals and objections o f real
w e i g h t , even i f A u g u s t i n e h a r d l y appears as r e t r a c t i n g any o f his m a i n
c o n t e n t i o n s i n response t o his j u n i o r
F u r t h e r m o r e , the b o o k approaches a subject of the greatest p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l i m p o r t a n c e , namely our k n o w l e d g e of t h e highest
r e a l i t y , even i f , as A u g u s t i n e a d m i t s i n Chapter 8, it does so by t h e rather
t o r t u o u s r o u t e o f c o n s i d e r i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between signs a n d other
signs, and again b e t w e e n signs a n d the t h i n g s t h e y signify. A u g u s t i n e ,
t h e n , is w r i t i n g o n the p h i l o s o p h y o f language; and as p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t e n
d o , he has some b o l d and c o n t r o v e r s i a l themes t o propose. T h e r e is
some disagreement a b o u t their v a l u e ; a r e c e n t c r i t i c has stated t h a t the
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e * f o u n d here and in some related texts is
neither o r i g i n a l nor p r o f o u n d nor correct; whereas he allows t h a t i t is
b o l d ; and i t has been g i v e n a m u c h m o r e sympathetic assessment by P r o fessor B u r n y e a t I am i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k , w i t h great respect, t h a t B u i n y e a t is t o o k i n d . A u g u s t i n e ' s m a i n t h e m e , o f course, is C h r i s t as the
teacher o f supreme r e a l i t y , w h i c h points one a w a y f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y
o f l a n g u a g e ; b u t o n the w a y t o his c o n c l u s i o n he argues - or seems t o
1

The critic is Dr C A. KTRWAN, who kindly let me read part of his fotthcoming book on Augustine's philosophy. Contrast Professor M . F BURNYEAT'S Inaugural Address, The Aristotelian

1-24

Society

Supplementary

Volume

LXI

(1987)

xvni

XVIII
Augustine's

64
argue - f i r s t , that all sentences are statements; secondly, t h a t a l l w o r d s
are n o u n s ; and t h i r d l y , t h a t n o t h i n g is l e a r n t by means o f signs, i n
w h i c h , o f course, w o r d s are i n c l u d e d . B u t i f this t h i i d c o n t e n t i o n is t r u e ,
w h y has A u g u s t i n e given himself t h e t r o u b l e o f w r i t i n g ?
A u g u s t i n e begins his a r g u m e n t b y c l a i m i n g t h a t w h e n w e speak, our
i n t e n t i o n is always to teach I t is this c l a i m t h a t I have p h r a s e d , m o r e
p r o v o c a t i v e l y , i n t h e f o r m t h a t a l l sentences are statements B u t this paraphrase does, I t h i n k , f a i r l y represent A u g u s t i n e ' s use o f the w o r d s
<teaching> and <learning>, at least i n the e a r l y chapters o f this book.
W h a t he discusses is n o t t e a c h i n g someone h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g , b u t
t e a c h i n g h i m that s o m e t h i n g is the case; and <learning> has a c o r r e s p o n d i n g sense; i t is o n l y m u c h later t h a t w e are l e d t o consider t e a c h i n g a n d
l e a r n i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e n o n l y i n rather specialized i n stances; f o r instance, h o w t o r e c o g n i z e w h a t a w o r d stands f o r ; and bey o n d t h i s , the v e r y special instance o f t e a c h i n g or l e a r n i n g h o w to see
t h i n g s as they r e a l l y are
I n i t i a l l y , t h e n , t e a c h i n g is represented as an act o f m a k i n g statements
T h i s is clearly seen i n the f i r s t f e w w o r d s , w h e r e A d e o d a t u s says i n effect
t h a t speech comprises b o t h statements a n d questions; f o r our purpose i n
speaking is either t o teach or t o l e a r n , a n d w e learn by asking questions
A u g u s t i n e answers b y saying t h a t the sole purpose o f asking questions is
to teach ones i n t e r l o c u t o r w h a t one wishes to k n o w
O n e can clearly see t h a t this answer is f a u l t y b y t a k i n g a m o d e r n example M y f r i e n d asks me W h y are y o u g o i n g to the e n q u i r y o f f i c e ? * I
r e p l y , Because I w a n t to f i n d o u t t h e t i m e o f the n e x t t r a i n t o L o n d o n * .
I t is clear t h a t this answer tells m y f r i e n d w h a t I w i s h to k n o w ; b u t i t is
e q u a l l y clear t h a t I am n o t asking h i m a q u e s t i o n ; I m a y w e l l believe t h a t
he does n o t k n o w t h e answer O n the other h a n d m y f r i e n d ' s q u e s t i o n ,
"Why are y o u g o i n g .. ?, does i n d e e d t e l l me w h a t he w a n t s t o k n o w ;
b u t i t also contains an element w h i c h c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to a statement,
n a m e l y a request f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . O n c e requests are m e n t i o n e d , w e can
see t h a t speech has m a n y other f u n c t i o n s c o m m a n d s , encouragements,
e x c l a m a t i o n s , w h a t y o u w i l l ; some at least o f these w o u l d be easily
f o u n d i n ancient g r a m m a r b o o k s A d m i t t e d l y , a v a r i e t y o f needs m a y be
satisfied b y the statement f o r m ; for instance Y o u m a y go, or W e l l , I
a m s u r p r i s e d * ; b u t one misses their p o i n t if one t h e n assumes t h a t the
sole purpose is t o i m p a r t i n f o r m a t i o n , or as A u g u s t i n e says, t o teach
2

A d e o d a t u s answers A u g u s t i n e w i t h an o b j e c t i o n ; he observes t h a t our

utterance m a y take t h e f o r m o f s i n g i n g , a n d t h a t w e o f t e n sing w h e n w e
are alone, and so c a n n o t be i n t e n d i n g t o teach a n y o n e A u g u s t i n e makes
2

C f e g SVF 2,186-187

De Magistro: a philosopher's view

65

a p a r t i a l concession, suggesting n o w t h a t there are t w o reasons for

s p e a k i n g ; w e speak e i t h e r t o teach or t o r e m i n d ourselves or o t h e r s ; perhaps t h e n w e sing t o r e m i n d ourselves A d e o d a t u s r e t o r t s t h a t w e often
sing p u r e l y f o r pleasure; b u t A u g u s t i n e replies t h a t w h a t pleases us is the
r h y t h m a n d m u s i c , w h i c h is i n d e p e n d e n t o f the w o r d s
A d e o d a t u s has made a v a l i d p o i n t ; b u t he c o u l d have chosen a better
e x a m p l e ; w h y s h o u l d he n o t take the case o f p o e t t y , or indeed a n y f o r m
o f w o r d s i n w h i c h w e take pleasure? I t is surely absurd to argue t h a t we
recite such w o r d s i n o r d e r t o r e m i n d ourselves o f t h e m ; no d o u b t we
sometimes d o t h i s ; b u t i n most cases we r e c a l l t h e m simply because we
e n j o y d o i n g so. T o r e c a l l t h e m b y w a y o f a r e m i n d e r is a special exerc i z e , e n s u r i n g t h a t w e can c o n t i n u e t o recall a n d t o e n j o y t h e m i n f u t u r e
A d e o d a t u s h o w e v e r is n o t y e t p r e p a r e d t o accept Augustine's s h o r t list
o f t w o reasons f o r s p e a k i n g ; he objects t h a t w e can speak t o G o d i n
p r a y e r ; and w e c a n n o t be i n t e n d i n g t o teach G o d a n y t h i n g , or t o r e m i n d
h i m , as i f he h a d f o r g o t t e n A u g u s t i n e ' s r e p l y strikes a deeper n o t e than
a n y t h i n g he has said so far. G o d , he says, s h o u l d be sought a n d p r a y e d
t o in the silent depths o f the r a t i o n a l soul T h e r e is n o need o f w o i d s ,
except perhaps t o r e m i n d others i n public prayer and t o arouse i n them
the desire t o p r a y B u t this i m m e d i a t e l y b r i n g s up the p o i n t t h a t w h e n
the supreme Teacher t a u g h t his disciples t o p r a y , he d i d so b y t e a c h i n g
t h e m a f o r m o f w o r d s . A d e o d a t u s ' r e p l y is t o i n t r o d u c e w h a t becomes a
c e n t r a l theme i n the d i a l o g u e : H e d i d n o t teach t h e m w o r d s , b u t realities b y means o f words B u t A u g u s t i n e ' s c o m m e n t does not m a k e i t perf e c t l y clear w h a t he understands b y wordless prayer H e says, Although
w e utter n o s o u n d , yet because w e ponder the w o r d s themselves, w e do
speak w i t h i n our o w n minds. Prayer thus involves the d e v o u t inner
p o n d e r i n g o f c e r t a i n w o r d s ; w h a t is unclear t o me is w h e t h e r this devout
p o n d e r i n g simply is the act o f p r a y e r , or w h e t h e r prayer involves some
f u r t h e r a c t i v i t y , a d i r e c t i o n o f t h e m i n d t o w a r d s t h e highest reality,
w h i c h is p r o m p t e d b y t h e u n v o i c e d w o r d s b u t goes b e y o n d t h e m H o w ever i t be n a m e d , A u g u s t i n e accepts this d i r e c t i o n as o u r greatest o b l i g a t i o n , p r i v i l e g e and f u l f i l m e n t
R e t u r n i n g t o p h i l o s o p h y , w e f i n d A u g u s t i n e c o n c l u d i n g that such unu t t e r e d speech serves o n l y to r e m i n d ; our m e m o r y , b y r e c a l l i n g certain
w o r d s , brings t o m i n d t h e realities themselves o f w h i c h the w o r d s are
signs
H e goes o n t o e n q u i r e , i n C h a p t e r 2, h o w the m e a n i n g of w o r d s can
be e x p l a i n e d , t a k i n g as an example the verse f r o m V e r g i l si n i h i l ex
t a n t a superis placet urbe ielinqui; i n the event, h o w e v e r , o n l y the first
three w o r d s are discussed A u g u s t i n e seems t o assume t h a t if w o r d s are
significant t h e y must represent t h i n g s i n the w a y n o u n s represent things;

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a n d this causes d i f f i c u l t i e s , especially w i t h <si> a n d <nihil>; i t m i g h t have

been better t o i n q u i r e w h a t their f u n c t i o n is w i t h i n the sentence as a
w h o l e A u g u s t i n e tries t o meet the d i f f i c u l t i e s b y a d o p t i n g a suggestion
w h i c h goes b a c k t o A r i s t o t l e , t h a t w o r d s s i g n i f y states o f m i n d T h u s <if>
signifies d o u b t ; <nothing> signifies the m i n d ' s d i s a p p o i n t m e n t i n its
search f o r reality. I n the t h i r d case this m e t h o d is a p p a r e n t l y n o t
a d o p t e d ; A d e o d a t u s explains t h a t <from> signifies separation, w h i c h
comes rather nearer t o e x p l a i n i n g a w o r d i n terms o f its f u n c t i o n . I n
passing, there is l i t t l e t o be said f o r this A r i s t o t e l i a n t h e o r y ; o f course
<some> w o r d s stand f o r states o f m i n d , b u t t h e y are the e x c e p t i o n ; w e
call t h e m p s y c h o l o g i c a l terms B u t this discussion leads o n t o a m u c h
m o r e c e n t r a l point.. W e have t r i e d our h a n d at e x p l a i n i n g w o r d s b y
means o f w o r d s , t h a t is, b y signs; b u t can w e d e m o n s t r a t e t h e realities
t h e y stand for w i t h o u t using signs? T h i s leads t o a n i n t e r e s t i n g discussion o f w h a t m o d e r n philosophers call <ostensive d e f i n i t i o n C a n w e
s h o w w h a t the w o r d <wall> means? W e can o f course p o i n t t o a w a l l ; b u t
the act o f p o i n t i n g is itself a sign, so t h a t our c o n d i t i o n is n o t f u l f i l l e d
I n d e e d , w e c o u l d a d d , the sign is a m b i g u o u s ; w e m i g h t be t a k e n t o m e a n
t h a t the w o r d <paries> stands f o r the act o f p o i n t i n g , n o t f o r t h e w a l l I t is
c o n c e d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t w e can e x p l a i n w o r d s w h i c h refer t o actions b y
p e r f o r m i n g t h e a c t i o n ; always p r o v i d e d t h a t w e are n o t already p e r f o r m i n g t h e a c t i o n w h e n the q u e s t i o n is asked. B r e a t h i n g , i t f o l l o w s , w o u l d
be an a c t i o n w h i c h w e c o u l d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e i n this w a y
3

T h e discussion n o w passes t o a subject w h i c h seems to me rather less

i m p o r t a n t , n a m e l y t h e cases i n w h i c h signs are s i g n i f i e d b y signs A u g u s t i n e brings up the case o f the w o r d <nomen>, w h i c h can be translated
either <name> or <noun> <Nomen>, he says, q u i t e c o r r e c t l y , stands f o r a
class o f w o r d s w h i c h includes itself, f o r the w o r d <noun> is a n o u n ; here
t h e n w e have a sign w h i c h signifies a sign. B u t t h e class o f n o u n s i n cludes w o r d s l i k e <Rome> a n d <virtue> a n d <iiver>; these w o r d s are also
signs, b u t the realities t h e y stand f o r are n o t signs. A u g u s t i n e goes o n t o
p u t the question w h e t h e r there are signs w h i c h have r e c i p r o c a l significat i o n ^ so t h a t <x> signifies <y>, b u t conversely <y> signifies <x>. H e takes the
case o f <noun> a n d <word> (<uerbum>) H e is aware t h a t the t w o w o r d s
have d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s , b u t suggests t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e is analogous t o
t h a t b e t w e e n <coloured> a n d <visible> ; i n m o d e r n t e r m s , w e w o u l d say
t h a t the reference o f t h e t w o t e r m s is the same, t h o u g h their sense is d i f f e r e n t I n other w o r d s , all w o r d s are n o u n s
4

De Interpretatione 1, 16 a 3
Cf Aristotle, De Anima 2 7, 418 a 27sqq. The distinction between <sense>
(Sinn) and <ieference> (Bedeutung) was introduced by FREGE; see below p.
68, on <nomen> and <uerbum>

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67

N o w this is t o f l y i n t h e face o f c o m m o n sense T h e dullest g r a m m a r i a n w i l l state, q u i t e c o r r e c t l y , t h a t n o u n s f o r m o n l y one o f t h e six or

eight parts o f speech; m o r e o v e r A u g u s t i n e h i m s e l f has a l r e a d y represented A d e o d a t u s as saying t h a t a l l nouns are w o r d s , b u t n o t a l l w o r d s
are n o u n s , a n d h i m s e l f r e p l y i n g w i t h the p e r f e c t l y c o r r e c t a n a l o g y of
<horses> and <animals> W h a t has misled h i m ? O n e can perhaps u n d e r stand h o w easily c o n f u s i o n can arise b y q u o t i n g this sentence f r o m mag
5 , 1 1 : Then y o u k n o w t h a t as <noun> is s i g n i f i e d b y <word>, so <word> is
s i g n i f i e d b y <noun> .. T h i s suggests t h a t t h e r e is a s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e m ; b u t w e have a p r i o r assurance t h a t this c a n n o t be t r u e ;
a n d w i t h a l i t t l e patience w e can w o r k o u t a c o r r e c t e d paraphrase o f A u gustine's sentence. I suggest the f o l l o w i n g : <Word> stands for a class of
signs w h i c h includes the w o r d <noun> and m o r e o v e r includes a l l n o u n s ;
but <noun> stands f o r a class o f signs w h i c h includes the w o r d <word> but
does n o t i n c l u d e all w o r d s . This satisfies the common-sense assumption
t h a t a l l nouns are w o r d s b u t n o t all w o r d s are nouns
A u g u s t i n e himself seems t o t h i n k t h a t some f u r t h e r p r o o f of his parad o x is n e e d e d ; a n d he f i n d s i t b y q u o t i n g t h e text o f 2 Cor 1,19, non
erat i n C h r i s t o est et n o n , sed est i n i l l o erat H e argues, c o r r e c t l y as I
t h i n k , t h a t St. P a u l c a n n o t m e a n t h a t the w o r d <est> w a s in C h r i s t , but
r a t h e r , w h a t is s i g n i f i e d or n a m e d b y the w o r d <est> T h i s leads h i m to
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the w o r d <est> is a n o u n , because i t names or signifies
w h a t was in C h r i s t ; f o r that b y w h i c h a n y t h i n g is n a m e d is a noun
O n e m i g h t o f course c o m m e n t t h a t St Paul's expression t o w h i c h he appeals is an e x t r e m e l y u n u s u a l use o f l a n g u a g e ; b u t A u g u s t i n e proceeds to
b r o a d e n his a r g u m e n t b y s h o w i n g t h a t any w o r d whatsoever can be discussed, a n d can appear as the subject o f a sentence; he p o i n t s t o t w o sentences w h i c h c o n t a i n the w o r d s <because> a n d <if>, a n d argues t h a t we
can l e g i t i m a t e l y say <If> is c o r r e c t , w h i l e <because> is i n c o r r e c t * This
leads h i m , n o t t o the w e l l - g r o u n d e d c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a n y w o r d can in
c e r t a i n circumstances f u n c t i o n as a n o u n , b u t t o the incautious assertion
t h a t all w o r d s are n o u n s and all n o u n s are w o r d s * T h e f i r s t clause is i n defensible; a n d w e c a n n o t m e n d matters b y t r a n s l a t i n g <nomina> as
<names>. I n d e e d is n o t clear even t h a t the class o f n o u n s enjoys a p r i v i leged p o s i t i o n W e m i g h t argue b y t h e same t o k e n t h a t the n o u n <dolor>
is r e a l l y a v e r b , since i n the c o n t e x t <proh doIoi> i t is equivalent to
<doleo>, or possibly < d o l e n d u m est>; and as w e all k n o w , the n o u n <pax>
can be used to f r a m e a request W e classify w o r d s i n terms o f t h e i r p r i m a r y a n d basic f u n c t i o n , w h i l e n o t i n g t h a t v a r i a t i o n s ate possible W e
d o n o t quote t h e phrase <But me n o buts> t o argue t h a t <but> is a verb,
b u t i t is also a n o u n .

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Augustine's

B u r n y e a t offers an i n t e r e s t i n g defence o f A u g u s t i n e at this p o i n t ,

s h o w i n g , quite c o r r e c t l y , t h a t A u g u s t i n e recognizes the d i s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n the m e n t i o n o f a w o r d a n d the use o f i t a n d a r g u i n g t h a t a n y
w o r d whatsoever can be used t o name itself, or again to name t h e <dictio> that i t signifies I n the case w e have just c o n s i d e r e d , <If> is c o r r e c t ,
w h i l e <because> is i n c o r r e c t * , A u g u s t i n e is n o t m a k i n g a p o i n t a b o u t the
t w o L a t i n c o n j u n c t i o n s i n v o l v e d ; i n t h a t case, w e s h o u l d have q u o t e d
t h e m v e r b a t i m , instead o f t r a n s l a t i n g t h e m ; he is r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i g n i f i e d b y the L a t i n <si> a n d the E n g l i s h <if>, a n d so on.
B u t , w e m a y c o m m e n t , he is n o t discussing the f o r c e of these c o n j u n c tions t a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n , b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t w o sentences i n w h i c h t h e y
occur M i g h t i t n o t be b e t t e r , t h e n , t o say he is c o n t r a s t i n g t w o sentences
in respect o f the single feature by w h i c h t h e y d i f f e r ? T h i s , i t appears,
w o u l d m u c h reduce the significance o f B u r n y e a t ' s d e f e n c e ; t h o u g h it
w o u l d be v a l i d , no d o u b t , i f A u g u s t i n e w e r e g i v i n g a m o r e generalized
t r e a t m e n t o f the t w o c o n t r a s t e d w o r d s
5

I n any case, a l l t h a t A u g u s t i n e has p r o v e d is t h a t various kinds o f

w o r d s can be used as n o u n s A n d I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t he is at all clear
a b o u t the f o r c e o f his o w n a r g u m e n t s H e has stated p r e v i o u s l y , a n d c o r r e c t l y , t h a t n o u n s , <nomina>, f o r m a d i s t i n c t class w i t h i n the larger class
o f w o r d s , <uerba>; whereas t h e L a t i n <nomen> a n d the G r e e k <onoma>
are genuine s y n o n y m s . B u t he goes o n t o m a k e t h e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t c l a i m
t h a t <nomen> a n d <uerbum> have the same range o f a p p l i c a b i l i t y , or r e f e r e n c e ; i t is their sense t h a t is d i f f e r e n t , <uerbum> b e i n g so c a l l e d because
o f sounds w h i c h s t r i k e the ear, <uerberare>, and <nomen> because o f its
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h <knowing> I t seems, t h e n , t h a t t h e y are r e l a t e d l i k e the
w o r d s <ouis> a n d <bidens>, t w o w o r d s w h i c h have d i f f e r e n t senses or associations, b u t w h i c h b o t h n a m e the same class o f sheep O u r familiar
example o f < m o m i n g star> and (evening stai> is s i m i l a r , except t h a t the
phrases name one a n d t h e same i n d i v i d u a l , n o t the same class
C o u l d A u g u s t i n e have been u s i n g his inconsistency as a p e d a g o g i c device i n t e n d e d t o exercize his readers' w i t s b y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e m to see
t h r o u g h his m y s t i f i c a t i o n s ? I d o n o t t h i n k so M o r e p r o b a b l y he t h o u g h t
he r e a l l y h a d established his p a r a d o x i c a l c l a i m H e was b y n o means the
last great p h i l o s o p h e r t o be ensnared b y a b e g u i l i n g t h e o r y
H a v i n g s u m m a r i z e d his c o n c l u s i o n s , A u g u s t i n e seems a l i t t l e uncertain h o w t o resume t h e discussion, t h o u g h he insists t h a t i t has a serious
p o i n t i n d i r e c t i n g our t h o u g h t s t o w a r d s e t e r n a l life B u t C h a p t e r 8 c o n tributes l i t t l e b e y o n d r e a f f i r m i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n signs a n d the
realities t h e y s i g n i f y O n c e again i t is n o u n s w h i c h o c c u p y t h e f i e l d , the
5

