Univ Cebu Political Law Jurisprudence 2012

University of Cebu
College of Law
UCLASS Bar Operations
Political Law Society
POLITICAL LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
2012
Chairperson: Paul Nejudne
Vice Chair: Lester Wee
Members:
Robie Quino, Gibran Abubakar,
Jhona Grace Alo, Leah Lara Bardoquillo,
Jennelyn Bilocura, Joy Bolivar,
Kristine Athena Nedamo,
Kristine Nejudne, Chelisa Roxas
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

References: Law Textbooks, Codes, Reviewers, Notes, Compilations, Articles and Internet Sources
For Private and Personal Use Only
Political Law Jurisprudence

University of Cebu College of Law
UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society
SELECTED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
IN
POLITICAL LAW
2000
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines
null
and
void
and
unconstitutional.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said

powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress
and
review
by
the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President
full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II
of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Ruling:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.

and Personal Use Only
2
For Private

2001
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo de Guzman
G.R. No. 134844-45 (2001)
Facts:
On or about the month of December, 1995 and
of October 2, 1996, in Tagig, Metro Manila, the accused,
with lewd designs and by means of force and
intimidation, unlawfully have sexual intercourse with
Marlyn Perlas y Roque, fourteen (14) years old, against
her will and consent. The accused is the common-law
spouse of the victims mother, but the prosecution failed
to allege the relationship in the information. Two
information were charged against the accused docketed
as Criminal Case No. 110978-H and 110979-H.
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses
who testified against the accused and further
corroborated finding that the victim was indeed raped
and intimidated due to the fact the she had poor mental
development who acts like a 7-8 year old girl even if she
was already 15 years old.
The accused entered a plea of no guilty, upon
arraignment, on the two information charging him the
crime of simple rape. Presiding judge, however, rendered
judgment of conviction for two (2) counts of the crime of
rape, sentencing accused to suffer death penalty.
A perusal of the Information reveals that
Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Izon intended to charge
accused-appellant "with the crime of violation of Art. 335
(rape) of the RPC in relation to Section 5, R.A. 7610",
(AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND
SPECIAL
PROTECTION
AGAINST
CHILD
ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES)
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing
two (2) death penalties upon accused-appellant despite
failure of the prosecution to allege in the two (2)
information that accused-appellant is the common-law
spouse of the victims parent.
Ruling:
The court held that the two information charged
accused-appellant with the crime of simple rape,
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
with the indivisible penalty of reclusin perpetua.
There is no indication in the two Information
that the crime charged is punishable by death under the
foregoing law. Republic Act No. 7610 covers child
prostitution, which is not the case here. Besides, Republic
Act No. 7610 itself does not impose death for rape but
rather refers the matter to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as the applicable law.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying
circumstance to be considered as such must be so
alleged in the information, which is not required of
aggravating circumstances.
"It has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same
are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only

3
as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of

proof even if not pleaded. Indeed, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process,
if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned"
GEORGE MANANTAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES
MARCELINO
NICOLAS
and
MARIA
NICOLAS G.R. No. 107125 (2001)
Facts:
On or about the 25th day of September 1982, in
the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the
Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality,
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and
without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a
passenger jeep driven by Charles Codamon, thereby
causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting
to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said
automobile.
The defense version as to the events prior to the
incident was essentially the same as that of the
prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin
declared Manantan did not drink beer that night.
The lower court promulgated a decision in
petitioners favor. It finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the
crime charged and hereby acquits him.
Private respondents filed their notice of appeal
on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In their
appeal, the appellate court decided in favor of the
respondents. Decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that
defendant-appellee is held civilly liable and sentenced to
indemnify plaintiffs-appellants.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
appellate court denied the motion. Hence, the present
case.
Issues:
1.
2.
Whether or not the decision of the trial court

acquitting the petitioner of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide foreclosed any
further inquiry on the accuseds negligence or
reckless imprudence because by then he will be
placed in double jeopardy and therefore the
Court of Appeals (CA) erred in passing upon the
same again.
The CA did not have jurisdiction to award
damages and indemnity to the private
respondents
considering
that
the
nondeclaration of any indemnity or award of
For Private

3.
4.
damages by the lower court was itself consistent

with the petitioners acquittal for the reason that
the civil action was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action and there was no express waiver
of the civil action or reservation to institute it
separately by the private respondents in the trial
court.
deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or

information.
The CA did not have jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the case and render the decision
sought to be reviewed when the same was
prosecuted by the private respondents in their
personal capacities and the filing fees not having
been paid, thus violating the Manchester
doctrine.
Facts:
Ruling:
The court ruled that:
1st issue: That the petitioner had once been
placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066
and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note,
however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals
by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The
records clearly show that no second criminal offense was
being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the
filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the
same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
2nd issue: The court supports the conclusion of
the appellate court that the acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was
not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
court's declaration that did not discount the possibility
that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found
that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
accused presented itself before the Court" and since said
"hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Court's
mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."The
foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to
enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
3rd issue: The actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal,
temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged,
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Criminal
Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the
award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the
effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the
institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are

4
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N.,

FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO
N., all surnamed AGUILAR G.R. No. 137152 (2001)
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with

the Regional Trial Court a complaint for expropriation.
Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square
meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the
defendants, herein respondents.
Respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar
who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of
Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged
that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject
lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties
inventoried for socialized housing. As counterclaim,
respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.
Respondents filed a "Motion for
Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged in
their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents
prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for
preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed.
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
which was admitted by the trial court. Respondents filed
a "Manifestation and Motion" adopting their "Answer with
Counterclaim" and "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" as
their answer to the Amended Complaint.
The motion was granted. The trial court
issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after
declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose
land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No.
7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not
for a public purpose for petitioner's failure to present any
evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless residents of
Mandaluyong.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines
passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays down as a policy
that the state, in cooperation with the private sector,
undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban
Development and Housing Program. Section 9 also
exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by
small property owners. Petitioner argues that the exercise
of the power of eminent domain is not anymore
conditioned on the size of the land sought to be
expropriated.
For Private

Issues:
Whether or not respondents qualify as "small property
owners as defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279.
Section 3.
Ruling:
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are
to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are
the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land
swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land
banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint
venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to
two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are
exempt from such acquisition.
Respondents therefore appear to own real
property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the
records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco,
Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by
respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not
present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio
Aguilar's testimony.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are
now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar
testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment
cases against the occupants of the land before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and
60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on
September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the
tenants and other occupants from the land in question.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED
and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and December
29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig
City in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED.
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E.
MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC.,
respondent G.R. No. 128448 ( 2001)
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.

Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop
loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of
their
obligations
to
it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November,
1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized
PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed
that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be

5
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds

were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds
which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties.
PNB
still
had
a
deficiency
claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for
the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National
Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to
declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof
are
unconstitutional.
3.
Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Ruling:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64,
Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the
validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory
relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that
such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room
for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of
a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.
For Private

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579

and its implementing issuances are void for violating the
due process clause and the prohibition against the taking
of private property without just compensation. Petitioners
now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following
requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must
be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RAMIL VELEZ RAYOS G.R. No. 133823, February 7,
2001
Facts:
On or about the 9th day of April, 1997 at about
6 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
Binitinan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with a nine-year old retardate Mebelyn B.
Ganzan against her will and consent and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and stab the victim with the
use of a knife which accused previously provided himself
thus hitting her on the different parts of her body,
causing her instantaneous death."
The accused, when arraigned, entered
a plea of not guilty. The facts were culled from the
testimony of the individual witnesses presented, by the
prosecution and the defense in the course of trial. It
showed that the circumstantial evidence points out to the
accused. However accused appellant contended that ohe
was brought to the municipal hall on the same night and
placed behind bars until he would have recovered from
drunkenness. Eventually, he was released from jail but he
was soon brought back to the police station and held for
the rape-slay of the child victim.
Accused-appellant,
in
the
instant
appeal, maintains his innocence and seeks a reversal of
the decision rendered by the trial court holding him
responsible for the rape-slay of the victim. He further
contends that he has been coerced into executing his
extrajudicial confession and insists that he only has been
forced to affix his signature on the document by a
policeman.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court has erred in finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide, claiming to have been coerced into
executing his extrajudicial confession.

6
Ruling:
A confession is often said to constitute evidence

of high order but before it can be taken in evidence,
several requirements have to be satisfied. Chiseled in our
jurisprudence are the four fundamental conditions
needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) The
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; (3) the confession must be
express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.
Confessing to a crime has the semblance, at least insofar
as its legal repercussions are concerned, of a plea of
guilt. Extreme care must thus be taken by lawyers,
prosecutors, and the police in seeing to it that the person
under investigation for the commission of an offense has
been properly secured in his constitutional rights. Article
III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution requires that
"(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him."
The right to counsel, particularly, is designed to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
confessions or coerced admissions and to preclude the
slightest suspicion that an accused would be led to an
imprudent act. It ought to follow that a lawyer should see
to the protection of an accused in ensuring his basic
rights. The accused is entitled to no less than an effective
and vigilant counsel who must be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Counsel should ascertain that the confession is voluntarily
made and that the person making the same fully
understands the nature and consequences of his
extrajudicial confession.
But while the Court in this case is not
comfortable in giving weight to the confession made by
the accused and holding it to bear out a faithful
observance of the Constitution, the guilt of accusedappellant, nevertheless, has here been independently
established. When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime,
resort to circumstantial evidence becomes almost
certainly unavoidable. Circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient for conviction, if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
have been derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be
consistent with each other, from which the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn there from would be that
the accused is guilty. The circumstances must create a
solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically
believable, that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of
others, as being the perpetrator of the crime and thereby
sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.
For Private

Here, the pieces of evidence, taken in their

entirety, unmistakably point to the guilt, not innocence,
of accused-appellant. In rape with homicide, the evidence
against an accused is basically circumstantial. The nature
of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would
have been around during its commission makes the
prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the
victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Thus, resorting to circumstantial evidence is inevitable
and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of
the offense and the identity of the perpetrator would be
unreasonable.
FLORENCIO FRANCISCO Y ALEJO, G.R. No. 135200,
(2001)
Facts:
On 3 October 1995, while the victim was asleep
together with her mother, five (5) sisters and three (3)
brothers in their tenement at No. 9 J. P. Rizal St.,
Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, her father,
the accused, woke her up and told her to look for his
slippers as he was going out to buy cigarettes. When she
told him that she could not find his slippers he suddenly
covered her mouth tightly with his hands and forcibly
dragged her towards the toilet, undressed her, feasted on
her young breast and inserted his penis into her vagina
while the two (2) of them were standing" with the
accused propping her up on the seat of the toilet bowl.
Afterwards, he warned her not to tell anyone about what
happened. Since the accused had been beating her and
her siblings in the past, she was afraid of what the
accused would do if she would tell anyone about what he
did to her this time.
Editha further disclosed that her father
had been sexually abusing her repeatedly since she was
only nine (9) years old until she learned that her father
was also sexually molesting her two (2) younger sister,
Baby Flor and Maria Coralyn.
The accused alleged that his wife
Isabelita Jucutan fabricated the charge as he denied the
accusation against him. According to him, he used to
beat and spank his wife and their daughters. He
countered that it was actually the brother of his wife,
Amuncio Jucutan, who sexually abused Editha but he did
not file any charges against him upon the request of his
wife Isabelita.
The trial court then found the accused
guilty of qualified rape and sentenced him to death, plus
civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages.
The accused appealed contending that
rape was not committed and that he finds it inconceivable
that Editha did not make any outcry when their house
and those of her relatives were adjacent to the toilet
where the rape was supposedly perpetrated. He also
argues the absence of allegation in the information of the
special qualifying circumstance of his relationship to
Editha, which made it legally impossible to sentence him
to death. Consequently, he must be imposed the penalty
next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua.

7
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving

credence to the testimony of Editha despite her
silence or failure to shout and cry for help.
2.
Whether or not the trial court erred in holding

him liable only for qualified rape as the
Complaint failed to allege the special qualifying
circumstance of his relationship to Editha.
Ruling:
The court disagree with accused-appellant that
simply because complaining witness failed to shout for
help he could not be guilty of rape. Even if accusedappellant did not cover the mouth of Editha, her silence
would not by itself be sufficient to negate the conclusion
that rape was committed. Being complainants father,
accused-appellant had moral ascendancy and influence
over his daughter who was then of tender years. Her fear
of her father was more than enough to intimidate her to
submit to his lewd advances without shouting for help.
The answers of accused-appellant to the charges
consisted only of bare denials and allegations that would
not suffice to disprove rape.
The court, however, ruled in favor of the accused
in that the failure of the prosecution to allege in the
Complaint the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship between him and the victim will not allow the
imposition of the death penalty. Under Sec. 11 of RA
7659, the death penalty shall be imposed for the crime of
rape if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. These circumstances are in the
nature of qualifying circumstances that must be jointly
alleged in the complaint or information. Such failure of
the Complaint to implead the relationship of accusedappellant to the victim makes it legally impossible to
convict him of qualified rape. Hence, he can only be
convicted of simple rape. Indeed, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process,
if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", G.R.
No. 133917, (2001)
Facts:
On or about August 8, 1996, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
For Private

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in

conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession
946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them. Trial
ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as
witnesses.
The trial court then found the
appellants guilty and through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for
having been obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this
was
likewise
denied.
Accused-appellants
waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the
acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible

in evidence for having been seized in violation of
appellants
constitutional
rights
against
unreasonable, searches and seizures;
2. Whether or not, assuming it is admissible in
evidence, the government has otherwise proved
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. Whether or not, assuming their guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the imposable
penalty for violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659
(sic), in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, is life imprisonment, not death.
Ruling:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

8
particularly describing the place to be searched and the

persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a
form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this
Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.
The
foregoing
constitutional
proscription,
however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained there from may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search).
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its
judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace officers, are valid because
accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs. This brings us to the issue
of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure in the present case fall within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Here, there could have been no valid in
flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed. Accused-appellants manifested no outward
indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag
on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said
to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime.
Moreover, it could not be said that accusedappellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on
their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the
Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of
accused-appellants.
For Private

DELA CRUZ vs. ADJUTO ABILLE, G.R. No. 130196,

(2001)
Facts:
Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total
landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in Infanta,
Pangasinan, in which 2.84 hectares were tilled by Balbino
dela Cruz, as an agricultural tenant since 1968, who died
in 1981. After his death, he was, nevertheless, issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27. The certificate was entered
in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of
Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No.
1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz.
In 1987, Abille filed a petition for exemption
under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings
alleging that he was not notified of the coverage of his
land under OLT; that he learned of its coverage only on
March 25, 1987; that prior to the issuance of the
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711, DAR did not
notify him or his representative; that he has been
deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
1989, Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I, San
Fernando, La Union, issued an Order, denying the petition
for exemption, and granted the right of extension of not
more than seven (7) hectares instead. He directed the
petitioner to immediately select the retention areas,
canceling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued on the
tenants on the retained area and ordered MARO to
prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the
petitioner and the tenants and implement the Order.
Herminio selected the 7-hectare retention area,
which included the area covered by CLT No. 0-064711
issued to Balbino dela Cruz; hence, said CLT was
automatically cancelled.
Petitioners, on the other hand, who are the
compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz, filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the
issuance of emancipation patent, which was later referred
to the Regional Director I, San Fernando, La Union, for
appropriate action. They prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the
ground that DAR Order, ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Land Transfer of the retained area, had
become final and had been implemented by the Provincial
Agraria Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had
become moot and academic.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
said Decision of the Secretary of DAR having been
denied, they filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
said petition for review. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied by the appellate court.
Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the
Court of Appeals to hold that they were accorded due

9
process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate

of land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order
dated April 19, 1989; and that their petition for issuance
of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from
the petition filed by Herminio Abille where in Regional
Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the cancellation of their
predecessor's (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land
Transfer; that in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille,
they were not notified and given the opportunity to be
heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due
process so that the Order dated April 19,1989 of Regional
Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate of Land Transfer
No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null
and void, and cannot be used to deny their petition for
the issuance of an emancipation patent.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that

the petitioners were accorded due process
when the validity of the cancellation of
Certificate of land Transfer No. 0-064711
was resolved.
2.
Whether or not the petition for the issuance

of emancipation patent may be granted due
to lack of due process.
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
The court ruled that the CA was correct
in holding that although the petitioners were not given
the opportuniy to be heard when Regional Director
Antonio Nuesa in his Order regarding the cancellation of
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained
area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an
emancipation patent, petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the
validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was
resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis and also
in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which
was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and was resolved. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of (emphasis supplied). Futher, the petition filed by
landowner Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of
his property from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M.
Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not
require notice to petitioners.
Furthermore, the Certificate of Land
Transfer No. 0-064711 was validly cancelled. Said
certificate was issued to petitioners' predecessor, Balbino
dela Cruz, before landowner Herminio Abille was informed
of such issuance and that his landholding was subject to
Operation Land Transfer. Subsequently, Herminio Abille,
who was found to own riceland with an area of 9.2903
hectares, was granted the right to retain an area not
For Private

exceeding seven (7) hectares, and the right to select and

segregate such area under P.D. No. 27.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar,
that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of a department head,
in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
Issues:
1.
DE RAMA vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH

DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
FLORENIO RAMOS, G.R. No. 131136 , (2001)
2. Whether or not the public respondent Court

of Appeals seriously erred
in
finding
that the particular grounds namely:
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a
letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments
of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of said
employees were midnight appointments of the former
mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the
recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of
merit. The CSC dismissed petitioners allegation that
these were midnight appointments, pointing out that
the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority
can validly issue appointments until his term has expired,
as long as the appointee meets the qualification
standards for the position.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of the CSC's Resolution, but petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied
Petitioner then filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC
arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it ignored his
"supplement to the consolidated appeal and motion for
reconsideration" wherein he laid out evidence showing
that the subject appointments were obtained through
fraud. The Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the
petition for review.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration arguing that the appellate court erred in
upholding the CSC's resolutions despite the following
defects:
I. No screening process and no criteria were
adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating
the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public
places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and
the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not
observed by the selection board and by the appointing
authority as required by the Civil Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the
appointments of respondents.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

10
Whether or not the public respondent Court

of Appeals, gravely and seriously erred in
finding that the Civil Service Commission
was correct in not upholding the petitioner's
recall of the appointments of private
respondents in the face of fraud and
violation of rules and laws on issuance of
appointments.
I. No screening process and no criteria

were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board
in nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous
public places of notice of vacancy as required by
the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were
not observed by the selection board and by the
appointing authority as required by the Civil
Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall
the appointments of respondents.
Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC
and the Court of Appeals for being contrary to
law and not being supported by the evidence on
record.
Ruling:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional
prohibition on so-called midnight appointments,
specifically those made within 2 months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. There is no law that
prohibits
local
elective
officials
from
making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
The records reveal that when the petitioner
brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the
fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the
only reason he cited to justify his action was that these
were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition
applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in
fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or
her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of
fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the
appointments. Neither did he allege that the said
appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies
that
breached
laws
and
regulations
governing
appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these
For Private

appointments was that they were, to his personal belief,

"midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had
no authority to make.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an
appointment and the appointee's assumption of the
position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right
which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the
appointment or by removal except for cause and with
previous notice and hearing." 17 Moreover, it is well-settled
that the person assuming a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just
an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected
not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which
right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the
appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause
to do so, provided that there is previous notice and
hearing.
ARNEL MATARO y ELIZAGA and NICK PERUCHO y
SINGSON, G.R. No. 130378, (2001)
Facts:
Two separate information were filed against

appellants Amel Mataro and Nick Perucho. That on or
about the 23rd day of October 1992 in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true
identities, whereabouts and other personal circumstances
of which have not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery,
superior strength and evident premeditation, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR. y BALBIN, by then and
there shooting the latter with the use of firearms thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR., y BALBIN.
The
prosecution
presented
two
eyewitnesses, Victor Nilo Fernandez and Reden Guzman,
seeing the two accused shot the victim.
Appelants on the other hand, denied
accusation against him, averring that they were in Aklan
from June until November.
Trial court rendered its decision, finding
the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder, both to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Enrique Castillo the following: 1) P725,000.00 as actual
damages; 2) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) to
pay the cost.
The appellants question the credibility
of Femandez and Guzman. They aver that during the
investigation, a certain Ebalde gave his statements to the
police that the car used by the assailants was a gray Kia
Pride. They also point out that the witnesses of the
prosecution did not agree on the number of persons
riding the car which was stopped by Castillo. They
likewise raise that during the initial investigation, the
eyewitnesses described Mataro as a man between 35 to
40 years old. Mataro was only 24 years old at the time of
the incident. Finally, they invoke the "equipoise" rule 15

11
because their guilt had not been established beyond

reasonable doubt.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court erred in:
...CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM:
(A) ON GROUNDS OF REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
(B) BY APPLYING THE "EQUIPOISE RULE."
Ruling:
The accused appellants invoke the equipoise
rule because their guilt had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The SC said that it has enumerated the
requisites for credible identification in the case of
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995) as
follows:
1)
the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime;
2)
witness degree of attention at that
time;
3)
the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness;
4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification;
5)
the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and
6)
the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. 18
The Court held that in their view, these
requirements were met. In the instant case, there is no
question that both witnesses had the opportunity to view
the incident as it unfolded before them with a degree of
attention that allowed them to take in the important
details and recall them clearly. Moreover, as repeatedly
stressed, appellate court should accord to the factual
findings of trial courts and their evaluation great weight
and respect concerning the credibility of witnesses. The
conditions of visibility being favorable and these
witnesses not appearing to be biased, the conclusion of
trial courts regarding the identity of the malefactors
should normally be accepted.
The SC also held that the trial court did
not err in qualifying the killing as murder. There was
treachery in this case since, as testified to by prosecution
witness Fernandez, the victim had already dismissed the
appellants after they talked to him. The victim was
deliberately allowed to enjoy a false sense of security.
They shot the victim when the latter had his hands
raised. The SC therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower
court, but made modifications with the costs to be paid
by the accused.

ANGELES STA. TERESA, G.R. No. 130663, (2001)
Facts:
For Private

That sometime in the month of October, 1996,

at Brgy. Soledad, Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter LORNA
STA. TERESA, who is about 12 years old, taking
advantage of her tender age and innocence, against her
will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
When arraigned, appellant with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty."
But after the prosecution presented its witnesses -- Dr.
Maria Lorraine De Guzman, medico-legal officer, and the
rape victim withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed
it to a plea of "guilty." He said that he "had no intention
to commit such act at the time but because I was drunk,
I was not on my right mind x x x." He then asked that he
be pardoned for his deed.
The trial court then admitted all the
documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without
any comment and/or objection from the defense counsel.
It granted the motion of appellant to change his plea to
one of guilt.
The trial court, after evaluating the prosecution
evidence and considering appellant's admission of the
crime, convicted him of rape and sentenced him to death.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in not entering a plea of not guilty for the
accused-appellant and in not affording the latter
the opportunity to adduce controverting
evidence in blatant violation of his right to due
process.
in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of
the material inconsistencies and improbabilities
that tainted the testimony of the private
complainant.
the fact that the testimony of the private
complainant is contrary to the common
knowledge and experience of mankind.
complied with in the court a quo, thus necessitating the

remand of this case for further proceedings.
As can be gleaned from this Rule, the trial court
must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
first, conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; second, require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and third, ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires. As shown in the
records of the case, the trial court, after a brief exchange
of remarks with appellant's counsel de oficio, and finally
with appellant himself, issued the Order dated May 16,
1997 or nine (9) days after the accused was initially
arraigned.
The court held that the abbreviated and aborted
presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant's
improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster
performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too
exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional
due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a
human being.
The right to counsel proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may
be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
"The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of
the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case,
and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely
put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation."
Using this standard, the court believes that the
defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment
and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely
nine (9) days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged, his counsel de oficio made a
manifestation in open court that his client is changing his
plea to that of "guilty."

complainant's failure to offer any resistance prior
to and even during her alleged rape.
Ruling:
The court finds that the stringent constitutional
standards impelled by due process have not been

12
AKBAYAN Youth, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 147066, (2001)
For Private

MICHELLE D. BETITO, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO

BENIPAYO (COMELEC),G.R. No. 147179, (2001)
Facts:
Petitioners in this case represent the youth
sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According
to them, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC.
However,
the
COMELEC
issued
Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for
additional registration of voters on the ground that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners
filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside
and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to
declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar
as
said
provision
effectively
causes
the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly
situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit
for registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14,
2001 General Elections
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution;
2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELEC's
imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the
May 14, 2001 general elections.
Ruling:
1. No
The right of suffrage invoked by

petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right
of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is
subject
to
existing
substantive
and
procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books
and other repositories of law. As to the procedural
limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by thefundamental charter, is obliged by
law to register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's
Registration Act of 1996." Section 8, of the R.A. 8189,
explicitly provides that "No registration shall, however, be

13
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty

(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election." The 100-day prohibitive period
serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the
registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the
COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the
evidence on the application. If we compromise on these
safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter's list
full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified
registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts.
Likewise, petitioners invoke the so
called "standby" powers or "residual" powers of the
COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of
Sec. 28 of RA 8436 "Designation of Other Dates for
Certain Pre- election Act".. The act of registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under
Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, "(a) Registration refers to the
act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer
of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears
emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436
invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189
volunteered
by
respondent
COMELEC, far
from
contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A.
8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of
upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying
the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28,
R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the preelection acts are susceptible of performance within the
available period prior to election day.The "stand-by
power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being
exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Moreover, the petitioners in the instant
case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their
petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason,
within the period of registration and came to this Court
and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to
speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that
the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on
their rights.Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt.
2.
NO .
SC believes that petitioners failed to

establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are
entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of voters.
TUNG CHIN HUI vs.RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ,
Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, G.R. No. 141938, (2001)
For Private

Facts:
Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in this

country, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was
arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). He
was then duly charged, and the Bill of Commissioners
issued Summary Deportation Order, finding him guilty of
possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by
Taiwanese authorities.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the
ground that his detention was illegal. In their Return of
Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision,
the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release
and consequently denied respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondents then filed a Notice of
Appeal which was granted. Subsequently, the appellate
court rendered its Decision, which as earlier mentioned
reversed the trial court.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari before this Court,
contending that the
RTC should have rejected the appeal for allegedly being
filed late-beyond the 48-hour period provided under the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. In its decision, which became
final, this Court denied the Petition.
The appellate court held that petitioner
was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because
the BID Board of Commissioners had found him guilty of
violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended. Citing documents from the Taiwan
Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), the CA found that
petitioner's passport had been cancelled by the Republic
of China on the ground that its holder was not the real
Tung Chin Hui, but a fugitive from justice who had
tampered the passport. The CA also held that the TECO
documents, being public in nature, need not be testified
to by the persons who had issued them.
Issues:
A. PRINCIPAL ISSUES:
(1) Is the reglementary period within which to appeal in
habeas corpus cases forty-eight hours from notice of the
Decision appealed from? (as petitioner contends); or is it
15 days similar to other cases from notice of the
Decision? (as contended by the respondents);
(2) Was the appeal taken by the respondents from the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, proper?
(as postulated by the respondents) or improper and not
allowable being violative of Sec. 1 (a), Rule 41, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? (as comprehended by the
petitioner)
A. SECONDARY ISSUES:
(1) Should the Court of Appeals give weight to findings of
fact arrived at by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

14
Branch 26, based on the evidence presented or adduced

during the trial of the case, in keeping with established
precedents?
(2) May the Honorable Court of Appeals consider
extraneous facts brought out by the respondents in their
memorandum but are not supported by the evidence
presented, identified and admitted by the trial court
during the hearing of the case?
(3) Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the
case when the appeal was filed out of time and the Order
appealed from is not appealable?"
Ruling:
The Petition is not meritorious.

Propriety of the Appeal
The reglementary period for filing an
appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides:
'SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.'
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed
within the 15-day reglementary period.
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid
or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
In the instant case, petitioner was
properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for
illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a
passport issued to another person and cancelled by the
Taiwanese government in 1995.
Alleged Lack of Notice
The court rejects petitioner's reliance
on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true
that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the
petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien,
having used a passport which had already been
cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed
about it. There is no sufficient basis to overturn the
presumption that the Bureau of Immigration conducted
its proceedings in accordance with law.
In sum, the court hold that petitioner's
confinement was not illegal; hence, there is no
justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, he has not shown any cogent reason to
For Private

warrant the nullification of the Board of Commissioners'

Summary Deportation Order.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE
TORRES
vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
G.R.
No.
132860, April 3, 2001
Facts:
Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor
of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos (UPLB)
who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay
from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989 due to his
service
as
the
Philippine
Government''
official
representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural
Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).
When the term of his leave of absence
was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but
was denied by then Director of the Agricultural Credit
Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLBm advised De Torres to
report for duty; while the then UPLB Chancellor apprised
him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and
warned of the possibility of being considered on Absence
Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and
report for duty as directed.
Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had
'no alternative but to pursue the matter in continuing his
commitment to CIRDAP, and was advised that failure to
report within 30 days, he would be dropped from the rolls
of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not
report to work.
After almost five years of absence
without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent
Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back
to duty. He was then notified he [was] considered to be
on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.
Dr. De Torres sought reconsideration
and was further granted. Meanwhile, members of the
academic Personnel Committee requested the Civil
Service Commission regarding the employment status of
Dr. De Torres.
The Commission ruled that Dr. De
Torres is considered to have been dropped from the
service, hence, his re-employment requires the issuance
of appointment subject to the requirements of Civil
Service Law and Rules.'
Dr. De Torres and the University of the
Philippines at Los Baos (UPLB) filed separate requests
for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution. The
commission denied the motion for reconsideration,
further stating that CSC Resolution [stood] and that since
separation from the service [was] non-disciplinary in
nature, the appointing authority may appoint Dr. De
Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil
service law and rules.
From the unfavorable Resolutions of the
CSC, petitioners sought recourse before the Court of
Appeals, but was dismissed for
finding
no
grave
abuse of discretion on the part of CSC. Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:

15
1. Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary

for Dr. de Torres to resume
his
post
at
the
UNIVERSITY despite having remained continuously with
the Civil Service, not having been dropped from the rolls
of the University, and after
returning to fulfill his
service contract as a government scholar.
2. Whether or not the issuance by the
COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045
and 961041,
was in excess of its authority.
3. Whether or not the COMMISSION violated the
Subido-Romulo Agreement which is still in force and
effect.
4. Whether or not the express repeal of the old
law had the effect of doing away with
the policy of
automatic dropping from the government service in favor
of notice
before dropping.
5. Whether or not Section 33 of Rule XVI is ultra
vires as it does not relate or is
not in
any
way
connected with any specific provision of R.A. No. 2260.
6. Whether or not Resolution No. 95-3045
violated Dr. de Torres' constitutional right
to
due
process."
In the main, the issue is the validity of Dr.
Alfredo de Torres automatic separation from the civil
service due to his prolonged absence without official
leave.
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious.
Petitioner De Torres was never actually
dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the
UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had
been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the
service if he failed to return to work within a stated
period. The action of the Chancellor, though, in advising
the petitioner on the Civil Service Rules regarding leaves,
constituted a sufficient notice.
However, UP's actuations, in spite of
Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom.
We have held time and again that "the University has the
academic freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."
Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant
therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel.
Needless to say, UP definitely
recognizes and values petitioner's academic expertise. As
the vice chancellor for academic affairs explained,
"[d]ropping him from the rolls will utterly be a waste of
government funds and will not serve the best interest of
the country which is suffering from 'brain-drain'."
For Private

Consequently, there is no need for the

issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres.
His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his
tenure at CIRDAP.
PHILHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or
SPS. JOVENAL and CELIA TORING, vs.
CONSOLIDATED ORIX LEASING and FINANCE
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 135287, (2001)
Facts:
Petitioners were declared in default when they
and their counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, failed to appear
at the pretrial hearing on 22 April 1993. The order of
default was subsequently lifted. Petitioners were again
declared in default for having been absent in the pretrial
hearing scheduled on that day. Respondent presented its
evidence ex-parte. the default order was once more lifted
but the evidence presented was retained in the records
subject to cross-examination by petitioners. In the next
pretrial hearing, petitioners and counsel still failed to
show up. For the third time, they were declared in
default. This time, the trial court considered the case
submitted for decision.
The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent in a decision. Petitioners filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Set Aside Judgment by Default",
but were subsequently denied by the trial court.
Petitioners then filed a "Petition for
Relief from Judgment." Petitioners claimed that they were
deprived of their right to present their evidence. Their
non-appearance in the pretrial hearing was according to
them, was due to their counsels "honest mistake and
excusable negligence" of entering in his calendar the date
of the pretrial to be "May 23" when it should have been
"May 16".
The trial court dismissed the petition for
relief for lack of merit. The court said that the mistake of
counsel cannot be countenanced and could not in any
manner be attributed to fraud or deception committed by
the prevailing party that could call for the setting aside of
the judgment.
Still undaunted, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal to the order denying the petition for
relief, which notice was approved by the court a quo.
The Court of Appeals sent a letternotice to petitioners counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega,
requiring him to file the appellants brief within 45 days
from notice. Meanwhile, counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a "Motion for Leave to Admit Late Payment with
Notice of Change of Address," prompting the appellate
court to send anew a letter-notice to counsel. Atty. Vega
filed a "Motion for Extension to file Brief" alleging that he
received the first notice on 04 October 1997 and praying
for an additional 90 days, or until 12 February 1998,
within which to file the required pleading. The motion for
extension was granted by the Court of Appeals. Noting
that counsel had, in fact, received the first letter-notice,
the appellate court withdrew the second notice.
Despite the extension, Atty. Vega still
failed to file the appellants brief. The Court of Appeals
thus considered the appeal by petitioners to have been
abandoned and accordingly dismissed the case pursuant
to Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. After the receipt of the notice of dismissal,

16
that counsel filed a "Very Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration." Consequently, the appellate court
dismissed the motion for having been filed out of time.
Petitioners, with a new counsel, now
come before this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari seeking the remand of the case to the appellate
court and another chance to file the appellants brief on
the ground that failure of their former counsel to file the
required brief constitutes gross mistake or negligence
which should not bind them as to do so would deprive
them of due process and will cause them serious
injustice.
Issues:
Whether or not the negligent act of counsel in failing to
file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of an
appeal, a matter that binds the client.
Ruling:
Regrettably, the Court finds itself unable to hold

that the appellate court has committed a reversible error.
Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own accord or
on motion of the appellee for failure of the appellant to
serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
or memorandum within the time prescribed by the Rules.
The obvious reason for this rule is that upon appeal, the
appellate court can only but place reliance on the
pleadings, briefs and memoranda of parties such as may
be required. The dereliction of duty by counsel affects the
client. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused
from the failure of counsel, the factual and case settings
in this instance, however, would not warrant such an
exception; indeed, petitioners themselves may not be
said to be entirely faultless.
Petitioners have not been denied their
day in court. It is basic that as long as a party is given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
would have no reason to complain, for it is this
opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of
due process. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral argument or through pleadings, is accorded,
there can be no denial of procedural due process.
Furthermore, petitioners could not have
failed to notice the succession of blunders committed by
their counsel, yet they took no precautionary measures
such as by forthwith seeking the help of another counsel.
No prudent party would leave the fate of his case
completely to his lawyer. It should be the duty of the
client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case.
Spouses VIRGILIO AND GLYNNA F. CRYSTAL, acting

for themselves and as parents of minor children
MONICA CLAIRE CRYSTAL and FRANCES LORRAINE
CRYSTAL vs.
CEBU INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, G.R. No. 135433 ,
April 4, 2001
Facts:
For Private

The petitioners-spouses Virgilio and Glynna

Crystal alleged that they sent all their children Sheryll
Louise, Doreen Angeli, Monica Claire and Frances Loraine
to study at the private respondent Cebu International
School (CIS). In 1996, the petitioners' parents and
children went to CIS to enroll. After complying with the
school's enrollment and admission requirements, they
were given the schedule of fees as well as the summary
of total fees due upon enrollment in the amount.
However, without any justifiable reason, the school
refused to accept the payment by the petitioners of the
enrollment fees unless they also pay the other charges
called 'land purchase deposit' in the amount of P50,
000.00 per student plus surcharge of 2.5% per month
starting from the school year 1995-1996.
The petitioners thereafter repeatedly
tendered payment of the total fees due upon enrollment
computed at and pleaded for the admission of their
daughters for enrollment and for the release of their
report cards but were just ignored by the respondents.
Accordingly, they prayed for the
following reliefs:
1. Immediately enjoining the defendants from
enforcing and collecting the 'land purchase deposit' and
its 'surcharge' as prerequisite for enrollment and/or
ordering the defendants to immediately accept, the
plaintiffs' application for admission and/or to immediately
admit the plaintiffs in Grade 4 and Grade 8 respectively
at the defendant school and to accept the payment in the
amount of P35, 187.00;
2. After trial, making the injunction above
mentioned permanent and:
a. Declaring the imposition and collection of
'land purchase deposit' and surcharge of 2.5% per month
as illegal, unreasonable and oppressive;
b. Declaring the imposition and collection of the
increase in tuition fees and other fees not approved by
the Department of Education and Culture as illegal and
ordering the refund thereof to the plaintiffs;
c. Ordering the defendants to jointly and
severally pay plaintiffs the amount of P2,000,000.00 as
moral damages; the amount of P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages; the amount of P100,000;00 as . . .
nominal damages; the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and costs of this suit;
3. Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs and
remedy consistent with law and equity.
After the summary hearing, the
respondent court issued a temporary restraining order,
restraining defendants from imposing on the plaintiffs any
amount, except the total amount due upon enrollment,
as reflected in the Schedule of Fees for Grades 4 and 8.
Meanwhile, private respondents, in their
answer averred that petitioner did not pay with cash but
with checks postdated. The postdated checks were not
accepted because the respondent CIS Board of Trustees
had earlier decided that the petitioners should pay either
in cash or in manager's check because on several
instances in the past their personal checks either
bounced or were delayed in encashment due to their
advice not to cash the same until further notice.
The land purchase deposit of is not an
additional requirement for enrollment or admission as it
is refundable once the student graduates or otherwise
decides to leave the school. It was imposed after prior

17
consultation with the parents and upon agreement of all

parents, including the petitioners, to enable the school to
purchase a piece of land and to construct new school
buildings and other facilities to which the CIS will transfer
and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract with
the Province of Cebu over its present site. The 2.5%
surcharge per month refers to the late payment of the
deposit under Option 3 which the petitioners themselves
finally chose after they were not able to comply with
Option 2 which was their earlier preference.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the RTC Order was denied. Petitioners filed before the
CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. They
contended that the RTC had acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued its Order.
The CA issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining respondents from collecting from
petitioners the questioned land purchase deposit. The
appellate court promulgated the assailed Decision
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, holding
that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The
former held that petitioners had not shown the existence
of a right that was free from doubt.
Issues:
1. Whether the respondents' insistence on the
land purchase deposit which is judicially
admitted; by them as not a precondition or an
additional requirement for enrollment is a valid
challenge to the petitioners' right to enrollment.
2. Whether or not the minor children have a
clear and legal right to be admitted to
respondent school.
3. Whether or not respondents have the right to
reject or bar the petitioners' children from
enrollment for refusal to pay the land purchase
deposit which is judicially admitted as [a] nonenrollment [requirement].
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
not issuing the writ of a preliminary mandatory
injunction." 7
In the main, the Court is called upon to
determine whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction.
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued
only upon proof of the following: (1) a clear legal right of
the complainant, (2) a violation of that right, and (3) a
permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
For Private

Petitioners have failed to show that

they have a clear and unmistakable right that has been
violated. Neither have they shown permanent and urgent
necessity for the issuance of the writ.
Furthermore, petitioners have no right
or standing to pray for the issuance of an injunctive writ,
because they failed to pay the required school fees on
time. Not only had their personal checks bounced several
times in the past, but these had been postdated as well;
sometimes they were not even encashed upon
petitioners' advice.
It was not clearly shown any urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ since the children
are already enrolled in another school.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Facts:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization for the stay of the
aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April
13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are
disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully
legalized by said accused.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for
libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss
or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending
petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her
opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her.
The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of
the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension
order
Issues:
Whether the Sandiganbayan
suspension to petitioner.
has jurisdiction
issuing
Ruling:

18
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the

preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of
benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty
of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed
before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in
form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to
be "no ifs and buts about it."
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the
accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither
does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2)
the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial
of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In view of multiple petitions
Petitioner next claims that the Amended
information did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained therein were authorized under Executive
Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of
the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even
though they had arrived in the Philippines after December
31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the information.
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused
admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]).
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:
(1)
She
was
a
public
officer,
(2)
She approved the application for legalization of
For Private

the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after

January
1,
1984;
(3)
Those
aliens
were
disqualified;
(4)
She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5)
She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the execution of her official functions.'
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of
the Constitution
The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution
which deals with the power of each House of Congress
inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,'
and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds
of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of
RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the House of Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that
Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999,
acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, G.R. No. 133254-55,
April 19, 2001
Facts:
Two charges against accused-appellant for

violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed docketed as Case
No. Q-95-64357 and Case No. Q-95-64358 alleging the
facts as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of December
1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess
and/or
use
11.14
grams
of
Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation
of said law and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana,
a prohibited drug.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution presented three witnesses.
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own
behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-inlaw.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its
decision, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision

19
correccional; and,
accordingly sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Issues:

in declaring the search warrant valid
2. Whether the court a quo erred in convicting
accused-appellant for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydro-chloride (SHABU)
in convicting accused-appellant for violation Sec
8, R.A. No. 6425.
4. Whether or not the court a quo erred in
admitting in evidence the two (2) bricks of
marijuana.
5. Whether or not the court a quo erred in not
finding that the policemen used excessive force
in enforcing the search warrant.
Ruling:
First. It was held that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's
house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid,
even though the second part, with respect to the search
for drug paraphernalia, is not. Evidence was presented
showing
probable
cause
of
the
existence
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
However, the fact that there was no probable
cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The
fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence
was presented showing probable cause as to its
existence.
Second. Because the location of the shabu was
indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police
found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for
admitting the other items subsequently found.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to
prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the "plain view
doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. The court justified the police officers
claim that they had to use some force in order to gain
For Private

entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house,

especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door
despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the
door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house.
These circumstances justified the searching party's
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would
be frustrated unless they do so.
ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING",G.R.
No. 128822, May 4, 2001
Facts:
Information was filed with the Regional Trial

Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta charging accused Alberto
Pasudag y Bokang with violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sec. 9.
That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates
thereto at barangay Artacho, municipality of Sison,
province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant,
cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of marijuana in the
land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the
accused, without authority or permit to do so.
Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425.
The trial court arraigned the accused who
pleaded not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into
consideration his educational attainment (he reached only
grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable
penalty. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the
law.
Issues:
1.
2.
Whether or not trial court erred in finding

that the marijuana plant submitted for
laboratory examination was one of the
seven (7) marijuana plants confiscated from
his garden; and
Whether or not the trial court erred in
concluding that the confiscation report was
not an extrajudicial admission which
required the intervention of his counsel; and
in convicting him on the basis of inference
that he planted, cultivated and cultured the
seven (7) plants, owned the same or that
he permitted others to cultivate the same.
Ruling:
The court found the appeal meritorious.

As a general rule, the procurement of a
search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
validly search or seize the person, house, papers or
effects of any individual.The Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons,

20
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained
in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In the case at
bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to
secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito
Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house
were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to
uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three
months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe
that they would be uprooteds on that same day.
The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of
law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic
of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes
and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous
disregard of the Bill of Rights. With the illegal seizure of
the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized
plants are inadmissible in evidence against accusedappellant.
Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from
the moment the police team went to his house and
ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his
backyard garden.
The implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more that mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even
if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it
was made without assistance of counsel and without a
valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION, G.R.
No. 124442, July 20, 2001
Facts:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police
informant that accused-appellant was growing and
cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and
SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field
Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod
City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant who was then the
barangay captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said
surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard
of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be
marijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the
team proceeded to Barangay Bagonbon and arrived at
the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning
of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and
called out for the accused-appellant. What happened
thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The
prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened
the gate and permitted them to come in. He was
immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and
cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was
For Private

suffering from migraine. The operatives then uprooted

the suspected marijuana plants. Accused-appellants
version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the
early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family
were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his
house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After
he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought
were members of the military, entered the premises then
went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count
the others who entered the house as the same was lit
only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to
sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs
while the others went around the house. None of them
asked for his permission to search his house and the
premises.
when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the

marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises
on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the
evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to
secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one
to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not
come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when
they conducted a surveillance and barged into accusedappellants residence.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 147571, May
5, 2001
Facts:
Issues:
Whether or not the search and seizure performed at
the backyard of the accused was valid.
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure
conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search
warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls
under any of the exceptions. Consequently, accusedappellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated. It is extant from the records that
accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless
search and seizure conducted. While the right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like
every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such
waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accusedappellant in allowing the members of the military to enter
his premises and his consequent silence during the
unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed
as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when
members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed.
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence
against
the
accused,
but
nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus,
the following elements must be present before the
doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further
search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises
without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the
suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana

21
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is

a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics,
politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting
the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features newsworthy items of information including
election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
The term "election surveys" is defined in Section
5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election,
including voters preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter
referred to as "Survey").
The implement of Section 5.4, Resolution 3636,
Sec. 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC
enjoins:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression, and the press.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled Section 5.4 of R.A.
No.9006 as unconstitutional.
For Private

To be sure, Section 5.4 Iays a prior restraint on

freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting
the publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15)
days immediately preceding a national election seven (7)
days before a local election. Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression,
and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for in enforcement of such restraint. There,
thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that
inheres in every legislation.
What test should then be employed to determine
the constitutional validity of Sec. 5.4? The United States
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
United States v. O 'Brien:
[A] Government regulation is sufficiently
justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4]
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O
'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to
the asserted governmental interest makes such interest
"not related to the suppression of free expression." By
prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing
the expression of opinion concerning the same subject
matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion
takers. In effect, Sec. 5.4 shows a bias for a particular
subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal
opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression means that "the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
Second. Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of
speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is
only incidental, Sec. 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the
restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, Sec. 5.4 aims
at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or
"losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these
aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression,
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.

22
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and

CESAR O. MANCAO, vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR
LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA
357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ; May 10, 2001
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion
were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners
assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them was filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is
resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced
with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issues:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with
the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly
effected
by
the
same.
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department
and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed
prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant,
thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No.
38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with
arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave
the country in the near future. To declare the hold
departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in
the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged
For Private

impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no

complaints have been filed against them for any crime,
furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
petitioners
are
not
subjected
to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001
Facts:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty
of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was
convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and
two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one
(1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had
filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issues:
Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail
bond violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel?
Ruling:
Imposing bail in an excessive amount could

render meaningless the right to bail. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate
conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of
the hold-departure order and the requirement that
petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the
amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00
is
unreasonable,
excessive,
and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
ESTER M. ASUNCION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR.
WILFRIDO JUCO
G. R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner was an accountant/bookkeeper of the
Mabini Medical Clinic. The NCR company discovered upon

23
petitioners disclosure that there were violations of the

Labor Standards Law. Later a memo was issued charging
petitioner with chronic absenteeism, habitual tardiness,
wasting time, getting money without a receipt, and
disobedience and was asked to explain why she should
not be terminated so she submitted her response. She
was dismissed on the same day so she filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there
was illegal dismissal. The NLRC set it saying that
petitioner
admitted
that
charges.
Issues:
Whether
or
not
there
was
illegal
dismissal.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in favor of petitioner. For a valid
dismissal not only must there be just cause supported by
clear and convincing evidence, there must also be an
opportunity ;to be heard. The employer has the burden
to prove that the dismissal was just or authorized cause.
Failure to discharge this burden means that the
dismissal ;is unjustified. Here the evidence submitted
was merely unsigned handwritten records and printouts.
This is insufficient to justify a dismissal. The provision for
flexibility in administrative procedure does not justify
decisions without basis in evidence having rational
probative value. Here both the handwritten listing and
computer print outs being unsigned, so the authenticity is
suspect and devoid of any rational probative value. Nor
was there due process. There is no showing that there
was warning of the absences and tardiness. The 2-day
period given to answer the allegations is an unreasonably
short period of time. The clinic cant have given ample
opportunity to answer the charges filed. There are
serious doubts as to the factual basis of the charges
against petitioner. There doubts shall be resolved in her
favor in line with the policy rule list that if doubts exists
between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be titled in favor of
the latter.
CITY OF MANILA vs. OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE,
BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA,
ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, G.R. No. 142304, June 20,
2001
Facts:
On December 21, 1993, the City Council of
Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manilas First District
in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and
138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to
be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to
the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
One of the properties sought to be expropriated,
denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square
meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C
was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of
Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de
Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred
to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued.
The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996
For Private

to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued.

On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an
amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 9472282) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila,
against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs
70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273,
which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose,
Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed
Serrano. On November 12, 1997, the Serranos filed a
consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C
from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial
court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing
the City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00
equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After
the City had made the deposit, the trial court issued
another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The
Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not
exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds
300 square meters which is no longer considered a small
property within the framework of RA 7279, the other
modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in Sec. 9-10 of
the law must first be tried by the city government before
it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City
from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated
February 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied
two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether it was premature to determine whether the
requirements of RA 7279, Sec. 9-10 have been
complied with.
Ruling:
Rule 67, Sec. 2 provides that Upon the filing of
the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due
notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right
to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall
be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be
deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit
is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof
to the court with service of copies to the parties. Thus, a
writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing
by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made
by the government of the amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property subject to expropriation.

24
Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance

of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein,
these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it
became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the
writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream
and the present case is that in the former, the judgment
in that case had already become final while herein, the
trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of
possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has
complied with these provisions requires the presentation
of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner
did allege that it had complied with the requirements.
The determination of this question must await the
hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly
the hearing for the condemnation of the properties
sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings
consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be
for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with
the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project
Manager of the National Irrigation Administration,
vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO,
G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
Facts:
Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in
Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an
area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South
Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr.,
Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of
the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De
Onorios husband agreed to the construction of the NIA
canal provided that they be paid by the government for
the area taken after the processing of documents by the
Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way
agreement was executed between De Onorio and the
NIA. The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of
P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights
and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for
damages to crops and improvements which she suffered
as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her
property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the
sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement
(financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035,
18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her
property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De
Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against
Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying
that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of
P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her
property used in the construction of the canal constructed
by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban
admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the
property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain
For Private

landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation

purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1)
the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the
total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only
2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that
De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the
taking of her property considering that she secured title
over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial
court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De
Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for
the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land
owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it
for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the
NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31
October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. NIA filed the petition for review.
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without

prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just for then the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time
of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the
property, thus, must be determined either as of the date
of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
ANTONIO BENGZON III vs. HOUSE of
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
Teodoro Cruz, 357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840,
May 7, 2001
Issues:
Whether the valuation of just compensation is
determined at the time the property was taken or at
the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.
Ruling:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or
conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or
instrument of conveyance (sales patent) registered with
the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owners duplicate of title issued, such lands are
deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and
the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and
indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to
private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings. The only servitude which a private property
owner is required to recognize in favor of the government
is the easement of a public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does not state that
the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined. This
implies that the same should have been pre-existing at
the time of the registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to respect it.
Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and
is sought to be imposed only after the land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.
Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on October 6, 1981,
several years after the property had been registered on
13
May
1976.
Accordingly,
prior
expropriation
proceedings
should
have
been
filed
and
just
compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could
be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation
which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value
which should be paid or that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefore. Further, just
compensation means not only the correct amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the

25
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On
March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen.
Ruling:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the

Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
For Private

CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL vs.

RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, G.R. No. 141211, August
31, 2001
(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive

to marginalized and under-represented sectors
and organizations.
Facts:
Ruling:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines National

Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation
program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited
various jails in Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila,
they found 34 prisoners, herein respondents, whom they
believed were entitled to be released after deducting time
allowances for good conduct in the service of their
respective
sentences.
Respondents
asked
herein
petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City
Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had
already served their sentences, less time allowances for
good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and 99 of
the
Revised
PenalCode.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major

political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections merely on the ground that they are political
parties. But while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In
other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the
ground that they are political parties, they must show,
however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Issues:
Does the Director of
supervision
of
the
Prisons have control and

city
jails
of
Manila?
Ruling:
No. Under the Revised Charter of the City of

Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not
have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It
was the Chief of Police of Manila who under Section 34 of
the Charter "shall exercise supervision, administration,
and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners."
There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No.
6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the
contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and
brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi. For there to be an
implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of
repugnance. The language used in the later statute must
be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been
formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW Labor Party vs.
COMELEC ,G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the
COMELEC. Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain
major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections
arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented and not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not political parties may participate
in the party-list elections.

