11 views

Uploaded by Frontiers

- Behavioral Finance
- Work Sampling
- Course Info
- 1 Convexity and Nonsatiation (1)
- Midterm12ans.pdf
- ACtion Research
- Neo_Classical_Theory_5th_Lecture.doc
- 20159257.pdf
- Topic 3: Educational Research Procedure
- Consumers Equilibrium
- 501_waiver_2011-2
- Accuracy Assessment
- New Cafeteria
- 3consumer Behaviour Presentation
- Economics of Risk and Time
- P7 Sampling Techniques.ppt
- YMS Topic Review (Chs 1-8)
- ch10
- rea.doc
- Chapt 15

You are on page 1of 6

Guy E. Hawkins

(guy.e.hawkins@gmail.com)

Adrian R. Camilleri

(adrian.camilleri@duke.edu)

Duke University

Andrew Heathcote

Ben R. Newell

(andrew.heathcote@newcastle.edu.au) (ben.newell@unsw.edu.au)

University of Newcastle

Abstract

In most everyday decisions we learn about the outcomes of alternative courses of action through experience: a sampling process. Current models of these decisions from experience do not

explain how the sample outcomes are used to form a representation of the distribution of outcomes. We overcome this limitation by developing a new and simple model, the Exemplar

Confusion (ExCon) model. In a novel experiment, the model

predicted participants choices and their knowledge of outcome probabilities, when choosing among multiple-outcome

gambles in sampling and feedback versions of the task. The

model also performed at least as well as other leading choice

models when evaluated against benchmark data from the Technion Prediction Tournament. Our approach advances current

understanding by proposing a psychological mechanism for

how probability estimates arise rather than using estimates

solely as inputs to choice models.

Keywords: Experience-based choice; Probability estimation;

Sampling; Feedback; Exemplar model

Most choice models describe behavior as if people multiply some function of the probability of an outcome by that

outcomes value, and maximize. The utility maximization

framework is fundamental to many successful models of

choice including Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky,

1979) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Evaluation of these models has relied heavily

on decisions from description, where outcomes and their

associated probabilities are explicitly stated (Barron & Erev,

2003; Rakow & Newell, 2010). This focus neglects cognitive

processes that must underlie many everyday decisions where

probabilities and outcomes are not explicitly provided. In

such decisions from experience (Rakow & Newell, 2010),

decision-makers must explore their environment to establish the range of potential outcomes and the probability with

which each occurs. Here, we extend utility maximization

models to capture the process of acquiring knowledge of potential outcomes and the representation of their probabilities.

In decisions from experience the decision-maker learns

about potential outcomes and their respective probabilities

by sequentially sampling outcomes from the environment.

This situation is modeled in the laboratory using two similar paradigms. In the feedback paradigm the outcome of

each sample is added to a running total that the decisionmaker is tasked with maximizing. The decision-maker must

Scott D. Brown

(scott.brown@newcastle.edu.au)

University of Newcastle

(to explore) while trying to maximize the payoff from an

unknown number of choices (to exploit). The sampling

paradigm separates these goals, allowing the decision-maker

to freely sample during an exploration stage and, at a time

of their choosing, proceed to an exploitation stage where a

single choice is made.

Preferences in the sampling and feedback paradigms tend

to be highly correlated (Erev et al., 2010) and suggest

that decision-makers underweight low-probability outcomes

(Camilleri & Newell, 2011b; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart,

2009). This contrasts with preferences observed in the conventional description paradigm, where decision-makers appear to overweight low-probability outcomes (Kahneman &

Tversky, 1979). This description-experience gap can be reduced or eliminated in the sampling paradigm when samples

are equated (Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Camilleri &

Newell, 2011a). This suggests the description and experience

formats may share common core features the need to combine probability information with outcome values to inform

choice. Recent models of experience-based choice have not

retained utility maximization as a core feature. This may be

due to a failure to adequately capture the process by which

outcome distributions are represented.

