TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVEG.R. No.

166471 March 22, 2011TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE Petitioner,vs.LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
Facts
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC), a registered cooperativeestablished by Barangay Tawang,
La Trinidad residents for the purpose of operating a domesticdrinking water service, applied with the National Water
Resources Board (the Board) for aCertificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to maintain and operate a waterworks
system within its barangay.But respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a government-owned corporationthat
supplied water within La Trinidad for domestic, industrial, and commercial purposes,opposed the application.
LTWD claimed that its franchise was exclusive in that its charter provides that no separate franchise can be granted
within its area of operation without its prior
written consent. Still, the Board granted TMPCs applicat
ion.
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person oragency for domestic, industrial or
commercial water service within the district or any portionthereof unless and except to the extent that the board
of directors of said district consents theretoby resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to
review by the Administration.
LTWD contested the grant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad which,after hearing, rendered
judgment set
ting aside the Boards decision and cance
ling the CPC it
issued to TMPC. The RTC denied TMPCs motion for reconsideration, prompting the latter to
come to this Court on petition for review.
Issue
Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid to be the foundation ofthe rulings of RTC.
Rulings
The court ruled on the negative. Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution andSection 11, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
publicutility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associationsorganized under
the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
norshallsuchfranchise
, certificate or authorization
beexclusiveincharacter
or for a longer period than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The constitution is clear that franchises for theoperation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character. There is no exception. In case ofconflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
Constitution always prevails because theConstitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The
duty of the Court is touphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Since the
Court,exercising its Constitutional power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198 voidand
unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginning. Thus, the decisionof the RTC was set aside
and the decision of the NWRB was reinstated

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS

CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR
FAMINI, GR NO 184861, JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private respondent, together with her husband, filed a complaint against
petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private
respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to
suspend proceddings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f prejudicial question in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. [
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with private respondents argument that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency
of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had.In the instant case, the phrase, previously
instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal
action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is
no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil
action must precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but
also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.This
principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. [17]In other words, every
effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be
made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that
would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded
and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be
filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with
the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

Case Digest: Grande vs. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248 : February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and
wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record
of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the
father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental
authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to
immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to
the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar
of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and record
the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights
upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the
father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by
the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the
order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition
of their filiation.
HELD: The petition is partially granted
CIVIL LAW Filation
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in
case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the
prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged
before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must
be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use
of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

Civil Service Commission Vs. Court Of Appeals, Dr.Dante G. Guevarra And Atty. Augustus F. Cezar, G.R.No. 176162,
October 09, 2012 (ATIENZA) F a c t s
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and AugustusF. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President andthe Vice
President for Administration, respectively, of thePolytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva(Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed anadministrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for grossdishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of officialdocuments, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of theservice, being notoriously undesirable, and for violatingSection 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva
chargedGuevarra with falsification of a public document,specifically the Application for Bond of AccountableOfficials and
Employees of the Republic of the Philippines,in which the latter denied the existence of his pendingcriminal and administrative
cases, despite the fact thatGuevarra and Cezar have 17 cases pending before thSandiganbayan.
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar withConduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion forReconsideration and Motion to
Declare Absence of PrimaFacie Case. This was denied and Guevarra wassubsequently placed under preventive suspension
forninety (90) days.
Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for
certiorari
andprohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. On December 29, 2006, the CArendered its
Decision granting the petition and nullifyingand setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC forhaving been rendered
without jurisdiction citing EO 292(Administrative Code of 1987) which states that heads ofagencies and instrumentalities "shall
have jurisdiction toinvestigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actionagainst officers and employees under their
jurisdiction"thereby bestowing upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involvingdisciplinary
action against respondents Guevarra andCezar.
ISSUE:
WON the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES
According to the SC, the CSC have original jurisdictionover cases filed to it. The CSC, as the central personnelagency of the
government, has the power to discipline itsofficials and employees and to hear and decideadministrative cases instituted by or
brought before itdirectly or on appeal.
Based on the constitution, the civil service embraces allbranches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies ofthe Government,
including government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charters. By virtue of PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 1341,
PUP became a chartered stateuniversity, thereby making it a government-owned orcontrolled corporation with an original charter
whoseemployees are part of the Civil Service and are subject tothe provisions of E.O. No. 292
In the case of
Camacho v. Gloria,
the SC stated that underE.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university officialmay be filed with either the university
s Board of Regents
or directly with the Civil Service Commission.
This is further emphasized on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases stating that The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide administrative casesinstituted by, or br
ought before it, directly or on appeal. Also, Sec. 7 of the same rules further provides that
Headsof Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalitiesand other instrumentalities
concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective
officers and employees.
These rules, according to the SC,are a reasonable interpretation of EO 292 (AdministrativeCode).

shall

have

original

This concurrent jurisdiction means that if a case is filed tothe CSC and the CSC assumes jurisdiction over the case,then it shall be
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercisingconcurrent jurisdiction (The disciplinary tribunal of PUP orits Board of regents in
this particular case). Even if theCSC delegates the investigation to other department oragency like the disciplinary tribunal, it
does not deprive theCSC of its jurisdiction. In the same way, if the Disciplinarytribunal of PUP or its Board of Regents takes
jurisdictionover the case, it shall be to the exclusion of the CSC