Sie sind auf Seite 1von 6

Modeling Probability Knowledge and Choice in Decisions from Experience

Guy E. Hawkins (

University of New South Wales

Adrian R. Camilleri (

Duke University

Andrew Heathcote (

University of Newcastle

Ben R. Newell (

University of New South Wales

Scott D. Brown (

University of Newcastle


In most everyday decisions we learn about the outcomes of al- ternative courses of action through experience: a sampling pro- cess. Current models of these decisions from experience do not explain how the sample outcomes are used to form a represen- tation of the distribution of outcomes. We overcome this lim- itation by developing a new and simple model, the Exemplar Confusion (ExCon) model. In a novel experiment, the model predicted participants’ choices and their knowledge of out- come probabilities, when choosing among multiple-outcome gambles in sampling and feedback versions of the task. The model also performed at least as well as other leading choice models when evaluated against benchmark data from the Tech- nion Prediction Tournament. Our approach advances current understanding by proposing a psychological mechanism for how probability estimates arise rather than using estimates solely as inputs to choice models.

Keywords: Experience-based choice; Probability estimation; Sampling; Feedback; Exemplar model

Utility Maximization Models

Most choice models describe behavior as if people multi- ply some function of the probability of an outcome by that outcome’s value, and maximize. The utility maximization framework is fundamental to many successful models of choice including Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahne- man, 1992). Evaluation of these models has relied heavily on “decisions from description”, where outcomes and their associated probabilities are explicitly stated (Barron & Erev, 2003; Rakow & Newell, 2010). This focus neglects cognitive processes that must underlie many everyday decisions where probabilities and outcomes are not explicitly provided. In such “decisions from experience” (Rakow & Newell, 2010), decision-makers must explore their environment to estab- lish the range of potential outcomes and the probability with which each occurs. Here, we extend utility maximization models to capture the process of acquiring knowledge of po- tential outcomes and the representation of their probabilities.

Decisions from Experience

In “decisions from experience” the decision-maker learns about potential outcomes and their respective probabilities by sequentially sampling outcomes from the environment. This situation is modeled in the laboratory using two sim- ilar paradigms. In the feedback paradigm the outcome of each sample is added to a running total that the decision- maker is tasked with maximizing. The decision-maker must

trade-off the objectives of learning more about the options (to “explore”) while trying to maximize the payoff from an unknown number of choices (to “exploit”). The sampling paradigm separates these goals, allowing the decision-maker to freely sample during an exploration stage and, at a time of their choosing, proceed to an exploitation stage where a single choice is made. Preferences in the sampling and feedback paradigms tend to be highly correlated (Erev et al., 2010) and suggest that decision-makers underweight low-probability outcomes (Camilleri & Newell, 2011b; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009). This contrasts with preferences observed in the con- ventional description paradigm, where decision-makers ap- pear to overweight low-probability outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This “description-experience gap” can be re- duced or eliminated in the sampling paradigm when samples are equated (Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Camilleri & Newell, 2011a). This suggests the description and experience formats may share common core features – the need to com- bine probability information with outcome values to inform choice. Recent models of experience-based choice have not retained utility maximization as a core feature. This may be due to a failure to adequately capture the process by which outcome distributions are represented.

Modeling Decisions from Experience

Several models of experience-based choice were recently tested in the Technion Prediction Tournament (TPT), where the organizers collected large datasets in the description, sam- pling, and feedback paradigms (Erev et al., 2010). The win- ner in each paradigm was the model that best predicted aver- age choice in its own paradigm, with no incentive to develop models that generalized across different tasks, such as the sampling and feedback paradigms. The competition struc- ture therefore did not prioritize capturing how sequentially observed outcomes were integrated into a representation nor how this representation could be used to model knowledge of the outcome probabilities. In fact, some models took proba- bility information as inputs to the modeling process. An alternative approach is illustrated by exemplar mod- els such as the ACT-R modeling framework (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) and the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986). Exemplar models assume that a memory trace is recorded each time a stimulus is encountered, which might include information about the stimulus, the corresponding feedback, and the gen-

eral context in which the stimulus was encountered. Later, the properties of an unfamiliar stimulus can be inferred from the properties of related exemplars stored in memory. Ex- emplar models are not new in economic decision making – e.g., the k-sampler model (Erev et al., 2010) and the Instance Based Learning (IBL) model (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011) – and also have a much longer history in explaining many aspects

of higher-level cognition, such as categorization (e.g., Nosof-

sky, 1986) and probability judgment (e.g., Juslin & Persson, 2002). We argue that the storage of exemplars in memory provides a simple and psychologically plausible approach to explain decision-makers’ choices and the estimation of prob- ability information about gambles in risky choice problems.

