STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION2012

Rule1.ApplytheLawwhenitisCLEAR.DonotInterpretorCONSTRUE.

Rule2 in StatConisIBC, interpretbeforeyouCONSTRUE. You

CONSTRUEonlywhenthe written
lawisnotenoughtogivemeaningandEFFECTtotheINTENToftheLAW
.

The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by ang aging
FreshmanwhoshallbeaLawyersoooooon!!!

literalmeaningorplainmeaningrule
duralexsedlex
doctrineofnecessaryimplication
ejusdemgeneris
limitationsofejusdemgeneris
expressiouniosestexclusioalterius
negativeoppositedoctrine
applicationofexpressiouniusrule
doctrineofcasusomissus
doctrineoflastantecedent
reddeddosingulasingulis
staredecisis
resjudicata
obiterdictum

A
legislature is a kind of
deliberative assembly with the power to pass,
[1]
amend, and repeal
laws
. The law created by a legislature is called

legislation or
statutory law
. In addition to
enacting laws, legislatures usually
have exclusive authority to raise or lower
taxes and adopt the
budget and
other
money bills
. Legislatures are known by many names, the most

common being
parliament and
congress
, although these terms also have
morespecificmeanings.


Legislativeintent
In law, the
legislative intent of the
legislature in enacting
legislation may
sometimes be considered by the
judiciary when interpreting the law (see

judicialinterpretation
).Thejudiciarymayattempttoassesslegislativeintent
where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or
adequately addressa particular issue,orwhenthereappearstohavebeen
alegislativedraftingerror.
Whenastatuteisclearandunambiguous,thecourtshavesaid,repeatedly,
that the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a
statute could be interpretedin morethan one fashion that legislative intent
mustbeinferredfromsourcesotherthantheactualtextofthestatute.

Sourcesoflegislativeintent
Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine
the goals and purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it
passedthelaw:

thetextofthebillasproposedtothelegislativebody,

amendmentstothebillthatwereproposedandacceptedorrejected,

therecordofhearingsonthetopic,

legislativerecordsorjournals,

speechesandfloordebatemadepriortothevoteonthebill,

legislativesubcommitteeminutes,factualfindings,and/orreports,

other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the

definitionsinthestatuteonquestion,

other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in

question,

legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or

president,

case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the

problemsthelegislaturewasattemptingtoaddresswiththebill,or

constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congressstillhave passed

certain sections of a statute 'had it known' about the constitutional
invalidityoftheotherportionsofthestatute?").

legislativeintentthereasonforpassingthelaw

literal meaning or plain meaning rule.

If the statute is clear,

plainandfree from ambiguity,it mustbe givenitsliteralmeaningand

appliedwithoutattemptedinterpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law.Literal meaning or
plain rule means INTERPRETATION of the LAW.
ALL WORDS
words in a statute
shouldifpossible,begiveneffect.

Where a statute definesaword or phrase employedtherein,thewordorphraseshould

not,byCONSTRUCTION,begiven adifferentmeaning.Whenthelegislaturedefinesa
word used in a statute, it doesnot usurp the courts function to interpret the laws butit
merelyLEGISLATESwhatshouldformpartofthelawitself.

Itis settledthat inthe absence oflegislative intent todefine words, words andphrases
usedin statuteshouldbegiventheir plain,ordinary,andcommonusagemeaningwhich
is supported by the maxim
generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda
or what is

generally spoken shall be generally understood. It is also the same as

GENERALI

DICTUM GENERALITIR EST INTERPRETANDUM a general statementis understood

inageneralsense.

WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not

intenttowords.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

When the law
doesnotdistinguish,donotdistinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTAEST.

The law maybe harsh, but is still the law

.
It isexceedingly hard,but so the
lawiswritten.

doctrine of necessary implication

this doctrine states that
what is

implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is

expressed
.
Every statute is
understand by implication to contain all such
provision asmaybe necessarytoeffectuate toitsobjectandpurpose
,ortomake
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms.
The principle is expressed in themaximEX NECESSITATE LEGIS
or
fromthe
necessityofthelaw.

ejusdemgeneris
.
THE SAMEKINDORSPECIE
.
Thisistogiveeffect
to both the particular and general words,
by treating the particular
words as indicating the class
and the
general words as indicating
all
that is embraced in said class
,
although not specificallynamed by

theparticularwords.


The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application it should be used tocarry
out,not to defeatthe intent or purpose ofthelaw
the rulemustgiveway in favorof
thelegislativeintent

limitationsofejusdemgeneris
requisites:
1. Statue contains an
enumeration of particular and specific words
,
followedbyageneralwordorphrase

2. The particular and

specific words constitute a class or are of the
samekind

3. The
enumeration of the particular and specific words is not
exhaustive
orisnotmerelybyexamples

4. There is
no indication of legislative intent to give generalwordsor
phrasesabroadermeaning.

expressiouniosestexclusioalterius.

the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence

IMPLIES the
EXCLUSION
ofOTHERS

or

Whatisexpressedputsan
end
tothatwhichis
implied
.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM,

where a Statute, by
its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by

interpretationorCONSTRUCTION,beextendedtoothermatters.

These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downsthe exceptions, whatis
not listdown as anexception isACCEPTED
expressinthemaximEXCEPTIOFIRMAT
REGULAMINCASIBUSNONEXCEPTIS,

the
expressexception
,exemptionorsavings
excludesothers.

application of expressio unius rule

.
This auxiliary rule is used in
CONSTRUCTION
of statutes
granting powers
,
creating
rights and
remedies
,
restricting
common
rights
, and
imposing penaltiesand forfeitures
,aswell as those
statutes which are strictly construed. It isonlyatooland nota mandatory ruleusedfor
ascertainingthelegislativeintent.
Therulemustalsoyieldtolegislativeintent.

negative opposite doctrine

,
WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN
END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED
is known as negativeopposite doctrine
or
argumentumacontrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (

case of omission
)
pro
omissohabendusest
.
Aperson,objectorthingomittedfrom
an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted
intentionally
.
Thisrule isnotabsoluteifitcanbeshownthatthe
legislaturedidnot

intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative
intent isclearly indicated,
theCOURTmaysupply the omission iftodosowill
carryout
theintentofthelegislature
andwillnotdoviolencetoitslanguage.

doctrine of last antecedent or

AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS

FIAL RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATURSENTENTIA or

relative wordsreferto the
nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires.
QUALIFYING WORDS
restrict
or
modify
onlythe
wordsorphrases
towhichtheyare
immediatelyassociated.