Op

cit

9-12

De Magi%tro a philosopher's view

69

n o u n <homo> b e i n g t a k e n as an e x a m p l e N e w g r o u n d is first a t t a i n e d in
the n e x t chapter, w h e r e A u g u s t i n e suggests t h a t realities are m o r e v a l u able t h a n the signs w h i c h represent t h e m A d e o d a t u s objects, q u i t e p r o p e r l y , t h a t bad t h i n g s have a disvalue; t h e y are t h e r e f o r e worse t h a n their
signs. T h e discussion t h e n t u r n s t o the k n o w l e d g e w h i c h signs c o n v e y ; is
it a g o o d t h i n g t o give b a d things a name? A d e o d a t u s is d o u b t f u l ; but
A u g u s t i n e soon persuades h i m t h a t k n o w l e d g e even o f bad realities is
g o o d ; i t is better t h a n their signs, w h i c h i n t u r n aie better t h a n t h e bad
realities. A d e o d a t u s h o w e v e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e r e are f o u r t h i n g s t o be
c o n s i d e r e d : the name, t h e r e a l i t y , k n o w l e d g e o f the n a m e , and k n o w l edge o f the r e a l i t y I n t h e case o f bad t h i n g s , perhaps i t is better simply
to k n o w their n a m e t h a n t o k n o w the reality? B u t A u g u s t i n e dissents; he
insists t h a t k n o w l e d g e of vices is m o r e valuable t h a n k n o w l e d g e o f their
names
It is a p i t y t h a t this a r g u m e n t was n o t c o n t i n u e d , a n d the i m p o r t a n t
phrases m o r e f u l l y d e f i n e d W h a t does A u g u s t i n e mean by k n o w l e d g e of
a w o r d ? Is it e n o u g h , say, to k n o w that the L a t i n w o r d <uitiuru> c o r r e sponds t o the G r e e k <kakia>, or to paraphrase i t as <malitia cordis>? Or
does one have t o k n o w w h a t the w o r d represents? I n this case, k n o w l edge o f the w o r d demands at least some k n o w l e d g e of the reality. B u t is
it a g o o d t h i n g t o k n o w w h a t , say, lust is, as A u g u s t i n e seems t o insist?
A n d i n w h a t sense can one k n o w i t w i t h o u t e x p e r i e n c i n g it? O n e m i g h t
perhaps answer t h a t perfect innocence is impossible m this w o r l d , wheie
we are members one of a n o t h e r ; the m a n bent o n securing his o w n i n n o cence m a y w e l l be insensitive, and m a y n o t be successful as a pastor The
g o o d m a n w i l l have had e n o u g h experience o f lust t o put him o n his
g u a r d against i t ; he may perhaps c o m b i n e the m a x i m u m of sympathy
w i t h the m i n i m u m o f actual engagement
T h e r e is also, no d o u b t , a
place f o i the m a n w h o has fallen b u t has n o t been f i n a l l y c o r r u p t e d H e
w i l l c o n t r i b u t e his o w n resources o f f e l l o w - f e e l i n g and practical e x p e r i ence Some of these t h o u g h t s w i l l be f o u n d i n A u g u s t i n e ; but n o t , 1
t h i n k , i n the De
Magistio
W e n o w r e t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r realities can be demonstrated
w i t h o u t the use o f signs The activities of speaking a n d t e a c h i n g , it is
agreed, f o r m an e x c e p t i o n , since i n their case the use o f signs is p a i t of
the r e a l i t y to be d e m o n s t r a t e d B u t w h y c o u l d not one ha\e a simple dem o n s t r a t i o n , say, o f the act of v, a l k i n g ? A d e o d a t u s sees d i f f i c u l t i e s here;
a mere d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d not make it clear whether it was a d e m o n stration of w a l k i n g , or o f w a l k i n g so manv steps H e c o u l d w e l l h a u
added t h a t quite a c o m p l e x d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d be needed to explain
w h i c h various styles of m o v e m e n t can p r o p e r l y qualify as w a l k i n g ; and
c o u l d this be achieved w i t h o u t a sign of n e g a t i o n to disq u a I i f\ tejected

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examples? B u t A u g u s t i n e overrules his o b j e c t i o n , a n d persuades h i m t h a t
an i n t e l l i g e n t m a n c o u l d l e a r n f r o m a d e m o n s t r a t i o n a l l t h a t is n a m e d b y
the w o r d <fowling>; a n d w h a t can be said o f f o w l i n g must also a p p l y t o
walking
T h i s , pace B u r n y e a t , is a most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y a r g u m e n t . F o w l i n g seems
a c o n v i n c i n g example precisely because i t is a c o m p l e x and s o m e w h a t
u n u s u a l a c t i v i t y ; t h e f o w l e r w o u l d have g o o d g r o u n d s f o r supposing t h a t
a passer-by w h o stopped and l o o k e d closely at his i n s t r u m e n t s was c u r i ous t o u n d e r s t a n d their f u n c t i o n E v e n so, his d e m o n s t r a t i o n c o u l d n o t
m a k e i t clear w h e t h e r he was d e m o n s t r a t i n g the a r t o f f o w l i n g as such,
or the l o c a l style o f f o w l i n g , w h i c h is r o u g h l y the p o i n t t h a t A d e o d a t u s
has m a d e i n the case o f w a l k i n g B u t A u g u s t i n e has g i v e n n o g r o u n d s at
all f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t his a r g u m e n t can be g e n e r a l i z e d so as t o apply t o
c o m m o n p l a c e activities such as w a l k i n g . "Worse s t i l l , he goes o n t o assert, n o t s i m p l y t h a t some t h i n g s can be l e a r n t w i t h o u t signs, b u t t h a t
n o t h i n g is l e a r n t b y the signs p r o p e r to it; f o r i f I d o n o t k n o w w h a t
t h e sign stands f o r , it is a meaningless s o u n d , a n d i f I d o k n o w , there is
n o t h i n g t o be l e a r n t A u g u s t i n e explains this p o i n t b y r e f e r r i n g t o the o b scure w o r d <saraballae>, w h i c h he takes t o m e a n <head-coverings>, and t o
the f a m i l i a r w o r d <caput>. H e concludes t h a t by means o f w o r d s we
learn n o t h i n g b u t w o r d s ; i n f a c t , o n l y the noise a n d s o u n d o f words.
B u t w h a t a b o u t the s t o r y o f t h e t h r e e h o l y c h i l d r e n , i n w h i c h the
w o r d s <saraballae> a n d <caput> occur? D o w e n o t l e a r n o f their adventures b y means o f w o r d s ? A u g u s t i n e has a t w o - f o l d answer t o this quest i o n . First, he says, we a l r e a d y k n e w t h e m e a n i n g o f a l l those w o r d s ;
f o r instance, w h a t three boys are, w h a t a f u r n a c e is, w h a t f i r e is, a n d so
o n But the names A n a n i a s , A z a r i a s a n d M i s a e l c o n v e y e d n o t h i n g t o
m e , any m o r e t h a n <saraballae> did. H i s second answer is t h a t the
events described i n the s t o r y r e a l l y d i d take place as t h e y are described,
a n d t h a t i t is u s e f u l , i n d e e d perhaps o b l i g a t o r y , t o believe t h i s ; b u t t h a t
such beliefs d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e k n o w l e d g e K n o w l e d g e involves d i r e c t
awareness; o n the one h a n d , k n o w l e d g e o f sense-qualities a n d sensible
o b j e c t s ; o n the o t h e r , those t h i n g s w h i c h w e b e h o l d w i t h the m i n d , t h a t
is, w i t h the i n t e l l e c t a n d r e a s o n * ; o r a g a i n , those t h i n g s w h i c h w e beh o l d i m m e d i a t e l y i n t h a t i n t e r i o r l i g h t o f t r u t h w h i c h effects e n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d happiness i n the so-called inner man.
T h e r e is n o l a c k o f c o m m e n t s t o be m a d e at this p o i n t L e t m e t r y t o
present m y observations u n d e r t h r e e h e a d i n g s : f i r s t , A u g u s t i n e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t n o t h i n g can be l e a r n t b y means o f w o r d s ; s e c o n d l y , t h e strategy
o f his a r g u m e n t at the p o i n t w h e r e he i n t r o d u c e s t h e concept o f belief;
a n d t h i r d l y , the i m p r e s s i o n he gives of r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e

Augustine's

De Magistral

a philosopher's view

71

First, t h e n , A u g u s t i n e ' s p r o b l e m s i n t h e f i r s t p a r t o f the b o o k are

l a r g e l y a r t i f i c i a l ; at least, t h e y arise because he is w o r k i n g w i t h a defective c o n c e p t o f l a n g u a g e H i s discussion o f w o r d s is i n practice m a i n l y
concerned w i t h nouns, and moreover w i t h nouns taken in isolation H e
does n o t r e c o g n i z e t h a t w e n o r m a l l y gain i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d i m p a r t i t , by
means o f c o m p l e x c o m b i n a t i o n s o f signs, so t h a t the i n t e r p l a y o f familiar
w o r d s can give us g e n u i n e l y n e w i n f o r m a t i o n ; a n d f o r t h a t m a t t e r , the
significance o f a c o m p l e t e l y u n k n o w n w o r d can o f t e n be c o r r e c t l y ded u c e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t occurs A u g u s t i n e fails t o see this, I
t h i n k , because he c o n t i n u e s to conceive t h e p r o b l e m o n the lines o f
Plato's Cratylus, w h i c h h a d c o m e t o d o m i n a t e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o a degree w h i c h was n o longer advantageous, o b s c u r i n g t h e valuable discoveries made later b y A r i s t o t l e a n d especially b y the Stoics; f o r these
observed m u c h m o r e c l e a r l y t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n t u n i t o f discourse is n o t
the w o r d , b u t t h e sentence
W e m i g h t perhaps agree w i t h A u g u s t i n e t h a t n o f o r m o f w o r d s can i n t r o d u c e us t o a n experience t h a t is e n t i r e l y u n k n o w n t o us, just as a b l i n d
m a n can never k n o w w h a t is r e a l l y meant b y the w o r d <red> B u t even
this is n o t b e y o n d q u e s t i o n A f r i e n d ' s w o r d s m i g h t i n d u c e i n us the t o t a l l y u n f a m i l i a r experience of f a l l i n g i n l o v e ; even blindness, i f its cause
w e r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l , m i g h t be c u r e d b y a psychologist's i n c a n t a t i o n
M o r e o v e r , A u g u s t i n e has p r o b a b l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e power o f analo g y Suppose he tells us, Explain t o me t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f <heaven>, if
y o u can E v e n i f we accepted t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f u s i n g o n l y n o u n s , we
c o u l d surely c o n v e y some idea o f i t b y saying Light, f i r e , soap, honey;
it w o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t l y clear t h a t heaven is s o m e t h i n g t o be h o n o u r e d
and p r a i s e d ; t h e r e w o u l d be n o danger o f o u r being t a k e n to r e f e r t o the
unpleasant taste o f soap or the pervasive stickiness o f h o n e y E v e n the
m a n w h o is i n c u r a b l y b l i n d c o u l d be g i v e n some useful i n f o r m a t i o n , if
w e w e r e free t o e x p l o i t t h e resources o f n o r m a l l a n g u a g e , since he u n derstands w h a t surfaces a r e , a n d k n o w s t h a t t h e y have d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i ties l i k e smoothness or hardness W e c o u l d n o t , o f course, give h i m any
f i r s t - h a n d k n o w l e d g e o f a visual q u a l i t y ; b u t i t w o u l d n o t be m i s l e a d i n g
to e x p l a i n t h a t redness is characteristic o f b l o o d , a n d o f t e n appears o n
m i l i t a r y u n i f o r m s , so t h a t i t has associations f o r us a k i n t o those aroused
by the sound of a t r u m p e t
S e c o n d l y , w e m a y consider the n e w t u r n g i v e n to t h e a r g u m e n t at the
p o i n t w h e r e A u g u s t i n e i n t r o d u c e s t h e story o f the t h r e e c h i l d r e n H e has
a r g u e d so far t h a t n o t h i n g is l e a r n t b y means o f w o r d s ; and w h e n c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e s t o r y he m a i n t a i n s this c l a i m ; the w o r d <furnace> brings
to m i n d o n l y w h a t w e k n o w a l r e a d y , the w o r d <saraballae> r e m a i n s o b scure Y e t i t seems o b v i o u s t h a t t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g t h a t w e d i d n o t k n o w ,

XVIII

XVIII
72
and o n l y discovered by h e a r i n g the w o r d s o f t h e B i b l e , namely the c o m plex fact t h a t the three boys w e r e p u t i n t o the f u r n a c e a n d sang praises
to G o d and suffered n o h a r m A u g u s t i n e claims t h a t this awareness is
n o t t o be called k n o w l e d g e ; nevertheless o n his s h o w i n g the s t o r y is t r u e
and i t is useful t o believe i t . Some u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the s t o r y is t h e r e f o r e
i m p l i e d ; a n d i f the s t o r y is t r u e , a n d w e c o m e t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d believe
i t , this w o u l d satisfy m o s t people t h a t w e have l e a r n t i t .
A u g u s t i n e does n o t concede t h i s ; he conceives l e a r n i n g as a process o f
c o m i n g to see t h i n g s f o r oneself, a n d t e a c h i n g as a process o f e n a b l i n g
someone to d o this T h e r e is a v a l i d p o i n t concealed here, n a m e l y t h a t
the teacher c a n n o t d o t h e pupil's l e a r n i n g f o r h i m ; at best he can present
the facts i n a f o r m w h i c h t h e p u p i l w i l l easily grasp B u t this useful o b servation is c o n f u s e d b y the i n i t i a l assumption t h a t all t e a c h i n g is done
b y means of w o r d s , a n d t h a t all l e a r n i n g involves either seeing or somet h i n g a n a l o g o u s t o seeing I n f a c t , o f course, the u n a v o i d a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s
of t e a c h i n g are e q u a l l y pressing i f the teacher w o r k s b y g i v i n g a visual
d e m o n s t r a t i o n - w h e r e , as w e have seen, A u g u s t i n e believes m u c h t o o
r e a d i l y t h a t the p u p i l w i l l grasp t h e p o i n t he is i n t e n d e d t o grasp. O n c e
w e d i s c a r d the assumption t h a t the teacher p r o f f e r s o n l y w o r d s , i t becomes o b v i o u s that w o r d s can e n o r m o u s l y enlarge t h e usefulness o f a
visual d e m o n s t r a t i o n A u g u s t i n e i n effect admits this w h i l e c o m m e n t i n g
o n our awareness o f sensible t h i n g s : W h e n w e are asked about t h e m ,
w e r e p l y if t h e y are present t o our senses; f o r example i f w e are l o o k i n g
at the new m o o n and someone asks w h a t i t is or where T h e curious
impression t h a t w e can o n l y answer questions a b o u t t h e m o o n w h e n w e
are a c t u a l l y l o o k i n g at i t is soon c o r r e c t e d ; A u g u s t i n e allows t h a t m e m o r y can supplement our o w n d i r e c t experience B u t i t seems o b v i o u s t h a t
a m a n can r e c o g n i z e t h e m o o n a n d p o i n t i t o u t even i f he believes, w i t h
the M a n i c h e e s , t h a t t h e m o o n is an i n f l a t a b l e bag T h e r e is far m o r e v a lue in t h e belief t h a t t h e m o o n is a spherical b o d y t h a t shines b y reflecti n g t h e sun's l i g h t ; and such a belief can be h e l d by a m a n w h o has never
seen the m o o n
T h i s brings us, t h i r d l y , t o the contrast w h i c h A u g u s t i n e d r a w s bet w e e n belief a n d k n o w l e d g e I n the De Magistro, belief seems t o be i n t r o d u c e d as an e x p e d i e n t e n a b l i n g A u g u s t i n e t o a d m i t t h a t a b i b l i c a l narrative is i n f o r m a t i v e w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t i t equips us w i t h k n o w l e d g e B u t
this t r e a t m e n t o f i t g r a v e l y underrates the i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h belief
s h o u l d have i n his t h e o l o g y , a n d w h i c h he actually gives i t i n several
other b o o k s F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f e p i s t e m o l o g y there is n o t h i n g i n the
story o f the t h r e e c h i l d r e n w h i c h distinguishes i t f r o m other b i b l i c a l narratives; let us say, the n a r r a t i v e o f Christ's R e s u r r e c t i o n B u t f o r a Chris-

Augustine's

De Magistro*.

a philosopher's

view

73

t i a n i t seems a disastrous u n d e r s t a t e m e n t t o say t h a t the R e s u r r e c t i o n

n a r r a t i v e is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h it is useful t o believe.
As a matter o f general p r i n c i p l e A u g u s t i n e p l a i n l y h o l d s t h a t k n o w l edge is superior t o b e l i e f ; this is after all suggested b y the b i b l i c a l c o n trast b e t w e e n f a i t h and sight. T h e highest f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e , t h e n , is
f o u n d i n those heavenly realities w h i c h w e come t o k n o w d i r e c t l y
t h r o u g h the i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r o f C h r i s t t h e T e a c h e r , a n d w h i c h w i l l be
m o r e p e r f e c t l y apparent i n the l i f e t o come. I n the m e a n t i m e , i t may
seem t h a t belief is t o o l i g h t l y r e g a r d e d ; but i t is a fact o f o u r h u m a n c o n d i t i o n t h a t some t h i n g s can at present o n l y be b e l i e v e d ; i n the hereafter
these same t h i n g s w i l l be f u l l y k n o w n I n a n y case, A u g u s t i n e is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o the c r u d e idea t h a t a n y a n d every i t e m o f d i r e c t awareness is
m o r e valuable t h a n any i t e m o f belief H e h o l d s t h a t i n the use o f our
minds w e g a i n a d i r e c t awareness o f i n t e l l i g i b l e realities w h i c h is analogous t o our d i r e c t awareness o f sensible, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y v i s i b l e , things
B u t in o u r present c o n t e x t he does n o t f u l l y develope this idea; so far as
I can discover, the o n l y i t e m o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h he describes us attaini n g b y our i n t e l l e c t u a l v i s i o n is the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t w i s e men are super i o r t o f o o l s , w h i c h i t h a r d l y needs a n i n t e l l i g e n t reader o f C i c e r o t o discover
T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l v i s i o n o f the highest realities is a noble t h e m e ; b u t discussion o f i t w o u l d take us far b e y o n d the De
Magistro

XVIII

XVIII
AUGUS TINE S DE MAGISTRO:

Augustine's De Magistro:
An Addendum
I n retrospect I must add a comment on the oddity of Augustine's treatment of
the meaning of words He knows the grammarians' distinction between different parts of speech; but this seems to have lodged i n his head as a mere
piece of book-learning W e might perhaps excuse h i m for knowing little
about the long and elaborate discussion, to w h i c h the Stoics made important
contributions, w h i c h led to the recognition of eight parts of speech B u t the
veriest tiro should have remembered the passage i n Sophist 2 6 l e , which
makes it clear that a meaningful sentence, logos, requires both a noun and a
verb (onoma, rhema)
Since the word onoma signifies both 'noun' and
'name', i t seems plain common sense that the function o f naming things
should be performed by an onoma; whereas a rhema has the function of indicating an 'action or inaction, an existence or non-existence' (262c)
Augustine is misled by the fact that any w o r d can be used in a secondary
sense to name itself; and this leads, by a further mistake, to the view that any
word is normally used to name the state of m i n d that i t expresses There is
certainly a very well-known text w h i c h encourages this mistake; i n De
Interpretatione
1, 16 a 3 f f , both spoken and written words are 'symbols of
affections i n the soul'; but this immediately follows a sentence which claims
that the distinction of 'name' and 'verb' is the first point that must be determined
I n his generally excellent book on Augustine (Augustine, Ancient Thought
Baptized [Cambridge, 1994], pp. 314-16) Professor Rist attempts a defence
'Porphyry', he writes, 'argued precisely that a proposition about the ordinary
world
consists of a subject plus a concept (noema, or ennoia) w h i c h indicates the special and disambiguating features of the subject in each case
Thus the reference of the whole proposition is the same as that of its subjectsign, w h i c h acquires a privileged status such as i t also enjoys i n The Master'
I n m y review I considered Rist's discussion of first-order and second-order
predicates w h i c h elucidates the fallacy i n (e.g.) ' A lion comes out of your
mouth' This, I think, does not call for criticism. B u t the passage I have
quoted above seems to me totally misleading, whether or not it correctly rep-

ADDENDUM

resents what Porphyry says. For the comment I have quoted only holds good
for a particular class of sentences, namely definitions I t does not apply to the
vast majority of statements about 'the ordinary w o r l d ' ; to take Plato's own
example, ' A man learns' (262d). I t is impossible to take this as a disguised
f o r m of definition; say, ' A man, qua rational, is a learner'; f o r Socrates
immediately comments ' H e makes a statement about that which is or is
becoming or has become or is to be'; and this comment, even i f i t applies to
definitions at a l l , as 'that w h i c h i s ' might suggest, clearly does not apply to
them exclusively. I t seems obvious that ' A m a n learns' is to be read, like
Aristotle's example ' A m a n runs', as referring to an event Thus any theory
of the identity of reference of subject and predicate is excluded ab initio I h i s
of course does not reduce The Master as a whole to nonsense; it has many
interesting and wise things to say. B u t i t is absurd to claim that a patent
fallacy 'makes sense of The Master'
To repeat what I wrote i n my review, the simple subject-predicate analysis
breaks down very obviously in the specimen sentence that Augustine quotes:
(Si) nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui, where (as I said) ' i t is a puzzle
to identify the subject' A n d Augustine's theory fails to recognise that some
words in their ordinary usage do not have a referential function at a l l ; their
function is to quality other words. "The prefixing of Si transforms what
would otherwise be a statement into a supposition f r o m w h i c h consequences
are drawn, w h i l e non reverses the sense of adjacent words' B y neglecting the
functions of words that are not nouns - and thus even of verbs! - Augustine
rules out ab initio any satisfactory theory of the sentence
A bold man might attempt a defence on some such lines as these: granted
that The Master culminates i n a tremendous theme, our knowledge o f the
highest realities, Augustine, he might argue, was not obliged to pursue this
theme w i t h unremitting seriousness; he might on accasion allow himself to
tease, to entertain and to beguile, by way of relaxation B u t I would hesitate
to pursue this fancy Augustine was a proud man who did not like being made
to look foolish; and he gives himself away by stating, w i t h an explicit
warning (33): ' I f we consider this a little more closely, perhaps you w i l l find
that nothing is learnt even by its appropriate sign I f I am given a sign and I
do not k n o w the thing of w h i c h i t is a sign, i t can teach me nothing I f I know
the thing, what do I learn f r o m the sign?' Augustine does not warn us that his
dilemma is exposed as an obvious fallacy at Meno 80e, confirmed by
Euthydemus 276d. For a one-time professor of rhetoric this is a serious piece
of professional incompetence

XIX

Augustine, the

Meno

and the subconscious mind

A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w o f m e m o i y has o f t e n b e e n d e s c r i b e d , a n d is k n o w n
t o be c o m p l e x

I t can indicate t h e recall a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n o f ex-

p e r i e n c e s a n d r e p o r t s t h a t o n e h a s e n c o u n t e r e d ; b u t i t also ranges
m o r e w i d e l y t o i n c l u d e one's h a b i t s o f t h o u g h t a n d p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s ,
w h e r e ' e x p e r i e n c e ' m i g h t seem t o be a b e t t e r e q u i v a l e n t T h e s e t w o
c o n c e p t i o n s a r e v e r y u n e q u a l l y d e v e l o p e d . T h e f i r s t is p r e s e n t e d i n an
u n f o r g e t t a b l e s i m i l e i n Confessions

Book 10, comparing memory to

a l a b y r i n t h i n e cave o r s t o r e h o u s e w i t h b r a n c h i n g passages ( 1 0 . 8 , 1 2
13, 9.16-10.17) w h i c h contains b o t h items l y i n g ready t o h a n d and
o t h e r s w h i c h a r e b u r i e d i n s o m e r e m o t e recess, h a r d t o r e t r i e v e a n d
y e t n o t c o m p l e t e l y f o r g o t t e n ; o n e m u s t i n s o m e sense k n o w w h a t o n e
is l o o k i n g f o r , o t h e r w i s e w h e n r e m e m b e r e d i t w o u l d n o t be r e c o g n i s e d
as t h e o b j e c t o f one's s e a r c h ( 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 4 , 1 8 2 7 , 1 9 , 2 8 ) .
S h o u l d w e refer t o t h e c o n t e n t s o f m e m o r y as 'objects'? A u g u s t i n e
n o t e s t h a t t h e y a r e n o t ' t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s ' , ipsa,

( 1 0 . 8 . 1 3 ) ; the

t e r m ' o b j e c t s ' is c o r r e c t i n so f a r as t h e y a r e u s u a l l y seen as i n a n i m a t e , w i t h n o s u g g e s t i o n o f l i v i n g b e i n g s i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e cave.