26
LACSASA M. ADIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R.

No. 136480, December 4, 2001
Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
as well as its resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
On December 6, 1994, Mayor Sultan Serad A.
Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nasiba A.
Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar.
The same appointment was duly approved by the Civil
Service Commission Office, Marawi City on December 9,
1994. The new mayor, Lacsasa M. Adiong issued a
memorandum informing all municipal employees of the
termination of their appointment and directing them to
clear
themselves
from
money
and
property
accountabilities. On July 1, 1995, another memorandum
clarified this by specifying that the mass termination of
services applied only to temporary or casual workers and
requiring
those
holding
approved
permanent
appointments to submit copies of their appointments.
Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her
appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy
call on the petitioner as the new mayor, he terminated
her services and appointed a certain Nanayaon Samporna
in her stead.
On August 27, 1995, respondent Nuska wrote
Mayor Adiong requesting for her reinstatement and
payment of salaries covering the period July 1, 1995 to
August 31, 1995. Mayor Adiong failed to act on the
request. Hence, on March 11, 1996, respondent Nuska
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
latter issued a resolution declaring the termination of
Nuskas employment to be invalid and ordering her
immediate reinstatement.
On March 17, 1997, petitioner Mayor Adiong
filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 11,
1997, the CSC denied the motion. Mayor Adiong filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution
of CSC.
For Private

Issues:
Whether or not respondent Nuskas termination of
employment was valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution provides that: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." It further mandates that: "No
officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed
are suspended except for cause provided by law."
In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanent
appointment to the position of municipal civil registrar of
Ditsaan Ramain, Lanao Del Sur. She thus enjoyed
security of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee
in the civil service and as a civil service eligible,
respondent Nuska entitled to the benefits, rights and
privileges extended to those belonging to the classified
service. She could not be removed or dismissed from the
service without just cause and without observing the
requirements of due process.
The reasons advanced by petitioner why
respondent Nuska's employment was terminated were
the following: failure to make a courtesy call, failure to
submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to
work which was tantamount to abandonment. The failure
to make a courtesy call to one's superior is not an
offense, much less a ground to terminate a person's
employment. Respondent Nuska's failure to submit her
appointment papers is not a cause for her outright
dismissal. It was not shown that respondent Nuska was
informed of the July 1, 1995 memorandum requiring
those with permanent appointments to submit their
papers. At the very least, petitioner could have reminded
her to submit the documents without terminating her
employment immediately.
On the alleged abandonment by respondent
Nuska of her position, the same is without any basis. It is
significant to note that Nuska, in her letter dated 27
August 1995, informed Mayor Adiong that she did not
resign and that the termination of her services was not in
accordance with existing Civil Service rules and
regulations. She requested that she be reinstated to her
lawful position and her back salaries be paid accordingly.
The foregoing explains that although Nuska was
physically absent in the office premises, all the while, she
had the intention to return to work. Hence, she could not
be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished her right
to the position under an appointment with permanent
employment status.
A person holding a public office may abandon
such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers
to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an
office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an office
does
not
constitute
abandonment
where
such
nonperformance results from temporary disability or from
involuntary failure perform
Abandonment may also result from acquiescence
by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for
instance, after a summary removal; an unreasonable

27
delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to

vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of
the office. If a person was still willing to return to work
despite his physical absence, it would not constitute as
abandonment.
BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,

G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001
Facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and
Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation
of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section
34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as
amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that
the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange
earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within
the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular
prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior
authorization from the Central Bank.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash
all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91101892, and 91-101959 to 91- 101969. Their motion was
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and
absence of a preliminary investigation and extinction of
criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied
petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23,
1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting
cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960
had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order
dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
motion on October 18, 1994.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid
preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353
and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of
the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an
inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well- founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and
can be waived, either expressly or by implication.
For Private

When the records of the case were disclosed to

them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the
charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they
are deemed to have made an express waiver of their
right to have a preliminary investigation.
(2) NO. In the instant case, it must be noted
that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No.
1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for
residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and
1353 shows that both contain a saving clause expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have
no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter
Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the
effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost
under the new law. In the present case, the respective
saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly
manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to
prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the
repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either
pending or under investigation.
BERNARDO vs. ABALOS , G.R. No. 137266,
December 5. 2001
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the
nullification of Resolution No. 98-3208 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc promulgated on
December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote
buying filed by petitioners against respondents.
On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M.
Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed
with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against
respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos,
Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera
for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs
(a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in
relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section
68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case No.
98-110, alleged that: Respondents sponsored, arranged
and conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food
and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public school
teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas
Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon Province.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech
wherein he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City
public school teachers and employees a hazard pay of
P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from
P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of
P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month.
The offers and promises to said public school
teachers, who are members of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters
thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to
induce or unduly influence the said teachers and the
public in general (the other guests) to vote for the
candidacy of Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr.
On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the assailed Resolution No. 98- 3208 dismissing
the complaint "for insufficiency of evidence to establish

28
prima facie case." On February 09, 1999, petitioners,

without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed
the instant petition with this Court.
Issues:
Whether petitioners failure to submit a motion for
reconsideration was fatal to his cause of action.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies
available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they
did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC
En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Petitioners' failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly
disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an
orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission."
Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort
to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears
stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give
the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a
motion for reconsideration, then it is the most
expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the
COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act,
then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying
recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for
certiorari.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be
resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.''
Having failed to file the required motion for
reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners'
instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they
have not raised any plausible reason for their direct
recourse to this Court.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION , G.R. No. 144464, November 22,
2001
Facts:
On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) that Paitim, Municipal
Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional
examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed
in the said examination three times.
The CSC found after a fact finding investigation
that a prima facie case exists against you for
DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge
entering a general denial of the material averments of
the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were
electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
For Private

averring that if the investigation will continue, they will

be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil
Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor
and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16,
1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report
and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of
"Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the
government service
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1),
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative
Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate
jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office
and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen
against the government employee.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners right to due process was
violated when the CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same
time.
Ruling:
NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based
on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative
bodies, being considered experts in their field, are
binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly
disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the
CSC.
After a careful examination of the records, the
Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The
photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the
Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career
Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim.
Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the
said document is totally different from the signature of
Gilda Cruz.
Petitioners' contention that they were denied
due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the
same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA
correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and
decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted
before it directly or on appeal including actions of its
officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book
V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
It cannot be denied that the petitioners were
formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case
for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly
informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and
were given the opportunity to defend themselves.
Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that there was a
denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R. No. 127182,
December 5, 2001

29
Facts:
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we
ruled that private respondent's appointment on August
28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the
Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying
the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, we held that since
private respondent was not a Career Executive Service
(CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain
permanency because he did not possess the required
CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was
appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned
without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos,
et al., decided on September 26, 1990, where the
nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry
Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local
Government, was first contested, this Court issued a
Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that
Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of
private respondent.
There was no Career Executive Service Board
during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of
appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only
reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6)
members sometime in August 1988. There was no
CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's
incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO
board. The first CESO examination was given on
August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a
requirement at the time of the appointment of
petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first
grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore,
having met all the requirements for the position to
which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in
violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of
tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent
contends that the nature of his appointment can no
longer be passed upon and controverted in the present
case considering that said issue had already been
settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not res judicata applies.
Ruling:
NO. Concededly, if we follow the conventional
procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of
judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c)
of the Rules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the
nature of private respondent's appointment. Indeed, once
an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of
a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew
and should be finally laid to rest.
Yet, the Court is not precluded from reexamining its own ruling and rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata
would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It
must be stressed that this is not the first time in
Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle
For Private

of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial

justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law
and jurisprudence.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, 19

November 2001
Facts:
On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of
Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Criminal Cases 26559 to 26...562, inclusive, for violation
of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3,
paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7,
paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as
amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada
filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification d of the charges in the
Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for
reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications a, b, and c to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds
raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of
the law under which they are charged were never raised
in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April
2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
On 25 June 2001 petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001,
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness,
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash.
Issues:
Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear
to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to
enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Ruling:

30
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains

ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts,... conduct and conditions required
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with
its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it
can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder
Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which
Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing
that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in
his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
There is no basis for Estradas claim that the Supreme
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The
theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. This rationale
does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine
states that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. The over breadth doctrine, on the
other hand, decrees that a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, over breadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. On its
face invalidation of statutes has been described as
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manifestly strong medicine, to be employed sparingly

and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored.
petitioner with violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3 (e). On 22

February 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint
and/or manifestation to forward all records to the
Supreme Court. The motion was denied.
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, et al. G.R. No. 124295,
October 23, 2001
Issues:
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (represented by
DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of
the properties affected by the project before the trial
court presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
DPWH won the expropriation case and as of 19 May
1994, it still owed the lot owners the following amounts:
Reynaldo Lao P489, 000; Tessie Amadeo P1,
094,200; and Alfonso Galo P13, 927,215. On 5 April
1994, the trial court granted Amadeos motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to
satisfy her unpaid claim. The writ was served by Sheriff
Paralisan to the DPWH-Region IX. On 3 May 1994,
Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy addressed to the
Regional Director describing the properties subject of the
levy. The auction sale pushed through on 18 May 1994
with Alex Bacquial as the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was issued by Paralisan.
On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but were
prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject
DPWH properties. On 20 May 1994, Bacquial filed an exparte urgent motion for the issuance of a break-through
order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the
auctioned properties. The motion was granted by
petitioner on the same date. Armed with the court order,
Bacqiual succeeded in hauling off the properties for 5
successive days until the lower court issued another
order temporarily suspending the writ of execution earlier
issued. However, on 21 June 1994, the lower court issued
another order upholding the validity of the writ of
execution.
On the basis of letters from Cong. Manuel Garcia
of the 2nd District of Davao City and the DPWH
custodian, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court
directed petitioner and Paralisan to comment on the
report recommending the filing of an administrative case
against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the
anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. By
virtue of an administrative complaint filed by the DPWH,
Paralisan was dismissed from the service by the Supreme
Court on 23 August 1995. The Court further directed the
Court Administrator to conduct an investigation on
petitioner and to charge him if the investigation so
warrants.
On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended
that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the Supreme Court for
acts unbecoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996,
Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging

31
Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an

investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:
NO. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: Sec. 15. Powers,
Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction; it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory
agency
of
the
Government,
the
investigation of such cases.
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary
Authority, Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
members of the Cabinet, local government, governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only be
impeachment, or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before
his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power
to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court
that is tasked to oversee the judges and the court
personnel and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned orders directing the
attachment of government property and issuing a writ of
execution was done in relation to his office, well within
his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void
for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not
such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
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judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked

to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service
of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision
whether final and executory or notand pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts
alone.
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. G.R. Nos.
119609-10, September 21, 2001
Facts:
On August 28, 1990, PCGG sent Corporate
Secretary Victor A. Africa of Oceanic Wireless Network,
Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him
to send notices to all stockholders of record of OWNI for
special stockholders' meeting. On September 17, 1990,
during the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI, PCGG
voted all the Class "A" shares in the election of directors
and elected to the board of directors Commissioners
Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing the Class
"A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class "B"
and "C" shares. None of the registered Class "A"
shareholders of OWNI was present in that, special
stockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered the Class "A"
shareholding about 60% of the outstanding capital stock,
and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares.
On October 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa
wrote the SEC questioning the election of PCGG nominees
as directors of the OWNI board on the ground that they
were not stockholders of OWNI.
On January 27, 1991, the special stockholders'
meeting of OWNI took place. Stockholders owning 63,573
Class "A" shares were represented. An election of
directors for Class "A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa
and A. Africa were elected as directors for Class "A"
shares for 1991 until their successors are elected and
qualified. Class "B" and "C" shareholders did not attend
the meeting. No new directors for them were elected.
On July 29, 1991, PCGG, acting for itself and in
behalf of OWNI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa,
Nieto, Jr. and Ocampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the
defendants from interfering with PCGG's management of
OWNI and/or representing themselves as director.
Issues:
Whether or not the PCGG's takeover of OWNI is legal
Ruling:
NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled
that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the
determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares
and consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The
issue was still pending in the main case in the
Sandiganbayan. This is only an incident of the main case
and is limited to the stockholders' meeting held on

32
September 17, 1990. This is without prejudice to the final

disposition of the merits of the main suit. The ownership
of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known
whether the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos and his "cronies." We find the
writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid
because the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr.
and J. Africa as shareholders in OWNI is not a suit
against OWNI. This Court has held that "failure to
implead these corporations as defendants and merely
annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a
violation of their right to due process for it would in effect
be disregarding their distinct and separate personality
without a hearing.''
Furthermore, PCGG issued the writs of
sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the
period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26,
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 26.The authority to issue sequestration or
freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
remain operative for not more than eighteen months
after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the
national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.
"A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued
only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and
the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders
issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the
corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within six months from its ratification. For those issued
after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding
shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof.
"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed
automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is
commenced as herein provided."
The
sequestration
orders
issued
against
respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to
the failure of PCGG to commence the proper judicial
action or to implead the respondents therein within the
period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution.
The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not
necessarily be fatal to the main case since the lifting of
the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the
sequestered property are not ill- gotten. The effect of the
lifting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be
the termination of the role of the government as
conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no
longer exercise administrative or housekeeping powers
and its nominees may no longer vote the sequestered
shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of
the subject firm.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO,[G.R.
Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001
Facts:
ZENY was born on 19 November 1984 in Sto.
Nino, South Cotabato. Her parents were BERNARDINO
and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March
1997, she was sleeping with her sisters and younger
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brother in their house at Poblacion, Esperanza, Sultan

Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room
awakened her. When she opened the door, her father
immediately slapped her and demanded to know why she
locked the door. Then, BERNARDINO asked her daughter:
"Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the suggestion,
ZENY refused, only to find just as quickly that her father
had poked a knife at her neck. BERNARDINO thereafter
pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the floor and
boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his
daughter, he undressed her; and while choking her he
imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her daughter's
pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to
tell anyone of the deed or he would kill her. He then stood
up, dressed up and left the daughter to her weeping.
Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality, BERNARDINO
repeated the assault, twice on the honor and chastity of
ZENY about midnight of 10 March 1997.
Upon
arraignment
on
19
May
1997,
BERNARDINO, assisted by his counsel Atty. Balo, entered
a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997,
BERNARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to
withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in each of the
three cases and to substitute the same upon rearraignment with pleas of guilty.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused was accorded with due
process.
Ruling:
NO. The Court found that the trial court failed,
albeit regrettably, to observe the rigid and severe
constitutional mandate on due process, more particularly
the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his
behalf.
As pointed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance
with said rule, where an accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, should be attained by the trial court, thus:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the
accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
precise degree of his culpability, and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires
to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.
There is no debate that the trial court had
persuasively observed the second command of the rule
by directing the prosecution to adduce evidence to

33
determine the exact culpability of the accused, taking

into account the presence of other possible aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. On the first requirement, it
bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty
can be truly said to be based on a free and informed
judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would
be well for the court to do the following:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a.) how he was brought into the custody of the
law;
b.) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
c.) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court
shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent or avenging quarters.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions
as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences
of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile
of the accused, such as his age, socio- economic status,
and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and
the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not
infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 293 G.R.
NO. 143802; 16 NOV 2001
Facts:
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos
Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty.
Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself
and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed
a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge
after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for
brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation
(p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the
case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner
received a subpoena directing him to file his counter
affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting
documents. He did it the following day. While proceedings
are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because
the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the
private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal
and irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on
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the case. The C.A. granted the petition holding that the
judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the
private respondent and the p.i. he conducted has 2
stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now
consists only of one stage. He conducted the requisite
investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined the
witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead
of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the
Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct
the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the
same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended
the filing of information for murder which the OMB
approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but
prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a
motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the
determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on
the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in
conducting preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting
evidence.
Ruling:
The proper procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation was not followed because of the
following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation
was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom
completed the preliminary investigation There was not
one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing
the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck
to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is
a non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone
should have merited a deeper and more thorough
preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing of the sort
but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He
did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the
resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything
and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for
evaluation. Thirdly, a person under preliminary
investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for
reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of Procedure
by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is
an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.
The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right
itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone
renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case
incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the
Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMBs
certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts
of the case much more so in the face of the latters
flawed report and one side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans
assertion of having found probable cause on its own,
considering the OMBs defective report and findings,
which merely rekied on the testimonies of the witnesses

34
for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the

defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the
resolution
of
the
Sandiganbayan,
ordering
the
Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and
remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary
investigation.
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
et al. G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001
Facts:
Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City,
issued search warrants for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police
searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and
found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No.
2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions, among others.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional
Trial Court information accusing them with illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter,
petitioners were arrested and detained.
At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied
petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused
are being charged of two criminal offenses and both
offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and
3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in
its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule
114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94,
particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure
orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as
well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure because the place searched and
articles seized were not described with particularity.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and
seizure orders in question were valid and the objects
seized admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be
searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by
the police. Policemen may not be restrained from
pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must
be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not
disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search
made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber
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pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against

petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at
Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned
Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of
its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the
description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. That the articles seized during the search of
Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to
be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2
were described with specifity in the warrants in question.
The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not
require a technical description. Moreover, the law does
not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not
know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a
class or species would suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz,
37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the
tests to determine the particularity in the description of
objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants
shows that they were worded in such a manner that the
enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct
relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure
of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

35
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2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALTAZAR
BONGALON y MATEOS G.R. No. 125025 January 23,
2002
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, Baltazar Bongalon not
being lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor
vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic bag/sachet containing
brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70 grams,
which
was
found
positive
to
the
test
for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated
drug, in violation of. When arraigned, the accused pled
not guilty.
he
prosecution
presented
the
following
witnesses, to wit: (1) PO3 Noel Castaeto, the poseurbuyer who discussed in details the preceding incidents
prior to the entrapment operation; (2) PO3 Rogelio Galos,
member of the buy-bust operation team who testified the
same; and (3) Police Senior Inspector Julita de Villa, the
forensic chemist who showed his findings of the specimen
confiscated in the position of the accused. The
presentation of PO2 Felipe Metrillo, member of the buybust team, was dispensed with after the prosecution and
the defense had stipulated at the trial that he would
merely corroborate the testimony of PO3 Galos.
For its part, the defense presented the accused
himself, Baltazar Bongalon who denied the allegations
and saying among others that his house was search
without securing any search warrant.
After the trial, the trial court found the accused
guilty as charged. The accused filed a Notice of Appeal.
Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial
to present additional witnesses that included his 4-year
old son, Mark Anthony. The motion was denied by the
trial court on the ground that the additional witnesses he
offered to present were available during the trial proper
of the case. Subsequently, the accused filed several
motions including a motion to inhibit, but they were all
denied. The trial court ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court for automatic review.
In the meantime, the accused filed a MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL with this Court. Pursuant to its
directive, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment. After considering their pleadings, we denied
the motion for new trial for lack of merit. The accuseds
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Finally, the
appellant and the Solicitor General filed their respective
briefs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant is a valid
arrest.
2. Whether or not the search conducted by the NARCOM
agents constitutes a valid search even without securing a
search warrant.

36
Ruling:
Yes, it is a valid arrest. The appellant cannot
assail the validity of his arrest on account of the absence
of a warrant. He was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu. There was, therefore, no need for a warrant to
effect his arrest pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. Said section
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawfulA
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped
from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to
move to quash the information against him before his
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and
objection thereto is waived where the person arrested
submits to arraignment without objection.
The
subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally
detained will cure the defect of that detention.
2. Yes, it is a valid search. The appellant claims
that the search conducted in his house was unlawful. He
also laments that the NARCOM agents robbed him of his
personal properties during the search and they received
money from his relatives after his arrest. This Court
need not tarry on the validity of the said search for the
appellant consented to the search. He admitted that he
voluntarily accompanied the policemen to his house. As
for the charges of robbery and extortion, as in the alleged
unlawful search made in his house, those incidents
transpired after his arrest. Whether true or not, his
liability for the unlawful sale of shabu remains.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY
ESCORDIAL G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16,
2002
Facts:
On December 27, 1996, the said accused, armed
with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by
means of violence and intimidation on the person, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00,
belonging to said offended party and on the occasion
thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant
Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside
her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a
boarder. When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon
the two cases were jointly tried.
For Private

The prosecution presented eight witnesses,

namely, Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda who were
playing inside a jeepney in front of the boarding house
where the complainant resides and said accused told
them to go home; Erma Blanca, one of the roommates of
the victim who was in the room when the accident took
place; Dr. Joy Ann Jocson who examined the victims and
found bruises and lacerations; PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one
of the policemen who responded to the report shortly
after the commission of the crime; Leo Asan, an
employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod; Ma. Teresa
Gellaver; and Michelle Darunday. The victim herself
narrated facts pointing the appellant as accused. She said
that eventhough she was blindfolded when raped, she
could identify the accused because of the scar and rough
skin which she accidentally touch and it so happened that
the same scar was found in the body of the accused.
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias
Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo
Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of
Barangay Miranda, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial,
Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave
a different account of the events that led to the arrest of
accused-appellant. The accused as his defense put up an
alibi stating among others that he was in Pontevedra
when the incident happened. However, the trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime charged and is
ordered to pay for damages. Hence, the accused
appealed. In his appeal, he contends among others that
the court erred in convicting him guilty of the crime
charged.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arrest conducted against the
accused constitutes an illegal arrest.
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of the
accused to remain silent and to have an independent
counsel are violated.
3. Whether or not the presence of counsel is needed in
the conduct of police lineup.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Accused-appellant questions the legality
of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas
Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had
arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by
a judge. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects
against
To implement this provision, Rule 113, 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
arrest a person only under the following circumstances:

37
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(b)
When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs
(a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a
basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to
commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on
that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest
could be effected even without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under
paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead
them to believe that accused-appellant had just
committed a crime. The phrase personal knowledge in
paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a
warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon probable cause which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officer making the arrest.
In these cases, the crime took place on
December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested
only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of
the crime. As the arresting officers were not present
when the crime was committed, they could not have
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of
the commission of the crime so as to be justified in the
belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime. The
arresting officers had no reason for not securing a
warrant.
However, the records show that accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged
against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997
without questioning his warrantless arrest. He thus
waived objection to the legality of his arrest. As this
Court has held in another case:
The accused waived objections based on the
alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they
pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must
be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this
ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is
not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
For Private

judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The

technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void
and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the
accused.
2. No. Accused-appellant invokes Art.
III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that [a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel. He contends
that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without
being informed of his right to remain silent and to have
independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he
contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence
obtained from him during such interrogation for violation
of accused-appellants rights under this provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant
was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which
was used in evidence against him. The records do not
show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty,
the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accusedappellant testified that at no point, even when subjected
to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the
crime with which he was charged. In other words, no
uncounseled statement was obtained from accusedappellant which should have been excluded as evidence
against him.
3. No. As a rule, an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch
as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention
by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain
Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was
already under custodial investigation when these out-ofcourt identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can
be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is
identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered
for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This
is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings
might well settle the accuseds fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality. We have thus ruled that any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of
the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Here, accused-appellant was identified by
Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and
by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after
his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant

38
did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court

identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses
regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being the direct result of the illegal
lineup come at by exploitation of [the primary]
illegality.
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object
immediately when these witnesses were presented by the
prosecution or when specific questions regarding this
matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, 36
of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be
deemed to have waived his right to object to the
admissibility of these testimonies.
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-ofcourt identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being
the fruits of the poisonous tree. This in-court
identification was what formed the basis of the trial
courts conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not
derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accusedappellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as
evidence against him. However, whether or not such
prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. Spouses

VICTOR MA. GASTON and LYDIA GASTON, G.R. No.
141961 : January 23, 2002
Facts:
Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston
were residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara
Subdivision located in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They
purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in
1974, and at the time of purchase, there was no mention
or requirement of membership in any homeowners'
association. From that time on, they have remained nonmembers of Sta. Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA).
They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein
homeowners who were non-members of the association
were issued "non-member" gatepass stickers for their
vehicles for identification by the security guards manning
the subdivision's entrances and exits. This arrangement
remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of
March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution
which decreed that only its members in good standing
were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.
Thereafter, on three separate incidents, Victor M. Gaston,
the son of the spouses Gaston who lives with them, was
required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to
show his driver's license as a prerequisite to his entrance
to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite
their knowing him personally and the exact location of his
residence. On March 29,1998 Victor Ma. Gaston was
himself prevented from entering the subdivision and
proceeding to his residential abode when security guards
Roger Capillo and a "John Doe" lowered the steel bar of
the KAMETAL gate of the subdivision and demanded from
him his driver's license for identification. On
April
For Private

1,1998, Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston

filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction/preliminary
mandatory
injunction
and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against Santa
Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA) thru its Board of
Directors, namely: Arneil Chua, Luis Sarrosa, Jocelyn
Garcia, Ma. Milagros Vargas, Lorenzo Lacson, Ernesto
Piccio, Dindo Ilagan, Danilo Gamboa, Jr., Rizza de la
Rama and Security Guard Capillo and 'John Doe', and
Santa Clara Estate, Incorporated (Civil Case 98-10217,
RTC-Branch 49, Bacolod City); alleging that the acts of
SCHA, et al., done in the presence of other subdivision
owners had caused the spouses Gaston to suffer moral
damage. On 8 April 1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute
between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act
580, as amended by Executive Orders 535 and 90, much
less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of
the board of directors of SCHA, the proper forum being
the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
To support their claim of intra-corporate controversy,
SCHA, et al. stated that the Articles of Incorporation of
SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4 October 1973, provides
"that the association shall be a non-stock corporation
with all homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its
membership"; and that its by-laws contains a provision
that "all real estate owners in Sta. Clara Subdivision
automatically become members of the association",
among others. On 6 July 1998, the lower court resolved
to deny SCHA et al.'s motion to dismiss, finding that
there existed no intra-corporate controversy since the
Spouses Gaston alleged that they had never joined the
association. On July 18,1998, SCHA, et al. submitted a
Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause of action
as ground for the dismissal of the case. On August
17,1998, the trial court denied the said motion without
however ruling on the additional ground of lack of cause
of action. On August 18,1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion
to resolve its motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
cause of action. On September 8,1998, the trial court
issued an order denying the motion. On September
24,1998, SCHA. et al. elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. On August 31,1999,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and ruled that
the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. The appellate
court likewise denied SCHA, et al.'s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated 11 February 2000.
SCHA, et al. filed the petition for review.
Issues:
Whether or not the Spouses Gaston
considered members of the SCHA.
are
to
be
Ruling:
No. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of

association includes the freedom not to associate. The
right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is
the very foundation and essence of that partnership.
Further, the Spouses Gaston cannot be compelled to
become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of
including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws

39
without their express or implied consent. True, it may be

to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to
band themselves together to promote their common
welfare, but that is possible only if the owners voluntarily
agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the
association. True also, memberships in homeowners'
associations may be acquired in various ways often
through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms
of evidence of property ownership. Herein, however,
other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws,
there is no showing that the Spouses Gaston have agreed
to be SCHA members. The approval by the SEC of the
said documents is not an operative act which bestows
membership on the Spouses Gaston because the right to
associate partakes of the nature of freedom of contract
which can be exercised by and between the homeowners
amongst themselves, the homeowners' association and a
homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a
homeowner/lot buyer. Clearly, no privity of contract exists
between SCHA and Spouses Gaston. When the Spouses
Gaston purchased their property in 1974 and obtained
Transfer Certificates of Titles T-126542 and T-127462 for
Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta.
Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their
automatic membership in the SCHA. Furthermore, the
records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate
that the Spouses Gaston intended to become members of
the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid
Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not
members of the association were issued non-member
gate pass stickers for their vehicles; a fact not disputed
by SCHA. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were
subdivision landowners who were not members thereof,
notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws.
SALVADOR H. LAURELvs . HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
President Aquino issued Administrative Order

No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation
ofthe National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The
Committee was mandated "to take charge of
thenationwide preparations for the National Celebration
of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration ofPhilippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress. President Ramos issued Executive Order No.
128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation
ofthe National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It
renamed
the
Committee
as
the
"National
CentennialCommission" and Vice-President Laurel was
appointed as chair. Its duty is to "take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of
the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress and its existence shall terminate upon
thecompletion of all activities related to the Centennial
Celebrations.
A corporation named the Philippine Centennial
Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was
among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators and was
elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. Senator
Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged
For Private

anomalies in the construction andoperation of the

Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special
Economic Zone. The privilege speech was referred to the
Blue Ribbon Committee for investigation.
President Estrada issued Administrative Order
No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizenscommittee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects. Senator Saguisag was appointed to chair the
Committee. Blue Ribbon Committee filed its report
recommending the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ
ofLaurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the
rules on public bidding, relative to theaward of centennial
contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development
Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the
NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR
(Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract
that has caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law.
The Saguisag Committee issued its own report.
It recommended the further investigation by the
Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of Laurel
for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section
4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary
investigation be conducted before theEvaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the
Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair
Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro
Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.3019, as
amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;
That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
this Office, act as the nominal complainant. Apostol, OICDirector of the EPIB, directed Laurel to submit his
counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses. Laurel filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Ombudsman denied motion to dismiss. EPIB
found probable cause to indict respondents LAUREL and
PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to
Republic Act No. 1594. Desierto, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, approved the resolution with respect to
Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea. Laurel
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence this present petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
the case; Whether EXPOCORP is a private corporation
and not a GOCC; Whether NCC was not a public office;
Whether or not Laurel is not a public officer.

40
Ruling:
The Ombudsman has the power to investigate
any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a
public officer or employee of the government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Neither
the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
however, defines who public officers are. A definition of
public officers cited in jurisprudence 13 is that provided
by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: a
public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according
to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office.
We hold that the NCC performs executive
functions. The executive power "is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power
of
carrying
the
laws
into
practical
operation and enforcing their due observance." The
executive
function,
therefore,
concerns
the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more
coordinated and synchronized celebration ofthe Philippine
Centennial and wider participation form the government
and non-government or privateorganizatiuons and to
rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries and to carrythem into effect.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for
the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
"need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more
coordinated
andsynchronized
celebrations
of
the
Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the
governmentand
non-government
or
private
organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize
the relevanceof historical links with other countries."
There can hardly be any dispute that the
promotion of industrialization and full employment is
afundamental state policy. Clearly, the NCC performs
sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a publicoffice, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any
compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the
office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and
is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.
For Private

Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be

characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which
salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a
public office, nonetheless.The petition is DISMISSED.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs.
BALITE PORTAL MINING COOP., et al.[G.R. No.
135190, April 3, 2002
Facts:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining
Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which
included the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's SmallScale Mining Act.The law established a People's SmallScale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary
of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct
supervision and control.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of
EP No. 133 and the admission of aMineral Production
Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was
filed before theDENR Regional Executive Director,
docketed as RED Mines Case.
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case
was pending, Marcopper assigned itsEP No. 133 to
petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
(SEM), which in turnapplied for an integrated MPSA over
the land covered by the permit.
In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Regional Office No. XI in Davao City(MGB-XI) accepted
and registered the integrated MPSA application of
petitioner and thereafter,several MAC cases were filed. On
March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine
Mining Act, was enacted.Pursuant to this statute, the
MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of
Arbitrators (RPA)tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting
mining
rights.The
RPA
subsequently
tookcognizance of the RED Mines case, which was
consolidated with the MAC cases.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 whichprovided that the
DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option
of direct stateutilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus before the
Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR
Secretary and BaliteCommunal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the abovequotedMemorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that
the "direct state utilization" espoused thereinwould
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and
that the memorandum orderarbitrarily imposed the
unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted
before mining andenvironmental laws are enforced by the
DENR.

41
Issues:
Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme"
espoused in MO 97-03 divested
petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area
under its EP No. 133.
Ruling:
No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct
state utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute.The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what wasdirected thereunder was merely a study of
this
option
and
nothing
else.Contrary
to
petitioner'scontention,
it
did
not
grant
any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to
small-scaleminers or to any party, for that matter, but
simply
instructed
the
DENR
officials
concerned
toundertake studies to determine its feasibility.
As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by
petitioner, it is well to note that the same isinvariably
based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed
in the Consolidated Minescases.A reading of the appealed
MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP
No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with
respondents therein asserting that Marcoppercannot
legally assign the permit which purportedly had
expired.In other words, whether or notpetitioner actually
has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still
an indefinite andunsettled matter.And until a positive
pronouncement is made by the appellate court in
theConsolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be
deemed as a source of any conclusive rightsthat can be
impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.
It must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights underEP No. 133 be
regarded as total and absolute.As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended, modified
orrescinded when the national interest so requires.This is
necessarily so since the exploration,development and
utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are
matters impressed withgreat public interest.Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the
granteeany permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and
dueprocess clauses of the Constitution, since the State,
under its all-encompassing police power,may alter, modify
or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of
the general welfare.
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition
raised against a mere study of analternative which the
State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in
the first place. Worthnoting is Article XII, Section 2, of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the
PhilippineMining Act of 1995.
Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional
policy of full control and supervision of theexploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural
mineral resources, by eitherdirectly undertaking the same
For Private

or by entering into agreements with qualified entities.The

DENRSecretary acted within his authority when he
ordered a study of the first option, which may
beundertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above.Obviously, the
State may not be precluded from considering a direct
takeover of the mines, if it isthe only plausible remedy in
sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold
rush.
CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002
Facts:
On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and

Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an Information forEstafa against Marilyn Carreon, an
employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on
thecomplaint filed by herein complainants.The Office of
the City Prosecutor found no cogent reasonto reverse,
modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman and recommended thatthe case be set for
trial. Complainants filed the instant complaint charging
both respondent Judge and his BranchClerk of Court with
ignorance of the law.Complainants take issue of the fact
that althoughrespondent Judge already issued a warrant
of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to giveway
to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the
accused.They believe that there is nolonger any reason
why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance
of a warrant of arrestconsidering that the Office of the
City Prosecutor already made a finding that there
existsprobable cause to indict the accused.
In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge
manifests that the issuance of a warrant ofarrest is not a
ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to
determine the existence ofprobable cause before issuing
a warrant.Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other
hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to
release duly signed orders, resolutions anddecisions of
the presiding judge of her branch.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring
the implementations of the warrant of arrest.
Ruling:
NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Preliminary
investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is
an investigation forthe determination of a sufficient
ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation forthe determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind
ofpreliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is
part of the prosecutions job. The secondkind of

42
preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is

lodged with the judge.
In making the required personal determination,
a judge is not precluded from relying onthe evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers.The extent of
reliance depends on thecircumstances of each case and is
subject to the judges sound discretion. It is not
obligatory,
but
merely
discretionary,
upon
the
investigating judge to issue awarrant for the arrest of the
accused, even after having personally examined the
complainant andhis witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. For the determination of whether
aprobable cause exists and whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustratethe ends of
justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
It appears from the records that the challenged
Orders issued by the respondent Judgewere not at all
baseless.The respondent Judge merely exercised his
sound discretion in notimmediately issuing the warrant of
arrest
and
in
suspending
further
proceedings
pendingreinvestigation of the case.On her part,
respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted
forperforming a ministerial function, that is, releasing
Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY G.R. No.
140740, April 12, 2002
Facts:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996,
the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho
was found.Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped
before she was drowned.The one who caused its
discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself,
who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was
catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of
Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that
he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping
and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody
of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions
by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that
Juanito was not yet incustodial investigation. Based on
his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito
guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court
violated Section 12(1) of Article III of theConstitution
when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his
constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves
to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no
moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police
investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon
them to observe the express mandate of the
Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the
prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his
rights through a written waiver executed in the presence
of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible in evidence.
For Private

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession
before the barangay captain was
admissible.
Issues:
(2)Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial

before the judge was admissible.
Ruling:
confession
Ruling:
1) YES.As to his confession with the Baragay
Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional
provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous
statement,
note
solicited
through
questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime.Neither can it apply to admissions
or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a
crime before he is placed under investigation.What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case,
Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine.
This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and
voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given
before he was arrested or placed undercustody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the
offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of
improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which
could havecompelled her to testify falsely against him.
(2) NO.However, there is merit in Juanitos claim
that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation
were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded
to himincriminating questions without informing him of
his constitutional rights. It is settled that at themoment
the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by,
the police officers, the custodialinvestigation is deemed to
have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked
about hiscomplicity in the offense without the assistance
of counsel. Judge Dicon's claim that no complainthas yet
been filed and that neither was he conducting a
preliminary investigation deserves scantconsideration.
The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already
under the custody of thepolice authorities, who had
already taken the statement of the witnesses who were
then beforeJudge Dicon for the administration of their
oaths on their statements.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONTERON
[G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002]
Facts:
Accused-appellant was formally charged with

rape, he entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment.After trial, the lower court convicted him of
the crime of rape. Accused-appellant contends that the
RTC of Davao has committed an error in notacquitting
him of the crime charged in the Information. He argues
that his negative plea to theinformation filed against him,
his filing of the notice of appeal, and his denial of the
rape charges against him during trial, indicate his
innocence.

43
Whether or not the contention of the accused-appellant

is correct.
NO.Constitutional due process demands that the

accused in a criminal case should be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.The
rationale behind thisconstitutional guarantee are: First, to
furnish the accused with the description of the
chargeagainst him as will enable him to make his
defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction
oracquittal, for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform thecourt of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support aconviction, if one should be
had.
The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the
accused of the possible loss of freedom, even ofhis life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or
at the very least to inform himwhy the prosecuting arm
of the State is mobilized against him.Consequently, when
the accused-appellant entered a negative plea during his
arraignment, the same was not binding on the court as
an indication of his innocence.Rather, it is a general
denial of the charges impugned against him and an
exercise of his right to be heard of his plea.
Neither is the accused-appellants filing of a
notice of appeal indicative of his innocence.Onthe
contrary, accused-appellants appeal was necessitated by
the judgment of convictionrendered against him by the
trial court. While the accused-appellant is guilty of rape,
the same was committed only in its attemptedstage.This
and the fact that the accused-appellant was still a minor
when the crime was committed warrant the modification
of the decision of the RTC of Davao.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS
[G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002]
Facts:
For automatic review are decisions promulgated

by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her
two minor daughters. When first arraigned on the
charges, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel,pleaded not guilty.When the case was submitted
for decision, the prosecution moved to reopenthe case to
present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the
Marriage contract of theparents.This motion was granted
over the objection of the defense counsel.Before
theprosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through
his counsel, moved for the change of hisformer plea of
not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC
granted.
Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded
guilty to the charges. The defense waived itsright to
present evidence and submitted them for decision based
For Private

on the evidence presented by the prosecution.The RTC

then rendered the assailed decisions.
Issues:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was
proper.
Ruling:
NO.The Constitution guarantees the right of
every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.This right finds amplification and implementation in
the different provisions of the Rules of Court.Foremost
among these enabling provisions is the office of an
Information.The facts stated in the body of the
Information determine the crime that the accused stands
charged and for which he must betried. This recital of the
essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of
accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation
of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape asdefined
by law is alleged in the Information.
Since the Information fails to allege the essential
elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have
been
convicted
of
that
crime.
Otherwise,
his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him would be violated.
LETICIA R. MERCIALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al. [G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002]
Facts:
On August 12, 1993, criminal cases for rape with

homicide were filed against the private respondents for
the death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales. During the trial,
after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor
filed a motion forthe discharge of accused Joselito Nuada,
in order that he may be utilized as a state
witness.However, the prosecution contended that it was
not required to present evidence to warrant thedischarge
of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been
admitted into the WitnessProtection Program of the
Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent
judge denied themotion for discharge, for failure of the
prosecution to present evidence as provided for by
Section9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
On July 13, 1994, private respondents filed a
motion to set the case for hearing, invokingtheir
constitutional right to speedy trial.The respondent Judge
granted the motion.On the saiddate, the prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting
further evidence.The respondent Judge postponed the
hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, the respondent Judge called
for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide whether
or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to
prove the due executionof the accused Nuada's
extrajudicial confession.However, after the recess, the
public prosecutordeclined to present the NBI agent, and
instead manifested that he was not presenting any

44
furtherevidence. On October 21, 1994, the trial court

issued the assailed Order which acquitted all of
theaccused.Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother
of the victim in the said criminal cases filed before the
respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order
of the trial court.However, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the Order of the trial court is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The trial court, notwithstanding its
knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was
insufficient to convict, especially after the public
prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state
witness, the trial court passively watched as the public
prosecutor bungled thecase.The trial court was well
aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven
prosecution
witnesses
that
have
so
far
been
presented.Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio,should have called additional witnesses for the
purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy
his mind with reference to particular facts or issues
involved in the case.
It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her
day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so
the offended party, that is entitled to due process in
criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused
by the court a quo was done without regard to due
process of law, the same is null and void.It is as if there
was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute
aclaim for double jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged decision is
void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
petition does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy
attaches onlywhen the following elements concur: (1) the
accused are charged under a complaint orinformation
sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court hasjurisdiction; (3) the accused
have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted oracquitted, or the case is dismissed without
their consent.
Thus, the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy because, from the verybeginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Any ruling issued
without jurisdictionis in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist. The dismissal of the
casebelow was invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. No. 135789.January
31, 2002]
Facts:
On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos
organized HMHMI to serve as a holding company for the
shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi, Jose Y. Campos, Cesar
For Private

C. Zalamea and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in Bulletin

Publishing Corporation and the shares of stocks of Hans
M. Menzi in other companies including Liwayway
Publishing Incorporated.
On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July
6, 1984, the court appointed Manuel G.Montecillo
executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menziand later the
president of HMHMI. With the lone exception of
Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea
and Jose Y.Campos, constitute the principal stockholders
and incorporators of HMHMI.
On February 12, 1987, the PCGG issued
Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against allshares of
stocks, assets, properties, records and documents of
HMHMI. Forthwith, on February13, 1987, upon the
request of PCGG, Central Bank Governor Fernandez
instructed commercial banks and non-bank financial
institutions to withhold the withdrawal of funds and
assets by Liwayway Publishing Corporation and HMHMI.
Ruling:
NO. It is well settled that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of
law. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain setof facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidencepresented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the
doubtor difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of thewhole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy ofspecific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, andthe probability of the
situation.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is
not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over
again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.
On July 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the

Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against the following
defendants: Manuel G.Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R.Marcos.On October 17, 1990, the PCGG filed a Second
Amended Complaint naming specifically the estate of
Hans M. Menzi as one of the defendants.
On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M.
Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan
a "Motion to Lift Freeze Order" dated February 12, 1987,
alleging that: (1) Thestocks, assets, properties, records
and documents of HMHMI were sequestered without
anyjudicial action having been filed against it, or without
impleading it as a defendant in Civil Case No. 0022; and
(2) Such issuance of a writ of sequestration without filing
a corresponding judicial action against HMHMI within the
reglementary period established by Section 26, Article
XVIII ofthe 1987 Constitution resulted in the automatic
lifting of the sequestration order on August 12, 1987.
At any rate, the Court agrees with respondents

that the Sandiganbayan has full authorityto decide on all
incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of
the writs of sequestrationthat the PCGG initially issued.
Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to
theSandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost onehundred
(100%) per cent since 1957, except those Bulletin shares
sold to U. S. AutomotiveCorporation in 1985, those
converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to
the generalpublic at public offerings. In the absence of
competent
evidence
showing
thus
far
that
PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired
Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi orHMHMI that
might be subject to sequestration, the Court may not
void the resolutions of theSandiganbayan in question.
On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan granted

the motion. On October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 1993, the Republicof the Philippines filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order.
Facts:
On July 16, 1996, the Court set aside the

Sandiganbayan's resolution lifting the freeze order and
remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan for
resolution.Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration
dated February 12, 1987, reasoning that there was no
prima facie factual basis for its issuance. Petitioner filed a
motion
for
reconsideration
which
the
Sandiganbayan denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in lifitng the
writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stock,
property records and bank deposits of HMHMI.

45
O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

[G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002]
Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were

candidates for the position of vice- governor, province of
Rizal during the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 19,
2001, upon conclusion of the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass coming from the thirteen
municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the
Provincial
Board
ofCanvassers
(PBC)
proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected vice-governor with 216,798
votesover respondent Rodriguez's 215,443 votes.
On May 23, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filedwith the
COMELEC, a petition to correct entries in the certificate of
canvass of votes.It was alleged that there were
typographical errors in the number of votes garnered by
petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of
7,000 votes to petitioner. The MBC of Binangonan
submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal
Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she
committed the mathematical error.
For Private

On May 25, 2001, respondent Rodriguez filed

with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of
the winning candidate for vice-governor of the province
of Rizal, and to correct alleged manifest mathematical
errors. Respondent Rodriguez asserted that after
themathematical error would have been corrected, she
would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against
petitioner's 209,798.
Petitioner filed his answer to the petition,
arguing that there was no manifest error apparent in the
certificate of canvass which respondent Rodriguez and
the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct.
On July 25, 2001, the COMELEC issued a
resolution in the cases, wherein it ordered that
petitioners proclamation is annulled, the PBC of Rizal to
reconvene and correct the manifest mathmatical error in
the votes, and to proclaim respondent as the duly elected
Vice-Governor of Rizal.
Accordingly, on July 27, 2001, the PBC of Rizal
reconvened.However, petitioner wasnot notified of the
proceedings of the PBC of Rizal.On the same day, the PBC
of Rizal issued another certificate of canvass of votes and
proclamation of the winning candidates for provincial
officers, and on the basis thereof proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected vice-governorof Rizal.
Immediately, respondent Rodriguez took her oath of
office before Judge Leila SuarezAcebo, Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City.
Issues:
Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the
PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the alleged
manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by
theMBC of Rizal.
Ruling:
YES. The COMELEC should have conducted
further investigation or at least a technical inspection or
examination of election returns to verify the existence of
the alleged error before itgave credence to the
statements of the MBC of Binangonan and concluding
outright that theStatement of Votes submitted by
respondents were accurate.
The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these
Statement of Votes because they wereprepared by the
same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a
mistake due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical
exhaustion."It would have been more prudent to make a
determination whether these same individuals committed
any other mistake in the tabulation orstatement of votes.
Even based on the statements/affidavits of the
MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors sought
to be corrected do not appear on the face of the
certificate of canvass.As above-stated, the alleged error
which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does not
fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid
down in Chavez vs. COMELEC . . . To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the

46
board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes

of their respective proceedings.
The Constitution gives the Commission on
Elections the broad power "to enforce
all laws and
regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative,
referendumand
recall."The
Commission
indisputably exercises the power of supervision and
control over boards of election inspectors and boards of
canvassers. The Commission must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
cast in the elections. The Constitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and
more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's
sacred right of suffrage.
In the absence of any manifest error in the
certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the
Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the
election returns or the re-counting of the ballots in the
municipality of Binangonan in order to validate the claim
of its MBC.
If after the re-canvass of the election returns or
the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of the votes had
been established, the Commission should have annulled
the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous
certificate of canvass. If the records had borne out that
petitioner's proclamation was the result of a clerical error
or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes
and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the
electorate, there could have been no valid proclamation
to speak of. The issue would involve a pre-proclamation
controversy.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
[G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002]
Facts:
In 1986, the Philippine Government, under the
administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
obtained from the World Bank (WB) an Economic
Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of 310 Million US
Dollars.The ERL was intended to support the recovery of
the Philippine economy, at the time suffering severely
from the financial crisis that hit the country during the
latter part of the Marcos regime.
As a condition for granting the loan, the World
Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which was
then saddled with huge non-performing loans.The
governments commitment was embodied in the Policy
Statement ofthe DBP which, among others, provided that
the mentioned bank will now be required to have aprivate
external auditor.
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending theCentral Banks
Manual of Regulation for Banks and other Financial
Intermediaries.Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central
Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124
which substantially provides that the requirements for
an annual financial audit by an external independent
auditor shall extend to specialized and unique banks such
For Private

as the Land Bank of thePhilippines and the DBP.On

December 12, 1986, pursuant to CB Circular No. 1124
and the governments commitment to the WB, DBP
Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote the Commission on
Audit (COA) seeking the approval of the DBPs
engagement of a private external auditor in addition to
the COA.
On January 20, 1987, the COA Chairman
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. replied to the December 12, 1986
letter of the DBP Chairman with a statement that the
COA will interpose no objection to your engagement of a
private external auditor as required by the Economic
Recovery Program Loan Agrrement of 1987 provided that
the terms for said audit are first reviewed and approved
by the Commission.Cosequently, the Board of Directors
of the DBP approve the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co.
as the DBPs private external auditor for calendar year
1986.
However, a change in the leadership of the COA
reversed the course of events. On April27, 1987, the new
COA Chairman, Eufemio Doningo, wrote the CB Governor
protesting the issuance of Circular No. 1124 which
allegedly encroached upon the COAs constitutional and
statutory power to audit government agencies.On May
13, 1987, after learning that DBP had signed a contract
with above-mentioned auditing firm, the new COA
Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident
auditors were under instruction to disallow any payment
to
the
private
auditor
whose
services
were
unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chairman a copy of the DBPscontract with Joaquin
Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987.The DBPChairmans covering hand-written note
sought the COAs concurrence to the contract.During
thependency of COAs concurrence to the contract, DBP
paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount
of Php 487,321.14 despite the formers objection to the
same.Thereafter,
the
COA
chairman
issued
a
memorandum disallowing the payments.On January 19,
1988, the DBP Chairman moved for a reconsideration of
the memorandum issued by the COA which the latter also
denied ratiocinating that the said Commission has the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures of uses of funds and property
pertaining to the government. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA
to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and
precludes the concurrent audit of the DBP by a private
external auditor.
(2)Whether or not there is a necessity of hiring a
private auditor and the reasonableness of their fees.
Ruling:
(1) NO.The resolution of the issue herein

requires an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Constituition, which provides:
Sec. 2 (1)

47
The Commission on Audit shall have the power,

authority, and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
andexpenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
and held in trust by, or pertaining to, theGovernment, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive
authority, subject to thelimitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniquesand methods required therefore, and
promulgate
accounting
and
auditing
rules
and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance
of
irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive,extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,
or uses of government funds and properties.
The bare language of Section 2 shows that the
COAs power under the first paragraph is not declared
exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph
is declared exclusive.The framers of the Constitution, in
deleting the word exclusive in the first paragraph,
deemed that the inclusion of such word would constitute
a disincentive or obstacle to private investment. There
are government institutions with private investments in
them, and some of these investorsFilipinos, as well as
in some cases, foreignersrequire the presence of
private auditing firms, not exclusively but concurrently.
The qualifying word exclusive in the second
paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first
paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A
qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to
which it is immediately associated.Thus, the first
paragraph of Section2 must be read the way it appears,
without the word exclusive, signifying that non-COA
auditors can also examine and audit government
agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution
intentionally omitted the word exclusive in the first
paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit
by private external auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from the
reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COAs power to
examine and audit is non-exclusive.On the other hand,
the COAs authority to define the scope of its audit,
promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Further, the mere fact that private auditors may
audit government agencies does not divest COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government
agencies.The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its
usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind the government agencies and its
officials.A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
scrutiny of a COA audit.
(2)YES.The hiring of a private auditor being an
express condition for the grant of the US $310 Million
Economic Recovery Loan, a major objective of which was
DBPs rehabilitation, the same was a necessary corporate
act on the part of the DBP. The national government,
represented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as the
Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economic Planning, had
For Private

already committed to the hiring by all government banks

for private auditors in addition to the COA. For the DBP to
refuse to hire a private auditor would have aborted the
vital loan and derailed the national economic recovery,
resulting in grave consequences to the entire nation.The
hiring of a private auditor was not only necessary based
on the governments loan covenant with the World Bank,
it was also necessary because it was mandated by
Central Bank No. 1124 under pain administrative and
penal sanctions.
The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being
a condition of the loan, the fees of suchprivate auditors
are in reality part of the governments cost of borrowing
from the World Bank.Anannual private audit fee of about
half a million pesos added to the interest on a US $310
Millionloan would hardly make the cost of borrowing
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.Besides, the
condition imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk,
requiring the borrower tosubmit to audit by an
independent public accountant, is a reasonable and
normal business practice.
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in

office of Benipayo, Borraand Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of thead interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointmentprohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2)Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and subsequent assumption
of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
(3)Whether or not Benipayo's removal of petitioner from
her position as Director IV of the EIDand her
reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and
without authority, having been done without the approval
of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
Ruling:
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L.

BENIPAYO, et al. [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002]
Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed

petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.On February
15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou
renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of
EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001,
Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the
appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
"Temporary" capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of
office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman;
and Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths ofoffice
and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
The Office of the President submitted to the Commission
on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmations.
However,
the
Commission
on
Appointments did not act on said appointments. This
process was repeated twice.
On April 11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo
issued a Memorandum whereby here aasigned petitioner
to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her reassignment to the Law Department but
to no avail.Upon denial, petitioner filed an administrative
and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258,
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07 and other
pertinent administratve and civil service laws, rules and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the
Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition

48
(1) NO. An ad interim appointment is a

permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as
follows:
"The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of theCongress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress."
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked
by the President. The fear that the President can
withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
Hence the ad interim appointments extended by
the President to Benipayo, Borra andTuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not
constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) NO. There is no dispute that an ad interim
appointee
disapproved
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new
appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointingauthority of the
President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits,
being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of
the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for
For Private

any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final

and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing
power.In this instance, the President can no longer renew
the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final
decision by the Commission onAppointments to withhold
its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed
because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter.A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon
on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at
theclose of the session of Congress. There is no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by
the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed
appointee.
(3) NO. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of
the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of
this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure
the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner's appointment papers dated February
2, 1999, February 15, 2000 andFebruary 15, 2001,
indisputably show that she held her Director IV position
in the EID only in anacting or temporary capacity.
Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer,
and neither does she hold Career Executive Service
Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding
the position of Director IV as prescribed in the
Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the
Civil Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not
enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ACELO
VERRA, G.R. No. 134732 - May 29, 2002
Facts:
A day in court is the touchstone of the right to
due process in criminal justice. It is an aspect of the duty
of the government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his
liberty.1 But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due
process in criminal prosecutions. 2 It must similarly be
given the chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge.
Petitioner, People of the Philippines, claims that
it was denied its day in court and its due process right
was breached. Filing this Petition under Rule 45, it seeks
to set aside, on pure questions of law, the April 6, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra
was charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain
Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by the
Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988.
He remained at-large until May 24, 1996 when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately,
arraignment proceeded during which he entered a plea of
"Not Guilty."

49
On the same day, the prosecution called to the

witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant
Damiana Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she has
executed an affidavit of desistance;3 (2) she is no longer
interested in prosecuting the case; and (3) other
witnesses of the shooting incident have turned hostile
and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same.
Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the
accused, moved for the dismissal of the case. In light of
these developments, the trial judge issued an Order
dated May 24, 1996 granting the motion, thus the Court
dismissed the case.
Subsequently, two other witnesses of the
shooting incident appeared after learning of the dismissal
of the case and manifested their willingness to testify.
Further, two sisters of the victim assailed the allegation of
lack of interest. Consequently, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal on July 22,
1996 asserting that Damiana and the accused misled the
trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the
Philippines, its day in court. For which reason, it argued,
the Order dismissing the case should be voided.
The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the case. Hence,
the present course of action.
Issues:
Whether or not the court of appeals committed a grave
abuse of decision on reinstating the case.
Ruling:
Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its

day in court. It was, in the first place, represented by a
public prosecutor who was personally present in every
stage of the proceeding -- from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the dismissal order -- to protect its
interests. It was given the chance to submit its evidence
as it in fact called to the stand its own witness, Damiana
(who incidentally was the only witness presented here),
during the day of the hearing. Then, the prosecutor was
able to conduct her direct examination. More importantly,
petitioner was the one who jointly moved with accused's
counsel for the dismissal of this case due to lack of
evidence. The Order of Dismissal was given in open court
by the presiding judge without any remonstrance from
the prosecution.
In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited
requisites present. First, there was a valid information,
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by 4 th Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Merin. 16Second, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10 of Tacloban City clearly had
jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the
respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on May
24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de
officio.17 Fourth, during the arraignment, he entered a
plea of not guilty.18 Finally, there was a valid termination
of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to
Dismiss the case. While it is true that the respondent
joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double
jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was
the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view
of private complainant's desistance and her testimony
that other witnesses have turned hostile and are also no
For Private

longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner

clearly lacks the evidence to support the charge.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO
BERNALDEZ, G.R. No. 142932
May 29, 2002
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated

February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as
it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor
Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three
entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they were tried.
Trial Court adjudged them to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
appealed contending that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial are inadmissible in law.
Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the
interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to
remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in
violation of 2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution.
Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is
inadmissible in evidence against them.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellant was corrent in his claim
that the evidence be inadmissible in trial.
Ruling:
This contention lacks merit.
Accused-appellants were already under
custodial investigation when they made their admissions
to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had
began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this
reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of freedom in a substantial way.40 Hence, the
admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the
Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its
objections to the admissibility of these statements
immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when
Inspector Malintad was presented as a witness for the
prosecution or when specific questions concerning the
confession were asked of him. Consequently, accusedappellants are deemed to have waived their right to
object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's
testimony.41 Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who
provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to
elaborate on the circumstances of accused-appellant
Gonzales' admission in the course of his crossexamination of the said witness.

50
JOEY POTOT y SURIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and LOLITO DAPULAGG.R. No.
143547, June 26, 2002
Facts:
After the accused has filed with the trial court a

manifestation that he is not appealing its Decision
convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to serve
his sentence, can the same court, upon motion by the
private complainant with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and remand the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing
of the corresponding charge? This is the issue raised in
the instant petition for review on certiorari.1wphi1.nt
Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar.
Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein
the information was read to him in his own dialect,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge.2 Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the circumstance
of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he
surrendered voluntarily to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Headquarters immediately after the commission of
the crime. The public prosecutor did not raise any
objection. Instead, he manifested that there is no
aggravating circumstance which attended the commission
of the crime.
Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied
that
petitioner
understood
the
meaning
and
consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and
promulgated its Decision 3 in open court convicting him of
homicide, with the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor.
On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a manifestation with motion 5 informing the
trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and
praying that a commitment order be issued so he could
immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the motion
is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he does not
intend to appeal from its Decision. 6
However, on February 11, 2000, the private
complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim), filed
through
counsel,
a
motion
for
reconsideration/retrial7 praying that the Decision be set
aside and that the case be heard again because "there
were irregularities committed before and during the trial
which caused miscarriage of justice." The motion, which
bears the conformity of the public prosecutor, alleges,
among others, that:
Petitioner opposed8 the motion, asserting that
there was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation
of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court;
and that the decision can no longer be modified or set
aside because it became final when he formally waived
his right to appeal.
The trial court, in its order dated May 3,
2000,9 granted private complainant's motion and set
aside its February 1, 2000 Decision "as proceeding from a
rigged, hence, sham hearing." It likewise ordered that
the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the
For Private

Provincial Prosecutor "for re-evaluation of the evidence

and to file the corresponding charge,"
Issues:
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in its
decision to reopen the case because of the
irregularities in the previous proceedings.
Ruling:
It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for
a modification or setting aside of a judgment
of conviction. And this he must do before the said
judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal.
Such judgment becomes final in any of the following
ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the
accused, except in case of automatic review of the
decision imposing the capital penalty; 13 (b) when he has
partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he
expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except
when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he
applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is
present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of
conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. 14
It is an undisputed fact that on February 3,
2000, or three days after the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation
expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His
intention not to appeal is further indicated by his prayer
in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of
a commitment order so he could serve his sentence. Such
waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become
final and unalterable. 15 Thus, it was beyond the authority
of the trial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting
aside its February 3, 2000 Decision which had attained
finality.
In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City16 and in a long line of cases, this Court (En
Banc) held that a judgment which has acquired the status
of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one
was committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes.
Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the
assailed orders would violate his constitutional right
against double jeopardy.19 Such right prohibits any
subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of
which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The
objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a
second charge against him for the same offense.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
These requisites have been established. Records
show that petitioner was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before
the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was
arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis

51
of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the

corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in
jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first offense charged.
SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A.

DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, G.R. No.
145368 July 1, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a
reconsideration of this Court's decision declaring him, as
Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a
public officer. Petitioner also prays that the case be
referred to the Court En Banc.
First, petitioner points out that the decision has
"serious
constitutional
repercussions"1 because
the
composition of the NCC included members of the Cabinet,
the Senate, the House of Representatives and the
Supreme Court,2who are prohibited by the Constitution
from holding any other office during their term or tenure.
In connection, the Court, in its decision,
allegedly disregarded the pronouncement in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Panay Transportation Co.4 that the
"Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions."
Issues:
Where or not the petitioner as Chair of the NCC is a
public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the

designation of other members to the NCC runs counter to
the Constitution, it does not make petitioner, as NCC
Chair, less a public officer. Such "serious constitutional
repercussions" do not reduce the force of the rationale
behind this Court's decision.
Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims
that the official acts of the President, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet members,
Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him
to believe that the NCC is not a public office.6
The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the
party representing material facts must have the intention
that
the
other
party
would
act
upon
the
representation.7 It is preposterous to suppose that the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker and the
Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials to the
NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would
accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel must be
unequivocal and intentional. 8 Moreover, petitioner himself
admits that the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign
powers.9
For Private

Third, as ground for the referral of the case to

the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision in
this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this
Court, which can only be done by the Court En Banc.
It is argued that by designating three of its then
incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the
position that the NCC was not a public office.10 The
argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article VIII
of the Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc." In designating three of its
incumbent members to the NCC, the Court did not render
a "decision," in the context of said constitutional
provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less
did the Court, by such designation, articulate any
"doctrine or principle of law."
Invoking
the
same
provision,
petitioner
asserts11 that the decision in this case reversed or
modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,12 holding that the
Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head
of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) is
not a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019. This
contention also has no merit. The rationale for the ruling
in Macalino is that "the PNCC has no original charter as it
was incorporated under the general law on corporations."
However, as we pointed out in our decision, a conclusion
that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled
corporation would not alter the outcome of this case
because petitioner's position and functions as Chief
Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by virtue of his being
Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised by
petitioner are mere reiterations of his earlier arguments.
The Court, however, remains unswayed thereby
the value of the properties subject for expropriation is

more than Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) per square
meter. While petitioner found the valuation of
Lot No.
Site I
TCT No.
2-D-1-A- T-212616
2
Total Area
29.583
m.
Affected Area
sq. 1,186 sq. m.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. KER AND

COMPANY LIMITED, G.R. No. 136171 July 2, 2002
2-D-1-B- T-212617
2,902 sq. m. 1,035 sq. m.
1
respondents property in Site II reasonable, petitioner, in
its comment on the Report of the Appraisers found the
estimate for Site I excessive, stating that:
1) the provincial Appraisal Committee in a joint
Appraisal Report dated January 14, 1993 recommended
the market value of Ker and Companys property at
P1,000.00 per square meter;
2) the highest valuation of lots within the JP
Laurel-Buhangin area adjudicated by the RTC, Davao City
in a decision rendered on December 23, 1993 is at
P4,000.00 per sq. meter; and,
3) the appraisers did not take into account that
the areas in the proceedings are being expropriated for
use in a government project vested with public interest.
On September 27, 1996, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring plaintiff to have a lawful right to
acquire possession of and title to tne two lots ordering to
pay just and fair compensation.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
lower court in toto, ruling that just compensation cannot
be measured by the assessed value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market
values approved by the Provincial Appraisal Committee
and that for the purpose of appraisal, the fair market
value of the property is taken into account and such
value refers to the highest price in terms of money which
a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public
market.
Facts:
Issues:
Before
us
is
a
petition
for
review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways, assailing the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 54256 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines v. Ker and
Company Limited." The decision in question affirmed the
trial court in ordering petitioner to pay herein respondent
Ker Company Limited the sum of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) per square meter as just compensation for
the 1,186 square meter lot (Site I) which was
expropriated by the government.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City a petition for expropriation of
portions of two (2) parcels of land owned by respondent
described as follows:
Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the
widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin
Interchange in Davao City. The provisional value of the
properties sought to be expropriated was fixed at the
aggregate sum of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty One
Thousand Pesos (P2,221,000.00) or One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per square meter. Respondent claimed that

52
Site II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in

affirming the decision of the lower court.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in not upholding

petitioners claim that the valuation for the lot in Site I is
excessive and unreasonable since the tax declaration of
the property indicated its assessed value at only Four
Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (P425.00) per square meter
while its market value was only Eight Hundred Forty-Nine
Pesos (P849.00) per square meter based on the revised
1993 schedule of market values. We have declared
in Manotok v. National Housing Authority3, that the
statements made in tax documents by the assessor may
serve as one of the factors to be considered but they
cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination after
expert commissioners have examined the property and
all pertinent circumstances are taken into account and
after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully
plead their cases before a competent and unbiased
tribunal.
For Private

That the tax declaration of the property in Site I

indicated a much lower assessed or market value
therefore does not make commissioners valuation of just
compensation
for
the
property
excessive
or
unreasonable. The duly appointed commissioners of both
parties made a careful study of the properties subject of
expropriation. They considered factors such as the
location, the most profitable likely use of the remaining
area, size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other
properties within the vicinity to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of just compensation for both lots due the
respondent. Petitioner, in fact, does not question the
commissioners appraisal value as just compensation for
the area affected in Site II.
Petitioner maintains that the assessment of just
compensation for the lot in Site I is excessive since the
highest valuation made for the properties within the
vicinity of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Road was pegged at Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) in a decision rendered by
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao in
December 1993. This contention is not plausible. In
computing
just
compensation
for
expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the
taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at
the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
taken into consideration.4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the
filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this
matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding
petitioners claim.
Nonetheless, we find merit in petitioners
contention that there are no substantial distinctions
between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant
different valuations.
The lots subject of expropriation are adjacent to
each other. The Appraisal Report even indicated that the
remaining area of the lot in Site II has the same problem
as in Site I with respect to access. The construction of
the service road has created a problem pertaining to
ingress or egress to the remaining portions of both
Sites.5Considering that there is no evidence showing
substantial distinctions between the lots affected by Site I
and Site II and no explanation was given by the
commissioners as to why Site I had been given a higher
valuation than Site II, we find it just and reasonable that
the undisputed sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty-Three
Pesos
and
Forty-Eight
Centavos
(P5,423.48) per square meter as just compensation for
Site II should likewise apply to Site I.
co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena

Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted
against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite. 1 They alleged
that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased
her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five
years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and
was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused
to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
The trial court, despite the written certification
from NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to declare
petitioner in default and ordered them to present
evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
After learning of the adverse decision against
him, petitioners counsel filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside
judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and
docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5
Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and
sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of
the monetary award. 7
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief
from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393. 8 In
support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of
merit,9alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which
he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena
Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.10
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC
issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment.11Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14,
1997.12 On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued
commanding the sheriff to remove the building and
improvements made by petitioner on the subject
premises and to deliver the possession thereof to
respondents.13
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
432O2.14 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals
dismissed
the
petition.15 Petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration
was
denied
on
November
14,
1997.16 Hence this petition for review.
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO vs. LEONOR B. RAON,

AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A.
MAYO, and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
131482 July 3, 2002
Issues:
Whether or not the petition of Regalado Samartino is with
merits.
Facts:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin

G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in
a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of

53
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be
effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants dwelling house or residence with some
For Private

person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or

by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the
defendant shall be by personal service first and only
when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person
will substituted service be availed of.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 133250July
9, 2002
Facts:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with

prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel
the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose
all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
On November 20, 1973, the government,
through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases
I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration
of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos
issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP
x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have
a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441)
square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The

54
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250

hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands
to complete the configuration in the Master Development
Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed
the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved
the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President
Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all
scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer
to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel. 10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today published reports that there were ongoing renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According
to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio
Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed
before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy,
without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the
proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez
("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by
PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
For Private

petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of

billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.
After
several
motions
for
extension
of
time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October
19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on
December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion:
(a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a
temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for
hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative
Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which
the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for
brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated
contract be declared null and void."
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement.
Ruling:
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of public
concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential
to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens
say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions
are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the

55
proper information, they cannot hold public officials

accountable for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy.
AMARI
argues
there
must
first
be
a
consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the
quality of decision-making in government agencies.
Government officials will hesitate to express their real
sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate
public dissemination of their discussions, putting them
under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
The right covers three categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official
records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government
research data used in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is part of the public
records in the custody of government agencies or
officials. The second category refers to documents and
papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on
the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of
meetings, terms of reference and other documents
attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA. However, the right to information does not compel
PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only
affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One
who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying
when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets,
information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies
before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have
long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be
subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by
law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers. The information does not
cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
For Private

government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and

assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This
is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right
to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on
the right to information in several legislations.
ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL
CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD
ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER
YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATOR FRANKLIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002
Facts:
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to
prevent
the
postponement
of
the Sangguniang
Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled
last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the
reduction of the age requirement for membership in the
SK.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this
petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their own
behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated.
Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being
disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections
should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to
a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to
youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
Petitioners allege that public respondents
"connived, confederated and conspired" to postpone the
May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership
age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age.
Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths
at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be
"summarily
and
unduly
dismembered,
unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK
organization." Petitioners pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction .
Issues:
Whether or not the bill to abolish SK may be under the
Judicial Review powers of the Supreme Court.
Ruling:

56
The petition is bereft of merit.

The Court's power of judicial review may be
exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.21
In the instant case, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the
SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections,
there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention.
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable
by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress.
Under the separation of powers, the Court
cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its
internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to
judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of
Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of
Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee
of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of
the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent
a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot
exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BASHER
BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, G.R. No.
143944 July 11, 2002
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated
December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding
accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 2 as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon
was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
For Private

"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of

Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control eight (8)
packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately
400 grams, without the corresponding license or
prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article
III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659."3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded
not guilty. Trial ensued.
The accused-appellant contends that the
Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends thatPeople v. Marti15 is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
Issues:
Whether or not the court erred in holding the drug
admissible in evidence against accused.
Ruling:
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.16Evidence acquired in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual
may
choose
between
invoking
the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by
this Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the
absence
of
governmental
interference,
liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State."19 The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.20
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and
the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the
accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed

57
by the vessel security personnel should be considered as

one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and
order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is
against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be invoked.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, G.R. No. 139333
July 18, 2002
Facts:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a
competent and independent counsel qualified to assist a
person under custodial investigation. Hence, the
extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His
Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this
confession,
the
remaining
evidence,
which
is
circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence,
acquittal is inevitable.
For automatic review by this Court is the
Decision1 dated February 12, 1999, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch
11), finding Crispin Velarde y Bandojo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case
No. 773-M-97. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused
CRISPIN B. VELARDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer
the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages."2
"Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has
been detained since May 12, 1997 or more than one (1)
year already because he was told that he was the one
who committed a crime against his cousin Brenda
Candelaria. According to him, on the night of May 11,
1997 he was arrested while selling balot in Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan, by four (4) Barangay Officials. When said
Barangay Officials asked him where he brought the child
Brenda Candelaria, he told them he 'don't know' [sic]. He
did not insist answering them 'because I don't know what
they were asking about the child'. He just went with them
because if he will not go with them 'di nila lulubayan and
pamilya ko'. He was brought to the Barangay Hall of
Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and
mauled by the father and brothers of Brenda. The father
of Brenda is his uncle and was the one who hurted [sic]
him. He was boxed several times, hitting him in all parts
of his body. While he was being boxed, he told them to
stop because he did not know about the incident.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found the existence of enough
circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant as the
culprit in the crime. It also found his written extrajudicial
confession admissible in evidence. As a consequence, it
convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed upon
him the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.9
For Private

Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for
the following alleged errors:10
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in relying merely on the
weight and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution and the admissibility of the
extra-judicial confession of the accused contained in his
Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of
Malolos, Bulacan.
interest."20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of

the place where the investigation was taken, could not
act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to
act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned
by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful
advice to protect the rights of appellant. The former did
not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences
of an extrajudicial confession.
Issue/s:
People vs. Dy G.R. Nos. 115236-37 (395 SCRA 256)
Whether the extrajudicial confession of appellant is

admissible in evidence, The Court's Ruling
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay,
Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant while he was
sellingbalut on the night of May 11, 1997.11 He was
subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station, where
he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled. 12 On
May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police
to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo
Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to
him.13 Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde's written
extrajudicial
confession
was
taken.
During
the
investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as
counsel.14 Armed police officers were also present during
the investigation.15
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution
provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel."
The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was found
in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. But appellant, a
resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos was
brought to and detained in the Malolos Police Station,
where he was investigated by the Malolos police.
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot
be considered as an independent counsel. He was the
mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised
"operational supervision and control"18 over the PNP unit
in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of
the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and
order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal
offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.19
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant,
who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main
suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of
appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of
"operational supervision and control" over the police.
"What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12
(1) is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's
defense
without
any
intervening
conflict
of

58
Facts:
This is a consolidated resolution of two motions
for reconsideration filed by the accused in the decision by
the Supreme Court to affirm judgment rendered by the
RTC of Baguio City. In the said decision, the accused were
found to be guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The accused contented, among others, that the
1st division has no jurisdiction over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher, as it is Supreme Court en banc shall take
cognizance of the case.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused are correct in pointing out
that it should be en banc that should take the case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the contention is
misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members.
At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the
divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered
as separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any
of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in
effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts, but as
divisions of one and the same court.
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by
accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan
Bernardino are DENIED WITH FINALITY.
People vs. Libnao GR No. 136860 (395 SCRA 407)
Facts:
In November 19, 1988, the RTC Branch 65 of
Tarlac City convicted the accused for violation of Article
II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of
1972) and was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay two million pesos in fine.
The accused were arrested in a tricycle flagged
down by an officer. Basing on the intelligence report from
surveillance conducted, two drug pushers will be making
a delivery of dangerous drugs riding in a tricycle. They
were brought to Kabayan Center where they were asked
on the ownership and content of the black bag they were
For Private

carrying with them witnessed by the Barangay Captain,

during which they were not represented with a counsel.
The bag turned out to contain bricks of marijuana.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the arrest without warrant was
valid.
(2) Whether or not their constitutional rights were
violated when they were not represented by a
counsel during the custodial investigation.
Ruling:
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure
is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to
the rule, one of which relates to search of moving
vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability
of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
The warrantless search in the case at bench is
not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance
operation for three months in the area. The surveillance
yielded the information that once a month, appellant and
her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks.
The two were riding a tricycle and carrying a suspiciouslooking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in
bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its
content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of
appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was
apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She
was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under
the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is
permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the
person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in
flagrante delicto. Thus the warrentless arrest was valid.
The High Court also ruled that there was no
extra judicial confession used, during the custodial
investigation, for the conviction thus no infringement of
constitutional rights happened.
People vs. Tee GR No. 140546-47 (395 SCRA 419)

Facts:
Thereafter, a search warrant was issued to look
for more prohibited drugs within the residence of the
accused-appellant which yielded more marijuana. Thus,
he was charged with 2 counts of violations of RA 6425 or
the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.