The
lastantecedentruleis adoctrineofinterpretationofa
statute
,bywhich
"Referential andqualifying phrases,where no contraryintentionappears,refersolelyto
the last antecedent."
The rule is typically bound by "common sense" and is flexible
enough to avoid application that "would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain
intent of the language, or if the context for other reason requires adeviationfromthe
rule."
Evidencethataqualifyingphraseissupposedtoapplyto

all antecedents instead of onlytotheimmediatelypreceding

one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the
antecedentsbyacomma."

reddendo singula singulis

when two descriptions
makesit impossibletoreconcile,reconcileittohavea
singularmeaningtosettletheissue.

refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be takenDISTRIBUTIVELY toeffectthateach
word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriate
relatedandtowhichitismostapplicable.

REDDENDO

SINGULA

SINGULIS
,
construction.

By

rendering each his own

for example, when two
descriptions of property are given together in one mass,
both the next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless in
cases where a construction can be made reddendo
singulasingulis,thatthenextofkinshalltakethepersonal
estate and the heir at law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490.
Vide11East,,513,n.Bac.Ab.Conditions,L.

Stare Decisis
[Latin,
Letthedecision stand
.]
The policy of courtsto abide

by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases.

(stahray

duhseesis) n. Latin for

"to stand by a decision,"
the doctrine that a trial

court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) on a legal

questionwhich israisedin the lowercourt.
Reliance onsuchprecedentsis
required of trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the
rule, for the trial court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial
judgebelievesitis"badlaw")

Res Judicata
[
Latin,
A thing adjudged.
]
A rule that a final judgment
on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the
parties toa suit asto all matters that werelitigatedorthatcouldhavebeen
litigatedinthatsuit.
The partyasserting res judicata,havingintroduced a final judgment on the
merits, must thenshow that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive
asto the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff

in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She
sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of
Negligence
.
A jury

returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent.
The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that
wouldhelp her provethat theother driver was negligent.
Acourtwould

dismissthesecondlawsuit
underresjudicatabecausethesecond
lawsuit is
based on the same
Cause of Action
(negligence) and the

sameinjuryclaim.

Obiter Dictum
[Latin
, By the way
.]
Words of an opinion entirely
unnecessary
for the decision of the case
. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a
decisionupon a cause, "bythe way",that is, incidentallyorcollaterally,andnotdirectly
upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of thecause,orintroducedby wayofillustration,oranalogyorargument.
Sucharenotbindingasprecedent.

AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS

.
EQUITY
neveractsincontraventionofthelaw.
ThereasonoftheLawistheLifeoftheLawor
RATIOLEGIS
ETANIMA.

InterpretationandCONSTRUCTIONofStatutesmustbedone
to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA
INTERPRETATIOQUAEVITIOCARET.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat,

the

interpretation that will give the thing the EFFICACY is to beadopted. Law
must receivesensible interpretation to promote theendsforwhichtheyare
enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give
LIFEtothem,IFITCANBEDONEwithoutdoingVIOLENCEtoreason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

, A STATUTE must be
interpreted to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the
nullification of provisions.
IT is so that a legal provision must not be so
construed astobeauselessSURPLUSAGE
.Accordingly,incaseofDoubt
or obscurity, that construction should make the statute fully operative and
effective.
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A
VAINTHINGINTHEENACTMENTOFTHESTATUTE.

InPAREMATERIA
,ofthesamepersonorthing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST

OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS
, or every statute must be so
CONSTRUED and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system ofJurisprudence.
ALL lawsarepresumed tobe consistentwith
eachother.

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA

, distinguish
timesandyouwillharmonizelaws.

IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislatureis presumed tohave beenaware,

and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus,
conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur, Court must

construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute.

If it is

impossible to reconcile and harmonize,onestatutehastogivewayto

the other.
The lateststatuteshall prevail beingthelatestexpressionofthe
legislativeWILL.

A GENERALLAW and aSPECIAL LAWare

inparemateria
.Thefactthat
one isgeneral and the other special createsapresumptionthatthespecial
act is to beconsidered asremainingan exception oftheGeneral Act.
One
as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular
case. This shall apply all the time regardless of which law was enacted
first.

CONTEMPORANEOUS

CONSTRUCTIONS

or

CONTEMPORARY

CONSTRUCTIONSaremadebytheEXECUTIVEDepartments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the
Executive on Statutes, for them to implement it, they must understand it
and interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive
makes RULES orIRRs for this statutes,or ADMINISTRATIVERULESand
PROCEDURES. TheseIRRs orRULESissuedbytheexecutivetoexecute
theStatuteareCONTEMPORARYConstruction.
Second Type of ContemporaryConstructionsarethe INTERPRETATIONS
of the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER
LAWS, under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine
Republic. The issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are
CONTEMPORARYCONSTRUCTIONoftheJusticeSecretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
handling disputes in a QUASIJUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are

based on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress, laws

that are enforced. TheseareCONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and
Constructions.
THESE
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN,
WHENTHEREARE
NOACTUALCONTROVERSIESQUESTIONINGTHE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT
, therefore,NO
STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN THE
JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme
Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO
INTERPRET AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEYMAKE, MAY ALSO DO
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT
THEYTHEMSELVESAREBOUNDTOFOLLOW.

W
ITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE
RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER.

This is so because the greater includes the lesser as

expressed in the maxim,

in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus.
THERE SHALLBE NO CONSTRUCTIONTOGIVEEFFECTTOA
LAW THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS
INTENDEDBYTHELAW.

Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain suchprovisions

as maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make

effective Rights, powers, privileges or JURISDICTION which it grants,

including all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as expressed in the
maxim,
Ex necessitate legis or
from the NECESSITY of the LAW
.
DoctrineofNecessaryImplication.

WHAT CANNOTBEDONE DIRECTLYCANNOTBEDONEINDIRECTLY.

QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EXDIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER
OBLIQUUM.

WHATISAUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrineof Autolimitation
ItisthedoctrinewherethePhilippinesadheresto
principlesofinternationallawasalimitationtotheexerciseofitssovereignty.