A u g u s t i n e speaks o f t h e m as ' i m a g e s ' {similitudines,

imagines);

but

w e r e m e m b e r n o t o n l y p e r s o n s a n d places w h i c h w e have s e e n , b u t
actions a n d e m o t i o n s ( 1 0 8 1 4 ) ; t h o u g h such images d o n o t have the
p o w e r o f present sensations

A m e m o r y o f p a s t sadness n e e d n o t

i n d u c e p r e s e n t sadness ( 1 0 . 1 4 . 2 1 - 2 ) , t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y i t m a y d o
so.. A g a i n , w e c a n r e m e m b e r

h o w w e forgot things (10.16.24);

A u g u s t i n e is p u z z l e d h e r e ; p e r h a p s he h a s c o n f u s e d t h e u n p r o b l e m a t i c
'memory o f forgetting something' w i t h the enigmatic 'remembering
what

one does

n o t remember'..

There is n o puzzle

f o r g e t t i n g s ; I c a n s e n s i b l y say ' I r e m e m b e r

about

that I forgot

past

x ' and

e x a c t l y d e s c r i b e t h e x w h i c h I f o r g o t . B u t , as A u g u s t i n e h a s n o t e d ,
i f I now say ' I h a v e f o r g o t t e n x\ I c a n g i v e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e
x t h a t I have f o r g o t t e n ; b u t I cannot
remember i t

s p e c i f y i t e x a c t l y unless I

XIX

XIX
340

Augustine, the Meno and the subconscious m i n d

O n t h e w h o l e , A u g u s t i n e seems t o p i c t u r e a n a c t i v e r e s p o n s i b l e
self w h o is f a i r l y s h a r p l y d i s s o c i a t e d f r o m h i s m e m o r i e s

Trinitate

12 1 5 . 2 4 , w h e r e the

Meno

341

is c l e a r l y r e c a l l e d , A u g u s t i n e is

H e operates

s u m m a r i z i n g a v i e w w h i c h h e h a d c o m e t o reject.. B u t i n t h e e a r l y

w i t h t h e m , as w e l l as s e a r c h i n g t h e m o u t ; h e b r e a k s t h e m d o w n a n d

w o r k s , a n d i n d e e d i n t h e Confessions, he is s t i l l s y m p a t h e t i c T h e

(Conf.

reassembles their p a r t s t o p r o d u c e n e w f o r m s

10.8 1 4 ,

Trin.

Confessions

logic o f

1 0 . 2 0 . 2 9 - 3 1 w o u l d suggest t h a t i n s o m e sense

9 6 10, 11,10.17) l i k e a c h i l d p l a y i n g the game o f 'heads, bodies a n d

w e r e c a l l a p r e - A d a m i c h a p p i n e s s w h i c h w e have never e n c o u n t e r e d

tails'

i n o u r p r e s e n t lives.

B u t t h e y m a y also i m p e r c e p t i b l y m e r g e t o p r e s e n t false r e -

collections

(Trin..

12 . 1 5 . 2 4 ,

ad fin.)., T h e y

are s e l d o m c o n s i d e r e d as

A g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p r e - e x i s t e n c e t h e o r y raises n o p r o b -

a c t i n g o n their o w n e r , or o n o n e another; the m o s t o b v i o u s change

lems.. I t w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y f i g u r e i n q u i t e e l e m e n t a r y l e c t u r e s o n t h e

t h e y u n d e r g o is t o w e a k e n a n d f a d e

(Conf,

1 0 . 1 1 18).. A m e m o r y o f

soul; a n y p r o o f that the soul c a n exist a p a r t f r o m t h e b o d y w o u l d

sensuous e x p e r i e n c e m a y i n d e e d be a p r e s e n t t e m p t a t i o n ( 1 0 3 0 . 4 1 ) ;

serve t o d i s p r o v e E p i c u r e a n m a t e r i a l i s m . B u t c a n w e g o f u r t h e r , a n d

y e t i t n e e d n o t b e ( 1 0 . 21..30); a n d t h e r e is n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t i t i n t e n d s

suggest t h a t A u g u s t i n e q u i t e e a r l y i n h i s l i f e a c q u i r e d s o m e k n o w l -

to tempt, Augustine makes rather little o f the fact t h a t

unwelcome

edge o f t h e

Conf

10 14 22).

o n Cicero's

m e m o r i e s m a y f o r c e themselves o n our a t t e n t i o n (cf

Meno itself?
Jusculans

C o u i c e l l e stated t h a t he is w h o l l y d e p e n d e n t
for w h a t

little he k n o w s

A t 1 0 1 9 2 8 , s o m e f o r m o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y is a s c r i b e d t o m e m o r y

C h a d w i c k seems t o b e a l i t t l e m o r e p o s i t i v e

i t s e l f , as i t seeks t o s u p p l y w h a t is m i s s i n g

passages i n t h e

Buto n the whole, we

s e l d o m hear t h a t a m a n ' s m e m o r i e s h e l p t o m a k e h i m t h e m a n he is.

Augustine

o f the

Meno;

I s h a l l refer t o some

w h i c h d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y m i g h t seem t o have

influenced Augustine..

W h a t o f the c o n t r a s t i n g c o n c e p t i o n , w h i c h w e m i g h t judge t o be
e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t ? T h i s is m u c h less v i v i d l y presented.,

Meno

T h e f i r s t c o m e s l a t e i n t h e d i a l o g u e , a t 9 7 a ff, w h e r e

Socrates

claims t h a t 'men m a y be g o o d a n d useful t o their c o u n t r y ' n o t only

speaks o f 'the s k i l l s a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h t h e l i b e r a l a r t s ' , n o t i n g t h a t i n

t h r o u g h k n o w l e d g e b u t t h r o u g h r i g h t o p i n i o n ( S a Tirj as o p -

t h e i r case ' I c a r r y n o t t h e i m a g e s , b u t t h e v e i y s k i l l s t h e m s e l v e s '

p o s e d t o EHICTTTIUT)). T h i s passage is n o t e w o r t h y , as i t c o n t r a s t s w i t h

(10. 9 16).. R a t h e r t y p i c a l l y , h e t h i n k s f i r s t o f 'the s k i l l s o f d i a l e c t i c a l

m a n y others i n w h i c h Plato regards o p i n i o n ,

d e b a t e ' , a n d is p u z z l e d t o k n o w h o w t h e y a r e a c q u i r e d ( i b i d , w i t h

i n f e r i o r t o k n o w l e d g e (esp, Rep.. 5 0 9 d f f . , 5 1 1 d e ) . B u t ' b e l i e f

10 1 2 . 1 9 ) . H e d o e s n o t suggest, as w e m i g h t , t h a t w e c a n g e n e r a l i z e

p e r f e c t l y a d e q u a t e t r a n s l a t i o n o f Sa (cf PGL

a n d a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s e m b o d i e d i n t h e r e p o r t s w h i c h r e a c h us

w o u l d suspect t h a t t h e passage w o u l d b e u s e f u l t o C h r i s t i a n a p o l o -

t h r o u g h t h e senses; h i s a n s w e r is r a t h e r , t h a t t h e i r o r i g i n m u s t be

gists

f o u n d i n some r e m o t e corner o f the m e m o r y ( 1 0 , 1 2 . 1 9 , 1 3 . 2 0 )

This

a b l e a s s u r a n c e s h o u l d b e f o l l o w e d w h e r e c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y is i m -

b u t t h e r e is n o sugges-

p o s s i b l e , is c o m m o n e n o u g h , b u t seems t o d e r i v e f r o m s o u r c e s other

is n o t u n l i k e t h e v i e w p r o p o s e d i n t h e

Meno;

56cc, as m a r k e d l y
1

is a

s.v., B ) ; a n d o n e

T h e general a r g u m e n t used against t h e sceptics, t h a t reason-

Meno,

t i o n h o w t h e y c a m e t o be t h e r e . A t a h u m b l e r l e v e l 'beasts a n d b i r d s

t h a n the

also h a v e m e m o r y ; o t h e r w i s e t h e y c o u l d n o t r e d i s c o v e r t h e i r dens

t o E u s e b i u s a n d M e t h o d i u s . . B u t t h e r e is a n i n c o n s p i c u o u s

a n d nests' ( 1 0 , 1 7 . 2 6 ) . B u t t h e r e is l i t t l e n o t i c e o f t h e r o l e o f m e m o r y

w h i c h p e r h a p s deserves m e n t i o n . T h e usefulness o f b e l i e f is i l l u s -

in h u m a n p r a c t i c a l activity..

trated in the

I t is i n d e e d o f t e n suggested t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w o f m e m o r y a n d
r e c o l l e c t i o n is i n d e b t e d t o t h e t h e o r y set o u t i n P l a t o ' s

Meno,

one's i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e

geometrical

o f certain facts ( i n P l a t o ,

M o r e o v e r , the dialogue was apparently

Meno

unknown
parallel

b y the example o f ' k n o w i n g the w a y t o Larissa'

( 9 7 a f f ). W h e n i n t h e

Confessions

Augustine alludes to the m e m o r y

that

truths) derives f r o m a n exact k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m w h i c h w e a c q u i r e d

in a pre-natal existence

A u g u s t i n e , after c a u t i o u s l y a p p r o v i n g t h e

d o c t r i n e o f t h e s o u l ' s p r e - e x i s t e n c e , c a m e t o a b a n d o n i t i n his m i d d l e

De Genesi ad Lttteram,

w r i t t e n i n 406..

It follows that in

De

te Selle, Augustine

the Theologian

( L o n d o n 1970) p p 69-70.

Orations

12 1 5 2 4 , Cicero Tusculan
of Hippo

Paris 1 9 4 8 , p. 1 5 8 , rf. Augustine

3 2 2 7 7 See f u r t h e r G. B o n n e r , St

( L o n d o n 1 9 6 3 ) p p 394-5

H C h a d w i c k , Saint Augustine,
n

en occident,

Trin

Augustine

l i f e T e Selle dates t h i s d e f i n i t e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e p r e - e x i s t e n c e t h e o r y
t o the

P. C o u i c e l l e , Les lettres grecques

Confessions

( O x f o r d 1 9 9 2 ) pp. 185 n 12, 189

IS

Conf

6. 5 7, Ut Cred.

12,26-7; cf. m y Philosophy

brrdge 1994) p. 112 a n d n. 6; C i c e r o lucullus

m Christian
99-109

Antiquity

(Cam-

XIX

XIX
Augustine, the Meno and the subconscious m i n d

342

343

o f beasts a n d b i r d s ( 1 0 1 7 . 2 6 ) i t is n e s t - f i n d i n g , n o t n e s t - b u i l d i n g ,

m a t e o b j e c t s , B u t is i t a n e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f e i t h e r s i m i l e t h a t such

w h i c h s t r i k e s h i m as t h e a p p r o p r i a t e

a l i m i t a t i o n s h o u l d persist?

example

A n o t h e r passage w h i c h deserves n o t i c e is t h e s o p h i s t i c a l a r g u m e n t set o u t a t

Meno

scious.. T h i n g s c a n be t h e r e e v e n t h o u g h u n p e r c e i v e d , or h a l f - p e r -

cannot

c e i v e d , or d i m l y p e r c e i v e d ; i t is t h i s d i m p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h enables

w h a t he k n o w s or a b o u t w h a t h e does n o t k n o w . . F o r he

C l e a r l y b o t h w r i t e r s h a v e , i n s o m e sense, a t h e o r y o f t h e s u b c o n -

about

8 0 e : ' A m a n c a n n o t i n q u i r e either

such

u s , so t o s p e a k , t o d r a g t h e m o u t f o r i n s p e c t i o n a n d f u r t h e r d e v e l -

i n q u i r y is n e e d e d ; n o r a g a i n , a b o u t w h a t h e does n o t k n o w ; f o r t h e n

o p m e n t . . B u t t h e r e is n o t m u c h s u g g e s t i o n , so f a r , t h a t these h i d d e n

i n q u i r e a b o u t w h a t he k n o w s ; f o r he k n o w s i t , a n d so n o

he d o e s n o t k n o w w h a t he is t o i n q u i r e a b o u t ' . C l e a r l y t h e s o p h i s m

i m a g e s a n d urges i n t e r a c t o n e w i t h a n o t h e r ; i n d e e d t h i s m i g h t h i n d e r

c a n be a t t a c k e d f r o m b o t h sides. I f o n e k n o w s s o m e t h i n g , o n e c a n

t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f m e m o r y i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense; w e are a l l a w a r e

nevertheless i n q u i r e i n t o the n a t u r e a n d g r o u n d s o f one's k n o w l -

o f a tendency t o elaborate a n d d r a m a t i z e the experiences w h i c h w e

edge, B u t t h e c o n v e r s e a r g u m e n t is p e r h a p s t h e m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g , I f

p r o f e s s t o r e m e m b e r (cf. Inn..

one does n o t k n o w s o m e t h i n g , this by n o means prevents one f r o m

be t h a t t h i s i d e a o f s u b c o n s c i o u s i n t e r a c t i o n is j u s t w h a t is needed

i d e n t i f y i n g the p r o b l e m i n t o w h i c h one s h o u l d i n q u i r e ; t h o u g h

t o u n d e r p i n A u g u s t i n e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f memoria

no

1 1 . 1 0 1 7 , 12.1.5 24).. B u t i t m a y w e l l
i n i t s w i d e r sense..

that

O b v i o u s l y w e m u s t n o t t h i n k o f t h e s u b c o n s c i o u s as h a r b o u r i n g

for-

a set o f t h o u g h t s , b e l i e f s , w i s h e s , s p e c u l a t i o n s o r w h a t e v e r , w h i c h

m u l a t e d a r e p l y o n s o m e s u c h l i n e s ; a n d t h a t t h i s r e p l y u n d e r l i e s his

are p r e c i s e l y s i m i l a r t o c o n s c i o u s t h o u g h t e x c e p t t h a t t h e y h a p p e n

t r e a t m e n t o f m e m o r y , w h e n he a r g u e s t h a t o n e m u s t i n s o m e sense

t o be g o i n g o n b e h i n d

r e m e m b e r t h e t h i n g s t h a t o n e has f o r g o t t e n , o t h e r w i s e o n e c o u l d n o t

u n d e r l y i n g Freud's n o t o r i o u s theory o f the Oedipus C o m p l e x ; it

i d e n t i f y t h e f o r g o t t e n f a c t or b e l i e f

easily suggested the v i e w t h a t a l l , o r m a n y , m e n h a d an unconscious

doubt

i n some kinds of ignorance

it will.

I t seems t o m e

A u g u s t i n e m a y h a v e k n o w n t h e passage u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n a n d

mains a puzzle at
suggested, at

Confessions

' M e m o r y of forgetfulness' re-

1 0 . 1 6 2 4 ; b u t an answer

is

soon

a curtain. This, I t h i n k , was a

mistake

d e s i r e f o r s e x u a l i n t i m a c y w i t h t h e i r m o t h e r s . T h e t r u t h is m o r e
p r o b a b l y t h a t s e x u a l desires a n d fantasies are s i m p l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

10.18.27

A s w e h a v e o b s e r v e d , A u g u s t i n e p i c t u r e s m e m o r y as a k i n d o f

t h e f e m a l e f i g u r e best k n o w n t o us f r o m c h i l d h o o d . T h i s m i g h t s t i l l

c a v e r n o r store-house, T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n has n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n

e m b a r r a s s u s ; b u t i t b y n o m e a n s a m o u n t s t o a f o r m u l a t e d desire

w i t h t h e f a m o u s p a r a b l e o f t h e cave i n Republic

w h i c h is o n l y c h e c k e d b y s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , i n t e r n a l i z e d as a ' c e n s o r '

5 1 4 a ff..; i t is a
197c ff,,

I t m a y b e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s cave is b e s t i n t e r p r e t e d o n

w h e r e Plato compares the k n o w i n g m i n d t o a bird-cage; k n o w l e d g e

the analogy o f our d r e a m s ; b e a r i n g i n m i n d the e x t r a o r d i n a r y v a r i -

m a y be p r e s e n t l i k e a b i r d i n t h e c a g e , w i t h o u t b e i n g i m m e d i a t e l y

e t y o f o u r d r e a m s , w h i c h m a y p r e s e n t a t o t a l l y i n c o h e r e n t succession

a c c e s s i b l e , l i k e a b i r d i n t h e hand..

o f i m a g e s , o r o n e i n w h i c h t h e r e is n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i n g t h r e a d ,

distant derivative of that expounded

i n the

Theaetetus

I n p o i n t i n g o u t t h i s p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e , w e seem t o be t h i n k i n g o f

b u t s o m e t i m e s o f f e r us a r e l a t i v e l y c o n s i s t e n t , t h o u g h p e r h a p s sur-

m e m o r y i n i t s n a r r o w e r a n d m o r e p r e c i s e sense, as t h e r e c a l l i n g o f

p r i s i n g , e x h i b i t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , or a f o r m u l a w h i c h

p r e v i o u s l y k n o w n e x p e r i e n c e s or reports.. C a n i t be r e l a t e d t o t h e

i m p r e s s e s i t s e l f as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . I n m o s t cases, o u r w a k i n g

w i d e r sense w h i c h A u g u s t i n e gives t o memoria,

r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h i s l a t t e r i m p r e s s i o n is d e l u s i v e ; b u t n o t i n a l l . There

m a k i n g i t t h e gr o u n d

o f a b i l i t y a n d c o n s t r u c t i v e t h i n k i n g ? I t is w o r t h p o i n t i n g o u t

an

i m p o r t a n t l i m i t a t i o n b o t h i n Plato's parable and i n Augustine's. The

b i r d s i n P l a t o ' s b i r d - c a g e m e r e l y f l y a b o u t , so t h a t t h e y are s o m e -

mind

are e x c e p t i o n a l cases i n w h i c h d r e a m s p r o v i d e us w i t h t h e s o l u t i o n
o f a p r o b l e m , or c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t f u t u r e events..
We

h a v e suggested

a n i m p r e s s i o n o f A u g u s t i n e ' s cave as

s i m p l y a r e p o s i t o r y o f i n e r t images

m i g h t m a t e a n d p r o d u c e o f f s p r i n g . A n d A u g u s t i n e ' s cave d o e s n o t

e x c a v a t e d , b u t a m e d i u m i n w h i c h a s s o c i a t i o n s o f ideas a r e f o r m e d

c o n t a i n p o t e n t i a l l y a c t i v e p r i s o n e r s ; t h e m a i n s u g g e s t i o n is o f i n a n i -

a n d again dissolved
random

or

memories

waiting to

not

t i m e s a c c e s s i b l e , s o m e t i m e s n o t . T h e r e is n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e y

be

T h i s c o u l d p e r h a p s be seen as a p r o c e s s o f

s h u f f l i n g w h i c h l e a d s , e v e r y so o f t e n , t o a n

association

w h i c h is s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r i k i n g t o h o l d o u r s l u m b e r i n g a t t e n t i o n , a n d
Cf. Euthydemus

2 7 6 d f f , presumably u n k n o w n to Augustine

may

indeed

be v e r i d i c a l ; as a v e r y s i m p l e

example, w e

might

XIX

XIX
344

Augustine, the Meno

misremembet a lesson which itself was incorrect, and so come up

with the right answer. But perhaps a process of selection and combination could be located below the level of conscious attention (cf
Conf.. 10.19.28); even without conscious control we could have
some degree of organizing ability resembling that which enables us
to coordinate the various muscles involved in executing some complex physical movement.
Is this picture recognizable as a legitimate interpretation or
supplement of Augustine's conception of memory? It depends, I
would think, on which aspect of it we prefer to emphasize. If we
reflect that he interpreted memoria in the broadest possible sense,
assigning to it out ability to solve new problems and formulate new
theories, our view of his cave as a storehouse of active and inter active
images and thoughts will be seen as a legitimate development of his
theory.. If we concentrate on his interpretation of memoria in the
narrower sense, as the recalling of something which has been, or
could be, forgotten, then we may note his observation that our
subconscious associative power may lead us to 'think false things'
(Irin, 11 10.17) or it may be to misremember Yet even thismemoria
will be a useful analogy for the process of constructive thought,.
Any such theory, however, will be a valuable corrective of the alltoo-common caricature of the intuitive intellect as a magical
accomplishment which gets somewhere starting from nowhere at
all, a process of creation which is nevertheless veridical.. The Greeks,
I believe, were much misled by the analogy so commonly drawn
between intellect, nous, and the sense of sight.. They were impressed
by its clarity and discrimination as compared with our other senses;
it did not, I think, occur to them that vision is a skill which has to
be gradually acquired in infancy; at least, I cannot recall any notice
of the imperfect vision of infants to compare with the frequent
reference to their lisping speech and stumbling gait.
We can thus be startled to find Augustine suggesting that ethical
concepts and values - in particular, pure love - can be known by
a process of pure intuition, analogous, perhaps, to that by which we
assent to a geometrical proof.. We might perhaps see this as
6

s.v 64115.

See, f o r instance, the I n d e x t o C o h n a n d W e n d l a n d ' s Pbilo

C o n f . 1.6.8 ' p a u l a t i m sentiebam, u b i essem' m a y be n o t e d , b u t is h a r d l y typical.