Several models of experience-based choice were recently

tested in the Technion Prediction Tournament (TPT), where

the organizers collected large datasets in the description, sampling, and feedback paradigms (Erev et al., 2010). The winner in each paradigm was the model that best predicted average choice in its own paradigm, with no incentive to develop

models that generalized across different tasks, such as the

sampling and feedback paradigms. The competition structure therefore did not prioritize capturing how sequentially

observed outcomes were integrated into a representation nor

how this representation could be used to model knowledge of

the outcome probabilities. In fact, some models took probability information as inputs to the modeling process.

An alternative approach is illustrated by exemplar models such as the ACT-R modeling framework (Anderson &

Lebiere, 1998) and the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986). Exemplar

models assume that a memory trace is recorded each time

a stimulus is encountered, which might include information

about the stimulus, the corresponding feedback, and the gen-

the properties of an unfamiliar stimulus can be inferred from

the properties of related exemplars stored in memory. Exemplar models are not new in economic decision making

e.g., the k-sampler model (Erev et al., 2010) and the Instance

Based Learning (IBL) model (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011) and

also have a much longer history in explaining many aspects

of higher-level cognition, such as categorization (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) and probability judgment (e.g., Juslin & Persson,

2002). We argue that the storage of exemplars in memory

provides a simple and psychologically plausible approach to

explain decision-makers choices and the estimation of probability information about gambles in risky choice problems.

Studies of experience-based choice have previously asked

decision-makers to estimate outcome probabilities and observed that estimates are either well calibrated (Fox & Hadar,

2006) or that rare events are overestimated (e.g., Camilleri &

Newell, 2009; Ungemach et al., 2009). This reveals a subtle paradox where decision-makers overestimate the probability of rare events yet make choices as if they underweight

rare events. A successful model of experience-based choice

should account for this overestimation-underweighting paradox, but this is only possible if the model accounts for probability knowledge to begin with.

feedback paradigms (cf. Erev et al., 2010). Participants observed more samples in the feedback than sampling condition, so we expected more accurate probability estimates from

those participants.

Method

Participants

107 undergraduate students from two Australian universities

participated for payment contingent on performance.

Participants always made choices between two competing

lotteries; we denote such a pair of lotteries as a problem.

We used six lotteries in total, adopted from Lopes and Oden

(1999). Each lottery had five possible outcomes ranging from

$0 to $348. The outcome distribution was unique for each lottery but all had expected values of approximately $100 (Figure 1). The lotteries were unlabeled during the experiment,

but for discussion we adopt Lopes and Odens lottery names:

Riskless, Rectangular, Peaked, Bimodal, Shortshot, or Longshot, depending on the specific distribution of outcomes.

A New Approach

In developing our modeling approach, we highlight two limitations of the current choice modeling enterprise, exemplified

by the TPT. First, many current models are highly specific

and only successful in the task for which they were originally designed. Second, existing data and procedures make it

difficult to discriminate between models models that make

a variety of assumptions can perform nearly equally well.

This is due to the limited variability in the problem sets

(a binary choice between a safe option and a two-outcome

risky option), limited data sources used to constrain the models (solely choice), and a very general prediction goal (prediction of aggregated choice proportions). To the best of

our knowledge, no model has attempted to simultaneously

model choices and the outcome distributions associated with

the alternative options. Therefore, we constructed a general, exemplar-based model and evaluated it with respect to

two streams of data in multiple-outcome gambles: decisionmakers choices and their estimates of outcome probabilities,

in the sampling and feedback paradigms.

Experiment

Decision-makers were presented with pairs of five-outcome

lotteries in the sampling or feedback paradigms, and asked to

choose between the lotteries and estimate the probability of

each outcome. This allowed us to collect ten outcome probability estimates per gamble (five for each lottery), which were

used to constrain the model in subsequent analyses. We expected similar patterns of choice between the sampling and

for the six lotteries, adapted from Lopes and Oden (1999).