Functus officio
an officer or agency whosemandatehasexpiredeitherbecauseofthearrivalofanexpirydate
orbecauseanagencyhasaccomplishedthepurposeforwhichitwascreated.FunctionismereFORMALITY.

Sinperjuicojudgmentsarejudgment,w/oanystatedfactsin
supportoftheconclusion.

RULESinSTATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
Thesolemndecisionsofthejudgesuponastatutebecomepartof
the statute andthesecurityofmen'slivesandproperty, require that they should
be adhered to:
for precedents serve to regulate our conduct and there is more

danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition

because,

when the rule is settled, men know how to conform toit

but, when all is
uncertain, they are left in the dark,andconstantlyliabletoerrorforthesameoffence
which, at one time,wasthoughtentitledto
clergy
,atanother,maybedeemedcapital
and thus the life or deathofthecitizenwillbemadetodepend, not upon a fixt rule,

but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more
miserablestateofthingscannotbeconceived.

1.PresumptionofCorrectness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the
statutetobevalid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect ison
the challenger.
"Every act of the legislature is
presumed to

be

constitutional
, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to
sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When theconstitutionalityofan
act is challenged,
a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the

challenge
. Alllawsarepresumedtobeconstitutionalandthispresumptionisoneof
thestrongestknowntothelaw.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting

statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations
thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored,iftwostatutes
are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant,
the latterenactment repealsoramendsthe

earlierenactedstatute.

"The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting

c.

legislation
.
d. Whenamendments areenactedsoonaftercontroversiesarise
"as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard
theamendmentasalegislativeinterpretationoftheoriginalact,a
formalchangerebuttingthepresumptionofsubstantialchange.

e. " We "assume that the

legislature chose,with care,

the words it used

whenitenactedtherelevantstatute."

whencurrentandpriorversionsofa statuteareatissue
,
thereis

f.

a presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to

effect a substantive change in the law. "Further,
CONGRESS amendments to a

we assume that

statute are purposeful, rather than

unnecessary.

g. "TheSupremeCourtrepeatedlyhasaffirmedthat it is apresumption ofstatutory

construction that, where both general and specific statutes appear toaddress a
matter,CONGRESSintendsthespecificstatutetocontrolthesubject
h."Whenastatutebeginswiththephrase"
notwithstandinganyotherprovision

oflaw,"
itispresumedthatCONGRESSintendedto
overrideanypotential

conflictswith
earlierlegislation.

i."
Theconstructionofstatutesbyagencieschargedwith
administrationofthosestatutesisentitledtogreatweight.
A
decisionofanagencyspecifiedtoexecutethelawmadebyCONGRESScarriesgreat
weightandisentitledtodeferenceunlessitisproventheagencyerred.
Thegrantof

regulatoryauthorityextendsonlytodutiesorpowersconferredbylaw
.
Assuch,"regulations,promulgatedpursuanttodefinitivestatutoryauthority,havethe
forceandeffectoflaw.Moreover,thoseregulationswhich"clearlyandexplicitly
mirror"statutoryauthorityarelikeliesttobesustained.Anyregulationofthe
Departmentmustbereasonablygroundedinanidentifiableanddefinitivestatutory
foundation.
"Generally,thecourtaccordssubstantialdeferencetoanagency'sinterpretationsofitsownregulations.
Providedtheinterpretation"doesnotviolatetheConstitution,itmustbe
given'controllingweightunlessitisplainlyerroneousorinconsistentwith
theregulation.

j.
we will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or

capricious"andthusa"clearabuseofdelegateddiscretion."Ontheotherhand,an"agencydoesnot
possess specialized competence over the interpretation ofastatutemerelybecauseitaddresses
topics within theagency'sdelegable authority. Pure statutoryconstruction,amatterwithinthe"core
competency ofthejudiciary," ."Thisaxiom stemsfrombasic principlesof separationof powers.
It

is emphatically the province and duty of the

JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT to say what the law is.

It necessarily follows that the a priori

question whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory
interpretation,oneimplicatingourdutyofdenovoreview."

k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's

reasoning, correctly noting that

courts give "great deference" to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from
Code
2.24027
, which requires that reviewing courts
"take due

account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the

agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so, "
deference is not

abdication
,anditrequiresustoacceptonlythoseagencyinterpretations
that are reasonable in light oftheprinciples of constructioncourtsnormally
employ. No matter how one calibrates
judicial deference, the

administrative power to interpret a regulation

does
notincludethepowerto rewrite it
.
When a regulation is"not

ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's positionwouldbetopermit

the agency,undertheguiseofinterpretingaregulation,tocreatedefactoa
new regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way
around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice
and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking processthereby putting

injeopardythe"enhancedpoliticalaccountabilityofagencypolicydecisions
adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of
allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to
participateintheprocessofdeterminingtherulesthataffectthem.
l. "
However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts

with the language of the statute or when the interpretation hasnot been
consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an
agency'sinterpretationshouldbewithheld.

m.
When Congress
enacts an imprecisestatute that it commits

to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control

overthatimplementation(except,ofcourse,throughfurther,more
precise, legislation).
The legislative and executive functions are not
combined.
But when anagencypromulgatesanimpreciserule,itleavestoitselfthe
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule'smeaning.
And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law.
Itseems

contrary to fundamental principles of separation of

powers to permit the person whopromulgates alaw
tointerpretitaswell.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress,out
of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes the vagueness effectively
cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferringtoanagency's interpretationof

its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which giveitthepower, in
futureadjudications,todowhatitpleases.