Gen ad Lit. 12 1 1 2 2 Cf M a g 12.40, o n Truth.

a n d the subconscious m i n d

345

confirming the influence of Plato's Meno, But in fact this view of

moral knowledge is, I would hold, unplatonic as well as imper fect..
It is admitted, of course, that Plato regarded geometrical knowledge
as an ideal, in respect of clarity and certainty, to which our
knowledge of transcendent realities may hope to approximate. But
he also holds that such knowledge can only be attained by a complex
process of dialectic, which in this case would involve compar ing and
contrasting the various forms of our experience to which the word
'love' can be applied, and thereby coming to isolate the unique
reality to which the word 'love' most properly applies and which
articulates all its derivative and improper uses..
It was common ground between Plato and Augustine that there
is such a supreme reality, though they do not wholly agree on its
proper designation. Plato can speak of an Idea of the Good, which
is the source of all goodness, and which - according to the Symposium - can be best approached through purified human affection.
Augustine devotes himself to an all-encompassing G o d who unites
and fulfils within himself all perfections, intellect, goodness, beauty
and love. Using the language of practical devotion rather than
philosophy, Augustine finds that this supreme reality can be glimpsed
in a flash of illumination of inspiration,. But he also holds that a
lifetime of patient discipleship is needed for us to understand it and,
in the measure which our mortality permits, to offer ourselves to its
transforming power.

XX
LOGIC AND T H E APPLICATION OF NAMES TO GOD

M y title seems to c a l l for an e s s a y i n p h i l o s o p h y

It
hardly relates to the section of G r e g o r y ' s text that w e were
a s k e d to e x a m i n e ; it w o u l d indeed a l l o w m e to by-pass
G r e g o r y completely and investigate the problem of names for
G o d in the context o f modern logical theory.. B u t this I think
w o u l d hardly appeal to a company of theologians,. I prefer to
begin by showing h o w the problem w a s c o n c e i v e d during the
seven centuries extending from Plato to G r e g o r y , - at the risk
of some overlap with Professor K o b u s c h , w h o s e contribution
was not yet announced when I began to consider this paper
T h e first and most i n f l u e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n of names is
found in one of Plato's earlier dialogues, the C r a t v l u s , . T h e
q u e s t i o n h e r e p r o p o s e d i s w h e t h e r the c o r r e c t u s e , the
p S 6 T 1~| c;, of names is m e r e l y a matter of c o n v e n t i o n , or
whether it has some basis i n nature, B y 'convention' and
'nature' I refer to the contrast between u o p o t ; and i p v j a t c ;
w h i c h was already f a m i l i a r , being u s e d foi e x a m p l e by the
Sophists w h e n d i s c u s s i n g the basis of morality; u b p o g then
stands for accepted custom rather than enacted law,. B r o a d l y
s p e a k i n g w e may s a y that Plato takes up a cross-bench
position, i n c l i n i n g slightly towards the v i e w that names are
significant by nature,. Socrates first interrogates Hermogenes,
the champion of convention, A t the outset his position i s not
c l e a r l y d e f i n e d ; he maintains that the right use of names
i n v o l v e s convention and agreement, but i n the same breath
adopts a p u r e l y subjectivist approach; I may c a l l m y slave
whatever I l i k e without c o n s u l t i n g anyone. I n the ensuing
d i s c u s s i o n Socrates shows that the notion of a purely private
language is incoherent; language is a social activity, B u t this
still l e a v e s the o b v i o u s point that different societies have
different languages I s there any c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h w e can
decide that one is better than another?

XX

XX

A t this point the argument i s c o n f u s e d b y a f a l l a c y .

Socrates argues that s i n c e statements c l e a r l y c a n be true or
false, the same principle should apply to parts of statements,
and therefore to n a m e s ; thus there c a n be true a n d f a l s e
names ( 3 8 5 c ) W e c a n show that this argument i s . u n s o u n d
s i m p l y by extending it; names are c o m p o s e d o f v o w e l s and
c o n s o n a n t s ; thus i f S o c r a t e s i s r i g h t , it m u s t f o l l o w
that
i n d i v i d u a l letters c a n be true or false ( 1 ) N e v e r t h e l e s s the
notion of a true n a m e has i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; it is
suggested that some n a m e s a c t u a l l y ' r e v e a l the e s s e n c e ' o f
the things they denote ( 3 9 3 d; cf, 4 2 2 d, 4 2 3 e).. A s a modern
e x a m p l e , w e might take the w o r d 'wash-basin ; but later i n
the dialogue it is pointed out that s u c h a name i s instructive
only i f w e k n o w the m e a n i n g o f its e l e m e n t s , ' w a s h ' and
'basin'; it seems impossible to continue the process by finding
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n these elements t h e m s e l v e s .
1

T h e d i s c u s s i o n now turns to the process of d e v i s i n g or

choosing names; it is suggested that they were introduced by
some individual, the u o p o F J E T ! " ] ( ; , - or possibly by some group
of talented men (401 b ) - w i t h an e y e to their purpose and
the objective reality to w h i c h they are directed T h e idea that
the i n v e n t i o n
of n a m e s d e m a n d s
an i n v e n t o r i s n a t u r a l
e n o u g h , though n a i v e , and I cannot be sure h o w s e r i o u s l y
P l a t o intends it; i n G e n e s i s 2 : 2 0 w e f i n d the s a m e r o l e
assigned, no doubt s e r i o u s l y , to A d a m . B u t the argument i s
r e p e a t e d l y interrupted by p a r o d i e s of a b s u r d attempts
to
find s i g n i f i c a n c e in names by far-fetched e t y m o l o g i e s , w h i c h
in the last resort must be unhelpful even i f they were sound,
as w e have j u s t e x p l a i n e d C a n w e then d i s c o v e r some c l a s s
of p r i m a r y n a m e s w h i c h are s i g n i f i c a n t i n their o w n
right?
S o c r a t e s s u g g e s t s that
we c a n imitate
the s h a p e s
and
movements of things by gestures, and that hu ma n speech is a
form o f v o c a l gesture (426-7)
C r a t y l u s now enters the d i s c u s s i o n ; he contends that a
true name indicates the nature of a thing, but tries to argue
that any other name m u s t be a m e r e u n m e a n i n g
noise
Socrates r e p l i e s by r e c a l l i n g the picture-theory of n a m i n g ; a
portrait c a n be recognizable e v e n if it i s not 100 % perfect
W e are then taken back to the theory of names as imitative

304

gestures; they c a n be appropriate to their s u b j e c t s without

matching them c o m p l e t e l y ; thus the G r e e k w o r d CTKA n p O Q ,
'rough', c o n t a i n s the appropriate r o u g h letter p , though the
s m o o t h X figures i n i t as w e l l S o c r a t e s then introduces a
d i l e m m a , w h i c h leads to a point of great importance to later
r e a d e r s of the d i a l o g u e .
Assuming
a first inventor
of
language, he must have c h o s e n his n a m e s in the light o f a
prior knowledge of the realities to w h i c h they apply; but how
could he k n o w them, if he h a d as yet no means of naming
t h e m ? C r a t y l u s r e p l i e s by suggesting that s o m e superhuman
p o w e r i n t r o d u c e d the o r i g i n a l n a m e s
T h i s point is very
l i g h t l y s k e t c h e d i n ( 4 3 8 e; s o p r e v i o u s l y , 3 9 7 c ) ; i n d e e d
Socrates at once raises an objection; and the dialogue ends by
making
a
point
which
Plato
clearly
considered
more
important, n a m e l y that w e do have a k n o w l e d g e of things
w h i c h i s not d e r i v e d f r o m n a m e s , for e x a m p l e true beauty
and goodness; w e are thus left ready to attend to the theory
of F o r m s .
H a v i n g made this b r i e f s u r v e y I w i l l add one or two
critical
comments.
First,
some
of
the d i f f i c u l t i e s
are
m i s c o n c e i v e d , and a r i s e f r o m the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a 'namegiver', with its c o r o l l a r y that the process of d e v i s i n g a set of
names must be either w h o l l y or l a r g e l y completed w i t h i n a
s i n g l e life-time, G i v e n a l o n g e r time-span i t b e c o m e s far
easier to imagine the business of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g realities and
n a m i n g them as two a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h go hand in h a n d and
support one another. S e c o n d l y , the theory o f language as
i m i t a t i v e gesture i s c r u d e and inadequate, though w e shall
meet it again.. A n d the notion that words are l i k e pictures has
the o b v i o u s d r a w b a c k of suggesting that w e use language
only for making statements; w e need a theory w h i c h c a n deal
w i t h q u e s t i o n s , c o m m a n d s , a n d other sorts o f d i s c o u r s e
C e r t a i n l y the road s i g n w h i c h c a r r i e s a picture of s c h o o l c h i l d r e n c o n v e y s the injunction ' B e w a r e of school-children';
but it is not clear that m u c h further development is possible;
l a n g u a g e h a s d e v e l o p e d i n t o a f l e x i b l e instrument w h o s e
resources
far
exceed
those
of pictures
T h i r d l y , even
c o n v e n i e n c e or the reverse attaches to the w h o l e structure of
a language rather than to s i n g l e words. T h e r e is c e r t a i n l y
some inconvenience i f it is r e a l l y true that in T o n g a the word
for 'No' i s ' H o o l i m a kittiluca chee-chee-chee'; but once again,

305

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XX

this i s an exceptional case.

acquire their

2.
W e pass then to Aristotle, w h o approaches the theory of
l a n g u a g e , inter a l i a , i n two i m p o r t a n t
e a r l y w o r k s , the
C a t e g o r i e s and the D e
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e . . H e sets out a
distinction w h i c h is not a l w a y s clear i n Plato; the C a t e g o r i e s
is intended to deal with realities or notions or w o r d s taken
separately, whereas the D e Interpretatipne is concerned with
c o n c e p t s or w o r d s connected to f o r m a statement; thus a
name is a spoken sound significant by convention (c..2, 16 a
19); but only a combination of n a m e s and v e r b s s i g n i f i e s
something true or false (c 1, 16 a 15).. There are a number of
p r i m i t i v e features i n Aristotle's treatment of language w h i c h
w e r e to c a u s e d i f f i c u l t i e s to later commentators w h o took
these words as authoritative, F i r s t , he is handicapped by an
e x t r e m e l y limited understanding of grammar.
Thus0U0|JCt
has to do duty both for what w e c a l l a noun and for a name;
there is as yet no sign of a distinction between proper names
and common nouns
A g a i n , 6uop a contrasts with pf|pa; but
this contrast m a r k s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t w e c a l l
subject and predicate, whether the latter consists of a verb or
of a descriptive term such as 'white' or introduces another
noun, as in 'Homer is a poet' Moreover Aristotle sometimes
ignores this contrast and suggests that a statement s i m p l y
i n v o l v e s the c o n n e c t i n g , or i n d e e d the u n i f i c a t i o n , of two
e l e m e n t s , as i f these w e r e s y m m e t r i c a l l y r e l a t e d ; i n other
w o r d s , he often ignores the distinction w h i c h w e now mark
by s a y i n g that the subject-term r e f e r s to s o m e t h i n g , the
predicate describes it A g a i n he says that spoken w o r d s are
symbols of affections in the s o u l , and that written marks are
s y m b o l s of spoken words. B u t this cuts across our w e l l founded c o n v i c t i o n that the name S o c r a t e s stands for the
man himself; for the name was given to h i m , and so not given
to s o m e p e r s o n ' s i d e a or c o n c e p t i o n of him.
I d e a s and
conceptions are no doubt i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s of g i v i n g
n a m e s ; but is not to them that the names are attached. In
Christian societies, w e baptise our c h i l d r e n , not our thoughts,

3..
T h e S t o i c s are said to have taken over the theory of
n a m e s as i m i t a t i v e sounds, w h i c h w e encountered i n the
Cratylus, (2)
T h e y are generally described as holding that
names c o m e into u s e by nature, tp vj a e L ; but perhaps their
intention w a s to e x p l a i n only the origin of language, since
C h r y s i p p u s points out that i n our c o m m o n usage there i s not
a l w a y s the natural correspondence that w e might expect; for
s i m i l a r w o r d s denote d i s s i m i l a r things and vice-versa, ( 3 )
B u t there are other more important and v a l u a b l e aspects of
S t o i c philology.. F o r one thing, they i n t r o d u c e d a better
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the parts o f speech.. D i o g e n e s of B a b y l o n
mentions
a
five-fold
division
c o m p r i s i n g 6 u o p cx
npoariyopia pqpa. cnJu6EO-p,oc; and apBpou. Here then
we meet for the first time an e x p l i c i t distinction between
ouojja, the proper name, and T T p o a T i y o p i a , the common
noun; this i s said to have been introduced by C h r y s i p p u s ,
whereas the older S t o i c s distinguished only ouopa, p f| p: a ,
aL)u6eo"poc;1 dpBpou T h e s e four words in fact occur with
others, in a list set down i n Aristotle's P o e t i p s . . in w h i c h
T T p o o ~ r ] y o p i a does not appear, ' Pf|[ja now begins to take on
the more restricted sense of the ' v e r b ; CTiliu6apoc. includes
all i n d e c l i n a b l e connecting w o r d s , ie p a r t i c l e s , prepositions
and conjunctions in our notation; apBpou is what we c a l l the
a r t i c l e ; there is n o m e n t i o n
of p r o n o u n s ,
a d j e c t i v e s or
adverbs

All

these

discussion;
Aristotle

but
is

points
we

must

decided

of

course

pass

on,

advocate
306

require

much

remembering
of

the

view

further

chiefly
that

that

names

significance by

convention,

A n e v e n more important innovation introduced by the

Stoic is one whose f u l l significance has only been appreciated
fairly recently, namely their theory
of X E K T C C , for w h i c h we
m a y use the w o r d 'propositions', A n c i e n t s o u r c e s e x p l a i n
their distinction between the s i g n i f i c a n t sound and the fact
,npay|jcx, w h i c h it signifies; but this fact, or proposition is
not
identical
with
the
objective
r e a l i t y , T 6 E K T 6 c;
ijifOKELfjEuou
w h i c h i n this c o n n e c t i o n i s c a l l e d T 6
ruyx^uou>
w h i c h exists' or 'occurs'. ( 4 ) T h i s c a n be
clearly seen in a case like that of Socrates w a l k i n g , since here
we
h a v e three entities of s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t f o r m :
the
sound-waves in the air, the p r e d i c a t i v e statement, and the
human animal in motion. T h e distinction appears again i n the
tenet that the sounds and o b j e c t s r e f e r r e d to are both
t

307

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XX

m a t e r i a l , and therefore r e a l , w h e r e a s the X , E K T d ,

being
immaterial, are not f u l l y real ( 5 )
It m a y also help to explain
the p u z z l i n g distinction d r a w n by S e n e c a between s a p i e n t i a
and s a p i e n s e s s e : s a p i e n t i a being a c o l l e c t i v e noun referring
to w e l l - s t o c k e d m i n d s i n g e n e r a l , w h e r e a s s a p i e n s
esse
means the fact that one or more people are wise,. ( 6 )
We
note that i n the context of t h i s theory, w o r d s are c o n s i d e r e d
s i m p l y as i n d i v i d u a l acts of s p e a k i n g , though e l s e w h e r e the
S t o i c s h a v e m u c h to s a y about w o r d s i n a p u r e l y f o r m a l
context, as w e have already made clear. A E K T C C , then, seems
to be distinguishable f r o m the words that express them, even
though the d i s t i n c t i o n i s quite o f t e n ignored. T r a n s l a t i n g
X e K T 6 u by the L a t i n word d i c t u m c e r t a i n l y m a k e s
for
c o n f u s i o n ; but e v e n d i c t u m can be interpreted as 'that w h i c h
is signified', not 'that w h i c h i s pronounced'.
As
u s u a l l y p r e s e n t e d , this theory r e t a i n s the d e f e c t
w h i c h w e h a v e already o b s e r v e d ; it applies most e a s i l y to
statements, and there are problems i n e x t e n d i n g it to deal
with other uses of language. B u t it has important advantages.,
I n the first p l a c e , it a v o i d s the m i s l e a d i n g suggestion that
words are s y m b o l s of thoughts, w h i c h we noticed above; ( 7 )
'misleading', that i s , as a general doctrine; w e shall not w i s h
to deny that s o m e words describe and refer to our thoughts.
S e c o n d l y , it s u g g e s t s , c o r r e c t l y , that the n o r m a l u n i t of
d i s c o u r s e is the sentence, not the i n d i v i d u a l w o r d
Aristotle
had begun by c o n s i d e r i n g w o r d s taken separately, and then
explained how they can be c o m b i n e d to form a sentence; the
S t o i c s keep their e y e s on situations and the sentences that
d e s c r i b e them
D e t a c h e d parts
of a sentence are c a l l e d
'incomplete i e k t a ' , X E K T C L
E X X i n f j ; though here admittedly
there is a danger of c o n f u s i n g the w o r d s w i t h the meaning
w h i c h they express.
T h e theory of X E K T d being immaterial is bound to raise
problems about the effects they produce. T h e o f f i c i a l S t o i c
v i e w i s that c a u s e and e f f e c t are i n t e r a c t i o n s of material
things, B u t i f w e act on a command, w e are responding, not to
the sounds as s u c h , but to the meaning w h i c h they c o n v e y ,
the
immaterial
X E K T 6 u .. T h e r e i s an a l t e r n a t i v e S t o i c
treatment of c a u s a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t p r o v i d e the a n s w e r ; i f
wood is burnt by f i r e , it i s sometimes argued that both the
308

c a u s e and thing affected are material, but the effect i t s e l f is

not; the burning of the wood i s a K a T T y y 6 p F | p a , a stateable
fact, and as such immaterial ( S V F 2.341), P e r h a p s , then, an
immaterial
f a c t o f this k i n d c o u l d
be p r o d u c e d b y
an
immaterial
X E K T D U
B u t I think there i s a deep-rooted
c o n f u s i o n at this p o i n t
A changing
substance is still a
substance;
for
that
matter,
burning
wood
does
not
immediately cease to be w o o d . A n d i f w e speak of a f i r e , we
are
n a m i n g this p r o c e s s ; our w o r d s denote a s u b s t a n c e
undergoing
change,
rather
than
simply
expressing
the
stateable fact that it occurs, O n e c a n p i c k u p a f i r e i n a
shovel: I do not see how one c a n shovel up a fact,
D e s p i t e a l l s u c h e m b a r r a s s m e n t s , it i s c l e a r that the
S t o i c s have e s c a p e d f r o m the n a r r o w h o r i z o n of t r y i n g to
e x p l a i n language s i m p l y by a c c o u n t i n g for n a m e s ; they are
c o n c e r n e d w i t h situations and events, and are at least trying
to distinguish these f r o m the sentences w h i c h describe them.
(8)
A fortiori, they see the same i n d i v i d u a l c a n be referred
to i n different w a y s , ( 9 ) a n d thus either by g i v i n g his name
Q U O pet,
or by borrowing what is normally a descriptive term,
a npoariyopta. I f A l e x a n d e r is k i n g , it makes no difference
whether w e say ' A l e x a n d e r i s brave' or 'the k i n g is brave';
but it does not f o l l o w from this that 'king' s i m p l y m e a n s the
same as 'Alexander'; for 'the king of Persia' i s a meaningful
phrase; 'the A l e x a n d e r of P e r s i a ' is not
(

4,
I think, then, that it i s probably the S t o i c s who c l a r i f i e d
the meaning of a term w h i c h plays an important part i n the
controversy
aroused
by
Eunomius,
namely
the
noun
E TT C U 0 L a ,
T h e facts about this w o r d are not very e a s y to
d i s c o v e r , partly b e c a u s e the only a v a i l a b l e m o n o g r a p h ,
the
little treatise p u b l i s h e d by A n t o n i o O r b e in 1 9 5 5 , p a y s no
attention to pre-Christian authors.. I n popular usage E T U U O L C X
seems to have had the fairly ill-defined meaning of a thought
or notion; it can also refer to a project, and it i s worth noting
that its one occurrence i n the N e w T e s t a m e n t , at A c t s 8:22,
refers s p e c i f i c a l l y to the w i c k e d project entertained by S i m o n
Magus.
In
s o m e c o n t e x t s it r e f e r s to the e x e r c i z e of
i m a g i n a t i o n , though this m a y be c o n t r o l l e d by the intellect,
and thus enable us to a r r i v e at notions for w h i c h sensory

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XX

e x p e r i e n c e provides the material, though it i s not properly

speaking the c a u s e of our thinking. T h e k e y passage here,
given by von A r n i m , S V F 2.87, is Diogenes Laertius 7.52. T h e
same material i s used w i t h p o l e m i c a l intention by S e x t u s
Empiricus
adv.math.
8.56, and it s e e m s that E u n o m i u s
independently drew on D i o g e n e s , though his p o l e m i c a l aims
are rather different from those of S e x t u s ; see G r e g o r y of
N y s s a c . E u n . 2.179,. Diogenes tells us that our conceptions, T d
u o o t i u e u c c , are based either on experience, nEplrrTLocnc;, or
on m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , w h i c h he e n u m e r a t e s , a n d w h i c h
mostly i n v o l v e easily intelligible modifications of experience:
l i k e n e s s , analogy, transposition, composition, opposition; thus
by analogy w e imagine giants and d w a r f s ; again, death is
c o n c e i v e d as the opposite of l i f e (though w h y ? , one might
ask; w e can have a direct encounter with death). B u t w e are
then
told
that
some
things
are
conceived K a r a
pET&Pacuu T i u a , such as XEKTd
and r 6 r r o e , ; these w e
note belong to the four phenomena w h i c h the S t o i c s describe
as incorporeal, arid therefore as not fully real ( S V F 2 331).
B u t they are not m e r e i m a g i n a r y f o r m s l i k e centaurs or
giants (ibid 3 3 2 ) ; they depend upon a sophisticated process
of generalization and abstraction. It appears from Sextus that
the phrase r d
KaT'ETTLUoiau
uooupeua
stands for the
products of any such process, whether naive or sophisticated,
as opposed to what i s k n o w n from e x p e r i e n c e , T O
K a r a
TTEpLTTTcoo"L U y u c o O | J i u o u ; for Sextus is concerned to make
the f a i r l y s i m p l e point that both our conceptions and our
f a n c i f u l imaginations depend on sense-experience., E u n o m i u s
however
wants
to
suggest
that
things
qualified
as
K a r ' e T T L U D i a u are purely fanciful; he mentions only giants,
d w a r f s , many-headed monsters and half-beasts T h i s a c c o r d s
w i t h the popular meaning of TT i u o i a , but not w i t h its
technical usage, as w e can see once again from Sextus 10.7,
SVF
2,501; he tells us that if w e imagine all (real) objects
abolished, the space w h i c h contains them w i l l still r e m a i n :
Kdu
K a T ' E T T L U o i a u 6e
d n a u r a
d u E X c o p E U 6 rorroc;
OUK
d u a i pEBfjaE r a t
EU
&
fju
Td
rrduTa
dXX'iJTTOjJEUEi ( U T T O U E U E T?). T h i s no doubt postulates an
exercise of the imagination; but it is not idle or poetic fancy,
but rather a d i s c i p l i n e d
thought-experiment.