Participants were not presented with labels or figures.

Participants were allocated to the sampling or feedback

task. We measured participants preferences in each problem,

and their estimates of the probabilities of the outcomes from

the lotteries in the problem. In the sampling condition, lottery

preference was operationalized as the one-shot choice made

after the free sampling phase. In the feedback condition, lottery preference was operationalized as the deck selected most

frequently in the final 50 samples.1

The six lotteries can be ordered in 15 unique pairings (ignoring order, and without identical choices). Participants in

the sampling condition played each pairing once, with order

randomized across participants. To equate experiment length,

participants in the feedback condition played a random sample of six of the fifteen problems. Data were excluded from

1 Similar results were obtained when using the mode across all

100 samples or just the final sample.

Results

Preferences

Figure 2 displays the percentage of participants preferring

each lottery, averaged over all problems in which the lottery was presented. Participants generally favored lotteries

that minimized the possibility of obtaining zero (riskless,

peaked, shortshot), consistent with a negatively accelerated

utility function for gains, as assumed in many theories of

80

60

*

Sampling

Feedback

t

Sampling

Feedback

sh

o

od

m

ng

Lo

ta

ec

R

Bi

ar

ng

ul

ts

ho

or

al

Sampling

Feedback

Feedback

t Sampling

Sampling

Feedback

Sh

kl

e

ss

Pe

a

20

ke

d

Sampling

Feedback

40

is

decks of cards and were instructed to use their choices to earn

as much money as possible. The screen position (left, right)

and order of lotteries was randomized. Participants were presented with two unlabeled images of decks of cards, each

associated with a lottery from Figure 1. When a deck was

selected, an outcome was randomly sampled (with replacement) from the associated lottery and displayed briefly as if

the participant had turned over a playing card. We call the act

of selecting a deck and observing an outcome a sample.

The sampling task began with an exploration phase where

the participant could learn about the lotteries, so each sample

had no consequence. Participants terminated exploration at

any time to make a final choice indicating their lottery preference. The outcome of the final choice was added to the participants running total for the experiment. In the feedback task,

each problem granted 100 samples (participants were not told

the number of samples). Each of the 100 samples was consequential: the sample outcomes were added to the participants

running score, which was constantly displayed on screen.

After making a choice (sampling) or taking 100 samples

(feedback), participants estimated the probability of different

types of cards in each deck the probability of the different outcomes in the lotteries. Six different outcome values

were presented beside adjustable sliders with order randomized across problems and participants. The default starting

estimate was 0. Participants moved sliders between 0 and

100 to indicate the estimated percentage. One of the six outcomes was a foil that was not an outcome from the lottery

in question but was selected from one of the other decks. The

foil was used to identify participants who did not attend to the

sampling process. Participants proceeded to the next problem

when the sum of the sliders for each deck equaled 100% and

a confirmation button was clicked. At the end of the experiment participants were reimbursed by converting every 100

experiment dollars to AU$1 (contingent on choices, not probability estimates).

100

Procedure

were positively correlated (r = .64, p = .01), consistent with

previous research (Erev et al., 2010).

lotteries. Some participants did not complete all problems

during the one hour experiment so there were unequal sample

sizes: 40 participants in the sampling condition experienced

a total of 528 problems (3239 data points per problem), and

67 participants in the feedback condition experienced a total

of 386 problems (2232 data points per problem).

averaged over problems.

Preferences in the sampling and feedback conditions differed in two respects: under feedback there was a stronger

preference for the rectangular lottery (2 (1) = 4.89, p = .027)

but a weaker preference for the bimodal lottery (2 (1) = 7.07,

p = .008). Table 1 shows preferences between pairs of lotteries. Cell entries indicate the average preference for the

column-named lottery over the row-named lottery. Asterisks

denote preferences where a lottery was significantly preferred

over indifference (i.e., 5050) by z-test. For example, in the

first row of Table 1 the 79 value is asterisked, indicating that

a significant proportion of participants preferred the peaked

lottery over the longshot lottery in the sampling condition.