Modeling Probability Knowledge

Studies of experience-based choice have previously asked decision-makers to estimate outcome probabilities and ob- served that estimates are either well calibrated (Fox & Hadar, 2006) or that rare events are overestimated (e.g., Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Ungemach et al., 2009). This reveals a sub- tle paradox where decision-makers overestimate the proba- bility of rare events yet make choices as if they underweight rare events. A successful model of experience-based choice should account for this overestimation-underweighting para- dox, but this is only possible if the model accounts for proba- bility knowledge to begin with.

A New Approach

In developing our modeling approach, we highlight two limi- tations of the current choice modeling enterprise, exemplified by the TPT. First, many current models are highly specific and only successful in the task for which they were origi- nally designed. Second, existing data and procedures make it difficult to discriminate between models – models that make

a variety of assumptions can perform nearly equally well.

This is due to the limited variability in the problem sets

(a binary choice between a safe option and a two-outcome risky option), limited data sources used to constrain the mod- els (solely choice), and a very general prediction goal (pre- diction of aggregated choice proportions). To the best of our knowledge, no model has attempted to simultaneously model choices and the outcome distributions associated with the alternative options. Therefore, we constructed a gen- eral, exemplar-based model and evaluated it with respect to two streams of data in multiple-outcome gambles: decision- makers’ choices and their estimates of outcome probabilities,

in the sampling and feedback paradigms.


Decision-makers were presented with pairs of five-outcome lotteries in the sampling or feedback paradigms, and asked to choose between the lotteries and estimate the probability of each outcome. This allowed us to collect ten outcome proba- bility estimates per gamble (five for each lottery), which were used to constrain the model in subsequent analyses. We ex- pected similar patterns of choice between the sampling and

feedback paradigms (cf. Erev et al., 2010). Participants ob- served more samples in the feedback than sampling condi- tion, so we expected more accurate probability estimates from those participants.



107 undergraduate students from two Australian universities participated for payment contingent on performance.

Materials and Design

Participants always made choices between two competing lotteries; we denote such a pair of lotteries as a “problem”. We used six lotteries in total, adopted from Lopes and Oden (1999). Each lottery had five possible outcomes ranging from $0 to $348. The outcome distribution was unique for each lot- tery but all had expected values of approximately $100 (Fig- ure 1). The lotteries were unlabeled during the experiment, but for discussion we adopt Lopes and Oden’s lottery names:

Riskless, Rectangular, Peaked, Bimodal, Shortshot, or Long- shot, depending on the specific distribution of outcomes.

shot, depending on the specific distribution of outcomes. Figure 1: Visual representation of the outcome distribution

Figure 1: Visual representation of the outcome distribution for the six lotteries, adapted from Lopes and Oden (1999). Participants were not presented with labels or figures.

Participants were allocated to the sampling or feedback task. We measured participants’ preferences in each problem, and their estimates of the probabilities of the outcomes from the lotteries in the problem. In the sampling condition, lottery preference was operationalized as the one-shot choice made after the free sampling phase. In the feedback condition, lot- tery preference was operationalized as the deck selected most frequently in the final 50 samples. 1 The six lotteries can be ordered in 15 unique pairings (ig- noring order, and without identical choices). Participants in the sampling condition played each pairing once, with order randomized across participants. To equate experiment length, participants in the feedback condition played a random sam- ple of six of the fifteen problems. Data were excluded from

1 Similar results were obtained when using the mode across all 100 samples or just the final sample.

problems where participants failed to sample from one of the lotteries. Some participants did not complete all problems during the one hour experiment so there were unequal sample sizes: 40 participants in the sampling condition experienced

a total of 528 problems (32–39 data points per problem), and

67 participants in the feedback condition experienced a total of 386 problems (22–32 data points per problem).