ConstruedAgainsttheState/Vagueness
a."
Itisanancientmaximofthelawthatallsuchstatutesmustbe
construedstrictlyagainstthestateandfavorablytothelibertyofthe
citizen
.Themaximisfoundedonthetendernessofthelawfortherightsof
individualsandontheplainprinciplethatthepowerofpunishmentisvestedinthe
legislatureandnotinthejudicialdepartment.Nomanincursapenaltyunlesstheact
whichsubjectshimtoitisclearlywithinthespiritandletterofthestatutewhich
imposessuchpenalty.Therecanbenoconstructiveoffenses,andbeforeamancan
bepunishedhiscasemustbeplainlyandunmistakablywithinthestatute.Ifthese
principalsareviolated,thefateoftheaccusedisdeterminedbythearbitrarydiscretion
ofthejudgesandnotbytheexpressauthorityofthelaw."
b."Whena
statuteispenalinnature
,it"mustbe
strictlyconstrued
against

theSTATEand
infavorofanaccused.
c.
"While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the

STATE in criminal cases, "

we

will not apply 'an unreasonably

restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the

legislativeintentexpressedtherein.
d."Indeterminingwhetheralegislativeenactmentisunconstitutionallyvague,the
SupremeCourthasconsideredwhetherthewordsusedhaveawellsettled...
meaning...(citingdictionarytodetermine"generallyunderstood"meaningfor
adjectiveinordinance).
"Apenalstatuteisvoidforvaguenessifitbothfails

togiveapersonof
ordinaryintelligencenoticethathercontemplated
conductisforbiddenbythestatute
andencouragesselectiveprosecution

StatutoryExceptions,NegativeElementv.Affirmative
Defense

1) "
When construing
PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application,
the limiting language may be

viewedas anegative elementof the offense which the prosecutionmust

disprove.
Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory
defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the

prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the

offenseorastatutorydefense, a court should lookbothtotheintentofthestatuteasa
wholeandtheabilityoftherespectivepartiestoasserttheexistenceorabsenceofthe
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining
whetherthelimitinglanguageisanegativeelementorastatutorydefense, this Court
hasidentifiedfourfactorstobeconsidered:'the wording of the exceptionanditsrole
inrelationtotheotherwordsinthestatutewhetherinlightofthesituationprompting
legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition
intended whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would
otherwisebecriminalconduct, i.e.,setsforthanaffirmativedefenseandwhetherthe
matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application ofthese
factors to the present casedemonstratesthatthephrase"except as provided by law,"
as used in Code 29.1553, establishes astatutorydefenseasopposedtoanegative
element
2) "
In order to resolve
whether there is a due process violation in this

case, wefirst mustaddressthethreshold issueofwhethertheabsenceof

a validprescriptionisanaffirmativedefenseoranegativeelementofthe
offense.
If it is the latter, the burden of proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be

shifted to the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications,

exceptionsorexemptionstotheirapplication,thelimitinglanguagemaybeviewedas
a negative element of the offensewhichtheprosecutionmustdisprove. Alternately,
thecourtmaydeterminethattheexemptionisastatutorydefense, which the accused
can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution
. The
ACCUSED

BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING

EVIDENCE OF

THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a

reasonable doubt of his guilt
.

In determining

whether

specificlimitinglanguage isanelementoftheoffenseora
statutory defense, a
courtshouldlookbothtotheintentof
the statute as a whole and the ability of the
respective

parties to assert the existence or absence of the

underlying facts
sustaining the applicability of the
limitation.
Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the exception and its
role in relation to the other words in the statute whether in light of the situation
prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general
prohibition intended
whether the exception makes an excuse or

justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct

, i.e., sets
forth an affirmative defense and whether the matter is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant.
(It is undoubtedly the general rulethatthe

state must prove all the essential facts entering into the
descriptionoftheoffense.Butithasbeenheldinmanycasesthat
when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of
thedefendantitisincumbentonhimtoestablishthatfact).

Wenextobservethatthe"validprescription"exemptionofCode18.2250relatesto
afactthatwouldbesolelywithintheknowledgeoftheaccused.Ifweaccept
appellant'scontentionthattheSTATEmustproveappellanthadnovalidprescription,
theoffensewouldbevirtuallyunprovable.Underappellant'stheory,toobtaina
convictionunderthefactsofthiscase,theSTATEwouldberequiredtoprovethatno
medicalprofessional,whereverlocated,inthisCommonwealthorelsewhere,had
prescribedthedrugtoappellant.Thiswouldinvolveanationwidesearchofchain
drugstores,aswellasindependentpharmacies,hospitals,prisoninfirmaries,etc.
Appellant,atoralargument,concededthatsuchanundertakingwouldmostlikelybe
impossible.CONGRESSclearlydidnotintendsucharesult,norwouldtheyenact
suchanimpotentstatute

ConstitutionalConstruction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other
rightsofthepeoplenotthereinexpressed.

2)
The office and purposeof the constitution is toshape and fixthelimitsof

governmental activity. Itthus proclaims, safeguards and preserves inbasic

form the preexistinglaws, rights, mores,habits,andmodesofthoughtand
life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at
the time ofits adoption tothe extent and therein statedThe purposeand
object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be
looked for, and the will andintentofthepeoplewhoratifieditistobemade
effective. As we havestated,CONGRESSmay enact any law or takeany
action notprohibitedbyexpressterms,orbynecessaryimplicationsbythe
Constitution.
3)A fundamental right is one
EXPLICITLY OR
guaranteedbytheconstitution

IMPLICITLY implied

4)"Itisan"establishedprincipleofconstitutionallawthatacourtwillnotruleupon
theconstitutionalityofastatuteunlesssuchadeterminationisabsolutelynecessaryto
decidethemeritsofthecase.
Astatutewillbeconstruedtoavoida

constitutionalquestionwheneverthisispossible.

5)"
Theconstructionofaconstitutional
provisionbyCONGRESS
(
note it is congress construing, not the supreme court
,

thatiswhyitisCALLED
CONTEMPORANEOUSCONSTRUCTION
)isentitledtoconsideration,andi
f

theconstructioniscontemporaneouswithadoptionofthe
constitutionalprovision
,itisentitledtogreatweight.Inaddition,Long
acquiescenceinsuchanannouncedconstructionsostrengthensit
thatitshouldnot

bechangedunlessplainlywrong.
6)
Constitutional

provisions are
EITHER SELFEXECUTING

OR

MANDATORY.

A
selfexecuting provision
does not require enabling legislation for its

enforcement.

A
mandatory provision declares or
imposes a duty or
requirement
thatmustbefollowed.