Probability Knowledge

Figure 3 plots median probability estimates assigned to outcomes against the actual sampled frequency of those outcomes, in the samples observed by participants.2 Participants had good knowledge of the outcome probabilities: in

both conditions the median estimate assigned to outcomes

increased almost always with increasing sample probability.

Nevertheless, there was a tendency to overestimate the probability of rare outcomes and underestimate the probability of

frequent outcomes, indicated by the inverted-S shapes in Figure 3. This pattern appeared in the sampling and feedback

paradigms, and was unchanged when probability estimates

were graphed against the population probability of the outcome (i.e., the proportion of times it would appear in the long

run, Figure 1) rather than the sampled frequency of the out2 Participant estimates of the probability of foil outcomes were

accurate. Foil cards were assigned zero probability in 62% of problems. On the remaining problems, this estimate was still small

11% on average and on 37% of these trials the foil was assigned the

smallest of the estimated probabilities. Since the foils were mostly

well identified by participants we do not analyze those data further.

LS

BM

RC

SS

PK

RL

62 (84)

82 (99)

59 (95)

44 (95)

39 (86)

Feedback

PK

SS

72 (73) 88 (61)

70 (76) 88 (79)

79 (73) 56 (56)

70 (63)

RC

63 (46)

62 (80)

BM

55 (52)

samples observed by participants).

We confirmed the statistical reliability of differences between the pattern of estimated versus sampled probabilities

and the y = x line (which indicates probability estimates that

perfectly reflect the sampled probabilities) using the WaldWolfowitz (or runs) test. This analysis examines the sign of

successive residuals under the null hypothesis that residuals

should be randomly distributed either side of zero. There was

non-random scatter around the y = x line in both paradigms,

both ps < .001, reflecting the run of positive residuals for

low sample probabilities and negative residuals for high sample probabilities.3

and Probability Knowledge

Exemplar models assume that observers record a memory

trace each time they encounter a stimulus, and later use these

traces to make inferences about their experiences. The exemplar confusion (ExCon) model employs this idea as an extension of the primed sampler models described by Erev et

al. (2010), which we refer to as a k-sampler. The standard k3 A mundane explanation for the inverse-S shape of the probability estimates is a mixture of participants, some who were perfectly

calibrated (y = x line) and others who were not engaged in the task

(probability estimates unrelated to the sampled probabilities horizontal lines at y .2), which could lead to the inverted-S shapes

even if no individual participant displayed such a pattern. We ruled

out this explanation by removing many participants to leave us with

only the very best (those most likely to be engaged in the task), and

the inverted-S shape remained (graphs not shown).

.5

Probability Estimate

Table 1: Percentage of participants preferring the columnnamed lottery over the row-named lottery, separately for the

sampling and feedback conditions. ExCon model predictions

are shown in parentheses. Lottery pairings for which data and

model had the same modal preference are shown in bold face.

Abbreviations refer to deck type: RL=riskless, PK=peaked,

SS=shortshot, RC=rectangular, BM=bimodal, LS=longshot.

p < .05 by z-test.

Sampling

RL

PK

SS

RC

BM

LS

60 (73) 79 (62) 75 (48) 46 (39) 49 (23)

BM 55 (88) 69 (77)

59 (59) 39 (48)

RC 59 (89) 64 (73)

58 (55)

SS

47 (73) 66 (82)

PK 39 (78)

Feedback Paradigm

Sampling Paradigm

.4

.3

.2

.1

0

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

Sampled Probability

against the sampled probability for the corresponding outcome (x-axes) in the sampling (left panel) and feedback (right

panel) conditions. Circles show medians, whiskers show 5th

and 95th percentiles across participants. Gray identity lines

indicate probability estimates that perfectly reflect the sampled probabilities. Black lines show median probability estimates of the ExCon model.

sampler draws k samples from each lottery and prefers the lottery with the greater sample mean. The k-sampler instantiates

a limited memory capacity (only k exemplars per lottery are

maintained). Despite its simplicity, the k-sampler provides a

reasonable account of choice data compared to more complex

models (e.g., Erev et al., 2010). However, the k-sampler fails

to capture biased probability knowledge because it necessarily predicts accurate estimates, on average.