The

distinction

between

sense and

310

reference which

we

have ascribed to the Stoics becomes fairly c l e a r in a much

discussed passage of Posidonius, fr 92 E d e l s t e i n = D i e l s D G
458; here it i s said that ouaCa and uX.n, are identical K a r a
TfjU
U T T O C T T a a L U and differ E T T L U O i a
pouou, I think this
must mean that the r e f e r e n c e of the terms o u a i a and uX,T]
is identical; they differ in sense, or i n the description they
convey, W e learn from fr.. 9 2 that O U C H a can mean existence
as a w h o l e , w h i c h neither i n c r e a s e s nor d i m i n i s h e s , but
merely suffers change; while fr. 5, if reliable, indicates that
Posidonius thought of uAn, as the passive drrOLoc;
ouaCa,
distinguishable
f r o m the a c t i v e p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n it,. T h e
argument, then, is that one and the same reality is c a l l e d
O U C H a in that it exists, and uX F] in that it is liable to change.

5,. W e may now turn to P h i l o , who accepts the principle that

one and the same thing c a n have various E T T i u o i a L , , and
indeed gives it a theological application T h e w o r d itself i s by
no means infrequent; L i e t z m a n n ' s i n d e x notes 26 instances,
and there are others, less easy to trace, in the Q u a e s t i o n e s In
Philo's usage it very seldom refers to mere fantasy, l i k e the
invention of centaurs; there i s j u s t one possible e x a m p l e , at
Migr.
1 9 2 ; God's m i n d r e a l l y does pervade the u n i v e r s e ,
unlike man's, w h i c h can only travel round it i n imagination,
TTLUOa puou. B y far the commonest meaning is a project,
or the means c h o s e n to attain it, a n d not infrequently a
w i c k e d project, l i k e that of the tower-builders of B a b e l ,
C o n f u s . 158, S o m n .
2 , 2 8 5 ; but s o m e t i m e s an
admirable
human s k i l l , l i k e that of the ship-builder, S p e c . L e g . 1.335
S o m e t i m e s T T L U O L a denotes theoretical knowledge; it can
refer to o r g a n i z e d r e s e a r c h , S o m n .
1.39, or again to the
knowledge
of m e d i c i n e , E x s e c r .
145. T h i s leaves three
contexts to be considered, of w h i c h by far the most important
is H e r e s 23. Here P h i l o explains that G o d , as indicated by
a ' T L O c ; , has two appelations (TTpoapu,aEL.t;), namely B E o c
a n d KpiOC;: but i n the text under d i s c u s s i o n , Gen.. 15:2, the
w o r d EanrrjC;
is used; and Kpioc; a n d E o r r r n c ;
are
said to be synonymous P h i l o then continues: d X X ' E L ,
TD
TFOKELUEUOU
EU K a l
rauTu
artu,
muoCaic;
ai
KXf)0"ELCj
Latppoucn
the two titles differ i n their
descriptive
f o r c e , K p i o c; s i g n i f y i n g f i r m n e s s or v a l i d i t y
( K p o c ; ) and EcnTrjC, implying a bond, E a p c ; , which

311

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XX

again suggests 6 E O C ; , fear T h e picture i s complicated, and w e

should not assume that the two terms K u p t o q a n d 6 a n 6 rr)c;
have the same relationship as Beog a n d K u p i o c ; . T h i s latter
pair are o f c o u r s e related to the one a n d o n l y G o d , but as
P h i l o t e l l s u s e l s e w h e r e they n a m e t w o d i s t i n c t p o w e r s ;
whereas K u p i o q a n d io"Tr6Tnt;
are alternative titles for o n e
of these p o w e r s , and it i s this that i s indicated b y saying T O
UTTOKEIUEUOU
E"u K C C I T C X U T O U
0~TLU.. H o w e v e r at Q u . E x .
2 6 3 the w o r d eniuoia
seems to m a r k a contrast between
the t w o p r i m a r y p o w e r s t h e m s e l v e s , here d e s c r i b e d as 'the
c r e a t i v e ' a n d 'the r o y a l ' p o w e r s ; f o r the G r e e k
fragment
reads: n p E a f j U T E p a
6E
f) T r o i n T i K f ]
rf\q f j a a t X i K f j g
Kar'TTCuoL.au
( A s a rough p a r a l l e l , w e might imagine a n
E n g l i s h aristocrat w h o has inherited o r obtained t w o distinct
titles, one of them more d i g n i f i e d or actually more ancient
than the other, though o f course there i s no difference i n the
age of the m a n h i m s e l f ) . T h i r d l y , at S p e q . L e g . 2.29 w e are
told that 6 r f | c ; ( p u a E c o c ;
opBoc. Xdyoc, has the function
both of a father and o f a husband, T T C X T p b c ;
6po\J K C U
au6p6cj E " X
6 v j u a u L U , EmuoCaic; fciatpopoic;, i n that
he both i m p l a n t s
the seeds o f v i r t u e i n the s o u l a n d
procreates g o o d designs and a c t i o n s , w h i c h h e subsequently
nourishes w i t h refreshing doctrines, T T O r C f J O i C,
66yp:acuu,
T h e language i s largely S t o i c , e s p e c i a l l y the phrase 6 opBbr;
Xoyoc;: the sequence 6 Tf|Cj t p u a E o o c ; 6pB6c; Xbyoc, i s
repeated at O p i f . 1 4 3 , w h i c h m a k e s the c o n v e n t i o n a l S t o i c
comparison of the c o s m o s with a well-governed c i t y ; a n d the
S t o i c s of c o u r s e d e s c r i b e d the L o g o s a s a n E p u a r i K O C ; ,
though I have not so far d i s c o v e r e d parallels to P h i l o ' s v i v i d
i m a g e s of its intercourse w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l soul
Plutarch
also quotes from C h r y s i p p u s a reference to b
KOLU6C;
rfjr;
ipuaeojc;
Xoyoc;, w h i c h i s identified with E i p a p i J E u r i a n d
T T p b u o i a a n d Z e u s ( S V F 2 . 9 3 7 ) ; no doubt the theory of
ETTLUOICLL
w i l l have been employed
in making
these
equations.
E I

A t a l l events, P h i l o c l e a r l y understands that one and the

same reality c a n be r e f e r r e d to by alternative designations
w h i c h d e s c r i b e its a c t i v i t y under different a s p e c t s o r by
different
metaphors

312

6,
O u r account s o far m a y have suggested a continuous
p r o c e s s of improvement and c l a r i f i c a t i o n i n terminology; but
f r o m about P h i l o ' s time o n w a r d s w e have to r e c o g n i z e an
i n f l u e n c e w h i c h c o n t i n u a l l y threatens to o b s c u r e the results
so laboriously a c h i e v e d ; I refer to the influence of c l a s s i c i s m ,
the v i e w that a l l i m p o r t a n t k n o w l e d g e and understanding
had already been d i s c o v e r e d by the ancients, a n d the further
disposition to select among ancient authors o n the s c o r e of
literary merit T h e C r a t y l u s o f Plato and the C a t e g o r i e s and
De
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e o f Aristotle now c o m e to b e regarded as
standard
authorities;
A r i s t o t l e ' s T o p i c s a l s o gains more
influence than it deserves. T h u s the important progress made
by the S t o i c s i n understanding the w a y i n w h i c h language is
significant tends to b e o v e r s h a d o w e d b y a return to the old
p r o b l e m , do names acquire their m e a n i n g b y nature o r by
convention? W h a t w e c o m m o n l y find i s a compromise theory,
that names are indeed to be traced to an original name-giver,
but
that
h e s e l e c t e d the n a m e s
that
had a
natural
appropriateness to their objects, B u t here the argument all
too often stops short, w i t h o u t attempting to enquire what
m a k e s n a m e s n a t u r a l l y appropriate
P h i l o thus argues that
M o s e s d i d better than the G r e e k s in attributing the origin of
l a n g u a g e , n o t s i m p l y to w i s e m e n , but to the f i r s t man
created; ( 1 0 ) 'for i f many persons h a d a s s i g n e d things their
names,
these
would
have
been
inconsequent
and illm a t c h e d , ,.. w h e r e a s n a m i n g
b y o n e m a n w a s l i k e l y to
h a r m o n i z e w i t h the r e a l i t y , a n d this w o u l d b e a consistent
s y m b o l f o r a l l m e n of the fact or the thing signified', r o G
Tuyxduouror;
f\ T O O a i y i j a i u o u E U O i J , the phrases which
w e have already seen in u s e among the Stoics,,

7,
T o this theory of the g i v i n g of names there i s of course
one major exception, the name of G o d himself, i f it i s right to
c a l l it a n a m e T h i s , it i s c l e a r , c a n only be known because
G o d h i m s e l f h a s r e v e a l e d i t , B u t w h a t e x a c t l y h a s he
r e v e a l e d ? P h i l o ' s difficulty i s obvious, O n the one h a n d , he
k n o w s that G o d h a s a n a m e w h i c h must n o t be s p o k e n ,
'except by those w h o s e tongue i s purified by w i s d o m i n the
holy place', V i t . M o s . 2 114, and that this name i s signified by
four H e b r e w characters; he most probably d i d not k n o w how
these s h o u l d be pronounced,
(11)
O n the other h a n d , in

313

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XX

Philo's G r e e k B i b l e , Moses asks G o d for his name, and is given

the reply "EyoJ eCpi ou (Ex 3:14); though an alternative
is immediately suggested: T h e L o r d G o d of your fathers, the
G o d of A b r a h a m
this is my name for ever'. W e cannot say
that
'Qu
functions for Philo as a proper name; indeed he
says explicitly that God has no need of a name ( A b r . 5 1 ) ; but
he c l e a r l y regards it as a uniquely appropriate and revealing
title. L e t us note that a l l other appelations w h i c h w e find
applied to G o d are in one p l a c e or another referred by P h i l o
not to G o d himself, but to one of his u u d \i E I e,. T h i s is
certainly true of the titles B E C , ,
Kpioc;,
Fjacn A E C ; ,
noLf|Tr|c;( r | | J i o u p y t ; apxwu EUEpyTTiq, and I think
o f d p x i l B u t the phrase
' Q u is never identified w i t h a
u a p t c ; ; it has uu|_JEi.c; assigned to it. W e must not
enlarge on Philo's theory of God's uudpEic;, w h i c h has often
been described; in his v i e w , G o d i s perfectly simple, but has
m a n y uudpEic;; the intellectual apparatus for this doctrine
is d r a w n f r o m the G r e e k debate as to w h e t h e r w e c a n
consistently describe the s o u l , or the m i n d , as s i m p l e , and
also as having parts; i e , can w e harmonize the P h a e d o with
the R e p u b l i c ? A commonly-accepted v i e w was that the soul
i s s i m p l e , but has v a r i o u s functions, w h i c h can be described
as 6 u u d U E l C ; , or again as i n later C h r i s t i a n theology, as
EUEpYElCU.
P h i l o can therefore be said to anticipate E u n o m i u s i n one
respect,
namely
that
he
selects
one
title
as
uniquely
appropriate and indicative of G o d ' s nature., I n other respects
he is of course poles apart.. A l t h o u g h he comments on this
title,
he
also
explains
that
God
is
'unnameable
and
indescribable
and
incomprehensible',.
It
is
presumably
because
fu is a completely general expression that he
d e s c r i b e s G o d h i m s e l f - as d i s t i n c t f r o m h i s L o g o s - as
'supremely g e n e r a l ' , yEUiKCura roc;, and so comparable with
the w o r d r i ,
w h i c h for the S t o i c s included things that were
not even real ( L e g . A l l . 2,86),. P h i l o ' s language, h o w e v e r , is
c o n t r o l l e d by the m e t a p h y s i c s o f the P l a t o n i s t s , for w h o m
'being' i s a v a l u e term, and distinct varieties of being arise by
some form of limitation OT q u a l i f i c a t i o n , rather as w e now
r e a l i z e that c o l o u r s are d e r i v e d f r o m plain white light
We
therefore h a v e the p a r a d o x
that the p u r e l y abstract and
u n i n f o r m a t i v e term i s c o n s i d e r e d appropriate to denote the

314

i n e x h a u s t i b l e r i c h e s o f the s u p r e m e r e a l i t y , of w h i c h all
beauty
a n d p e r f e c t i o n that
w e c a n o b s e r v e is o n l y
a
derivative of inferior rank
There i s of course one further question to be raised here.
P h i l o refers to the supreme being both as 6
cbu
and as T O
6u
- he w i l l not unfortunately delight those friends of ours
w h o think he should have u s e d the designation f|
cOca!
A r e w e to say that the notion of pure B e i n g is i n some way
qualified
by the e x p r e s s i o n 6
cou,
w h e r e the m a s c u l i n e
gender imports
s o m e s u g g e s t i o n o f m a l e , and
therefore
personal, b e i n g , w h i c h is appropriate w h e n w e read of G o d
s p e a k i n g , and therefore r e v e a l i n g h i m s e l f to m a n ? O r s h a l l
we say that it merely neutralizes the opposite suggestion of
i m p e r s o n a l , and so p o s s i b l y sub-personal, b e i n g , w h i c h is
encouraged
by T O
O U , and perhaps also affects the u s e of
phrases l i k e T O B E L O U as opposed to 6
8E6C;? I do not know
h o w to a n s w e r this question.. I s l i g h t l y p r e f e r the first
alternative. I n G r e e k usage, of course, it is by no means true
that the m a s c u l i n e gender applies only to h um an males, and
the neuter only to inanimate objects; nevertheless the use of
the neuter to denote males i s a little unusual; men's names
are u s u a l l y m a s c u l i n e in f o r m ; the neuter being u s e d not
uncommonly
for
women's
names,
and
of
course
for
diminutives.

H a v i n g dealt as best I can with Philo's usage, I w o u l d like

to continue by tracing the use of the w o r d E T T C U O L c t
d o w n to
the Fourth Century. B u t time does not allow this; and I must
offer some general comments on the logic of nomenclature
B u t there i s one passage w h i c h i s important e n o u g h
to
d e s e r v e mention even in the briefest sketch o f the patristic
e v i d e n c e , namely O r i g e n C o m m . J o .
1,20,119, 6
GEOQ
pEU

ouu TTaurri E U E O * T I KCXL dnAouu; 6 6E aoorf|p t\[i(ov

6 i d Td noXA.d, E T T E I T T P O E B E T O a u r a u 6 FJEOC;
iA.aarfipi.au K a t a n a p x ^ ndarjc; Tfjq KTICTEIJOC;,
rroAAd ytUErat
K T X . I n the event, of course, it proves
that the L o g o s has several distinct r o l e s , for w h i c h O r i g e n
uses the term ETTI uot a t ,
quite apart from the various good
o f f i c e s w h i c h he undertakes for the s a l v a t i o n of m e n ; a
suggested l i s t is aotpCa,
Aoyoc;,
scof) and perhaps
d A f | B E i a . T h e strong declaration that G o d himself, 6 B E O Q ,

315

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XX

is t o t a l l y one and s i m p l e m a y p e r h a p s h a v e h e l p e d
to
c o n v i n c e E u n o m i u s that only one d e s i g n a t i o n for h i m is
a l l o w a b l e B u t this of course i s not Origen's v i e w ; he argues
that one and the same being is r j U L o u p y and B E O
and
TT a f f] p , both of C h r i s t and of o u r s e l v e s , and is at least
prepared to c o n s i d e r the argument that the titles TT a T f j p
and B E O
indicate distinct T T i U O I a t : C o m m . J o . 19,5 i n i f W e
m a y note that i n his use of E T U U O L C X
Eusebius
conforms
fairly closely to Origen f E . T . 2,10.6, 14.22), and A r i u s appears
to do so too (Ath. s y n . 1 5 ) ; w h e r e a s A t h a n a s i u s r e p l i e s by
t r e a t i n g TTLUOia
as a w o r d r e s e r v e d for mere f a n c i e s or
fabrications,
and
to
this e x t e n t p r e p a r e s the w a y
for
Eunomius

8..
I return at last, then, to my ostensible subject, ' L o g i c and
the application of names to God', W h a t are w e to understand
by the w o r d 'names'? I n the broadest sense ouopcx
c a n be
e q u i v a l e n t to our w o r d 'noun', and thus i n c l u d e
common
nouns or d e s c r i p t i v e terms, m o r e accurately d i s t i n g u i s h e d by
the w o r d s rrpQOT|YOpi.ai,
and npoapfjaEic;.. F r o m these we
can distinguish proper nouns or proper names; but w e note
at the outset that these are not n e c e s s a r i l y p e r s o n a l names;
there are names of countries, l i k e S i c i l y , and of mountains,
like E t n a . Indeed in some w a y s these are less problematic; it
m a y w e l l be that the island of S i c i l y is the only country to
w h i c h this name is attached; w h e r e a s i n h u m a n s o c i t i e s a
p e r s o n a l n a m e c a n o n l y p i c k out its o w n e r w i t h i n
his
immediate
c i r c l e ; there are s i m p l y not e n o u g h n a m e s in
existence to give e a c h i n d i v i d u a l i n the w o r l d a name of his
own.. B u t in discussing personal names w e c o m m o n l y keep up
the fiction that someone's name r e a l l y is a proper name in
the sense of being peculiar to him A n d we have to recognize
another f i c t i o n e n c o u r a g e d by the G r e e k p h r a s e K upt
ou
0 U O |J ex, namely that a person's name in some w a y not only
denotes that one i n d i v i d u a l , but c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e s h i m
This
is a state of affairs w h i c h w e s h o u l d f i n d it v e r y difficult to
bring about, e v e n if w e tried to do s o , w h e r e n a m e s are
normally
a s s i g n e d to i n d i v i d u a l s
b e f o r e their c h a r a c t e r
developes
W e c o u l d I think i m a g i n e p r o v i d i n g
somebody
with a n i c k n a m e w h i c h r e a l l y w a s p e c u l i a r to h i m and was
also significant to the extent of alluding to some outstanding

316

feature
of
his
appearance
or h i s
character
Fictional
c h a r a c t e r s , o f c o u r s e , do h a v e n a m e s w h i c h are significant
and p o s s i b l y unique; M e d u s a , the c u n n i n g o n e , Prometheus,
the forward-looking; and returning to r e a l l i f e , of c o u r s e it
c o u l d have been the case that Xenophon's friend Cheirisophus
really was c l e v e r with his hands, or e v e n r e c e i v e d this name
as a s o b r i q u e t w h e n his s k i l l w a s d i s c o v e r e d , W h a t is
i m p o s s i b l e i n the c a s e of h u m a n b e i n g s o r i s l a n d s or
mountains
i s to p r o v i d e
a name
f r o m w h i c h a l l their
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s c a n be d e d u c e d , as w e m i g h t c l a i m
for
g e o m e t r i c a l figures l i k e the triangle; but a n c i e n t theorists,
under Plato's i n f l u e n c e , are often haunted by the ghost of
this possibility,
I n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s it seems that no e m b a r r a s s m e n t
was felt i n designating gods by p e r s o n a l n a m e s T h e early
I s r a e l i t e s n a m e d their o w n G o d J a h w e h , a n d w e r e quite
prepared
to
acknowledge
Chemosh
as the
god
of
the
A m m o n i t e s and therefore no c o n c e r n of theirs.. It w o u l d need
an O l d Testament specialist to tell us precisely w h y the name
J a h w e h c a m e to be regarded as too sacred to pronounce
A
tentative answer might be that
the w o r s h i p p e r s of J a h w e h
w e r e c o n c e r n e d that he s h o u l d be p r o p e r l y h o n o u r e d , i,e.
concerned about his 'name' i n the sense of his reputation, and
i n d e e d attributed a s i m i l a r c o n c e r n to J a h w e h h i m s e l f ; so
that the phrase 'his name' c a m e to indicate his real character,
a n d . a l s o to be u s e d as a r e v e r e n t i a l e x p r e s s i o n for the
d i v i n i t y . B u t there m a y w e l l be a different explanation for
the avoidance of the actual name 'Jahweh', as opposed to the
d e s c r i p t i v e e x p r e s s i o n 'his name'; for w e n o r m a l l y
apply
n a m e s to f a m i l i a r
things
l i k e p e r s o n s a n d places,. T h e
Israelites m a y w e l l have felt that to provide the G o d of all
the u n i v e r s e with a name w a s to assimilate h i m to the cultic
gods of the heathen. More g e n e r a l l y , w e might suppose that
it is normally the function of a personal name to pick out an
i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n a c l a s s of similar beings; i n this c a s e , to
apply a personal name to G o d would be to suggest that he is
not unique. T h i s w o u l d go some w a y to e x p l a i n the special
appeal of a distinctively mysterious phrase l i k e 'I am' or 'He
W h o Is'.