A
Directory provision sets forth procedures
legislature"foritsimplementation
.

or "
confers discretion on the

7) "We review arguments regarding the

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF A

STATUTE
DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged,
we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be
constitutional.
Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the
litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face
,
that

is, as applied to a third person in a

hypothetical situation
. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute
only

insofar as it has an adverse

impact on his
own
rights

8
) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a

statute, departs from the express limitations of the Constitution and

relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative
usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the courts holding
that an enactment is unconstitutional.
9)
"This Courts jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well

established. The fact that many things of a diverse nature are

authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not
expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized by the act
is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and
natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is
sufficient
. [I]f there is
doubt as to the sufficiency of the title
, the doubt must
be
resolved in favor of its sufficiency
, as courts will not declare an act of the

legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis of a particular act

must necessarily stand on its own, and we must look to both the body and to
the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the
Constitution.
10)
"As ageneralrule
,
wherea statuteisconstitutional asappliedto

a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the

ground that it may be unconstitutionalonits face,thatis,asappliedtoa
third person in a hypothetical situation."
We have said that classification
ordinarilywillbeupheld"ifanystateoffacts canbereasonablyconceivedthatwould

support it." But where the statute creates a "

suspect classification" (e.g.

race, sex,orreligion)or whereitaffectsafundamentalconstitutionalright,the

presumption of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the
morerelaxed"rationalrelationship"testapplies.

"Statutory interpretation presents a

pure question of law and

11)

isaccordinglysubjecttodenovoreviewbythisCourt.
denovo
isaLatinexpressionmeaning"fromthebeginning,""afresh,""anew,""beginningagain."

RetroactiveEnactmentofLaws
1)"Accordingly,whenastatuteisamendedwhileanactionispending,therightsof
thepartiesaretobedeemedinaccordancewiththelawineffectwhentheactionis
begun,unlesstheamendedstatuteshowsaclearintentiontovarysuchrights.
(Our

analysisisguidedbythefundamentalprinciplesofstatutory
constructionthatretroactivelawsarenotfavored,andthatastatuteis
alwaysconstruedtooperateprospectivelyunlessacontrarylegislative
intentismanifest.)

Newlawswillapplyonlytofuturecasesunlessthereis
somethingintheverynatureofthecase
,orinthelanguageofthenewprovision,
whichshowsthatthenewlawwasintendedtohavearetrospectiveeffect.
Further,
everyreasonabledoubtisresolvedagainstaretroactiveoperationofa

statute
,andwordsofastatuteoughtnottohavearetrospectiveoperation
unless

they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning

can be annexed to them
.Retroactiveeffectwillbegiventoastatuteonly
whenlegislativeintentthatastatute
be so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and
unequivocal terms.

CommonLaw

1)
In construing statutes,the
statutorydefinitionmustprevailover

thecommonlawdefinition

2)
CONGRESS is presumedtohaveknownandtohavehadthe

commonlawinmindintheenactmentofastatute.Thestatutemust
therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the
latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express
language or by necessary implicationthatthepurposeofthestatutewasto
changethecommonlaw.

statutory provision will not

3)
"We also apply the established principle that a

be held to change thecommonlawunlessthelegislative intent todo

so is plainly manifested.
Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will
be recognized only in that which is expressly stated in thewordsofthestatuteoris
necessarilyimpliedbyitslanguage.

4)
" A

statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the

legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the

common law are to bestrictlyconstruedandnottobeenlargedintheiroperationby

construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the
common law is limited to that which is expressly stated inthestatuteornecessarily
implied by its language becausethereisapresumptionthatnochangewasintended.
"When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common
law, it abrogates thecommonlawruleonlytotheextentthatitstermsaredirectlyand
irreconcilablyopposedtotherule

PreviousConstructionofaStatute
1)
"
Where

a statute has been

construed by the

courts
, and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the
construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned
by the legislature, and

thenceforth becomes

obligatory upon the courts."

Hence, when the court

finds the old construction should be modified, it cannot

anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction
because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2)
"Theterm"battery"possesses"alonghistoryofdefinitionby"thecourts,
andtherefore,it"carriesitshistoricalconstruction"whenusedby
CONGRESSinastatute.
3)
"We have said that when judicial interpretations have settled the

meaningof an existing statutoryprovision,repetition of the samelanguage

ina new statute indicates, asa general matter, the intent to incorporate its

judicial interpretations as well. (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or
STATUTEthatisambiguousevenifitwasappliedtoaprivatecase)

NewLawNewRemedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "
a statute

prescribing anewremedyforanexistingrightshouldneverbeconstruedto
abolish a preexisting remedy in the absence of express words or
necessaryimplication. Further, "
'when a statute givesanewremedy,

and contains no negative, express or implied, of the oldremedy,

thenewoneprovidedbyitiscumulative,andthepartymayelect
betweenthetwo.'

TwoStatutesPertainingtotheSameSubject
1)
"Itiswellacceptedthatstatutesrelatingtothesamesubject

shouldnotbereadinisolation
.Suchstatutesshouldbeconsideredin
pari
materia
.Moreover,statutesdealingwiththesamesubjectmattershouldbe
construedtogethertoachieveaharmonious
result,resolvingconflictstogive
effecttolegislativeintent.Anacceptedprincipleofstatutoryconstructionisthat,

whenitisnotclearwhichoftwostatutesapplies,themorespecific
statuteprevailsoverthemoregeneral
.
Also,whenstatutesprovide

differentproceduresonthesamesubjectmatter,"thegeneralmust
givewaytothespecific.

"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your

questions and in accord with the rule of
statutory
construction
in
parimateria
,

statutoryprovisionsare
not tobeconsideredasisolatedfragmentsoflaw
. Suchprovisionsareto
be considered as a whole, or as parts ofagreaterconnected,homogeneous systemof laws, ora
singleandcompletestatutorycompilation.

Statutes inparimateriaare consideredasiftheyconstitutedbutoneact

,sothatsectionsof oneact
maybeconsideredasthoughtheywerepartsoftheotheract.

As ageneralrule,wherelegislation dealingwith aparticularsubjectconsistsof asystemofrelated

general provisions indicative of a settled policy,
new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that
subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect

conformablytoit,andtheyshouldbe soconstruedas toharmonize thegeneraltenororpurport of

the system and make the scheme consistent in all its parts and uniforminitsoperation,unlessa
different purpose is shown plainly orwithirresistibleclearness.
It willbe assumedorpresumed,in

the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend to
innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violatea generalstatuteorsystemofstatutory provisions
the entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in
absenceofwordstocontrary,legislaturedidnotintendtoalterorrepealgeneralstatuteorsystem).
3)
Closelyrelatedstatutesmustbereadas beingconsistent with oneanother.
Two

statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and construed

together and effect given to all of their provisions. Statutes should be
construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effectshouldbe
giventheprovisionsofeach.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible
effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.