59
He moved to quash the search warrant on the

ground that it was too general because the amount of
marijuana was not specified, and that the NBI had not
complied with the requirements for the issuance of a
valid search warrant.
During the trial, the case was put into rest
because of the failure of the witness to appear and testify
on several occasions despite postponements of the
hearing. However, after some time, the witness agreed to
finally testify and the trial court ordered the reopening of
the case.
The trial court dismissed the motion to quash
search warrant and convicted the accused for the
violation of RA 6425 with regard to items found at the
residence of the appellant but acquitted for the charge
filed as regards the items found on the leased place. The
penalty provided was that of death penalty thus, resulted
to this automatic review, with issues in question on
validity of search warrant and violation of constitutional
rights of the accused-appellant.
Issue/s:
1) Whether or not the search warrant is illegal on the
ground of defects in securing it and the generality of
description of items being searched;
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of constitutional
rights of the accused-appellant.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that what the
Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad
or general characterization or sweeping descriptions,
which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is
not required that technical precision of description be
required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods
to be seized, their description must be rather general,
since the requirement of a technical description would
mean that no warrant could issue.
The description "an undetermined amount of
marijuana or Indian hemp" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant.
Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is
property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit
drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances
under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A
further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and
the circumstances. \
The specified description has satisfied the
Constitutions
requirements
on
particularity
of
description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a
conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the peace
officers may be guided in making the search and seizure;
and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear
For Private

direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is

being issued.
The High Court also ruled, contrary to the claim
of the accused-appellant, is not a general warrant
because even if the warrant did not specify provision of
the law violated, it was nevertheless, specific on the
offense committed.
It further ruled that the operatives, although
they themselves cannot be eyewitnesses to the crime,
relied on a witness with personal knowledge of the
offense, thus it is not hearsay information was used to
secure evidence, notwithstanding the failure to attach the
disposition of the said witness.
The address stated in the warrant was held as
specific as can be, supported by a detailed sketch of the
premises. It was ruled that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
There was also no violation of right to speedy
trial, rejecting view that there was unjustified and willful
delay of resolution of the case due to failure or willful
refusal of the witness to testify against him. This was
proven, among others, by issuance of warrants of arrest
against the witness and even punishing NBI supposedly
having custody over the witness for contempt due to
failure to produce the witness.
Finding neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the present case, appellants possession
of dangerous drugs, no matter how enormous, does not
merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Pe People vs. Macalaba G.R. Nos. 146284-86 (395
SCRA 461)
Facts
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

Ruling:
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search
and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement. The evidence
clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence
information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by
ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the
members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for
the carnapped car. They spotted the suspected carnapped
car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL
was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration
papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent
sachets of shabu.[ These sachets of shabu were therefore
in "plain view" of the law enforcers.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects
within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the
seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the
following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt
under the circumstances above discussed that all the
elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar.
Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on
ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not
transgress his constitutional rights.
Supreme court affirmed in toto the decision of
the lower court.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority
Facts:
Accused was charged of Illegal Possession of

Firearms and Ammunition, Possession of Forged Money
and Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
An expropriation proceeding, separate from the

current, transpired between petitioners and respondents.
The ruling ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner
the defined just compensation and cost of proceedings.
On the order for search of a carnapped car

allegedly perpetrated by the accused, police officers
made a search of the accused and luckily were able to
tag down the accused. There they saw a gun. When
pressed on the papers of the gun, they saw the forged
money and the sachet of shabu from the clutch bag of
the accused.
After sometime the petitioner came before the

court praying for forfeiture of the expropriation rights
because of the failure of the respondents to effectuate
the public use requirement in eminent domain.
Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the respondent
failed to implement the relocation proceedings which is
the purpose sought by the taking.
The lower court convicted the accused of

possession of dangerous drugs and acquitted him of
other charges for lack of evidence.
The trial court dismissed the petition prayed for

by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed such
dismissal.
Issue/s:
Issue/s:

60
For Private

Whether or not petitioner has the right to ask for

forfeiture of expropriation rights.
Ruling:
The constitutional restraints in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain over private properties
upon just compensation, are public use and just
compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of
the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
contending that the contract for low cost housing is a
deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled
doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
"use by the public" has been abandoned. The term
"public use" has now been held to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a
contract with a real estate developer for the construction
of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to
mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of
their taking.
The Supreme Court likewise do not subscribe to
petitioners contention that the stated public purpose was
abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the
expropriated lots by relocating squatters from the Metro
Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that
respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners
properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding the
Dasmarias Resettlement Project." The taking here is
absolute,
without
any
condition,
restriction
or
qualification.
When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
The Court ruled that non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lots.
Vda. De Danao vs Ginete A.M. No. MTJ031474

(395 SCRA 542)
Facts:
Merlita Dapadap Vda. de Danao charged Judge
Manuel V. Ginete with gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of authority, delay in rendering judgments and
serious misconduct for (1) issuing a writ of seizure a 6 x
6 truck despite being informed by police officers that the

61
said truck was in custodia legis; and (2) for ordering her
arrest solely on the basis of the purported affidavits of
witnesses. These affidavits turned out to be nonexisting, as indicated by a Certification by the Clerk of
Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty as
charged for issuing the warrant of arrest basing on
non-existing affidavits.
Ruling:
Respondent judge also gravely erred in ordering
the arrest of complainant based on non-existing
witnesses. In his order, he ruled that probable cause was
established on the basis of witnesses affidavits allegedly
submitted together with the Complaint.
However, a
Certification issued by Clerk of Court attested to the fact
that there were no affidavits of the witnesses in a
separate case against petitioner.
The assumption of office by respondent judge
placed upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his
exalted position. While the determination of probable
cause that would warrant the arrest of a person is subject
to judicial discretion, he should not have carelessly used
or abused such discretion. Also, while the lone affidavit
of a complainant might have been sufficient to determine
probable cause, respondent should have nevertheless
clearly indicated such fact in his Order of Arrest. Instead,
he made it appear that Atty. Serra had submitted the
affidavits of the latters witnesses along with the
Complaint. Further, respondent pretended that he had
personally examined these Affidavits to show that he had
ample basis to order Danaos arrest. As a member of the
judiciary, he must be beyond suspicion. He must be
perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but as
one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule
of law.
Issuing a patently erroneous order and undue
delay in rendering a ruling constitute serious and less
serious charges under Sections 8 and 9, respectively,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, Supreme Court fined the respondent judge
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
People vs. Estella G.R. Nos. 138539-40 (395 SCRA

553)
Facts:
A search warrant was issued in search for

dangerous drugs in a particular house allegedly owned by
the appellant. Appellant was outside the said house when
the search was performed and the searching officer found
firearms, ammunition and dangerous drugs. The search
was continued despite the appellant pointing to a
different house as his and not the one they are searching.
For Private

The trial court convicted the appellant of the crime

possession of dangerous drugs but was acquitted with
other crimes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the search was valid.
Ruling:
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence
gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug
was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for
residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be
held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found
therein.
The OSG argues that appellant is deemed to
have waived his right to object to the legality of the
search and the admissibility of the evidence seized
through that search because, during the trial, he did not
raise these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant
constantly questioned the legality of the search. This was
manifested by his objection of admittance of evidence,
testimony concerning the evident and the Demurrer To
Evidence filed.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence
against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his
guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence fall
short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it
has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our
Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the
accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. To overcome such presumption, the prosecution
must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our
criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution
fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the
accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of
the court to set them free. This principle leaves this Court
no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for
insufficiency of evidence.
The appealed decision was set aside.
Edna Collado, et.al, vs. Court of Appeals and
Republic of The Philippines, thru the Director of
Lands , G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002
Facts:
This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision
dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec.
No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners
over a parcel of land.
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado
filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area

62
of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot

for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro
(formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and
covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-inCharge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T.
Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional
co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined
(collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due
course, the land registration court issued an order of
general default against the whole world with the
exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the
Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been
open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva,
one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March
22, 1902.
Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation
purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
The land registration court held that petitioners
had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court
rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners. The Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had
been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously
classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to
private appropriation. In a decision dated June 22, 1992,
the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared
null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the
land registration court on the ground that the private
respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever
that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has
been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and
declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. And worse, the technical description of Psu162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-inCharge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was
attached to the application of private respondents,
categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed.
Issues:
Whether the petitioners have registrable rights over the
subject lot.
Ruling:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The
1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in
Section 2 of Article XII [25] on National Economy and
Patrimony. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well
as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine
For Private

Constitution belong to the State. And Watershed

Reservation is a Natural Resource.
In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court declared that inalienable public lands x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the
State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.
The
evidence
of
record
thus
appears
unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and
positively that the Lot had been officially released from
the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Supreme Court pronounced that once a parcel of land is
included within a watershed reservation duly established
by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that
neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient
proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974,
petitioners possession as of the filing of their application
on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years
counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974.
The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from
1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners
case falters even more because of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to
then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No.
1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Pedro Cupcupin v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 132389. November 19, 2002
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking
to set aside the November 27, 1997 decision of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17334, which affirmed with
modification the November 18, 1994 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, wherein
petitioner Pedro Cupcupin was found guilty of the crimes
of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, and of violation of Section 1, Presidential
Decree 1866, otherwise known as the Unlawful
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in Criminal Case
No. 13374-MN and Criminal Case No.13375-MN. 5784,
respectively.

63
Version of the Prosecution. Based on a

confidential information that petitioner, Pedro Cupcupin is
engaged in selling methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), and in possession of firearms and ammunitions
without the necessary license, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano
of the National Capital Region, conducted a surveillance
on the vicinity of petitioners residence at Int. David
Santos, C. Arellano Streets, Malabon, Metro Manila.After
confirming said confidential information, Agent Rejano
applied for the issuance of search warrants before Judge
Romeo J. Callejo, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49.
Contention of the Accused. Petitioner contends
that the items allegedly seized from his residence are
inadmissible as evidence because the search warrants
issuedagainst him failed to comply with the constitutional
and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. Specifically, petitioner claims that said
warrants were defective on the grounds that: (1) NBI
Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance
thereof had no personal knowledge of the facts on which
the warrants were based; and (2) subject warrants failed
to particularly describe the place to be searched because
there are two houses (the residential house and the nipa
hut which is the workshop room) located in the address
stated in the said warrants.
Issues:
1.
2.
Whether the NBI agent who applied the

issuance of the search warrants has personal
knowledge of the facts on which the warrants
were based.
Whether the subject warrants are able to
particularly describe the place to be searched.
Ruling:
Yes, the NBI agent who applied the issuance of
the search warrants has personal knowledge of the facts
on which the warrants were based. In the case at bar,
NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance
of Search Warrant Nos. 56-93 and 57-93, had personal
knowledge ofthe circumstances on which the warrants
were based. Admittedly, Rejanos knowledge of petitioners
illegal possession of firearms and prohibited drugs came
from a confidential informant, and therefore, initially
hearsay. Nevertheless, the surveillance and investigation
he conducted on the basis of said confidential information
enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the illegal
activities of petitioner. Hence, his testimony was sufficient
justification for the examining judge to conclude that
there was probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.
Yes, the subject warrants are able to
particularly describe the place to be searched. It is clear
that the workshop room where the packs of shabu were
found is actually an integral part of petitioners residence.
Hence, it cannot be argued that there are two houses in
the address stated in the warrants and that the same
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched.
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
For Private

intended to be searched. Tested against the foregoing

rule, the Court finds that the residence of petitioner
stated in the warrants as Int. David Santos, C. Arellano
Street, Malabon, Metro Manila, can with reasonable effort
be ascertained and identified by the NBI agents who were
ordered to search the above address, including the rooms
located therein.
Supreme Court found the contention of the
petitioner not meritorious.
Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Zeida Aurora B.

Garfin, Mtcc, Branch 2, Iriga City, A.M. NO. MTJ-011367. SEPTEMBER 5, 2002
Facts:
In a verified letter-complaint dated June 25,
1999, complainant Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge
Zeida Aurora B. Garfin of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Iriga City, Branch II, with ignorance of the law and
serious misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 20420,
20424, 20426 and 20428, all entitled People of the
Philippines v. Fredesminda Dayawon. Judge Garfin
allegedly convicted complainant, who was the accused in
said cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
without conducting a trial on the merits. As a result,
complainant was deprived of her day in court and was
found guilty of the crime charged without due process of
law. After arraignment and in the course of proceedings
in the criminal cases, complainants counsel filed a
motion to dismiss (or a motion to quash) the
informations on the ground that the amount of the four
bouncing checks she issued have already been paid. On
December 2, 1996, Judge Garfin issued an order setting
the hearing on complainants motion to dismiss on
January 21, 1997. Pursuant to the trial courts directive,
complainant presented evidence in support of her motion
to dismiss. Thereafter, the prosecution presented
evidence in support of its opposition. On August 24,
1998, the motion was submitted for resolution. On March
19, 1999, Judge Garfin rendered a joint judgment in the
criminal cases denying the Motion to Dismiss and
convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the
offense
charged.
Apparently,
Judge
Garfin
simultaneously resolved complainants motion to dismiss
and the criminal cases on the merits without setting the
cases for trial.
Arguments of the Respondent. In view of
complainants admission and the presentation of evidence
for both parties at the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
Judge Garfin maintained that the proceedings were
converted into a full-dress hearing on the merits with the
consent of both parties, who actively participated therein.
Judge Garfin further emphasized that with the admission
made by complainant that she issued the bad checks, the
burden of proving that she did not violate Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shifted to her. Since there is no specific
provision in the Rules of Court governing such a remedial
situation, she applied Section 6, Rule 135, to wit:

64
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into

effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or
rules
Arguments of the Complainant. Complainant
denied that she consented to the conversion of the
hearing on the motion to dismiss into a trial on the merits
of the criminal cases. According to complainant, there
was no order to this effect. Judge Garfin merely adopted
her own rules of procedure to the prejudice of
complainants constitutional right to due process. Had she
known that the proceedings were already on the merits;
complainant stated she would have endeavored to
present other evidence in her defense. She reiterated
that the evidence presented in the criminal cases
pertained only to the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
Whether complainant is deprived of her constitutional
right to due process.
Ruling:
Yes,
complainant
is
deprived
of
her
constitutional right to due process. Supreme Court
pronounced that conformably, a modified order of trial is
authorized whenever an accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense. This does not mean,
however, that in such a case, trial could be dispensed
with altogether. A judge must nonetheless ascertain
whether the defense put up by the accused could
withstand judicial scrutiny. In other words, while the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an
extenuating circumstance, the trial court is still dutybound to establish that the accused, in fact, did not incur
any liability relative to his admission. Needless to say, a
regular trial on the merits is necessary for this purpose.
Furthermore, it was not for respondent judge to
unilaterally determine that the entire case was submitted
for decision without giving complainant the opportunity to
submit or at the very least, manifest if she had additional
evidence to prove her innocence. Granting that
complainant was accorded the chance to offer proof as to
the alleged payment in support of her motion to dismiss,
it remained incumbent upon respondent judge to notify
complainant that the case will be decided on the merits.
An accused in a criminal case must not be precluded from
availing of every option allowed by the rules to adduce
evidence in his defense. In this case, respondent judge
deprived complainant of this opportunity when she
adopted procedural shortcuts and decided the criminal
cases without conducting a trial on the merits. Contrary
to respondent judges claim, there is no showing that
complainant consented to submit the cases for decision
without a trial. Neither could such consent be inferred
from the active participation of complainant in the
hearing
of
the
motion
to
dismiss
because,
For Private

understandably, she participated therein under the

supposition that what was being heard at that time was
only her motion. The rules likewise do not sanction the
automatic conversion of a hearing on a motion to dismiss
to a hearing on the merits of a case, in the absence of
any clear waiver by the accused of his right to a regular
trial. Consequently, respondent judge has no valid excuse
for her error, which resulted in a violation of
complainants right to be properly heard on her defenses.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, G.R. No. 148571. September
24, 2002
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition
Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale
No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note
Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly
authenticated documents requesting the extradition of
Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary
of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary
of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to
Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also
known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of
the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially,
the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers and
to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file
a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court
issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical
vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government
of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition docketed as
Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged,
inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the

65
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999.

The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following
charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section
371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2
US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18
US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD
No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by
the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case
to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit
their
respective
memoranda.
In
his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that
in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail
in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of
Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3,
2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one
million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated
July 4, 2001.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
Whether respondent is entitled to notice and

hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
Whether is respondent entitled to bail?
Whether due process is violated in the
immediate deprivation of appellants liberty prior
to his being heard.
Ruling:
hearing
Section
require
warrant
No, respondent is not entitled to notice and

before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
2 of Article III of the Constitution does not
a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
For Private


To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In Ho v. People
and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just
for the purpose of personally determining probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required
was that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause. In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In
doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
That the case under consideration is an
extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to
justify the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure were
called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite
-- would be justified in view of respondents
demonstrated predisposition to flee. Since this is a matter
of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and
its supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and
Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie
case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer
the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In
our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the
ends of justice in extradition cases.
No, the respondent is not entitled to enjoy the
constitutional right to bail. As suggested by the use of the
word conviction, the constitutional provision (Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution), as well as Section 4 of

66
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a

person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The
provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
No, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of
his right to due process. The essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an
extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity
to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent
will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.There is no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges
independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No.
148825. December 27, 2002
Facts:
Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425. On February
12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, was
found possessing nine hundred ninety eight point two
eight hundred zero nine (998.2809) GRAMS of
For Private

methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,

without the corresponding prescription or license.
Version of the Prosecution. Susan was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When
she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping
sound was emitted. Upon frisking SUSAN, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking
and Terrorism (NACHT) named Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand
under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several
times and noticed that the package contained what felt
like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt
similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and
thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but
the latter refused and said that was money only. Mylene
forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes, her supervisor on duty who in turn instructed
Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring
SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room,
Mylene touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ.
She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and
panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered
three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray
colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to
them. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray
plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened
the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances which, when submitted for laboratory
examination,
yielded
positive
results
for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug. SUSAN signed a receipt of the articles seized from
her. For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator
of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that he
informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted
that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or
not to sign the receipt.
Version of the Accused. After the trial court
rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the alleged offense, SUSAN filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, alleging
therein that the trial judge erred in upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of
police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not
even a police officer. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of
the search and seizure without warrant on the ground
that the seized items were not in plain view.
Issues:
1.
Whether the warrantless search against Susan

was legal.
Whether the arrest of Susan was legal.
Whether the constitutional right to counsel
afforded
an
accused
under
custodial
investigation was violated.
2.
3.
Ruling:
was
Yes, the warrantless search against Susan

legal. Supreme Court pronounced that the

67
warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the

regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not
violative of her constitutional rights. Sections 2 and 3(2)
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
persons or things to be seized. XXX
Sec. 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined
in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute.
The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
In the present case, the search was made
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading
as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by
the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among
others the following condition printed thereon: Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be
allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a
part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures.
In the case of People v. Johnson, which involves
similar facts and issues, The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
For Private

airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their

airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure.
These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
Yes, the appellant, having been caught
flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Section.
The search conducted on
SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three
packages containing white crystalline substances, which
upon
examination
yielded
positive
results
for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed
earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal.
Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in
People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a
warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante
delicto.
No, the constitutional right to counsel
afforded an accused under custodial investigation
was not violated. Entrenched is the rule that the rights
provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may
be invoked only when a person is under custodial
investigation or is in custody interrogation. Custodial
investigation refers to the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed a crime and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession
from him. And the right to counsel attaches upon the
start of such investigation. The objective is to prohibit
incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness
for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized
from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had
the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement

68
was taken from her during her detention and used in

evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her
right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO ASIS y
FONPERADA and GILBERT FORMENTO y
SARICONGR 142531, 15 October 2002
Facts:
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y

Saricon were charged in an Information dated 18
February 1998; the information stating That on or about
February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then
and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the
body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to
wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1)
wristwatch one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined
items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or
less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of
P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof,
he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death. When arraigned on 9
July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be
deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de
oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist
Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although
none of them had actually seen the crime committed,
strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented
by them attempted to link both accused to the crime.
After due trial, both accused were found guilty and
sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8
March 2000, held that the crime charged and proved is
robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, ruled that although no witnesses to
the actual killing and robbery were presented, the
circumstantial evidence including the recovery of
bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved
that the two (2) x x x committed the crime, and
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus
sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court.
Both the accused do not question the legality of their
arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the
arraignment, but object to the introduction of the
bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the
bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally
done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal
and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the
other hand, contends that it was Formentos wife who
voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that
her act constituted a valid consent to the search without
a warrant.
For Private

Issues:
Whether the voluntarily surrender by Formentos wife of
the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the
victim constitutes a valid consent to the search without a
warrant on the part of Formento.
Ruling:
NO, the voluntarily surrender by Formentos wife
of the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the
victim does not constitute a valid consent to the search
without a warrant on the part of Formento. Primarily, the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or
who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf.
In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of
shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife
and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the
search, necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver
could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs.
Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused
therein was not present when the search was made.
Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown
that first, the right exists; second, the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and third, the person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could
not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the
first place, he did not understand what was happening at
that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him a
deaf-mute during the arrest, search and seizure. The
point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. as
the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officers
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto,
but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law, becomes even more pronounced
in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute,
and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was
happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search
without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple
confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts
was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and
should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case
in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses
suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to
convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or
even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral
certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of
innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.

69
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO

SAMUS, G.R. Nos. 135957-58. September 17, 2002
Facts:
This is for automatic review of the Decision
dated October 8, 1998, issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, in Criminal Case Nos.
5015-96-C and 5016-96-C.
The trial court found
Guillermo Samus guilty beyond reasonable of two counts
of murder.
Samus, appellant, was a farmer, tilling and living
in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan,
Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old
Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, six (6) year old John
Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of appellants father at
San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna.
Version of the Prosecution. On September 2,
1996, 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional
Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna received
a telephone call from a local barangay official informing
them of the victims deaths. Arriving at the victims
residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy.
Canlubang, Calamba, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy
H. Garcia the team found a pair of maong pants, a white
T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom
and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn by
Dedicacion Balisi was reported missing from her body. On
September 10, 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal
Investigation Group received information that appellant
was the principal suspect in the killing of the two (2)
victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of
spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His team, accompanied by local
barangay authorities, went to Vallejo spouses house and
shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof.
Rushing outside, they saw appellant crawling on the roof.
They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from
the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an
injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right
forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on
appellant who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the
killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Appellant was
brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office
where he was informed of his constitutional rights by
SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of September 11,
1996, appellant, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his
statement admitting the killings.
Later that day, SPO3
Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings from
Ponciano, to whom appellant allegedly pawned the same,
who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan.
Version of the Defense. Alleging denial and alibi
as defenses, appellant presents his version of the
incident. He alleged that he was brought to Camp Vicente
Lim where he was tortured until he lost his
consciousness. On the same night, he was brought to a
hospital, was given medicine, then brought back to the
cell where he was handcuffed at the door of the cell. The
CIS got hold of the medical certificate. He was forced by
the CIS to admit the killing of the victims and the sale of
jewelry by means of torture and threat. He also testified
that he was forced to execute a document admitting the
killing. He was forced to sign said document. He did not
know Atty. Juliano and did not talk to him. According to
For Private

witness Vallejo, appellant Guillermo Samus was in their

house at about 6:00 p.m. of September 10, 1996. It was
then that CIS operative together with their Brgy. Captain
entered their house, arrested and handcuffed appellant.
It was not true that accused Guillermo Samus hid himself
on the roof of her house.
When the accused was
arrested by the CIS men, together with the barangay
officials, the other persons present were the witness and
her 3 children. The police were not armed with a warrant
of arrest or search warrant. On cross-examination, he
testified that media interviewed him 2 days after his
arrest. He and his relatives in Laguna did not have the
capacity to hire/secure the services of a lawyer.
Issues:
1.
Whether the arrest of appellant is

lawful.
2.
Whether the confession made by

appellant to the media while in police
custody be admissible as evidence.
3.
Whether the testimony of Pontaos

and the picture of a pair of earrings
together with the turnover receipt,
which appellant identified during his
testimony, be considered inadmissible
as the fruit of the poisonous tree and
hence be disregarded at this stage of
appeal.
Ruling:
No, the arrest was unlawful. The police officers
version of the arrest is incredible. Supreme Court finds it
hard to believe that anyone would jump from the roof of
a two-story house to escape and, after landing on the
ground without any broken bones, make a complete
turnaround and just meekly surrender without further
ado. Even if this story were true, jumping from a roof is
not a crime that would justify the warrantless arrest of
appellant. It is undisputed that when the CIS team went
to the Vallejo residence on the evening of September 10,
1996, it had no warrant of arrest against appellant. Yet,
they arrested him. Under the Rules, peace officers may,
without a warrant, arrest a person under any of these
circumstances: (a) when, in their presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense; (b) when an offense
has just been committed, and they have probable cause
to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another, or from a penal
establishment where he or she is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while the case is pending. None
of these circumstances was present when members of
the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG) arrested
appellant.
He was not a prisoner.
The killing of
Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi was not done in the
presence of the arresting officers. Since it took place on

70
September 2, 1996, it could not have been considered as

having just been committed. Evidently, they unlawfully
arrested appellant on September 10, 1996.
Yes, the confession made by appellant to the
media while in police custody is admissible as evidence.
Supreme Court clarified that after being illegally arrested,
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to
counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the
law enforcers during custodial investigation is normally
inadmissible in evidence. Nonetheless, even if the
uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible,
under the present circumstances Supreme Court cannot
rule it out because of appellants failure to make timely
objections.
Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in
evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the
Constitution, because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the assistance of
counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its
presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility.
No, the testimony of Pontaos and the picture of
a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt,
which appellant identified during his testimony, cannot be
considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Upon examination of the records, we find that during the
entire examination in court of Prosecution Witness
Pontaos, appellant did not question or object to the
admissibility of the formers testimony.
Worse, the
latters counsel even freely cross-examined the witness
without any reservations. Having made no objection
before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question
for the first time on appeal.i[21] The evidence having been
admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject
it. If only appellant had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could
have been warned of the need to present additional
evidence to support its case.
To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late
stage when it can no longer present additional evidence
as substitute for that which is now claimed to be
inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness. Be that
as it may, and even if Supreme Court affirmed appellants
conviction for murder, the Court does not agree with the
trial courts imposition of the death sentence, because
the proven aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not
alleged in the Information.
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal , GR 141489, 29 November 2002;
Facts:
On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the PartyList System Act which took effect on 3 March 1995,
national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including
Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C.
Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
For Private

party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric

Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA),
NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan!
Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). APEC was able to send 2 representatives to
the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. District representatives belonging to
various political parties were also elected. Subsequently,
the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by
electing its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies which was done through nomination by the
political parties of House members who are to occupy
seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).
From available records, it does not appear that
after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to
the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President
Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now
retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested
Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to
include party-list representatives to conform to Sections
17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its
meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct
the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels
letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy
B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General
Roberto P. Nazareno.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this
Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and
Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and
the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4
seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al.
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act
positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its
Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc
directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489.
On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a
motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the
members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and
admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed
the present petitions on the strength of his oath to
protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA,
ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

71
Issues:
1.Whether the present composition of the House
Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation
because there are no party-list representatives
in the HRET.
2.Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to
reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Ruling:
1. NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the
House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12
seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in
the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who among their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective
electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are
reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the
HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory
constitutional
rule
on
proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with
the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine
of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it
sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the
CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House
from participating in the election of members of the HRET
and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or
the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that
the party-list groups in the House at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of Representatives,
the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by
petitioners at this time.
For Private

2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack

of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal
rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Energy
Regulatory Board vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R.
No. 141314. November 15, 2002
Facts:
On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the
revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an
average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt/hour (kwh)
in its distribution charge. The application also included a
prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant
to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of
Executive Order No. 172.
On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order
granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh,
subject to the condition that in the event the Board finds
that the applicant is entitled to a lesser increase in rates,
all excess amounts collected from the applicants
customers shall either be refunded to them or
correspondingly credited in their favor for application to
electric bills covering future consumptions.
On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its
Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which
contained, among others, the recommendation not to
include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its
operating expenses for purposes of rate determination
and the use of the net average investment method for
the computation of the proportionate value of the
properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base.
Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision
adopting the above recommendations and authorized
MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average
amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to
MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. The
ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the
amount of P0.184 per kilowatt/hour granted under the
Boards Order dated January 28, 1994 is hereby
superseded and modified and the excess average amount
of P0.167 per kilowatt/hour starting with [MERALCOs]
billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing
cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to
[MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in
their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that
income tax should not be treated as operating expense
as this should be borne by the stockholders who are
recipients of the income or profits realized from the
operation of their business hence, should not be passed
on to the consumers.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the
ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the
MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167 per kwh and the
refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers

72
beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle

beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners seek before the Court a reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1.
Whether the private property used for a public
purpose is subjected to regulation under the police
power of the State.
2.
Whether there is a proper delegation of
legislative power to Energy regulation Board with
regard to the fixing of the rate of energy watts.
3.
Whether the issue on fixing the energy watt rate
can be subjected for judicial review.
Ruling:
1.
Yes, the private property used for a
public purpose be subjected to regulation under the
police power of the State. The regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
exercise thereof. When private property is used for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it
ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the
property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities,
the State protects the public against arbitrary and
excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and
quality of services rendered. However, the power to
regulate rates does not give the State the right to
prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public
utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the
rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a
fair return on the public utility upon the value of the
property performing the service and one that is
reasonable to the public for the services rendered.[10
The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. In
his famous dissenting opinion in the 1923 case of
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
The thing devoted by the investor to the public
use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but
capital embarked in an enterprise. Upon the capital so
invested, the Federal Constitution guarantees to the
utility the opportunity to earn a fair return. However, the
Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the
opportunity to earn a return on the value of all items of
property used by the utility, or of any of them. The
investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its
charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is
the substitute for the State in the performance of the
public service, thus becoming a public servant. The
compensation which the Constitution guarantees an
For Private

opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting

the business.
2.
Yes, there was a proper delegation
of legislative power to Energy regulation Board
with regard to the fixing of the rate of energy
watts. The ERB was created under Executive Order No.
172 to regulate, among others, the distribution of energy
resources and to fix rates to be charged by public utilities
involved in the distribution of electricity. In the fixing of
rates, the only standard which the legislature is required
to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. It has
been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied. What is a just and reasonable rate is a question
of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense,
and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The
requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates
which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too
high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate
is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility.
Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of
administrative bodies on technical matters within their
area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but
even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence
even if not overwhelming or preponderant. In one case,
we cautioned that courts should "refrain from substituting
their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the
discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions
of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the
Public Service Commission when it really appears that the
evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions."
3.
Yes, the issue on fixing of energy
watt rate can be subjected for judicial review to
determine whether the administrative body is
acting within the limit of its power and discretion.
While the power to fix rates is a legislative function,
whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated
through an administrative agency, a determination of
whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a
purely judicial question and is subject to the review of the
courts. In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of
the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to
the public should be respected. The function of the court,
in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine
whether under the facts and circumstances, the final
order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or
unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the administrative
agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the
exercise of its power, the time-honored principle is that
courts should not interfere. The principle of separation of
powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the
acts of administrative officers except in clear cases of
grave abuse of discretion. In determining the just and
reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility, three
major factors are considered by the regulating agency: a)
rate of return; b) rate base and c) the return itself or the
computed revenue to be earned by the public utility
based on the rate of return and rate base. The rate of
return is a judgment percentage which, if multiplied with
the rate base, provides a fair return on the public utility
for the use of its property for service to the public. The

73
rate of return of a public utility is not prescribed by

statute
but
by
administrative
and
judicial
pronouncements. This Court has consistently adopted a
12% rate of return for public utilities. The rate base, on
the other hand, is an evaluation of the property devoted
by the utility to the public service or the value of invested
capital or property which the utility is entitled to a return.
Joel M. Sanvicente vs. People of the Philippines ,
G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the
killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. Petitioner fatally shot
the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan
Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter
allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash
which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller
machine.
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of
the victim at the parking space in front of the Far East
Bank and Trust Company Branch along Katipunan Road,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene
were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45
bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta
Sanvicente. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A.
Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioners .45
caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He
also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz,
Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas
Road, Quezon City which serves as a voluntary surrender
of his client, however, without admission of guilt. At his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits,
which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners
counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL
which the trial court. Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave
to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
trial court. Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a
Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on
the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting
dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally
hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt
of the accused was not proven by positive evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an
Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect
thereof for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the
ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case
double jeopardy had set in. Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was granted by
the appellate court and nullified the October 7, 1996
Order of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals nullification of trial
courts order dismissing the case is repugnant to the
right against double jeopardy of the petitioner.
For Private

Ruling:
Yes, the Court of Appeals nullification of trial
courts order dismissing the case is repugnant to the right
against double jeopardy of the petitioner.
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a
verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court
grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal
and any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This
constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of
a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double
jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus
in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the
finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the
humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal
contest with the State xxx.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds
right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on
an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case, or where the trial was a sham.

74
For Private

2003
Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration (2003)
Facts:
1. The petitioner was terminated from there
position in the national tobacco administration as a result
of the executive order issued by president Estrada which
mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco
administration, a government agency under the
department
of
agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the
civil service commission to recall the Organization
Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP)
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with
prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining
order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the
respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and
from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order
ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint
the petitioner to the OSSP to position similar to the one
that
they
hold
before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed
to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the
RTC.
6.
Petitioner
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court.
Issues:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national
tobacco administration is valid true issuance of
executive
order
by
the
president.
Ruling:
According to the supreme court, the President
has the power to reorganized an office to achieve
simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided under EO
292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides
that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down
if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public
service.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc
resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are
DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made
in due course. No costs.
BAROT VS. COMELEC (2003)
Facts:
In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed
the 10th winning candidate for councilor of Tanjay City,
Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the Chairman of the
Board of Canvassers sent a Memorandum to the

75
COMELEC requesting for authority to correct the

Certificate of Canvass and to proclaim Tabaloc, instead
of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor,
by errors committed by the Board of Canvassers. The
COMELEC considered the Memorandum as a petition,
and after notice and hearing, granted the request.
Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor.
Barot filed with the Supreme Court a petition for and
prohibition.
Ruling:
1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides
that a petition for correction must be filed not later than
five (5) days following the date of proclamation,
impleading the candidates who may be adversely affected
thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules also
provides that in the interest of justice and in the order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before
the Commission, these rules or any option thereof may
be suspended by the Commission. The filing of the
petition beyond the 5- day period was upheld in the
interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that it
was Tabaloc and not Barot who was the 10th winning
candidate
for
councilor.
2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the
Memorandum of the Chairman of the Board of
Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even motu
propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation of
the votes.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (2003)
Facts:
President Marcos through a presidential
decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease,
and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also
transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of
Manila
Bay
under
the
Manila-Cavite
Coastal
Road
and
Reclamation
Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed
areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a
JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom
Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in
the
absence
of
any
public
bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator
President
Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams.
An investigation was
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA
was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public
domain;
the
certificates
of
title
over
the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was
illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee
on
the
legality
of
the
JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that
government
stands
to
lose billions
by
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas
AMARI.
He also asked for the full disclosure of
renegotiations happening between the parties.
the
the
to
the
For Private

Issues:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the
transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
Ruling:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine,
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of
the
public
domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine.
It declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State and except for alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750
hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of
the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila
Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will
reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of
land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be
incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are
part of the lands of the public domain, waters and
other natural resources and consequently owned by
the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall
not be alienable unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
There
must
be
a
law
or
presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed
lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania
156039, 14 August 2003)
(GR
Facts:
Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II
and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the
Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding
this position after the confirmation of her appointment by
the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. On 2 October
1998 Gania received a copy of Special Order 477-P dated
28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes
Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the
alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed
to report for work. She verified the status of her
appointment and found out that her appointment was not
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation.
Gania immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a
ruling on the validity of the termination of her
employment. In Resolution 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000
the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and
prolonged absence without official leave from the time

76
she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a

result of Special Order 477-P. Gania moved for
reconsideration. In Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March
2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her
removal from office as illegal, exonerated her from the
charge of being on absence without official leave and
ordered her reinstatement as Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU but disallowed
the payment of back salaries for the period she was not
working as a result of the illegal dismissal. The CSC
explained the non-payment of her back wages, i.e. "the
incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the principle of
'quantum meruit' (as you work so shall you earn). In
other words, her entitlement to compensation depends
on her actual performance of work. Short of approval by
the Commission, the appointment while already effective,
by itself is not a basis for payment of salary but the
assumption of duties of her office x x x x Such being the
case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for the
period that she was not reporting to work." MSU moved
for reconsideration of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001, while Gania moved for its early execution. In
Resolution 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001, the CSC denied
MSUs motion for reconsideration and ordered its
President to allow Gania to assume and exercise the
functions of Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer.
MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for
reconsideration under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (CA-GR SP-66188), to the Court of Appeals,
but the appellate court did not issue any restraining order
or injunction to prevent the execution of the resolution on
appeal. Gania did not seek a review of any of the
resolutions of the CSC including the order denying back
salaries and other benefits for the period she was out of
work. She instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement
but MSU refused to employ her back. Hence, she was
compelled to file a second motion for the execution of
CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, citing Sec.
82 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, which states that [t]he filing and
pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals
or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the
execution of the final decision of the Commission unless
the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction. In
Resolution 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC
granted Ganias motion and held that CSC Resolution
01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained finality and
must be immediately implemented, as it again ordered
the MSU President to reinstate Gania. On 8 October 2001
Gania for the first time questioned the portion of CSC
Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 prohibiting the
payment of back wages and other benefits to her for the
period that her employment was terminated, and moved
for the modification of the resolution by granting her the
relief prayed for. On 29 October 2001 the Court of
Appeals dismissed MSUs petition for review on the
ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping was
not personally signed by pertinent officers of the
university but by its counsel of record. MSU moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal. On 12 December 2001,
there being still no action on her request to be paid her
back salaries and other benefits, Gania moved for an
immediate ruling thereon. On 21 February 2002 the
Court of Appeals denied MSUs motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack of merit.
For Private

On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321

denied Ganias motion. Without the aid of an attorney,
Gania appealed CSC Resolution 02-0321 dated 28
February 2002 to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (CA-GR SP 69668). In
her petition for review, she did not mention that she did
not seek a review of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001 which was the real object of her appeal. In
addition, she impleaded only Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose F. Erestain Jr.
and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name
as the Mindanao State University or any of its officers. On
28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found
merit in Ganias petition for review. The Court of Appeals
ruled that back wages should be paid to Gania from the
time of her illegal dismissal until she was ordered
reinstated by the CSC as Director II of MSU on 8 March
2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered
MSU to admit Gania back to work since the damages she
suffered for that period were chargeable in the proper
forum against the MSU President who in bad faith refused
to abide by the relevant CSC resolutions. On 3 January
2003 the OSG filed the present petition for review under
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf
of the Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC.
Issues:
Whether the Court can still take jurisdiction of the
issue of backwages even if Gania had lost the right to
ask for the modification of CSC Resolution 01-0558
dated 8 March 2001 and to demand compensation for
her back salaries and other benefits.
Whether Gania is entitled to receive back salaries and
other benefits for the period that she was illegally
dismissed.
Ruling:
There are special circumstances in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant such
liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a
compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. To
begin with, Gania was consistently denied reinstatement
by the responsible officers of MSU and vehemently barred
from resuming her previous position. The first order for
her return to work was issued on 8 March 2001 which
was followed by repeated personal appeals for the
immediate execution of the CSC resolution. Thereafter,
when Gania was still forced out of work, the CSC issued
its second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4
October 2001, respectively, for the President of MSU to
restore her to the item from which she was illegally
dismissed. As these private requests and official
directives were cruelly rejected by her employer and the
period of her unemployment was unduly prolonged,
Gania had no choice and was compelled to ask for back
salaries and other benefits to offset the callous
repudiation of what was due her. To prevent Gania from
claiming back wages would leave incomplete the redress
of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and
amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer
or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid
application of the pertinent provisions of the Revised

77
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

as well as the Rules of Court will not be given premium
where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader
interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.
There is more than substantial evidence
in the record consisting of the general payroll and
attendance sheets to prove that Gadia assumed and
exercised the functions of Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her
permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10
April 1995. It cannot be refuted that in September 1998
she was terminated from the service on the alleged
ground of expiration of her term and stopped from
performing the functions of her position, and
subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration
of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal.
Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled
that Gania did not actually assume and perform the
duties of her position so as to deprive her of back wages
and other benefits. As held in Gabriel v. Domingo, an
illegally dismissed government employee who is later
ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal
up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible
because an employee who is reinstated after having been
illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his
office and should be given a comparable compensation at
the time of his reinstatement. Gania cannot be faulted for
her inability to work or to render any service from the
time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her
reinstatement. The policy of no work, no pay cannot be
applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not
of her own making or liking even as her family suffered
tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while
she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and
other benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to
naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure
for those in the civil service. However, MSU cannot be
made to pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits
in favor of Gania. MSU as a government institution must
compensate Gania with back salaries and other benefits
only from the time of her illegal dismissal, which
according to the case record began sometime in October
1998, until the motion for reconsideration of the MSU was
denied and a writ of execution for Ganias reinstatement
as Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning
Officer was issued. The reckoning period is not 8 March
2001 as determined by the appellate court but 19 July
2001 when CSC Resolution 01-1225 was promulgated
wherein the motion for reconsideration of the MSU was
denied with finality and the latter was explicitly
commanded to allow Gania to assume and exercise the
functions of Director II and Manila Information and
Liaisoning Officer. For, a final decision of the CSC is
immediately
executory
unless
a
motion
for
reconsideration is filed in the meantime. The back wages
and other benefits accruing after 19 July 2001 are to be
treated separately since they must be collected in the
proper forum wherein the assertions of malice and ill will
in the failure to reinstate Gania to her post are threshed
out and the concerned parties given the full opportunity
to be heard. Until such separate proceeding has been
For Private

instituted and decided, it is premature to fix the liability

for this portion of Ganias back wages and other benefits
upon either the government as represented by MSU or
the accountable officers thereof.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et
al (2003)
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates
under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications
to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26,
2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary
issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim
Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the
EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue
halal certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on the
halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations, entity or scholars
can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
Issues:
Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision
as to freedom of religion
Ruling:
The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with
the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a "national cultural community"
and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the
constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the
latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the nonestablishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred
status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." Without doubt,
classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an
and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own

78
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a
society with a democratic framework like ours, the State
must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are
already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46,
these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed
functions on how to screen and check the quality and
safety of food products, the perceived danger against the
health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally
avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and
similar organizations come forward as the official
religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim
consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order
46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS vs. MARGIE
CORPUS MACIAS (2003)
Facts:
Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein
petitioner)filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11,Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition
fordeclaration of nullity of marriage against MargieCorpus
Macias-service
of
summons
thyough
publication
innewspapers in Dapitan and Dipolog. Instead of
ananswer respondent, through counsel, on April 10,2001,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition. On April19, 2001,
the trial court issued an Order denyingrespondents
motion to dismiss. Incidentally, in thesame Order, the
trial court granted respondentsrequest (via long distance
telephone call) to set thehearing on April 30, 2001-April
30 hearing was cancelled and moved to May 2and
3,2001. but petitioner received notice only onMay 8..
Thus, when the case was called for hearingas scheduled,
respondent and counsel, not beingduly notified, did not
appear. Surprisingly, the trialcourt allowed the petitioner
to present his evidence
ex parte-On May 5, 2001, respondent still
unaware that thecase had been submitted for decision,
filed a motionfor reconsideration of the Order dated April
19, 2001denying her motion to dismiss. The trial
court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in
hisOrder dated May 16, 2001.-May 18, 2001, respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or awrit of preliminary injunction challenging the
trialcourts Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied
For Private

her motion to dismiss; and Order dated April 30,

2001cancelling the April 30, 2001 hearing and resetting
it on May 2 and 3, 2001.-Acting thereon, the Court of
Appeals, in a Resolutiondated May 23, 2001, enjoined the
trial court fromconducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. S-695.Meanwhile, on May 15, 2001 the trial court
rendered its Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage
between
the
parties
on
the
ground
of
psychologicalincapacity on the part of herein respondent
-July 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision
granting
respondents
petition
for
certioraristating: Petitioner had until April 16, 2001
within which to file a Motion to Dismiss under Section
1,Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an
Answer to the complaint. However, she opted to file on
April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file herAnswer to the
complaint. Until said motion isr esolved by the
Respondent
Court
with
finality, itbehooved
the
Respondent Court to suspend thehearings of the case on
the merits What is so triteis that the Respondent Court
violated its own Orderdated February 27, 2001, declaring
that the hearing of the case on its merits will ensue only
after thePetitioner shall have filed her Answer to
thecomplaint
Issues:
WON the CA erred in nullifying the orders of the trial
court.
Ruling:
No.
-the trial court did not observe the rudimentary
principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution.
Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural rules.-the
trial court, without even waiting for respondents motion
for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001Order denying
her motion to dismiss, hurriedly setthe case for hearing.
Also, without allowing therespondent to file her answer to
the petition and
knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet,
thetrial court hastily authorized petitioner to present
hisevidence
ex-parte
-Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997
Rulesof Civil Procedure, as amended, where the
defendingparty fails to file his or her answer to the
petition, thetrial court should order the prosecutor to
intervenefor the State by conducting an investigation
todetermine whether or not there was collusionbetween
the parties. Here, the trial courtdisregarded such
procedure-As stated at the outset, respondent received
thenotice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how
couldshe be present in court on May 2 and 3In Uy vs. Court of Appeals
, we ruled that (a)decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result,a party (as in this case) is
deprived of theopportunity of being heard-Indeed, in
depriving respondent her constitutionaland procedural
right to due process, the trial courtgravely abused its
discretion. It is, therefore,imperative that the instant

79
case for declaration of nullity of marriage be litigated

anew in accordance with the Rules.
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and
BONCODIN (2003)
Facts:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court
upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition,
stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people, considering that public
funds are to be used and appropriated for the
implementation of said law.
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 ing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law
empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates
for
national
offices
and
party
list
representatives, including the President and the VicePresident, violates the constitutional mandate under Art.
VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winningcandidates
for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing
Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of
the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Issues:
1)
Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)
Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3)
Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1)
NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)
YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with
respect only to the votes of the President and VicePresident, and not to the votes of the Senators and
party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4
of the Constitution.
3)
YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with
respect only to the second sentence in its second
paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec.
1 of the Constitution.
For Private

PCIB v. CA (G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 & G. R.

No. 128604)
Facts:
This case is composed of three consolidated
petitions involving several checks, payable to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an
organized syndicate.
I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford issued a
Citibank check amounting to P4,746,114.41 in favor of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of
manufacturers taxes. The check was deposited with
defendant IBAA (now PCIB), subsequently cleared the the
Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds
never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make a
second payment. Defendant refused to reimburse
plaintiff, and so the latter filed a complaint. An
investigation revealed that the check was recalled by
Godofredo Rivera, the general ledger accountant of Ford,
and was replaced by a managers check. Alleged
members of a syndicate deposited the two managers
checks with Pacific Banking Corporation. Ford filed a third
party complaint against Rivera and PBC. The case against
PBC was dismissed. The case against Rivera was likewise
dismissed because summons could not be served. The
trial court held Citibank and PCIB jointly and severally
liable to Ford, but the Court of Appeals only held PCIB
liable.
II. G. R. No. 128604
Ford drew two checks in favor of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting to
P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed
checks payable to payees account only. The checks never
reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make second
payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery
against PCIB and Citibank.
On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi was
discovered. Gorofredo Rivera made the checks but
instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro,
who was the manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro
opened a checking account in the name of a fictitious
person Reynaldo Reyes. Castro deposited a worthless
Bank of America check with the same amount as that
issued by Ford. While being routed to the Central Bank
for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the
genuine one from Ford.
The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank
liable, which decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is contributory negligence on the
part of Ford
(2) Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the
collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank
(Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue?
Ruling:
(1) The general rule is that if the master is
injured by the negligence of a third person and by the

80
concuring contributory negligence of his own servant or

agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior
and will defeat the superior's action against the third
person, asuming, of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of
which complaint is made. As defined, proximate cause is
that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces
the injury and without the result would not have
occurred. It appears that although the employees of Ford
initiated the transactions attributable to an organized
syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the
proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the
CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be
characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the
parties. The mere fact that the forgery was committed by
a drawer-payor's confidential employee or agent, who by
virtue of his position had unusual facilities for
perpertrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper
upon the bank, does notentitle the bank toshift the loss
to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some
circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This
rule likewise applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated
or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them
in their possession.
(2) We have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's
share of negligence when the syndicate achieved its
ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.
a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority
of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of
PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter
requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check No.
SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and
prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it
was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the
payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of
BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal
regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the
payor or its agent. It is a well-settled rule that the
relationship between the payee or holder of commercial
paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is, in
the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of
principal and agent. A bank which receives such paper for
collection is the agent of the payee or holder.
Indeed, the crossing of the check with the
phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the
check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR.
Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to
ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account
only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which
is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its
depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement
"all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed".
Lastly, banking business requires that the one
who first cashes and negotiates the check must take
some precautions to learn whether or not it is genuine.
And if the one cashing the check through indifference or
other circumstance assists the forger in committing the
fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds
of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it
did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of
the person negotiating the instrument before paying the
check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check
For Private

drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to

the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries
with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against
the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were
afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. In such
cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the
cashing bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual
proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of
the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who encashed a
check which had been forged or diverted and in turn
received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of
negligence which proximately contributed to the success
of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may
recover from the holder the money paid on the check.
b. G. R. No. 128604
In this case, there was no evidence presented
confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the
embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking
corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and
scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for
the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within
the course and scope of their employment. It may be
liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards
that species of tort of which malice is an essential
element. In this case, we find a situation where the
PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme
hatched by a syndicate in which its own management
employees had participated. But in this case,
responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBank's
shoulders alone.
Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence
of the clearing stamps. For this reason, Citibank had
indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it,
which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should
be paid only to its designated payee. The point is that as
a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative
negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and
Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both
were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check
Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to
hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of
said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-3261314; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge
that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a
band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating

81
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud.

The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without
any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of
the
CPP
regardless
of
voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membership therein, and for
other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear
and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of
the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states
that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing
false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the
CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex
post
facto
law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Ruling:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the AntiSubversion
Act
of
1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of
guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of
the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it
must be shown that membership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt
acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof
of a members direct participation. Why is membership
For Private

punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to

the organization. Membership makes himself party to its
unlawful
acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature.
Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the
act. The members of the subversive organizations before
the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy
to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be
the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of
Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE
EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of
Expression and Association in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were
done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in
freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following
elements
must
also
be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be
proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully
and
knowingly
done
by
overt
acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and
knowingly
done
by
overt
acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of
the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside
the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC) (2003)
rule-making power is the power to make rules and

regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To
be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and
be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule
or set of rules issued by an administrative body
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is
the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual
controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative
or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed
directly with the regular courts without requiring
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before
going
to
court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
Facts:
The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which
promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the
RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground
of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The
RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the
CA
reversed
RTC.
Ruling:
1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or

82
Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc vs.

Macaraeg G.R. No. 145800 (395 SCRA 720)
Facts:
Respondents are employees of the cooperative
who were dismissed for serious misconduct, and breach
of trust and confidence reposed on them by
management.
The
dismissal
was
due
to
the
misappropriation by respondents through encashing
private checks with funds from the company. The
dismissal was brought before the labor arbiter who ruled
in favor of the respondents, reinstating the petitioner, in
light of the CBA requirement that dismissal case must go
For Private

through grievance committee. The decision of the arbiter

was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the arbiter was correct in ordering the
reinstatement of the respondents.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the issue raised in
the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA
grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties
active
participation
in
the
voluntary
arbitration
proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be
remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear
intention on their part to have the issue of respondents
illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary
arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on the
matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal
dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing
through the grievance machinery.
This leads us to the next issue of whether
respondents were validly dismissed. To constitute a valid
dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met,
namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause, and
(2) the employee must be afforded due process.
We hold that there exist a valid reason to
dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code
allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful
breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it
being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or
that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that
they are responsible for the misconduct and their
participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded of their position. The acts of
the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial
interest of the petitioner.
Nor is there any doubt that petitioner observed
procedural due process in dismissing the respondents.
The respondents were both appraised of the particular
acts or omissions constituting the charges against them.
They gave their own "answer/explanation" to the
charges. They participated in the investigation conducted
at petitioners board. They were represented by counsel
during the investigation. Finally, notices were sent to
them, informing them of the basis of their termination. In
fine, private respondents were given due process before
they were dismissed. Time and again, we have stressed
that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.
Alauya, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos.
152151-52 (395 SCRA 742)
Facts:
Petitioner
and
private
respondents
are
candidates of the ARMM election for the post of regional
assemblyman. COMELEC declared failure of election for 1

83
municipality, while respondent Tamano prayed for the

declaration of failure of election on 5 provinces and also
the suspension of the proclamation of winners. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and private respondent
Sarangani filed an answer and opposition to the
suspension. COMELEC issued an order to suspend
proclamation. Thus, a certiorari and prohibition is filed
before the Supreme Court alleging among others
violation of due process for failure of notice of the
suspension of proclamation as required in Section 242 of
the Omnibus Election Code
Issue/s:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that aparty cannot
successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was
accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral
arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process
when a party is given an opportunity through his
pleadings.
We find no breach of Alauyas right to due
process. Contrary to Alauyas claim, it appears that
notices were given to all concerned parties requiring
them to file their answer to the petition and setting the
case for. The COMELEC noted that Alauya did not appear
during the hearing.
Subsequently, Alauya filed his
Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions. Verily,
Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the
hearing held which he failed to attend and was in fact
heard through the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC.
The petition is DISMISSED.
People vs. Ostia G.R. Nos. 131804 (398 SCRA 132)
Facts:
Accused was initially charged of rape with
homicide which he pleaded not guilty. However, after he
was assigned a new counsel, the accused retracted his
previous plea and instead signified intention to plea guilty
for murder. The lower court allowed his change of plea
and informed him that the penalty for murder was
reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and
that the court may impose the death penalty on him
depending on the circumstances found by the trial court.
Indeed the trial court convicted the accused of
murder
characterized
by
three
aggravating
circumstances.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court was correct in convicting the
accused despite the improvident plea of the accused.
Ruling:
For Private

The Court is convinced that the trial court failed

to comply with its duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. It bears stressing that accused-appellant
did not even know how to read and write.
The trial court failed to explain to accusedappellant:
(a) the nature of murder and the elements
thereof;
(b) that killing a four-year old girl, constituted
treachery, a qualifying circumstance; accused-appellant
being unlettered could not be presumed to understand
the requisites of treachery, a highly technical legal term;
(c) the nature and effect of a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the killing of Beverly and its
effect on the penalty that may be imposed on him;
(d) what heinous crimes are and the meaning
and import of indivisible penalties;
(e) the specific circumstances which may be
considered by the court in the imposition of reclusion
perpetua or death penalty;
(f) whether his plea of guilty after the
prosecution had commenced presenting its evidence may
still be considered by the trial court as a mitigating
circumstance; the nature of civil liabilities that he may be
ordered to pay and the amounts thereof.
The trial court even failed to probe into the
reasons for accused-appellants change of plea from "not
guilty" of rape with homicide to "guilty" of murder and for
his failure to adduce evidence during the reinvestigation
of the case despite having been granted the right to do
so by the trial court. The trial court did not even bother
inquiring from accused-appellant whether he sought the
advice of his counsel before pleading guilty to murder
and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his behalf
to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission
of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Notwithstanding the improvident plea of guilty of
accused-appellant, this Court finds it unnecessary to
remand the case to the trial court. This is so because
independent of accused-appellants plea of guilty and his
testimony admitting liability for Beverlys death, the
evidence
adduced
by
the
prosecution,
albeit
circumstantial, established the guilt of accused-appellant
for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the
lower court removing the appreciation of qualifying
circumstances as they were not alleged in the
information.