317

XX

XX

9.
B u t w e need to come back to E u n o m i u s ; for it is clear that
the c o n t r o v e r s y w h i c h he p r o m p t e d
d o e s not
turn
on
p e r s o n a l n a m e s ; the q u e s t i o n at i s s u e i s r a t h e r , whether
there i s some one descriptive term for G o d w h i c h e n j o y s a
p r i v i l e g e d status E u n o m i u s made this c l a i m for the w o r d
d y e u u r } T O t ; . . H i s argument, I think, must be that G o d i s
p e r f e c t l y s i m p l e as r e g a r d s his e s s e n c e , though he has
v a r i o u s operations, p o w e r s , and energies,, H e c a n therefore
h a v e o n l y one proper d e s i g n a t i o n ; i f more than one term
w e r e applied to h i s e s s e n t i a l nature, this w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y
i m p l y that there were distinguishable aspects o f h i s essence
named by the different terms, so that it w o u l d be no longer
simple I find this argument u n c o n v i n c i n g ; and I think it can
be a n s w e r e d e v e n without appealing to B a s i l ' s theory of
ETTLUOLCtt ; for it s e e m s to i m p l y that the actual w o r d
dyEUUF|TOC;
is indispensable. W o u l d E u n o m i u s then insist
that no L a t i n or P e r s i a n speaker c a n hold correct theological
v i e w s ? B u t ifdyUur|TOc; can be translated, w h y should one
r e f u s e to admit that it can be r e p l a c e d i n G r e e k by a
s y n o n y m w h i c h ' i s e q u a l l y c a p a b l e of r e p r e s e n t i n g G o d ' s
perfectly simply essential nature? It may be answered,
p e r h a p s , that there is no p e r f e c t l y adequate s y n o n y m ; but
then, c l e a r l y , there i s no p e r f e c t l y adequate
translation
either
E u n o m i u s therefore has to c h o o s e ; either he must
insist that G r e e k i s the only language i n w h i c h theology can
be a c c e p t a b l y
stated, or he m u s t
admit
that
roughly
s y n o n y m o u s e x p r e s s i o n s may be admitted, w i t h a l l the risk
of a variation o f nuance w h i c h w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e the divine
simplicity., T h e word ex p X M. . f instance, might be suggested
as an appropriate s y n o n y m
r

E u n o m i u s c o u l d a n s w e r , of c o u r s e , that d p x u. w i l l not
do, since it has a wide range of applications; whereas, i n his
o w n time and m i l i e u at l e a s t , it c o u l d be argued that
d y E u u r y r o c ; - spelt with u u - w a s only used in connection
with the divinity A n d its compound, negative f o r m does give
it a certain advantage o v e r other d e s c r i p t i v e terms,, If w e
take a word s u c h as TT O I T\ T f j c;, it could be argued that w e
only l e a r n the use of this w o r d by meeting it in ordinary
contexts, and that therefore it must have associations w h i c h
render it unfit for describing the unique source of all life and
being
B u t this argument ignores the f l e x i b i l i t y w h i c h our

318

language d i s p l a y s , and the extent to w h i c h it i s affected by

its context What i s normally a descriptive term, 'the X ' , can
often be understood a s 'the X to w h i c h it is proper to refer in
this context'; w i t h i n a f a m i l y , for instance, the word 'Father'
quite properly means 'the father of this family', without any
sense of a conflict with its use as a common noun. A more
sophisticated variant of this is the case where 'the X ' denotes
some i n d i v i d u a l K a T ' E ^ O X n >
Aquinas refers to Aristotle,
c a l l i n g h i m p h i l o s o p h u s . 'the philosopher',, T h i s logic governs
our use of the word 'God'; w e learn the use of the word partly
by learning what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s v a r i o u s societies a s c r i b e to
their gods; at a later stage we refine our conception, and also
understand that the being w h o fulfils our specification must
be unique, 'I b e l i e v e i n one G o d ' , w e then s a y , thereby
excluding the conceptual possibility of a plurality of gods, It
may still be true, h o w e v e r , that this e x c l u d e d possibility has
played a part i n our coming to understand the word 'God',
u

10 E u n o m i u s , I think, makes two distinguishable errors. T h e

first is to say that only one term i s properly applicable to
G o d , as signifying his essence, T h e second is to suggest that
this term d y E U U T y r o c ; , is proper i n the sense of g i v i n g a
complete specification of what is c o m p r i s e d i n the being of
God, T h i s latter point is so generally condemned that I shall
not enlarge on it T h e former point has rather more basis in
tradition; thus P h i l o maintains that the phrase 6
' O u i s not
really a name, since there is no name at all w h i c h properly
applies to G o d - O U 6 E U
ouopcx
TO r r a p d r r a u
ETTEpoO
KUpLOXoyELTCXl
t j j pOUQJ
TTp6aEO"TL
T O E l U C t l , . But
P h i l o does not develope this last phrase; on the contrary, as
w e have seen, he pictures G o d as r e v e a l i n g a name to men,
and also as e x e r c i z i n g a variety of functions, 6 U U d p E l c;, in
virtue of w h i c h w e may use names l i k e K u p i o c ;
and B E or;,
Unfortunately
these
powers
often
appear
to
detach
themselves as autonomous beings l i k e the angels, who are at
least theoretically able to escape from G o d ' s control, l i k e the
A e o n s of the G n o s t i c s A t this point a better picture is already
outlined by Justin f A p o l . 2,6,2): 'the Father of a l l has no given
name, being ingenerate', s i n c e , he adds rather n a i v e l y , this
w o u l d imply some more senior divinity who g a v e him s u c h a
name; 'but " F a t h e r " and " G o d " and " C r e a t o r " and " L o r d " and
" M a s t e r " are not n a m e s , but appellations ( T T p o a p f i C T E L C ; )

319

XX

XXI
derived

from

follow,

broadly

have
one

no

fault to
that

find

'simple'

or energies

actions'

this
them

I am
they

would

the

Biblical

with

question

must

i t s e l f requires

be

that

track,

think

which

squaring

we

with

which

important
divinity

in

a perfectly s i m p l e

operations

term

beneficent

speaking,

assumption,

namely
of

his

being

can

this

tradition.
it

uneasy

can

and

Gregory

this

respect I

with

with

regard
a

intelligible,

let

the

alone

enormously

P o s s i b l y the

should

plurality

of construing
this

to

Eunomius,

exercize

way
But

set a s i d e

must end by c o n f e s s i n g , o m n i a

in

share

see no

make

Basil
and

nature

not

be

answerable,

exeunt

in

rnysterinm

of

Divine simplicity as a problem for

orthodoxy

and

' I h e e v o l u t i o n o f o r t h o d o x y ' m i g h t easily b e u n d e r s t o o d as a process

which

belongs

w h o l l y t o the past:

doctrine, o n which

the development

Henry Chadwick

of Christian

has shed s u c h a g r a c e f u l a n d

p e n e t r a t i n g l i g h t , w o u l d t h e n be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h a c o m p l e t e a n d stable
1

Plato himself

later c o i r e c t e d the f a l l a c y ; see T h e a e t e t u s

c o n s t r u c t i o n i n w h i c h C h r i s t i a n i t y has c o m e t o rest. B u t t o c a l l i t

203.

c o m p l e t e a n d stable n e e d n o t m e a n t h a t f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s is e x c l u d e d ; at

2 . S V F 2 146, = Origen C e l s . 1.24; c f . 2 895

t h e v e r y least, n e w challenges are l i k e l y t o arise, a n d o l d t r u t h s w i l l need

S Y E 2 151,

S V F 2,166; and for X E K T C X

fin.

The

differently

t o be re-stated A n d m o s t o f o u r g e n e r a t i o n , a n d o f o u r j u n i o r s , w i l l t h i n k

same
by

threefold

Origen,

r d

distinction

Philocalia

(pooufj, d f i L i a i u o L J E u a ,
KEturai

n p a y p a

expressed

rather

4; here the terms u s e d are

and

ar||jauLJEua

is

r a , 3 Diog,, 2 0 ad

n p d y u a r a

KaB'&u

; cf, also S V F 2.168,

Ep

Cf

Cf.SVE

p r o c e s s , i n w h i c h established p o s i t i o n s n e e d t o be c l a r i f i e d a n d some

117 (not in S V F V . but cf. 2.132.

S V F 2.167 with the misleading

QxdL

handbook

2.171

beginners

148, L e g . A I l . 2.14 f , M u t . N o m . 6 3 f ; contrast,

11 Cf. V i t . M o s . 115 init: T E T p a y p d p u a r o u

BeoXyo

a n d better

F r o m such a s t a n d p o i n t o n e can t u r n w i t h a r u e f u l a d m i r a t i o n t o a

168,

h o w e v e r , V i t . M o s . 1.130, D e c a l . 23
cprau

static. I f o r o n e w o u l d c e r t a i n l y w i s h t o see its e v o l u t i o n as a c o n t i n u i n g

a r t i c u l a t e d consensus o f b e l i e f m a y be a t t a i n e d

9. S Y E 2.151.
10

far t o o t a m e : i n t h e i r eyes, o n l y a n o b s t i n a t e a n d

s e c l u d e d m i n d w i l l p e r s i s t i n d e f e n d i n g a n o r t h o d o x y t h a t is p u r e l y

false steps r e t r a c t e d , i n t h e f a i t h t h a t a b e t t e r g r o u n d e d

S Y E 2.166, 170, 331,

this p r o g r a m m e

Eua.

6e

rouuoLJd

which

has g i v e n

invaluable

i n t h e o l o g y , t h e Entbiridion

service t o a succession
Patrtiticum

of

o f M J R o u e t de

J o u r n e l , c o m p l e t e d i n 191 r a n d a p p e a r i n g i n its t w e n t y - f o u r t h e d i t i o n i n
1969

T h e l e a r n e d a u t h o r has c o l l e c t e d o v e r 2,400 b r i e f passages f r o m

t h e F a t h e r s , a n d offers a g u i d e t o h i s s e l e c t i o n i n a n ' I n d e x A n a l y t i c u s ' ,

a r r a n g e d so as t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e F a t h e r s p r o s p e c t i v e l y u p h o l d the
e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e o f m o d e r n c a t h o l i c o r t h o d o x y as d e f i n e d i n t h e t r a d i t i o n
o f St T h o m a s
simpluissimus,

Aquinas
tta ut nullum

A s a r t i c l e 97, w e find t h e h e a d i n g
omnino admittat

cited include TeituUian, Athanasius,

compontionem.

Deus eit

The authorities

Basil, G r e g o r y o f Nyssa,

John

C h r y s o s t o m , A m b r o s e , A u g u s t i n e a n d C y r i l : and m o s t o f t h e m , i t must
be s a i d , a r e c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e a u t h o r ' s f o r m u l a t i o n a n d seem t o have
no

reservations

about

the black-and-white

c o m p o s i t e , o n w h i c h i t is based.

320

antithesis,

simple

or

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy

I shall submit that this is an over-simplification: we must not t h i n k

that simplicity is itself a simple notion B u t h o w eise can one explain the
fact that the theme of divine simplicity has been so little discussed ? I t
figures, no doubt, i n text-books of dogmatic theology: but I cannot
discover that much detailed attention has been given to the actual usage
of the key words baplous and haplofs or to their Latin equivalents. The
entry i n H . J Sieben's Voces makes it appear that simplicity has been
examined only i n its guise as a moral virtue, i n w h i c h a modest
disposition is expressed i n t r u t h f u l unaffected language and unassuming
reliability of conduct. The article ' E i n f a l t ' i n the Realiexikon fr Antike
und Christentum surveys much the same ground Nevertheless there are
some unexpected features i n the philosophical use o f the words for
simplicity, and some transitions o f thought w h i c h I believe cannot bear
the weight that has been p u t upon them

construction which Gregory omits is the doctrine that G o d is strictly

immutable: but this is commonly based on a rather different
understanding of 'composite b e i n g ' , in w h i c h change is explained as a
rearrangement of the minute particles, atoms or otherwise, of which
material things ate composed: thus also they w o u l d come t o an end
when their constituents lose their cohesion and are absorbed i n t o the
surrounding matter Conversely, if G o d is not composed of such
particles, he is immune f r o m change. This argument can easily be

We may begin by taking an example of the standard exposition f r o m

The origins of this train o f thought ate clearly pre-Christian, and

illustrations can be found i n P h i l o ; but for the moment I w i l l postpone
this enquiry, and consider some other, and less rigorous interpretations
of simplicity which entered the Christian tradition

Gregory Nazianzen's Second Theological Oration

in the Enchiridion)

(Oratio

2 8 ) , 7 (not included

For what will you conceive the Deity to be, if you rely on ail methods of
reason? A body? How then is he infinite and boundless and formless and
intangible and invisible? . For how shall he be an object of worship i f he be
circumscribed ? Or how shall he escape being compounded out of elements and
resolved into them again, or indeed totally dissolved? For composition is a
source of conflict, and conflict of separation, and this again of dissolution ; and
dissolution is totally foreign to God and to the first nature So there can be no
separation, to exclude dissolution : no conflict, to exclude separation ; no
composition, to exclude conflict ; and therefore He is not a body, to exclude composition So the argument is established by going back from the last to the first.
The rhetorical and allusive style w h i c h Gregory adopts, while
addressing a largely uninstructed congregation, shows that he takes his
argument t o be thoroughly established and familiar. The w o r d baplous
does not i n fact appear i n this passage, but Gregory makes his point
clearly enough by saying that G o d is ' n o t compounded of elements' (ek
stoicheidn sugkeistbai)
and is immune f r o m composition
(suntbesis);
composition w o u l d imply conflict (mache). The mention o f conflict
suggests that Gregory is using ' elements ' i n the fairly precise sense to
indicate the traditional four, earth, air, fire and water, which were
thought t o display contrary qualities, h o t and cold, wet and dry : it was
a favourite topic o f Christian apologetics t o say that God's wisdom is
manifested i n the art w i t h w h i c h he combined potentially discordant
elements i n t o an harmonious w o r l d order. One feature o f the traditional
1

256

illustrated (e g. Athanasius Contra gentes 4 1 , De decretis

11);

but i t is not

easy t o see w h y change or dissolution should result f r o m conflict among

minute bodies such as atoms: one w o u l d rather t h i n k of a failure to
cohere or t o maintain their orderly disposition This may already suggest
that the orthodox case is not quite so simple and straightforward as
appears at first glance

(1) First of all, a student o f Aristotle cannot read fat w i t h o u t

encountering the phrase 'simple bodies', hapla somata. 'Simple' i n this
connection means that they do n o t consist of other elements which could
exist separately The last four words are important, since the four
elements, w h i c h are simple bodies i n this sense, were thought t o result
f r o m the imposition of qualities o n formless matter (see e. g Hippolytus,
Kefutatio omnium haeresium 1 19 1 for a doxographic account): b u t this is
a purely theoretical analysis, as one cannot actually find matter existing
w i t h o u t qualities, or vice versa, t o use as ingredients which could
actually be combined o r compounded. Further, 'simple bodies' have no
structure o r pattern; or more exactly, to say that they are simple makes
no stipulations about their location or distribution. I t follows that things
which are simple i n this sense need not be indivisible; the element fire,
for example, appears i n a multitude of separate places, i n the stars, for
instance, and in a modified f o r m i n animal bodies. Arius DkTymus
mentions the division o f simple bodies..
2

W i t h i n the Christian tradition this usage is best illustrated by

Tertullian, w h o o f course makes use of stoic teaching o n matter and its
qualities The Stoics held that the elements can change one into another
( 5 VT 2 4 1 3 e t c ) , so that none of them is imperishable except the fire
f r o m which they originate and t o which they return; while in the short
257

"1

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy

run it is admitted that fire itself can be extinguished and ' d i e ' (ibid. 430,

which Christ is anointed (Psalm 4 4 : 8 L X X )

446).

powers and functions are suggested by the composite ointment

The whole process is controlled by ' s p i r i t p n e u m a (ibid

416),

priests

in

Exodus

30:221!

prescribed

(ibid ), sometimes as fire (ibid 4 2 1 - 3 ) or a compound of air and fire

implication is not to be taken seriously, any more than the suggestion

4 3 9 - 4 1 ) ; but i n each case i t functions as the rational directive

that God's w i l l is, so to speak, the matter and substance f r o m w h i c h the

process i n the universe, or G o d (ibid 1045).. G o d , then, is i n some sense

universe is derived. I n Eusebius' view G o d is a unity, monas - indeed he

But

the

physical

surpasses the monad as the source of all creation (ibid. 4.1 5 ) ; and i n a

simple (suneches), but is not unchangeable.

These doctrines appear w i t h some variation i n Iertullian's teaching
about the soul. He takes i t for granted that the soul is i m m o r t a l ; but i f
indissoluble, i t must be indivisible, and therefore simple (singularis
simplex,

the

many
(muron)

whose status is unclear; it is sometimes identified as a separate element

(ibid

for

whereas God's

later w o r k , the Ecclesiastical

Theology (2.14.6) Eusebius insists o n the

absolute simplicity of the divine being

et

De anima 14). But i t is only simple i n a very large and loose sense;

(2)

Iertullian's o p i n i o n that the soul is a simple substance but is also

I e r t u l l i a n immediately notes that i t is commonly divided into ' p a r t s ' ;

subject to change could be endorsed by many thinkers, both Christian

t h o u g h these are more properly called ' faculties' or ' p o w e r s '

and pagan, w h o w o u l d not accept his peculiar doctrine of a corporeal

aulem non tarn partes

14.3)

(huiusmodi

animae habebuntur quam vires et efficaciae et operae, i b i d

soul

I t seems likely, i n fact, that the whole argument about

the

O n the other hand he believes that the soul is corporeal and has

simplicity of G o d begins w i t h a debate about the soul, i n w h i c h Plato

a shape c o n f o r m i n g to that of the body (ibid. 9 ) ; i t is hard to see h o w

played the leading part I n the Phaedo 78a, he draws a distinction between

it can fail to have ' parts' i n the sense o f limbs and other members; and

composite things and those that are uncompounded

if so, i t is ' simple' i n a much weaker sense even than ' simple bodies' like

argues that i t is the former that ate liable t o change, whereas absolute

fire or spirit

Moreover I e r t u l l i a n , while repeating that the soul is

essences, for instance o f beauty or equality, persist unchanging.. B u t the

(22 2), also insists that i t is subject to change ( 2 1 ) ;

sou! is akin to these realities; i t is ' most like the divine and immor tal and

substantia

simplex

(axunthetos),

and

otherwise there could be no possibility of human free w i l l One m i g h t

intellectual and u n i f o r m (monoeides)

compare the stoic doctrines that both G o d and the soul are ' s p i r i t '

(ibid. 80b) The natural inference w o u l d be that the soul can properly be

( 5 I / T 2.1035)

described as simple. O n the other hand, i n the Phaedrus and the

a n

t n a t

G o d is subject to change (ibid 1045,

1049!!);

t h o u g h on the latter point I e r t u l l i a n dissents and takes the normal v i e w :

only G o d is unchangeable (De anima 21 7 ) ,

and indissoluble and unchanging'

be compared w i t h the ' composite force' (sumphuto(i)

I n other respects, however, I e r t u l l i a n stands apart f r o m the main

Republic

he introduces the well-known theory o f three elements i n the soul: i t can

winged

horses

and

their charioteer, w h i c h

dunamei) o f a pair of

represent desire, im-

2 4 6 A ) . Plato is very sparing w i t h

tradition, and I am not clear that the Fathers commonly understood the

pulsiveness and reason (Phaedrus

simplicity of G o d o n the analogy of simple bodies I t m i g h t certainly

technical terms; he does not refer to ' p a r t s ' of the soul, but to 'natures'

have provided an answer to anthropomorphic theories; the idea that

(phuseis)

G o d had man-like limbs and features could be contradicted by p i c t u r i n g

(homophues:

h i m as u n i f o r m l y distributed t h r o u g h the universe, and Augustine tells

discussion by asking whether we learn and lust and rage w i t h three

or ' forms of being' (tide)

Republic

w h i c h are not ' identical i n nature'

4 3 9 e , 440c, 441a). H o w e v e r , since he introduces the

us that he came to rest for a time i n a conception of this sort (Confessiones

d i s t i n c t ' t h i n g s ' (trisin ousin, cf trito\t) tint) or w i t h the whole soul - 43 6a

7 1 1-2). Again i t m i g h t seem a natural deduction f r o m the statements

i t was natural to represent h i m as analysing it into three parts Finally,

that G o d is light, and fire, and spirit (1 John 1:5,

a perplexing passage i n Republic

Deuteronomy 4 : 2 4 ,

John 4 : 2 4 ) ; but i n a well-known passage (De principiis

1.1.4) Origen

10, 61 la-d suggests that the description

of the soul as simple only applies to its ideal condition or ' truest nature'

explains that these words are not to be interpreted i n physical terms, and

(fe(i~) alethestafe(i)

he could probably count on general agreement. Some suggestion of the

chatacteis, i t is t r u l y described as composite, and

'simple bodies' interpretation m i g h t be f o u n d i n Eusebius, w h o argues

compounded (61 i b and c).

(Demonstrate

evangelka

4 15 .16) that God's simple, uncompounded

and

unmixed nature may be symbolized by the simple ' o i l of gladness' w i t h

258

phusei);

i n its actual state, as manifested in disorderly

not even

well

Aristotle makes i t clear that i n his day there was a debate as to whether
one should refer to ' p a r t s ' of the soul (mere, moria)

or regard i t as
259

XXI

XXI
Divine simp/icily as a problem for orthodoxy

undivided but exercising a variety of functions, dunameis.

The latter
opinion seems to have gained g r o u n d ; at any rate Galen reports that
both Aristotle and Posidonius preferred to speak of ' p o w e r s ' in the sou!
rather than 'parts '; but arguments about ' p a r t s ' of the soul continued,
at least i n the doxographic literature, and are frequent i n P h i l o .
Posidonius accepted Plato's threefold analysis and claimed the support
of Cleanthes, whereas Chrysippus apparently adopted an intellectualist
theory which regarded emotions as judgments and so thought o f all the
operations of the soul as proceeding f r o m a single source Posidonius
complains that Chrysippus' language is confused, but Tertullian is
probably mistaken in saying that he reckoned eight parts in the soul; this
was a common Stoic opinion, but not that o f Chrysippus himself
3

I n the later tradition opinion seems to have veered to the view that
is i t correct to speak of ' p o w e r s ' o f the soul rather than ' p a r t s ' ; so
I e r t u l l i a n , as noted above: Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Calcidius
223, Porphyry and Severus, in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, 13 17 6, all
noted by J H. Waszink ; Iamblichus is inconsistent, but on the whole
prefers ' p o w e r s ' .
9

10

Meanwhile i t had become customary to apply the same principle to

the d i v i n i t y ; Philo draws a parallel between our m i n d and the divine one
(ho huper hemas), explaining that both are w i t h o u t parts and undivided
(quit

rerum divinarum

beres?

2 3 4 - 6 ) ; but this apparently applies to

out

m i n d only, as distinct f r o m other 'parts' o f the soul

Philo seems to
speak of such 'parts' w i t h o u t embarrassment; but his enumeration of
these parts can be precisely paralleled i n terms of ' p o w e r s ' , seven lower
powers plus the reason (De mutations nominum 110-11). But G o d is a
whole in which there are no parts (Deposter itate Caini 3 - 4 , Mut. nom 184);
moreover to speak of parts w o u l d suggest the picture o f a G o d in human
f o r m , which the scriptures introduce only as a concession to human
weakness (De somntis 1 234-6). I t follows that G o d must be seen as
operating t h r o u g h his powers
1 1

A similar parallel between G o d and the human m i n d could be drawn

by considering not their constitution but their operations I t is a
commonplace that the m i n d does not impair its o w n power by
expressing itself in words or by making an act of w i l l (so e g Philo, De
gigantibus 25). I n the same way Christian theologians could argue that
the divine Logos proceeds f r o m the Father w i t h o u t any loss or division,
as spoken W o r d or as expressing the Father's w i l l (Justin, Dialogus 61
and 128, Tatian, A d Graecos 5 1, Theophilus, A d Autolycum 2.22 etc.)
' w i t h o u t cutting off any part of the m i n d ' (Origen, De principles 1.2 6).
260

This notion of 'undiminished g i v i n g ' , accepted also by neo-Platonist

philosophers, has been much discussed, and probably needs no further
illustration
F r o m the above reflections it w o u l d seem that there are radical defects
in the neat antithesis of simple and compound which is presupposed by
Gregory and has been adopted by orthodox Christian theologians. For,
i n the first place, an object w h i c h has no parts need not be wholly
undifferentiated; i t might have distinguishable features, like the colours
of a rainbow, which could not properly be described as parts (whether
we think of the colours themselves, or of the coloured areas which
merge one into the other) A g a i n , if an object consists o f parts, i t does
not f o l l o w that i t is constructed by assembling those parts: a tree has a
t r u n k , branches, and twigs, but i t is not brought i n t o being b y taking
those parts and p u t t i n g them together, as a house is built by collecting
and then assembling bricks, beams and roofing tiles i n the appropriate
order. A n d the converse is also probable; i t is not intuitively obvious
that physical objects can only perish by the separation of their parts;
w h y should not some things simply fade away, like a spark? A g a i n , a
tree may die w i t h o u t its branches falling apart f r o m the t t u n k ; this will
occur later, i t may be, when b o t h have begun to r o t ; the total dispersal
of its constituent atoms w i l l take still longer
12

Where the soul is concerned, i t seems reasonable to use the

comparison of a natural organism; and the Stoics may have partly seen
this possibility, even though they expressed i t in the rather absurd form
(as we w o u l d think) that the universe is a rational a n i m a l ; for they
represented the cosmos as an organic whole whose parts reacted one
upon another by ' s y m p a t h y ' ,
and taught that thete is an analogy
between the cosmos and man, w h o can be called a 'little universe' or
'microcosm'
13

14

1 5

O n the other hand i t w o u l d seem that a soul which exercises a variety

of powers cannot be simple i n any very rigorous sense; for if they are
to be powers of the soul, rather than auton6mous agencies that just
happen to sympathize w i t h its activities, there must be modifications in
the soul w h i c h explain why i t exercises one power rather than another
on a given occasion or towards a particular object This w i l l be true, I
think, whether the powers are seen as t r u l y intrinsic to the soul or as
semi-independent auxiliaries; if such auxiliaries merely go into action on
behalf of a rigorously simple soul, the soul itself is not acting.. A n d the
same should be true of God, whose action is sometimes seen as delegated
to quasi-independent powers or even to angels, w h o can act o n a lower
16

261

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy

level (Philo, De opificzo mundi

even rebel (Gig. 6.17)

7 4 - 5 ! ) , misunderstand their instructions or

There is of course the alternative of supposing that

To resume: if we now consider a scheme i n v o l v i n g four members,

primus,

unicus, simplex,

constans, it w i l l be difficult to resist the claims of

all God's powers are mutually compatible, and that he exercises them all

t w o other candidates, namely bonus and verus, since these constantly figure

perpetually.