Participants made a number of choices between computerized decks of cards and were instructed to use their choices to earn as much money as possible. The screen position (left, right) and order of lotteries was randomized. Participants were pre- sented with two unlabeled images of decks of cards, each associated with a lottery from Figure 1. When a deck was selected, an outcome was randomly sampled (with replace- ment) from the associated lottery and displayed briefly as if the participant had turned over a playing card. We call the act of selecting a deck and observing an outcome a “sample”. The sampling task began with an exploration phase where the participant could learn about the lotteries, so each sample had no consequence. Participants terminated exploration at any time to make a final choice indicating their lottery prefer- ence. The outcome of the final choice was added to the partic- ipant’s running total for the experiment. In the feedback task, each problem granted 100 samples (participants were not told the number of samples). Each of the 100 samples was conse- quential: the sample outcomes were added to the participant’s running score, which was constantly displayed on screen. After making a choice (sampling) or taking 100 samples (feedback), participants estimated the probability of different types of cards in each deck – the probability of the differ- ent outcomes in the lotteries. Six different outcome values were presented beside adjustable sliders with order random- ized across problems and participants. The default starting

estimate was 0. Participants moved sliders between 0 and 100 to indicate the estimated percentage. One of the six out- comes was a “foil” that was not an outcome from the lottery in question but was selected from one of the other decks. The foil was used to identify participants who did not attend to the sampling process. Participants proceeded to the next problem when the sum of the sliders for each deck equaled 100% and

a confirmation button was clicked. At the end of the exper-

iment participants were reimbursed by converting every 100 experiment dollars to AU$1 (contingent on choices, not prob- ability estimates).



Figure 2 displays the percentage of participants preferring each lottery, averaged over all problems in which the lot- tery was presented. Participants generally favored lotteries that minimized the possibility of obtaining zero (riskless, peaked, shortshot), consistent with a negatively accelerated utility function for gains, as assumed in many theories of

choice. Preferences in the feedback and sampling paradigms were positively correlated (r = .64, p = .01), consistent with previous research (Erev et al., 2010).

100 80 60 * * 40 20 0 Riskless Peaked Shortshot Rectangular Bimodal Longshot Deck
Riskless Peaked
Deck Preference (%)
Feedback Sampling
Sampling Feedback
Feedback Sampling
Feedback Sampling
Feedback Sampling
Feedback Sampling

Figure 2: Percentage of participants preferring each lottery, averaged over problems.

Preferences in the sampling and feedback conditions dif- fered in two respects: under feedback there was a stronger preference for the rectangular lottery (χ 2 (1) = 4.89, p = .027) but a weaker preference for the bimodal lottery (χ 2 (1) = 7.07, p = .008). Table 1 shows preferences between pairs of lot- teries. Cell entries indicate the average preference for the column-named lottery over the row-named lottery. Asterisks denote preferences where a lottery was significantly preferred over indifference (i.e., 50–50) by z-test. For example, in the first row of Table 1 the 79 value is asterisked, indicating that a significant proportion of participants preferred the peaked lottery over the longshot lottery in the sampling condition.

Probability Knowledge

Figure 3 plots median probability estimates assigned to out- comes against the actual sampled frequency of those out- comes, in the samples observed by participants. 2 Partici- pants had good knowledge of the outcome probabilities: in both conditions the median estimate assigned to outcomes increased almost always with increasing sample probability. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to overestimate the prob- ability of rare outcomes and underestimate the probability of frequent outcomes, indicated by the inverted-S shapes in Fig- ure 3. This pattern appeared in the sampling and feedback paradigms, and was unchanged when probability estimates were graphed against the population probability of the out- come (i.e., the proportion of times it would appear in the long run, Figure 1) rather than the sampled frequency of the out-

2 Participant estimates of the probability of foil outcomes were accurate. Foil cards were assigned zero probability in 62% of prob- lems. On the remaining problems, this estimate was still small – 11% on average – and on 37% of these trials the foil was assigned the smallest of the estimated probabilities. Since the foils were mostly well identified by participants we do not analyze those data further.

Table 1: Percentage of participants preferring the column- named lottery over the row-named lottery, separately for the sampling and feedback conditions. ExCon model predictions are shown in parentheses. Lottery pairings for which data and model had the same modal preference are shown in bold face. Abbreviations refer to deck type: RL=riskless, PK=peaked, SS=shortshot, RC=rectangular, BM=bimodal, LS=longshot. p < .05 by z-test.