84
For Private

2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM,
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 4933.
Respondent claimed that she was born on
October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was
registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her
record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was
misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her
school records and in her marriage certificate. She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in
her use of the surname "Yu".Second, she claims that her
fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu
To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co
Tian)."Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when
it should have been Filipino considering that her father
and mother never got married. Only her deceased father
was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that
her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is
a Filipino citizen.
The trial court granted respondents petition.
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
decision.
Issue/s:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the correction of the citizenship of
respondent from Chinese to Filipino despite
the fact that respondent never demonstrated
any compliance with the legal requirements for
election of citizenship.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing respondent to continue using her
fathers surname despite its finding that
respondent is an illegitimate child.
Ruling:
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision
in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect

85
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a

statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines." Plainly, the above
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. As
such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth.
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis
Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to
use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she
has been using ever since she can remember. In this
regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement
for her to use her fathers surname.To bar her at this
time from using her fathers surname which she has used
for four decades without any known objection from
anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of
the reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname
is to avoid confusion.
The instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893
dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil
Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following
corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim.
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and
SPORTS
AND
GAMES
ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004
Facts:
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the
"Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming," executed by
respondent
Philippine
Amusement
and
Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor
of respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment
Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors
approved an instrument denominated as "Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted SAGE the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station
in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors,
provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the
integrity and fairness of the games. Pursuant to the
authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
For Private

operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a

trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of
winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the
Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition,
praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of
SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling
on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason
that the said decree could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its
enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet
inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space.
franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and

a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must
not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but
must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly
adhere to its terms and conditionalities.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to
enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is
not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share
its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate
its power in view of the legal principle of delegata
potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly
authorized to do so.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant of
Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE
is declared NULL and VOID.
Issue/s:
DORCAS G. PETALLAR vs.

JUDGE JUANILLO M.
PULLOS, MCTC, SAN FRANCISCO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004]
1.) Whether or not respondent PAGCOR is

authorized under P.D. 1869 to operate
gambling activities on the internet
2.) Whether PAGCOR acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it authorized
respondent SAGE to operate internet gambling
on the basis of its right to operate and
maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
amusement places under Section 10 of P.D.
1869
Ruling:
Considering that the instant petition involves
legal questions that may have serious implications on
public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite
legal standing to file this petition.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege
granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of
public concern which cannot be exercised at will and
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as
the government may impose on them in the interest of
the public. After a circumspect consideration of the
foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits
of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise
to SAGE.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an
agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the
latter the authority to operate and maintain sports
betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In
essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege
to actively participate, partake and share PAGCORs
franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of

86
Facts:
In a complaint-affidavit dated February 7, 2002,
Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del
Norte, stands charged by complainant Dorcas G. Petallar
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct; as well as Rule 140, Section
4 and Rule 70, Sections 10 and 11 of the Rules of Court;
for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137
for Forcible Entry.
For his part, respondent judge in his comment,
by way of 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 2002, stated
that he handed down his decision in Case No. 137 on
June 2, 2002. He pointed out that said decision is, in fact,
the subject of an appeal. Respondent submitted that the
charges against him had become moot.
The Office of the Court Administrator observed
that said decision was rendered out of time, in breach of
Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that judgment must be rendered within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position
papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
On March 30, 2003, respondent retired from the
judiciary
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 70, Sec. 11 of
the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering
judgment.
Ruling:
Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11
of the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering
judgment. The records show that the parties in Special
Civil Action Case No. 137 had filed their respective
position papers as early as February 2, 2000. Thus,
respondent had until March 4, 2000 to render judgment.
Had there been circumstances which prevented him from
handing down his decision within the prescribed period,
For Private

respondent should have at least requested from this

Court for an extension of time within which to render
judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137
was decided only on June 2, 2002 or two (2) years and
some three (3) months beyond the reglementary period.
Moreover, he could not even come up with an explanation
for the delay.
We cannot overemphasize the Courts policy on
prompt resolution of disputes. Justice delayed is justice
denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision
within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious
violation of Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution.
Respondent Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former
presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco, Surigao del Norte, is found LIABLE for undue
delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137,
tantamount to GROSS INEFFICIENCY. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P10,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement pay and benefits.
However, no action was taken by LA Cuyuca on the said

motion.
LA Cuyuca rendered a decision holding that the
respondent was illegally dismissed and directed the
petitioner to pay P62,530 as backwages and P19,240 as
separation pay to the private respondent. LA Cuyuca
declared that the private respondent was denied of her
right to due process before she was dismissed from her
employment and that the petitioner failed to show that it
notified the private respondent of the charges against
her.
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the decision
to the NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its right to a
formal hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her
decision. The NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
NLRC. The petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition.
SHOPPES MANILA, INC., vs. THE HON. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER
ERMITA ABRASALDO-CUYUCA and LORIE TORNO,
G.R. No. 147125
January 14, 2004
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in

finding that the absence of a formal hearing did
not amount to a denial of petitioners right to
due process
2.

affirming the illegality of private respondents
dismissal despite the existence of just causes in
support thereof
Facts:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged
in garments manufacturing using the brand name
"KAMISETA." On May 6, 1994, the petitioner employed
private respondent Lorie Torno as trimmer. Sometime
thereafter, the petitioner started to receive information
from the head of its production department that,
according to other employees, Buan and the private
respondent had been stealing "KAMISETA" items from the
factory. The petitioner had the witnesses interviewed.
Susan Paligamba and Loly dela Cruz, co-employees of
Buan and the private respondent, executed unverified
statements implicating the latter. During the said
inspection, the representatives found the following items:
KAMISETA fabrics (approx. 1 yds), 2 pcs. shirts made
out of KAMISETA excess cuttings, NAUTICAL SHOP wall
paper.
The private respondent failed to appear during
the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner
decided to dismiss the private respondent from her
employment. When notified of the petitioners decision,
the private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, non-payment of service incentive leave pay
and 13th-month pay against the petitioner before the
National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The
petitioner filed a motion for the labor arbiter to conduct a
formal investigation on its claim. Acting on the motion,
LA Tumanong granted the same and set the case for
hearing. In the meantime, LA Tumanong was replaced by
Labor Arbiter Ermita Abrasaldo-Cuyuca (LA Cuyuca for
brevity) who issued an order declaring that the case was
submitted
for
decision.
The
petitioner
filed
a
manifestation and motion informing LA Cuyuca that a
formal hearing had been set by LA Tumanong and
requested that the case be set for hearing anew.

87
Ruling:
The petition is barren of merit. Petitioner did not
have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and
merely because Labor Arbiter Tumanong granted its
motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant to Section
5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,the
labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or
not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in
cases brought before him for adjudication. The holding of
a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor
arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand
as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to
decide a labor case before him, based on the position
papers and supporting documents of the parties, without
a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due
process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are
supposed to attach all the documents that would prove
their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be
conducted or was necessary.
Similarly, we affirm the finding of the CA that
the private respondent was illegally dismissed. In order
to effect a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there
be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of
the Labor Code; and (b) the employee be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
As stated by the CA, the petitioner had failed to
show that it had complied with the two-notice
For Private

requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement

of the cause for the termination to afford the employee
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b)
if the employer decides to terminate the services of the
employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the
decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason
therefore.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCO BALLESTER,
[G.R. No. 152279. January 20, 2004]
Facts:
Appellant Franco Ballester was charged with
Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4038. That on the third
week of January, 1999, at noontime, at Barangay
Catumag, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, by means of force, threat and intimidation and
while armed with a knife did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) MARICEL ODOO, 12 years of age, against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice. On
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered
judgment finding appellant guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
there being no mitigating circumstance but with the
presence of one aggravating circumstance of dwelling. In
his Brief, appellant assails his conviction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full
weight to the testimony of the offended party and in
not giving full weight and credence to the denial and
alibi of the accused and his witnesses
Ruling:
A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory. Thus we have
followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy,
the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to
crimes which shock the conscience and numb the senses.
More importantly, the alleged inconsistencies referred to
by the defense pertain to matters extraneous to the
crime of rape that do not detract from the fact that the
offended party had indeed been sexually defiled.
The defense of alibi and denial interposed by
appellant must likewise fail. For alibi to serve as a basis
of acquittal it must be established with clear and
convincing evidence, with the requisites of time and place
strictly observed. Where the accused fails to convincingly
show that it was physically impossible for him to be at

88
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, as

in the instant case, alibi must altogether be rejected.
In imposing the maximum penalty of death, the
trial court took into account the absence of a mitigating
circumstance and the presence of one aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. This is clearly erroneous. Not
being alleged in the Information, dwelling cannot be
properly considered in determining the imposable
penalty. Indeed, it would be a denial of appellants right
to be informed of the charges against him which would
amount to a denial of due process if he were to be meted
the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying
circumstance not alleged in the information. Rule 110,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that the complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given in the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstance.
When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime, the minimum penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua,
should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Franco Ballester is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is further
ordered to INDEMNIFY the victim the reduced sum of
P50,00.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), CLAUDIO
FRANCISCO, JR. and RUDY PACAO, G.R. No. 142051
February 24, 2004
Facts:
Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo
Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt. Roberto Cana,
Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David
Valenciano, Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and
Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for the fatal
shooting of one Marcial "Boyet" Azada.
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1989, inside the Le Janni Restaurantthe
above named accused conniving, confederating and
helping one another, moved by one common interest and
design to kill, did then and there with Pat. Pacao, using
his service pistol caliber .38 TM Squire Bingham and
accused Claudio "Danny" Francisco, Jr. likewise using a
gun TM Smith and Wesson, caliber .38 revolver with
Serial No. 11327, with treachery shot one Marcial "Boyet"
Azada y Garza while the latter had both arms raised and
his back was turned against accused Pat. Rudy Pacao a
means employed and consciously adopted by both
accused to ensure the death of said Marcial "Boyet"
Azada without danger to their persons and thereafter
with criminal intent and design to conceal his (Pacao)
criminal act did knowingly and willfully altered, tampered
For Private

and/or attempted to destroy his service pistol, while

accused Francisco did knowingly and deliberately planted
the gun he used in shooting his victim on the latters
(Azada) body, all of said acts of the herein accused were
done with the sole aim and purpose to conceal and
mislead the authorities as to the authorship of the crime.
In a decision dated February 7, 1994, the court
a quo exonerated accused Pellas and Alosan and
convicted respondents Francisco Jr. and Pacao for
homicide and attempted murder. On appeal, the trial
courts decision was reversed and respondents Francisco
and Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged.
In absolving respondent Pacao of any culpability,
the Court of Appeals found that Azada, instead of
surrendering peacefully to the apprehending police
officers, resisted arrest and fired his gun towards their
direction. Respondent Pacao was therefore acting in selfdefense and in fulfillment of his duty as a police officer
when he returned fire at the victim.
The prosecution, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, vehemently challenges the acquittal
in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
exonerating the private respondents notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence of their guilt.
Issue/s:
1.
2.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper legal recourse for the reversal of the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of
acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution
Ruling:
The special civil action for certiorari is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The
raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed.
While petitioner in the case at bar ostensibly
alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the discussions therein however
ascribe to the Court of Appeals errors of judgment, not
errors of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner delves on,
among others, the testimonies relative to the positions of
the victim vis--vis the accused, and the opinions of the
expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence.
Obviously, these are errors that goes deeply into the
appellate courts appreciation and assessment of the
evidence proffered by the parties. On this score alone,
the dismissal of the instant petition is called for.

89
As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the

case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the permissibility
of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In our
jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a
safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to
the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States.
In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable.
Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco
where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not
only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by
the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said
petition would constitute a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we
clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e.
the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether
it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of
Appeals.18
Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having
been found not guilty by a court of competent
jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from
repeated attempts by the State at conviction and their
anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore
be accorded finality in faithful adherence to the rule
against double jeopardy. Petition is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARIEL

MACARANG, G.R. Nos. 151249-50
February
26, 2004
Facts:
On or about November 8, 1999, in San Juan,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, being the father of Armie Christine
Macarang y Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Armie
Christine Macarang y Amboy, 13 years old, against her
will and consent. In Criminal Case No. 116969-H, the
accused is convicted of the crime of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection and the accessory penalty provided by law and
to pay the costs.
Appellee, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its brief, entitled "Brief For The
Appellee With Recommendation To Remand The Cases To
The Court A Quo For Further Proceedings", calling our
attention to the fact that the trial court had considered
appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence
without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the
consequences of such waiver.
When the case was called supposedly for the
initial presentation of defense evidence, the defense
counsel manifested that the accused had intimated to
him that he was not prepared to testify, the reason being
For Private

that he was just recuperating from an illness. Considering

that the trial of this case had been repeatedly postponed
and that Defense Counsel had been the subject at least
two (2) show cause orders, reset for the last time to
August 28 and September 18, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning, with a warning that if on the next scheduled
hearing accused would not still be ready to present
evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right
to do so.
Record shows that such presentation had been
repeatedly postponed mostly at the instance of the
accused and/or his lawyer. Thus, as prayed for by the
Public Prosecutor and pursuant to the order of August 28,
2001, accused is now deemed to have waived his right to
present evidence. As further prayed for, this case is now
deemed submitted for decision.
Based on the prosecution evidence, the trial
court, on November 13, 2001 promulgated its Decision
dated October 17, 2001, convicting appellant of the crime
of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death in each of the criminal cases.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the appellant was deprived of his right
to due process when the trial court had considered
appellant to have waived his right to present his
evidence without any showing that the latter was fully
aware of the consequences of such waiver.
Ruling:
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty
may be death, as in the present cases, the presiding
judge is called upon to see to it that the accused is made
aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning
given by the trial court. It must be noted that the waiver
of the right to present defense evidence in the present
cases was not even voluntary nor upon the instance of
the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently
to penalize appellant, after he and his counsel repeatedly
moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings.
Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that
the next time that he would not be ready with his
defense evidence, he would be deemed to have waived
his right to present it, did not satisfy appellants
constitutional right to due process. The trial court should
have first apprised appellant or explained to him in clear
terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant
to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial
court granted the motion of appellants counsel to
withdraw his appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no
more counsel. The trial court did not ask him if he would
wish to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or
want the court to designate a de oficio counsel for him.
It is obvious then that the appellant was
deprived of his right to due process.
In the light of the foregoing, we have no other
recourse but to set aside the judgment of the trial court
convicting appellant and order the remand of the records
of the case to the trial court to conduct further
proceedings.

90
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRISCILLA DEL

NORTE, G.R. No. 149462 March 29, 2004
Facts:
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997,
their group was tasked to serve a search warrant against
a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North
Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
6425. They were ordered to "forthwith seize and take
possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and
marijuana leaves." They coordinated with the barangay
officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them
by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door
was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced
themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the
door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant.
They informed her they had a search warrant, but
appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It was
only after some prodding by the barangay officials that
she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted
the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in
Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They
asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and
said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was
brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon
identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana in
court.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search
warrant against her. She contended that she lived at 376
Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, and that
on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend,
Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to
Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she
waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several
people introduced themselves as policemen, made her
sign a white paper and entered the house.
The trial court convicted appellant. In this
appeal, she raises the lone error that "the lower court
erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt."
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
establish who owned the house where the search was
conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did
not automatically make her the owner of the marijuana
found therein. She likewise argues that the search
warrant specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the
owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is
not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the
confiscated drugs as evidence against her.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
For Private

Ruling:
We reverse the trial court's decision. The
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
We cannot countenance the irregularity of the
search warrant. The authorities did not have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search.
They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the
warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant
that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of
the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising
Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the
same person, but said barangay official was not
presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge
on pure hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed
to discharge its burden of proving appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses
failed to establish appellant's ownership of the house
where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for
their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that
appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited
articles at the time of her arrest. In fact, it seems that
the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which
were not in plain view. In all criminal cases, it is
appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In
the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution's evidence
treads on shaky ground.
The decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 161872
April 13, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17,
2004.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No.
04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same

91
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated

February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated
by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner
seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution,1 by limiting the number of
qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations
under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the
Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of
candidates since it does not ask for the candidates biodata and his program of government.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioners right to equal access to
opportunities for public service is violated upon
COMELECs refusal to give due course to petitioners
Certificate of Candidacy
Ruling:
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access"
provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to
public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions 9 of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution
No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the
For Private

instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse

to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. The rationale behind the prohibition
against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly.
The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not
direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate.
This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review
would necessarily take into account the matters which
the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
The question of whether a candidate is a
nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court.
Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. As to petitioners attacks on the
validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice
it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is
hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete
the reception of evidence and report its findings to this
Court with deliberate dispatch.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDIE
MURILLO, G.R. No. 134583 July 14, 2004
Facts:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in
the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Paz Abiera with a bladed weapon on her chest,
thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds
which directly caused her death after the latter slapped,
scolded him and uttered hurful words. With the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty and abuse of
superior strength.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused be prosecuted of the
severest penalty on account of his improvident
plea of guilty.
Ruling:

92
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence.--- When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
The reason for this rule is that courts must
necessarily proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form death for the
reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.
Experience has shown that innocent persons have at
times pleaded guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment,
or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. An accused might be admitting
his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and
liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequences of his plea. The judge
therefore has the duty to ensure that the accused does
not suffer by reason of mistaken impressions. Requiring
the trial court to take further evidence would also aid this
Court on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.
It is well established that the due process
requirement is part of a person's basic rights and is not a
mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. An accused needs the aid of counsel lest he
be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
complexity or of his own ignorance and bewilderment.
Indeed, the right to counsel springs from the
fundamental principle of due process.
The right to
counsel, however, means more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is sufficiently accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. This right
necessitates an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. Indeed, the right of an accused to
counsel finds meaning only in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client and an
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance which is not
just a simple perfunctory representation.
While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per
se rule that once a plea of guilty is found improvidently
he is at once entitled to a remand, the circumstances of
this case warrant that a remand to the trial court be
made. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, the
Court has held that it must be shown that as a result of
such irregularity there was inadequate representation of
facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the
trial. Where the improvident plea of guilty was followed
by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at
all played by the defense, we have ruled that this
procedure was just too meager to accept as being the
standard constitutional due process at work enough to
forfeit a human life. What justifies the remand of the
For Private

criminal case to the trial court is the unfairness or

complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea
of guilt. In this case, apart from the testimony of
appellant, the prosecution does not have any other
evidence to hold him liable for the crime charged.
In view of the foregoing, we find that it is
imperative to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only
the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his
lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.
AIDA POBLETE and HON. REUBEN P. DE LA CRUZ
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM LU , G.R. No.
128859 June 29, 2004
Facts:
Sometime in 1995, upon complaint of private
respondent William Lu, filed an Information against the
petitioner
Aida
Poblete,
for
Estafa.
The Information alleged that the petitioner committed the
crime of estafa in relation to P.D. 818 by willfully and
unlawfully making, drawing and issuing to William Lu,
with deliberate intent to defraud and by means of deceit,
false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneous with, checks amounting to P2,318,047.60.
The Information did not recommend bail.
On December 18, 1995, counsel for the
petitioner, accused Aida Poblete, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation. She prayed therein that execution of the
warrant of arrest be held in abeyance pending the
reinvestigation of the case.
The lower court issued an Order denying
accuseds Motion for Reinvestigation and directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, with the bail for her
provisional liberty fixed at P40,000.00. The Order stated
that the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right
since the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated February
9, 1996, private respondent sought the setting aside of
the Order, stressing that the imposable penalty upon the
accused in view of the amount involved would exceed 30
years and that applying section 1 of P.D. 818 in relation to
section 3 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail would not
be a matter of right. That being the case, hearing on any
application for bail would be mandatory, he urged.
On March 31, 1997 the Court of Appeals
reversed the Order of the presiding judge and required
him to conduct hearing on the bail issue. The appellate
court ruled that P.D. 818 needs no further interpretation
or construction, pointing out that the trial judges
pronouncement that the penalty for the crime charged at
bar should be termed reclusion perpetua only in
connection with the accessory penalties imposed under
the Revised Penal Code is erroneous. In making the
pronouncement and in granting bail ex parte, the Court
of Appeals stressed, the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, the petitioner elevated the Court of
Appeals D E C I S I O N to this Court by a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

93
Issue/s:
Whether or not bail would still be required when the
accused was already acquitted.
Ruling:
Before deciding the case, the Court asked for the
complete records of the case from the lower court.
The Court for the first time learned that the
criminal case subject of this case was dismissed as early
as October 15, 1999, when the lower court, acting upon
the accusedsDemurrer to Evidence, issued an Order
acquitting the accused. With the acquittal of the accused,
the instant case which involves the issue of bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused has become moot and
academic. This Court has no alternative but to dismiss
the Petition.
GEORGE VINCOY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 156558
June 14, 2004
Facts:
On or about March 14, 1996, the accused, by
means of deceit defraud Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando
Flores, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
represented that he could mobilize 30 dump trucks and 2
payloaders for use of the complainants subject to the
payment ofP600,000.00 mobilization fund and, believing
this representation to be true, the said complainants paid
and delivered the said amount to the accused at Banco
de Oro Bank, Pasig City Branch, which representation
accused knew well to be false and fraudulent and were
only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver
as in fact they gave and delivered the said amount
of P600,000.00 to the respondent, and accused once in
possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants, Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in
the amount ofP600,000.00.
In May 1996, Lizah Cimafranca filed a complaint
for estafa against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City. It was, however, dismissed on
the ground that petitioners obligation was purely civil in
nature and for complainants failure to attend the
hearings.4 On October 8, 1996, Lizah Cimafranca, joined
by Rolando Flores, re-filed the complaint charging the
same offense against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City which filed the corresponding
information in court, root of the present petition.
The trial court sustained the version of the
prosecution. The trial judge found incredible petitioners
averment that he failed to notice that the check in
question was not issued in his name. A judgment of
conviction was rendered on February 23, 2000.
Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals to no
avail. Hence, this petition for review.
For Private

He points out that the dismissal of the previous

complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca by the City
Prosecutors Office of Pasay City supports his acquittal.
Issue/s:
Whether
or
not
dismissal
during
investigation constitute double jeopardy?
preliminary
Ruling:
The
dismissal
of
a
similar
complaint
for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City
Prosecutors Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the
petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioners prosecution. It
is settled that the dismissal of a case during its
preliminary investigation does not constitute double
jeopardy9 since a preliminary investigation is not part of
the trial and is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence but only such
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and accused is probably guilty
thereof.10 For this reason, it cannot be considered
equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal.
Hence, petitioner was properly charged before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which is not bound by
the determination made by the Pasay City Prosecutor
who may have had before him a different or incomplete
set of evidence than that subsequently presented before
the Pasig City Prosecutor.
BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004
Facts:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises
de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and
Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On
September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B.
Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine
National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to
the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two
boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of
Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A
heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and,
moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some
wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team
was then brought to petitioners house in Daram, where
they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there petitioner is entitled to
presumption of innocence when all the elements of
arbitrary detention are not attendant.

94
Ruling:
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians
testimony negate the element of detention. More
importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective. Addressed to the mind of the victim, its
presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but
must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the crime. As such,
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were
not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in
the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was
thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their
testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1
Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent.
The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the proposition that
the private offended parties were taken to petitioners
house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the
next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that
petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised
them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was
rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with
the private offended parties and even laughed with them
while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent
with a hostile confrontation between the parties.
Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served
alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left
the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. He is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the
accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of
right. For the prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on
its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is
concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also
weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of
the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys. When the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as
in this case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is compatible
with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and
the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.
JORDAN P. OKTUBRE vs. JUDGE RAMON P.
VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444 July 22, 2004
Facts:
For Private

Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy

Louise D'Arcy vda. De Paler ("D'Arcy"), a non-resident
American. D'Arcy is the widow of Abraham Paler
("Abraham"), a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew.
During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey
commercial and residential building ("Paler building") in
Maasin city. D'Arcy, through complainant, administered
the Paler building.
Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin
in March 1998, respondent Judge, with D'Arcy's
permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days.
He sought an extension of his stay but D'Arcy turned
down his request since during her next visit to the
country she would use the room respondent Judge then
occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to
continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a
room reserved for a sister of Abraham.
Complainant filed a complaint with the
respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room.
Complainant also charged respondent Judge for taking
the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building.
Complainant and respondent Judge met at the Office
of Punong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there was
no settlement as
respondent
Judge
questioned
complainant's residency in Abgao.
Complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested
and detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest and a
Commitment Order issued by the respondent Judge, the
basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery
supported by an affidavit executed by the respondent
Judge Ramon Velasco himself. Also, in Criminal Case for
"Malicious Mischief", records show that the complaint is
supported by the lone affidavit of the same..
Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent Judge
of the warrant of arrest, herein complainant elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court, via "Certiorari and/or
Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction". The RTC in its
Order dated December 7, 2000 ruled that "respondent
Judge in issuing a warrant of arrest violative of Rule 112,
Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court may not only be
committing grave abuse of discretion but gross ignorance
of the law.
Complainant sought to annul the warrant of
arrest which was consequently granted by the RTC.
Because of these events, complainant prays that
the Court discipline respondent Judge for using his sala's
letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own
criminal complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest
upon the complainant. And W/N failure to comply with
this mandatory procedure would result to his dismissal
from service.
Ruling:
The Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA")
recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10, 000 for

95
Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave

Abuse of Authority is well-taken. However, the Court finds
the recommended penalty disproportionate to respondent
Judge's offenses and instead imposes on him the penalty
of dismissal from service.
Here, although he is the complainant in the
three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not
disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued
a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in
the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so,
respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication
Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary
stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation
in this case does not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision
itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More
importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting
in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel
within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to
prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a
party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his
own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that
such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule
3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judge's subsequent inhibition from
the three cases does not detract from his culpability for
he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the
first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks
to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due
process. This became fait accompli when respondent
Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging
was the effect of respondent Judge's conduct on the
image of the judiciary, which without a doubt,
immeasurably suffered from it.
Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when
he proceeded to issue the warrant of arrest. Section 6 of
Rule 112 provides:
When warrant of arrest may issue. x x x (b)
By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial court
judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest.
This is the same procedure prescribed in Section
2, Article III of the Constitution and in Section 5, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A judge
who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying
with such mandatory procedure is liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
We have held, in a number of cases before this
Court, that the procedure described in Section 6 of Rule
112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same
would amount to a denial of due process. With respect
to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of
arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that
probable cause exists: 1) through an examination under
oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses,
which examination should be 2) in the form of searching
questions and answers. This rule is not merely a
procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to
For Private

two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the

fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the due process requirement.
The only instance where the judge may dispense
with such procedure is when the application for the
warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial Court
judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the
report of the prosecutor on the finding of probable cause.
R
TRANSPORT
CORPORATION
vs.
ROGELIO
EJANDRA, G.R. No. 148508 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Private respondent Rogelio Ejandra worked as a
bus driver of petitioner R Transport Corporation for
almost six years, from July 15, 1990 to January 31, 1996
until he was apprehended by an Officer of the Land
Transportation Office for obstruction of traffic for which
his license was confiscated. He was able to retrieve his
license only a week thereafter. This led the respondent
to indefinite suspension. He was likewise accused of
causing damage to the bus he used to drive. He denied
the charge, considering that the damage was sustained
during the week that he did not drive the bus.
Petitioner
denied
private
respondents
allegations and claimed that private respondent, a
habitual absentee, abandoned his job. Had it been true,
he should have presented an apprehension report and
informed petitioner of his problems with the LTO. But he
did not. Petitioner further argued that private respondent
was not an employee because theirs was a contract of
lease and not of employment, with petitioner being paid
on commission basis.
Labor arbiter Rogelio Yulo rendered his decision
in favor of private respondent. That the dismissal of
Rogelio Ejandra was without cause, therefore, illegal and
ORDERING R-Transport REINSTATE him to his former
position without loss of seniority and other benefits and
to pay him backwages from the time of his dismissal until
actual reinstatement.
Labor arbiter Yulo gave no weight to petitioners
claim that private respondent abandoned his work. His
one-week absence did not constitute abandonment of
work considering that it took him the whole week to
reclaim his license. Private respondent could not retrieve
it unless and until the apprehending officer first
transmitted it to their office. His inability to drive for
petitioner that whole week was therefore not his fault and
petitioner could be held liable for illegal dismissal. Due
process was not accorded to private respondent who was
never given the opportunity to contest the charge of
abandonment. Moreover, assuming actual abandonment,
petitioner should have reported such fact to the nearest
employment office of the Department of Labor and
Employment. But no such report was ever made.
The NLRC rendered a decision affirming the
decision of the labor arbiter. It is very clear that from no
less than appellants admission, that complainant was not
afforded his right to due process prior to the severance of
his employment with respondents. Appellants defense of
denying the existence of employer-employee relationship
with the complainant based on the manner by which
complainant was being paid his salary, cannot hold water.

96
Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari on the ground that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
labor arbiter. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision.
Categorizing the issues raised by petitioner as factual,
the appellate court held that the findings of fact of the
labor arbiter (affirmed by the NLRC) were entitled to
great respect because they were supported by substantial
evidence. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner
was barred from denying the existence of an employeremployee relationship because petitioner invoked its
rights under the law and jurisprudence as an employer in
dismissing private respondent.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner can validly sever their
employment with respondent without following the
procedural requirement of due process due to the nonexistence of employee-employer relationship.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the labor arbiter, the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that
private respondent worked as a driver of one of the buses
of petitioner and was paid on a 10% commission basis.
After he was apprehended for a traffic violation, his
license was confiscated. When he informed petitioners
general manager of such fact, the latter gave him money
to redeem his license. He went to the LTO office everyday
but it was only after a week that he was able to get back
his license. When he reported back to work, petitioners
manager told him to wait until his services were needed
again. Considering himself dismissed, private respondent
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
We have no reason to disturb all these factual
findings because they are amply supported by substantial
evidence.
In addition to the fact that petitioner had no
valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it
violated the latters right to procedural due process by
not giving him the required notice and hearing. Section
2, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9
provides for the procedure for dismissal for just or
authorized cause. SEC.2. Standards of due process;
requirement of notice xxx.
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136264 May 28, 2004
Facts:
The Assistant City Prosecutor accuses Lourdes
Angeles, Estrella Mapa, Atty. Ponciano R. Gupit, and ATTY.
Reynaldo P. Dinayacyac of the crime of Falsificartion of
Public Document.
Before his arraignment, petitioner Dimayacyac
moved to quash the information on 2 grounds. First, that
the officer who filed the information had no legal
authority to do so, and second, that more than one
offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash,
petitioner was arraigned.
For Private

By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T.

Dayaw was holding that the "grant or denial of Motion to
Dismiss whether the accused is arraigned or not is
discretionary on the part of the court, thus granted the
petitioners motion to quash upon the second ground.
Accordingly, the information was quashed.
More than 2 years after the quashal of the
information, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the
same accused including petitioner 2 informations for
falsification of public documents. The Informations arose
from the questioned acts of falsification subject of the
earlier quashed information.
Petitioner later filed with a motion for the
quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy. He
argued he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was
indicted before for the same offenses and the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996,
public respondent, Judge Vicente Q. Roxas to which the 2
informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually
lodged, held that the information in Criminal Case No. Q93-49988 involved a different document as that involved
in the first one which had already been quashed.
Resolution of the motion to quash the information in the
second one was stayed pending the submission by
petitioner of the documents required by the court a quo.
Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the
information and ordered petitioners arraignment, he
holding that said case did not place petitioner in double
jeopardy.
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which denied his petition stating
in its Decision that since the Information in the first
Criminal Case, on petitioners motion, was quashed on
the ground that more than one offense was charged, he
is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another
Information for an offense included in the charge subject
of the first Information.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner

under the second Information would constitute
double jeopardy, considering that when the first
Information in Criminal was previously quashed,
he had already been arraigned; and
2.
Whether or not petitioners constitutional right to

a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated.
Ruling:
With regard to the first issue, we are in accord
with the ruling of the CA that not all the elements for
double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. To raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first.

97
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid

indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
The duplicitous information was a valid
indictment. We ruled in the long line of cases that when
an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time
prescribed, he is thus deemed to have waived the defect
in the Information. The accused who fails to object prior
to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be
found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein
and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the
elements of such component crimes in the said
information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that
an accused be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous
information is valid since such defect may be waived and
the accused, because of such waiver, could be convicted
of as many offenses as those charged in the information
and proved during trial.
It should be noted that the termination of the
first Information was upon motion of petitioner who, on
April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent Motion to
Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23,
1991. The reinstatement of criminal case against the
accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy
since the dismissal of the information by the trial court
had been effected at his own instance when the accused
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case. In this case,
considering that since the dismissal of the previous
criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his
motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is
thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such
dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this
case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the
dismissal be without accuseds express consent, is not
present.
As to whether the subsequent filing of the two
informations constitutes a violation of petitioners
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, we
rule in the negative. There is no showing that petitioner
was made to endure any vexatious process during the
two-year period before the filing of the proper
informations.
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs.
Sandiganbayan14 where we held that:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like
the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
In the determination of whether or not that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also
For Private

be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each

case.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner
never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. The only ground he raised in assailing the
subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will
be subjected to double jeopardy. Petitioner did not raise
the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
We are not convinced that the filing of the informations
against petitioner after two years was an unreasonable
delay.
MERIAM BALAGTAS vs. OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO,
JR., Judge, MTCC, Branch 2 Cebu City, A.M. No. MTJ01-1377 June 17, 2004
OCA, therefore, recommends the dismissal of the case

against the respondent judge but admonishes him to
refrain from resorting to insulting and offensive language
in his future judicial actions.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not respondent Judge should be

punished from resorting to insulting and
offensive language.
2.
Whether or not the respondent judge can be

punished for gross ignorance of the law because
of violation of the basic and fundamental rights,
due process.
Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the sworn Letter-Complaint1 of Ms. Meriam
Balagtas accusing Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr.,
MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, of knowingly rendering an
unjust interlocutory order, gross ignorance of the law and
serious irregularities in the performance of judicial duties
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 82863-R and
83186-R, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Hermann Peith," for violation of B.P. 22.
Balagtas was the private complainant in the
aforementioned criminal cases.
She alleges that accused Hermann Peith filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad which was
granted by the respondent judge on the same day it was
filed without notice to her or the prosecution.
Balagtas then filed a Motion for the Inhibition of
Judge Olegario Sarmiento on grounds of bias and
partiality. She claimed therein that she filed a Motion for
the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against Peith
which the respondent judge did not act upon. However, in
a move evincing bias in favor of Peith, the respondent
judge granted his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for
Abroad.
The respondent judge granted the motion for
inhibition. He remarked that "Herein judge is responsibly
informed that the herein parties have had a special
personal relationship only that accused married another
woman. This Court does not want to be an instrument of
the misgivings, sourgrapings and importunings of
complainant." And that Balagtas "can push through with
her personal agenda of vendetta without unnecessarily
dragging" him into it once Peith sets foot on Philippine
soil.
He further states that he "cannot act as
Berdugo for complainants personal ill motive and selfish
interest."
Balagtas now asserts that the respondent
judges Orders are unjust and amount to gross ignorance
of the law. She also claims that the respondent judge
committed serious irregularities in the performance of his
duties.
The Court referred the complaint to another
Judge for investigation, during its pendency another
Judge took over.
The OCA sustains with modification the findings
and recommendation of the investigating judges. The

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Ruling:
On the first issue, the respondent judge
deserves the sternest reproof for making these remarks.
Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions
in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably
upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial
actuations. Moreover, intemperate speech detracts from
the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the
constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.
On the second issue, the Rules of Court is
explicit on this point. A motion without notice of hearing
is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
question which the court could decide. The court has no
reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive
it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the
movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will
be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a
capricious change of mind in order to provide due process
to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.
The essence of due process is the right to be
heard. Therefore, every motion which may prejudice the
rights of a party should be set for hearing. The
intendment of the law will never be achieved if notice is
not served, such as in this case.
In granting Peiths Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic
and fundamental constitutional principle, due process.
When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are
expected to have more than just a modicum of
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN HORNTON for and in behalf of the
minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
For Private

Facts:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a
Filipino, were married. A year later, respondent gave
birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew
restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to
return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In
fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the
family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying
her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the
child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to
ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the
barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing
there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold
of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila
and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition
for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family
Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
Ruling:
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out
that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides
that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.
The petition is granted.

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The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of

the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody
of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is
being transferred from one place to another, which seems
to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
The primordial consideration is the welfare and
best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA
8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote
the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and
transient will not result in one of the situations that the
legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is
paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus
proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs
privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought
to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and
well being will be prejudiced.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to
search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
explained by the Solicitor General:
That the serving officer will have to "search for
the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a
task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of
the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since
the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the
Philippines.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. MAXIMO
IBARRIENTOS y PERICO, G.R. Nos. 148063-64
June 17, 2004
Facts:
On August 1996 the accused who is the Uncle of

the victim, LORILIE a.k.a. LORELIE I. BRILLO, then an 8
years old minor while in their house, did then and there,
with lewd design willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
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and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Lorelie

I. Brillo, who afterwards reported the incident to her
Aunt, Imelda Ibarrientos, the wife of the accused, to her
damage and prejudice.
On February 1998, in Barangay Sagurong,
Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, the above-named
accused, being the father of and having parental
authority, influence and moral ascendancy over victim
JOAN IBARRIENTOS, his 7 year old daughter, while the
latter was sick and sleeping in their bedroom, did then
and there, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie on top of her and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her which she reported immediately
to her mother, Imelda, to her damage and prejudice.
The trial court found that the appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both counts of rape,
and sentenced him to death.
Issue/s:
Whether or not accused is sentenced to the
severest penalty when the qualifying circumstance was
not specifically alleged in the information.
Ruling:
We agree with the OSG. The Aquino case settled
already the issue on the proper allegation of
circumstances. What properly informs the accused of the
nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of
the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the
crime to a higher category.
The new Rules on Criminal Procedure require the
qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the
information, in order to comply with the constitutional
right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is
to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to
prevent surprises during the trial. This requirement is
satisfied as long as the circumstances are alleged in the
information, even if these are not specified as
aggravating or qualifying circumstances.
In the present two cases of rape, however, the
death penalty imposed on appellant is improper and
erroneous.
Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase
its penalty to death cannot be the subject of speculation.
The appellant cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or
admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity
and irreversibility of capital punishment. Proof of the age
of the victim cannot consist merely of testimony. Neither
can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the
victims age be considered sufficient proof of minority.
In the instant case, no authentic document was
presented as evidence of the victims age other than a
poor photocopy of what is claimed to be Lorelies birth
certificate. The prosecution failed to present an original
or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth.
Neither was it shown that these were lost, destroyed or

100
unavailable at the time of trial. Thus, secondary evidence

is inadmissible to prove the age of the victim in Crim.
Case No. P-2696. The testimonies tending to prove the
victims age cannot be accepted as adequate proof
thereof.
Much as we abhor child abuse, nevertheless, we
are constrained to hold that capital punishment cannot be
imposed on appellant in these two cases. Even if we
agree that the victims are indeed minors below 12 years
old, at most, appellant is liable only for statutory rape.
Gregorio Amante vs Bibiano Serwelas 471 SCRA
348
Facts:
Danilo Bicomong, a plant supervisor of Amante
Motors, was the registered owner of a 1990 Isuzu Jitney.
In 1992, he sold the vehicle to respondent Bibiano
Serwelas for P200,000 in a deed of absolute sale. The
respondent had the vehicle registered in his name, which
was later used as a common carrier, on a boundary
system.
On December 9, 1993, the vehicle was seized by the
police highway patrol group in General Mariano Alvarez,
Cavite without a warrant, upon the request of petitioner
Gregorio Amante, the manager of Amante Motors. The
vehicle was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna and,
after being subjected to macro-etching examination by
SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory Service, was later released to petitioner
Gregorio
Amante.
Despite respondent's demand, Gregorio Amante refused
to return the vehicle. Hence, respondent instituted a
replevin suit with the trial court. Asserting ownership of
the vehicle, petitioner Vicente Amante, the proprietor of
Amante Motors, intervened in the suit. But the trial court
rendered a decision stating that respondent Serwelas is
the lawful owner of the vehicle. The court also awarded
damages to respondent for lost earnings as premium for
the
replevin
bond
of
respondent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision holding respondent as the rightful owner of the
vehicle. It ruled that respondent had established
ownership of the vehicle to the exclusion of the whole
world. It also affirmed the award of damages as
unrealized earnings but deleted the award for replevin
bond premium since no claim for it was made in the
complaint.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue/s:
Is there a violation of the right against unreasonable
seizure of a moving vehicle in this case?
Ruling:
For Private

The resolution of San Pablo City Assistant

Prosecutor Esperidion Gajitos could not but strengthen
respondent's claim of good faith. Petitioner Gregorio
Amante's criminal complaint for violation of RA 6539 and
the Anti-Fencing Law was filed in court only against
Bicomong. Respondent was exonerated of any liability
whatsoever.
As to the issue of damages, we concur with the Court of
Appeals that only petitioner Gregorio Amante should be
held liable for the unrealized rentals of respondent during
the period he was deprived of the vehicle's possession.
Petitioner Vicente Amante was not privy to the unlawful
seizure and detention of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bibiano
Serwelas is hereby declared the owner of the disputed
vehicle. Petitioner Gregorio Amante is hereby ordered to
pay respondent the amount of P103,200 as unrealized
rentals plus P37,963 as premium for the replevin bond.

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For Private

2005
Pimentel, et al. vs. Ermita, et al. GR 164978, 13
October 2005
Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives

(Congress) commenced their regular session on 26 July
2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of
Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25
August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued
appointments to Arthur C. Yap (Department of
Agriculture, 15 August 2004), Alberto G. Romulo
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 August 2004), Raul M.
Gonzalez (Department of Justice, 23 August 2004),
Florencio B. Abad (Department of Education, 23 August
2004), Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. (Department of National
Defense, 23 August 2004), Rene C. Villa (Department of
Agrarian Reform, 23 August 2004), Joseph H. Durano
(Department of Tourism, 23 August 2004), and Michael T.
Defensor (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, 23 August 2004) as acting secretaries of their
respective departments. Defensor, et al., took their oath
of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8
September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator
Pimentel), Edgardo J. Angara (Senator Angara), Juan
Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada
(Senator
Ejercito-Estrada),
Jinggoy
E.
Estrada
(Senator Estrada), Panfilo M. Lacson (Senator
Lacson), Alfredo S. Lim (Senator Lim), Jamby A.S.
Madrigal (Senator Madrigal), and Sergio R. Osmea, III
(Senator Osmea) filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines, to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(Secretary Ermita). The petition also sought to prohibit
respondents from performing the duties of department
secretaries.
Issue/s:
Whether President Arroyos appointment of
Defensor et al. as acting secretaries was constitutional,
even without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session
Ruling:
The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the
obligation
to
appoint
automatically
the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on

102
the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a
department secretary may become vacant while Congress
is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus,
by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting
capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient
that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee. The law expressly allows the President to
make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent. Pimentel, et al. assert that Section 17 does
not apply to appointments vested in the President by the
Constitution, because it only applies to appointments
vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that
Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to
the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal
ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law,
and judicial decisions. Finally, Pimentel, et al., claim that
the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. They, however, fail to consider that
acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. In distinguishing ad interim appointments
from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted
textbook writer on constitutional law has observed that
"Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy.
Moreover
ad-interim
appointments
are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments." The Court find no abuse
in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim
appointments to Defensor et al. immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of
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2006
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D.
JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO
R. SALENGA G.R. No. 136433 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Pending resolution on an agrarian case, the
instant case was instituted by the petitioner Antonio
Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, the
attorney-in-fact of the lot owner.
This was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging private respondents of conspiracy
through the issuance of the TRO in allowing respondent
Salenga to retain possession of the subject property.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on
public respondent Ombudsman for allowing respondent
Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit when the
preliminary investigation was already concluded and an
Information filed with the Sandiganbayan which assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case. This contention is
utterly erroneous.
Issue/s:
a. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing
b. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion for allowing respondent Ilao, Jr. to
submit his Counter-Affidavit when the preliminary
investigation was already concluded
c. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing his finding of probable
cause
Ruling:
a.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of
appearance in a court of justice x x x on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the
"real-parties-in interest" rule.
Accordingly, the "realparty-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."
The records show that petitioner is a non-lawyer
appearing for himself and conducting litigation in person.
Petitioner instituted the instant case before the
Ombudsman in his own name. In so far as the ComplaintAffidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is
concerned, there is no question on his authority and legal
standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous
complaints and motu proprioinquire into alleged improper
official acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a
newspaper. Thus, any complainant may be entertained
by the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate an inquiry
and investigation for alleged irregularities.
However, filing the petition in person before the
Supreme Court is another matter. The Rules allow a nonlawyer to conduct litigation in person and appear for
oneself only when he is a party to a legal controversy.
In the case at bar which involves a criminal
proceeding stemming from a civil (agrarian) case, it is

103
clear that petitioner is not a real party in interest. Except

being the complainant, and not being an agent of the
parties in the agrarian case, the petitioner is a stranger
to the agrarian case. Hence, the instant petition must be
dismissed on that score.
b. The graft court cannot be faulted in granting
the prayed for re-investigation as it can readily be seen
from the antecedent facts that respondent Ilao, Jr. was
not given the opportunity to file his Counter-Affidavit.
Courts are given wide latitude to accord the
accused ample opportunity to present controverting
evidence even before trial as demanded by due process.
Thus, we held inVillaflor v. Vivar that "[a] component
part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right
accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim
to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them
of the full measure of their right to due process.
c. The Court will not delve into the merits of the
Ombudsmans reversal of its initial finding of probable
cause or cause to bring respondents to trial. Petitioner
has not shown that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering such reversal.
The
function of determining the existence of probable cause is
proper for the Ombudsman in this case and the Court will
not tread on the realm of this executive function to
examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties,
which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal
proceedings. It cannot pass upon the sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of
probable cause.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-021651; 22 JUN 2006]
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondents
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to
investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issues:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for
such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling:
For Private

No. The State could not penalize respondent for

she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put
it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights.
The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a freeexercise claim. In the case
at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the freeexercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.
OSCAR Z. BENARES vs. JOSEPHINE LIM, G.R. No.
173421 (December 14, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar Beares was accused of estafa.
Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution
presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to
formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution did
not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner
filed a motion praying that the prosecution's submission
of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the
case dismissed for lack of evidence. The motion was
granted; the case was dismissed.
Respondent moved to reconsider the order of
dismissal claiming that she had difficulty securing
documents from the court which were marked during
trial; Motion for Reconsideration was granted.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
RTC. In granting the petition, the RTC noted that the
MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
"had the effect of an acquittal" which is "a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged.
The
Resolution.
Court
of
Appeals
reversed
the
RTC's
Issue/s:

104
a. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to speedy

trial was violated
b. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to
invoke double jeopardy
Ruling:
a. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a
valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
In the instant case, there is no question as to
the presence of the first four elements. As to the last
element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on
the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case
was based on failure to prosecute.
A dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy,
except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based
on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed
for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
However,..
b. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution's delay
in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to
speedy trial is not well taken.
It appears that there was justifiable reason for
the prosecution's failure to formally offer its evidence on
time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked
in court were misplaced. There is no showing that the
criminal case was unreasonably prolonged nor there was
deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to cause
delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and great
prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused.
Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the
time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts
peculiar to it. Since the delay was not vexatious or
oppressive, it follows that petitioner's right to speedy trial
was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke
his right against double jeopardy. Petition is DENIED.
AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO
BALTAZAR, REYNALDO F. CABRERA and DIONY
VENTURA, G.R. No. 129098 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner
Amelia
M.
Cabrera
accused
respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that
she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality
of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of
devoting it to fishpond operations.
A month later,
petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the
impending demolition of her fishpond as it was
For Private

purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak

River. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered
the destruction of petitioner's fishpond.
At the preliminary investigation, respondents,
except Senior Superintendent Ventura, submitted
counter-affidavits, denying the accusations against them.
In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar and
Vice-Mayor Cabrera, they insisted that contrary to
petitioner's claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure
because it was erected on the seashore, at the mouth of
the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. They
claimed that the demolition was done by the Task
Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then President
Fidel V. Ramos.
On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The
dismissal was based on the declaration that the fishpond
was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by
respondents in the exercise of the police power of the
State.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before it.
of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere

errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it,
the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's
supervision and control over the preliminary investigation
conducted by him. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to
review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled
to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
Ruling:
Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned
issuances of the Ombudsman. However, such direct
resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the
Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A.
No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The right to appeal is
granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The provision does
not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases. More importantly, Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar
as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions
is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of
probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Grave
abuse
of
discretion
should
be
differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible
only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise

105
CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON, G.R.

No. 164605 (October 27, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner
Caterpillar, Inc.
is
a
foreign
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
shoes, clothing items, among others. Upon the request of
petitioner, the Regional Intelligence
Investigation
Division-National Capital Region Police Office (RIIDNCRPO) filed search warrant applications against
respondent Manolo P. Samson for violations of unfair
competition, provided under the Intellectual Property
Code. On the same day, the trial court issued five search
warrants
against
respondent
and
his
business
establishments.
Respondent filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash
the search warrants. Pending the resolution thereof,
RIID-NCRPO filed five complaints against the respondent
and his affiliate entities before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Later, the trial court issued an order denying the
respondents motion to quash, but nevertheless directed
the release of the articles seized on the ground that no
criminal action had been commenced against respondent.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for lack
of merit ruling that there was no arbitrariness in the way
the trial court exercised its discretionary power to release
the items seized in the absence of a criminal action filed
in court. It also noted that the criminal complaints filed
before the DOJ that underwent preliminary investigation
were all dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.
Issue/s:
For Private


Facts:
Whether or not the facts that no criminal complaint had

been filed against the private respondent and the
subsequent dismissal by the investigating state
prosecutor justify the immediate return of the seized
items.
Ruling:
The petitioner asserts that the seized articles
can only be returned when a criminal case can no longer
possibly materialize since the seized articles are crucial to
the eventual prosecution of the respondent.
The petitioners assertion is incongruent with the
peculiar circumstances of this case. The articles seized
the thousands of articles of clothing, footwear, and
accessories, among others - had little, if any, evidentiary
value for the criminal action for unfair competition, which
the petitioner expected to file.
There exists a constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Constitution,
however, does not provide a blanket prohibition against
all searches and seizures, rather the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is
that between persons and the police, there must stand
the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the
power to issue or refuse such search warrant. Yet, the
responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the
granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of the
articles seized. In exercising custody over these articles,
the property rights of the owner should be balanced with
the social need to preserve evidence, which will be used
in the prosecution of a case.
In the instant case, no criminal action had been
prosecuted for almost a year. Thus, the court had been
left with the custody of highly depreciable merchandise.
More importantly, these highly depreciable articles would
have been superfluous if presented as evidence for the
following reasons: (1) the respondent had already
admitted that he is the owner of the merchandise seized,
which made use of the trademarks in dispute; (2) the
court required the respondent to execute an undertaking
to produce the articles seized when the court requires
and had already in its possession a complete inventory of
the items seized as secondary evidence; (3) actual
samples of the respondents merchandise are in the
possession of the police officers who had applied for the
search warrant, and photographs thereof had been made
part of the records, and respondent did not dispute that
these were obtained from his stores. Where the purpose
of presenting as evidence the articles seized is no longer
served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the
rights of a person to his property.
In ordering the return of the articles seized, the
trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in
determining from the circumstances of the case what
constitutes a reasonable and unreasonable search and
seizure.
Petition denied.
LECA REALTY CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 155605
(September 27, 2006)

106
On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the

Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for
eminent domain for the taking of some portions of the
properties of the private respondents.
On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed
three (3) competent and disinterested persons; as
commissioners to ascertain and report the just
compensation of the properties sought to be taken.
On January 9, 1998, the commissioners
submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and
recommended the fair market value of the subject
properties.
In
arriving
at
the
said
Report,
the
Commissioners took into consideration the following
factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood
data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best
use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values
within the vicinity.
"On March 30, 1998, the court rendered the
decision whereby the Commissioners' Report was
adopted."7
The CA affirmed the lower court's judgment. The
appellate court likewise debunked the contention of the
Republic of the Philippines that the commissioners had
erred in fixing the fair market values of the properties,
because the appraisals exceeded the zonal values
determined in Department of Finance Order No. 71-96.
The CA held that the zonal valuation was made for
taxation purposes only and was not necessarily reflective
of the actual market values of the properties in the area.
Issue/s:
Whether or
determined.
not
just
compensation
was
properly
Ruling:
Just compensation, is the full and fair equivalent
of a property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss.
Note must be taken that the word "just" is used to stress
the meaning of the word "compensation," in order to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.
Necessarily, just compensation must not be
arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation
of different factors. In the present case, the
Commissioners' Report made use of the so-called marketdata approach in arriving at the valuation of the
properties. In this method, the value of the land is based
on sales and listings of comparable property registered
within the vicinity.
Well-settled is the rule that in expropriation
proceedings, the value of a property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this
case, the Complaint was filed on March 18, 1996, and the
trial court issued the Writ of Possession on June 19,
1997. The offers cited in the Commissioners' Report,
For Private

though, were made between May 1996 to February 1997,

a period after the filing of the Complaint on March 18,
1996. Thus, there is no evidence on record of the fair
market value of the property as of March 1996.
Moreover, the offers for sale were good for
properties inside the Ortigas Center.41 Thus, those offers
cannot be used as bases for the values of properties
along EDSA, where the property of Petitioner Leca is
situated. In fact, no listing or evidence of concluded sales
was submitted for properties in areas outside the Ortigas
Center. While it is true that adjoining properties may be
valued differently, competent evidence still has to be
presented to establish the differences in market values.
The Republic is incorrect, however, in alleging
that the values were exorbitant, merely because they
exceeded the maximum zonal value of real properties in
the same location where the subject properties were
located. The zonal value may be one, but not necessarily
the sole, index of the value of a realty.
Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is remanded
to the trial court for the proper determination of the
amount of just compensation.
RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., PABLO LUCERO and

ANTONIO TENORIO, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF
PASIG, as represented by the Market
Administrator, G.R. No. 132834 (November 24,
2006)
Facts:
Petitioners were granted lease contracts to
occupy and operate stalls in the public market of Pasig by
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983.
Later, the municipal government of Pasig
renovated the market facilities and constructed annex
buildings to the old public market. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig then enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56,
series of 1993, entitled "An Ordinance Prescribing the
Rules and Regulations in Occupying and Using Market
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof."
Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal
officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and submit the
necessary application forms which would serve as the
lease contract.
Petitioners, however, refused to apply for a new
lease on their market stalls. Hence, the city government
of Pasig filed a complaint for ejectment against
petitioners for failing to pay the required P10,000
performance bond and their rental fees since January
1994 as required by the municipal ordinance.
Petitioners mainly assail the non-renewal of their
lease contracts on stalls in the public market when they
did not comply with the requirements of the new
ordinance. They claim to have a vested right to the
possession, use and enjoyment of the market stalls based
on their 1983 lease contracts. This, they assert, could not

107
be impaired by the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No.