The ExCon model makes two modifications to the ksampler. First, ExCon replaces the k-samplers limit on memory capacity (k) with a limit on memory accuracy. We instantiate memory imperfection by degrading the information

content of exemplars: a sample-by-sample confusion process

where new exemplars can interfere with previously stored exemplars. This form of confusion occurs with the passing of

events rather than the passing of time alone, which has precedence in the memory literature (e.g., Lewandowsky, Geiger,

& Oberauer, 2008).

The confusion process occurs as follows. Each lottery begins with an empty, limitless memory store. When a sample

outcome is observed a memory trace of the outcome value is

added to the corresponding lottery store, and the confusion

process then operates which leads to a small chance of confusing the exemplars within that store. Each exemplar in the

store has a fixed probability (p) of having its outcome value

confused substituted with the outcome value from another

exemplar already in the store. If an exemplars outcome value

is confused, the new outcome value assigned to that exemplar

is chosen uniformly from the list of all exemplar labels in the

store (rather than uniformly from the distribution of all exemplars in the store). The p parameter governing the exemplar

confusion process is the sole free parameter of the model to

be estimated from data.

a utility maximization rule: ExCon prefers the lottery whose

exemplar store has the highest average utility. We implemented the diminishing marginal utility function for gains

specified by Lopes and Oden (1999): u(x) = x0.551 . This duplication reflects our belief that the choice rule at the core

of both description and experience-based choice is the expected utility theory assumption of multiplying some function of probability with an outcome value, and maximizing.

ExCon Implementation

The ExCon model was given the same sequences of outcomes

experienced by the participants on a problem-by-problem basis. The sequences of outcomes were shown to the model 100

times (i.e., 100 Monte-Carlo replicates for every real participant). After the sampling process had finished, model preference was inferred differently for the sampling and feedback

paradigms consistent with the human data. In the sampling

paradigm, the model preferred the lottery with the highest average utility. In the feedback paradigm, after each sample

outcome the ExCons decision rule determined which lottery

would be chosen on the following sample, for all 100 samples in each problem, and the preference of the Monte-Carlo

replicate was taken as its modal choice over the last 50 trials.

We simulated model predictions for 20 values of the p

parameter on [0, .1]. The upper end of this interval implies a high degree of confusion: with a .1 chance of confusion at each sample, the probability of accurately maintaining a single memory trace (exemplar) following 10 samples is (1 .1)10 = .349, and following 100 samples is only

(1 .1)100 < .001. The ExCon instantiates that a single exemplar is increasingly likely to be confused as new exemplars

enter the store. Nonetheless, the set of exemplars will approximate the true distribution with increasing accuracy up until a

certain sample size, after which the set of exemplars become

noisier.

We assessed the goodness-of-fit on the ExCons ability to

predict two outcome measures in data: choice and probability knowledge. Choice prediction accuracy was calculated

as the proportion of times the model successfully predicted

the choice made by the participant when exposed to the same

sequence of samples for each problem, which we refer to as

trial-by-trial agreement. Probability estimate prediction accuracy was calculated as the sum of the squared deviations

between participant and model probability estimates across

the sampled probability bins. This measures an average distance between the data and the model when represented in

a plot such as Figure 3. Probability estimates were derived

from the frequency of each outcome in the ExCon memory

stores. The best-fitting parameter estimates were those that

maximized goodness-of-fit to choices and minimized prediction error in probability estimate data. Parameters were estimated separately for the sampling and feedback tasks.