60 (73)

79 (62) 69 (77) 64 (73) 66 (82)

75 (48) 59 (59) 58 (55)

46 (39)

49 (23)


55 (88)

39 (48)


59 (89)


47 (73)



39 (78)










62 (84)

72 (73)

88 (61) 88 (79) 56 (56)

63 (46)

55 (52)


82 (99)



62 (80)




79 (73) 70 (63)


44 (95)



39 (86)


come (i.e., the proportion of times it really did appear, in the samples observed by participants). We confirmed the statistical reliability of differences be- tween the pattern of estimated versus sampled probabilities and the y = x line (which indicates probability estimates that perfectly reflect the sampled probabilities) using the Wald- Wolfowitz (or “runs”) test. This analysis examines the sign of successive residuals under the null hypothesis that residuals should be randomly distributed either side of zero. There was non-random scatter around the y = x line in both paradigms, both p’s < .001, reflecting the run of positive residuals for low sample probabilities and negative residuals for high sam- ple probabilities. 3

Exemplar Confusion: An Account of Choices and Probability Knowledge

Exemplar models assume that observers record a memory trace each time they encounter a stimulus, and later use these traces to make inferences about their experiences. The ex- emplar confusion (ExCon) model employs this idea as an ex- tension of the primed sampler models described by Erev et al. (2010), which we refer to as a k-sampler. The standard k-

3 A mundane explanation for the inverse-S shape of the probabil- ity estimates is a mixture of participants, some who were perfectly calibrated (y = x line) and others who were not engaged in the task (probability estimates unrelated to the sampled probabilities – hor- izontal lines at y .2), which could lead to the inverted-S shapes even if no individual participant displayed such a pattern. We ruled out this explanation by removing many participants to leave us with only the very best (those most likely to be engaged in the task), and the inverted-S shape remained (graphs not shown).

.5 Sampling Paradigm .4 .3 .2 .1 0 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Probability
Sampling Paradigm
Probability Estimate
Feedback Paradigm 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Feedback Paradigm

Sampled Probability

Figure 3: Probability estimates from participants (y-axes) against the sampled probability for the corresponding out- come (x-axes) in the sampling (left panel) and feedback (right panel) conditions. Circles show medians, whiskers show 5 th and 95 th percentiles across participants. Gray identity lines indicate probability estimates that perfectly reflect the sam- pled probabilities. Black lines show median probability esti- mates of the ExCon model.

sampler draws k samples from each lottery and prefers the lot- tery with the greater sample mean. The k-sampler instantiates

a limited memory capacity (only k exemplars per lottery are

maintained). Despite its simplicity, the k-sampler provides a reasonable account of choice data compared to more complex models (e.g., Erev et al., 2010). However, the k-sampler fails to capture biased probability knowledge because it necessar- ily predicts accurate estimates, on average.

The ExCon model makes two modifications to the k- sampler. First, ExCon replaces the k-sampler’s limit on mem- ory capacity (k) with a limit on memory accuracy. We in- stantiate memory imperfection by degrading the information content of exemplars: a sample-by-sample confusion process where new exemplars can interfere with previously stored ex- emplars. This form of confusion occurs with the passing of events rather than the passing of time alone, which has prece- dence in the memory literature (e.g., Lewandowsky, Geiger, & Oberauer, 2008). The confusion process occurs as follows. Each lottery be- gins with an empty, limitless memory store. When a sample outcome is observed a memory trace of the outcome value is added to the corresponding lottery store, and the confusion process then operates which leads to a small chance of “con- fusing” the exemplars within that store. Each exemplar in the store has a fixed probability (p) of having its outcome value confused – substituted with the outcome value from another exemplar already in the store. If an exemplar’s outcome value


confused, the new outcome value assigned to that exemplar


chosen uniformly from the list of all exemplar labels in the

store (rather than uniformly from the distribution of all exem- plars in the store). The p parameter governing the exemplar confusion process is the sole free parameter of the model to be estimated from data.

The ExCon also differs to the k-sampler in the adoption of

a utility maximization rule: ExCon prefers the lottery whose

exemplar store has the highest average utility. We imple- mented the diminishing marginal utility function for gains specified by Lopes and Oden (1999): u(x) = x 0.551 . This du- plication reflects our belief that the choice rule at the core

of both description and experience-based choice is the ex- pected utility theory assumption of multiplying some func- tion of probability with an outcome value, and maximizing.