56 in 1993.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and
dismissed the complaint; The RTC reversed the MTC
decision and decided in favor of the city government.
The appeal by the petitioners was denied by the CA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners can are covered by
Municipal Ordinance No. 56 in 1993
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners contention that they
were no longer covered by the 1993 ordinance their 1983
lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights to
the market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege
to occupy and operate such booths.
What petitioners had was a license to occupy
and operate particular stalls over a period of time. Their
possession and use of these facilities could not be
characterized as fixed and absolute.
It was within the ambit of the Sanggunians
authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the
enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The
enactment of the Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of
1993 repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of
1983 (the basis of petitioners lease) was a valid exercise
of such governmental authority to regulate the
possession and use of the public market and its facilities.
The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public
market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege
governed by laws and ordinances. The operation of a
market stall by virtue of a license is always subject to the
police power of the city government. An application for
this privilege may be granted or refused for reasons of
public policy and sound public administration. The city
government, through its market administrator, is not
duty-bound to grant lease privileges to any applicant,
least of all those who refuse to obey the new ordinance
prescribing the rules and regulations for the market
stalls.
Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to
the service of the general public and operated under
government control and supervision as a public utility.
Hence, the operation of a public market and its facilities
is imbued with public interest. Petitioners 1983 lease
contracts contained an implied reservation of the police
power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power could be exercised any time to change the
provisions of the contracts or even abrogate them
entirely, for the protection of the general welfare. Such
an act did not violate the non-impairment clause which is
anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police
power.
Petition denied.
NS
TRANSPORT
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
(NSTEA), et. al., vs. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES,
INC.(NSTS), NICANOR SORIANO, JAIME MENDOZA,
and TERESITA MENDOZA, G.R. No. 164049
(October 30, 2006)
For Private

Facts:
In a proceeding before the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration to settle a dispute between the NSTEA (the
Union) and the NSTS (the Company), the labor arbiter
ruled in favour of the Union, holding that the strike
staged by the Union was legal.
The company sought reconsideration of the
resolution, claiming that it was denied due process when
they were not allowed to adduce evidence on the
illegality of the strike and the violation of the Return-toWork Order. The NLRC dismissed the motion without
resolving the companys protest on the lack of notice of
the hearings.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
company and remanded the case to the NLRC for further
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the NLRC did not
violate the companys right to due process since its
resolutions were based on the parties respective
pleadings and on the records of the case.
Respondents maintain that the company was
deprived of its constitutional right to due process when
the NLRC disallowed it to present its evidence due to the
conceived "failure to attend" the three (3) scheduled
hearings, when in fact the company and its counsel were
not notified of the hearings since the NLRC sent the
notice of said hearings to a wrong address
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Company was deprived of its
constitutional right to due process
Ruling:
In labor cases, it has been held that due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard and not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held
since a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential to due process the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of controversy.
The holding of an adversarial trial is
discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot
demand it as a matter of right. However, when such a
formal hearing is allowed but a party is not informed
thereof, as a consequence of which he is unable to attend
the same, such failure to attend should not be taken
against him. As the labor arbiter allowed the holding of a
formal hearing, he must accord the parties the
opportunity to participate therein and allow the formal
hearing to proceed its natural course, if due process and
the elements of fair play are to be observed.
In the instant case, the labor arbiter has granted
his imprimatur on the holding of a formal hearing, as
agreed upon by the parties. However, the company was
not given the chance to exercise the same privilege, since
the case was submitted for decision even before it was
able to adduce its evidence during the formal hearing.
While the speedy and inexpensive disposition of
cases is much desired and should be pursued, the swift

108
resolution of labor disputes is counterproductive if it is

achieved through a lop-sided hearing and at the expense
of the employers rights. Thus, it has been held that while
labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases with
the least attention to technicalities, the fundamental
requisites of due process must not be sacrificed.
Petition denied.
RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, G.R. No.
159659 (October 12, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with three counts of
violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
957,
otherwise
known
as The
Subdivision
and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree.
The trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for
petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with the
arraignment. Petitioners asserted that petitioner Ruben
was denied his right to counsel when the trial court
forced him to enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court did
not transgress petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right to counsel
since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed in
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not
necessarily mean that such choice by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent lawyers from handling the
defense.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of
his right to counsel when only a counsel de
oficio assisted him during his arraignment despite his
insistence to be assisted by their newly hired
counsel de parte
Ruling:
We agree with the herein respondent Lee when
she said that petitioners were given ample time by the
trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not.
Through the course of the proceedings, the petitioners
filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21,
2001, the trial court noted that although the informations
were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not yet
been arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer
be countenanced.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
assuring an accused of counsel of his choice pertains
specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we
were to extend the choice of a counsel to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a
lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and
arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer
exclusively to the predilection of the accused. In Amion
v. Chiongson this Court stated:
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section
12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from
For Private

handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,

the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct
the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
SIME
DARBY
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GR
148021 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Due to a deadlock in the negotiations regarding
the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Union and the
Company resulting to a lockout and dismissal of some
employees, the dispute was brought before the NLRC.
Labor arbiter ruled in favour of the Company,
dismissing for lack of merit the petitioners complaints.
Petitioner appealed the arbiters decision to the
NLRC. It was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal.
Petitioner argued that had the labor arbiter
allowed them to present evidence during a formal trial,
the decision would have been different.
Respondents maintains that the decisions of the
labor arbiter and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are
supported by substantial evidence.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the labor arbiter erred in not holding a
formal hearing.
Ruling:
Petitioners argument that had the labor arbiter
allowed respondents to present their evidence during the
formal trial, the Decision would have been different,
cannot be sustained. As previously stated, the labor
arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether
there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and
he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of each case without regard to technicalities. With
or without a formal hearing, the labor arbiter may still
adequately decide the case since he can resolve the
issues on the basis of the pleadings and other
documentary evidence previously submitted. When the
parties submitted their position papers and other
pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is
understood/given/deemed that they have included
therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish
their respective cases. The rationale for this rule is
explained by the Court in one case, thus:
(P)etitioner believes that had there been a
formal hearing, the arbiters alleged mistaken reliance on
some of the documentary evidence submitted by parties
would have been cured and remedied by them,
presumably through the presentation of controverting

109
evidence. Evidently, this postulate is not in consonance

with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases, for
the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and
disclose the same only during the formal hearing, thus
creating surprises which could merely complicate the
issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to
lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor
disputes."
SKECHERS,
U.S.A.,
INC.
vs. INTER
INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP., et al.
164321 (November 30, 2006)
PACIFIC
G.R. No.
Facts:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation existing under
the laws of the State of California, United States of
America and engaged in the manufacture of footwear.
Petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines and is
suing before the trial court only to protect its intellectual
property rights.
Petitioner engaged the services of a private
investigative firm, to conduct an investigation on Inter
Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation (Inter Pacific) in
coordination with the NBI to confirm if Inter Pacific is
indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale
of unauthorized products bearing counterfeit or
unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner.
Special Investigator Borromeo of the NBI, with a
witness, applied for warrants against the warehouse and
outlet store being operated and managed by respondent
for infringement of trademark.
After personally examining the search warrant
applicant and his witness, the court a quo found probable
cause to issue the search warrants applied for and thus
issued on the same day. That same afternoon, the
search warrants were simultaneously served by the
operatives of the Intellectual Property Rights Division of
the NBI.
After concluding that there are glaring
differences that an ordinary prudent purchaser would not
likely be mislead or confused in purchasing the wrong
article, the lower court issued the assailed Order
quashing Search Warrant and directing the NBI to return
to respondents the items seized by virtue of said search
warrant.
Issue/s:
Whether or not that the trial court may be faulted for
quashing the search warrants.
Ruling:
The power to issue search warrants is
exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of
their judicial function. And inherent in the courts power
to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants
already issued. After the judge has issued a warrant, he
is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he
finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable
cause exists.
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In the determination of probable cause, the

court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense
exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant. In the case at bar, the subject search warrant
was issued allegedly in connection with trademark
infringement, particularly the unauthorized use of the "S"
logo by respondent in their Strong rubber shoes. After
conducting the hearing on the application for a search
warrant, the court a quo was initially convinced that there
was sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the search
warrant. However, upon motion of respondent to quash
the search warrant, the lower court changed its position
and declared that there was no probable cause to issue
the search warrant as there was no colorable imitation
between respondents trademark and that of petitioner.
In ruling that there was no colorable imitation of
petitioners trademark in light of the factual milieu
prevalent in the instant case, the trial court may not be
faulted for reversing its initial finding that there was
probable cause. Based on the courts inherent power to
issue search warrants and to quash the same, the courts
must be provided with the opportunity to correct itself of
an error inadvertently committed. After reevaluating the
evidence presented before it, the trial court may reverse
its initial finding of probable cause in order that its
conclusion may be made to conform to the facts
prevailing in the instant case.

110
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2007
ROMONAFE CORP. vs NATIONAL POWER CORP.
(NPC) GR No. 168122, January 30, 2007
Facts:
Respondent National Power Corporation is a government
owned and controlled corporation which filed a complaint
on July 12, 1995 for eminent domain with the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite against Romonafe Corporation
and Vine Development Corporation. The trial court
designated
commissioners
to
determine
just
compensation for the properties involved in this case.
NPC filed an opposition to the commissioners valuation
on the ground that the valuation used as basis the
present (1997) market value of the property instead of
the market value on July 12, 1995, the time of the filing
of the complaint. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering plaintiff to pay defendant based on the value
starting from the time the plaintiff took possession of the
property up to the time the full amount have been paid.
NPC thus filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court
received the Compromise Agreement between NPC and
Romonafe. The Office of the Solicitor General questioned
such compromise agreement on the ground that the
attorneys of the NPC who signed the agreement were not
authorized to sign in its behalf. The appellate court
nullified
the
compromise
agreement
for
being
disadvantageous to the government as it is against public
policy. It further ruled that the market value of the
expropriated parcel of land is fixed at P1,500 per square
meter.
Issue/s:
1.
2.
Whether or not the

payment
of just
compensation is based upon the filing of the
complaint
Whether or not the compromise agreement
entered into by NPC and Romonafe is valid
Ruling:
On the first issue, the court held in the

affirmative. Just compensation is to be determined as of
the date of the taking of the of the property or the filing
of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at
bar, just compensation should thus be determined as of
July 12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed
before the trial court.
On the second issue,
remanded the to the appellate court.
the
court
PEOPLE vs ANONAS,GR No. 156847, January 31,

2007
Facts:
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at
the Western Police District, was apprehended by his
colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four
other
persons
were
sniffing
methamphetamine

111
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a

regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver.
City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) two separate Informations against
respondent,
one
for
illegal
possession
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and another for illegal
possession of firearm.
Respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
reinvestigation on ground that he was apprehended
without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. trial court granted
respondents motion.However, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag,
designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was appointed
judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform
the prosecutor who took his place about the pending
reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in
detention.
Respondent filed with the trial court a motion to
dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay in
the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The
trial court issued an order denying respondents motion
to dismiss the Informations. Respondent then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Court of
Appeals granted the petition, dismissed the criminal
charges against respondent and ordered that respondent
be released from custody. The Government, represented
by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration but
was denied.
Issue/s:
Wether the appellate court erred in holding that
respondents right to due process has been violated
Ruling:
No. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that All persons shall have the
right to speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. There
can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by
the delay, having to be confined for more than four
oppressive years for failure of the investigating
prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary
investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals,
respondents right to due process had been violated.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. INC. vs THE
(MUNICIPAL)
CITY
MAYOR,GR
No.
141010,
February 7, 2007
Facts:
BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision with a land
area straddling the cities of Paraaque, Las Pias, and
Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country.
Municipal Council of Paraaque enacted Municipal
Ordinance reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in
BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial
areas.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
Municipal Ordinance alleging that the reclassification of
certain portions of BF Homes Paraaque from residential
to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it
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amounts to impairment of the contracts between the

developer of BF Homes Paraaque and the lot buyers.
Public respondents alleged that the passage of
the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power by the Municipal Council of Paraaque and that
such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations entered into by the petitioners and the
developer.
El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade
Organization (EL ACTO), a non-stock, non-profit
corporation, intervened as respondent EL ACTO asserted
that the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power and that petitioners are guilty of estoppel since
petitioners endorsed the opening of many of these
commercial establishments in BF Homes Paraaque.
Court of Appeals held that the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power
by the Municipality of Paraaque.
Issue/s:
Whether
the
Municipal
Ordinance
is
unconstitutional considering
that it impairs
a
contractual obligation annotated in homeowners titles
and violates the doctrine of separation of powers
Ruling:
Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body of
the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for
the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants. There was no sufficient evidence disputing
the regularity of the enactment of the Municipal
Ordinance. Before the Municipal Council of Paraaque
passed the Municipal Ordinance, it has been the subject
of barangay consultations and committee hearings in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and is found to
be reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive with
respect to BF Homes Paraaque. Moreover, several
homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues
already converted their residences into business
establishments. As found by the Court of Appeals, El
Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main thoroughfares in
BF
Homes
Paraaque
which
have
long
been
commercialized.
The Court has upheld in several cases the
superiority of police power over the non-impairment
clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare. The Municipal Ordinance is a
legitimate
exercise
of
police
power
and
the
reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF
Homes Paraaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
PEST MGT. ASSOC. OF PHILS. (PMAP) vs
FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY (FPA), GR
No. 156041, February 21, 2007
respondent Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). It

questioned the validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987
Pesticide
Regulatory
Policies
and
Implementing
Guidelines. Petitioner argued that the specific provision
on the protection of the proprietary data in FPAs
Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines
is unlawful for going counter to the objectives of
Presidential Decree No. 1144 (P.D. No. 1144); for
exceeding the limits of delegated authority; and for
encroaching on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Intellectual Property Office.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the provision on the protection of proprietary data in the
FPA's Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing
Guidelines is valid and legal as it does not violate the
objectives of P.D. No. 1144; the proprietary data are a
substantial asset which must be protected; the protection
for a limited number of years does not constitute
unlawful restraint of free trade; and such provision does
not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Intellectual
Property Office.
Respondents expound that since under P.D. No.
1144, the FPA is mandated to regulate, control and
develop the pesticide industry, it was necessary to
provide for such protection of proprietary data,
otherwise, pesticide handlers will proliferate to the the
detriment of the industry and the public since the
inherent toxicity of pesticides are hazardous and are
potential
environmental
contaminants
respondents
emphasize that the provision on protection of proprietary
data does not usurp the functions of the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) since a patent and data protection
are two different matters.
Issue/s:
Did the FPA go beyond its delegated power and
undermine the objectives of P.D. No. 1144 by issuing
regulations that provide for protection of proprietary
data?
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative As stated in the
Preamble of said decree, there is an urgent need to
create a technically-oriented government authority
equipped with the required expertise to regulate, control
and develop both the fertilizer and the pesticide
industries.
Under P.D. No. 1144, the FPA is given the broad
power to issue rules and regulations to implement and
carry out the purposes and provisions of said decree, i.e.,
to regulate, control and develop the pesticide industry. In
furtherance of such ends, the FPA sees the protection of
proprietary data as one way of fulfilling its mandate.
Facts:
Petitioner,
a
non-stock
corporation
duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
is an association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by

112
PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS, GR No. 170233, February 22,

2007
For Private

Facts:
Jesus Nuevas was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City with illegal possession
of marijuana. Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio were
likewise charged with the same crime. RTC rendered a
Decision finding all accused in the above-entitled cases
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the warrantless searches and seizure
made by the police officers is valid and the evidence
obtained by virture thereof is admissible
Ruling:
First, the Court holds that the searches and
seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. Arrest
must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed
as in this case where the search preceded the arrest.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio
were not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did
not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the persons to be arrested had committed an offense.
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot
be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified
under the plain view doctrine. If the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
Records show that the dried marijuana
leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass case, the
dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were
wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Dins case, the marijuana
found upon inspection of the plastic bag was packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein. It cannot be therefore
said the items were in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further
search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the
search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his
consent. The Court is convinced that he indeed
voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the
police officers. However, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. Thus the Court modified
the judgment. Appellants Reynaldo Din and Fernando are
ACQUITTED.

113
GARCIA vs J.G. SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL CORP. GR

No. 127925, February 23, 2007
Facts:
Respondent
J.G.
Summit
Petrochemical
Corporation was registered by the BOI as a new domestic
producer of polyethylene and polypropylene resins, for
which it was issued on May 24, 1994 BOI Certificate of
Registration. Respondent informed the BOI that its plant
would be located in barangay Alangilanan, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental. On January 29, 1996, however, it
advised the Board in writing that its plant site would be
located in barangay Simlong, Batangas City, instead of
Negros Oriental. BOI caused the publication of
respondents amended application for registration in a
newspaper of general publication to enable interested
persons to file their sworn objections within one (1) week
from said publication.
In due time, petitioner and concerned residents
of barangay Simlong, Batangas submitted separate
letters of opposition Petitioner objected to the Batangas
plant site, citing as basis the 1990 decision of this Court
in G.R. No. 92024, which annulled the Boards approval of
the change of plant site from Bataan to Batangas, and of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG).
He argued that by the said
decision, this Court declared the Bataan petrochemical
zone as the only possible site for petrochemical plants as
provided for under P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803.
Issue/s:
Whether Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 949 and
1803, the laws creating a petrochemical complex in
Limay, Bataan, prohibit the establishment of a
petrochemical facility outside of it.
Whether or not petitioners were denied due
process and access to information of national concern
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. 949
and P.D. 1803. What is clear then is that the law
reserved an area for a petrochemical industrial zone in
Bataan and that PNOC was to operate, manage and
develop it. There is, however, nothing further in the law
to indicate that the choice of Limay, Bataan as a
petrochemical zone was exclusive. On the contrary, the
use of the word may in the proviso of Section 2 runs
counter to the exclusivity of the Bataan site because it
makes it merely directory, rather than mandatory, for the
PNOC to lease, sell and/or convey portions of the
petrochemical industrial zone to private entities or
persons locating their plants therein. When the law
makes no distinction, the Court should not distinguish.
As for petitioners claim that he was denied due
process and access to information of national concern
because of the Boards omission to make the SRI report
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known before and during the hearings of respondents

amended application, it is bereft of merit. Petitioner has
not denied having actively participated in the August 23,
1995 meeting of the ad hoc committee on the
petrochemical industry in which the report was discussed.
But even granting that the report was not mentioned
during the hearings, petitioner could have easily moved
for a reconsideration of the BOI Decision, reserving his
right to refute the SRI findings upon actual receipt of a
copy thereof.
Finally, it is not for this Court to rule on whether
the national interest would be served by allowing
respondent to locate its plant in Batangas, instead of
Bataan. As the first Garcia case held, this Court is not
concerned with the economic, social, and political aspects
of this case for it does not possess the necessary
technology and scientific expertise to determine whether
the transfer of the proposed BPC petrochemical complex
from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG will be best for the
project and for our country. This Court is not about to
delve into the economics and politics of this case . . . .
DIMACUHA vs PEOPLE, GR No. 143705, February
23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha seeks
her
acquittal by a reversal of the October 22, 1999
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
20720 which affirmed her earlier conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila, Branch
273, for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Dimacuhas motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied by the CA in
its June 19, 2000 resolution. After due assessment of the
evidence presented, the trial court gave full faith and
credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
upheld the presumption applied in cases involving
violation of Dangerous Drug Acts of regularity in the
performance of duty by public officers conducting antinarcotics operations when the police officers have no
motive in testifying falsely against an accused. It found
that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly
established petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Unable to accept the trial courts judgment of conviction,
petitioner went on appeal to the CA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses and
their testimonies is credible; and, the the arrest and
search conducted on the person and belongings of the
petitioner without a warrant is valid.
Ruling:
Petitioner questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies by giving
stress over the non-presentation in court of Benito
Marcelo, the professed police asset. She argues that the

114
non-presentation of Marcelo was a denial of her

constitutional right to meet and confront her accuser.
The right of the petitioner to confront the
witnesses against her is not affected by the failure of the
prosecution to present the informant. The matter of
presentation of witnesses is not for accused nor even for
the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the
prosecutor as to how the State should present its case.
The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would
present as witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs cases, the
presentation of an informant is not essential for
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful
prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative As stated earlier, the
testimony of the police officers carried with it the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
function. Absent any persuasive evidence showing why
these officers would falsely testify against the petitioner,
the logical conclusion is that no improper motive exists,
and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and
credit.
Finally, petitioner contends that the arrest and
the search conducted incidental to her arrest were illegal
as the surrounding circumstances of the arrest were not
within the purview of the allowable warrantless arrests
under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in
actual possession of another 10.78
grams
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of
an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the
basis of information received from Benito Marcelo
regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's
arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure
of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her
checkbook was justified and legal in light of the
prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any property found upon his
person in order to find and seize things connected with
the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore,
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime. The
Court finds the penalty imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by the CA to be correct
TAYABAN vs PEOPLE,
2007
GR No. 150194, March 6,
Facts:
Petitioner Robert Tayaban was the Municipal
Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao Sometime in 1988, then Mayor
Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial
governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the
Tinoc Public Market.
Subsequently, Tayaban was
informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved
and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera
Executive Board (CEB). Subsequently, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong
(Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the
said public market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract
was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor,
and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction of
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the public market was commenced in June 1989 Tayaban

and his co-petitioners, together with some men,
proceeded to the construction site and demolished the
structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a
result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein
petitioners.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is undue injury committed by the
officials for which they should be held liable
Ruling:
The following indispensable elements must be
established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited
act during the performance of his official duty in relation
to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
parties.
The Court agrees with the findings of the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in
causing the demolition.
First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he
submitted the project proposal for the construction of the
Tinoc Public Market, he did not indicate the exact location
where the market should be put up saying that he shall
specify the location when the budget for the project shall
have been approved. However, despite meeting the
Governor twice in 1989, and being informed by the latter
that the project had already been approved and funded,
Tayaban still did not suggest to the Governor nor mention
to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang
Bayan desire to have the public market erected. Worse,
when the construction was commenced and petitioners
discovered that the public market was being built
allegedly in a place where it should not be, petitioner
Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the
Governor of such fact. The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to reimburse
the said amount lost by the Government.
This resolves the petition for the issuance of the

writ of habeas corpus filed by Mark Darwin Camara
(petitioner) for the release from detention of Leticia
Lourdes A. Camara (Camara), Assistant Vice-President
and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Complying with the Order,
LBP, on 14 February 2007, deposited P71,634,027.30 in
its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and
in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court. Seven
days after such deposit, during which Camara remained
in detention, respondent judge issued the 21 February
2007 Order finding LBPs deposit insufficient because LBP
should have placed [the deposit] in the name of Josefina
S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily
withdrawable. Thus, respondent judge ordered Camara
to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order.
What petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to
release Camara from detention despite LBPs deposit with
its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of
the preliminary compensation provided in respondent
judges 4 March 2005 Order
Issue/s:
Whether respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
his jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The facts of this case highlight respondent
judges failure to appreciate, in full measure, the nature
of his power to cite litigants in contempt of court. It is a
drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be
exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is
clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders. If a bona
fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not
justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings,
with more reason that it should not serve as basis to
prolong a litigants detention under a prior contempt
citation when, as here, there has been an attempt to
comply with the order.
Thus, we find the detention of Camara
unlawful. To ensure that Camara will not be detained
again for the same cause, we deem it necessary to order
respondent judge to desist from doing so, irrespective of
the outcome of CA G.R. SP No. 98032 in the Court of
Appeals. This ruling is without prejudice to Camaras
availment of administrative reliefs.
CELSO VERDE vs. VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, AIDA
MACAPAGAL, RECTOR E. MACAPAGAL, HECTOR
MACAPAGAL, FLORIDA M. GUIRIBA, REDENTOR E.
MACAPAGAL, NESTOR E. MACAPAGAL and ZENAIDA
E. MACAPAGAL
Facts:
CAMARA vs PAGAYATAN,GR No. 176563, March 6,

2007
Facts:

115
Vicente F. Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella were

the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of
this dispute, denominated as Lot No. 4714, Cad-320-D,
Case 1, situated in Palapala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their
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children (respondents herein) who are now the proindiviso owners of the same.
On the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold
tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father,
Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof.
On 14 July 1995, respondents initiated an action
for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in Malolos, Bulacan.
In a decision dated 07 February 1996, Provincial
Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz dismissed the case for lack
of merit. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the provincial adjudicator.
Respondents then filed an appeal before the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which,
however, affirmed the earlier ruling of the provincial
adjudicator.
Undaunted by these setbacks, respondents filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision now
assailed before us, the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the DARAB. According to the Court
of Appeals, Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 1199[11] prohibits
a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or
furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
that petitioner did not personally cultivate the subject
land thereby justifying his ejectment there from.
Ruling:
Under Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 1199, a
'share tenant is defined as a person who himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or
in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
In the present case, it is not disputed that dela
Cruz is not a member of petitioner's immediate
household. The question thus posed is whether by
petitioner's hiring his services and that of his carabao,
the agricultural lease relationship between the parties in
this case ceased to exist. We rule that it did not.
We cannot, however, sustain petitioner's stance
that the appellate court erred in giving credence to the
joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz in
contravention of the pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court. The DARAB New Rules of Procedures explicitly
ordains that technical rules of procedure which bind the
regular courts find no application in proceedings before
said board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators.
To give effect to this rule, the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure commands that all agrarian cases, disputes or
controversies should be resolved 'in a most expeditious
manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.
But what makes petitioner's stance on this
matter even more unavailing is the fact that the
provincial adjudicator, acceding to petitioner's prayer in

116
his motion for reconsideration that a hearing be

conducted for the purpose of asking clarificatory
questions, set the date for the parties' oral argument on
10 July 1996. Despite notice, however, petitioner failed to
show up during said date prompting provincial
adjudicator to submit for resolution petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. In an order dated 06 December
1996, the provincial adjudicator recalled his 10 July 1996
order and instead scheduled another hearing on 14
January 1997 for the purpose of asking clarificatory
questions.[29] Yet again, petitioner failed to attend this
hearing, thus, respondents moved that petitioner's
motion for reconsideration be resolved.[30] Given this
series of events, petitioner cannot now be heard to
complain that the Court of Appeals erred in putting
premium on the joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and
Cruz as he was given ample opportunity to challenge its
contents. Notwithstanding this finding, we still find merit
in the instant petition and resolve to grant the same.
ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS.
JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO, MCTC, PONTEVEDRAPANAY,CAPIZ,RESPONDENT.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz
for gross neglect of duty relative to a civil case for
unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 405 and entitled Spouses Estanislao V. Alviola
and Carmen L. Alviola v. Spouses Dullano and Theresa
Suplido.
In a Resolution dated 21 June 2006, the Court noted the
OCAs report and directed the parties to manifest their
willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings filed. Complainant, in his Manifestation
dated 30 August 2005, informed the Court of his
willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
Respondent judge likewise manifested the same
willingness in his Manifestation dated 23 March 2007.
Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled
Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and
Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures states that:
The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order
within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial.
Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters
not disposed of and control the course of the action
during the trial x x x
Issue/s:
Whether or not Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2 nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay,
Pontevedra, Capiz for gross neglect of his duty
Ruling:
For Private

Evidently, respondent judge violated the abovequoted provision by issuing the pre-trial order only on 2
January 2005 or more than four (4) months after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. It should likewise
be underscored that since the civil case is an unlawful
detainer case falling within the ambit of the Rules on
Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have
handled the same with promptness and haste. The
reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases. It is therefore not encouraging
when, as in the case at bar, it is the judge himself who
occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the rule.
By no means is the aim of speedy disposition of cases
served
by
respondent
judges
inaction.
Section 9 (1), Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that undue delay in rendering an
order is classified as a less serious charge punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding
P20,000.00.
For the record, respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 in
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1583, entitled Arcenas v. Avelino[21] for
gross inefficiency. In addition, respondent Judge was
fined P20,000.00 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1606, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Avelino,[22] likewise for gross
inefficiency. As such, the Court agrees with the OCA that
a
sterner
penalty
is
in
order.

117
For Private

2008
REPUBLIC V. JUDGE EUGENIO G.R. NO. 174629, 14
FEBRUARY 2008
Facts:
After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of
investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3
contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman
and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). The OSG wrote
AMLC requesting AMLCs assistance in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of
corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project, and also
noting that the Republic was presently defending itself in
two international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an
intelligence database search on the financial transactions
of certain individuals involved in the award, including
Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Technical Committee). By this time, Alvarez had
already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation
of Section 3(J) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8
bank accounts with 6 different banks. The AMLC issued a
resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and
verify an application to inquire into the deposits or
investments of Alvarez et al. and to authorize the AMLC
Secretariat to conduct an inquiry once the RTC grants the
application. The rationale for the resolution was founded
on the findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred
from a Hong Kong bank account to bank accounts in the
Philippines maintained by respondents. The Resolution
also noted that by awarding the contract to PIATCO
(despite its lack of financial capacity) Alvarez violated
Section 3(E) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order granting the
AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject
bank accounts of Alvarez et al. In response to a letter of
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a
Resolution authorizing its Executive Director to inquire
into and examine the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and
several other entities involved in the nullified contract.
AMLC filed an application before the MANILA RTC to
inquire into the accounts alleged as Sec 3 Corrupt
practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

118
This provision shall apply to officers and

employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions
having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3
Project. The ex parte application was granted and the
MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order. Alvarez alleged
that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order,
which was issued following an ex parte application, and
he argued that nothing in the Anti- Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to
inquire into bank accounts ex parte. After several
motions, manifestations, orders and resolutions the case
went up to the SC. Alvarez et al.s position: The AMLA,
being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive
effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to
deposits or investments opened prior to the affectivity of
the AMLA (17 October 2001). The subject bank accounts,
opened in 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the
bank inquiry order without violating the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto
laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a provision
which does not provide a penal sanction BUT which
merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts
and deposits).
Ruling:
YES. It is clear that no person may be
prosecuted under the PENAL provisions of the AMLA for
acts committed prior to the enactment of the law (17
October 2001). With respect to the AUTHORITY TO
INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex post facto law is
one that (among others) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
PRIOR to the AMLA:
(1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in
activities later on enumerated in the law did not, by itself,
remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute
confidentiality.
(2) In order that bank accounts could be
examined, there was need to secure either the written
permission of the depositor OR a court order authorizing
such examination, assuming that they were involved in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or in a case where the money deposited or invested was
itself the subject matter of the litigation.
(3)Please read the original for the other issues
aside from Art. 3, section 22.
(4) Section 11. Authority to inquire into Bank
Deposits.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the
AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit
or investment with any banking institution or non-bank
For Private

financial institution upon order of any competent court in

cases of violation of this Act when it has been established
that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments involved are in any way related to a money
laundering offense: Provided, That this provision shall not
apply to deposits and investments made prior to the
effectivity of this Act.
The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer
off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a
measure of lawful protection to the account holder. The
application of the bank inquiry order as a means of
inquiring into transactions entered into prior to the
passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm,
offensive as to the ex post facto clause.
NEVERTHELESS,
the
argument
that
the
prohibition against ex post facto laws goes as far as to
prohibit any inquiry into deposits in bank accounts
OPENED prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the
TRANSACTIONS were entered into when the law had
already taken effect cannot be sustained. This argument
will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to
further money laundering. It is hard to presume that
Congress intended to enact a self-defeating law in the
first place, and the courts are inhibited from such a
construction by the cardinal rule that a law should be
interpreted with a view to upholding rather than
destroying it.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by
EDGARDO E. VELUZ, vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and
TERESITA R. PABELLO, G.R. No. 169482 January
29, 2008
Facts:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2
dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the
petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed
by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow,
allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and
deteriorating cognitive abilities. 4 She was living with
petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her
guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005,
respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello
took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these
proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining
Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed
to present any convincing proof that respondents (the
legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to
establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he
was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated
February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his
petition.
Whether or not petitioner failed to present any

convincing proof that respondents were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty and failed to
establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as
legal guardian.
Ruling:
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of
a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of
liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising
legal custody over
another person. 11 Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons
liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the
custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from
petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her
liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he
did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless
insists that respondents themselves have no right to her
custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is
irrelevant. What is important is Eufemias personal
freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of
the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be
in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.12
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an
inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being
detained and restrained of her liberty by
respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary,
respondents, being Eufemias adopted children, are
taking care of her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason
to disturb this finding.
Facts:
Issue/s:

119
For Private

On October 24, 1991, an Information for double

murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 40, docketed as Crim. Case No. D10678, against Manolo Salcedo, Romulo Salcedo, Ricardo
Samuco, Rolando Pingol and one Joel Doe for the death
of the brothers Mario and Tito Untalan on October 21,
1991.
Respondent
denied
the
motion
for
reconsideration on January 10, 1992.
On March 15, 1992, respondent issued an Order
denying the motion, stating:
Considering that time is of the essence because
all the accused except Joel Doe have been under
detention at the City Jail since October 21, 1991 and
considering that the City Prosecutor has not yet resolved
the matter of reinvestigation on December 23, 1991 as
ordered by the Court, and considering further that Asst.
City Prosecutor Rosita Castro interposed no objection to
the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which
she considered reasonable, without determining whether
or not the proper charge could be double homicide, the
Court granted bail for the provisional liberty of each
accused in the amount of P40,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no legal
and factual basis for the Motion to Inhibit. 1
On April 13, 1992, complainant moved for the
reconsideration of the Order of March 15, 1992.
Respondent denied the motion in an Order dated June 8,
1992.
reversal of the Decision 2 and Resolution3 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89539. The Court of Appeals'
decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein
petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
In a Decision7 dated 8 November 2004, Deputy
Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez approved
the
recommendation of the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner from service
based on the existence of substantial evidence of a
discrepancy
in
petitioner's
account
totaling
P4,080,631.36. The said decision noted petitioner's
supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and position
paper despite due notice.
On 29 November 2004, petitioner filed an urgent
motion8 stating that she complied with the directive to file
a counter-affidavit and position paper and praying that
the defenses therein be considered in reversing the 8
November 2004 decision. The motion was treated as a
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in
the assailed Decision dated 23 October 2006. 15 It held
that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation
and it affirmed the deputy ombudsman's factual finding
that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. The appellate court also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30
January 2007.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent committed gross ignorance
of the law when he granted bail to the accused in Crim.
Case No. D-10678.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the recommendation of
the OCA. Respondent clearly failed to accord the
prosecution the basic and elementary entitlements of due
process, such as timely notice and opportunity to be
heard. Such failure equally clearly resulted either from
ignorance of the law or, worse, partiality in favor of the
accused. The recommendation is thus in order.
The Court notes that respondent has been
dismissed from the service in A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ
entitled Hilario De Guzman, Jr. v. Judge Deodoro J.
Sison,5 promulgated on March 26, 2001. However, the
dismissal of respondent in 2001 does not prevent the
Court from imposing a sanction against him for gross
ignorance of the law while in office.
LORNA A. MEDINA, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA), represented by the Audit Team of
EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN PALLERNA, and MA.
DOLORES TEPORA, G.R. No. 176478 February 4,
2008
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the

120
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of her right to
due process, whether the penalty of dismissal is proper
and whether petitioner's guilt for grave misconduct and
dishonesty is supported by substantial evidence.
Ruling:
Petitioner's theory is erroneous.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial
of petitioner's request for a formal investigation is not
tantamount to a denial of her right to due process.
Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and
position paper and later on, was given a chance to file
two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the
deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.28
Petitioner's assertion that the Court of Appeals
refused to reopen and review the case and ignored
material issues and arguments in her motion for
reconsideration of the 23 October 2006 Decision in
violation of her right to due process, is quite hollow.
To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and
grave misconduct have always been and should remain
For Private

anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on

the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When
an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is
not the punishment of such officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of
the public's faith and confidence in the government.
JEFFREY
T.
GO,
vs.
LEYTE
II
ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 176909 February 18,
2008
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the
November 30, 2006 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02010 setting aside the April 4,
2006 and May 2, 2006 Orders of Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City in Special Civil Case No.
2006-03-24, which ordered the issuance of a writ of
injunction
against
respondent
Leyte
II
Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO II). Also assailed is the
February 27, 2007 Resolution3 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Jeffrey T. Go is a resident of Block 16,
Lot 14, Imelda Village, Tacloban City. He bought the
property from Rosita Mancera, who is the registered
consumer and member of respondent LEYECO II.
At about 10:20 a.m. of February 13, 2006,
respondents inspection team went to petitioners
residence to inspect his electric meter. They requested
the occupant of the house to witness the inspection but
were told that the owner was out of town.
Petitioner immediately filed a "Petition for
Injunction and Damages with Preliminary Injunction with
a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order"6 before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
He claimed that the inspection was irregular and illegal,
and that respondent had no legal basis to cause the
disconnection of his electric service.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court in its November 30,
2006 Decision.
Petitioners motion
denied, hence this petition.
for
reconsideration
was
Issue/s:
1) whether the inspection of petitioners electric meter
was in accordance with R.A. No. 7832; 2) whether
petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto; and 3)
whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly
issued against respondent LEYECO II.
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
The inspection was conducted in accordance
with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832, While it is not disputed

121
that petitioners electric meter had a broken seal and

shunting wire, petitioner claims that the foregoing
circumstances cannot be considered prima facie evidence
of illegal use of electricity because the inspection was not
conducted in the presence of an "officer of the law" as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7832. He argues that only a
barangay chairman witnessed the inspection, and that his
presence failed to satisfy the requirements of the law
which specifies the police or the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) as competent authority to verify the
findings of a private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative.
However, under Section 1 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832, an officer of the
law is defined as one "who by direct provision of the law
or by election or by appointment of competent authority,
is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property." Contrary to
petitioners claim, the definition is not limited to members
of the police force or the NBI. The rules specifically state
that a barangay chairman is considered an officer of the
law. Thus, his presence during the inspection satisfies the
requirements of the law.
We now come to the issue whether petitioner
was caught in flagrante delicto.
In flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of
committing the crime." To be caught in flagrante delicto,
therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by
the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct
evidence" of culpability, or "that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."
In the instant case, it was impossible for
petitioner to have been caught in the act of committing
an offense considering that he was not present during the
inspection. Nor were any of his representatives at hand.
The presence of a broken seal and a shunting wire in
petitioners electric meter will not suffice to support a
finding that petitioner was in flagrante delicto. Such
circumstances merely operate as prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832.
Absent a finding of in flagrante delicto, there is
no basis for the immediate disconnection of petitioners
electric service under Section 6 of R.A. No. 7832.
Respondents reliance on the said provision is clearly
misplaced.
As to whether the writ of preliminary injunction
was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II, we
rule in the affirmative.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 provides that unless
there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection of
electric service was made with evident bad faith or grave
abuse of authority, a writ of injunction or restraining
order may not issue against any private electric utility or
rural electric cooperative exercising the right and
authority to disconnect such service. However, the second
paragraph of the same provision provides for another
instance when a writ of injunction or restraining order
may be issued. Consistent with the foregoing provision,
For Private

Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

R.A. No. 7832.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
only instance where the court can issue a restraining
order or injunction is when there is prima facie evidence
of bad faith or grave abuse of authority.16 As the law
stands, there are two exceptions to the restriction on the
issuance of restraining orders or writs of injunction, to
wit: 1) when there is prima facie evidence that the
disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave
abuse of authority; and 2) when, even in the absence of
bad faith or grave abuse of authority, the electric
consumer deposits a bond with the court in the form of
cash or a cashiers check equivalent to the differential
billing.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a bond in the
form of a cashiers check in the amount of One Hundred
One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Seven and 99/100
(P101,597.99), the equivalent of the differential billing
charged against him by respondent in compliance with
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 and Rule VIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832.
R.B. Michael Press and Annalene Reyes Escobia,
petitioners, vs Nicasio C. Galit
Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B.
Michael Press as an offset machine operator, Duringhis
employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times and
was absent without leave for a totalof nine and a half
days. Respondent was ordered to render overtime service
in order to comply with a job order deadline,but he
refused to do so. The following day respondent reported
for work but petitioner Escobiatold him not to work, and
to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he
returned, a copyof an Office Memorandum was served on
him. Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to the
following offenses: (1) tardiness constitutingneglect of
duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or
willful disobedience. Respondent was terminated from
employment, gave him his two-day salary and a
terminationletter. Respondent subsequently filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before
theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The CA found that it was not the tardiness and
absences committed by respondent, but his refusalto
render overtime work which caused the termination of his
employment. It ruled that the timeframe in which
respondent was afforded procedural due process is
dubitable; he could not havebeen afforded ample
opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on
his behalf. Itfurther ruled that the basis for computing his
backwages should be his daily salary at the time of his
dismissal which was PhP 230, and that his backwages
should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to
the finality of the CAs decision.
Issue/s:

122
1. whether there was just cause to terminate the

employment of respondent
2. whether due process was observed in the dismissal
process
3. whether respondent is entitled to backwages and other
benefits despite his refusal to be reinstated.
Ruling:
The Courts Ruling Respondents tardiness
cannot be considered condoned by petitioners
In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce
any evidence to show waiver or condonation on the part
of petitioners. Thus.
the findings of the CA that
petitioners cannot use the previous absences and
tardiness because respondent was not subjected to any
penalty is bereft of legal basis. The petitioners did not
impose any punishment for the numerous absences and
tardiness of respondent. Thus, said infractions can be
used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.
Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence
is paid based on such arrangement. For said daily paid
workers, the principle of "a days pay for a days work" is
squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in any
wise that such nonpayment of the daily wage on the days
he was absent constitutes a penalty.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for
dismissal, these two elements must concur:(1) the
employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that
is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude(2)
the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The
issue now is, whether respondents refusal or failure to
render overtime work was willful; that is, whether such
refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude. The fact that respondent refused to
provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there
is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that
without him, the offset machine operator, no further
printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse
mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness. The Court rule
that respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime
work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his
offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that
he was a difficult employee.
Under the twin notice requirement, the
employees must be given two (2) notices before his
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to
apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second
notice to communicate to the employees that their
employment is being terminated. On the surface, it would
seem that petitioners observed due process (twin notice
and hearing requirement ): On February 23, 1999
petitioner notified respondent of the hearing to be
conducted later that day. On the same day before the
hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an office
memorandum which contained a list of his offenses, and
a notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the
same day. The next day, February 24, 1999, he was
notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael
Press had been terminated. The hearing was immediately
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set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999the day

respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was
not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official
or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.
Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it
can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or
friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to
adduce evidence in his defense. In the February 24, 1999
notice
of
dismissal,
petitioners
simply
justified
respondents dismissal by citing his admission of the
offenses charged. It did not specify the details
surrounding the offenses and the specific company rule
or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was
grounded. The Court concludes that termination of
respondent was railroaded in serious breach of his right
to due process. Therefore, the CA decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Court declares respondents dismissal
from employment VALID and LEGAL. Petitioners are,
however, ordered jointly and solidarily to pay respondent
nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 for
violation of respondents right to due process.
PADILLA MACHINE SHOP, RODOLFO PADILLA and
LEONARDO PADILLA, vs. Petitioners,
RUFINOA.JAVILGAS, G.R.No.175960 February19,
2008
Facts:
This petition for review assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89164 which reinstated the decision of the Labor
Arbiter finding respondent Rufino A. Javilgas to have
been illegally dismissed. Also assailed is the Resolution of
December
21,
2006
denying
the
motion
for
reconsideration.
On December 10, 2002, Javilgas filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13 th
month pay, separation pay and non-remittance of SSS
contributions against petitioners Padilla Machine Shop,
Rodolfo Padilla and Leonardo Padilla.
Javilgas alleged that in January 1998, he was
hired by Padilla Machine Shop, located at Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. Javilgas further alleged that in
April 2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and
told him to stop working, but without giving any reason
therefore. He stopped reporting for work and sued
petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the
payment of backwages, pro rated 13 th month pay,
separation pay, and moral and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla
(Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine Shop, alleged that
in 1999, SSS and Medicare contributions were deducted
from Javilgas salary and remitted to the SSS; that in
2000, they (petitioners) submitted a report to the SSS
that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his work,
and transferred to another shop, Raymond Machine Shop,
located within the same vicinity as Padilla Machine Shop;
that some months after, Javilgas returned and pleaded to
be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo Padilla took
Javilgas back to work, but their customers were not

123
satisfied with the quality of his work; hence Javilgas was

assigned to the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas incurred
numerous absences in the Novaliches branch; that
Javilgas had opened his own machine shop and even
pirated the clients of petitioners; and finally, Javilgas
again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop without prior
notice.
On March 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
that Javilgas was illegally dismissed.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC found no
sufficient evidence to show that Javilgas was dismissed or
prevented from reporting for work; that Javilgas could
not categorically state when he was dismissed. In fine,
the NLRC held that Javilgas voluntarily resigned, and not
illegally
dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that
the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show that
Javilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause.
The appellate court did not lend credence to petitioners
claim that respondent voluntarily resigned since the issue
was only raised for the first before the NLRC. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the instant
petition.
Issue/s:
1.

holding that the said consistent position adopted
by petitioners that they never dismissed
Javilgas is not sufficient to negate the charge
of illegal dismissal;
2.

awarding attorneys fees to the respondent who
was being represented pro bono by the Office of
Legal Aid of the U.P. College of Law.
Ruling:
In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce
evidence to rebut Javilgas claim of dismissal and satisfy
the burden of proof required. As regards the eight-month
hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case,
we sustain the Court of Appeals ruling that Javilgas filed
the complaint within a reasonable period during the
three-year period provided under Article 291 of the Labor
Code.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners claim that
attorneys fees may not be awarded to the respondent
since his case was being handled pro bono by the U.P.
Office of Legal Aid, which provides free legal assistance to
indigent litigants. In this jurisdiction, there are two
concepts of attorneys fees. In the ordinary sense,
attorneys fees represent the reasonable compensation
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paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has

rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees may be awarded
by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the
losing party to the prevailing party,and not counsel. In
its extraordinary sense, attorneys fees as part of
damages is awarded only in the instances specified in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, among which are the
following which obtain in the instant case:
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for
compensation
and
indemnity under workmen's

employer's
liability
laws;
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA

Facts:
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo
(Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC,
filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala
before
Secretary
Bienvenido
Laguesma
of
the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The
committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense
charged. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the
Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but
with
there
recommendation
that
the
penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from
service for being found guilty of grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Rayala filed Motions for
Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found
Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of
service for the maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this
Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act
of sexual harassment. The Republic then filed its own
Petition for Review. On June 28, 2004, the Court directed
the consolidation of the three (3)petitions.
G.R. No. 155831 Domingo Petition 1. The President has the power to remove
presidential appointees; and
2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential
appointees.
G.R. No. 155840 Rayala Petition
In his petition, Rayala raises the following
issues:
1. Hes act does not constitute sexual
harassment;
a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring,
re- employment, or continued employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination
against
the
employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual
harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250.
Issue/s:

124
(1) Whether or not Rayala committed sexual harassment?

(2) what is the applicable penalty?
Ruling:
CA and OP were unanimous in holding that
RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only differ in
the appropriate imposable penalty. That Rayala
committed the acts complained of and was guilty of
sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual
finding
of
not
just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,
the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when
supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made
by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded
great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The
principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should
bind us. He insists, however, that these acts do not
constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition
for her continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case
our ruling inA quino v. Acosta. We find respondents
insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the threefold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule
applies with full force
to sexual harassment. The law penalizing sexual
harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas
culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the
administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA,
along
with
the
Investigating Committee and the Office of the President,
found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that
sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He
argues that intent is an essential element in sexual
harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were
done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of
the charges
against him. The SC reiterated that what is
before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment.
Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum
in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial. The SC also
rejected Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus
constitute merely political harassment.
The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded
due process. Thus, when the President found that Rayala
was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the
Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to
impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law
for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty
for the first offense of either the administrative offense of
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sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral

conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of
the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of
dismissal from the service, a penalty which can
only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

125
For Private

2009
Ama computer College East Rizal Vs. Ignacio 590
SCRA (2009)
essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable

controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation
by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for
the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
Facts:
Issue/s:
Allan Ignacio was a supervisor of AMA Computer

College. He was dismissed by the said school on the
ground that he committed a gross misconduct for
destroying the school property and for the loss of school
records. The event happened during the renovation of the
school. The respondent facilitated in the demolition of the
concrete partition wall of the computer laboratory without
any approval of the concerned department of the school.
The petitioner wrote a written notice to the respondent
regarding his conduct and let him explain why he
committed such act, His contention was that, theres no
need for such approval because Ignacio was already
informed of the problem in the building which needs to be
renovated based on the copy of the building plan
provided by the owner. Seeing that the renovation plan
was signed by the VP for Education and the School
Director, so he decided to start with the demolition of the
partition taking into serious consideration that he was
given only a few days to comply with the deadline, and
after the respondent explained on his side, the petitioner
send back a written notice of dismissal.
The Department of labor and the NLRC
decided that there was no illegal dismissal since the
grounds for gross negligence was substantial and the
petitioner followed the procedural due process of
dismissing their employee. However, the CA reversed the
decision in favour with the respondent and affirmed that
there was an illegal dismissal
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent was accorded
with procedural due process?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the chance
afforded to respondent, although limited, is a clear
opportunity to be heard on the issue at hand. What the
law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard. However, affirmed the decision
of the CA that there is an illegal dismissal for the lack of
substantive evidence of proving gross misconduct on the
part of the respondent.
Lozano vs. Nograles 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective
petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution
No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members
of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering
Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In

126
WON the court

controversy?
has
the
power
to
review
such
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in determining
whether such case is subject to judicial review, there
must be an actual controversy, there must be a proper
party, the case must be raised at an earliest opportunity,
and there must be a necessity of deciding the
constitutional question.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed
to establish these elements for the house resolution
no.1109 was not yet enacted, hence, neither the case has
an actual controversy nor is the petitioner the injured
party. House resolution number 1109 may happen or may
not happen, hence, the SC dismissed the petition for lack
of actual controversy.
People vs Nunez 591 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of
the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate
court affirmed the Decision dated February 11, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case
No. 8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the
Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with
the Los Baos Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force
conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuez based
on reports of drug possession. The group, led by
Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1
Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano,
PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2
Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellants residence in
Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay
Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to
assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving
at appellants house, Mundin called on appellant to come
out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan
showed Nuez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2
Crisostomo then surveyed appellants room in his
presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two
barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1
Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters,
improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with
shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610
inside appellants dresser. The group also confiscated a
component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion
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that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following

the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property
Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which
appellant signed.
The trial court rendered the decision and
convicted Nunez for a sentence of Reclusion perpetua.
The accused appeal to the CA contending that such
evidence were planted against him, and the appellant
assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not
indicate his exact address but only the barangay and
street of his residence. He maintains that none of the
occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in
the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the
prosecution did not call the barangay officials as
witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.
Despite his contention, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court. And the appellant elevate the case to the
SC.
Issue/s:
1.
WON the search warrant is valid?
2.
WON the seizure of the property were valid?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the question of
the validity of the search warrant was deemed waive
since the appellant failed to raise such question to the
trial court and the appellant signed the receipt of the
property seized and the certification of orderly search.
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the
waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.
The SC affirmed and modified the
decision of the lower court and ruled that the seizure of
personal things not subject for seizure was invalidated.
LBC vs Mateo 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
Respondent James Mateo, designated as a
customer associate, was a regular employee of petitioner
LBC Express Metro Manila, Inc. (LBC). His job was to
deliver and pick-up packages to and from LBC and its
customers. For this purpose, Mateo was assigned the use
of a Kawasaki motorcycle.
On April 30, 2001 at about 6:10 p.m., Mateo
arrived at LBCs Escolta office, along Burke Street, to
drop off packages coming from various LBC airposts. He
parked his motorcycle directly in front of the LBC office,
switched off the engine and took the key with him.
However, he did not lock the steering wheel because he
allegedly was primarily concerned with the packages,
including a huge sum of money that needed to be
immediately secured inside the LBC office. He returned
promptly within three to five minutes but the motorcycle

127
was gone. He immediately reported the loss to his

superiors at LBC and to the nearest police station.
LBC, through its vice-president petitioner,
Lorenzo A. Nio, directed Mateo to appear in his office to
explain his side and for formal investigation. As directed,
Mateo appeared and presented his side. After
investigation, he received a notice of termination from
LBC dated May 30, 2001. He was barred from reporting
for work.
The Department of Labor and the NLRC
dismissed the complaint of the respondent for the
petitioner has followed the due process of terminating
their employee with the sufficient ground of gross
negligence on the part of the respondent. The respondent
appealed to the CA and reversed the decision of NLRC.
The petitioner elevates the case to the Supreme Court
contending that they terminate their employee with
sufficient ground of gross negligence and followed due
process.
Issue/s:
Did the petitioner violate the procedural due process in
dismissing their employee?
Ruling:
The SC ruled that in applying the procedural due
process in terminating an employee, requires that the
employee be informed of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought. The memorandum did
just that. Mateo was thereafter given the opportunity to
explain his side and was handed the requisite second
notice (of termination). Procedural due process was
therefore complied with. The substantive loss of a
property of the company is sufficient evidence that the
employee committed a gross negligence on his part. The
petition was granted.
Triumph international vs. Apostol 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
This a petition for a certiorari on the decision
rendered by the CA. The respondent was an assistant
manager hired by the petitioner, wherein the respondent
was terminated by the petitioner on the ground that the
latter has loss his trust and confidence with the former.
The respondent was given a memorandum to explain why
there is a huge discrepancy of the inventory in the
warehouse and permitted to leave with pay by the
petitioner since the investigation was still ongoing. After
the respondent explained his side, he was given a notice
of termination of his employment.
The respondent goes to the Department
of Labor and NLRC and assailed that they are illegally
dismissed by the petitioner. The Department of labor and
NLRC ruled that their dismissal was legal and the
petitioner followed the procedural due process in
terminating the respondent. The CA reversed the decision
of the NLRC and the petitioner went to the SC contending
that their ground for termination was sufficient.
Issue/s:
For Private

Did the petitioner follow the procedural due process in

terminating the respondent?
Ruling:
The SC held that the petition have merit. The
mere fact that the petitioner gave notice to the
respondent and gave him an opportunity to explain on his
part why such discrepancies occurred, and complying the
second requisite of notice of termination is a sufficient
requirement on applying the procedural due process.
Managerial position does not need proof beyond
reasonable doubt because his employment is base on
trust and confidence compared to the rank and file
employees. In the case at bar, the respondent was not a
rank and file employee, he has a position wherein the
company gives his trust and confidence to the
respondent, hence, the petitioner has a legal grounds for
terminating the respondent. The petition was granted.
Republic vs Libunao 594 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
The respondents were the owners of the land
which was taken by the petitioners the Republic of the
Philippines represented by NAPOCOR through eminent
domain. The RTC rendered their decision by approving
such taking by paying just compensation of the value of
whole lot area. The petitioners move their case to the CA
but they affirmed the decision with modification that the
petitioner should pay the interest of 6% of the value of
the land from the time of taking until the full payment of
the Value of the land.
The petitioners contend that they are
only allowed to pay the 10% value of the land since they
are only using a portion of the land as a means of right of
way.
Issue/s:
Is the contention of the petitioners meritorious?
Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirming the decision of the CA.
The Court held that the nature and effect of the
installation of power lines and the limitations on the use
of the land for an indefinite period should be considered,
as the owners of the properties would be deprived of the
normal use of their properties. For this reason, the
property owners are entitled to the payment of just
compensation based on the full market value of the
affected properties.
Abelita III vs Doria 596 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a
complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of
the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt.
Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez).
Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996,
at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to

128
their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when

P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents),
accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested
them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at
Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was
suspicious of the request and told respondents that he
would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had
brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he
parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez
grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace
van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search
without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a
licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotguns
license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez
continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber
pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle.
Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him,
without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special
detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a
team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the
incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain
William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place
of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and
when he found him, he informed him of the incident
report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him
to the police headquarters as he was reported to be
involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly
sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence.
P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner.
Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught up with
petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The
police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle
beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened the door.
They also saw a shotgun at the back of the drivers seat.
The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested
petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also
arrested other persons who were identified to be with
petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated
murder. An administrative case was also filed against
petitioner before this Court.
The trial court ruled that petitioners warrantless
arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were
valid and legal. The trial court gave more credence to the
testimonies of respondents who were presumed to have
performed their duties in accordance with law. The trial
court rejected petitioners claim of frame-up as weak and
insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the
police officers who conducted the arrest and the
incidental search.
Issue/s:
Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure were illegal.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that for the warrantless arrest
under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur:
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(1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2)

the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge should be
based on probable cause. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the
report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to
shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to
give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, is
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain
view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the
area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a
shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to
the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Hence the warrantless search and seizure were
justified. The petition was denied.
UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163858.
Facts:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to
investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake
UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The
agent took some photographs where the clandestine
manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then
sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an
application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC
of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a
search warrant directing the police to seize finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON
multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found;
instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of
Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed
that some of the sized items be turned over to the
custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for
examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized
items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,
which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of
Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view
doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the

129
respondents.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which,
when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox,
were
valid
under
the
plain
view
doctrine.
Ruling:
It is true that things not described in the warrant
may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However,
seized things not described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence
to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are
present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement
officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover
incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise
subject
to
seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to
prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not
enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of
the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of
officers who were present when the warrant was enforced
to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents
were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal
knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents
thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before
they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the
NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to
the seized items.
PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN,

G.R. No. 143372
Facts:
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared
in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain Francis
Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward
neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It also
claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through
lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation
of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in
the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed
the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community.
He
is
seeking
for
damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item,
ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to inform the
public on matters of general interest, promote the public
good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,
For Private

and that the story was published in good faith and

without
malice.
raising the
jeopardy.
Issue/s:
Issue/s:
Whether or not the news report fall under privileged

communication and therefore protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech.
Ruling:
The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is
not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we
assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character when the
matter was published in the newspaper and circulated
among the general population, especially since the
individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official
nor
a
public
figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two
levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the
deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of
the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also
untrue because the events she reported never happened.
Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren
Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a
lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances societys interest in
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated
falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection
constitutional
protection
against
double
Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.

Ruling:
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his
express
consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the
offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and
the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The
inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information
is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by
which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the
law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court
designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try and
decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the
drugs
involved.
(PP.
vs.
Velasco)
Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being
present,
the
defense
attaches.
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON.

MONINA A. ZENAROSA, G.R. No. 129472.
Facts:
On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro
possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks).
They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the
fact that they were in possession of and were
transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then
arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently
they applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutors
office filed two motions to admit amended information
(claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos,
not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the
accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion

130
For Private

2010
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161602
(July 13, 2010)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and prevent
it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until
another preliminary investigation is conducted in their
case.
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of
alleged
unlawfully
acquired
property
with
the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner
Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison
Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S
Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island
Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a
motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of
their right to a speedy disposition of their case; b) lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c)
prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On
September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a
motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend
proceedings. They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a
forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the
Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous
inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2
of the law.
In its Comment on the motion, the Republic
pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact
conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in
OMB-0-91-0820law and issued on January 22, 1992 a
resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing
of the forfeiture case.
On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution, law denying the Romualdezes' March 31, 2003
motion. It also denied by resolution on December 3, 2003
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
As the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out,

quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has
under its general investigatory powers the authority to
investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten
wealth had been amassed before February 25, 1986.
Thus:
While we do not discount the authority of the
Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of
his correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the
proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which
were amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said
date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such
forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority
to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such
ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even
before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general
investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act
No. 6770.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the
Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new
preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to
take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820.
They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had
been sent to their last known residence at the time it was
conducted.cracralaw The Republic categorically insists
that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the
Romualdezes.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for
proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes'
cases when they did not show up despite notice being
sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court
held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not
require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the
proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the
presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach
him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the
evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious
purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous
respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by
hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics."
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or
interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan.
NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM vs.
RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX GAVAN, G.R. No. 169999
(July 26, 2010)
Issue/s:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991
satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.
Ruling:

131
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal's (CA's) June 2,
2005 Decisioncralaw in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83577, which
affirmed with modification the October 28, 2003
Decisioncralaw
of
the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NCR CA No. 034421-03, and the
For Private

September 23, 2005 Resolutionralaw denying petitioners'

motion for partial reconsideration.
Petitioners contend that the investigation of
respondents was not an afterthought. They stress the
following peculiar circumstances of this case: First, when
the labor complaint was filed on November 3, 2000,
respondents had not yet been dismissed by petitioners.
Rather, it was respondents who were guilty of not
reporting for work; Lopez starting on October 23, 2000
and Gavan on October 28, 2000. Second, at this time
also, petitioners were still in the process of collecting
evidence on the alleged misappropriation of company
funds after they received reports of respondents'
fraudulent acts. Considering the distance between the
towns serviced by respondents and Puerto Princesa City,
it took a couple of weeks for petitioners' representative,
Armel Bagasala (Bagasala), to unearth the anomalies
committed by respondents. Thus, it was only on
November 18, 2000 when Bagasala finished the
investigation and submitted to petitioners the evidence
establishing that respondents indeed misappropriated
company funds. Naturally, this was the only time when
they could begin the formal investigation of respondents
wherein they followed the twin-notice rule and which led
to the termination of respondents on December 18, 2000
for gross misconduct and absence without leave for more
than a month.
Petitioners lament that the filing of the labor
complaint on November 3, 2000 was purposely sought by
respondents to pre-empt the results of the then ongoing
investigation after respondents got wind that petitioners
were conducting said investigation because respondents
were reassigned to a different sales area during the
period of investigation.
Respondents counter that their abandonment of
employment was a concocted story. No evidence was
presented, like the daily time record, to establish this
claim. Further, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint
negates
abandonment.
Assuming
arguendo
that
respondents abandoned their work, no proof was
presented that petitioners' served a notice of
abandonment at respondents' last known addresses as
required by Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. According to
respondents, on November 3, 2000, petitioners verbally
advised them to look for another job because the
company was allegedly suffering from heavy losses. For
this reason, they sought help from the Palawan labor
office which recommended that they file a labor
complaint.
Respondents also contest the finding that they
misappropriated company funds. They claim that the
evidence is insufficient to prove that they did not remit
their sales collections to petitioners. Neither were the
minutes of the proceedings before the labor officer
presented to prove that they admitted misappropriating
the company funds. Respondents add that they did not
hold a position of trust and confidence. They claim that
the criminal cases for estafa against respondents were
belatedly filed in order to further justify their dismissal

132
from employment and act as leverage relative to the

subject labor case they filed against petitioners.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in

construing that the investigation held by
petitioners is an afterthought; and
2. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in

awarding the sum of P30,000.00 each to the
respondents as nominal damages.cra
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
When the requirements of procedural due
process are satisfied, the award of nominal damages is
improper.
An employee's right to be heard in termination
cases under Article 277 (b) as implemented by Section 2
(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is
satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation
but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the
charges against him and to submit evidence in support
thereof.
In the instant case, the appellate court ruled
that there are two conflicting versions of the events and
that, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the courts are precluded from resolving factual
issues. Consequently, the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that petitioners stopped
reporting from work and misappropriated their sales
collection are binding on the courts. However, the CA
found that respondents were denied their right to
procedural due process because the investigation held by
petitioners was an afterthought considering that it was
called after they had notice of the complaint filed before
the labor office in Palawan.
Indeed, appellate courts accord the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC not only
respect but also finality when supported by substantial
evidence. The Court does not substitute its own judgment
for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight
of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. It is not for
the Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute the findings
of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained
expertise in its specialized field.cra19
However, while we agree with the CA that the
labor tribunal's factual determinations can no longer be
disturbed for failure of respondents to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC,
as in fact respondents effectively accepted these findings
by their failure to appeal from the decision of the CA, we
find that the appellate court misapprehended the import
of these factual findings. For if it was duly established, as
For Private

affirmed by the appellate court itself, that respondents

failed to report for work starting from October 22, 2000
for respondent Lopez and October 28, 2000 for
respondent Gavan, then at the time of the filing of the
complaint with the labor office on November 3, 2000,
respondents were not yet dismissed from employment.
Prior to this point in time, there was, thus, no necessity
to comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
As
can
be
seen,
under
the
peculiar
circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that
the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a
mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting
the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted
the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the
subject labor complaint. For this reason, there was
sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice
and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing
conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus,
the award of nominal damages by the appellate court is
improper.
SALVADOR V. REBELLION vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175700 (July 5, 2010)
Facts:
At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000,

PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo
Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael
Fermin and Joseph Apologista, all members of the
Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City,
were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay
Mauway, when they chanced upon two individuals
chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The
police officers introduced themselves and then inquired
from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out
from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which
PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on
petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting
that the substance was "shabu", he confiscated the
plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was
later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought
to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the
contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were
found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of
aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu.
On
the
basis
thereof,
petitioner
was
correspondingly charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further
investigated by the City Prosecutor's Office.
This petition for review assails the September

26, 2006 Decision1cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29248 which affirmed with modification
the December 8, 2004 Decision 2cralaw of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209,
finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended (otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended).
Petitioner denied the charge against him. He

claimed that he was merely standing in front of a store
waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was
suddenly accosted by the MAC team.
On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed

charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion with violation of
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the
accusatory portion thereof reads:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming

the decision of the Rigional Trial Court finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in

the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance and one (1) piece of aluminum foil
strip with trace of white crystalline substance, which were
found positive [for] Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, without
the corresponding license and prescription, in violation of
the above cited law.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on September 6, 2000,
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial
on the merits forthwith commenced.