A n d this view can be advocated i n impressive terms; G o d

in ancient discussions i n conjunction w i t h the n o t i o n of unity. Plato for

confronts us i n a single undifferentiated blaze of majesty and mercy by

instance argues that a god must be both simple and unchanging, and sees

which we are b o t h humbled and uplifted But this can only be made

i m m u n i t y f r o m change as a sign o f goodness (Rep. 2 380 d-e). Aristotle

17

convincing i f stated as a generality; we have no grounds f o r believing

discusses the relation between unity and t r u t h , w i t h o u t i t seems reaching

that ' G o d opposes the proud but gives grace to the h u m b l e ' ; we have

a final conclusion. O n the one hand he asserts that knowledge implies an

to say that the proud are frustrated because they miss their way to the

identity - at least an identity of f o r m - between the m i n d and its object

goal w h i c h w o u l d truly satisfy them, and, more sadly, that the humble

(De anima 3 5, 430 a 20 etc ) ; on the other hand both truth and falsity

ate uplifted if they can find the confidence to overcome their dejection.
The identity of God's attributes and powers cannot be combined w i t h

entail

a composition of thoughts into a unity (ibid. 3 6, 4 3 0 a 2 7 - 8 ) ; o r , w i t h

a different emphasis, both t r u t h and falsehood involve a combination of

a genuine doctrine of particular providence

notions (432 a T2).

(3) One reason w h y simplicity is easily misconstrued is that i t is one

relations between the six attributes we have named I n practice, i t would

possible interpretation of the n o t i o n of unity, and is liable to be

I n theory, it w o u l d be an admirable project to consider the logical

be an impossibly complex task. A set of six members exhibits 6 x 5 = 30

180-93,

possible combinations, and each of these w o u l d have to be tested i n

I referred to three interpretations of unity w h i c h can be labelled by the

both directions; if a, then b ; but also, i f b, then a B u t what finally puts

catchwords unicus, simplex,

I t m i g h t have been

this project out of court is the fact that several, and possibly all, o f the

to take note of the v i e w ,

attributes in question have been understood and explained i n different

probably Pythagorean in o r i g i n , that the structure o f the universe can

ways by different writers We have been considering simplicity; but this

be explained i n terms o f numbers, and that numbers derive f r o m the

is a minuscule discussion compared w i t h the vast literature devoted to

One, w h i c h is therefore the o r i g i n of all things.

the nature of goodness, and to theories of truth.

influenced by its neighbours I n my book Divine

constans (or immutabilis)

helpful to have added a f o u r t h , namely primus,

Substance, pp

W h y ' p r o b a b l y ' Pythagorean? Because Aristotle, our most reliable

I t is possible, however, to say something about the logical links which

witness, represented them as teaching that the One is derivative; see

were thought to connect simplicity in particular w i t h its neighbours;

A 5, 987 a i ; f f - t h e y reach two first principles - and

Metapbyma
Ethica

Nicomachea A 4 , 1 0 9 6 b 5, they place the One i n the column of goods

(and so not at its head). But contrast Metaphysica

A 6 , 987 b 231T: Plato

and I w o u l d begin by observing that most of them are pre-Christian, and

can be illustrated f r o m Philo Some further precision may have accrued
in later discussion; but i n the main they belong to the inheritance, rather

said, like the Pythagoreans, that numbers are to other things the cause

than to the evolution, of Christian orthodoxy I t hardly needs repeating

of their being, but differed f r o m them i n postulating a dyad instead oj the

that Philo takes over the Pythagorean teaching that a simple u n i t y is the

unlimited

source of all reality; at Heres

as a unity

Probably, then, some members

o f the school

190 he recalls the purely arithmetical

reckoned the monad as the first principle. A m o n g later critics, Aetius

doctrine that the monad is not a number (i e. plurality) but the source

seems to make them teach t w o principles, of w h i c h however the monad

of all number; at Somn

has the active and formative role and is identified as G o d ;

in

as to equate the monad w i t h the Maker I t might seem otiose to maintain

omnium

that the monad is unique; but the Pythagoreans exploited the verbal

Hippolytus' account the monad is the sole source (Refutatio

haeresium

1.2.6) Philo refers to G o d as monad (e.g. quod Deus

1 8

immutabilis

sit, 11, beres 183), but also teaches that the monad merely symbolizes
G o d (Legum

allegoriae

2. 3, De specialibus

legibus

3 180, cf

De praemiis

et

poenis 4 0 ) ; the dyad is, or symbolizes, created and divisible matter (Somn.
2.70, Spec
262

leg. 3 180) and is given a radically inferior dignity.

2.70 he applies this doctrine to theology, so

similarity of monasjmonosjmonimos,

and Philo in t u r n observes that the

monad is like G o d because o f their singularity, monosis (Heres

183, Spec

leg 2.176) A t Somn. 2 221 Philo speaks of the constancy o f the ultimate
source; at De confusione linguarum

180 he associates 'the eldest of things

that are' w i t h 'the most perfect g o o d ' ; at De praemiis

et poenis 40 'better
263

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy

than the g o o d ' is coupled w i t h 'older than the m o n a d ' cited above
Finally the monad is absolute reality (Immut
n ) , and De ebrietate 4 ;
refers to 'the one true G o d ' I n terms of our catchwords, therefore, the
monad is simplex,

primus,

unhus,

constans, bonus, verus

I h e source of these connections must be looked for in a region of

ancient philosophy which remains obscure despite intensive discussion:
the Pythagorean philosophy before the time of Plato, and the
Pythagorean teaching which Plato adapted in his theory of ideal
numbers, and above all in his enigmatic lecture on 'the One and rhe
G o o d ' We are nor concerned at present w i t h the question, how Plaro
thought the numbers are derived f r o m the O n e ;
nor w i t h the
connections o f thought w h i c h Plato must have tried to establish
between individual numbers and basic concepts (of w h i c h the traditional
example is that four justice, i n v o k i n g the 'four-square' right-angle as
the basis of exact division, o f equality, and of stable constructions) Our
main interest is the One itself; and I suggest that we can trace back to
these early discussions t w o principles which came to f o r m part of the
Christian tradition The first is that the One is the ultimate source of a
multiplicity of Forms which provide the permanent structure of the
universe and also the pattern of its values. These Forms themselves
exhibit b o t h unity and goodness, but in a lesser degree and a relative
mode compared w i t h their source; they are each of them a unity relative
to their multiple instances, but they are distinct f r o m each other as
contrasted w i t h its absolute u n i t y ; and they are each of them the source
of goodness, or pattern of goodness, for some class of beings, 'a good
so-and-so', rather than being the sole source of all goodness The second
principle is that the One is the highest reality and absolute t r u t h , since
it holds the key to the Forms on which all true predication must be
based; but i t is a t r u t h which is inconceivable and inexpressible, certainly
to us men, and possibly to any being other than itself; the reason being
that true statements were conceived on the model of a synthesis of t w o
notions (and, for that matter, knowledge was seen as the identification
of the m i n d w i t h its object); but in neither case was pure and absolute
unity achieved; a true statement could only be significant if t w o distinct
notions were brought together (a theory opposed to the view put about
by Antisthenes that the only unquestionably true statement was the
unqualified identity ' X is X ' ) ; and the mind's ' i d e n t i t y ' w i t h its object
could only be an identity of f o r m , not a wholesale coalescence. I t
followed that the One had to be exhibited as, on the one hand, good,
being the source of all goodness; but contrariwise as unknowable and
19

264

indefinable; not simply devoid of qualities ( e g sense-qualities) but

unconditioned by any attribute whatsoever, since any statement about it
could not be true unless i t was in formal correspondence w i t h its object
(i e simple) and could not be significant unless it were composite,
attaching a predicate which was distinguishable f r o m its subject
W i t h i n the Platonic tradition, Plotinus made the most sustained and
coherent effort to w o r k out these principles, concluding inter alia that the
ultimate source could not have knowledge even of itself, since even selfknowledge implied a distinction between the mind as Knower and the
mind as K n o w n ; thus the traditional 'scale of being', ascending from
inanimate nature to conscious minds and upwards through progressively
purer and more penetrating intelligences, was apparently interrupted;
not simply lost in the clouds of heavenly glory, but brought to a stand
by the paradox of a Being w h o is the source of all goodness but cannot
be good.' Christian thinkers, inheriting a richer though far more
complex tradition, struck out new lines o f thought w h i c h were never (I
think) connected in a logically coherent whole, but which, if pursued,
should have exhibited the n o t i o n of w h o l l y undifferentiated divine
simplicity as an unwanted survival.
20

W i t h i n the compass of this essay, there are only t w o critical principles

which I have space to develop One of these might be labelled 'the
diminishing returns of u n i f i c a t i o n ' ; the other I take to be simply an
application of a fairly recent movement in philosophy, namely the
rejection of the picture theory o f meaning.
However, no originality is claimed for the first principle either. It
relates to a proposal made by Leonard H o d g s o n , which perhaps never
attracted as much attention as it deserved. Hodgson contrasted
'mathematical' w i t h ' o r g a n i c ' unity, explaining that ' A p p r o x i m a t i o n to
the ideal o f mathematical unity is measured by a scale of absence of
m u l t i p l i c i t y ; but approximation to the ideal o f organic unity is measured
by a scale o f intensity o f unifying p o w e r ' (p. 94) Hodgson considers the
case of human character, in w h i c h a divided mind or a split personality
is a grave disadvantage ' I n the case of the human self, the u n i t y is by
no means always perfect . But in whatever measure it is achieved, this
is not affected by the cancellation of factors until nothing rs left but an
undifferentiated unity. far more intense is the unity manifested in a life
which unifies a wider range '
21

One m i g h t , alternatively, consider the role o f unity in personal

relationships, taking a single pair of friends to deputize for the more
complex interrelations of a group or of our whole society Clearly there
265

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy

must be some correspondence or similarity of interests, fortune or

temperament if any personal relationship is to begin; and the process o f
g r o w i n g together, of assimilating another's experience and imitating his
judgments and values, can be exciting and rewarding. But the
partnership needs refreshing by the maintenance o f outside interests and
the bringing in of fresh experience by each of the partners and ideally by
a love shared by both partners but directed on to another person or
cause; for however attractive initially the recognition o f an alter ego
provided by fortune, or the attempt to realize it as an ideal, the project
is self-defeating: to make one personality an exact replica o f the other is
to reduce by one the number of distinct moral agents; and a mutually
monopolizing partnership has no great advantage over a self-absorbed
individual
Hodgson used his concept o f unity to formulate a doctrine of the
Trinity in social terms ' I h e true pattern of unity for men w h o are made
in the image of G o d is one in which there is a place for all our different
selves, so far as they are good selves, a unity in which each is to remain
its own self in order that it may play its part in enriching the w h o l e ' (p
185) I w o u l d not follow him at every p o i n t : the sentence just quoted
could easily provoke the reply that there can be no analogy of this k i n d
w i t h a G o d w h o needs no enrichment, since he is himself the source o f
ah good things But the alternative seems to be that we treat the
substance or inner being of the Godhead, characterized by mysterious
and incomprehensible but absolute simplicity, as something totally
unrelated to the Trinity of Persons in w h i c h we believe i t is deployed
A n d I w o u l d think also that there is no escaping the conclusion drawn
by Plotinus: an absolutely simple Godhead cannot undersrand 01
control the influence and attraction that he exerts
M y second point is that i t is a mistake to think that a descriptive
sentence can only be true if i t is in a structural correspondence w i t h the
reality or state of affairs which it describes L i k e so many philosophical
theories, the picture theory of meaning is a Cinderella's glass coach so
long as one is content to go along w i t h it and accept it on its o w n terms,
but collapses into dust and cobwebs when the spell is broken I t seems
beneath the dignity of a serious objection if one observes that, on such
a theoty, to state that there are four people i n this room one would have
to formulate a sentence embodying four identical symbols- A n d of
course the theory can be developed so as to escape such simply
conceived objections: we have to incorporate conventions in which
' f o u r ' replaces a symbolism of the f o r m a, b, c, d, and ' i n the r o o m ' is
2 2

266

a conventional equivalent for an ideal symbolism in which the symbols

for the four people w o u l d be actually enclosed by the symbol for
' room'
Theories of this k i n d , however, seem to have affected ancient
discussions on the nature of G o d ; it could be argued, for instance, that
G o d cannot be k n o w n because he cannot be defined; he cannot be
defined because that w o u l d involve assigning him to a genus within
which he is distinguished by a differentia; and this would mean he
consisted of t w o distinct elements, and was no longer simple. The
answer, reduced to its simplest terms, is that there is no reason to think
that a correct description mirrors the structure of the thing described If
we describe man as a rational animal, we cannot point to the two
elements named by this phrase; and if we tried to do so - perhaps by
saying that he has an animal body plus a directing intelligence we can
only make this plausible by ignoring the relatedness o f the two
components Man lives his animal life in a way prescribed by reason, but
conversely the exercise o f his reason is qualified and sometimes
interrupted by his animal nature. Why not then ignore the attempt to
conform him to his definition, refer to h i m as a psycho-physrcal unity
and be done w i t h it?
23

I t is a mistake of this order which I take to be a peculiar weakness of

the Cappadocian theology of the T r i n i t y : the three Persons are defined
as possessing the same simple undivided divine substance qualified by
three distinguishing peculiarities. But this is not presented only as a way
in which they may be conceived; the definitions are supposed to
conform TO rheir inner structure, so that the undivided Godhead which
they share is not so much manifested in three personal beings o r modes
as contradicted by the imposed characteristics by which they are
distinguished O n the other hand the Cappadocians most opportunely,
though unexpectedly, insist that the simplicity of the Godhead does not
preclude a multiplicity o f descriptions, epinoiai
These, however, were
thought to relate to the energies and relationships of the Godhead,
leaving hrs simple substance unaffected; a position which I have given
reason to reject
To return, in conclusion, f r o m the intricacies o f exact theology to the
burdens imposed on our mortality by faith in a transcendent spirit: the
concept of divine simplicity should present a challenge to an over-simple
faith One cannot help feeling that there is some force in the sceptics'
objection to 'God-bothering'; it is less easy for us than it was for an
earlier generation t o assert w i t h o u t misgivings that 'the eyes of the Lord
267

XXI

XXI
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
are o v e r the righteous and his ears are open unto their ptayer'. I f w e

11

c l a i m that our prayers are h e a r d and a n s w e r e d , does this mean that w e

expect G o d to g i v e us his u n d i v i d e d attention? N o t , surely, in the sense

For which see Quts rerum divinarum beres? 232; De opificio mundi 117;

12 R T WalHs, Neoplatonism, London 1975, pp. 34, 62

C a n w e then imagine a

r ; SVF

2.92, 633-5, 638, etc.

m i n d w h o s e capacities are so vast that it can r e s p o n d to the i n d i v i d u a l

14 SVF

2.475, 534,

that w e ask h i m to neglect all other petitioners

needs of m e n w h o s e n u m b e r s are m u l t i p l y i n g beyond all

capacity o f our o w n minds to c o n t r o l m a n y c o m p l e x m o v e m e n t s

and

activities w i t h o u t a c o n s c i o u s effort of a t t e n t i o n ; w e m i g h t suppose that

in some similar way G o d automatically distributes his b o u n t y , ' m a k i n g

546, 1023,

16 C f W

106); Philo, migr

Pannenberg, in Baste Questions in Theology, vol 2, London 197 [, pp

170-1
17 Irenaeus, Haer 2 15 3, see my Divine Substance, Oxford 1977, pp

187-9;

Pannenberg, Basse Questions, p. 67.

18 Diels, DG 281a 6-12,

creatively, distributing

19 F o r which consult, e g , W

the help or c o r r e c t i o n that his

( = Posidonius fr

is Philo, Heres 155, cf Migr 219-20

the s u n to rise u p o n the e v i l and u p o n the g o o d ', or m o r e personally and

to each m a n

1211

178-80; Marcus Aureiius, 6.38

imagination?

T h e p r o b l e m here is that this is m o r e easily i m a g i n e d if w e note the

Legitw

allegoriae 1 w; Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat 168; De agrkultura 30 etc

502a

7-10
D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 19; 1,

c o n d i t i o n requires. B u t this still does not suggest a G o d w h o stands in

and the passages collected by C. J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy A Collection

a caring r e l a t i o n s h i p ; and it m a y p r o v e that the only w a y in w h i c h this

of Texts, vol 1: T'hales to Plato, Leiden 1950, undec the heading ' The Ideal
Numbers'

can be u p h e l d is by g i v i n g full w e i g h t to the doctrine that the F a t h e r

exercises

this

condescending

grace t h r o u g h

incarnate C h r i s t made m a n for us

his

expression in

the

20 Plotinus himself did of course identify the first principle as 'the G o o d ' , as
well as ' the O n e '

T o suggest this puts the o r t h o d o x y

of N i c a e a and C h a l c e d o n under the severest s t r a i n ; w e w o n d e r w h e t h e r

21

it can support the u n i o n

22 I use the phrase rather loosely, without specific reference to Wittgenstein's

intimacy

of

o f infinite, all-regarding majesty w i t h

a man-to-man r e l a t i o n s h i p ; so that

u n d i v i d e d , the majesty u n i m p a i r e d

the operations

by an unlimited

are
the

intimacy

preserved without

concern

T h i s is a p r o b l e m o n w h i c h e v e n the A r i a n s , i f g i v e n their due,

m i g h t have s o m e t h i n g

distraction over

distribution,

the

a c o s m i c extension

to teach u s ; and o n w h i c h the e v o l u t i o n

o r t h o d o x y m i g h t b r i n g much-needed

of

The Doctrine of the Trinity, London 1943, pp

ScjrT, esp pp

94-5

theory, for which see G H. R Parkinson, The Theory of Meaning, Oxford

1968, p 5
23 Cf Pannenberg, Basic Questions, p

132.

of

light

N O I ES
1 Methodius, De resurrections 2 10; Eusebius, Laus Constantin! 11 r ; , 12 r i ;
Constantine, Ad sanctos 7 3-2;

Athanasius, Contra gentes 27 fin, 367; cf

Severus in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelua 13.17

2 Diels, DG, p 449, fr 5

3 See De anima 1 5, 411b

1-19,

2 2, 413b 13ft , 28, cf 2 3 init ; De iuventute 1,

467b 17; Etbica Eudemia 1 1, 1219b

4 Posidonius, fr

;z

142-6 Edelsrein

; Diels, DG, Index, p

781b

6 See J Leisegang's index (vol v n

2, Berlin 1936), 868b 869a, to L Cohn

and P Wendland's edition of Phiio

7 Fr 3 2 5 V F
8 F r 34, cf S VF

1 571
2 283.

9 Tertullianus de anima, Amsterdam 1947, p

21;.

to A - M Festugire, L.a revelation d'Herms Trismgiste, vol 3, pp 1945.

268

269

INDEX

Abramowski, Luise: fil 140; X 76

Adeodatus, son of Augustine: XVIH 63
64-5 66, 67,69
Adoptionism heresy: IV 30
Aeschylus, Prometheus

Bound:

XVi! 3

Aetius: VI 154; X X I 262

Africanus: III 144, 145
Albinus: II 9; V 44; X V I 6
Alexander of Aphrodisias: III 144; V 47
48; VII 675, 676.. 678.68] 683
684; X X I 260
De Fato:

V 49: VII

674

Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria: IV 24

25,26, 27., 30, 34, 36; V 41, 42,
46,47, 50-51; VI 157; Vlil 51,
5 6 ; X 76. 82, 85-6,90
e philarchos,
analysis: X 76-91
Alexander of Lycopolis: V 43, 44
Alexandria: I 177; III 146; XII 248
Ambrose: X V 73; X X I 255
analogy, doctrine of: II 12-13
Anatolius: V 39, 40
Antichrist: X 80
Antinous: IX 231
Antioch, Synod of; III 140; X 76
Antipodes: X V I I 9
Apollinaris the Younger: X I I 233. 234
235; XIII 65, 69, 77
Apuleius: X V 73, 75; X V I 8
Aquinas: X X 319; X X I 255
arche : II

9-10

Archimedes: I 180; VII 680

Arianism; II 14; VIII 51-9
doctrine: X 83-5
see also Arius
Aristotle: II 18; VII 680; X I V 154 156:
XV 84, X V I 3 : X V I 1 I 6 6 ;
XVIII (Add) 2; X X 319
Categories:

X X 306., 313

on change: I 183
De Anima: XVIII 66; X X I 263 268
De Ceneratione

et

Corruptions:

VII 673
De Interpretation:

X X 306

3]3

De luventute:
X X ! 268
Elhica Eudemia:
XXI 268
Ethica Nitomachea:
X X I 262

on
on
on
on
on

Forms: I 182
knowledge: II 12
language, theory of: X X 306
light: X V I I 6
logic: I I 77-8

Metaphysics.