Potentially conflicting statutes should be

harmonized to give force and
effecttoeach.

5)
City

and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the

Constitution
.
Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given

effect,courtsmustharmonizethemandapplythemtogether.

TheMeaningofWords

1)
In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are

presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning.

3)Afundamentalruleofstatutoryconstructionrequiresthateverypartofastatutebe
presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary.
"We mustassumethatthelegislature didnot intendtodoavainanduselessthing.
"It

is a well established rule of construction that a statute ought to be

interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect,and not found to be
vain andelusive. "Awordorclausecontainedinastatute
mayonlybe
rejectedas

surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted through

inadvertence or mistake
, and

which is incapable of any sensible meaning," or

is

otherwiserepugnanttotherestofthestatute.

4)
"We will not construe a statute bysinglingoutaparticular term orphrase,butwill construethe

inthecontextoftheotherlanguageusedin

words andtermsat issue

thestatute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is
to

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature

,
that

intentionmustbegatheredfromthewordsused,unlessaliteral
construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the related
principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be
preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction
." Statutes should

not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or irrational

consequences
.

6)"A statute must be construed withreferencetoitssubject matter,theobjectsought

tobeattained,andthelegislative purposeinenactingittheprovisionsshouldreceive
a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather

thanonewhichwilldefeatit.

7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clearanddefinite, effect must be given to it.Itisunnecessarytoresorttoanyrulesof
statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations,thestatute'splainmeaningandintentgovern.

"
Languageisambiguousifitadmitsofbeingunderstood
in more than one way
, refers to two or more things
simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful
import,orlacksclearnessanddefiniteness.

9)"Black'sLawDictionary1586(8thed.2004)
defines
"valid"
as"
Legally

sufficient
binding
."
(notingthatiftheSTATUTEdoesnotprovideastatutory
definitionwemaylooktothedictionarydefinitiontodeterminelegislativeintent

10)"Indraftingthestatute,the
legislatureseparatedthetwoprohibitions

witha
comma
followedbythedisjunctiveword
"nor."
Wehavenoted
that,pursuanttotherulesofgrammar,"
phrasesseparatedbyacomma
and[a]disjunctive...
areindependent
.
Thedisjunctiveservesto

connectthetwopartsofthesentencebutalsotokeepthem
separateandindependent.

12)"Theword[willful]oftendenotesanactwhichisintentional,orknowing,or
voluntary,asdistinguishedfromaccidental.Butwhenusedinacriminalstatuteit
generallymeansanactdonewithabadpurposewithoutjustifiableexcuse
stubbornly,obstinately,perversely[.]Thewordisalsoemployedtocharacterizea
thingdonewithoutgroundforbelievingitislawful.Theterm
"willfulact"imports
knowledgeandconsciousnessthati
njurywillresultfromtheactdone.

The
actdonemustbeintendedoritmustinvolvearecklessdisregardfortherightsof
anotherandwillprobablyresultinaninjury.[T]he
term"gross,wanton,and
culpable"describesconduct
.Theword"gross"means"aggravatedorincreased
negligence"whiletheword"culpable"means"deservingofblameorcensure."
'Grossnegligence'isculpableorcriminalwhenaccompaniedbyactsofcommission
oromissionofawantonorwillfulnature,showingarecklessorindifferentdisregard
oftherightsofothers,undercircumstancesreasonablycalculatedtoproduceinjury,or
whichmakeitnotimprobablethatinjurywillbeoccasioned,andtheoffenderknows,
orischargedwiththeknowledgeof,theprobableresultofhisacts
13)
"But,courts arenotpermittedtoaddlanguagetoastatutenor

are they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial

interpretation." Rather, when thelanguageofastatuteisunambiguous,courtsare
bound by the plain meaning of that language andmaynotassignaconstructionthat
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has
stated.

14) "It is equally well established,however, that if thelanguageofa statuteisclear

and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by the Department that is in conflict
withtheplainlanguageofthestatutecannotbesustained.

15)"Undertheruleof
ejusdemgeneris
,whenaparticularclassofpersonsor

things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general

words are to be restricted in theirmeaningtoasenseanalogoustothelessgeneral,
particularwords. Likewise,accordingtothemaxim
noscitur asociis(associated

words) when general and specific words aregrouped, the general words are limited
bythespecificandwillbeconstruedtoembraceonlyobjectssimilarinnaturetothose
thingsidentifiedbythespecificwords.

16)
Ifastatuteexpresslyexceptsaclasswhichwouldotherwisefallwithinits

terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be
excepted
.

17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the

last antecedentdoctrine,is
particularly applicable here and can be summarized as follows:
Referential and

qualifying words and phrases,

where no contrary intention appears,
refer
solely to the last antecedent.
The last antecedent is 'the last

word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the
meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the
provision or clause immediately preceding it.

(explaining and applying "the

grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or

phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediatelyfollows. .. .") (notingthatconstructionofastatuteaccordingtothelast
antecedentruleis"quitesensibleasamatterofgrammar

erroneousinterpretationofastatutebythosecharged withits

19)
"An

enforcement
cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning.
Amendmentsofstatutescanonlybemadebythelegislatureandnotbythe
courtsoradministrativeofficerschargedwiththeirenforcement


20)
"Butprinciplesofstatutoryconstructionarenotso rigid
. Althoughwepresume

thatthesameterm hasthesame meaningwhenit occurshereandthereinasingle

statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as effectively
irrebuttable. We also understand that [m]ost words have different shades of
meaning and consequently may be variouslyconstrued,notonlywhen theyoccur
in different statutes, but when usedmorethan once inthesamestatuteor evenin
the same section.
Thus, the natural presumption that identical words

used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning isnot rigidandreadily yieldswhenever thereissuchvariationinthe
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion
thattheywere employedin differentpartsof the actwithdifferent intent.Ibid.A
given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
withdistinctstatutoryobjectscallingfordifferentimplementationstrategies."
Ibid.(
Latin
, shortfor
ibidem
,meaning"thesame place")isthetermusedtoprovidean
endnoteor
footnote
citationor
referencefora

source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similarin meaningto
idem(meaning somethingthat hasbeen
[1]

mentionedpreviouslythe same),abbreviated
Id.
, whichis commonlyusedin
legalcitation
.Tofindthe
ibid.
source,onemustlook
atthereferenceprecedingit.

"Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or,"

21)

are independent.
(finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence,
"'but disconnect[s] their meaning'") (noting disjunctive results in alternatives,
which must be treated separately) (finding that limiting phrase in statute is
independentofanddoesnotmodifytwoearlierphrasesbecausethelimitingphrase
is separatedfromthefirsttwobyacommaandthedisjunctive "or")(interpreting
the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and
independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by
corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net assets inexcessof itscapital").
Accordingly,thephrase,"madebytheDefendanttoanylawenforcementofficer,"

is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded
statementorconfessions."

TheTermsMay/Shall
1)Theterm
"may,"
asusedinastatute,shouldbegivenits
ordinarymeaning
intendedbytheCONGRESS
permission,importingdiscretion.
2)Itisalsotrue,however,thattheSupremeCourthasheldthattheword
"may,"
whileordinarilyimportingpermission,
willbeconstruedtobe
mandatory

when
itis
necessarytoaccomplish
themanifest
purposeofthelegislature.
3)
Theuseoftheword
"shall"
inastatute
generallyimplies
thatits
terms
areintended
tobemandatory
,ratherthanpermissiveordirective.
4)"[T]heuseof
shall,
inastatute
requiringactionbyapublicofficial,
is
directoryand
notmandatory
unlessthestatutemanifestsacontraryintent."14"A
statutedirectingthemodeofproceedingbypublicofficersistobedeemeddirectory,
andaprecisecomplianceisnottobedeemedessentialtothevalidityofthe
proceedings,unlesssodeclaredbystatute.

TheTermAggrievedLocusStandi
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In
order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear that
such

person had some direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding
thatheseekstoattack. .. . Thepetitioner
'mustshowthathehasanimmediate,

pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote or

indirect interest.'
. . .
Thus, itis not sufficient that the soleinterest of

the petitioner is to
advance some
perceived public right or to
redress some
anticipated public injury when the only wrong he has

suffered is incommon with other persons similarlysituated

. Theword
'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of
some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or
obligationuponthepetitionerdifferentfromthatsufferedbythepublicgenerally.

MensRea/Scienter/Intent
1)

"In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary

element in the indictment and proof of a particular crime becomes a question of

legislative intent to be construed by the court. Thus, to insertamensreaelement
into the offense, and to require proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose,
whichistocriminalizetheintroductionoffirearmsintoaschoolenvironment. Sowe
willnotadd, by implication,languageto thestatutethatthelegislatureexpresslyhas
chosennottoinclude. Consequently,weholdthatthetrialcourtcorrectlydecided,in
refusing the instruction in question, that this statute is one of strict criminal liability,
and that the Commonwealth was required to prove only that the defendant had
possessed,onschoolproperty,afirearmofthetypedescribedinthestatute.

2)

"
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when

inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion

. Itisasuniversal
and persistentinmaturesystemsoflawasbeliefinfreedomofthehumanwillanda
consequentabilityanddutyofthenormalindividualto
choose betweengood

andevil.

Arelationbetweensomementalelementandpunishmentforaharmfulactis

almostasinstinctiveasthechild'sfamiliarexculpatory"ButIdidn'tmeanto,"andhas
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.

Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the

Eighteenth Century was indicated by

Blackstone's sweeping statement that

to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious will.

"
Commonlaw commentatorsoftheNineteenthCenturyearlypronouncedthe
same principle,

although a few exceptions not relevant to our present

problemcametoberecognized.
Crime, as a compound concept,

generally constituted only from

concurrence ofanevilmeaningmindwithanevildoinghand,wascongenial
toanintenseindividualism.

As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were
silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in
the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation
.

Courts,withlittlehesitationordivision,foundanimplicationofthe
requirementastooffensesthatweretakenoverfromthecommonlaw.The
unanimitywithwhichtheyhaveadheredtothecentralthoughtthat
wrongdoingmustbeconscioustobecriminalisemphasizedbythevariety,
disparityandconfusionoftheirdefinitionsoftherequisitebutelusivemental
element.

However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of

different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones,
for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent,"
"criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent
intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens
rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
Byuseorcombinationofthesevarioustokens,theyhavesoughttoprotect
thosewhowerenotblameworthyinmindfromconvictionofinfamous
commonlawcrimes....TheGovernmentasksusbyafeatofconstruction
radicallytochangetheweightsandbalancesinthescalesofjustice.

The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent
is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit
as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe
the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Suchamanifestimpairmentoftheimmunitiesoftheindividualshouldnotbe
extendedtocommonlawcrimesonjudicialinitiative.
3)"Thepresenceofa"viciouswill"ormensreawaslongarequirementof
criminalresponsibility.Butthelistofexceptionsgrew,especiallyinthe
expandingregulatoryareainvolvingactivitiesaffectingpublichealth,safety,
andwelfare.Id.,at254.Thestatutoryoffenseofembezzlement,borrowed
fromthecommonlawwherescienterwashistoricallyrequired,wasina
differentcategory.13Id.,at260261.
"[W]hereCongressborrowstermsofartinwhichareaccumulatedthelegal
traditionandmeaning[401U.S.601,608]ofcenturiesofpractice,it
presumablyknowsandadoptstheclusterofideasthatwereattachedto
eachborrowedwordinthebodyoflearningfromwhichitwastakenandthe
meaningitsusewillconveytothejudicialmindunlessotherwiseinstructed."

TheDillonRuleandGrantsofAuthority
TheDillonRuleofstrictconstructioncontrolsourdeterminationofthepowersof
localgoverningbodies.Thisruleprovidesthat
municipalcorporations

haveonlythosepowersthatareexpresslygranted
,those
necessarilyorfairlyimpliedfromexpresslygrantedpowers,andthosethatare
essentialandindispensable.
"
In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where

a power is conferred and the mode of its execution is

specified, no other method may be selected;

any other means

would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable.

A

necessarycorollaryisthatwhereagrantofpowerissilentuponitsmodeofexecution,
amethodofexerciseclearlycontrarytolegislativeintent,orinappropriatetotheends
soughttobeaccomplishedbythegrant,alsowouldbeunreasonable.