ExCon Implementation

The ExCon model was given the same sequences of outcomes experienced by the participants on a problem-by-problem ba- sis. The sequences of outcomes were shown to the model 100 times (i.e., 100 Monte-Carlo replicates for every real partici- pant). After the sampling process had finished, model prefer- ence was inferred differently for the sampling and feedback paradigms – consistent with the human data. In the sampling paradigm, the model preferred the lottery with the highest av- erage utility. In the feedback paradigm, after each sample outcome the ExCon’s decision rule determined which lottery would be chosen on the following sample, for all 100 sam- ples in each problem, and the preference of the Monte-Carlo replicate was taken as its modal choice over the last 50 trials.

We simulated model predictions for 20 values of the p parameter on [0,.1]. The upper end of this interval im- plies a high degree of confusion: with a .1 chance of con- fusion at each sample, the probability of accurately main- taining a single memory trace (exemplar) following 10 sam- ples is (1 .1) 10 = .349, and following 100 samples is only (1.1) 100 < .001. The ExCon instantiates that a single ex- emplar is increasingly likely to be confused as new exemplars enter the store. Nonetheless, the set of exemplars will approx- imate the true distribution with increasing accuracy up until a certain sample size, after which the set of exemplars become noisier.

We assessed the goodness-of-fit on the ExCon’s ability to predict two outcome measures in data: choice and probabil- ity knowledge. Choice prediction accuracy was calculated as the proportion of times the model successfully predicted the choice made by the participant when exposed to the same sequence of samples for each problem, which we refer to as

“trial-by-trial agreement”. Probability estimate prediction ac- curacy was calculated as the sum of the squared deviations between participant and model probability estimates across the sampled probability bins. This measures an average dis- tance between the data and the model when represented in

a plot such as Figure 3. Probability estimates were derived

from the frequency of each outcome in the ExCon memory stores. The best-fitting parameter estimates were those that maximized goodness-of-fit to choices and minimized predic- tion error in probability estimate data. Parameters were esti- mated separately for the sampling and feedback tasks.

ExCon Evaluation

Choice Behavior

With p = .033 (sampling) and p = .027 (feedback), the Ex- Con model had 65.3% and 70.7% trial-by-trial agreement with preference data from the sampling and feedback tasks, respectively. In isolation it is difficult to determine whether this reflects good performance, so we provide two benchmark comparisons. The first benchmark was the “natural mean” heuristic, which prefers the lottery with the highest observed sample mean (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008). The ExCon reduces to the natural mean heuristic when p = 0 and assuming a lin- ear utility function. The ExCon model outperforms the natu- ral mean heuristic in both tasks (sampling – 62.9%, feedback – 64.5%). The second benchmark maximized choice in light of the inferred expected value of each lottery as indicated by participants’ probability estimates, and was also outper- formed by the ExCon model (sampling – 62.9%, feedback – 56.7%). The success of the ExCon relative to the two bench- marks highlights the benefit of a choice rule that maximizes utility rather than value. The average ExCon choice between pairs of lotteries is dis- played in Table 1; bold face shows lottery pairings for which ExCon produced the same modal preference as the partici- pants (i.e., both data and model scored above or below 50%). On this lottery-by-lottery basis, the model correctly predicted 24 out of 30 lottery preferences observed in data even though the model was not explicitly fit to this table.

Probability Estimates

The black lines in Figure 3 illustrate the ExCon probability estimate predictions. The model captures the qualitative pat- terns in the probability estimates – overestimation of rare out- comes and underestimation of common outcomes.

Technion Prediction Tournament

We now demonstrate that the ExCon model performs as well as leading competitor models when given a benchmark set of problems from the TPT (Erev et al., 2010). The TPT evaluated models separately for the sampling and feedback paradigms using a common problem set (for details, see Erev et al., 2010). The TPT used one data set for model calibra- tion, and another data set for the evaluation (from an identi- cal problem distribution as the original problems). We sim- ulated the process of entering the ExCon model in the TPT, following TPT guidelines: we estimated model parameters using the estimation data set, and used those parameter val- ues to evaluate predictive performance in the competition data set. In the TPT, model performance was evaluated using the average proportion of agreement (across problems) between the modal preference of the model and of the participants (e.g., Erev et al., 2010), which we refer to as “PAgree”. Our measure of trial-by-trial agreement reported above maintains more information than PAgree, but for ease of comparison we use the common metric of PAgree values to compare our results to those from the TPT (cf. Table 3, Erev et al.).