II 15; V 49; VII

673:

XXI 262
on names: X X 306-7
on participation: V 48
Physics:
Poetics:

II 9
X X 307

on simple bodies: X X I 257

on the soul: X V I 4: X X I 259-60
Topics:W

43,

313

on virtue: I 178-9
Arius: IV 34; X X 316
and the Logos doctrine: I V 25, 26,
2 8 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 6 ; V40-41,
45; VI 153-7, VII 671-84;
VIII 51-9: X 85 88-90
in Athanasius' De Decretis: VI 154
Letter

to Alexander:

VII 676-7

684

and Neoplatonism: V 39-51

sources on: IV 24-5
Thalia:

IV 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33;

V 41. 42.45. 46; VI 153, 154:

VII 672, 675 678,681,684;
X 82, 85, 86-7.. 88-9,90-91
theology: IV 26.. 32-3;V 47. 51
see also Arianism
Arius Didymus: X X I 25 7
Armstrong, A.H : I 185: X V I 9
Aspasius: 111 144, 145
Asterius: IV 25, 29; VIII 53
astronomy, and Augustine: X V I I 10-11
Athanasius: II 14; V 41, 43, 49; VI 157;
VII 671; X X 3 1 6 ; X X I 2 5 5
ad Epictetum:

XII 233

as an exegete: XI 174-84
Arius, criticism of: IV 24. 25, 26-7.
28, 29, 31,32. 33, 34: VI 153

156; VII 679 681,683. 684;

X90
Contra Gentes: IX 230 232, 233,
234, 235,236. 237. 238,239,
240; X 91; XI 178, 179:
XII 246, 248; X X I 257, 268
De Decretis: VI 154; X X I 257
De Incarnatione: IX 229, 230. 231,
232, 233,236. 237, 238;
X 77-8; X 91; XI 179; XII 246,
248; XIII 71
De Synodis: IV 24, 27, 28; VII 677,
678; VIII 51; X 80, 91; XI 78
Epistula ad Marcellinum: X 78;
X I 174. 179, 180; XII 241;
XIII 72; analysis: XIII 65-9 74
Epistulae Festales\X\ 175, 178,
180, 182, 183, 184; XII 248
Expositio Fidei: X I 176
Expositions
in Psalmos: X I 1 74;
XII 235. 236, 237,246,248;
XIII 65; analysis: XIII 69- 78
henos somatos analysis: X 76-91
Historia Arianorum: X 80
In Iliud Omnia: XI 175; XIII 74
on knowledge of God: I X 229-42
Orations:
XI 175, 179, 182
Plato 's Politikos cited: XI 179
on the soul of Christ: XII 233-50
Tomus ad Antiochenos: XII 233, 247
Vita Antonii: X 80; XIII 71
Athanasius of Anazarba: VI 154
Athenagoras: II 8; XI 181
Atticus: II 8; V 50
Augustine: I 179; II 18; IX 231; X X I 255
Against the Academics: X V 72
on astronomy: X V I I 10-11
on belief: X V I I I 73
cave simile: X I X 339, 343
City of God: X V 75; X V I 13; X V I I 9
Confessions: X V 74, 79; X I X 339.
340,341. 342; X X I 258
on cosmology: X V I I 1-13
De Interpretation:
XVIII(Add) 1
De Magistro, analysis: XVIII 63-73
De Trinitate: X I X 340, 341
on Ecclesiasticus:
X V I I 4, 5
on the firmament: X V I I 11-12
on the four elements: X V I I 9-10
on Genesis: X V I I 4-6
on heaven: X V I I 12-13
on human life: X V 80-81
on intellect; X V I 1
on the intelligible world: X V I 11-14
on knowledge: XVIII 73

INDEX

INDEX

on learning: X V I I I 72-3
life: X V 71-2
on light; XVII 6-7, 8
literal Commentary on Genesis:
X V I 1, 13; X V I I 2, 4; X I X 340
on the meaning of words:
XVIII 66-72; XVIII (Add) 1-2
on memory: X I X 339-45
on the natural world: X V 74-5;
XVI 6
on the nature of God: X V I 13-14
on nouns: X V I I I 66-8
On Free Choice: X V 80
on permanence: X V 834
on the philosophy of being:
X V 71-84
on the philosophy of language:
X V I I I 63-72
on Platonism: X V 72-3, 74;
X V I 2-4, 11-14
on seminal reasons: X V 79
on signs: X V I I I 66-70
Soliloquies: X V I 13
on speech: X V I I I 64-5
on spirits: X V 80
on teaching: X V I I I 72-3
Aurelian: III 147

X X I 260
Chrysostom, John: X X I 255
Cicero: I 179; II 9
De Natura Deorum: X V I 8; XVII 5
Horiensius: X V 71
Lucullus:XlX
341
Tusculan Disputations: X I X 341
Cleanthes: X X I 260
Clement: II I I ; III 147; V 43, 44;
VII 671, 674; IX 232, 236;
XI 181
Codex Alexandrinus: XIII 65
Cohn, L : X X I 268
Colluthus: X 9 1
Constantine, Emperor IV 24: V 39;
VII 684; X 90
Adsanctos:
X X I 268
Constantinople, Council of: X I V 350
Coquin, R G.: X I 175, 180, 183
Cosmas Indicopleustes, Christian
Topography: XVII 9
Cosmology, and Augustine: X V I I 1-13
Courcelie.. P.: X I X 341
Cross, F L : XII 250
Cyprian: I 176
Cyril of Alexandria: XIII 65, 7 7;
X X I 255

Bardy, G : III 140-41; IV 36; VI 153,

154; X 76, 91
Barnabas: XI 181
Barnes, T D . : Ill 141; X 76
Basil: I V 28; X V I 6; XVII 3, I I ;
X X 3 1 8 , 320; X X I 255
on light X V I I 6
Basi!ides:II 10; VIII 56; X V I 6
Bauer. W : V 48
Beryllus of Bostra: III 142, 148
Bienert. W A : VII 682
Blume, H -D.: II 15; VII 677
Brennecke.. H.C : III 141; IV 35
Bultmann, R K : II 18
Burnyeat, M F : X V I I I 63, 68, 70

Decartes, R : X V 72
demiourgos: I 181
Didymus: XIII 65 77
Dinsen, F : V 49
Diogenes of Babylon: X X 307
Diogenes Laertius: II 9; III 144, 146,
147; X X 310
Dionysius of Alexandria: I V 34; VII 683.
6 8 4 ; X 88
Dionysius the Areopagite: X V I 8
Dionysius of Rome: VII 683: XIII 74
Domnus, Bishop: IV 35
Dorival, G : XIII 65, 75, 77
Dorner. I.A.: XII 249
Drrie, H : II 9, 15; VII 677
Dyad, The: V 45- 6

Calcidius: X X I 260
Callias: V 48
Calvenus Taurus: X V I 5
Carneades: X V 72
Chadwick, H.: I 185; III 141; X I X 341;
X X I 255
Chalcedon, Council of: I 185
Christian thought, Greek influence:
I 175-85
Christianity and Platonism: II 2
Chrysippus: I 183; X X 307, 312;

Ecclesiasticus,
and Augustine: XVII 5
Elipandus:IV30
Empedocles: VII 672
Epicurus: X V I I 2-3
epinoia: X X 309-10, 3IS-12, 315, 316.
318; X X I 267
Epiphanius: X I 184; X V I I 7
Ettlinger., G H . : XII 249
Euclid, and geometry: I 180
Eudorus: II 9

Eunomius, Bishop : IV 28; X X , 309.

314,316
on names: X X 318-19
Eusebius of Caesarea: II 8; III 140-50;
IV 29; V 4 3 , 45, 49; V I 157;
VII 674, 683; VIII 53; I X 236;
X 81; XII 239, 241.. 242,243,
244, 246, 248; XIII 65, 73, 77.
78; X I X 341; X X 316
Commentaria: XII 247; XIII 74
Demonstratio Evanglica: XII 247,
248; XIII 74; X X I 258-9
Ecclesiastical
Theology: X X I 259
Eclogae Propheticae: XII 247
on knowledge of God: IX 229-42
Laus Constantini: X I 2 3 1 , 237;
XII 247; X X I 268
Praeparatio Evanglica: V 39;
IX 231, 238, 240; X X I 260, 268
on the soul of Christ: X 234
Theophaneia: XII 247, 248
Eusebius of Nicomedia, Letter to
Paulinus: VII 671, 677, 682
Eustathius of Antioch: 111 149; I V 33,
35. 36; X I I 234
On the Soul of Christ: XII 247
exegesis, examples: XI 181-4
principles: X I 177-81
existentia/existentialitas:
X V I 10-11
Feltoe.. C L : VII 683
Festugiere. A -M : V 4 5 ; X X I 268
firmament, the, and Augustine:
X V I I 11-12
Forms. Platonic: I 181-2; V 47; 1X240;
X I V 158, 159. 160; X V 79;
X V I 3-4; X X 305; X X I 264
Frend, W H C : III 141
Galen: X X I 260
Galtier, P: XII 249
Genesis, and Augustine: X V I I 4-6
geometry, and Euclid: I 180
George of Laodicea: VII 676
Gnosticism: II 5; VIII 56; X X 319
God, immutability: II 14-15
knowledge of: I X 229-42; X X I 267
as mind: II 6; I X 239-40; X X I 268
naming of: X X 314-15
nature of: X V I 11, 13-14
view of prophets: II 7
goodness: X X I 263
Greeks, The, and Christian thought:
I 175-85
and mathematics: I 179-80

and monotheism: II 6, 17
Gregg, R C : IV 25, 26,28; VI 153;
VII 671, 675
Gregory of Nyssa: IX 242: X X 310 320;
X X I 255. 261
Ad Eustathium de sancte trinitate:
X I V 149-50
AdGraetos:
X I V 149
on the Trinity doctrine: X I V 149-63
Gregory Thautnaturgus: I X 236
Grillmeier, A.: [II 141; XII 234, 249
Groh, D : IV 25, 26; VI 154; VII 675
Hadot, P : X V I 2
Hadrian, Emperor: I X 231
Hall, S G : VI 154
Hanson, R P C : III 141; VII 671
Harnack Adolf von: II 1,2, 18
Hatch, E : I 185
Heaven, and Augustine: X V I I 12-13
Hephaestus: 1 176-7
Hera: I 176-7
Heraclides: III 142, 148
Heraclitus, on change: I 181, 183
Hermogenes: VI] 679
Herschel, W : X V I ] 10
Hilary, Pope: XI 181
Hippolytus : HI 144 145: X V I 6;
X X I 25 7
Refutatio omnium haeresium:
X X I 262
Hodgson, Leonard: X X I 265-6
Homer: I 176, ]77
Hbner, R : VI] 671; X I V 150
hypostasis, meaning: I 183
and the Trinity: I 183-5
lamblichus: V 39, 40 44, 51; X X I 260
On the Mysteries of Egypt: V 50
Theologoumena Arithmeticae: V 46
immutability: II 14-15
Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses: II 8, 11,
16; III 144, 145; VII 671;
1X 232 238: XI 181; X X I 269
Jaeger, W : I 185; 11 4
Jerome: I 176; III 143, 144, 146. 147
Jews. The, and monotheism: II 6
John, S t : I 181
Josephus, Contra Apionem: XI 176
Justin Martyr, St.: 114.8. I I ; X X 319
Dialogus: X X I 260
Kannengiesser, C : IV 27. 28 29;
VI )53; VII 675 684; I X 2 3 S ;

INDEX

INDEX

X 7 8 ; XI 177
Kelly, J N D : III 141; X 76; X I V 157-8
Kettler, F.-H : VI 155, 157
Kirwan, C A : X V I I I 63
Klostermann, E ; III 147; VI 156
knowledge, theory of: II 12
Knowles D.: XVI 13
Kohnke, F W : X V I 9
Krmer. H J : X V I 2
Lactantius: 119; X V I I 9
language, philosophy of, and Augustine:
XVIII 63-72
Lefbrt, Lh : XI 175, 178
Leisegang, J : X X I 268
Lietzmann, H : X 76
light, and Aristotle XVII 6
and Augustine. XVII 6-7, 8
and Basil: X V I I 6
Hebrew notion of: XVII 6, 8
nature of: X V I I 3
and Plato: X V I I 7
and the Stoics: XVII 7
Livingstone, R.: ] 185
Lloyd, A C : X V 73
logic, and Aristotle; I 177-8
Logos, The and Arianism: I V 2 5 26 28
30 31. 32 33 36; V 40-41 45;
VI 153-7; VII 671-84;
VIII 51-9; X 85, 88-9
and Marcellus: VI 157; XII 234
and O r i g e n : X X 3 1 5
and Paul of Samosata: IV 34; X 85;
XII 234, 249
and the soul of Christ: XII 234, 244
Loofs, F.: II 2; III ]41
Lorenz R.: III 141: IV 25, 26, 27,
29-30,31 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 6 ;
V I 154-5: VII 671 672 . 676
677; X 76. 82.. 83-9
Louth, A.: 1X 230 231. 232
Lucan: V 47
Lucas, L : X V 83
Lucchesi, E : IV 28; XI 175
Lucian of Anrioch: ]V 34. 35.. 36;
VII 683
Luther: II 11 18
Malchion: III 141
Manichaeism: V 44; VII 684
Manichaeus: VII 677
Manichees: X V 71-2; X V I I 3
Mann. F : II 15; VII 677
Marcellus r III 149; IV 29; VII 675;
X 91; XI] 249; XIII 74

and the Logos doctrine: VI 15 7;

XII 234
Marcus Aurelius: XVII 7; X X I 269
Margerie, B. de: XI 177
Markus, R A : I 185
Martin, A : IV 24
Mathematics, and the Greeks: I 179-80
Maximus of Tyre: X V I 6
Melissus: II 9
memory, and Augustine: X I X 339-45
Merendino, P : X I 175
Mesopotamia: X V I I 4
Methodius: VII 671; X I X 341
De resurrectione: X X I 268
Meyendorff, J : X V 78; X V I 12
Moderatus: V 44
Mhler, J A : X 76
Monad, The; V 4 5 - 6
monotheism, and the Greeks: II 6, 17
and the Jews: II, 6
Mller, F.: X I V 149
Mller, G : X 78
names, application to God: X X 314-15,
317-20
and Aristotle: X X 306- 7
and Eunomius: X X 318-19
meaning: X X 3 I 6 - 1 7
and Philo of Alexandria:
XX313-15,319
and Socrates: X X 303-5
and the Stoics: X X 307, 309
Nazianzen, G., and simple bodies:
X X I 256-7
Nebridius: X V 81
Neoplatonism, and Arius: V 39-51
Nestorius: ill 140
Newman, J H : X 76, 80, 81
Nicaea Council of: I 184; IV 24
nomos: X X 303
Nords, F W: III 141
Nouns, and Augustine: X V I I I 66-8
nous: IX 233, 234, 235
numbers, nature of: 1 180; X X I 262
Plato's theory of: XXI 264-5
Numenius: V 44, 45
Oort, J. van: VII 684
Orbe,A:XX309
Origen: II 18; III 142, 145, 146, 147,
148; I V 25; V 45, 50; VI 157;
VII 672, 679,682; 1X232-3,
238, 2 4 2 ; X 8 1 ; X I 179, 181;
XIII 65, 70, 7 7; X V I I 6;
X X 3 1 5 , 316

Against Ceisus: I 177; III 144

Commentary on John: VI 155. 156
De Principas: 1 177; IV 32; V 4 4 ;
VII 671; 1X239, 240; X I 182;
X V I 6; X X I 258; X X I 260
on knowledge of God: I X 239
on the Logos: X X 315
on the soul of Christ: IV 26, 28, 30
31-2, 33; XII 233-4, 245
Ossius of Cordoba, Bishop: X 77
ousia: I 182, 183, 184; V 40, 46, 47,49;
X I V 149, 150, 155, 157; X X 311
Pannenberg, W : II 1-18; X X I 269
Parkinson, G H R : XXI 269
Parmenides: I 181, 182; II 9; V I I 672
Paul . St : I 178; IX 231, 236; X V I I 12;
XVIII 67
and the Stoics: I 179
Paul of Samosata : III 140, 143, 147-8,
149, 150; IV 26, 30, 34, 35,36;
V 4 9 ; V I I 683; VIII, 53
and the Logos doctrine: I V 34; X 85;
XII 234, 249
Pease, A.S : X V I 8
Peel, M L : X V I I 7
Pepin, J : X V I 2
Peter of Alexandria, Bishop: I V 33;
XIII 76
Peter, St : XVII 13
Pettersen, A : X I I 249
Philo of Alexandria: I 177; II 7-8, 9;
V 44, 45; VI 156; I X 230 232,
234, 236, 240, 241.242;
XII 248; X I V 159; X V I 6;
XVII 4, 5; XXI 257, 262
De agricultura: XXI 269
De confusione iinguarum: X X I 263
De ebrietate: X X I 264
De gigantibus: XXI 260, 262
De mutatione nominum: X X I 260
De opificio mundi: X X I 262, 269
De posteritate Caini: X X I 260
De praemiis etpoenis: X X I 262.
263-4
De Somniis: X X I 260
De specialibus legibus: X X I 262
on epinoia: X X 31112
Tieres: X X I 263,269
Le gum allegoriae: X X I 262, 269
on names: X X 313-15. 319
Quis rerum divinarum heres?:
X X I 269
Quod deter ius potior i mdidiari
soleat: X X I 269

INDEX

on simple bodies; X X I 259-60

on the theory of Ideas: X V I 5
phusis: X V 75; X X 303
Plantinga, C : X I V 158
Plato : I 176; II 18
Cratylus: XVIII 71; X X 303, 304.
305,307,313
Euthydemus: X V I I I (Add) 2
First Alcibiades: IX 237
on Forms: I 181-2; V 47; IX 240X I V 158, 159, 160; X V 79;
X V I 3-4; X X 305; X X ] 264
on God as mind: II 6
on ideal numbers, theory of
X X I 264-5
on Ideas, theory of: X V 75, 76-8;
X V I 2-3, 4-5
on immutability: II 14-15
on intellect: 1178
on justice: X V 76
on knowledge: II 12
on light: X V I I 7
Meno: XVHI(Add) 2; X I X 340
341-2, 345
on numbers: X X I 264-5
Parmenides: V 44, 45
Phaedo: I 176; IX 234; X X I 259
Philebus: X V I 6
Politicus: X V I 6
Republic: I 176; II 12, 14; IX 233
236, 238; X I X 342; X X I 259,
263
Sophist: X V I 3, 6 8; XVIII (Add) I
on the soul: I 178 179; X V I 2;
X X I 259
Symposium: I 178; X I X 345
Theaetetus: X I X 342
Timaeus: I 180-181; II 8, 16; V 50;
IX 238; X V 73, 74, 77; X V I 2,
4; X V I I 5, 7
vision, theory of: IX 238-9
Platonism, and Augustine: X V 72-3 74X V I 2-4, 11-14
and Christianity: II 2
Plotinus, Enneads: II 4; V 39, 40, 46, 47.
49. 50,51; 1X238, 239; X V 72.
73,77, 78; X V I 3, 5-6, I I , 12'
X X I 265,266,269
Plutarch: III 144, 145, 146, 147; V SO
VII 674 679; X X 312
Platonic Questions: VII 671
pneuma: X X I 258
Pollard, I" E : X I 1 77, 178, 180
Porphyry: V 39, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51;
1

X V 72, 73; XVIII (Add) 2;

INDEX

X X I 260
De Abstinentia: V 43
lsagoge: V 40, 41, 42, 47, 49
Tree of: X V I 6, 8, 9; illustration:
XVI 7
Posidonius: IX 238; X X 311; X X I 260,
268,269
Proclus: V 45
prophets, view of God: II 7
Psalter: XIII 66-78
Pythagoras: VII 680
Pythagoreans : II 9
and simple bodies: X X I 262-4
Ramos-Lisson, D : V 39
Richard, M : III 141, 142, 143, 144. 145,
146, 147, 148, 150; I V 35;
XII 234, 249
Riedmatten, Henri de: III 140, 141. 150;
IV 35; XII 234, 247, 249
Rist, J.: X V I 2; X V I I I (Add) 1
RitschI, A : II 2
Ritter, A M : II 2
Robertson, A : VII 675; XI 175; X 76, 81
Rondeau, M.-J : XII 246, 250; XIII 65,
71, 75, 76
Ross, W D : V 45; X X I 269
Rouet de Journel, M.I : X X I 255
Rufinus: III 143, 146, 147; IV 32;
IX 239
Russell, B : I 180
Sabellius: III 149
Saffrey, H D : IV 28
Sample, R L : III 141
scala naturae: X V I 6, 8, 9
illustration: X V I 7
Schwartz, E : X 76
Selle, E te: X I X 340
Seneca: X V I 6; X X 308
Severus:XX1260
Sextus Empiricus: III 144, 145; X X 310
Sieben H J.: XI 177, 1 78; XIII 66;
X X I 256
signs, and Augustine: XVIII 66-70
Simonetti, M : III 141, 142, 143, 146,
150; IV 35; VII 683; X 76
simple bodies, and Aristotle: X X I 257
and Gregory Nazianzen: X X I 256-7
and Philo: X X I 259-60
and the Pythagoreans: X X I 262-4
and lertullian: X X I 258-9
Simplicius: VII 672
Socrates: [ 182; V 39, 48; 1X237; X 81;
XVIII (Add) 2; X I X 341:

X X 307
on names: X X 303-5
Solomon: I 180
Sophocles: X V I I 3
Sorabji, R : II 9
soul: X X I 260
and Aristotle: X V I 4; X X I 259-60;
of Christ: and Athanasius:
XII 233-50; and Eusebius:
X 234; and the Logos: XII 234,
244; in the New Testament:
XII 235
and mind: I X 234-5
as mirror: IX 236-7
and Plato: I 178, 1 79; X V I 2:
X X I 259
purity: I X 235-6
and the Stoics: X X I 261
Sozomen: V 39
Speusippus: X V I 4
Stead, G C : VII 671, 675, 677; XI 174;
X X I 262
Stoics, and light: XVI] 7
and names: X X 307. 309
and 'propositions': X X 307-9
and St Paul: 1 179
and the soul: XXf 261
Stupperich R : VI 155
Tatian, Ad Graecov. X X I 260
Taylor, J H : X V I I 1
lertullian : I 176, 183; II 4; VII 671,
675, 679; X 90; X I 181: X V I I 3;
X X I 255; X X I 257
on simple bodies: X X I 258-9
Thagaste: X V 71; XVIII 63
Theodore of Mopsuestia: XIII 70
Theognostus: VII 671
Theophilus : XI 236

AdAutolycum: X X I 260
Thcophrastus: V 45
Ihomson, R.W : XII 250
Iorrance, I F : II 2
Trinity The, doctrine of: I 183-5;
X I V 149-63; X X I 266 267
Urbina, I Ortiz de: XII 249
Valentinus: VII 674-5,677
Verbeke. G : VII 671, 672
Vian, G M : XI 174; XII 237. 238 239
243; XIII 65, 70, 73 77
Victorinus, Marius: X V 73
Ad Candidum: X V I 9
on the intelligible world: X V I 9-11
13
on the nature of God: X V I 11
vision , theory of: IX 238-9
Vogel, C.J de: 112, 9; X X I 269
Voisin G : XII 249
Wallis. R I : X X I 269
Walzer. R : II 8
Waszink, J H : X X I 260
Wendland, P: X X I 268
West, M L : IV 27; VI 153
Wickert, U. VII 684
Williams, R D : III 141; VII 682; X 91
thesis on Arius and Neoplatonism:
V 39-51
Wittgenstein L : X X I 269
Xenocrates: X V 77; X V I 4
Xenophanes: II 5, 8. 16
Xenophon: III 147
Zeno:l 183:111 146
Zeus: ]176-7