ExCon Evaluation

Choice Behavior

With p = .033 (sampling) and p = .027 (feedback), the ExCon model had 65.3% and 70.7% trial-by-trial agreement

with preference data from the sampling and feedback tasks,

respectively. In isolation it is difficult to determine whether

this reflects good performance, so we provide two benchmark

comparisons. The first benchmark was the natural mean

heuristic, which prefers the lottery with the highest observed

sample mean (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008). The ExCon reduces

to the natural mean heuristic when p = 0 and assuming a linear utility function. The ExCon model outperforms the natural mean heuristic in both tasks (sampling 62.9%, feedback

64.5%). The second benchmark maximized choice in light

of the inferred expected value of each lottery as indicated

by participants probability estimates, and was also outperformed by the ExCon model (sampling 62.9%, feedback

56.7%). The success of the ExCon relative to the two benchmarks highlights the benefit of a choice rule that maximizes

utility rather than value.

The average ExCon choice between pairs of lotteries is displayed in Table 1; bold face shows lottery pairings for which

ExCon produced the same modal preference as the participants (i.e., both data and model scored above or below 50%).

On this lottery-by-lottery basis, the model correctly predicted

24 out of 30 lottery preferences observed in data even though

the model was not explicitly fit to this table.

Probability Estimates

The black lines in Figure 3 illustrate the ExCon probability

estimate predictions. The model captures the qualitative patterns in the probability estimates overestimation of rare outcomes and underestimation of common outcomes.

We now demonstrate that the ExCon model performs as well

as leading competitor models when given a benchmark set

of problems from the TPT (Erev et al., 2010). The TPT

evaluated models separately for the sampling and feedback

paradigms using a common problem set (for details, see Erev

et al., 2010). The TPT used one data set for model calibration, and another data set for the evaluation (from an identical problem distribution as the original problems). We simulated the process of entering the ExCon model in the TPT,

following TPT guidelines: we estimated model parameters

using the estimation data set, and used those parameter values to evaluate predictive performance in the competition data

set. In the TPT, model performance was evaluated using the

average proportion of agreement (across problems) between

the modal preference of the model and of the participants

(e.g., Erev et al., 2010), which we refer to as PAgree. Our

measure of trial-by-trial agreement reported above maintains

more information than PAgree, but for ease of comparison

we use the common metric of PAgree values to compare our

results to those from the TPT (cf. Table 3, Erev et al.).

the winners and runners-up in the sampling and feedback

paradigms, in contrast to the TPT where each model was successful in the sampling or feedback paradigm see Table 2.

The best-fitting parameter values tended toward extremes of

the parameter space (p 0). However, the choice data from

the TPT did not constrain the confusion parameter of the ExCon; similar PAgree predictions were observed across the examined parameter space of the model. This result was not restricted to the ExCon: we performed the same model fits with

the k-sampler and the three-parameter instance based learning

(IBL; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011) models, and found that the parameters of those models were also under-constrained when

the models were examined solely against choice data. This

under-constraint reinforces the need for multiple streams of

data, and richer problem sets, in evaluating modern choice

models.

Table 2: PAgree for the ExCon model and TPT winner in

the sampling and feedback paradigms, for the estimation and

competition data sets.

Estimation

Competition

ExCon TPT

ExCon TPT

Sampling

91.4

95

92.7

83

Feedback

83.3

82

83.3

87

Conclusions

We addressed two issues regarding experience-based choice.

Firstly, models of experience-based choice should account

not only for participants choices in multiple paradigms and

datasets but also the process by which participants construct

and represent the probability distributions upon which those

choices are based. To that end we designed a new model the

exemplar confusion model (ExCon) that provides a process

explanation of how people might acquire knowledge of outcome distributions. We assumed that sampled outcomes are

stored as memory traces exemplars and represent the outcome distribution for alternative options. We also assumed

an imperfect, noisy memory system implemented as a confusion process. The confusion process operated each time a

new exemplar was stored, similar to retroactive memory interference. The ExCon successfully predicted decision-makers

behavior across two experience-based choice paradigms in a

novel data set and an important existing dataset (the TPT).