The ExCon model performed approximately as well as the winners and runners-up in the sampling and feedback paradigms, in contrast to the TPT where each model was suc- cessful in the sampling or feedback paradigm – see Table 2. The best-fitting parameter values tended toward extremes of the parameter space (p 0). However, the choice data from the TPT did not constrain the confusion parameter of the Ex- Con; similar PAgree predictions were observed across the ex- amined parameter space of the model. This result was not re- stricted to the ExCon: we performed the same model fits with the k-sampler and the three-parameter instance based learning (IBL; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011) models, and found that the pa- rameters of those models were also under-constrained when the models were examined solely against choice data. This under-constraint reinforces the need for multiple streams of data, and richer problem sets, in evaluating modern choice models.

Table 2: PAgree for the ExCon model and TPT winner in

the sampling and feedback paradigms, for the estimation and competition data sets.


















We addressed two issues regarding experience-based choice. Firstly, models of experience-based choice should account not only for participants’ choices in multiple paradigms and datasets but also the process by which participants construct and represent the probability distributions upon which those choices are based. To that end we designed a new model – the exemplar confusion model (ExCon) – that provides a process explanation of how people might acquire knowledge of out- come distributions. We assumed that sampled outcomes are stored as memory traces – exemplars – and represent the out- come distribution for alternative options. We also assumed an imperfect, noisy memory system implemented as a con- fusion process. The confusion process operated each time a new exemplar was stored, similar to retroactive memory inter- ference. The ExCon successfully predicted decision-makers’ behavior across two experience-based choice paradigms in a novel data set and an important existing dataset (the TPT). Our second point relates to model evaluation. Examina- tion of solely choice data, as in the TPT, may not sufficiently constrain models, and therefore permits models with differ- ent assumptions to perform equally well. Under-constraint is due to limited variability in the problem sets (binary choices between a safe option and a two-outcome risky option), lim- ited data sources to constrain models (only choice), and a very general prediction goal (aggregated choice proportion). In collecting probability estimates we departed from previ- ous models of risky choice (e.g., Prospect Theory) which in-

fer probability weighting from choices or measure probability estimates to serve as model inputs. One of our novel contri- butions is to instead use this stream of data to constrain model development. With this constraint we developed a model of how discovered information is used to construct a representa- tion, and how that representation is used to form a preference. A challenge for future research is to develop a comprehensive model that also incorporates information search.


Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Barron, G., & Erev, I. (2003). Small feedback–based decisions and their limited correspondence to description–based decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 215–233. Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2009). The role of representation in experience–based choice. Judgment and Decision Making, 4,


Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2011a). Description– and experience–based choice: Does equivalent information equal equivalent choice? Acta Psychologica, 136, 276–284. Camilleri, A. R., & Newell, B. R. (2011b). When and why rare events are underweighted: A direct comparison of the sampling, partial feedback, full feedback and description choice paradigms. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 377–384. Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R., et al. (2010). A choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from description. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 15–47. Fox, C. R., & Hadar, L. (2006). “Decisions from experience” = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Bar- ron, Weber & Erev (2004). Judgment and Decision Making, 1,


Gonzalez, C., & Dutt, V. (2011). Instance–based learning: Integrat- ing sampling and repeated decisions from experience. Psycholog- ical Review, 118, 523–551. Hertwig, R., & Pleskac, T. J. (2008). The game of life: How small samples render choice simpler. In N. Chater & M. Oaks- ford (Eds.), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cog- nitive science (pp. 209–236). Oxford, England: Oxford Univer- sity Press. Juslin, P., & Persson, M. (2002). PROBabilities from EXemplars (PROBEX): A “lazy” algorithm for probabilistic inference from generic knowledge. Cognitive Science, 26, 563–607. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291. Lewandowsky, S., Geiger, S. M., & Oberauer, K. (2008). Interference–based forgetting in verbal short–term memory. Jour- nal of Memory and Language, 59, 200–222. Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1999). The role of aspiration in risky choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 43, 286–313. Nosofsky, R. M. (1986). Attention, similarity, and the identification–categorization relationship. Journal of Experimen- tal Psychology: General, 115, 39–57. Rakow, T., Demes, K., & Newell, B. R. (2008). Biased samples not mode of presentation: Re-examining the apparent underweight- ing of rare events in experience–based choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 106, 168–179. Rakow, T., & Newell, B. R. (2010). Degrees of uncertainty: An overview and framework for future research on experience–based choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 1–14. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory:

Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323. Ungemach, C., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (2009). Are probabilities overweighted or underweighted, when rare outcomes are experi- enced (rarely)? Psychological Science, 20, 473–479.