133
Issue/s:
Ruling:
The court sustained the appellate court in
affirming petitioner's conviction by the trial court.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made
by a peace officer or a private individual under any of the
following circumstances:7cralaw
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
For Private


however, not being favorable to the petitioner, cannot be

given retroactive application in this case.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)

hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 112.
ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., in his capacity as Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, G.R. No. 176278 (June 25, 2010)
Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that

the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under
Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto. The MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a
piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion
that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3
Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their
motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able
to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of
their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members
introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what
petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of
aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a
distance, PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of
the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline
substance. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were
apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation.
After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
Under these circumstances, we entertain no
doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto as
he was then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting
team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to the
rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
Consequently, the results of the attendant search and
seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of
the offense charged. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court in addressing the matter of the
purportedly invalid warrantless arrest:
Facts:
In any event, the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant was lawful because he was caught by the police
officers in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of
handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu".
Upon seeing the exchange, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3
Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito Yanson
and introduced themselves as members of the MAC. PO3
Sotomayor confiscated from accused-appellant the plastic
sachet of "shabu" while PO3 Garcia confiscated the
aluminum foil strips which accused-appellant was also
holding in his other hand.
Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer
in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to
search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate
those that may be used to prove the commission of the
offense. x x x
RA
9165,
otherwise
known
as
the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased
the penalty for illegal possession of less than five grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to an
imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a
fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Said law,

134
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen

and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria MacapagalArroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues
that respondent Davide's age at that time of his
nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from
holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on
Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement
age of all officers and employees of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA
employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent
Davide's entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against
the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide,
the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the
petition. First, they question petitioner's standing to bring
this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the
practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioner's citizenship nor his taxpayer
status vests him with standing to question respondent
Davide's appointment because petitioner remains without
personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit
which does not involve the taxing power of the state or
the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public
respondents question the propriety of this petition,
contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo
warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the
office in question.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Congress has the power to limit
the presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors
by
legislating
age
qualifications
despite
the
constitutional rule limiting Congress' role in the
appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on
Appointments' confirmation of nominees.
Ruling:
The petition presents no case or controversy for
petitioner's lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
Taxpayers' contributions to the state's coffers
entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures
For Private

which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.

However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed
by law and other executive issuances, the funding for
which was included in the appropriations for the DFA's
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets
Congress passed since respondent Davide's nomination.
Having assumed office under color of authority
(appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto
officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner's claim
of 'illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.'
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to
petitioner also obtains. Petitioner's suspension from the
practice of law bars him from performing 'any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.'
Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case
academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FORTUNE
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511 (June 29, 2010)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent
Fortune
Savings
and
Loan
Association, Inc. (Fortune Savings) owned a 4,230square meter agricultural land in San Gregorio, Malvar,
Batangas,[1] that it acquired for P80,000.00 after
foreclosing on the mortgage constituted on the land by
one of its borrowers who defaulted on a P71,500.00 loan.
Fortune Savings offered to sell the property for
P100,000.00 to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). But petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), the financial intermediary for the
CARP,[2] fixed the land's value at only P6,796.00.
Rejecting this amount, Fortune Savings filed a summary
administrative proceeding for the determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On April 7, 2000 or four months after the RTC
dismissed Agrarian Case 99-0214, Land Bank filed
another petition for the determination of just
compensation for the subject land in Agrarian Case 20000155. Because Fortune Savings failed to file a responsive
pleading, the RTC declared it in default. Land Bank
presented its evidence ex parte and on May 30, 2002 the
RTC rendered a decision, upholding Land Bank's valuation
of the property at P6,796.00 based on a technical
formula adopted by the DAR.
Fortune Savings appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[4] arguing that the DARAB decision had

135
already become final and executory and that the Land

Bank valuation of P6,796.00, adopted by the RTC was
erroneous. On August 29, 2006, the CA rendered
judgment, reinstating the March 3, 1999 DARAB decision
and its P93,060.00 valuation.[5] The CA ruled that Land
Bank incurred delay in filing only on April 5, 1999 its
petition for the determination of just compensation in
Agrarian Case 99-0214 and that, consequently, the
DARAB decision became final and executory on April 1,
1999.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that, since
Land Bank filed its original judicial action in Agrarian Case
99-0214 beyond the 15-day period set under Rule XIII,
Section 11 of the DARAB Rules, the DARAB determination
of just compensation became final and executory; and
2.
Whether or not the CA erred in adopting the
valuation fixed by DARAB for the property at P93,060.00
instead of the P6,796.00 established by Land Bank.
Ruling:
Although the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or CARL to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken
under the CARP, such determination is subject to
challenge in the courts.[6] The CARL vests in the RTCs,
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.[7] This means that the RTCs do not
exercise
mere
appellate
jurisdiction
over
just
compensation disputes.[8]
The RTC's jurisdiction is not any less 'original
and exclusive' because the question is first passed upon
by the DAR. The proceedings before the RTC are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. Indeed,
although the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable, still a resort to the courts
cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.[9]
Consequently, Land Bank's filing of Agrarian
Case 2000-0155 after the dismissal without prejudice of
Agrarian Case 99-0214 cannot be regarded as barred by
the filing of the latter case beyond the 15-day period
prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB
Rules. The procedural soundness of Agrarian Case 20000155 could not be made dependent on the DARAB case,
for these two proceedings are separate and independent.
The CA adopted the DARAB valuation of
P93,060.00 for the subject land for a technical reason.
But, since DARAB fixed the amount based on its expertise
and since that amount is not quite far from the price for
which Fortune Savings bought the same at a public
auction, the Court is inclined to accept such valuation.
Considering the relatively small amount involved, this
would be a far better alternative than remanding the case
and incurring further delay in its resolution.
For Private

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND

CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA
K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN
K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK,
MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEEMIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
G.R. No. 177861 (July 13, 2010)
Facts:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a
subpoena ad testificandum and a parent's right not to
testify in a case against his children.
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok
Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as
immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely,
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K.
Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin,
Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee,
and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young
woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that
Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another
property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh
children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively,
the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were
children of Lee and Keh.
April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the
RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena
ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed
mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the
motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she
being Emma Lee's stepmother.cra 3cralaw On August 5,
2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being
unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was
already very old and that the obvious object of the
subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was
Emma Lee's mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children's
motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,4cralaw setting aside the RTC's August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum,
not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for
being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule
21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that
Tiu's advanced age alone does not render her incapable
of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena
for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.

136
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the
trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of
entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for
the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner
Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter.
Ruling:
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC
correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it
issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable
and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would
be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
children's theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and
gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds
cited-unreasonable and oppressive-are proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of
documents and things in the possession of the witness, a
command that has a tendency to infringe on the right
against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:chan robles virtual
law library
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. - The court
may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion
promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time
specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or
the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
production thereof.
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the LeeKeh children's action, obviously, they would want Tiu to
testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee's other
children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died
and so could not give testimony that Lee's other children
were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a
legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony and,
normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to
compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other
objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify:
a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would
subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and
b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled
to testify against her stepdaughter.
Regarding
the
physical
and
emotional
punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to
testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to
the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have
passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the
issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine
if Tiu's current physical condition makes her fit to
For Private

undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being

questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena
issued to her.
1.
2.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral

examination might subject her to badgering by adverse
counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness
against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is
especially true where the witness is of advanced age.
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not
to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee,
invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No
person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar
provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only
in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege,
claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma
Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
those who descend from him. The latter binds a person
with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against petitioner Emma Lee.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZABETH
MARCELINO y REYES, G.R. No. 189278 (July 26,
2010)
Facts:
This is an appeal from the June 29, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03153 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth
Marcelino y Reyes, which affirmed the Decision in
Criminal Case Nos. 3048-M-2002 and 3049-M-2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76 in Malolos City,
Bulacan. The RTC found accused-appellant Elizabeth
Marcelino guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue/s:

137
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred

in ruling that a search warrant was not
necessary.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the integrity and identity of
the shabu was preserved.
Ruling:
Search warrant and warrant of arrest not needed
In People v. Villamin, involving an accused
arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation,
the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a
warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the
instant case. When carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially
sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in
illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as
the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police
officers but from the accused himself. The accused is
caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot.
From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the
absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal.
illegal drug seized was not the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to
believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule
126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently
provides:
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
Since the buy-bust operation was established as
legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a
warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.
Chain of custody
The prosecution's failure to submit in evidence
the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated will not result in accused-appellant's
acquittal of the crimes charged. Non-compliance with the
provisions of RA 9165 on the custody and disposition of
dangerous drugs is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's case. Neither will it render the arrest of an
accused illegal nor the items seized from her
inadmissible.
We discussed in People v. Pagkalinawan both
what the law provides and the level of compliance it
requires:
Sec. 21 of the Implementing
Regulations of RA 9165 provides:
Rules
and
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of

Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors
and
Essential
Chemicals,
For Private

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.

- The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be gleaned from the language of Sec. 21
of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the failure of
the law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It
does not render appellant's arrest illegal nor the evidence
adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is
"the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
Here, the chain of custody was established
through the following links: (1) SPO1 Dela Cruz marked
the seized sachet with "MDC-1" for the sachet that was
the subject of the buy-bust, and "MDC-2" for the sachet
found on accused-appellant's person; (2) a request for
laboratory examination of the seized items "MDC-1" and
"MDC-2" was signed by Police Senior Inspector Arthur
Felix Asis; (3) the request and the marked items seized
were received by the Bulacan Provincial Crime
Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-628-02
confirmed that the marked items seized from accusedappellant were shabu; and (5) the marked items were
offered in evidence as Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2."
As there is no proof to support the claim that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized shabu
have been compromised at some stage, we find no
reason to overturn the finding of the trial court that what
were seized from Elizabeth were the same illegal drugs
presented in the trial court. As it is, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements under RA 9165, and
the prosecution adequately established that there was an
unbroken chain of custody over the shabu seized from
Elizabeth.

138
Also working against Elizabeth's cause is the

presumption of regularity accorded those involved in the
buy-bust operation. It is a settled rule that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers,
for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption by
showing clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they
were inspired by an improper motive.
DR.
EDILBERTO
ESTAMPA,
JR.
vs.
CITY
GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, G.R. No. 190681 (June
21, 2010)
Facts:
On February 1, 2001 the City Government of
Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as
Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position
made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned to deal with
any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster
Coordinator for the Davao City Health Office under the
Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council.
On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful
bomb exploded at the passengers' terminal of the Davao
International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113
others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that time
and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He
learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8 p.m. His
wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao
Medical Center where most of the bombing victims were
brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to
stay home and he did.
On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara,
Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office,
required Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed
to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa
submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the
explanation and believing that Dr. Estampa's presence in
the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable
considering the presence of other medical practitioners,
Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did
not, however, bother to endorse the case to a superior
officer or to the City Legal Office with his
recommendation.
At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to
counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal
hearing and to just submit their position papers or
memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal
Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of "grave" neglect of
duty and recommended his dismissal. On February 8,
2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and
dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for
reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampa's
appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to
gross neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The
For Private

CSC also denied Dr. Estampa's motion for reconsideration

for lack of merit.
Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied
his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a decision
on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the
resolutions of the CSC. The CA also found no merit in his
motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of
the City Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr.
Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to
respond to the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.
Ruling:
In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified
his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals
to attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he
needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could not
leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no
house help. When his wife arrived from work shortly, he
also could not leave because she was six months
pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some meters from
their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in
his letter that he was unable from the beginning to give
full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his
family. He simply was not the right person for the job of
disaster coordinator.
Dr. Estampa's defense is not acceptable. A
person's duty to his family is not incompatible with his
job-related commitment to come to the rescue of victims
of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day. Besides,
knowing that his job as senior medical health officer
entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal
sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he
realized that he did not have the will and the heart to
respond.
HENRY "JUN" DUEAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, G.R. No. 191550 (May
4, 2010)
Facts:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
dated February 25, 2010 and its Resolution 2cralaw dated
March 18, 2010 be declared null and void ab initio.
Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman
for the Second Legislative District of Taguig City. Private
respondent filed an election protest with the HRET. After
revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts and
25% of the counter-protested precincts, the case was
submitted for resolution upon the parties' submission of
memoranda. However, in its Order dated September 25,
2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision
and appreciation of ballots for the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said Order was denied in a HRET
Resolution dated October 21, 2008 which reiterated the
Order to continue revision in the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts. Petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No.
185401, seeking the nullification of said order of revision,
alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On July 21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision
dismissing the petition. Said Decision became final and
executory and the HRET continued the proceeding in the
electoral protest case.
On February 25, 2010, the HRET promulgated its
Decision which declared private respondent as the winner
with a margin of 37 votes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion in its decision.
Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter

in the house, he could have taken her to relatives
temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work.
But he did not. And when his wife arrived shortly at 9
p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife
was six months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted
her to work away from home up to the evening. What
marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even
care to call up his superior or associates to inform them
of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result,
the city health office failed to provide the needed
coordination of all efforts intended to cope with the
disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of
victims to the right emergency rooms could have saved
more lives.
Ruling:
The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr.

Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed
him.
Likewise, the circumstance that none of the

three Supreme Court Justices took part in the Decision,
cannot be taken as proof of grave abuse of discretion.
Rule 89 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal provides that "[f]or

139
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition for

lack of merit.
The Court has long declared in Dueas, Jr. v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, that the
HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the
continuation of revision of ballots. Petitioner cannot
resurrect his claims, which had been finally adjudged
unmeritorious by this Court, through the present petition.
Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision of
ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot
be considered as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the electoral tribunal.
For Private

rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal

resolutions, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members
shall be necessary." The HRET Decision dated February
25, 2010 had the concurrence of six of its members.
Verily, the HRET was acting in accordance with its rules
and cannot be said to have committed any abuse of its
discretion.

140
For Private
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS POLITICAL LAW FEBRUARY 2009-APRIL 2010
FEBRUARY 2009 CASES

Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY.
It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of
criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of
the others. This is known as the threefold liability rule. Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the administrative cases against the petitioners will not
necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them. Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. et al. Vs. People of
the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February 13, 2009.
REORGANIZATION.
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public
clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. For a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass
the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic
reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the local government units gaping budgetary
deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurers office and waterworks operations unit where respondents were
previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the
new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The CSC, however, highlighted the
recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents
Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new
positions do not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. Nowhere in the records
does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to these
recreated positions violates R.A. 6656. Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13, 2009.
Constitutional Law
EXPROPRIATION.
The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of Co in
connection with the construction of NPCs transmission lines. The Supreme Court held that: (a) Republic Act No. 8974
applies to properties expropriated for the installation of NPCs power transmission lines; (b) NPC is liable to pay the full
amount of the fair market value and not merely a 10 percent easement fee for the expropriated property; (c) the value of
the property should be reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the filing of the complaint in compliance with Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court. National Power Corporation vs. Co, GR No. 166973, February 10, 2009.
POLITICAL QUESTION.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow incident
effectively asks the Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the
nature of a political question that, in Taada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the Constitution, is
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually
unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may
see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to intervene in
what is clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senates action. Sps. PNP
Director Eliseo D. Dela Paz, et al. Vs. Senate Committee., G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP.
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position. Cordora vs. Comelec, et
al..R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009.
Miscellaneous Laws
WITNESS.
The Supreme Court held that for an allegation of tampering to be the basis for the disconnection of a customers electric
supply, the discovery of such must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or an ERB
representative. This requirement can not be dispensed with. In the present case, it is admitted that no police officer or ERB
representative was present during the inspection, removal and subsequent replacement of the electric meters alleged to
have been tampered with, hence, the requirement of the law was not complied with a lapse fatal to MERALCOs cause.
Manila Electric Company Vs. Hsing Nan Tannery Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 178913, February 12, 2009
MARCH 2009 DECISIONS

Administrative law
BIDDING.
During the preliminary examination stage, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) checks whether all the required
documents were submitted by the eligible bidders. Note should be taken of the fact that the technical specifications of the
product bidded out is among the documentary requirements evaluated by
the BAC during the preliminary examination stage. At this point, therefore, the BAC should have already discovered that
the technical specifications of Audio Visuals document camera differed from the bid specifications in at least three (3)
respects, namely: the 15 frames/second frame rate, the weight specification, and the power supply requirement. Using the
non-discretionary criteria laid out in R.A. No. 9184 and IRR-A, therefore, the BAC should have rated Audio Visuals bid as
failed instead of passed. Commission on Audit, etc. vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No. 184173, March 13,
2009.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of
rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent
Justice. Aside from his naked allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his
charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent
Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his
perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake. The Law Firm of
Chavez Miranda Aseoche, etc. vs. Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J, March 13, 2009., see also Rodolfo B.
Baygar, Sr. vs. Judge Lilian D. Panontongan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1699, March 17, 2009.
Agrarian law
BREACH BY AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.
R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowners rights to his land. Nor does it authorize the
agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowners rights. After all, he is just an
agricultural lessee. Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle
of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be
reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Here, the Supreme Court held that the construction of
the reservoir by the leseee constitutes a violation of Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding
for a purpose other than what had been agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract between the lessee and
lessor, for which the former was penalized with permanent dispossession of his leasehold. PCarlo A. Castillo vs. Manuel
Tolentino, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; WHEN DETERMINED.
As to the legal basis of just compensation for land taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to farmerbeneficiaries, the Supreme Court held that the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita
Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al., the Court made a comparative analysis of cases that confronted
the issue of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for which the landowners had yet to be paid,
would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. The Court
observed that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines a case which LBP invokes in this controversy the Court
declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was
taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that after Gabatin, the Court
had decided several cases in which it found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the
property at the time of payment. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hernando T. Chico, et al., G.R. No. 168453. March 13,
2009
JUST COMPENSATION; MARKET DATA APPROACH.
In the instant case, the regional trial court (RTC) did not consider Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as well as
Department Administrative Order (DAO) DAO No. 6 in determining just compensation for agrarian reform cases. Instead,
it adopted, hook, line and sinker, the market data approach introduced by the commissioner nominated by Allied. This
undoubtedly constitutes a glaring departure from the established tenet on the mandatory nature of Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, as amended. It is worthy to note that Allied did not provide any evidence that the market
data approach, which based the value of the land in question on sales and listings of similar properties situated within the
area, conformed to the subject administrative order, and it is not also clear if same approach took into consideration the
said administrative order. Such being the case, the market data approach espoused by Allied cannot be a valuation that
complies with the requirements under the agrarian law. Besides, this Court has once refused to accept the market data
approach as a method of valuation compliant with the agrarian law and enforced by the DAR. Allied Banking Corp. vs. The
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 175422, March 13, 2009
Constitutional Law.
COMELEC POWERS.
Under Sec. 2, Article IV-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises original jurisdiction over all contests, relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, and has supervision and control over the board
of canvassers. The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such authority. The
COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the
COMELEC in division. Petitioners contention that the COMELECs choice of officials to substitute the members of the Board
of Canvassers is limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No. 6646 is untenable. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, the enumeration above is not exclusive. Members of Board of Canvassers can be filled up by the
COMELEC not only from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted provision, but from others outside if the former
are not available. Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras, Jr. vs. Comelec, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178259, March 13,
2009.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, illegally dismissed overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on
the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs
or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with
a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution,
the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state
interest through the least restrictive means. What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which
some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern. In the present case, the Court dug deep
into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve. Antonio M. Serrano vs.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
The Commission on Audit (COA) is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical
personality of its own. Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental
functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent. Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio Visual can be
taken as an implied consent to be sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari
proceedings, Link Worth did not appeal the Court of Appeals Decision deleting the award of damages against COA.
Consequently, Link Worth is bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including the
deletion of the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Commission on Audit, etc. Vs. Link Worth
International Inc., G.R. No. 182559, March 13, 2009.
OMBUDSMAN.
The scope of the authority of the Ombudsman in administrative cases as defined under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
is broad enough to include the direct imposition of the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine or censure on an
erring public official or employee.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is entitled to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason
or another, is not available to protect his interest. While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to
the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be
assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous
countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively. Since the
prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant
Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are
evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Reyes Y
Paje, et al., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009.
TERM LIMITS.
The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The Constitution did
not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional
Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more
precisely, [a]s provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that
barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office of
barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is
that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms,
an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the
first condition for disqualification. Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office. Nicasio
Bolos, Jr. vs. The Commission on Election, et al., G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009.
Election Law
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.
The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be
determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents,
which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The Supreme Court did not find grave
abuse of discretion when the COMELEC credited to respondent the vote for Mantete, following the idem sonans rule.
Aldo B. Cordia Vs. Joel G. Monforte and Comelec, G.R. No. 174620, March 4, 2009.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES.
The COMELEC should rule on pre-proclamation cases individually, even if the ruling is simply couched in a minute
resolution. This will dispel qualms about lack of adequate notice to party litigants, and obviate the confusion that generally
results from the issuance of omnibus resolutions. In all, such a practice would be consistent with the constitutional
principle of transparency, and lend itself to greater public confidence in our electoral system. In the case at bar, the
petitioner may have been equally confused on the remedies available to him vis--vis Resolution No. 8212. We do not fault
him for this, but we nonetheless dismiss his petition because we find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed COMELEC
Resolution and Order. Elpidio B. Valino vs. Alvin P. Vergara, Tomas N. Joson III, et al., G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009.
A DEBATE OVER A REGIME OF ISLANDS
On March 10, 2009, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 9522, entitled An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of
Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and
for Other Purposes.
Congress passed the law in order to comply with a May 13, 2009 deadline of the United Nations for countries to define the
boundaries of its continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Section 1 of the law defined the baselines of the Philippine archipelago. The geographic coordinates mentioned in Section
1 do not include the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), or better known as the Spratly Islands (which are also being claimed by
such countries as China, Vietnam and Malaysia). Congress chose to deal with the KIG (and Scarborough Shoal) in Section
2, which provides:
The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likes (sic) exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a)
The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b)
Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Prior to the passage of the law, it appears that four options were being considered in defining the territorial baselines of
the country:
1.
The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as regime of
islands. . .
2.
Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of
islands. . .
3.
The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of
islands.
4.
The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines. . .
(see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009)
According to reports, the House of Representatives version of the bill includes the Scarborough Shoal and KIG within the
baselines (see option 4) while the Senate version classified the disputed territory as a regime of islands (see option 2).
The Senate position prevailed during the bicameral conference committee deliberations held for the purpose of reconciling
the two bills. (see Congress set to ratify baselines bill, Inquirer.net)
In her sponsorship speech on her version of the 2009 baselines bill, Senator Miram Defensor-Santiago explains the
adoption of the regime of island principle.
There are three important reasons why the bill adopts the regime of islands principle:
First, it has the advantage of avoiding conflicting basepoints with other claimants to the Spratlys. Conflicting basepoints is
the reason why your Committee decided not to adopt other bills. The Committee takes the view that if a modern baselines
bill includes conflicting basepoints with other claimant states, this would certainly be a source of diplomatic strain with
such states as China , Vietnam , Malaysia , and Taiwan .
Second, the regime of islands principle increases the size of our archipelagic waters and EEZ by about 76,518 nautical
miles over existing laws.
Third, the pending bill does not deviate from the natural shape of our archipelago, thus complying with Unclos, Article 47,
para. 3, which provides that the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago. (see Sponsorship Speech, The 2009 Baseline Bill)
Not everyone agrees that KIG and Scarborough Shoal should be excluded from the baselines. For example:
. . . former Ambassador to the United Nations Lauro Baja says the baseline bill is seriously flawed because it excludes the
disputed Kalayaan islands from Philippine territory.
Baja says the exclusion of the Kalayaan islands, which is part of the province of Palawan, runs counter to national interest.
Thats because Kalayaan is part of the Spratly Group of Islands, a disputed atoll in the South China Sea that is claimed not
just by the Philippines but by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
Baja says these countries have included the Spratlys in their own baselines, and that by excluding it from our own baseline
law, the Philippines is effectively undermining our claim to Kalayaan. (see Baja: Baselines bill weakens RP claim to
Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) ,
On the other hand, while Senator Trillanes does not have objections to the exlcusion of the KIG from the baselines, he
disagrees with the exclusion of the Scarborough Shoal from the baselines. In his version of the baselines bill (Senate Bill
No. 1467), he included the Scarborough Shoal in the baselines. He says:
. . . there are some misconceptions regarding the label regime of islands that it supposedly weakens our claim or
reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as such. On the contrary, regime of islands is defined in Art. 121 [of the
UNCLOS] as: 1) island/s that is naturally formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have
its own 12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, islands classified as
regime of islands are treated the same way as other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal states would be
forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is because such territory is impossible to enclose within the
baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island group is one example. Since the UK is at the
other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify
Falkland as a regime of islands.
The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines [of Senate Bill No. 1467] primarily because its distance from Luzon is
less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf.
Another reason for its inclusion is that Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to Paragraph 3 of Art. 121, the
regime of islands definition has an exception and that is: Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to
designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of Scarborough
Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands. (see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline
issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009)
ABS-CBN News has learned that some lawyers are considering questioning the baseline bill before the Supreme Court.
(see Baja: Baselines bill weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) .
RELIGIOUS SPEECH OR INDECENT SPEECH?

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner Eliseo Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days later, several members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) filed affidavit complaints with the MTCRB. The MTRCB sent
petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10,
2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days. The same order also set the case for preliminary
investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza
P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. Two days after,
however, petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with the Supreme Court of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
In resolving the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the MTCRB has the power to issue
a preventive suspension against the petitioner; (2) the preventive suspension order did not violate petitioners right to
equal protection, his freedom of religion and his freedom of speech.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Petitioner argued that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are
invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and ruled:
A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit
impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. This authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for
the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. . . The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the
scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as
quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that
no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with
paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Petitioner also argued that the MTRCB denied him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the
preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and ruled:
Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It guards
against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises,
place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the
MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he
used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order
is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the
equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating
Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this
case, simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that
words like putang babae were said in exercise of his religious freedom.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. . . There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints
expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out
with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not
by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting
amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech.
We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that
petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the
main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words,
i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it
is, in that context, unprotected speech. . .
Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that
petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium
easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. . .
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free
speech, the Court rules that the governments interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children
adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioners prayer to continue as program host of
Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period . . .
Eliseo F. Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia etc., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009.
Constitutional Law
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION; VOID.
Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands
Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed
the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
A review center is not an
institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita,
et al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
AGRARIAN REFORM; COVERAGE.
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine
whether the land is agricultural. Here, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27
considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. Laureano V. Hermoso, et
al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
COMPENSATION.
Officers who in good faith have discharged the duties pertaining to their office are legally entitled to the compensation
attached to the office for the services they actually rendered. Although the present petition must inevitably be dismissed
on a technicality that serves as penalty for the pernicious practice of forum shopping, the Court nevertheless cannot
countenance the refund of the compensation differential corresponding to petitioners tenure as HEDF head with the
upgraded rank of Director III, since she had actually rendered services in the office with the elevated grade for that
period. Alicia D. Tagaro vs. Ester A. Garcia, etc.,G.R. No. 173931, April 2, 2009.
COMELEC; VOTING.
Section 5 (a)of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Rodante Marcoleta, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./ Alagad Party-list represented by Diogenes S. Osabel, President vs. Commission on Elections, et al .,G.R.
No. 181377, April 24, 2009.
DEPORTATION; POWER.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such
privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the
Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country
by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry in the country, but
such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was
not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is
an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of
the people. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present here: (1) the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a nonguilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to
an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to
reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to
put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.David Tiu vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo
Postanes, G.R. No. 162370, April 21, 2009.
DUE PROCESS; COURT DECISIONS.
Faithful adherence to Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a notarized and authenticated deed of sale enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and is admissible without further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, it declared
Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite petitioners contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a
part of the right of appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented for resolution, mere failure
by the appellate court to specify in its decision all contentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing
to believe appellants contentions is not sufficient to hold the appellate courts decision contrary to the requirements of the
law and the Constitution. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of facts to
warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld any specific findings of fact with respect to the
evidence for the defense. We will abide by the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,and all
matters within an issue in a case were laid down before the court and were passed upon by it. Marissa R. Unchuan vs.
Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009.
Ecozone. R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, etc. vs. Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated
(PEJI) Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE), et al., G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009.
ELECTION CONTESTS; JURISDICTION.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRETs) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over elections relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Seeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had
been recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed
their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari
before this Court. Dr. Hans Christian M. Seeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles, G.R. No. 178678,
April 16, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; PROCEEDINGS.
In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages: first, the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and
second, the determination of just compensation. In Tan v. Republic, the Supreme Court explained the two (2) stages in an
expropriation proceeding, to wit:
(1)
Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, with
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of expropriation is final. An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done
by the courts on the merits. The order of expropriation would also be a final one for after its issuance, no objection to the
right of condemnation shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby by filing
a record on appeal.
(2)
Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken with the assistance
of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before the
court and findings of the commissioners would likewise be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done by the
court regarding the issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation.
Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER.
For Metropolitan Cebu Water District to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely:
first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved on 27
February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other cases.
Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint for the expropriation of
respondents lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners manager, Armando
H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case against the owner of the
five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as
amended. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983. April 16, 2009
EMINENT DOMAIN; WRIT OF POSSESSION.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that upon compliance with the guidelinesthe court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.
Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations,
make the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. Metropolitan
Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
Under the factual circumstances of the case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be
paid respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Excise tax. Section 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by RA 9334: (1) does not violate the equal protection and
unformity of taxation clauses; (2) does not violate the constitutional prohibition on unfair competition; and (3) does not
vilate the constitutional prohibition on regresssive and inequitable taxation. British American Tobacco vs. Jose Isidro N.
Camacho, et al. G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech,
or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are
generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the
regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to
lesser but still heightened scrutiny. Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which
it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since
such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the
test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing
with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate
implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government
to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in
the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe
the right to free expression. Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy, et al., G.R. No.
170270/G.R. No. 179411, April 2, 2009.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by
its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted
within proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it.
Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC.
As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been
sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a patent nullity. Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the
complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a patent
nullity. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techniche Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009.
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as
not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these cases doctrinal
pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition
before this Court. . .
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation
of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is
clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to
prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those
subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked. Reghis
M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and
Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and
that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has
vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although
the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from
that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has
been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; POLITICAL QUESTION.
In asking the Supreme Court to declare Section 19 of the Oil Deregulation Law as unconstitutional for contravening
Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes the exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicial
review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. The power of judicial
review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the
Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to
exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1)
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2)
the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The Supreme Court ruled that that the issues petitioner presented to thee Supreme Court are non-justiciable matters that
preclude the Supreme Court from exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate implementation of full
deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which the Supreme Court cannot
overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. Congressman Enrique T. Garcia Vs.
The Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION.
The Special Agrarian Court and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that it is the provisions of
RA 6657 that is applicable to the present case. The SAC arrived at the just compensation for respondents property after
taking into consideration the commissioners report on the nature of the subject landholding, its proximity from the city
proper, its use, average gross production, and the prevailing value of the lands in the vicinity. The SAC correctly
determined the amount of just compensation due to respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing
jurisprudence. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Carolina vda. de Abello, et al., G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009.
PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
Robles act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY cannot, without more, be considered electioneering or partisan
political activity within the context of the Election Code. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are
purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate
in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in compliance
with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as
electioneering or partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil
servants. Dr. Hans Christian M. Seeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles, G.R. No. 178678, April
16, 2009.
PARTY LIST.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(1)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(2)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
(3)
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
(4)
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections/ Bayan Muna, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009.
POLICE POWER.
Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general
welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the
supreme law. Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and
administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing
the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. Review Center Associations of the
Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
PUBLIC DOMAIN; CLASSIFICATION.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The
primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands
specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also
states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al.
vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
Public Land Act; encumbrance. Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits any encumbrance or alienation of
lands acquired under homestead provisions from the date of the approval of application and for a term of five years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant. The same provision provides that no alienation, transfer, or
conveyance of any homestead after five years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and
legal grounds.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public
Land Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the
head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant
must show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must
have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon.
Settled is the rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal requirements for a homestead grant.
The homestead applicant himself must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It
would be a circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply in behalf of another, as the latter may be
disqualified or might not comply with the residency and cultivation requirements. Marcelino Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al./ Noel Rubber and Development Corp, et al. vs. Jose Esquivel, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 168734/G.R. No. 170621,
April 24, 2009.
Small scale mining permits. Petitioners small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree No.
1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining
contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a
representative from the small-scale mining sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a
representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.
In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making them bound
by the procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing
and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the
governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the
same permits are null and void. Leonora P. Calanza, et al. vs. Paper Industries Corp., et al., G.R. No. 146622, April 24,
2009.
SPEEDY TRIAL.
Under the circumstances of the cases, the right to the accused to a speedy tril was not violated. Dante Tan vs. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009.
SUBPOENA; CONGRESS.
PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to
appear and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past
Congress. On the postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before and
after it, the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted
is, for all intents and purposes, terminated. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M.
Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR
is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs.
Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al. G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit
that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the
lumber were lying around the vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed
to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for
his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no
necessity for a search warrant. The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the required permit to possess
the forest products cut is sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.
WARRANTLESS ARREST.
On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry
Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code
and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or
taken by the offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police
officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated
lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the
lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation
consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.
Election Law
ELECTION CONTESTS.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the
Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R.
Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1, 2009.
ELECTION PROTESTS.
Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one seeking the
annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-day period for filing an election protest. It is required that the issues
raised in such a petition be restricted to those that may be properly included therein. in the absence of any clear showing
or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects; appear to have been tampered
with, falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, which would
affect the result of the election, a petition cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation controversy. The purpose
of a pre-proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis of the election returns
duly authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers. It is a well-entrenched rule that
the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind electoral returns. A pre-proclamation
controversy is summary in nature. It is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies be summarily
decided, consistent with the laws desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. There is no
room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical
examination. That is why such questions as those involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the campaign and
balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding
election protest. Harlin Castillo Abayon Vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
DISHONESTY.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved
in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of
integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with
paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office
must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete
with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating
circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a first time offender. Office of the Court
Administrator Vs. Ma. Celia A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009.
RE-ASSIGNMENT; DETAIL.
A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail,
on the other hand, is a movement from one agency to another. National Transmission Corp. Vs. Venusto
JUNE 2009 DECISIONS

Constitutional Law
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates the Constitution. It is a universally recognized
principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is
based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service
would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic
by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter
with respect to the agencys performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government
officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued
against a government agency covered by its own charter.
The TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing
and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this
function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance
of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the
means for the performance of governmental functions.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.
Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; EASEMENT RIGHT OF WAY.
Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In installing the 230 KV TalisayCompostela transmission lines which traverse respondents lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner National
Power Corporation against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives respondent of the normal use of the
lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioners transmission lines but a portion is used
as the site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension
live wires, the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
Thus, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts. Respondent is entitled to
just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer
by reason of the expropriation.
Since the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial function, the Supreme
Court held that the amount of P450 per square meter to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated lands
of respondent. National Power Corporation vs. Carlos Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009.
OMBUDSMAN; PROSECUTORIAL POWERS.
Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article
XI provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Supreme Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop
and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power
to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Courts ruling in Acop that the
authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil
that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman
or
placing
the OSP under
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman. Carmelo Lazatin, et al.
vs.
Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al., G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009.
OMBUDSMAN; REMOVAL POWERS.
The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority, is vested by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fernando J. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June
5, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; ACTUAL CASE.
This Supreme Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with
parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court
from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker
Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero
C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally
concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.
Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J.
Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis Barok C.
Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners
have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the
presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanosthree-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as
taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of
public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved. While the
Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution
No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the transcendental importance
doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent
requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.
It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative,
Majority, House of Representatives/Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.
In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be
considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied petitioners claim of denial of his right to a speedy disposition of cases
considering that the petitioner in that case chose to remain silent for eight years before complaining of the delay in the
disposition of his case. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited
from the time his case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed to assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. He did not take any step to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to a
speedy disposition of cases after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting him for malversation of public
funds. Petitioners silence may be considered as a waiver of his right. Raul S. Tello vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
165781, June 5, 2009
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003, 22-2003, and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, as pertinent to cigarettes
packed by machine, are invalid insofar as they grant the BIR the power to reclassify or update the classification of new
brands every two years or earlier. Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, et al., G.R.
No. 166498. June 11, 2009.
Local Government Code
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN CITIES.
Now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the parties should follow Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) and should opt to amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the respective sanggunians of the parties. This has
become imperative because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle the dispute amicably under the aegis of
the LGC. The specific provision of the LGC, now made applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must be complied
with. In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC,
a certification shall be issued to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned within
sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned certification. In this regard, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC shall govern. Municipality of Pateros vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
157714, June 16, 2009
Administrative and Civil Service Law
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
The petitioners failed to appeal the decision of the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit to
the Commission on Audit proper before filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, in derogation of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the
court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. It is,
therefore, imperative that the Commission Proper be first given the opportunity to review the decision of the ASB. Only
after the Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition for certiorari be brought to the Supreme Court by the
aggrieved party. While the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the Supreme Court did
not find any cogent reason to apply the cited exceptions to the instant case. The non-observance of the doctrine results in
the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No.
177011, June 5, 2009.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority
to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses
against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be
lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the
charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Civil Service Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional
Director of CSC-NCR vs. Larry M. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009.
PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
Well-settled is the rule that an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full
investiture of the office. Since petitioner petitioner took his oath and assumed office only on February 26, it was only then
that his right to enter into the position became plenary and complete. Prior to such oath, Gasgonia still had the right to
exercise the functions of her office. It is also well to note that per certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago, Accountant
of PCUP, Gasgonia received her last salary for the period covering February 1-25, 2001; and petitioner received his first
salary for the period covering February 26 to March 7, 2001.
Clearly, at the time of respondents appointment on February 23, Gasgonia still was the rightful occupant of the position
and was, therefore, authorized to extend a valid promotional appointment. Chairman Percival C. Chavez, Chair and Chief
Executive Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor vs. Lourdes R. Ronidel and Honorable Court of Appeals
9th Division, G.R. No. 180941, June 11, 2009.
PUBLIC OFFICERS; HONORARIUM.
An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a
voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184
uses the word may which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right.
The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may be required of government employees outside of their regular
functions. It agrees that they ought to be compensated; thus, honoraria are given as a recompense for their efforts and
performance of substantially similar duties, with substantially similar degrees of responsibility and accountability. However,
the payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and
guidelines prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: For this
purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines. The word shall has always been deemed mandatory, and
not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should have first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before
payment of the honoraria. As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners could not just award themselves
the straight amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the law. Joseph
Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
Election law
DISQUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICE.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that
they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he
is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Roseller De Guzman vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009.
ELECTION CASE; MOOT.
A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It
is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon cannot have
any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
Since the present Petition is grounded on petitioner Baldos specific objections to the 26 ERs in the previous local elections,
no practical or useful purpose would be served by still passing on the merits thereof. Even if the Court sets aside the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions and orders the exclusion of the disputed ERs from the canvass of votes, and as a result
thereof, petitioner Baldo would emerge as the winning candidate for municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, in the 10 May
2004 local elections, it would be an empty victory. It is already impossible for petitioner Baldo to still assume office as
municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, elected in the 10 May 2004 local elections, since his tenure as such had ended on 30
June 2007. Petitioner Baldo himself is currently occupying the very same office as the winning candidate in the 14 May
2007 local elections. Irrefragably, the Court can no longer grant to petitioner Baldo any practical relief capable of
enforcement. Consequently, the Court is left with no other recourse than to dismiss the instant Petition on the ground
of mootness. Carlos Irwin G. Baldo vs. Commission on Elections. et al., G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009.
Agrarian law
JURISIDICTION; DAR.
Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.
Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator
and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy
over lands devoted to agriculture. Zosimo Octavio and Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta Albona) vs. Enrico
R. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009.
JURISDICTION;
DAR. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DARs original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA
No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Rene Ralla Belista, G.R. No. 164631. June 26, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION.
The procedure for the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court,
commences with the valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform
program. Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a written
notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending
on the value of the land, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), or the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the landowner still does not agree with the price so
fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court.
In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into account
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the Philippines and the Secretary of
the
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
G.R.
No.
177404/G.R.
No.
178097,
June
25,
2009 .
TENANTS.
Tenants are defined as persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price
certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of tenancy:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure. Joaquin Soliman, et al., vs. Pampanga Sugar Development Company (PASUDECO), Inc., and Gerry Rodriguez, G.R.
No. 169589, June 16, 2009.
TENANTS.
The CA held that there is no tenancy relationship between the private respondents and petitioners Apolonia, Carlos,
Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona due to the absence of personal cultivation of the subject landholding by the latter
In arriving at such a finding, the appellate court gave full credence to the evidence proffered by private respondents
showing that the aforementioned petitioners are not residents of the locality where the subject landholding is and neither
are they tenants of any lot thereat. The evidence, among others, consists of the Certification dated October 9, 2003 issued
by the Barangay Captain of Mauban, now Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan, stating that Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and
Rogelio Tarona are not residents therein and that they do not personally cultivate the subject property; and
the Certification of the election officer of Caloocan City showing that said persons are residents and registered voters of
Caloocan City.
We find no reason to disturb the aforesaid finding of the CA. Clearly, private respondents evidence, which significantly the
petitioners failed to refute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation. Petitioners
(intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality
which is in Caloocan City. Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be physically
impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding. Leonardo Tarona, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 170182. June 18, 2009
PRIVATE LANDS; DISBARMENT FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

One of the fundamental principles of Philippine constitutional law is that ownership of land is generally reserved only to
Filipinos. Article XII, Section 7 of the Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. On the other hand, Article XII, Section 8 provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law. To summarize:
Under the Constitution, private lands may be transferred or conveyed to the following:
(a)
Filipino citizens;
(b)
Corporations and associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens, since they have the
capacity to hold lands of the public domain;
(c)
Aliens but only in cases of hereditary succession; and
(d) Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship subject to limitations provided by law. (see 2 Philippine
Constitutional Law, p. 917 [2004])
One would think that all Philippine lawyers know this fundamental principle but that does not appear to be the case.
In Keld Stemmerik, represented by Attys. Herminio. Liwanag and Winston P.L. Esguerra vs. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. No.
8010, June 16, 2009, Keld Stemmerik, a Danish national, expressed interest in buying land in the Philippines and Atty. Mas
advised him that he can legally acquire and own land in the Philippines.
Keld gave Atty. Mas PhP3.8 million as purchase price of the property and returned to Denmark. Atty. Mas then prepared a
contract to sell between Keld (with Atty. Mas as representative) and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, who allegedly owns the
property. Atty. Mas then prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold the property to a certain Ailyn
Gonzales for PhP3.8 million. Atty. Mas also drafted an agreement between Keld and Gonzales stating that it was Keld who
provided the funds for the purchase of the property.
After the various agreements were signed, Keld tried to get in touch with Atty. Mas, who never replied to Kelds calls and
email messages. When Keld returned to the Philippines, he learned that he could not own land in the Philippines. In
addition, a verification made at the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within
the former US Military Reservation.
Keld tried to locate Atty. Mas but never found him. It appears that Atty. Mas abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City.
Keld then filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mas with the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The CBD and the IBP Board of Governors recommended the disbarment of Atty. Mas. The
Supreme Court agreed that Atty. Mas should be disbarred. According to the Supreme Court:
This Court has interpreted [Article XII, Section 7], as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, to mean that
under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands. The provision is a
declaration of imperative constitutional policy.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the
Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the
property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly
violated the Anti-Dummy Law.
Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real
estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a
falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he
deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional.
Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property,
respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Mas showed gross ignorance of the law. Based solely on the facts recounted in the
ruling, it is likely that Atty. Mas knew that aliens could not own land, and for that reason, the deed of sale he prepared was
between de Mesa and Gonzales. If Atty. Mas was not aware of the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership, then
he would have likely placed Keld as the purchaser in the deed of sale. In asking Gonzales to acknowledge that the funds
for the purchase of the property came from Keld, it seems that Atty. Mas was using Gonzales as a dummy for Keld.
JULY 2009 DECISIONS

Constitutional Law
DOUBLE POSITIONS.
The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Dante
Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009.
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not present when the search was conducted, the
search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Manalo was the barangay chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioners employee. Petitioner herself signed the
certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence. Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who conducted the search. Further, petitioner failed to
substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of
orderly search. In fact, the records show that she signed these documents together with three other persons, including the
barangay chairman who could have duly noted if petitioner was really forced to sign the documents against her will.
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. However, in this case, the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the search conducted
in petitioners residence and, thus, the articles seized during the search are admissible in evidence against petitioner.
Rosario Panuncio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION.
Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 applies only if the amount of just compensation of lands acquired through
Presidential Decree No. 27 remains unresolved despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a case, and to such
extent only, that this provision on the determination of just compensation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988 is made to apply retrospectively. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Josefina R. Dumlao, et al., G.R. No.
167809, July 23, 2009.
LANDHOLDING LIMITATION.
Section 11 of Article XIV of the governing 1973 Constitution states that no private corporation or association may hold by
lease, concession, license, or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred
thousand hectares. Complementing this provision was Chapter I, No. 3(e) of Forestry Administrative Order (FAO) No. 11
prohibiting any individual, corporation, partnership, or association from acquiring a timber license or license agreement
covering an area in excess of 100,000 hectares. Likewise, Chapter I, No. 3(d) of FAO No. 11 states that no individual
corporation, partnership, or association who is already a holder of an ordinary timber license or license agreement nor any
member of the family, incorporator, director, stockholder, or member of such individual, corporation, partnership, or
association shall be allowed to acquire a new timber license or license agreement or any interest or participation in it.
The constitutional and statutory limitations on allowable area leases and concessions were obviously meant to prevent the
concentration of large tracts of public land in the hands of a single individual. Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of
Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164800, July 22, 2009.
Party List. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1.
Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of
seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.
2.
Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat.
The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the
total party-list votes.
3.
The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the
party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this
threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall
be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Supreme Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4.
The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution. BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, July
8, 2009.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives. The Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is void insofar as it creates the
PNRC as a private corporation. The PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
175352, July 15, 2009.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION.
It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name
given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is
of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in
a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be
most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.
Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case, the Supreme Court held that there was no
violation of petitioners rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of
qualified theft. Sheala P. Matrido vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009.
SEARCH WARRANTS.
Under Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, as embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules
of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be
served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. Re: Request of the Police Director General Avelino I. Razon
for authority to delegate the endorsement of application for search warrant, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009.
SECURITY OF TENURE.
Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that [n]o officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The aforementioned constitutional provision does not
distinguish between a regular employee and a probationary employee.
The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the civil service has two legal ramifications. In Tria v. Chairman Patricia
Sto. Tomas, et al., the Supreme Court held that the prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of
the Civil Service except for cause provided by law is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Not
only must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also they can only be made
on the basis of a valid cause provided by law.
Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice and hearing. Thus, the
minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that the employees or officers must be informed of the charges preferred
against them, and the formal way by which the employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a copy of the
charges made against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to present their side of the matter, that
is to say, their defenses against the charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses
Here, the ground the petitioner invoked is not sufficient basis for the respondents dismissal, and her dismissal was
effected without the observance of both procedural and substantive due process. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Rowena O. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.
Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons
(citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who
invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but
also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees
protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the
prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Here, petitioners continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court process. Martin Gibbs Fletcher vs.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections or his representative, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009.
Election Law
APPEAL FEE; ELECTION CASES.
Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to further
affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through the specific guidelines contained in said
Resolution, the Supreme Court declared that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of its decision, errors in the
matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.
Appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of
the COMRLEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. In the absence of grave
abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions
rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
Since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for
reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for
certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15,
2009.
COMELEC; CANCELLATION OF COC.
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a false representation of material fact in the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material
fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a
candidates eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from
the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC. In the exercise of such
jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not treated
as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and
Mohammad Ali Mericano A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; ORDERS OF DIVISION.
Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of decisions of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here, the assailed Second
Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there was something more to be done, which was to decide the
election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
COMELEC; POWERS.
The COMELEC has broad power, derived from our fundamental law, to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall; its power of supervision and control over
boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers; the concomitant need to do everything in its power to secure a fair
and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections; the grant to it of broad and flexible powers to effectively perform its
duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; and its role as the guardian of the peoples
sacred right of suffrage.
In particular, the statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of canvassers includes the
power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have done. Such power
includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the
actions of the board; conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the election records of the
polling places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or tampered
returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either
because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all; or requiring the board to convene. Rafael Flauta, Jr.,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009.
COMELEC; PROTESTS.
Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over petitioners election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on
Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
DOUBLE REGISTRATION.
Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter of
Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her
eligibility in her COC, especially so because the COC is filled up under oath. An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. Jamela Salic
Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali Mericano A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES.
The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election cases. It has been applied in at least two cases involving the
payment of filing fees. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 &
G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET).
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. By employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET
in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended
to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body require that any finding of
grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any
accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
improvidence. The Supreme Court did not find evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving
its members, the Supreme Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of
whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the
continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. That is what
petitioner actually wants the Supreme Court to do. But in the exercise of its checking function, the Supreme Court should
merely test whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or had a different view. Henry June Dueas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Angelito Jett P. Reyes, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009.
FORFEITURE OF SENATE SEAT FOR HOLDING ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICE
In Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that
by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores vs. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators
lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary issue of whether the petitioners have standing to file the petition. The
Supreme Court answered in the negative:
. . . petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for
usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto,
specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66
of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly
usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the
action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that PNPRC is a private organization performing public functions:
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the
PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC
member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents
or not, can be members of the PNRC. . .
. . . the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC, which ruled that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test
used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled
that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a governmentowned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
of 1987. . .
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation,
at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by
analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control
PNRC.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the PNRC Charter is violative of the constitutional proscription against the creation of
private corporations by special law, as provided in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution:
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters.
Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special
charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled. . .
. . . although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled
corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as
a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the
creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is
void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended, are void.
AUGUST 2009 DECISIONS

Constitutional law
CONGRESS; LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament,
or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to
the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege
would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity
and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions
of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action
is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago, A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek
its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy
policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to
prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the
underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not
only the defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but
also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all
the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then
be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses
that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are once again employed
against the defendants individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any
less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through
either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule
45 of the same Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Dir. Cesar P. Nazareno, Dir. Evelino Nartatez, Dir. Nicasio Ma.
S. Custodio and The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPEMSATION.
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to be
considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated
by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the
value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the
time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property
involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of
Rule 67 partly states that [u]pon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken. However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing
of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for
damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions
of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. Republic of the Philippines through
the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Court of Appeals and Rosario Rodriguez Reyes, G.R. No. 160379,
August 14, 2009.
PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop
harvest as a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors as factors for
consideration in determining just compensation.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed
that just compensation has not yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. Thus, the issue to be determined is what
law shall govern in the determination of just compensation.
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said
law, although the property was acquired under PD 27. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R.
No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING.
It is the date of the issuance of emancipation patents that should serve as the reckoning point for purposes of computation
of just compensation. Copies of the emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, however, have not been
attached to the records of the case. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674,
August 4, 2009.
FREE ACCESS CLAUSE; COURT FILING FEES.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot
be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered
by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the
poor.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically,
Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the
State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has
the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption from legal
and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009.
LAWS; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law. Those who petition the court to declare a law unconstitutional must show thta there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
LAWS; TITLE.
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43
are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text
are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to
amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in
Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of
Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election
laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of
RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1)
Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends
Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend
RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority
and dominant minority parties at poll election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to
contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds
that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that
derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There
is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses
with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation
will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the
dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were
deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the community. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL.

Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 of RA 9369 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution for encroaching upon the jurisdiciton of the PET and the SET.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of
jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other,
are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be
invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand,
under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the
winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508,
August
7,
2009.
STRIKE; ILLEGAL STRIKE.
It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute (see Section 3 of
Article XIII of the Constitution). A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R. No.
166879, August 14, 2009.
TAXATION; DOUBLE TAXATION.
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, taxing the same person
twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but
once. Otherwise described as direct duplicate taxation, the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for
the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the
taxes must be of the same kind or character.
Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes
under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter
the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose to make persons conducting business
within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority petitioner City of Manila; (4)
within the same taxing jurisdiction within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods
per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the
business. The City of Manila, Liberty M. Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 4, 2009.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3)
it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase.
They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it
was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be
evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German
Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009.
Public Officers
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an
exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions:
first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend
to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employees resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which
can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or
employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and
the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend
with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies.
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without
any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is
that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. Query of Atty.
Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, on the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009.
Agrarian law
TENANTS.
To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, the claimant must
be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract;
and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. The tenant covered by PD 1517 is, as defined under Section
3(f) thereof, the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is
merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation of land is devoid of any legal authority or those whose contracts
of lease are already terminated, or had already expired, or whose possession is under litigation are not considered
tenants under the decree. Conversely, a legitimate tenant is one who is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance. The
petitioners-defendants whose occupation has been merely by the owners tolerance obviously fall outside the coverage of
PD
1517
and
cannot
seek
its
protection.
Francisco
Madrid
and
Edgardo
Bernardo
vs.
Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009.
Election Law
COMELEC; POWERS.
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935
or 1973] Constitutions. The phrase [w]here appropriate leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of
election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the
government. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by
Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
PURCHASE OF LAND DURING THE ELECTION BAN

The Omnibus Election Code prohibits the construction of public works and the issuance of treasury warrants during a
period of 45 days prior to a regular election and 30 days prior to a special election. Section 261 (w) reads:
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury
warrants and similar devices.- During the period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works
exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.
In Robert P. Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, Mayor Randolph S. Ting and Salvacion Garcia, G.R. No. 182380, August
28, 2009, the issue that arose is whether the purchase by the city mayor of land for use as a public cemetery and the
issuance of a treasury warrant as payment for the land violate the Omnibus Election Code.
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City
Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor
Ting purchased the two parcels of land. As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government
of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and the issuance of new certificates in its name.
Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261,
paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for
having released, disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the
prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May
9, 2004.
After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O.
Case No. 06-14 and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of the two parcels of land for a
public cemetery was not considered as within the term public works; and that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury
Warrant No. 0001534514 was not for public works and was thus in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The Supreme Court ruled that the purchase of the lots for use as a public cemetery does not constitute construction of a
public work within the context of the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code. According to the Supreme Court:
We first construe the term public works which the Omnibus Election Code does not define with the aid of extrinsic
sources.
The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed infrastructures and facilities owned and
operated by the government for public use and enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the responsibility of
providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds,
such as, among others, roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary
schools; and clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services.
Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the engineering and construction arm of the
government, associates public works with fixed infrastructures for the public. . .
The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood control and water
resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with national development objectives means
that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to
the rule of ejusdem generis . . .
Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of
the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as
roads or dams) built by the Government for public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works,
whether of construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed
to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.;
or, in other words, all fixed works constructed for public use.
It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioners insistence that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881
for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of Section
261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code was unfounded and unwarranted.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of the treasury warrant violated the Omnibus Election Code:
The OSG posits that [Section 261(w)] is violated in either of two ways: (a) by any person who, within 45 days preceding a
regular election and 30 days before a special election, undertakes the construction of any public works except those
enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b) by any person who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any
device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds within 45 days
preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election.
We concur with the OSGs position.
Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under subparagraph (a) above and that
under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering that Section
261(w) uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that
expresses an alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more things. The word signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it
ordinarily implies as a disjunctive word. According to Black, too, the word and can never be read as or, or vice versa, in
criminal and penal statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently, whether or not the treasury
warrant in question was intended for public works was even of no moment in determining if the legal provision was
violated.
There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated
when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the election ban period.
For this reason, our conclusion that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O. Case No. 06-14
for lack of merit is inevitable and irrefragable.
SUPREME COURT OF IDIOTS

After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar
Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots. . .
In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected
a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements. However, she explained that
those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring
out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago. In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399,
August 25, 2009, it ruled:
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof . Explaining
the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our Constitution
enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament,
or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to
the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege
would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity
and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions
of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action
is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.
While the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on the matter. It added:
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and
highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots. . .
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the
courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.
But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let
alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under
such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
SEPTEMBER 2009 DECISIONS

Constitutional Law
CITIZENSHIP; ELECTION.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to
be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with
the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the
age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the
age of majority. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has
always regarded himself as a Filipino. In hits case, not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension
of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such
belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he
was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship,
which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to
Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy
the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T.
Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No.
167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.
CITIZENSHIP; JUS SOLI.
The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme
Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only
benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken
application of jus soli.
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim
that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any
supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of
a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that
Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. Carlos T.
Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a.
Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009 .
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION.
The CSC is the constitutional body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the government. In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the
Court held that special laws such as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school teachers. This Court has also previously held in Civil Service
Commission v. Albao that the CSC has the authority to directly institute proceedings to discipline a government employee
in order to protect the integrity of the civil service. Civil Service Commission vs. Fatima A. Macud, G.R. No. 177531.
September 10, 2009
COMELEC: POLL AUTOMATION CONTRACT.
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to
have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question
to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And surely, the
winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the
conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means
and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was createdto promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people.
Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its power which, by law and
by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone
nullify, the acts of that body. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009.
Section 18 of the CARL mandates that petitioner shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon
by the landowner, DAR, and petitioner, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
In determining just compensation, Section 17 of the CARL enumerates the factors to be considered in the determination of
just compensation, namely, the cost of acquisition of the land; the current value of like properties; its nature, actual use
and income; the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations; and the assessment made by government assessors.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the government to the property,
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its value.
In the case at bar, the SAC arrived at the just compensation due respondents for their subject property by taking into
account the market value of the subject property, the tax declaration of respondents, the actual use of and income from
the subject property, the assessors valuation, and the volume and value of its produce; and factors specifically mentioned
under Section 17 of the CARL. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the determination of just compensation by the SAC.
There being no allegation or evidence that the determination of just compensation for the subject property by the SAC, as
affirmed by the appellate court, was not in conformity with or was in violation of the provisions of the CARL, the applicable
law, then we have no reason to disturb the same. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Asuncion Anonuevo Vda.
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 179862, September 3, 2009.
PCGG; POWER.
The PCGGs power to sequester alleged ill-gotten properties is likened to the provisional remedies of preliminary
attachment or receivership which are always subject to the control of the court.
The PCGG, therefore, as the receiver of sequestered assets and in consonance with its duty under EO 1, Series of 1986,
to protect and preserve them, has the power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those acts are approved by the
proper court.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is the PCGGnot COCOFED or the CIIF companiesthat has the right
and/or authority during sequestration to seek this Courts approval for the proposed conversion. Consequently, the terms
and conditions sought by COCOFED for the conversion are not material to the proposed conversion. At
most, COCOFEDs prayer for approval of the conversion reflects its conformity to said transfiguration.
After a circumspect evaluation of the incident at bar, we resolve to approve the conversion. The Court holds that
respondent Republic has satisfactorily hurdled the onus of showing that the conversion is advantageous to the public
interest or will result in clear and material benefit to the eventually declared stock owners, be they the coconut farmers or
the government itself. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo
P. Espina, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009.
SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW.
The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Sr.
Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009.
SEARCH; WARRANTLESS ARREST.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct
a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front
of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009.
STATUTES; CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Article 202(2) of the RPC, which penalizes any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support, is constitutional. The provision
is
not
vague
and
does
not
violate
the
equal
protection
clause. People
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Evangeline Siton y sacil, et al., G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; LIABILITY.
An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents
would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative
complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.
A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondents acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner
erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero
III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; QUANTUM OF PROOF.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot
be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his
allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D.
Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTION.
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a
court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action
and dismissible.
EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR for policy and program coordination and/or
administrative supervision x x x. Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to promulgate rules and
regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water
and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication
Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the
adjudication of pollution cases, including NPCCs function to [s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or
restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before
the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The
Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228. September 11, 2009.
DISMISSAL; GROSS MISCONDUCT.
Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for
the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsmans right to file the appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or
other responsible individuals. We are, of course, aware that in several administrative cases, this Court has refrained from
strictly imposing the penalties provided by the law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employees length of
service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and other
equitable considerations. However, we find that petitioners recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or misuse) of the more
than P700,000.00 in cash placed in her possession makes her unworthy of such humanitarian consideration, and merits
the most serious penalty provided by law. Gloria G. Hallasgo, Municipal Treasurer of Damulong, Bukidnon vs. Commission
on Audit (COA), Regional Office No. X, G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009.
PUBLIC OFFICER; PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE.
A private sector representative appointed to the National Book Development Board is a public officer for purposes of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos.
147026-27, September 11, 2009.
Election law
BALLOTS; APPRECIATION.
The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the
ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said
candidate. Such rule is usually applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle that in the
appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be
determined with reasonable certainty. Ernesto Batalla vs. Commission on Elections and Teodoro Bataller, G.R. No.
184268, September 15, 2009.
CANDIDATES; DOMICILE.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man
can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the
domicile of origin continues. Makil U. Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 179313. September 17,
2009
CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING.
The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of
Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate[.] A motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles or other motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof
during election periods by the candidates and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread
and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions,
to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and
recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no
other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.
In the instant Petition, Penera never denied that she took part in the conduct of the motorcade after she filed her COC on
the day before the start of the campaign period.
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. Rosalinda A. Penera vs.
Commission on Elections and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.
CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING.
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the
prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at
any time.
We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended.
A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that
it did not contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute
declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,identified by its number or title, is repealed.[35]
Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed.
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is
possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both. Rosalinda A. Penera vs.
Commission on Elections and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW PENALIZING LOITERING

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places
or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. It provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1.
Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply
himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2.
Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
3.
Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate
with prostitutes;
4.
Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any
inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5.
Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, they filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article
202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
The municipal trial court declared Article 202(2) constitutional. Evangeline and Krystel filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law.
They claimed that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an
arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise
performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.
The Regional Trial Court agreed with Evangeline and Krystel. In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the Regional
Trial Court opined that the law is vague and violated the equal protection clause. It held that the void for vagueness
doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.
The Supreme Court reversed the Regional Trial Court and ruled that Article 202(2) is not vague:
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. However,
in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable
precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts
it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. . .
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme
Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville . . .
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it encourages or promotes
opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give
fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and
limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of
exceptions.
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof, which are not
found in Article 202 (2). . .
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as
nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of
time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which
are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202
(2). The closest to Article 202 (2) any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping
or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would
be persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object. But these two acts
are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by without visible means of support while the Jacksonville ordinance
prohibits wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to
constitute a trap for innocent acts.
The Supreme Court also ruled that Article 202(2) does not violate the equal protection clause:
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for
conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which
punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such
conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized the rule the statues are presumed constitutional:
. . . we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with
grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested
by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast
and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As
an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE AS PUBLIC OFFICER

Various laws provide for the appointment of a private sector representative in governmental bodies. For example, the
Renewable Energy Act of 2008 creates the National Renewable Energy Board and provides for the appointment of private
sector representatives to the board.
Is a private sector representative to the board a public officer?
In Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009, Javier was charged with
malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board
(NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, otherwise known as the Book Publishing Industry
Development Act. R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and
supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the
President, five (5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private
education sector.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to
hear the case as the information did not allege that she is a public official who is classified as Grade 27 or higher. Neither
did the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee and that she belongs to the
NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she
claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to speak of that
she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant in the governments book
development policy.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javiers motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her
petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in
violation of her right against double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer:
To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative,
stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No.
8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she
was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed
against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a
statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the
book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this
end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. . .
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of public functions. A
public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this
case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies
of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing
Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts
collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private
sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the
book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that
a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified
or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that
does not make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of
no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of ones appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a
public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent,
subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation
of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled
book fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.