Our second point relates to model evaluation. Examination of solely choice data, as in the TPT, may not sufficiently

constrain models, and therefore permits models with different assumptions to perform equally well. Under-constraint is

due to limited variability in the problem sets (binary choices

between a safe option and a two-outcome risky option), limited data sources to constrain models (only choice), and a

very general prediction goal (aggregated choice proportion).

In collecting probability estimates we departed from previous models of risky choice (e.g., Prospect Theory) which in-

estimates to serve as model inputs. One of our novel contributions is to instead use this stream of data to constrain model

development. With this constraint we developed a model of

how discovered information is used to construct a representation, and how that representation is used to form a preference.

A challenge for future research is to develop a comprehensive

model that also incorporates information search.

References

Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of

thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Barron, G., & Erev, I. (2003). Small feedbackbased decisions

and their limited correspondence to descriptionbased decisions.

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 215233.

Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2009). The role of representation

in experiencebased choice. Judgment and Decision Making, 4,

518529.

Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2011a). Description and

experiencebased choice: Does equivalent information equal

equivalent choice? Acta Psychologica, 136, 276284.

Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2011b). When and why rare

events are underweighted: A direct comparison of the sampling,

partial feedback, full feedback and description choice paradigms.

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 377384.

Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R.,

et al. (2010). A choice prediction competition: Choices from

experience and from description. Journal of Behavioral Decision

Making, 23, 1547.

Fox, C. R., & Hadar, L. (2006). Decisions from experience =

sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004). Judgment and Decision Making, 1,

159161.

Gonzalez, C., & Dutt, V. (2011). Instancebased learning: Integrating sampling and repeated decisions from experience. Psychological Review, 118, 523551.

Hertwig, R., & Pleskac, T. J. (2008). The game of life: How

small samples render choice simpler. In N. Chater & M. Oaksford (Eds.), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science (pp. 209236). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Juslin, P., & Persson, M. (2002). PROBabilities from EXemplars

(PROBEX): A lazy algorithm for probabilistic inference from

generic knowledge. Cognitive Science, 26, 563607.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis

of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263291.

Lewandowsky, S., Geiger, S. M., & Oberauer, K.

(2008).

Interferencebased forgetting in verbal shortterm memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 200222.

Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1999). The role of aspiration in risky

choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A

theory. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 43, 286313.

Nosofsky, R. M.

(1986).

Attention, similarity, and the

identificationcategorization relationship. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 3957.

Rakow, T., Demes, K., & Newell, B. R. (2008). Biased samples not

mode of presentation: Re-examining the apparent underweighting of rare events in experiencebased choice. Organizational

Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 106, 168179.

Rakow, T., & Newell, B. R. (2010). Degrees of uncertainty: An

overview and framework for future research on experiencebased

choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 114.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory:

Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and

Uncertainty, 5, 297323.

Ungemach, C., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (2009). Are probabilities

overweighted or underweighted, when rare outcomes are experienced (rarely)? Psychological Science, 20, 473479.