"Consistentwiththenecessitytoupholdlegislativeintent,the
doctrineofimplied

powersshould
never
beappliedtocreateapowerthatdoesnot
existorto
expandanexistingpowerbeyondrationallimits.
Always,thetestinapplicationofthedoctrineisreasonableness,inwhichconcernfor
whatis
necessarytopromotethepublicinterestisakeyelement.

Finally,whena statute creates aspecificgrantofauthority,theauthority

exists only to the extent specifically granted in the statute. It
can never
gobeyondtheauthoritygiven
.

6)
When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative

agency topromulgate regulations,thoseregulationsmustneither

exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent
with it.
Furthermore, "delegations of legislative power are valid only if they
establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency,
or board in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which
lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void." For example,
language in an enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be
designed to protect and promote the safety and health of employees" is
insufficient.
7
) "We consistently have held that when theprimary purposeofan enactmentisto raiserevenue,

the enactment will be considered atax,regardlessofthenameattachedtotheact. TheGeneral

Assembly is directly prohibited from enacting any local, special, or private law . . . [f]or the
assessmentandcollection oftaxes. Thereis,however,anexceptiontothisspecificprohibition.
The

General Assembly may by special act like RA 7160(Local Government Code)

delegating the
poweroftaxation
toanyprovince,city,municipality.

InconsistentRegulations/Laws

As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of

ExecutiveDepartments havetheforceoflaw,andthatany ExecutiveDepartment
concernedwiththeexecutionofastatutesinterpretationofitsgoverning statutes,
as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight
.
Regulations,

however, may not conflict with the authorizing statute

.
Whether a regulation is
inconsistent with its enabling legislation is
properly a

subject of judicial review.

If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given
effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify the
ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with STATUTES. Such
ordinances are inconsistent with state law
when they cannot co-exist
with a statute.
The fact that acountyor municipal ordinanceenlarges on a statute's provisions does
not create a conflict with the statute unless the statute limits the requirements
(Separability Clause is
inserted)
for all cases to its own terms. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can begiveneffect,
courtsmustharmonizethemandapplythemtogether.

ASingleBodyofLaw
1)"WhenattemptingtodefinetermsinonepartoftheCode,courtsshouldreada
statutewith"
aviewtowardharmonizingitwithotherstatutes.
"
Ordinarily,whenaparticularwordinastatuteisnotdefinedtherein,a

courtmustgiveititsordinarymeaning.
2)
"Whenaskedtointerpretvariouscodesections,theSUPREMECourt
often
examinesotherrelatedstatutesthatcontain

similarorcontrastinglanguage
tohelpdeterminelegislative
intent.

TheExclusionRule

Ambiguity
1)
"Languageis
ambiguous
whenitmaybe
understoodin

morethanoneway
,orsimultaneouslyreferstotwoormore
things.
2)"Whenthelanguageofastatuteisambiguous,
it must be interpreted in a
manner that will give effect to the intent of CONGRESS.
3)"Theprimarygoalof
statutory

construction is to discern and give

effect
to
legislativeintent
,withthereadingofastatuteasawhole
influencingtheproperconstructionofambiguousindividualprovisions
4)
Doctrine

of Contra proferentem:
"
Usedintheconnection

withtheconstructionofwrittendocumentstotheeffectthatan
ambiguousprovisionisconstruedmoststronglyagainstthepersonwho
selectedthelanguage."
Black'sLawDictionary,5thEd.
5)"Instead, wefindtherestrictivecovenant,inparticularthephrase"residentialpurposes,"tobe ambiguousin
several respects....Indeed, even thecircuitcourt's interpretationthattheterm " '[r]esidence' means more than
merephysicalpresenceandlessthandomicile"isambiguous.Itcanbearguedthatanightlyorweeklyrentalis
morethanmerephysical presence. Moreover,if thephrase"residentialpurposes"carrieswith ita "durationof
use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of the property moves from shortterm to longterm.
Under ourcaselaw, arestrictivecovenant of"substantialdoubtorambiguity"mustbeinterpreted "infavorof
thefreeuseofpropertyandagainstrestrictions

CriminalVersusCivilIntentofaStatute
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction." First, one must determine
whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates
either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second,
where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty,

one must address "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate that intention

SupremacyClauseoftheConstitution
1)
"ByvirtueoftheSupremacyClauseoftheConstitution

supersedesanyconflictingstatelaw.
ThepreemptionofLocallawsby
STATUTESmayoccurbyexpressstatutorylanguageorotherclearindicationthat
Congressintendedtolegislateexclusivelyinthearea.EvenifCongressdoesnot
intendtheenactmentofaSTATUTORYschemecompletelytopreemptLocallawsin
thearea,congressionalenactmentsinthesamefieldoverrideLocallawswithwhich
theyconflict.

TheSupremeCourthasidentifiedthreewaysinwhich
preemptionmayoccur:
may adopt
express language setting forth the
existence and scope of preemption
;
(2)
Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that
"occupies the field" and leaves no room for states to adopt
supplemental laws
; and
(1)
Congress

(3)
whenstatuteactuallyconflictswiththeconstitution,typicallywhen

compliancewithbothlawsisa"physicalimpossibility"orthestatute
stands"asanobstacletotheaccomplishmentandexecutionofthefull
purposesandobjectivesofCongress.
2)
"Settledlegalprinciplesprovidethatthe
Constitution,notastate
courterroneousinterpretationofit,iscontrolling
.(incontextof
determiningwhethertoapplyretroactivelyanewrulefortheconductof
criminalprosecutions,adoptingBlackstonianviewthatjudges...findthe
lawratherthanmakethelawandthatjudicialdeclarationoflawis
merelyastatementofwhatthelawhasalwaysbeen.

PublicPolicy
1) "A
court may not "secondguess the lawmakers on matters of

economics, sociologyandpublicpolicy
....Those considerations
belong
exclusively in the legislative domain. Regardless of
whetherit"mayormay notbebetter publicpolicy".
MeaningCOURTS

do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY and

PUBLICPOLICY.
2)
"Judicialreview
doesnotevaluatethe"propriety,wisdom,

necessityand expediency" of legislation.Weask

onlywhether
the statutory classification erects an irrational, arbitrary
distinction one that no conceivable state of facts could
reasonablysustain.