On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no double jeopardy.
Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different
statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the
accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant
case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the
criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double
jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that
herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is
filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused
is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[38] The third and
fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
OCTOBER 2009 DECISIONS

Constitutional Law
BAIL.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus
depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y Bucalon, G.R. No.
176933, October 2, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; POWERS.
The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules and
regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations
and to review appointments. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT; POWERS.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. No. 1445, the COA, as one of the three independent constitutional
commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by the government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. To
ensure the effective discharge of its functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional limitations, to
define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor, to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary power of the COA to
decide. This no doubt includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758. Respondents claim against
petitioner, although it has already been validated by the trial courts final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims;
hence, it must first be filed with the COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved
party is afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance with Section 1
Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No.
166508, October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; CERTIORARI.
It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what may be brought to this Court on certiorari is the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC
arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in this case.
In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration of its final Order dated November 25, 2008, which
dismissed petitioners appeal. By arrogating unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the
First Division of the COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the
First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, is null and
void. Carmelinda C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009.
COMELEC; POWERS.
The COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially
executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over
election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower
ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of
procedure).
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935
Constitution to the present one, to reflect the countrys awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and protection
to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with
authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise
discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the
legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite
the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is
not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional
sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
The 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC shall be the sole judge of all contests, thus giving the
appearance that judicial power had been conferred. This phraseology, however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to
give the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction over all contests, thus removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power
as a court and correctly aligning it with what it is a quasi-judicial body.Consistent with the characterization of its
adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with the review of Civil
Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of
review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise the Courts supervisory authority. This means
that the Court will not supplant the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave abuse of
discretion or any other jurisdictional error exists. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M.
Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
COMELEC; DECISIONS.
Petitioners argue that the February 28, 2003 resolution of the COMELEC violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which states that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. The COMELEC allegedly made generalizations without detailing the basis for its
findings.
The assailed resolution substantially complied with the constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The resolution detailed the evidence presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed the respective pieces of
evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense and chose the one that deserved credence. It contained findings of
facts as well as an application of case law.
The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, especially the
parties, of how it was reached by the court after a consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable
laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that
the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring
to appeal therefrom can assign errors to it. Roberto Albaa, et al. vs. Pio Jude Belo, et al., G.R. No. 158734, October 2,
2009.
COMELEC; DUE PROCESS.
Based on the pleadings filed, there is no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing stage
rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the
case was deemed submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented his
evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various phases of the proceedings constitute the
hearing proper of the election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang
Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an
adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and controvert
each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be
heard. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15,
2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; DAMAGES.
In taking respondents property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be
countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to
respondents. Again, in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that the government agencys
illegal occupation of the owners property for a very long period of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner.
Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs.. Jovito M. Luis, et al. G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
EMINENT DOMAIN; ESTOPPEL.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of
time (from 1980 until the early 1990s) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken,
witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always
asked for compensation. It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents
property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are
also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et
al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial court, adopting the market data approach on which
Commissioner Chua relied, merely put premium on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which are
not among the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the formula provided in DAR
AO 6-92, as amended. This is a clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of
RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it.
Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended, in his appraisal of the
property. His conclusion that the market data approach conformed with statutory and regulatory requirements is bereft of
basis. Department of Agrarian Reform, rep. OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. Jose Marie Rufino, et al., G.R. No.
175644/G.R. No. 175702, October 2, 2009.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof
before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Petitioners interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, the Court declared in no
uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just compensation after noting several decided
cases where the Court found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the
time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Courts earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines
where it declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was
taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No.
27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was
passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just
compensation control. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; PRESCRIPTION.
Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. Hon.
Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The Rules of Court, in implementing the right, specifically require that the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, must be
stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and the attendant qualifying and
aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce
judgment. To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the accused, of an
Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the offense. Jurisprudence has laid down the fundamental test in
appreciating a motion to quash an Information grounded on the insufficiency of the facts alleged therein. Jose C. Go vs.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009.
Public Officers
MASS APPOINTMENTS.
It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on mass appointments before and after the elections.
Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment
process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end, appointments
within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections,
appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No.
010988, to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in
implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or
as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials.
Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does
not purport to nullify all mass appointments. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the
regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that
the appointments are not in bulk. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2,
2009.
Administrative Law
CARDINAL RIGHTS; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The
essence of this aspect of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of
Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or
denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a
hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence
presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence
presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the
conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of
the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty to give reason to enable the affected person to
understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and
criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on
Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have
availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the
courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of
law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is
exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish. Evelyn Ongsuco and
Antonia Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M. Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.
Election Law
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY.
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code limits a pre-proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein. The
enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the
absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects
(Section 234, Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Section
235, Omnibus Election Code); or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which
affects the result of the election (Section 236, Omnibus Election Code).
To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election
returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election irregularities. For
as long as the election returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers
cannot look beyond or behind the election returns in order to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or counting of
votes. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The issue of petitioners disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been resolved
by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan. This case stemmed
from the first disqualification case filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611. Although the
petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition
and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from
running as mayor of Pantar. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan, G.R.
No. 186006, October 16, 2009.
STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY DOCTRINE.

Under Lagumbay, the doctrine of statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the
votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the
opposing parties appear in the election return. The doctrine has no application where there is neither uniformity of tallies
nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one party. Thus, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received no
votes in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject
election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is but one
strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation.
The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care
being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices which is truly called for innocent voters become
disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us dismiss Suhuris urging that
some of the electoral results had been infected with the taint of statistical improbability as to warrant their exclusion from
the canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, his petition and the records nowhere show that his party-mates
received a similar number of votes (or lack of any) by which to conclude that there were a unique uniformity of tally and a
systematic blanking of other candidates belonging to one party. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on
Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October
2, 2009.
NOVEMBER 2009 CASES

Constitutional Law
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible
administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the
merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or
the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department, to which herein petitioner belongs.
Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, enumerates the powers and functions of
the CSC. In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the
CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out
this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary
investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.

It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when
the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their
office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Eugenio S.
Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; EQUAL PROTECTION.
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law;
when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in
the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective
officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to
length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution
provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application
of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this
disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged
proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This
conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive
application. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; LIS MOTA.
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that Proclamation No. 297, issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution; Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3092;
Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only
if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily clear that the third requisite is absent. The
general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. Apex Mining Co. Inc. Vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., G.R. No. 152613/G.R. No. 152628,
November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE RULE.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections,
amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states the laws
general subject matter the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes.
To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office
of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the
total number of terms for which a barangayofficial may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term
limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully
informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice,
consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject
matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates. Commission on Elections vs.
Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; POLITICAL QUESTION.
Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of
barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority
when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of
barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to
Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we
consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
These questions, previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by
Section 1, Article VIII.
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the
Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not
on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. These are the
hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must overcome. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado
Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; RETROACTIVITY.
The constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity objection does not
involve a violation of any constitutional standard.
Retroactivity of laws is a matter
Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil
The application of the Civil Code
they shall have retroactive effect.
of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the
Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.
is of course self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that
The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will
impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes
it away, a genuine due process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or
property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the
respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too,
there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises. Commission on
Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Election law
BALLOTS; APPRECIATION.
Although as a rule, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, still when it can be shown that, as in this case, it grossly misread evidence of such nature
that compels a different conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse that bodys factual findings.
It is by now a settled truth that no two persons write alike. Even if two handwritings have a common general outlook, they
are apt to be at variance in some basic characteristics that set them apart. Every person uses his own style for forming
letters, technically called personal characteristics. Whatever features two specimens of handwriting may have in common,
they cannot be regarded as written by one person if they show even but one consistent dissimilarity in any feature which is
fundamental to the structure of the handwriting.
Here, the Court did not find, after examining 93 of the excluded ballots pertaining to petitioner Torres, any two or more of
ballots that were filled in by a single hand. Of the 47 pairs of ballots that the En Banc excluded, only two pairs were
correctly excluded because they were written by one person for each pair. 45 pairs turned out to have been filled up by
different hands. While the general outlook of the handwritings on each of the two ballots in any given pair is the same,
such handwritings have distinct personal characteristics. In the same way, the three ballots that were supposedly written
on by one person turned out to have been the work of three different hands. Ramon P. Torres vs. Commission on Elections
and Josephine Joy H. Gaviola, G.R. No. 187956, November 19, 2009.
CANDIDATES; LIABILITY FOR ELECTION OFFENSES.

Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period.
This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he
filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that
any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009. Note: The Supreme
Court reversed its earlier decision dated September 11, 2009.
PRESIDENTS REFUSAL TO REVIEW DOJ DECISIONS
Can the President legally refuse to review the decisions of the Secretary of Justice except under certain circumstances?
Does that diminish the power of control of the President and bestow upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer,
unfettered power?
In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, et al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009 , the Provincial
Prosecutor denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for violation RA
7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge of violation of PD 1829. The petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice, which eventually dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The Office of the President dismissed the
petition, citing Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions, orders, and
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.
The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost
unfettered power.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It ruled:
This argument is absurd. The Presidents act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The CA cannot be
deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the Presidents reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it
merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
. . . the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in
order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioners argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power
of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses
the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot secondguess the Presidents power and the Presidents own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate
in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary
his own alter ego.
The Supreme Court observed that the President cannot delegate certain of her powers:
. . . the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for
restrictions. . .
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are
certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives
over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise
by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing
with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional
class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties
of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
Finally, the Court ruled that the memorandum circular do not deprive the President of her power of control:
Petitioners contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1,
Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive
departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was
promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular
No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said
Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS AND THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Can a rehabilitation court compel a lender to accept a 50% reduction in the borrowers principal obligation? Would that
violate the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution?
In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc./Pacific Wide Realty and Development
Corporation Vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 178768/G.R. No. 180893, November 25, 2009 , the borrower, Puerto Azul
Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves
the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers
with recreational areas. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount of
which amounted to aroundPhP640 million.
Because of financial difficulties, PALI subsequently filed a petition for rehabilitation. After trial, the rehabilitation court
issued a decision which reads, in part:
The rehabilitation of the petitioner, therefore, shall proceed as follows. . .
2.
Creditors who will not opt for dacion shall be paid in accordance with the restructuring of the obligations as
recommended by the Receiver as follows:
a)
The obligations to secured creditors will be subject to a 50% haircut of the principal, and repayment shall be semiannually over a period of 10 years, with 3-year grace period. Accrued interests and penalties shall be condoned. Interest
shall be paid at the rate of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. thereafter until the obligations are fully paid. The
petitioner shall allot 50% of its cash flow available for debt service for secured creditors. Upon completion of payments to
government and employee accounts, the petitioners cash flow available for debt service shall be used until the obligations
are fully paid.
b)
One half (1/2) of the principal of the petitioners unsecured loan obligations to other creditors shall be settled
through non-cash offsetting arrangements, with the balance payable semi-annually over a period of 10 years, with 3-year
grace period, with interest at the rate of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. from the 6th year onwards until the
obligations are settled in full. Accrued interest and penalties shall be condoned. (underscoring supplied)
One of the lenders, Export and Industry Bank (EIB), filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the decision of the rehabilitation court.
In its petition before the Supreme Court, EIB argues that the rehabilitation plan was unreasonable and in violation of the
non-impairment clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. The court first explained the nature of rehabilitation proceedings:
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to
enable the company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. The
rehabilitation of a financially distressed corporation benefits its employees, creditors, stockholders and, in a larger sense,
the general public.
Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a
position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its
creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as a
going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
An indispensable requirement in the rehabilitation of a distressed corporation is the rehabilitation plan . . .
On EIBs argument that the rehabilitation plan violates the non-impairment clause, the court ruled:
In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the
impairment of the obligations of contract.PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALIs rehabilitation plan: fifty
percent (50%) reduction of the principal obligation; condonation of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty
charges; repayment over a period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%) for the first five years and five
percent (5%) for the next five years until fully paid, and only upon availability of cash flow for debt service.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides
for means of execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the conversion of the debts or any
portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest.
The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and
as affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a
secured creditor. Enlightening is the observation of the CA in this regard,viz.:
There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the court a
quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as much as 85%.
Meaning, PALIs creditors accepted only 15% of their credits value. Stated otherwise, if PALIs creditors are in a position to
accept 15% of their credits value, with more reason that they should be able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by
their debtor. x x x.
We also find no merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or
an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtorPALI, its creditors and its accommodation
mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even
assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property
rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in
general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total
liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be
affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have participated in the proceedings or have opposed
the plan or whether or not their claims have been scheduled.
DECEMBER 2009 CASES

Constitutional Law
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The
right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission
lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et
al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN.
In computing for the value of the land subject to acquisition, the formula provided in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended, requires that figures pertaining to the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) and Market Value (MV) of the property be
used as inputs in arriving at the correct land valuation. Thus, the applicable formula, as correctly used by the LBP in its
valuation, is LV (Land Value) = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1).
To arrive at the figure for the CNI of lands planted to a combination of crops, Item II B.5 of the said administrative order
provides that the same should be computed based on the combination of actual crops produced on the covered land. Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs.
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097. December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST.
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the
States power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the
court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed
from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST.
In Philippine Railway Company v. Solon, decided in 1909, the Court treated interest as part of just compensation when the
payment to the owner was delayed. Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, and
Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
The term just compensation had been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and National Power Corporation v. Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corporation, the Court sustained the award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full
value of the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and
not the ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment of fair market value without
the concomitant transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As
illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned
than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane
to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid
if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION.
To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption
from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part
provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination
being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1,
Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from
government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged
act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons,
as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely
because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of
its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not
suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP
member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the
same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly
invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a
political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is
enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and
responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting
upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to
classify,necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December
21, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE.
PICOPc cause of action consists in the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its
constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts. The 1969 document signed by President Marcos is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under
the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP
Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory.
Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T.
Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875.
December 3, 2009
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so
warranted by the situation. The reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above
are not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the
pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which,
standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecutions case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the
MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly
notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
Reiterating the Courts pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that speedy trial is a relative and flexible term,
Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the
strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the
other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the
accuseds assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the delay in the proceedings, especially given that
he had posted bail. Federico Miguel Olbes vs. Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, etc. et al., G.R. No. 173319. December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
Petitioner invokes the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that
he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the Hold Departure Order is a
continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the
following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx a
persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the courts sound discretion.
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him
was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161, December
3, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION OVER COURT PERSONNEL.
The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is
whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court
personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the
case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service
Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before
the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Civil Service Commission vs. Herminigildo L. Andal, G.R. No.
185749, December 16, 2009.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and
separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were terminated due to the reorganization
of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.
Considering that they belong to the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. Evelyn S.
Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009.
COMELEC; CONTEMPT.
The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt
proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while
exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue
and support their respective positions.
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation,
despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the
purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and
to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his
possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the
Task Force hearings. Lintang Bedol vs. Commssion on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In this case, petitioners allege that they
will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the
2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet
candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates
do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative
effect on voters. The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the
assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI.
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of
the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public
funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or
some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds,
which respondents insist are not taxpayers money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be
spent for paying the interest of the bonds. In fact, a Deed of Assignment was executed by the governor in favor of
respondent RCBC over the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as payment
and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under the Trust Indenture Agreement dated September 17,
2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an
amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.
As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test bearing in mind
that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public interest, or farreaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In
cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did
not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December
14, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABILITY.
A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the
legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated.
In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek to restrain public respondents from implementing the bond
flotation and to declare null and void all contracts related to the bond flotation and construction of the town center. In the
petition before the RTC, they alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents. They put
in issue the overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable
assignment of the provincial governments annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and
secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and discussion with the community regarding the
proposed project, as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.
Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of. Thus,
we find the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs.
Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; OVERBROAD.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high
positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned
once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his
position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public
elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution
and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of
the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them. Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
HRET; JURISDICTION.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole
emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after
elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not
taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives
while the latter was still a candidate. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND OWNERSHIP.
Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite 14021 Duddell
Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock
is not qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to the
OGCCs claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully
own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private
corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the
Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not
own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R.
No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
POLICE POWER; MMDA.
MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising
media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system,
and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority vs.. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 179554,
December 16, 2009.
PUBLIC FUNDS; APPROPRIATION.
Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the Government Auditing
Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating P6.185 billion as compromise money before payment to
Radstock can be made. Otherwise, such payment violates a prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of the Civil Code
which states that [a]cts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the
law itself authorizes their validity.
Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay P6.185 billion to Radstock. Any contract allowing
such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, shall be void as provided in Section 87 of the Government Auditing
Code.
PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a private debt of CDCP
Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust
by PNCC for the National Government, which is the owner of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the P6.185 billion compromise amount, the
Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the P6.185 billion pertains to CDCP Minings private debt to Radstock, the
Compromise Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental public policy that government funds or property
shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code. Strategic
No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
SUFFRAGE; EXTENSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION.

Section 8 of RA 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period
starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the
coming elections. The COMELECs rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election acts, the same is
not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration under RA 8189. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A.
No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the
same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of
enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during the period
starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its
power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC. In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did
not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000
deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court
within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the
conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension
sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment
to the extension prayed for. Kabataan Party List vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancy in its import and export liquidations,
that it was given ample opportunity by the PEZA management to be heard or to explain its side in relation to its
unaccounted imported materials and that it was subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its
registration on the basis of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners cannot claim that they
were denied their right to due process of law. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al. Vs. Pearl City
Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009.
The CA correctly concluded that petitioners right to due process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional precept,
does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, filing charges
against the person and giving reasonable opportunity to the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. She was given every opportunity to
submit various pleadings and documents in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through her counter-affidavit and
documentary evidence, manifestation and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion,
petitioner moved and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and evidentiary records that were
submitted before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the
opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of the
Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give
the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the
courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, viz:
1.
when there is a violation of due process;
2.
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3.
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4.
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5.
when there is irreparable injury;
6.
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter;
7.
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8.
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9.
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10.
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11.
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition
with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only
when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being
extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are
powerless to afford relief.
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought the matter to the CSC
which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367,
December 18, 2009.
EO 259; LACK OF IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Carabeo impugns the validity of EO 259 for lack of implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259 lacks any
implementing guidelines. However, such fact is immaterial and does not affect, in any manner, the validity of the criminal
and administrative charges against Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its power and authority to gather
evidence against DOF officials and employees suspected of graft and corruption, the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with
such power in order to validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. In fact, any concerned ordinary
citizen can file criminal and administrative charges against any corrupt government official or employee if there exists
sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS, even without EO 259 and whether as subordinates of the Secretary
of Finance or as private citizens, can validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo.
At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically internal in nature needing no implementing rules and regulations in
order to be enforceable. Principally aimed at curbing graft and corruption in the DOF and its attached agencies,[14] EO
259 covers only officers and employees. Liberato M. Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No.
178003, December 4, 2009.
LLDA; FINES.
The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake
Development Authority G.R. No. 165299. December 18, 2009
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of the case against petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of the
National Library; as such, as an appointive employee of the government, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
to take cognizance of the action against the petitioner was beyond contestation.
Moreover, petitioners claim that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the action, since the act complained of
was committed before her entering government service, cannot be sustained. Under Section 46 (18), Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 198, even if the dishonest act was committed by the employee prior to entering government
service, such act is still a ground for disciplinary action. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion
Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009
OMBUDSMAN; PRESCRIPTION.
Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if
the complaint was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court held that the period stated in Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 does
not refer to the prescription of the offense, but to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman on whether it would
investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word may in the provision is construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given
their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint filed before
it even if it was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. Thus, while the complaint herein
was filed three years after the occurrence of the act imputed to petitioner, it was within the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to act, to proceed with and conduct an investigation of the subject complaint. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of
the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009
OSG. Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own
behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. Elvira
O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009.
Election Law
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; RESIGNATION.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
CANDIDATES; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to comply
with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution. Private respondents documentary evidence to disqualify
petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioners certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and
2004, which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his application
for a drivers license in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs
including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses
in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not
intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.
Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in
the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one
district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other
district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as
a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a
property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to
election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in
effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC, where the disqualified candidate was
shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there
appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place where he filed his COC,
except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and
abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
TERM LIMIT; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
The preventive suspension of an elected public official does not interrupt of his term of office for purposes of the threeterm limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160. Simon B.
Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong vs. Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo, G.R. No.
184836, December 23, 2009.
CREATION OF CITIES.
When Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or
codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the
embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not
have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much
simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the
local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified
income requirement from PhP 20 million toPhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no
different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from
the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056.
December 21, 2009.
SANGGUNIAN APPROVAL.
PICOP had claimed that it complied with Sections 2(c), 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (which requires the prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned) by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing
the approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing
provision. Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. Hon. Heherson T.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009
Other laws
PUBLIC BIDDING; DACION EN PAGO.

Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. COA Circular No. 89-926, issued on 27 January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and
other assets of the government.
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial parcels of land, by way of dacion en pago, in favor of
Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, PNCC argues that a dacion en pago is an exception to the requirement of a public
bidding.
PNCCs reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that public bidding is dispensed with in a dacion en
pago transaction.
Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion en pago transactions,
unlike here where the government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of assets.
Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically involves a disposition of a property. Strategic
No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
JANUARY 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
EMINENT DOMAIN; PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION.
The concept of just compensation contemplates just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals instructs, be
considered just, for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and Heirs of Vicente Adaza, Heirs of Romeo Adaza, Heirs of Cesar
Adaza, represented by Russel Adaza, G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; CREATION OF CITY.
On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a
legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with
constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such
questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts. Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of
legislative districts is important because the aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power
among districts. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF CITY.

RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand. The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether
actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010
elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
There is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to
the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the
City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; FINDINGS OF FACT.
The findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA. They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had
arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had
such evidence been properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon.
A review of the petition does not show any reversible error committed by the appellate court; hence, the petition must be
denied. Petitioner failed to present any argument that would convince the Court that the SEC and the CA made any
misappreciation of the facts and the applicable laws such that their decisions should be overturned. Catmon Sales
International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales International Corporation, G.R. No.
179761, January 15, 2010.
Election Law
BALLOTS; NUISANCE CANDIDATES.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates
is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain
situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the
electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition
to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in
appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was
declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for MARTINEZ or C.
MARTINEZ should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private
respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes. Celestino
A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11,
2010.
ELECTION CONTEST; APPEAL.
For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding the payment of the appeal fee, a discussion of the application of the
recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials is necessary.
Divinagracia explained the purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC issued to clarify existing
rules and address the resulting confusion caused by the two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC. Divinagracia stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount of
PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC,
through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal
should be dismissed. The Court went on to state in Divinagracia that Aguilar did not dilute the force of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the COMELEC-required appeal fees. The resolution, to reiterate,
was mainly issued to clarify the confusion caused by the requirement of payment of two appeal fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation of this
decision, errors in the matter ofnon-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer
excusable. Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Susana M. Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11,
2010.
ELECTION PROTEST; NUISANCE CANDIDATES.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the
lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation
of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests
of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of
the electorate.
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion
which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who,
based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots
with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them.
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by
nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates
who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Celestino A. Martinez III
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; JUDICIAL REVIEW.
The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
direction that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal
hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law.
Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots
with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly
counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly
establishing that such votes could not have been intended for Edilito C. Martinez who was declared a nuisance candidate
in a final judgment. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
FEBRUARY 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
EQUAL PROTECTION; REQUISITES.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
EXPROPRIATION; PRIVATE USE.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued,
and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject
to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
and Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010.
GERRYMANDERING; MEANING.
Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an
unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined
gerrymandering as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a
candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as
far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets
closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province
was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET); JURISDICTION.
The HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among
other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected
members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; REQUISITES.
The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether
such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen
sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE.
In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of
procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the
creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and
interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and
existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition should be
Dinagat Islands raises

constitutionality of the
are without substantial
academic because the
dismissed.
The contention is without merit.

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to
other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the
duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution.
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is
a grave violation of the Constitution. The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050,
February 10, 2010.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF PROVINCE.
The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the
creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is null and void. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
PRESIDENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987
Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it
abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that
indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission
violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
OVERBREADTH.
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or
conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed
on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially
reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as
they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which are, at best, bold predictions
cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and
has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent
approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather
than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
PUBLIC ASSEMBLY; MODIFICATION OF PERMIT.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of Manila gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the
permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and
present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued
permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of
the Philippines, represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. Honorable Manila
Mayor Jose Lito Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS; MULTIPLE OFFICE.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that
respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate
clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents
submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related
to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman,
the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President),
Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the
Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words
hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or
multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and
construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the
evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or
positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with
the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people
that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration,
which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and
employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740,
February 11, 2010.
Administrative Law
PROCEEDINGS; EVIDENCE.
In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial
evidence, that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
In the present case, petitioners Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively liable for neglect of duty, which
implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or
indifference, was adequately established by substantial evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E.
Cruzabra, G.R. No. 183507, February 24, 2010.
Election Law
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.
Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an
elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting
his seat.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and does not suffer from
overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22,
2010. (Note: The Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision of December 1, 2009.)
AUTOMATION PROJECT; VALIDITY.
The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R.
Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete
Quirino-Qaudra (Petitioner-in-intervention) Senate of the Philippines, represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili
(Movant-Intervenor), G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to reconsider
its earlier decision of September 10, 2009.)
BALLOT; TAMPERING.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring Peano, based on the results of the revision of ballots, the winner
in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality of Alfonso, Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering, cannot be considered
reflective of the will of the people of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
189078, February 11, 2010.
COMELEC; BALLOT APPRECIATION.
The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested
ballots without first ascertaining whether the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot
proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs.
Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; ELEVATION TO EN BANC WITHOUT DIVISION DECISION.
The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the
Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for
reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising quasi-judicial
functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.
Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or
diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more
particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of the contending parties.
This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action
cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily
transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned
another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated
by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel vs.
Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; FAILURE OF ELECTIONS.
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to
the right to vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may declare failure of elections. The
COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended before the hour fixed by law
due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct.
The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of election (i.e., force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only be determined by
the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the
COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC,
as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise
in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court.
Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It
is not present in this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on the
evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
170365, February 2, 2010.
COMELEC; INJUNCTION.
If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court opts to decide the case on its merits with the result
that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it stands to reason that the decision amounts to a grant of
preliminary injunction. Such injunction should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of
petitioner Panliliothat execution pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a decision of the higher court
enjoining such executiondoes not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before such court. Mayor Jose
Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184286. February 26, 2010
COMELEC JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP DISPUTES.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in
Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its
acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved
the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the
amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all
national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination
for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the
party. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC; TAMPERED VOTES.
We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject returns to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly
convincing evidence, the validity of election returns must be upheld. A conclusion that an election return is obviously
manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution
and only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable
man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which
results in disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly, there is a patent
lack of basis for the COMELECs findings that the subject returns were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring
extreme caution before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the
subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting in the
disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The proper procedure in case of discrepancy in
the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this
legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rose Marie
D. Doromal vs. Hernan G. Biron and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010.
DISQUALIFICATION; VOTER INCLUSION/EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS.
Voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be
included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show
possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of a
material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or
those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false
representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.
In Velasco, the Court rejected Velascos contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to vote when it
cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized the RTCs final and executory decision
on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaquis turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC properly cancelled Velascos
COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court rejects the same.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine
the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the
misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of ones
qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does
not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on Elections and Nardo M. Velasco, G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; CONTESTED RETURNS.
It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that preproclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers
(BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic
and duly accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166 lays
down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory,
so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate may contest the inclusion
of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall
also submit his objections in writing simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections
and opposition, if any, and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by such ruling must
immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall suspend the canvass. Any
party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days.
Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to have been tampered
with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns and, if the other copies
are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and
satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a recount
of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the
proclamation of the winner accordingly.
Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to the contested ERs.
Themistocles A. Sao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010.
Local Government
SUCCESSION; SANNGGUNIAN.
Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law
provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as
that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate
of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Atty. Lucky M. Damasen vs. Oscar G. Tumamao,
G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010.
Public officers
APPOINTMENT; SUBMISSION TO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
The deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submit respondents appointment paper
to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, [t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment. Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in
following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act
done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the CSC. While it may
be argued that the submission of respondents appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the conditions for the
approval of respondents appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith, the officials responsible for the submission
of respondents appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition should be
deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain instances despite noncompliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B. Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707,
February 17, 2010.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF SUBORDINATES

Can a military commander be held liable for the criminal acts of his subordinates?
The Supreme Court touched on that issue in Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No.
183871, February 18, 2010. However, that case did not provide a venue for the Supreme Court to provide a definitive
ruling on the matter.
The case involved a petition for a writ of amparo filed against the President, the Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), among others. The petition was originally filed with
the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals eventually dropped the
President as a respondent (based on presidential immunity from suit during her term).
The Court of Appeals also ordered the dismissal of the case against the AFP Chief and the PNP Chief. According to the
Court of Appeals, AFP Chief Gen. Esperon and PNP Chief P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included as respondents on the theory
that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against
petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or
the police force. The Court of Appeals hinted that the two generals would have been accountable for the abduction and
threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
The Supreme Court discussed the current status of Philippine law regarding command responsibility for criminal acts of
subordinates:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war
and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control
over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally
bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend
concurrence in its ratification.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable
to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.
While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that command responsibility for criminal acts is part of international law
and is deemed incorporated into Philippine law pursuant to the incorporation clause of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court held that command responsibility as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if
at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. According to the Supreme Court:
Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as
the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court
does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo, the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective
procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings. . . .
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix
criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
MARCH 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there
must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there is no actual case calling
for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims which is susceptible
of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question
is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.
Contrary to respondents assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioners members have shut down their operations as a
result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers
Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to settle such question once
and for all. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that
the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted
to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the
position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of
the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the
insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent
President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent
President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that the
incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to
the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not
so prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,
considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The
outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle
with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No.
191342, March 17, 2010.
It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used
in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this
Courts judicial review power, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their
constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this
obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators
Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE.
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to
vest them with the requisite locus standi.The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole,
and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of ones
personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint
not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which
already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner
when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any
obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from
discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No.
10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue: Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate
developers and builders in the Philippines. Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not
allege any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions].
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that it has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.
v. Defensor, we held that the association had legal standing because its members stood to be injured by the enforcement
of the assailed provisions.
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an
actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect
not only petitioners but practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the
issues raised and their overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No.
160756, March 9, 2010.
DUE PROCESS; MINIMUM CORPORATE INCOME TAX.
Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive, arbitrary
and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. It explains that gross income as
defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other direct expenses; other major expenditures,
such as administrative and interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income, were not taken into
account. Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporations gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital
because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain.
Petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary and confiscatory. The
Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. Taxation is necessarily burdensome
because, by its nature, it adversely affects property rights. The party alleging the laws unconstitutionality has the burden
to demonstrate the supposed violations in understandable terms. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
EQUAL PROTECTION; CREDITABLE WITHHOLDING TAX.
Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT is being levied
only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed
a CWT on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate enterprise.
Like a manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and it incurs costs
and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that goods produced by the real estate business are house
and lot units.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1)
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate
industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently from other business enterprises. Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
EQUAL PROTECTION; NPC REGULATION.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. The guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause,
therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification
intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the
objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors
especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction. National Power Corporation vs.
Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH; PRIOR RESTRAINT.
Petitioners threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his
exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for
certiorari and expounded in his memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some of the citations
of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed in some
detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy
discussion of the same issues and arguments.
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under the factual milieu of the
case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by
petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004.
Eliseo F. Soriano Vs.
Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, et al., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, March 15, 2010.
HRET; PROCEDURE.
It is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the electorate, ensuring the determination of the latters will
within a reasonable time. In sum, there is absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that the HRET gravely
abused its discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and formally offer the
same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Josephine Veronique R. LacsonNoel and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS; CONTIGUOUS REQUIREMENT.
Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by
RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town
of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3),
Article VI that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. It
is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic layout of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To
adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although
unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and
population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.

The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057,
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
SPEEDY TRIAL.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasijudicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who
are tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the
case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in
resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his
defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early
disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause
as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of
the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of
disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The
adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure
but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders
the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. Capt. Wilferdo G. Roquero vs.
The Chancellor of UP Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010.
UNFAIR COMPETITION; BIDDING.
The provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It should be
emphasized that the bidding process was not a free-for-all where any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could
take part. Section 5(e) of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a method of procurement which is open to participation
by any interested party and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-bid conference, eligibility
screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of contract x
x x. The law categorically mandates that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier stated,
bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or
qualifications. Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to predisqualify any applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a
bidding process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle that only
responsible and qualified bidders can bid and be awarded government contracts. Our free enterprise system is not
based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the
let-the-devil-devour-the-hindmost rule.
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not
render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. While the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper the governments effort of
curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA
7832 and certainly, it was well within the authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it. National
Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS.
Petitioners allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for
the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of
procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The intention is to
resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.
Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The records show that petitioner filed
the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his
evidence.
With
the
opportunities
he
had,
he
cannot
claim
he
was
denied
due
process.
Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the failure of
respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative
remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention
in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack
of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a case with the RTC without
appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. As such, his petition filed with the RTC must necessarily
fail. National Electrification Administration vs. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
REGULATIONS; PUBLICATION.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to
enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to
regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also
provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and
release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and
award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved
in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally. National
Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Agrarian law
CARL; COVERAGE.
Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of
the poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents landholdings were situated.
The significance of this fact cannot be overstated, for, thereby, the respondents landholdings were presumed to be
industrial and residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the presumption. In Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Court said: The presumption assumed by the appellate court that a parcel of land which is located in a
poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the
poblacion should be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a clearly preponderant
evidence to show that it is agricultural.
To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v. DAR, thus: We now determine whether such lands are covered by
the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only
those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents landholdings have been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario andNatalia, holding that the respondents landholdings were non-agricultural, and,
consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the
municipality. Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs. Pablo Berenguer, et al.,
G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010.
CARP; COVERAGE.
Petitioner insists on exemption of the Alangilan landholding from CARP coverage. It argues that the subject landholding
had already been converted into non-agricultural use long before the advent of the CARP. The passage of the 1982
Ordinance, classifying the property as reserved for residential, it asserts, effectively transformed the land into nonagricultural use, and thus, outside the ambit of the CARL. It cites Natalia, wherein it was ruled that lands intended for
residential use are outside the coverage of the CARL.
Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously
converted into non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately, petitioner failed
to convince us that the Alangilan landholding ceased to be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was
reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioners assertion, the term reserved for residential does not
change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary,
the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already
been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was
bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding
as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims,
then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. Alangilan Realty & Development
Corporation vs. Office of the President, represented by Alberto Romulo, as Executive Secretary and Arthur P. Autea, as
Deputy Secretary and Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010.
Election law
COMELEC; FINDINGS.
The appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a
specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative
bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. This principle is applied
with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
poll bodycreated and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher than statutory
administrative organs. Jesus O. Typoco vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359. March 5, 2010.
COMELEC; MAJORITY VOTE.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing
should have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section
6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter.
Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows: Sec. 6. Procedure if
Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot
be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and
Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010.
COMELEC; FIREARMS BAN.

The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714. The Court finds that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in this case. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779,
March 26, 2010.
HRET; VOTE COUNT.
What petitioner questions is the Tribunals reliance on election returns and/or tally sheets and other election documents to
arrive at the number of votes for each of the parties. However, jurisprudence has established that such action of
the HRET was well within its discretion and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the
best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and
their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be
produced, then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as
evidence. Bai Sandra S.A. Sema vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Didagen P. Dilangalen, G.R. No.
190734, March 26, 2010.
Local Government
CITY; POPULATION REQUIREMENT.
Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos Citys compliance
with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
Public officers
APPOINTMENT.
Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: (1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the CES under which the position of PEZA Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning is classified, the acquisition of
security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the CES Board.
Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure, she/he must
pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board,
and be appointed to a CES rank by the President.
Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination of her appointment, respondent did not go through the four
stages of CES eligibility examinations.
The appellate courts ruling that respondent became CES eligible upon earning the MNSA degree, purportedly in
accordance with Executive Order No. 696, as amended by Executive Order No. 771, does not lie.
By respondents attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred automatic CES eligibility. It was, as above-quoted
portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as equivalent to passing the Management Aptitude Test
Battery. For respondent to acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could proceed to the second stage of the eligibility
examination process . . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in accordance with existing policies and
regulations; and that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other stages of the CES eligibility
examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could qualify for appointment to CES ranks, PROVIDED that she meets
and complies with other requirements of the CES Board and the Office of the President to qualify for rank appointment.
Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had not undergone the second, third and
fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations prior to her appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director
General up to the time her appointment was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by
the CES Board. Not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by the PEZA Board on June
1, 2000 of her appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible by Ortaliz, were not illegal. PEZA
Board of Directors and Lilia D. De Lima vs. Gloria J. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010.
LEAVE.
Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application for leave should be acted upon within 5
working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is deemed approved. The CSC interpreted said provision in this
wise It is explicit from the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not been acted upon
either by approving or disapproving by the head of agency or his/her authorized representative within five (5) working
days from the date of its filing shall be deemed approved.
The CSC also ruled that Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the agency or his duly authorized
representative on the application for leave filed which is either to approve or to deny the same.
Being the central agency mandated to “prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any
phrase contained in them, with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. The Court has
consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless
there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter
and spirit of the law.
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatcos memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49. For one, it did not bear the
imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny
the application, as dictated by Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. For another, it only submitted to the Commission
Secretary Atty. Nghuatcos comments and/or recommendations on Palers application. It was merely preliminary and did
not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Palers application, and simply recommended what
action to take. It was obviously not controlling and the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended
action. In fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Palers request was still to be referred to the Legal Service for
comment, and that the application (could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and submission of
the medical certificate. These circumstances plainly meant that further action was yet to be made on the application. And
since there was no final approval or disapproval of Palers application within 5 working days from receipt as required by
Section 49, the application was deemed approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on AWOL. Commission on
Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010.
Misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Respondents acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident
occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances
were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was
impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and
respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they
were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons),
respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioners married state, and good character and
reputation. Teresita G. Narvasa vs. Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010.
CAN THE PRESIDENT LEGALLY APPOINT THE NEXT CHIEF JUSTICE?

After months of heated debate all over the country, the Supreme Court has finally spoken President Arroyo is not
prohibited by the Constitution to appoint the next Chief Justice of the Philippines (see Arturo M. De Castro Vs. Judicial and
Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No.
191342, March 17, 2010).
According to the Supreme Court, President Arroyo can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on
May 17, 2010 since the constitutional prohibition against presidential appointments during the two month period before a
presidential election does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

Many of our readers will likely be surprised with the ruling. In the poll we conducted among Lexoterica readers during the
past several weeks, 78% believe that the President cannot legally appoint the next Chief Justice. Only 19% believe that
the President can legally do so. For the rest, they dont know.
Have your views changed given the Supreme Courts ruling? Let us know by voting at our new poll. To help you decide,
here is a link to the majority opinion penned by Justice Bersamin, the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales, the
separate opinion of Justice Brion and the separate opinion of Justice Nachura.
APRIL 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
COA; POWERS.
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that
its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude
to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule
that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds
relied upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In
consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make
its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of
the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
158562, April 23, 2010.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; LGBT GROUP.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and
its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and
as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the
extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views
as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT; POPULATION REQUIREMENT.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws a plain
and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population,
a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793,
April 7, 2010.
PARTY LIST; ACCREDITATION.
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April
8, 2010.
PARTY LIST; MORAL DISAPPROVAL AS GROUND FOR ACCREDITATION.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list
system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis
as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
PARTY LIST; SECTORS QUALIFIED.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in
the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE.
The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.

Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010.
PRESIDENT; POWER TO REORGANIZE.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has
been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a)
to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of the
President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: Sec. 20. Residual Powers.
Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such
powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the
Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
PUBLIC FUNDS; DISBURSEMENT.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing
public funds. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees
and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term public purpose, in
relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any
purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity
as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of
government. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that
public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already
categorically stated that the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit
modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that
which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services,
but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with
public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept petitioners theory that the compensation and
benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries
and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous
conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the
property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R.
Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we
have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not
denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due
process grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529.
April 29, 2010
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS.
The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was
simplified into four basic rights, as follows:
1.
The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal
right;
2.
The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
3.
The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction; and
4.
The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due process. The
Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming
votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this
opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could not
also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and
witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R.
No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
REORGANIZATION; GOOD FAITH.
The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the
condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected
government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such
thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al.
vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Election Law
BALLOTS; REVISION.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of those 44 ballots should be included in the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting of the ballots.
In that regard, the ballots themselves are the best evidence. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy
of the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the
manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.
No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the
evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a full blown trial on the merits was first conducted. Tolentino should
accept the legal impossibility for the Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes
except after the revision process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De
Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No.
187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
PARTY LIST; DELISTING.
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if
it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the
plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional
deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds
is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and
the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different
and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as
follows: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in
light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified
in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in
the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of
Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed
or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding
elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should
be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
VOTER; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in
the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons
acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once
established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be
among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second
District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004
elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied
that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established
domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a nonexistent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a
voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC,
if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due
course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or
that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc.
et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
INTERNATIONAL LAW; BINDING EFFECT.
Although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Public Officers
CONDONATION DOCTRINE; APPLICABILITY TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who
were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed
during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that
prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of
office. The Court explained that [t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that
the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will
of the people. (underscoring supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the
therein petitioner having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial
Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public
official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even
if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct
occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or
period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public officials
culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope
of the doctrine of condonation.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not
violate the right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection
challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between
elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of condonation.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that
of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people
expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of
the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish
an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate.
The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable
appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents
posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability
that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010.
PUBLIC OFFICE; PUBLIC TRUST.
Unlike private offices which are held largely on the dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers
are tasked to serve the public interest, thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form of numerous prohibitions.
The liberal evidentiary standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative proceedings from technical
niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an
efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who exploit government processes to raise easy money. Respondents
hold on his item at the Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common situs for corrupt
activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict deprives respondent of his liberty,
adequate evidence justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc.
vs. Reynaldo M. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON POLITICAL LAW*

APRIL 2010-MARCH 2011
APRIL 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
COA; powers.
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that
its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude
to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule
that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds
relied upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In
consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make
its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of
the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
158562, April 23, 2010.
________________
* Sourced from http://lexoterica.wordpress.com by Vicente D. Gerochi IV
Freedom of expression; LGBT group.

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and
its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and
as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the
extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views
as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Legislative district; population requirement.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The provision draws a plain
and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population,
a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793,
April 7, 2010.
Party list; accreditation.
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April
8, 2010.
Party list; moral disapproval as ground for accreditation.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list
system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis
as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
Party list; sectors qualified.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in
the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
President; executive prerogative.
The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
President; power of appointment.
Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010.
President; power to reorganize.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and
redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has
been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a)
to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of the
President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: Sec. 20. Residual Powers.
Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such
powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the
Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Public funds; disbursement.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing
public funds. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees
and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term public purpose, in
relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any
purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity
as will serve as benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of
government. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that
public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already
categorically stated that the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit
modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that
which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services,
but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with
public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept petitioners theory that the compensation and
benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries
and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous
conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the
property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R.
Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process.
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we
have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not
denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due
process grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529.
April 29, 2010
Procedural due process; requirements.
The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was
simplified into four basic rights, as follows:
1.
The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal
right;
2.
The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
3.
The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of
competent jurisdiction; and
4.
The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due process. The
Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming
votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this
opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings. He could not
also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and
witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R.
No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
Reorganization; good faith.
The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the
condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected
government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such
thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al.
vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Election Law
Ballots; revision.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of those 44 ballots should be included in the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of the counting of the ballots.
In that regard, the ballots themselves are the best evidence. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy
of the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the
manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.
No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the
evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a full blown trial on the merits was first conducted. Tolentino should
accept the legal impossibility for the Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes
except after the revision process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De
Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No.
187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
Party list; delisting.
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if
it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the
plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional
deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds
is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and
the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different
and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as
follows: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in
light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified
in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in
the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of
Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed
or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding
elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should
be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
Voter; residency requirement.

The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in
the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons
acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once
established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be
among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second
District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004
elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied
that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established
domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a nonexistent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a
voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC,
if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due
course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or
that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc.
et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
International law; binding effect.
Although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Public Officers
Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive officials.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who
were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed
during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that
prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately preceding term of
office. The Court explained that [t]he underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that
the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will
of the people. (underscoring supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot, the
therein petitioner having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial
Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public
official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including two cases involving a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even
if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct
occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or
period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public officials
culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to broaden the scope
of the doctrine of condonation.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not
violate the right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection
challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions between
elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the doctrine of condonation.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that
of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people
expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of
the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish
an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate.
The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable
appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents
posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability
that would spawn and breed abuse in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010.
Public office; public trust.
Unlike private offices which are held largely on the dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers
are tasked to serve the public interest, thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form of numerous prohibitions.
The liberal evidentiary standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative proceedings from technical
niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an
efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who exploit government processes to raise easy money. Respondents
hold on his item at the Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common situs for corrupt
activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict deprives respondent of his liberty,
adequate evidence justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc.
vs. Reynaldo M. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.
May 2010 CASES

Agrarian reform; coverage.
Lands acquired by the National Housing Authority for resettlement purposes or housing development are exempt from the
coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such acquisition converts the land by operation of law from agricultural to residential.
The National Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any tenant in possession of the purchased
land. National Housing Authority vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 175200, May 4,
2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation.
In computing just compensation for rice lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest under DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, as amended, must be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of
actual payment of the compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines approves payment of
the compensation and deposits the amount in the name of the landowner, considering that release of such deposit is still
subject to compliance with documentary requirements. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its
taking. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and Mamerto Soriano, G.R. No. 180772 & G.R. No. 180776, May 6,
2010.
Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition.
Comelec may not, through a resolution setting the deadline for registration of political parties, differentiate between
political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial
distinction among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in
terms of deadlines. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline
for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be
understood as covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as a political coalition filed beyond that
deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to register separately in accordance with
established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to
registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish
to establish with other registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of
their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members democratic freedom of choice, but
they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 191771, May 6, 2010.
Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunals exercise of
its discretion and jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal ordered to continue the revision and appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for
resolution and when it issued its decisions without the participation of any of the Justices of the Court who were members
of that tribunal. Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No. 191550, May 4,
2010.
Province; requirements for creation.
Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the
creation of a province. Any derogation of or deviation from those criteria violates the Constitution. Thus, a law creating a
province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement of the Local Government Code, is
unconstitutional. The Court can pass upon the validity of such law even if the province it created has begun its
existence. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010.
Right to information; duty to disclose.
Comelec has the duty and can be compelled to explain fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections under Section 7
of Article III of the Constitution on the peoples right to information and Section 28 of Article II on the States
corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Any citizen can file a petition for
mandamus if the same is anchored on the peoples right to information. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010.
JUNE 2010 CASES

Administrative cases; quantum of evidence.
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such
kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly
accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondents administrative
liability would be anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the two separate
audits conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of shortage in respondents cash and
accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence against respondent
could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the
reliability of the initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or
inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in
administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) vs. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010.
Agrarian cases; just compensation.
The taking of property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is a government exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Since the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function, a
court proceeding to fix just compensation cannot be made to depend on the existence of, and is considered separate and
independent from, an administrative case of a similar nature. Thus, the filing by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) of
a new petition for judicial determination of just compensation after the dismissal without prejudice of another LBP-initiated
court proceeding on the same issue cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter proceeding beyond the 15-day
period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Although the formula for fixing just compensation found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in
certain cases, it is by no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc., represented by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation,
G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010.
Due process; local autonomy; police power.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended, which sets out rules on land use
conversion, does not violate the due process clause, because in providing administrative and criminal penalties, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and the
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, both of which provide penalties for illegal land conversion. Contrary to
petitioners assertions, the penalties provided under DAR AO No. 01-02 are imposed upon the illegal or premature
conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction.
In providing that reclassification of agricultural lands by local government units (LGUs) shall be subject to the
requirements of, and procedures for, land use conversion, including DAR approval or clearance, DAR AO No. 01-02 did not
violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute, and the Local
Government Code recognizes the authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands. DAR Memorandum No. 88,
which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications, is a valid exercise of
police power, as it was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime
agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such
measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may
be carried into. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
183409, June 18, 2010.
Jurisdiction over election cases; administrative regulation; substitution of party-list nominees.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a controversy in which the petitioner is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of a party-list group on the basis that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued a resolution approving that groups withdrawal of his nomination and substitution by
another nominee. Such controversy is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, both of which are within
the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Petitioner correctly brought before the Supreme Court
this special civil action for certiorari under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
proclamation of, and assumption of office by, the substitute nominee.
The COMELEC exceeded its authority when it issued an implementing regulation allowing a party-list nominee to be
substituted when his nomination is withdrawn by his party, because the statutory provision (Section 8 of the Party-List
System Act) that such regulation seeks to implement provides an exclusive list of instances in which a party-list
organization can substitute its nominees, and the above ground for substitution is not one of those instances. It is basic
that implementing rules and regulations should remain consistent with, and cannot override or modify, the law they intend
to carry out. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010.
Party list; Qualifications of party-list nominees.
The provision in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7941 (The Party-List System Act) that a nominee of the youth sector must
be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election applies to all youth sector nominees of any
party-list group. Public respondent erroneously interpreted that provision as applying only to those nominated during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
Section 15 of RA 7941 provides that a nominee of a sectoral party who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
party is not eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation unless such change occurred at least six months
before the elections. There is no textual support in the law for public respondents argument that Section 15 does not
apply to private respondents shift of affiliation from his partys youth sector to its sector representing overseas Filipino
workers and their families on the basis that there was no resultant change in party affiliation. Section 15 clearly covers
changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation within the same party. Milagros E. Amores vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva. G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing permits.
By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building officials, which has
authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether
on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures built
without said permit to remove such structures within 60 days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the
expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a fencing permit is issued
complementary to a building permit and that, within its premises, PEZA may properly issue a building permit, it is only
fitting that fencing permits be issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude
Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; power to grant casino licenses in economic zones.
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) draws its authority and power to operate, license and
regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential Decree No. 1869, and not from Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80, dated
April 3, 1993 (which extended to the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable incentives granted to the Subic
Bay Special Economic Zone), in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227, which created the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority and empowered it to license tourism related activities except casinos which shall continue to be licensed by
PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its power to license and regulate casinos when the Supreme Court nullified Section 5
of EO 80. It incorrectly argued that such nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of agreement with
respondent for the operation of a casino inside the CSEZ. It cannot therefore, on the basis of that position, revoke such
memorandum of agreement and replace it with its new Standard Authority to Operate. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation vs. Fontana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010.
Presidential Commission on Good Government; power to grant immunity.
The scope of immunity that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) may offer to witnesses under
Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending
on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree
to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. In petitioners case, respondent Republic of the
Philippines, acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity but also immunity against being
compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the
Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Governments honesty and fidelity, petitioner
agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should
hold the Republic on to its promise. The immunity from criminal or civil prosecution that Section 5 of EO 14 authorizes
covers immunity from giving evidence in a case before a court of law, because in reality the guarantee given to a witness
against being compelled to testify constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. Jesus P. Disini vs.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010.
Standing to sue.
Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not automatically clothe him with standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court
will grant access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of transcendental importance calling
for urgent resolution. Three factors are relevant in the Courts determination to allow third party suits so it can resolve the
merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy; a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition; and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the
suit. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Preparing a petition raising carefully
crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction falls within
the proscribed conduct. Allan F. Paguia vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010.
Warrantless search; arrest without warrant.
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search
or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause. In the instances the Supreme Court has recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial
warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause.
The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search can be lawfully conducted. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. The searching officer had to make a quick
decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under
the circumstances. He only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. Given the
above, and the fact that the officer had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs, the
search in this case was valid. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest
based on that search was also valid. People of the Philippines vs. Belen Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.
JULY 2010 CASES
Agrarian reform; coverage.

Lands that are not directly, actually and exclusively used for pasture nor devoted to commercial livestock raising are not
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the
President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010.
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there is any
false representation of a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidates qualifications for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The false representation must be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for
public office. Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The foregoing are
the legal standards by which the COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC must
determine whether or not the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his or her
residency that would otherwise render him or her ineligible for the position sought. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in this case when, in considering the residency issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to the stature of the
candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Citizenship; election and constructive registration.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Here, petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon
reaching the age of majority. However, registration of the documents of election with the civil registry was done belatedly.
Under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their exercise of suffrage, being elected to public office,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do
not on their own take the place of election of citizenship. But where, as here, the election of citizenship has in fact been
done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, registration of the documents of election beyond
the timeframe should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done publicly, consistently and
continuously. These acts constitute constructive registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship
for over half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal registration
of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the
fact that citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners
to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not defeat that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any. The documents petitioners submitted supporting their allegations that they have registered with the civil
registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case the Bureau
of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of
Immigration and the Department of Justice must be complied with within a reasonable time. Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al.
vs. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; elements.
Following are the elements of double jeopardy: (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present
in this case. The information filed in each of the criminal cases against respondent was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. The regional trial court had jurisdiction over these cases. The respondent was arraigned and entered
a plea of not guilty. The court dismissed both cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had as that would place respondent in double jeopardy.
People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; exceptions.
The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions. Double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion, or when the prosecution was denied due process. Here, the prosecution was given more than
ample opportunity to present its case. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the trial court simply because it
chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. While it would have been
ideal for the trial court to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules is it mandated
to do so. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the trial court, the
same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Errors or
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of double jeopardy. People of the
Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010.
Due process; administrative proceedings.
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants
may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of
due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for violating due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Even if no formal hearing
took place, it is not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not afforded it. In this case, petitioner
was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the properties were excluded from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by submitting various
pleadings and documentary evidence. It filed motions for reconsideration of every unfavorable outcome in all tiers of the
administrative and judicial processes. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is
provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction
before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the
action. In this case, however, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the
Commission on Higher Education is mandatory or even possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent,
which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where
the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners liability, if
any, for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. University of
Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.
Freedom of speech.
Government workers, whatever their rank, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against
what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or
waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away. Thus, Section 5 of
Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the political rights of those in the government service,
provides that the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage
or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Such limitation or qualification in the above
rule is intended to temper and focus the application of the prohibition, as not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. Respondents act of wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing for just over an
hour at the office of the GSIS Investigation Unit, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, and some
even badmouthing the GSIS guards and GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, are not constitutive of an
(i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession. These actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. Government Service
Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al. G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010.
Government agencies; reorganization.
Reorganization in a government agency is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good
faith is whether or not the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient.
Removal from office as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the
movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause
is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to reorganization, the observance of the rules
on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There was no demotion in this case because petitioner was appointed to
a position comparable to her former position. In fact, her new position entailed an increase in her salary grade from 20 to
24. There is, thus, no evidence to suggest that the Development Bank of the Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D.
Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Government contracts; perfection.
Contracts to which the government is a party are generally subject to the same laws and regulations that govern the
validity and sufficiency of contracts between private individuals. A government contract, however, is perfected only upon
approval of competent authority, where such approval is required. With respect to contracts of government-owned and
controlled corporations, the provisions of existing laws are clear in requiring the governing boards approval thereof. For
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), its charter (Presidential Decree 857) vests the general manager with power to sign
contracts and to perform such other duties as the Board of Directors may assign. Therefore, unless the Board validly
authorizes the general manager, the latter cannot bind PPA to a contract. The authority of government officials to
represent the government in any contract must proceed from an express provision of law or valid delegation of authority.
Without such actual authority being possessed by PPAs general manager, there could be no real consent, much less a
perfected contract, to speak of. A notice of award signed by the general manager does not embody a perfected contract
without the PPA Boards prior approval of the contract. Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation, et al. vs.
Philippine Ports Authority. G.R. No. 170530, July 5, 2010.
Local governments; authority of local chief executive.
Under Section 444(b)(1)(iv) of the Local Government Code, a municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization
of the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In this case,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing the Mayor to hire a lawyer of her
choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Courts Decision in another case. Such authority necessarily
carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. That the
authorization did not set the terms and conditions of the compensation of the lawyer signifies that the council empowered
the Mayor to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her choice subject to the general limitation that
the contractual stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and,
considering that this is a contract of legal services, to the added restriction that the agreed attorneys fees must not be
unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face, and there is no allegation to the contrary, the prior authorization given
under Resolution No. 15-92 appears to have been given by the council in good faith in order to expeditiously safeguard the
rights of Tiwi. Thus, there is nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization, and the Mayor was sufficiently
authorized to enter into said Contract of Legal Services. Such contract need not be ratified first by the Sangguniang Bayan
to be enforceable against Tiwi. The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the
local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. That authority was granted by the
Sangguniang Bayan to the Mayor under Resolution No. 15-92. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame C.
Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010.
Municipal ordinance; deed of restrictions.
While a zoning ordinance can override the deed of restrictions on the use of a property on the basis of the municipalitys
exercise of police power, the Court will reconcile seemingly opposing provisions in the deed of restrictions and the zoning
ordinance rather than nullify one or the other, particularly where, as here, the continued enforcement of the deed of
restrictions is reasonable and the municipality was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose contrary to the interest of
the subdivision developer that is seeking to enforce the deed of restrictions. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala
Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty.
Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality
of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Ombudsman; jurisdiction.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249 (Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan) limits the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who, as
punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official. Clearly, therefore, the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case. In administrative cases involving the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this
case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. When complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was
already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a
subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code,
the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper
court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the Ombudsmans powers are not merely recommendatory. The
Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than officials who may be removed
only by impeachment. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Rolson Rodriquez. G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.
Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher Education.
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions. Petitioners have not shown that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has power to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722
(the Higher Education Act of 1994), which enumerates the powers and functions of CHED) does not contain any express
grant to CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an action for
damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.
Public lands; registration.
All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. A notation on the advanced survey
plan stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal
classification of the disputed lot. It is not the kind of evidence required by law to establish that the land is alienable and
disposable. The approved survey plan merely identifies the property preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication
of title. Republic of the Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010.
Public officers; demotion.
There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting in diminution of duties, responsibilities, status or
rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same
duties and responsibilities but with rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no
demotion and the appointment is valid. In this case, the appointment of petitioner to Bank Executive Officer II did not
constitute a demotion. Her duties and responsibilities as Account Officer (her previous position) and as BEO II are
practically the same. Rather than lowering her rank and salary, petitioners appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted in
an increase thereof from salary grade 20 to 24. Further, her appointment to BEO II was done in good faith and pursuant
to a valid reorganization. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R.
No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Review of COMELEC Decision.
In light of the Supreme Courts limited authority to review findings of fact, it does not ordinarily review in a certiorari case
the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial
evidence, are final and non-reviewable. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court
is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting
errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Right to information.
Like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The peoples right to information is limited to
matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the States
policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law. National board examinations, such as the certified public accountant board examinations, are matters
of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair
and competent administration of these examinations in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of
assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. On the
other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the examination papers in order to properly administer the tests.
More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation,
generation, encoding, administration, and checking of the multiple choice examinations that require that the questions and
answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the Professional Regulation Commission is not a party to the
proceedings. It has not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind the regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the examination documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of the cases,
which may impact on every board examination administered by the Professional Regulation Commission, and in order that
all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.
Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Abelardo R. Domondon, et al./Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe. G.R. No.
165036/G.R. No. 175705, July 5, 2010.
Sanggunian resolution; validity.
A municipal resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance does not have to comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing, which are required for the validity and effectiveness of zoning ordinances. The
Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his
parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village
Association, et al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Standing to sue.
Legal standing refers to a partys personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained
or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized
grievance. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional
rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental action, he has no legal standing to challenge the same. In this
case, petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR)
of the Energy Regulatory Commission, which obligates residential end-users to advance the cost of extending power
distribution lines and installing additional facilities. However, petitioners members consist of developers, brokers,
appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers, architects, and other persons or entities engaged in the
housing and real estate business. It does not question the challenged DSOAR provision as a residential end-user, and it
cannot do so because the challenged provision refers only to the rights and obligations of distribution utilities and
residential end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its
members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising from Section 2.6 of the DSOAR; neither can they cite any
benefit accruing to them as residential end-users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. Chamber
of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
Waiver of locus standi rule.
The Court can waive the procedural rule on standing in cases that raise issues of transcendental importance. Following are
the guidelines in determining whether or not a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. In this case, the three determinants are absent. Public funds are
not involved. The allegations of constitutional and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are
unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the rules. Parties with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised the residential end-users undoubtedly exist and are not included as parties to the
petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No.
174697, July 8, 2010.
AUGUST 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction.