- Behavioral FinanceUploaded bySoledad Perez
- Work SamplingUploaded byEvita Nuriya R
- Course InfoUploaded byMimo Mimo
- 1 Convexity and Nonsatiation (1)Uploaded byalamchowdhury
- Midterm12ans.pdfUploaded by6doit
- ACtion ResearchUploaded byMichael Douglas
- Neo_Classical_Theory_5th_Lecture.docUploaded byAjay Pasi
- 20159257.pdfUploaded bybeatrice
- Topic 3: Educational Research ProcedureUploaded byFarah Diyana
- Consumers EquilibriumUploaded byabdan
- 501_waiver_2011-2Uploaded byAndy Griffin
- Accuracy AssessmentUploaded byArmando Rodriguez Montellano
- New CafeteriaUploaded byHiba Arif
- 3consumer Behaviour PresentationUploaded bydevashish_bajaj
- Economics of Risk and TimeUploaded byFlávio Dias
- P7 Sampling Techniques.pptUploaded byKabir
- YMS Topic Review (Chs 1-8)Uploaded byguillen2011
- ch10Uploaded byFlorence Cuanso
- rea.docUploaded byJuliana Molina
- Chapt 15Uploaded byDevilZaa
- Audit SamplingUploaded bymursyid
- info-needs-mourning-and-white-winged-dovesUploaded byapi-252580560
- Sampling Techniques FQA 5 A1Uploaded byShaira Madiline M. Gelvezon
- F2211103137.pdfUploaded byKpedenou
- Solution to QuestionUploaded byJakir_bnk
- Primary DataUploaded byilhammka
- esrdthfyguhijkUploaded byAnuragBajpai
- SOME COMMENTS ON THE ACCURACY AND PRECISION OF SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS FOR GOLD IN EXPLORATIONUploaded byDiego Domínguez Arias
- Cphq prepUploaded byTOBIN6319_395727986
- MEP GCSE StatisticsUploaded byqbexch

- tmpFFE0.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpCE8C.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpF3B5.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp88AC.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp59C2.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpE7E9.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpF178.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp6BF8.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpEFCC.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp1A96.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp80F6.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpA077.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp3CAB.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpF6B.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp6F0E.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp37B8.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpA0D.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpB1BE.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp9D75.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp8B94.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp4B57.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpC0A.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp75A7.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp60EF.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp72FE.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpF407.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpE3C0.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp6382.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmpD1FE.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- tmp998.tmpUploaded byFrontiers

- A Study To Assess The Role Of Parents In The Care Of Mentally Challenged Children As Perceived By Parents And Caretakers With A View To Develop An Information Booklet Regarding Care Of Mentally Challenged Children In The Selected Special Schools Of TamilnaduUploaded byIOSRjournal
- Youtube as a Learning ToolUploaded bystentorija
- Talwar S. (2007) - Accessing traumatic memory through art making: An art therapy trauma protocol (ATTP)Uploaded bynenjugata
- Framework ReportUploaded byRegina Marie Montañano Peralta
- Resume 2013Uploaded byxgxzez
- LP Verbs.docUploaded byJoana Joaquin
- A Concise Introduction to Multi-agent SystemsUploaded byAl Kash
- Managerial Effectiveness PptUploaded bySumit Panda
- discourse community ethnography and researched argumentUploaded byapi-260638682
- animalsUploaded byNinjasimircica Dumitrescu
- note-taking hypermediaUploaded byapi-273359036
- Surreal Photography Project 12Uploaded byAnonymous j6UCsdBP
- board meeting reflectionUploaded byapi-240535342
- QEC Presentation at LSEUploaded byNadeem Mustafa
- Research Agenda for CLIL PedagogiesUploaded byIsburt
- Goal Attainment ScalingUploaded byEnemias Perez Alarcon
- te 804 te1 revisedUploaded byapi-285545346
- Music-MelissaUploaded bygrandolph8
- Speech and WritingUploaded bymjourney2
- QWERTYUIOP Lesson PlanUploaded bySezgin Khoo Kay Win
- peel cv 2014Uploaded byapi-252973276
- STAAD Seismic Response Analysis Video TutorialUploaded byMAC e-Learning Revolution Pvt Ltd
- The Thinker's Guide to Critical ThinkingUploaded byJaime Rodriguez
- writing-argumentative day 1 2Uploaded byapi-345483624
- LHS Spanish III Course Syllabus (2013-2014)Uploaded byCrystal Barragán
- La Psicopatologia Como Ciencia BasicaUploaded byFudge Gee
- Philosophy Journal RankingsUploaded bylogrei88
- Thompson, 1998Creative arts in occupational therapy: Ancient history or contemporary practise?Uploaded byEirini Tsianou
- Meschonnic - Rhythm.pdfUploaded byRoberto Cruz
- Systems ThinkingUploaded byobem