The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law.
Thus, GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and
regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of
employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. Winston F. Garcia
vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18,
2010.
Double compensation.
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall
not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to the present
case as there was no double compensation to the petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid
corporate acts of petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly representation and transportation
allowance (RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of Philippine International Convention Center Inc. (PICCI), a
government corporation whose sole stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is distinct from salary as a
form of compensation. Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray
expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of
their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been
receiving from the BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their
capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in addition to their per diem, does not violate the constitutional
proscription against double compensation. Gabriel C. Singson, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9,
2010.
Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by landowner.
Where the landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives
his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time of the owner
to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver
of his right to gain back possession. The landowners remedy in such case is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that
it has held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the respondents
intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the
property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger lot subdivided, the respondents
earmarked a specific portion for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the
respondents had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to
the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties never formalized and documented such transfer. Consequently, petitioner
should be deemed entitled to possession pending the respondents formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, G.R. No. 185091, August 8, 2010.
Equal protection clause.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress and municipalities that
did not have similar pending bills for purposes of the income requirement for converting a municipality into a city under
Republic Act No. 9009. The pendency of such a bill does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. Thus, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill
in Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress limits the exemption (from the income
requirement) to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen
again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Also, the
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 respondent municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary
date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress as against all other municipalities that may
want to convert into cities after the effectiveness of RA 9009. Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the Constitutional requirement that the classification must apply to all those who are similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while those 16
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption found in the Cityhood Laws would be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case.
Private respondent was not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of
the phrase any reelection in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a persons second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case that
will benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. When a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
Court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or
controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or
practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections. G.R. No.
191988. August 31, 2010.
Operative fact doctrine.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. However, in this case, the
minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the
functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous
precedent. Under the minoritys view, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for
their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to
serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The
operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and
fair play. The doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Applying the doctrine to this case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity,
such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the concerned local government units or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, August 24, 2010.
Search warrant; requirements for validity.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3)
in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. On the first requisite, a magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. On the last
requirement, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. People of the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y Baludda.
G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010.
Warrantless arrest.
Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an
arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu
recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were properly admitted in evidence against him.
People of the Philippines vs. Michael Sembrano y Castro. G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
respect. In this case, there is no ground to disturb the DARABs findings, which affirmed those of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties. Heirs of Jose M.
Cervantes, et al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9, 2010.
Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process.

Section 45 of the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of GSIS the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. However, this power is
not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with civil service rules. While the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal charge issued against
a government employee without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is required that, upon receipt of
a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a counter-affidavit or comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite
obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give
the respondent the opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must be done prior to the issuance of the formal
charge, and the comment required is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to
petitioners claim, no exception is provided for in the Civil Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by
petitioner.
The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in this case. To comply with such
requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents comments, petitioner
should have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case
against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject
of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It
appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining
authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents. To condone this would give the disciplining authority an
unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Thus,
respondents here were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and
evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut taken by
petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the opportunity to comment violated their right to due process.
Accordingly, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime. Winston F. Garcia
vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18,
2010.
Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their
jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. Although
administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not
exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No.
174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence.
In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of the
uniform findings of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner connived with his co-defendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on
the subject property so they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No.
179333, August 3, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities.
Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as
to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the
vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the
SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the
government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in
compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all
government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is
made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty.
Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Local Government
Abuse of authority.
Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay official, that there was no abuse of authority because the incident
complained of occurred in another barangay over which he has no authority and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for abuse of authority on the basis that he participated in the
unlawful act as a higher authority that gave a semblance of legality over that act and influenced the actions of his codefendants. Here, petitioner was president of the organization of barangay officials in his municipality and sat as ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, which has power to review barangay ordinances and authority to discipline barangay
officials. His co-defendants were officials in the barangay where the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo,
G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Creation of local government unit.
The Constitution states that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law. The clear intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed
in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement
from Php20 million to Php100 million for the creation of a city. This law took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that
moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the Php100
million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws
converting these municipalities into cities, all enacted after the RA 9009 became effective, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To
be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. League of Cities of the
Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation.

The amount of provisional compensation that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the name of
the landowner if the latter rejects the offer of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section 16
of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the LBPs initial valuation of the land and not, as respondent argues, the sum awarded
by DARs adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The deposit of such provisional
compensation must be made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least simultaneously
with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit results from the landowners rejection of
the DAR offer (based on the LBPs initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit
of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the landowners rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of
Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is the principal basis for computing just compensation, and the factors set forth
therein have been translated into a formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR AO 5). While
the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial Court acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, a judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically
identified by law and its implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down
in DAR AO 5, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Courts
cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for determining just compensation. In this case, the court adopted a different formula in determining the land value
by considering the average between the findings of DAR using the formula laid down in Executive Order No. 228 and the
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration. This is obviously a departure from the mandate of the law
and DAR AO 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido, et al., G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010.
Agrarian reform; sale of land.
Petitioners title shows on its face that the government granted title to them on January 9, 1990, by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27. This law explicitly prohibits any form of transfer of the land granted under it except to the government or
by hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer beneficiary. Upon the enactment of Executive Order No. 228 in
1987, however, the restriction ceased to be absolute. Land reform beneficiaries were allowed to transfer ownership of
their lands provided that their amortizations with the Land Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this case,
petitioners title categorically states that they have fully complied with the requirements for the final grant of title under PD
27. This means that they have completed payment of their amortizations with Land Bank. Consequently, they could
already legally transfer their title to another. Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs. Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11,
2010.
Agricultural land; conversion.
Conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980 Kasunduan is not the conversion of landholding that is contemplated
by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, which governs the dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the termination of
his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding. Conversion here has been defined as the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. More to the point is
that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36 implies the necessity of prior court proceedings in
which the issue of conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing dispossession upon that ground. In
this case, however, respondent does not profess that there had been at any tine such proceedings or that there was such
court order. Neither does he assert that the lot in question had undergone conversion with authority from the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Emilia Micking Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010.
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers.
The Court rejected respondents contention that he was deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential AntiGraft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any
documents supporting the complainants assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the
power to give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the
complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a
belief that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it
empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision,
an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it
appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F.
Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Water districts; government-owned and controlled corporations.

A local water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with special charter since it is created pursuant to
a special law, Presidential Decree No. 198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water
districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water
districts derive their legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that water
districts shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to
the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act. Therefore, water districts would not have
corporate powers without PD 198. Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C. Gison. G.R. No. 165641, August 25,
2010.
SEPTEMBER 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; Presidential Proclamation 310; inalienable lands.

The Court declared as unconstitutional Presidential Proclamation 310, which took 670 hectares from petitioners registered
lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities, on the basis that such lands are inalienable, being
part of the functions of an educational institution. It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case,
attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. The
lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for petitioners use in
scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. Central
Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000.
The Court dismissed petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200,
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and
state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering
our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. The 1987 Constitution
takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods,
and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as
in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services. More important, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion
to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it
depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail
trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power of the
State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without
due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180) that restricts the retail
business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to
substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State
had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That
law is not arbitrary. Here, to the extent that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to property or to
engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to property
and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in
question has permitted the entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into
the wisdom of RA 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing
that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of RA 8762
would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business.
Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue.
The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus
standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing
refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage
of that law. The party must show that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of. In this
case, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 prejudices petitioners
or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when, as
here, the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No.
143855, September 21, 2010.
Court decisions; statement of fact and law.

The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their
decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the
tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. The
Court has sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if there (was left) much to
be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility, provided that they eventually set out the facts and
the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts
proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered
a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutions memorandum, but
made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the case.
On the other hand, the Court has expressed concern over the possible denial of due process when an appellate court failed
to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be heard by a
fair and responsible magistrate. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and
law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial
courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before the Supreme Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their
common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the
Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al.
G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Custodial investigation; right to counsel.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. The police officers here claimed that upon
arresting one of the accused and before questioning him, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent,
that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with
one. However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have
been such a valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the police investigators to the lawyer of the IBP Office,
Quezon City Hall, for the taking of his formal statement only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station
before he was brought to said counsel. Thus, the constitutional requirement had not been observed. Settled is the rule
that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the
latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, the Court rejected the appellants contention that the accused was not given a counsel of his own choice, as he
never objected to the IBP lawyer when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his
statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede or
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot
afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A
lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
statement before the swearing officer.
The Constitution gives the person under custodial investigation the right to a competent and independent counsel. The
modifier competent and independent is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the
uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a
diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made
voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution
in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The
lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it
indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and
independent counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with clear and convincing
evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the
extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar
Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos.
182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Immunity from suit.
Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, on the basis that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine
government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim immunity
from suit because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines, but the latters service contractor for the exploration
and development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves. While the Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as
the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the States full control and
supervision, it does not follow that petitioner has become the States agent within the meaning of the law. An agent is a
person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter. The essence of an agency is the agents ability to represent his principal and bring about
business relations between the latter and third persons. An agents ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts that
would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third persons. It is this power to affect the
principals contractual relations with third persons that differentiates the agent from a service contractor.
Petitioners main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to [p]erform all petroleum operations and provide all necessary
technology and finance as well as other connected services to the Philippine government. As defined under the contract,
petroleum operation means the searching for and obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines, including the
transportation, storage, handling and sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic consumption. Petitioners
primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business
with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the
State. Consequently, it is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology and financing
for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued
in relation to the project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38. Shell
Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010.
Judiciary; seniority in appointment of Court of Appeals justices.
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting an
individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of appointment is
absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary and the formal
evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied with. A written memorial that can render title to public office
indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment
process, the appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is
ready to be delivered or transmitted to the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the
appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but only to facilitate the
effectiveness of the appointment by the appointees receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which
is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority
of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In
other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he is over the other subsequent
appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of
the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as
amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, which gives
premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override
but must give way to the law they seek to implement. Re: Seniority among the four most recent appointments to the
position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010.
Police power; taxation versus regulation.
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented
measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in
some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an
exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. In this case, the royalty fees
were imposed by the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation
of income or profits as petitioner claims. These fees form part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to ensure free flow or
movement of petroleum fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the administrator of CSEZ, CDC
is responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the CSEZ. Addressing specific
concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services which respondent
CDC is expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its general power of supervision and control over the movement of
all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases conversion Development Authority and
Clark Development Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010.
Right to speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the
periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right
to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory. The determination of whether the right to
speedy disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this
case, the Court held that the delay of four years during which the case remained pending with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the
Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al.
G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings of fact.

Findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Securities and Exchange Commission are controlling on the reviewing
authority. The rule is that findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the
reviewing authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as
we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court,
the latters findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. The SEC Hearing Officer had the optimum
opportunity to review the pieces of evidence presented before him and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.
Administrative decisions on matters within his jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, which has not been shown by petitioner in this case. Queensland-Tokyo
Commodities, Inc., et al. vs. Thomas George. G.R. No. 172727, September 8, 2010.
Administrative investigation; right to counsel; admission.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation.
The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the rule under existing laws is that a party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to represent
herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not
always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the
investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Clarita J. Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission. G.R. No.
187689, September 7, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law,
relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had
until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief. This doctrine is a judicial recognition of
certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield
that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused
with administrative character. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No.
168656, September 22, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court
is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Public Hearing
Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22,
2010.
Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers.
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for
another forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases
within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.
Election Law
Automated election system; source code.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9369 is clear in that once an [automated election system]
technology is selected for implementation, the [COMELEC] shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC
has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source
code was that it was not yet available when petitioner asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
The Court here ruled on the petition notwithstanding the fact that the elections for which the subject source code was to
be used had already been held. It accepted petitioners claim that the source code remained important and relevant not
only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors
and claims of fraud in the May 2010 elections. Center for People Empowerment in Governance vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010.
Local Government
Salary standardization; Presidents power over local governments.
The Court here reversed the ruling of the Commission on Audit (COA), which disallowed the premium payment for
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by petitioner to its officials and employees. COA held that such
benefits disregarded Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 103, series of 1994 (AO 103), which prohibits all heads of
government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances
and benefits without the Presidents prior approval. The Court ruled that petitioner did not violate the rule of prior
Presidential approval since Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition applies only to government offices/agencies,
including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards. Nowhere is it
indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to local government units. The approval requirement must be
observed by government offices under the Presidents control, i.e., departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned
and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the Presidents general
supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution.
The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform
their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the Presidents power of control which is the power to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the President over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse
the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. Since LGUs are subject only to the power
of general supervision of the President, the Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws
are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay
down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in this case does not need the approval of the
President to be valid. The Province of Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al. G.R. No.
182574, September 28, 2010.
Special Laws
The Supreme Court here reiterated its previous rulings that the factors for determining just compensation under Section
17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), which have been translated into a formula through
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, are
mandatory and should be strictly complied with. In this case, Land Banks valuation correctly reflected the actual use and
produce of the subject properties and did not factor in potential use as what respondents appraiser did. (Note that DAR AO
No. 6, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, has been superseded by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998.) Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Conrado O. Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1, 2010.
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its
price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price,
and the time of actual taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of
his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.
The propertys character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses. Where, as here, it has been
conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the property
should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The lower courts erred in ruling that the
character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that
the property was approved for conversion to other uses by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the absence of such
approval, it cannot be said that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to
residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and should be valued as such. Respondents evidence of the value
of his land as residential property (which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer to the potential
use of the property. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is a
great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation. The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining just compensation for
this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential uses. The proper approach should have been to value
respondents property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the improvements in the locality
where it is situated.
As to the price, the factors and requirements set out in Section 17 of RA 6657 must be applied. Here, the Land Banks
authority to value the land is only preliminary and the landowner who disagrees with petitioners valuation may bring the
matter to court for a judicial determination of just compensation. The Regional Trial Courts, organized as special agrarian
courts, are the final adjudicators on the issue of just compensation. Land Bank must substantiate its valuation. It is not
enough that the landowner fails to prove a higher valuation for the property; Land Bank must still prove the correctness of
its claims. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.
Agrarian reform; retention rights.
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land acquisition by
granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards. Thus, landowners who
have not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided
for by Republic Act No. 6657. However, the limitations under Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner who
filed an application for retention under RA 6657. LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons
who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. Section 9 (d) of DAR
Administrative Order No. 05 is inconsistent with PD No. 27, as amended by LOI 474, insofar as it removed the limitations
to a landowners retention rights. It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to implement a statute. The power, however, is restricted such that an administrative regulation
cannot go beyond what is provided in the legislative enactment. It must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law; hence, any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the statute. Celestio Santiago
substituted by Lauro Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez substituted by Rogelio Gutierez vs. Amada R. Ortiz-Luis substituted by
Juan Ortiz-Luiz, Jr. G.R. No. 186184 & G.R. No. 186988, September 20, 2010.
Government Procurement Reform Act; jurisdiction; appeal from decisions of bids and awards committee.
Under Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), the proper recourse to a court action
from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the
regional trial court, which is vested by the GPRA with jurisdiction to entertain the same. Compliance with the mandatory
protest mechanisms of the GPRA is jurisdictional in character. Section 58 of that law requires that there be exhaustion of
the statutorily available remedies at the administrative level as a precondition to the filing of a certiorari petition. This
requirement points to the mechanisms for protest against decisions of the BAC in all stages of the procurement process
that are outlined in both the provisions of Section 55 of the GPRA as well in Section 55 of the implementing rules. Under
these relevant sections of the law and the rules, resort to the judicial remedy of certiorari must be made only after the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the BACs decision before the said body. Subsequently, from the final denial of the
motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party must then lodge a protest before the head of the procuring entity through
a verified position paper that formally complies with requirements in Section 55.2 of the GPRAs Implementing Rules and
Regulations Part A. Only upon the final resolution of the protest can the aggrieved party be said to have exhausted the
available remedies at the administrative level. In other words, only then can he viably avail of the remedy of certiorari
before the proper courts. Non-compliance with this statutory requirement, under Section 58 of the GPRA, constitutes a
ground for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water
Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; vested property rights.

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56
that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectiveness shall be
recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in petitioner as early as 1958.
Consequently, a Presidential proclamation transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not
in accord with the IPRA. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869,
September 21, 2010.
Republic Act No. 8975; government ICT projects.
This is the first time that the Court is confronted with the question of whether a government information and
communication technology project is covered by Republic Act No. 8975, which prohibits trial courts from issuing a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction against the bidding or awarding of a contract
or project of the national government. The term national government projects means (i) national government
infrastructure projects, engineering works and service contracts, (ii) all projects covered by the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
(BOT) Law, and (iii) other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment
and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement repair and
rehabilitation. The purpose of RA 8975 is to ensure the expeditious implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, under the BOT Law, the entire information technology project, including the civil works component and the
technological aspect thereof, is considered an infrastructure or development project and treated similarly as traditional
infrastructure projects. Such information technology project is therefore covered by RA 8975.
On the other hand, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), which contemplates
projects to be funded by public funds, the term infrastructure project is limited to the civil works component of
information technology projects. The non-civil works component of information technology projects is treated as an
acquisition of goods or consulting services. Thus, the civil works component of information technology projects are subject
to the provisions of the GPRA and its implementing regulations on infrastructure projects, while the technological and other
components would be covered by the provisions on procurement of goods or consulting services as the circumstances may
warrant. When Congress adopted a limited definition of what is to be considered infrastructure in relation to information
technology projects under the GPRA, legislators are presumed to have taken into account previous laws concerning
infrastructure projects, including the BOT Law and RA 8975, and deliberately adopted the limited definition.
Taking into account the different treatment of information technology projects under the BOT Law and the GPRA,
petitioners contention the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction (because of the prohibition
under RA 8975) would have been correct if the e-Passport Project was pursued under the BOT Law. However, petitioners
presented no proof that the e-Passport Project was a BOT project. On the contrary, evidence adduced by both sides
tended to show that the e-Passport Project was a procurement contract under the GPRA. Accordingly, only the civil works
component of the e-Passport Project would be considered an infrastructure project that may not be the subject of a lower
court-issued writ of injunction under RA 8975.
Could the e-Passport Project be considered as engineering works or a service contract or as related and necessary
activities under RA 8975. The Court ruled in the negative. Under that law, a service contract refers to
infrastructure contracts entered into by any department, office or agency of the national government with private entities
and nongovernment organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department,
office or agency concerned. On the other hand, the phrase other related and necessary activities refers to activities
related to a government infrastructure, engineering works, service contract or project under the BOT Law. In other words,
to be considered a service contract or related activity, petitioners must show that the e-Passport Project is an
infrastructure project or necessarily related to an infrastructure project. This, petitioners failed to do as they saw fit not to
present any evidence on the details of the e-Passport Project before the trial court and this Court. There is nothing on
record to indicate that the e-Passport Project has a civil works component or is necessarily related to an infrastructure
project. In fact, the BSPs request for interest and to bid confirms that the e-Passport Project is a procurement of goods
and not an infrastructure project. Thus, within the context of the GPRA which is the governing law for the e-Passport
Project the said Project is not an infrastructure project that is protected from lower court issued injunctions. Department
of Foreign Affairs and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Hon. Franco T. Falcon, G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010.
OCTOBER 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Presumption of Innocence.

In this case, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the police officer
who implemented the search warrant was found, after trial and appellate review, as the true story. It is on firmer ground
than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up. The defense cannot solely rely upon the
constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive. Notably, the
accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers
alleged ill motive. Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the presumption that
they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given
weight. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Probable Cause.
There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in light
of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of
the judge conducting the examination. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a
showing to the contrary. The defenses reliance of the quoted testimony of the police officer alone, without any other
evidence to show that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court.
The accused-appellant, having failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of
duty of the issuing judge, cannot not be sustained by the Court. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No.
171980, October 6, 2010.
Constitutionality; Actual Controversy; Standing to Sue.
The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy involving a statute, its
implementation or a government action. Without such controversy, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. The limitation on the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation
of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. But even
with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional question
or the assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who possesses locus standior the standing to
challenge it.To have standing, one must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.Particularly, he must show that (1) he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. The present petitions allege that then President
Ramos had exercised vis--vis an assignment of franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too, the
Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB),
in
the
guise
of
entering
into
contracts
or agreements
with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and other juridical entities, virtually enlarged, modified
and/or extended the statutory franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The usurpation came in the
form of executing the assailed Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements and the issuance of Toll Operation Certificates.
Grave abuse of discretion is also laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same contracts or
agreements without the required public bidding mandated by law. In fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President
Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that translate inter alia into usurpation of the congressional authority to grant
franchises and violation of extant statutes.The petitions make a prima faciecase for certiorari and prohibition; an actual
case or controversy ripe for judicial review exists.Verily, when an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In
doing so, the judiciary merely defends the sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution.
In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of procedural technicality, which may be relaxed when the subject in issue or
the legal question to be resolved is of transcendental importance to the public. Hence, even absent any direct injury to the
suitor, the Court can relax the application of legal standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, when the public interest so requires. There is no doubt that individual petitioners, Marcos,et al., in G.R.
No. 169917, as then members of the House of Representatives, possess the requisite legal standing since they assail acts
of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of Congress. On the other hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon, and
the other petitioning associations, as taxpayers and/or users of the tollways or representatives of such users, would
ordinarily not be clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is wont to presently relax the rule on
locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
implementation of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily by hundreds of thousands of
motorists. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of
the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599,
October 19, 2010.
Constitutionality; Locus Standi.
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that
the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have not
presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security
forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored
by men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the State.Even conceding
such
allegations,
petitioners
have
yet
to
show
any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.On the other hand, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No.
178581 would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The
tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the
law. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA
9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectiveness, belies any claim of imminence of
their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners in G.R. No. 178554, who
merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. RA 9372 has been in effect
for three years now.From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and
freely
without
any
threat
of,
much
less
an
actual,
prosecution
or
proscription
under
RA
9372.Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157, on the other hand, base their claim of locus standi on their sworn
duty to uphold the Constitution.The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those
arrested or detained under the law. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law, however, does not suffice
to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have
been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of
the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under
RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite
their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these statements,
no
concrete
injury
to
them
has
been
pinpointed.Petitioners Southern
Hemisphere
Engagement
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of any
specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights
advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or
immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt
the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Neither
can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
personal interest in the proceeding. In sum, it bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon.
Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al.
vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. No. 178552, 178554,
178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there
must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows
adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy. Unlike the plaintiffs
in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and
existing one.Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts
in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render
an advisory opinion, which is not its function.Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored
on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc, et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno
etc., et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As
distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. A facial challenge is
likewise different from an as-applied challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.On the other hand, the
allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge.The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. It is settled, furthermore, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In this case, since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372
is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. vs. AntiTerrorism Council,
et
al./Kilusang Mayo
Uno,
et
al.
Vs.
Hon.
Eduardo Ermita.,
et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554,
178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, compensation
should be just. The public, through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through
compensation for what is taken, value for value. The owners loss is not only his property but also its income-generating
potential. While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners after the
Supreme Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the time that the
State took the petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This
is the rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would have
made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. Furthermore, while the SC has
equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was
essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast,
the interest involved in the present case runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking. Thus, the interest due in
the present case cannot be reduced. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 164195,
October 12, 2010.
Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary; GSIS; Exemption from Legal Fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which
exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the
payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution
removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. In the instant case, therefore, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the permissive
counterclaim considering that petitioner is not exempted from the payment of legal fees. Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al. G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010.
Ombudsman; Disciplinary Authority over Public School Teachers.
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is
concurrent with the proper committee of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). However, while
petitioner has such concurrent authority, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may
refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case, it would have been
more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better position
to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is
covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve
the dispute. In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that the Supreme Court is nullifying
the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in. Respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached annexes.
Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. Finally, as to the
power to impose administrative liability, the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative
liability of an erring public official or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the concerned officer or agency to
implement the penalty imposed. This power to impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually
mandatory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Pedro Delijero, Jr. G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010.
Office of the Ombudsman; Powers.
The Ombudsmans decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It
cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the
provisions of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may
require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the
Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Joel S. Samaniego. G.R. No. 175573, October 5,
2010.
Preliminary Investigation; Decision; Applicability of Constitutional Requirements to DOJ.
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial.While the prosecutor
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment
on
the
accused,
not
the
prosecutor. A
preliminary
investigation
thus
partakes
of
an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial
nature may be taken. Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in
reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to
resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Atty. Alice Odchique-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a. Henry Tan. G.R. No.
186652, October 6, 2010.

Validity of Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements.
(a)
Public Utility Franchise; Substitution of Grantee.
The Court rejected petitioners contention that contractual provisions on substitution of the franchise holder violated the
Constitution. Relying on Clause 17.4.1of the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) for the North Luzon
Expressway that the lenders have the unrestricted right to appoint a substitute entity in case of default of
Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) or the occurrence of an event of default in respect of MNTCs loans, petitioners
argue that since MNTC is the assignee or transferee of the franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), then it steps into the shoes of PNCC.They contend that the act of replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an
amendment or alteration of PNCCs original franchise and hence unconstitutional, considering that the constitutional power
to appoint a new franchise holder is reserved to Congress. The Court disagreed. Petitioners presupposition that only
Congress has the power to directly grant franchises is misplaced. The Court has held that administrative agencies may be
empowered by the Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or similar authorizations. In this case, the Court
ruled that the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is empowered to grant a franchise for toll road projects.
Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the grantee in case of default with respect to its loans is tantamount to
an amendment of PNCCs original franchise and is therefore unconstitutional.The Court also found this assertion to be
without merit. Besides holding that the Legislature may properly empower administrative agencies to grant franchises
pursuant to a law, the Court explained in this case that Presidential Decree No. 1113 and the amendatory
Presidential Decree No. 1894 both vested the TRB with the power to impose conditions on PNCCs franchise in an
appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter the same when public interest so requires, save for the conditions
stated in Sections 1 and 2 of PD 1894, which relate to the coverage area of the tollways and the expiration of PNCCs
original franchise.Presidential Decree No. 1112 provided further that the TRB has the power to amend or modify a Toll
Operation Certificate that it issued when public interest so requires. Accordingly, there is nothing infirm much less
questionable about the provision in the MNTC STOA allowing the substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its loans.
Furthermore, the unrestricted right of the lender in Clause 17.4.1 of the MNTC STOA to appoint a substituted entity is
never intended to afford such lender the plenary power to do so. It is clear that the lenders do not actually have an
absolute or unrestricted right to appoint the substituted entity in view of TRBs right to accept or reject the substitution
within one month from notice, and such right to appoint comes into force only if and when the TRB decides to effectuate
the substitution of MNTC as allowed in Clause 17.2 of the MNTC STOA.
(b)
Public Utility Franchise; Extension.
The Court agreed with petitioners contention that the option in the MNTC STOA to extend the concession for the stated
period is unconstitutional. Clause 17.5 of the MNTC STOA grants MNTCs lenders the power to extend the concession in
case the Grantor (Republic of the Philippines) takes over the same, for a period not exceeding 50 years, until full payment
of the loans. At the outset, Clause 17.5 does not grant the lenders the power to unilaterally extend the concession for a
period not exceeding 50 years. The afore-quoted provision should be read in conjunction with Clause 20.12, which
expressly provides that the MNTC STOA is made under and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines, and particularly, by the provisions of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894.Under the applicable laws,
the TRB may amend, modify, alter or revoke the authority/franchise whenever the public interest so requires.In a word,
the power to determine whether or not to continue or extend the authority granted to a concessionaire to operate and
maintain a tollway is vested in the TRB by the applicable laws.The necessity of whether or not to extend the concession or
the authority to construct, operate and maintain a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB.As such, the lenders
cannot unilaterally extend the concession period, or, with like effect, demand that the TRB agree to extend the concession.
It must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested by law with the power to extend the administrative franchise or
authority that it granted, it cannot do so for an accumulated period exceeding 50 years. Otherwise, it would violatethe
proscription under Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no public utility franchise shall be
for a longer period than 50 years.
In this case, the MNTC STOA has an original stipulated period of 30 years.Clause 17.5 allows the extension of this period
if necessary to fully repay the loans of MNTC. If the maximum extension as provided in Clause 17.5,i.e.,50 years, is used,
the accumulated concession period granted in this case would effectively be 80 years.This is a clear violation of the 50year franchise threshold set by the Constitution.It is on this basis that the Court struck down the provision in Clause 17.5
allowing extension of the concession for up to 50 years. However, the nullity is only with respect to any extension beyond
the 50-year constitutional limit.
(c)
Government Guarantee.
The Court declared as unconstitutional and grossly disadvantageous to the Government Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA
(and a similar provision in the STOA for the South Luzon Expressway rehabilitation and extension
project), which guarantees the financial viability of tollway project. Under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the TRB agreed
to pay monthly the difference in the toll fees actually collected by MNTC and that which it could have realized under the
STOA. Article VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution mandates that [n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In this case, the TRB, by warranting to compensate MNTC for loss of revenue
resulting from the non-implementation of the periodic and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the constitutionally
guaranteed and exclusive power of the Legislature toappropriate money for public purpose from the General Funds of the
Government.
Further, Section 3(e)(5) of PD 1112 explicitly states that no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral securities, or
bonds shall be issued by any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing
program of the toll operator in connection with his undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate. What the
law here seeks to prevent is the eventuality that the Government, through any of its agencies, could be obligated to pay or
secure, whether directly or indirectly, the financing by the private investor of the project. In this case, under Clause 11.7
of the MNTC STOA, the Republic of the Philippines (through the TRB) guaranteed the security of the project against
revenue losses that could result in case the TRB, based on its determination of a just and reasonable toll fee, decides not
to effect a toll fee adjustment under the STOAs periodic/interim adjustment formula.
(d)
Toll Rate Adjustments.
The Court rejected petitioners contention that the toll rate adjustment mechanisms in the STOAs violated the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that the STOAs for the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and South Metro
Manila Skyway (SMMS) projects tie the hands of the TRB, as it is bound by the stipulated periodic and interim toll rate
adjustments provided therein.Petitioners contend that the provisions on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll rate
adjustments, by using a built-in automatic toll rate adjustment formula, guaranteed fixed returns for the investors and
negated the public hearing requirement. The Court held that the requisite public hearings under Section 3(d) of PD 1112
and Section 8(b) of PD 1894 are not negated by the fixing of the initial toll rates and the periodic adjustments under the
STOAs.
A clear distinction must be made between the statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll rates, on the one hand, and
ofperiodic/interimorsubsequenttoll rates, on the other.First, the hearing required under the said provisos refers to notice
and hearing for the approval or denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments or the subsequent toll rates, not to the fixing
of initial toll rates.By express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of
a hearing.It is only when a challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues that public hearings are required.
In determining the reasonableness of subsequent toll rate increases, the TRB must seek out the Commission on Audit for
assistance in examining and auditing the financial books of the public utilities concerned. Furthermore, while the periodic,
interim and other toll rate adjustment formulas are indicated in the STOAs, it does not mean that the TRB should accept a
rate adjustment predicated on the economic data, references or assumptions adopted by the toll operator.The final figures
should be determined by the TRB based on its appreciation of the relevant rate-influencing data. The TRB should exercise
its rate-fixing powers within the context of the agreed formula, but always having in mind that the rates should be just and
reasonable.Conversely, it is very well within the power of the TRB under the law to approve a change in the current toll
fees.Section 3(d) of PD 1112 grants the TRB the power to issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of
toll that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities.But the reasonableness of a possible increase in the fees must
first be clearly and convincingly established by the petitioning entities, i.e.,the toll operators. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et
al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs.
Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19,
2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after
an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before
the court. Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case while it was
pending before the Court. The Supreme Court thus deferred to the competence and expertise of the Securities and
Exchange Commission to determine whether, given the supervening events, the Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation
Plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a
consequence. Nestle Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010.
Government Contracts; Public Bidding.
The Court held that public bidding is not required with respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila Skyway,
North Luzon Expressway and South Luzon Expressway projects. Private petitioners maintain that public bidding is required
for these projects on the basis that they are in the nature of a build-operate-transfer infrastructure undertaking under the
BOT Law. The Court said that the BOT Law does not squarely apply to Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), which exercised its prerogatives and obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and
expansion of the above toll roads with chosen partners. These tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operatetransfer undertaking.However, given that the projects have been undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise
under Presidential Decree No. 1113 and Presidential Decree No. 1894, in joint venture with its chosen partners at the time
when it was held valid to do so by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department of Justice, the
public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply.
The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects, which
require, under the Government Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed Presidential Decree No. 1594,public bidding
as the preferred mode of contract award.Neither are these contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the
project are obtained from the government. Rather, the Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant to which PNCC
is undertaking the projects together with its chosen partners) actually constitute a statutorily-authorized transfer or
assignment of usufruct of PNCCs existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways.
The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit completely different
from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme infrastructure
project will have to construct, operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in
which case, public bidding is required under the law. Where, as here, a franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding. In pursuing the
projects with the vast resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the
exercise of its management prerogatives.In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in choosing
its partners, as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right
ofdelectus personae. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917,
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Election Laws
Candidate; Residency Requirement.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial
evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early
2009. Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary, which the latter
failed to do. On the other hand, the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on
the photographs of Mitras Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have been a residence
because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the room. Thus, the COMELEC Second Divisions
Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the
photographed premises; more than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack
of the qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see. The COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but
even used personal and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitras dwelling when, in fact, the law is replete with
standards, i.e.,
the
dwelling
must
be
where
a
person
permanently
intends
to
return
and
to
remain. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. G.R.
No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation.

Although the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the
CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The jurisdiction of
the RTCs is not any less original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The proceedings
before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Additionally, the administrative orders providing
for the guidelines in determining just compensation are mandatory and not mere guides that the RTC may disregard.
Finally, although in some expropriation cases, the Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature
of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of
forbearance. In this case, respondents are not entitled to interest on the final compensation considering that petitioner
promptly deposited the compensation for their lands after they rejected petitioners initial valuation.Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010.
Energy Regulatory Commission; Implementation of RA 7832.
SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss caps under Section 10
of R.A. No. 7832. Indeed, under National Electrification Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier
scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to
gradually phase out pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing utilities such as
SURNECO. However, it is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832,
and is repealed by Section 16 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A.
No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No.
7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for approval
by the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to
apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in their
computation of power cost adjustments. The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the
IRR that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to the ERB, now the Energy
Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the implementation of the electric cooperatives PPA formula
in the exercise of its rate-making power over them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs. Energy
Regulatory Commission. G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010.
PNCC; Authority After Expiration of Franchise.
In this case, petitioners assume and harp on the lack of authority of the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) to continue, in joint venture with private investors, with its North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) and Metro Manila Expressway (MMEX) operations after the lapse of its franchise (granted under
Presidential Decree No. 1113) on May 1, 2007. However, this expiration did not carry with it the cancellation of PNCCs
authority and that of its joint venture partners granted under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain anyand all such extensions, linkages or stretches,
together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of [NLEX], [SLEX] and/or [MMEX] and/or to divert the
original route and change the original end-points of the [NLEX] and/or [SLEX] as may be approved by the [TRB]. To
highlight the point, Section 2 of PD 1894 specifically provides that the franchise for the extension and toll road projects
constructed after the approval of PD 1894 shall be 30 years, counted from project completion. Indeed, prior to the
expiration of PNCCs original franchise in May 2007, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the exercise of its special powers
under PD 1112, signed Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOAs) with PNCC and its private joint venture partners.
These STOAs covered the expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case may be, and/or the construction,
operation and maintenance of toll road projects contemplated in PD 1894. Further, corresponding Toll Operation
Certificates (TOCs) have been issued for the toll road projects. The STOAsTRB entered into with PNCC and its joint
venture partners had the effect of granting authorities to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities, but with the
injection of additional private sector investments consistent with the intent of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894. The
execution of these STOAs came in 1995, 1998 and 2006, or before the expiration of PNCCs original franchise on May 1,
2007. Upon the expiration of PNCCs legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities to construct, maintain and
operate the subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the TRB pursuant to the validly executed STOAs and TOCs, shall
begin to operate and be treated as administrative franchises or authorities. After May 1, 2007, the operation and
maintenance of the NLEX and the other subject tollways are no longer be founded on PNCCs original franchise but on
entirely new authorizations,i.e.the TOCs, granted by the TRB pursuant to its statutory franchising authority under Sections
3(a) and (e) of PD 1112. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs.
The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Presidents Power to Approve TRB Contracts.
Petitioners here assert that the grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), as franchise holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its franchise is
unconstitutional for being an encroachment of legislative power. The Court rejected this claim. Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 requires approval by the President of any contract the Toll Regulatory Board may have
entered into or effected for the construction and operation of toll facilities. Complementing Section 3(a) is 3(e)(3) of PD
1112 enjoining the transfer of the usufruct of PNCCs franchise without the Presidents prior approval. The Presidents
approving authority is therefore of statutory origin.There is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with the delegation
to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest in its franchise, the
assignment and delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law itself. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al.
vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
2010.
Public Land; Alienability.
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that
private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties has
the right to possess the property. While the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this
occupation could not give rise to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain government land that had not
yet been declared alienable and disposable. It was the Modestos, however, who were the actual possessors of the property
when it was declared alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to possess the property until the
present time. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia
Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.
Public land; Foreshore.
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The lands proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a
foreshore land. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of the subject
lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by
water during high tide. Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high
tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but
remains private land owned by respondents.Manuel Almagro, joined by his spouse, Elizabeth Almagro vs. Salvacion C.
Kwan, et al. / Margarita Pachoro, et al. vs. William C. Kwan, et al. G.R. Nos. 175806, 175810 and G.R. No. 175849.
October 20, 2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Franchising Powers.
The Court dismissed petitioners argument that only Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive prerogative
to grant franchise to operate public utilities. With respect to the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient
power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the
corresponding toll operating permit or Toll Operation Certificate. By explicit provision of law, therefore, the TRB was given
the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects.
The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any
suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than
accurate.Asstressed inAlbano v. Reyes a case decided under the 1987 Constitution there is nothing in the
Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may
operate. A special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an
administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit
authority to grant a public utility franchise.However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation,to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. Ernesto B. Francisco,
Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Functions.
Petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the Court declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 (which accord the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter into contracts for the
construction and operation of toll facilities, and, at the same time, grant it the power to issue and promulgate toll rates)
and (ii) Section 8(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894 (which grant the TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving
toll rate movements). As submitted by petitioners, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts is inconsistent with
its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so
petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in such a situation. The Court rejected these arguments. It does not perceive
an irreconcilable clash in the enumerated statutory powers of the TRB, such that the exercise of one negates the other. The
ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the premises, be accorded cogency. Petitioners have not
shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate of balancing the interests of
the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with
reasonable profits. The fact that an administrative agency is exercising its administrative or executive functions (such as
the granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g., rulemaking) and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g., rate-fixing), does not support a finding of a violation of due process or
the Constitution. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
NOVEMBER 2010 CASES

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial.

The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In this case, far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, the delays entailed by the
postponements of the hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Franciscos extraordinary remedies
against the interlocutory orders issued by the lower court and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the
case. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate commencement of trial within 30 days from receipt of
the pre-trial order, and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119
provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejected
petitioner Franciscos claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences before the lower court violated his right to
a speedy trial. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al./Santos O. Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel
Joson Nelson/Imperial, et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 160067/G.R. Mo. 170410/G.R. No. 171622, November
17, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial.
In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, any delay should be considered in relation
to the entirety of the proceedings. Here, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases
by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period
set by the Sandiganbayan, and did so only after more than a year thereafter. However, while such reinvestigation delayed
the proceedings, the Court held that said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the
protection of the rights of petitioners and their co-accused. These rights should not be compromised at the expense of
expediency. Thus, even though the Court acknowledged the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice
suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the Court held that petitioners right to speedy trial and
disposition of the cases involving them do not justify the dismissal of the criminal cases. The Court further held that the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010.
Constitutionality; Legal Standing.
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Court held that he has no legal
standing. The issue of legal standing is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry: (1) There must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) The constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) The decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself. The Court said that even if the petitioners claim that he is a proper
party on the basis that the creation and operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue he raised is of
transcendental importance, his standing was still imperiled by his appearance as counsel to then presidential candidate
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest filed by her opponent before the PET. A constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. That appearance would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the PETs constitution. Instead, petitioner ubiquitously entered his appearance before the PET and
acknowledged its jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the PETs authority, meant that he did not meet the third condition and therefore has no
standing to file the petition. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23,
2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation.

Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as it violates Section
4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose. He contends that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The
Court said that, while the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude, much
less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests
involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision
of Section 4 that the Court may promulgate its rules for the purpose), are not restricted but include all necessary powers
implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plenary and the authority of the Court to decide
presidential and vice-presidential election contests through the PET are derived from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction
under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and
faithfully complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission clearly support the
foregoing conclusion. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function.

The Court here rejected petitioners claim that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial functions
contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The
traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Consistent with the
presidential system of government, the function of dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute.
The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of
the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Interest.
If property is taken for public use before compensation is paid or deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property was taken
to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property
and the actual payment, legal interest accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than)
that he was in before the taking occurred. As in previous cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of 12% interest on
just compensation payable to the landowner. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No.
182431, November 17, 2010.
Administrative Law
Due Process; Administrative Due Process.

Petitioners here assailed the credibility of a witnesss statement because it was not made under oath and he was not
presented as witness during the hearing. The Court rejected this claim. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No.
187752, November 23, 2010.
Other Laws
Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit.

Since Land Bank of the Philippines is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform proceedings, it is exempt from
the payment of costs of suit under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that No costs shall be
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther
Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010
DECEMBER 2010 CASES
Emancipation patent; issuance.

Following are the steps in transferring land to a tenant-tiller under Presidential Decree No. 27: (a) identification of tenant,
landowner, and the land covered; (b) land survey and sketching of portion actually cultivated by the tenant to determine
parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use; (c) issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer; (d) valuation of the land for
purposes of computing the amortization; (e) amortization payments of the tenant-tiller over a 15-year period; and (f)
issuance of Emancipation Patent. In this case, there is no evidence that these steps were followed. There are several
supporting documents that the tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent. The Supreme
Court found that majority of these supporting documents is lacking. Hence, it was improper for the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent. There was also no
sufficient evidence to prove that respondent has fully paid the value of the land. Full payment of just compensation is
required prior to issuance of Emancipation Patents. Renato Reyes, represented by Ramon Reyes vs Leopoldo Barrios, G.R.
No. 172841, December 15, 2010.
Equal protection clause; concept.
The Court here struck down Executive Order No. 1 (which created the Truth Commission) for violating the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration was
plain, patent and manifest. According to the Court, the Arroyo administration is a member of a class, that is, the class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include in the Commissions mandate past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Although Section 17 gives the
President discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the Commission so as to include acts of graft and corruption
committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. This expanded
mandate of the Commission will still depend on the discretion of the President. If he decides not to include them, the
provision would be meaningless. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites.

Judicial review requires the following: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the act or issuance; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very subject
matter of the case. As to standing, the Court here held that petitioners, who are legislators, met the requirement as they
are questioning the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 creating the Truth Commission on the basis that the latters
mandate constitutes usurpation of the power of the Congress. However, with regard to the petitioner who is questioning
EO No. 1 as a taxpayer, the Court held that he had no standing since he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger
of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of that EO. The Court took cognizance of
the case as the matter involved was of transcendental importance. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R.
No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to reorganize.
The creation of the Truth Commission does not fall within the Presidents power to reorganize. Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency or vice versa. This provision, according to the Court, refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These refer to situations where a body or
an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power of control.
The creation of the Commission is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter,
modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or the Executives inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R.
No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to conduct investigations.

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive.
It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. One of the recognized
powers of the President is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed or guide the President in performing his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of laws. Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the Truth Commission will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the Department of Justice or erode their respective powers. The investigative function of the Commission will
complement those of the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the
Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication
on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the Commission. Louis Barok C. Biraogo
vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,
G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
Tenancy relationship; elements.
For purposes of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, there is tenancy relationship between parties if the following
elements concur: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing
requisites must be proved by substantial evidence. In this case, the continued stay of the purported tenant in the
premises of the company was the result of an amicable settlement in a labor dispute and not because there was a
landlord-tenant relationship. The fact that the stay was free of charge only proves the absence of such a relationship.
Even assuming that the employer was receiving a share of the produce, the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of
sharing, does not ipso facto create a tenancy. There was no evidence to indicate that the parties agreed to any system of
sharing. The employees activities in the property cannot be classified as one for agricultural production. There was no
record showed that he was engaged in any planting or other agricultural activity. Heirs of Jose Barredo, namely, Lolita
Barredo, et al. vs. Lavoiser Besaes, G.R. No. 164695, December 13, 2010.
Warrantless arrest.
The Supreme Court here found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused, as (a) the evidence against
them is inadmissible and (b) granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established. The
police went to the house of one of the accused based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was
going on. Sole reliance on such a tip does not constitute probable cause. The apprehending officers should have first
conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the accused had earlier been ascertained.
After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, a search warrant should have been
secured prior to effecting the arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search is likewise illegal. The items
seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al., G.R.
No. 191366, December 13, 2010.
JANUARY 2011 CASES

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation.

As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares;
(2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did
not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence
were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover,
appellants confession is replete with details, which, according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it was not
voluntarily given. Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent counsel during
the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional
rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang
testified on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights,
advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty.
Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation.
Thus, the SC held that there was no duress or violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the custodial
investigation and that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during such investigation in the NBI. People of
the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy.
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On
occasions, however, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65. Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring his pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. Complainant Vizconde cited the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan as authority
that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the Court observed that the government
proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was
dictated, coerced and scripted. It was a sham trial. In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a
sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation such that the
seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not
really go through the process. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864. January 18, 2011.
Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have
that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that the seizure of the two
receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the
presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the
fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure
and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers
arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. Secondly, from where
he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and
throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable
ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected
of committing. The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was
indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The
law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2010.
Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures.
In this case, there was a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. The following are the circumstances immediately
prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative
about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in
Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters;
and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300
van. The crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic
containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. Furthermore, accused-appellants are deemed to have
waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng
Yik bun, et al., G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.
Constitutionality; Lis mota.
The SC observed that the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 (Philippine National Red Cross charter) was not raised by
the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the previous decision of the SC; thus, it was not the very
lis mota of the case. The SC reminded that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. A
court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC held that it should not have declared void certain sections of R.A.
No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have
exercised judicial restraint on the matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have
based its judgment. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
Congress; Creation of private corporations.
The SC observed that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations
was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other
groups. The SC found the Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by the constitutional provision, as it does
not grant special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
Eminent domain; Just compensation.

It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion for determining how much
just compensation should be given to the landowner. Prior to the NPCs introduction of improvements in the area where the
subject parcel of land is located, the properties therein, including the disputed lot, remained agricultural and residential.
The SC found that it was only upon entry of the NPC in Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings and other
facilities and bringing in various equipment for its multi-purpose project, that the lands in the said locality were later
classified as commercial or industrial. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power Corporation/National Power
Corporation vs. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio, G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093, January 24, 2011.
Government contracts; Payment based on quantum meruit for illegal contracts.
The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For
almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent. According to the SC,
public interest and equity dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work done. To deny
the payment to the contractor would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice
and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R.
No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Philippine National Red Cross; Status.
The SC found merit in Philippine National Red Crosss contention that its structure is sui generis. National Societies such as
the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of
services including disaster relief and health and social programmes. National societies were held to be organizations that
are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The
auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service
organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. The SC
further noted that the creation of the PNRC was a result of the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention which has
the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well
as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is
treated as an auxiliary of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
State; Immunity from suit.

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondents right to be duly compensated for actual
work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted
benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondents honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute
for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D.
Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian reform; Coverage.
The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing
lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to
livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
the meaning of the word agricultural showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not
agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the
Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands
used for its livestock business. Hence, the Court found that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively
being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court affirmed the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the
Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABCs livestock business
and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage. In contrast, however, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands
devoted to coconut trees and rubber and as such, are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage. Republic of the
Philippines, rep. by Dept. Agrarian Reform vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept.
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 178895, January 10, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative remedies; Exhaustion.

Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioners since, according to him, a large
amount of money was still due him under the Contract of Agreement involving the construction of a dike, executed
between him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the
Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there was no need to exhaust administrative
remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad
rules. The exceptions to these rules are the following: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of
the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case,
the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed
almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will
definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the enforceability
of the Contract of Agreement entered into by the parties. These, according to the SC, are questions purely of law and
clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino,
G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Career Executive Service; Coverage.
The Career Executive Service covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of
the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third Level
of Career Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 and those
identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.
Election Law
Candidate; Disqualification.
A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as
a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate
at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective
office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress.
However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility
since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S.
Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being sworn.
According to the SC, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn COC is
equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. This was held not to be a ground for disqualification under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Nowhere therein does it specify that a
defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Local government officials; Suspension pending appeal.

Respondent Barriga was held administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman as a result of anomalous transactions
pertaining to the handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and
Sanitation Project. This decision was appealed to the CA but was not implemented immediately. According to the SC, it is
clear from Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, that when a
public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed
is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of
course. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public official
from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being executory. Office of the Ombudsman
vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C. Barriga, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011.
February 2011 CASES

Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent.
The trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This
means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is
considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90
days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the
administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step
increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011.
Equal Protection; valid classification.
Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. The SC held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of
cities and without municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for
the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates,
to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from
P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found
that substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their
relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose.
In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used
the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by
the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs
predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled
to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the
government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over
the properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is
abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or
repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon
abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until
the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government.
Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners
can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases
and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the
Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as
Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may
have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of interests
earned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing
is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not
have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value
increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines,
et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al.
G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Impeachment; narration of facts.
Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming
the allegations in the complaints. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; publication requirement.

Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September
2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacked her
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. While promulgation would seem synonymous to
publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
generally understood, that is, to make known. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the
restricted sense was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the
former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine
on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the
Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed
a specific method of promulgation. The SC observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is
required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules, which
faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House
of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from the filing
of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted
and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners claim, the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House
of Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term initiate means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of
said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick light the candle at the
same time. According to the SC, what is important is that there should only be one candle that is kindled in a year, such
that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance.
Petitioner claimed that Congress failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of
the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable. The
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function
to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee. Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of
form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. Prudential considerations
behooved the Supreme Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional
purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share.
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent
municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted
by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress
desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very mandate of the Constitution. League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities
of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty.
The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or
abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international
crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative
of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our
national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US
persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In
the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing
high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting
effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to
surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and
absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from
a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan
Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R.
No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects
on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However,
a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive
agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender
Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence,
it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the
subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading
case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights,
patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The
Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements
mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a
given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary
consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in
the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to
effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur
Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction.
Respondents raised the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argued that public respondent (the
Congress) was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v. House of Representatives characterizes the
power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The SC found it well-within its power to determine
whether Congress committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions
and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the
Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Judicial Review; ripeness.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially
relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, the SC
found no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the
need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of
simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one
year. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011.
Legal Standing; requirements.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is
in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens, petitioners interest in the subject matter of
the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between
the Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established
national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations. Bayan Muna, as
represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
159618, February 1, 2011.
Stare Decisis; nature.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its
final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code. The previous case of Lubrica and the present case involve two different issues. The relief prayed for in the
previous case of Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of
payment and not of the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of the valuation of
the Land Bank of the Philippines and Department of Agrarian Reform and not that of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis, therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P.
Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as
Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from
the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the
plaintiffs property. The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of
eminent domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even
in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office
v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function.
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical
considerations dictate the establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at
the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered
because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the
former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. In this case, the
juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an agency of the Government was not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport,
an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23,
2011.
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles.
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve
a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A decision rendered by a Division of the SC in
violation of the constitutional provision, that only the SC En Banc may modify or reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would
be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be inefficacious since the
decision is void for being unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of
occasional error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of occasional error but also a
serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by
the Courts Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et
al. v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R.
No. 170889. February 15, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies.
Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock Corporation
(REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to petitioners
argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about
prepayment scheme with REMAD. It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the Supreme
Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of Annex I, the document to
which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. In
addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the
Credit Facility Proposal allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the
supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the Land
Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is
in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any agreement to release
the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There
is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to
the present petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission
of the irregular transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively
devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this
case, accorded respect to the CAs observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Teams Report do not
actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the
subject property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; just compensation.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228, is the law that should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land. The LBP and
the DAR argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for
the subject property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the
just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and
devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time, when the
emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both
the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. According
to them, the governments OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27
continues separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution
program under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only
suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of
lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6657. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and
EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Nasser C.
Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation.
It is the initial valuation made by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines that
must be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA
6657 does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators determination of just compensation for
the land which has not yet become final and executory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of
Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service.
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of
general or of permanent character are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution
No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit
selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the
personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center. The
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011.
Cityhood; criteria for conversion.

The cases involved here were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16)
laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated
November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as
unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in another Decision dated
December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August
24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC
held that the Cityhood laws were constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11 th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher
income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress
failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No.
9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the
individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage
of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011.
Legislative power; amendment.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the SC also held that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through
the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. League of Cities of the
Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil.
etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
MARCH 2011 CASE
Constitutional Law
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner
Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of
office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to the candidates election and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Fernando V.
Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.

Equal Protection.
The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the
enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been
effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming
exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is
still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27
(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support
in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated
October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCORs exemption from payment of corporate
income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made
pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable classification
by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection
clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was
PAGCORs own request to be exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Impeachment; Initiation.
The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the term initiate as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action on said complaint. The initial
action of the House of Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to the Committee on Justice. Ma.
Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.
Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules.
When the Constitution uses the word promulgate, it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the
meaning of to make known as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.
Non-impairment Clause.
Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions,
which inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest with it.
Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of
changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus, the amendatory
provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The SC held that a franchise partakes of the nature
of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution, PAGCORs franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment
under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No.
8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCORs
transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process.
This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for
the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of
the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to due process. The SC
did not agree. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of
quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, according to the SC, the
Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection.
Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction
over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator
Villars recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. The SC did not agree with
this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity,
integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee
on Ethics and Privileges. However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee
stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical
conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics
Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before
the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R.
No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Publication of Rules
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that
publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one
set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the
Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such
rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if
publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Senate; Quorum and Voting.
If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do
business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express
provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require
modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In
any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will
of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors.
Price is considered excessive if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item
bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive,
the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government price quotations;
(c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue was whether the computer units
bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the
respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids, the
technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra,
which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a
lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost 50%.
This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC
units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an
additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for
Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the amount of
Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditors findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et
al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers.
The SC held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of
separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a private
entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section
15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith
when he prevailed upon the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to modify
the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended
to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R.
No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.

This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for
the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse of
petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to
this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their
resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of
the Court, and not for an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary.
DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino
citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and
(4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land productive. The SC found that petitioner
Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo
was awarded by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo.
Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the
application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under
the CARP. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines.
In this case, the issue was whether the Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to file a petition for determination
of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created primarily
to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform
Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of
Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the
determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the
valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land
valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the
valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the
right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits
Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land.
It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions:
(1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other
qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform
rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case,
petitioner Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment
for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from respondent Loyolas mother, Cristina Hugo, to
Loyolas name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the
lot as basis for his claim. In other words, waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is
invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No.
181370, March 9, 2011.
Election Law
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition.
Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010,
a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino
mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidates COC may
be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to
Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC
under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e.
misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this case,
the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed
before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however,
state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as
one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule
provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure
for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the
prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of
Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a
petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidates qualifications. Section 4(B) of
Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in
Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age, residence and
citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the
COMELEC allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the candidates non-compliance with constitutional and statutory
requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 was simply
to remedy a perceived procedural gap though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case,
had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March
8, 2011.

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Political Law Jurisprudence

UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said

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as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of

Whether or not the decision of the trial court

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UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society

damages by the lower court was itself consistent

deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or

The CA did not have jurisdiction to take

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CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N.,

On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with

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UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.

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remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

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Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579

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A confession is often said to constitute evidence

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Here, the pieces of evidence, taken in their

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Whether or not the trial court erred in giving

Whether or not the trial court erred in holding

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Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in

1. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible

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particularly describing the place to be searched and the

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DELA CRUZ vs. ADJUTO ABILLE, G.R. No. 130196,

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process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that

Whether or not the petition for the issuance

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exceeding seven (7) hectares, and the right to select and

DE RAMA vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH

2. Whether or not the public respondent Court

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Whether or not the public respondent Court

I. No screening process and no criteria

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appointments was that they were, to his personal belief,

Two separate information were filed against

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