G.R. No.

L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence
of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis.
The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino
Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of
Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from
the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by
reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as
he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p.
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of
Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify
plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no
civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be
held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents.
In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903
of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16,
Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising
from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book
IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil
action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant
maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been
exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the
minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our
inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we
are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the
solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality

that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on
the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be

governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by
his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service
in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years
of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or
when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants
of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the

consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors
of establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less

serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be
broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article
1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion
worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope
in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors
being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this
responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to
the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance,
Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article
1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de
culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only
if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all
acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted

that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil,"
Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts
and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in
no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been
a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and
the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal
case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil
damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer,
the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether
the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part
(Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la
obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el
resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas
de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y

claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el

agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones
civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son
ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia
punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128
del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris.
Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion
de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables
del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o
sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y
empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la
jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales
con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son
demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub

judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba
legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no
existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion
civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason,
they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party
no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not
eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages
in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are
every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering
therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind
the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate
the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a
detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary
to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of

those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or
enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their
functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal
cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are
sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before
the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system,
so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as
different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved
the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered.
Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that
such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the nonexistence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there is greater reason
for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its
enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says,
referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed
by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted
till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a

principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol.
20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He
writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria?
es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar,
en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una
responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante
afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las
faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables.
La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que
enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes,
aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro,
etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta
falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno,
sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho
propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what
the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of
another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary
to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in
question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the
same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of
the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article
referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any
damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is
this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is
a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for

one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo
Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores
e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del
articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la
responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se
deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception,
one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the
order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and
incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the
case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according
to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of
those persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld
the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a
separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising
from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car
owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil
action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000
pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final

judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica
Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria
deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo
cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos,
y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el
hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado
descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y
que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el
fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in
the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the
two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects,
and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the
act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a
source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in
accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees
under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of
the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading

attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the
street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver,
Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime,
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have
been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo,
on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did
not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first,
the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred
the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be
observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released,
and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was
held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a
previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case
at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver
had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case
cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted
in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence
and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action
was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent,
employed by the company, had unjustly andfraudulently, refused to deliver certain

articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was
properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones
facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera
a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la
estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le
originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como
expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que
dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho
por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae
no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda
vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun
otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente
descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos
y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa
negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones
de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which
it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by
the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty
receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with
wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination,
their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these
goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and
damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines
and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the
orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments
of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from
non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based
on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties
litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the
decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods
consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in
virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected
with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and
by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet,
it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365
[year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the
defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily
to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him
and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when

there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for

the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient
to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for
failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts,
would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by
reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these
articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal
Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending
the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the
future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could

be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be

extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133
of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by
the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been
instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal
Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out
of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for

passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act
itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old
child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting
from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and
managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the
judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again
started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which
he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred
if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in
a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter
street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance
shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a
high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions
had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being
a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine.
In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327,
the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction.
The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile
that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water
from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The
trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed
the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic
occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the
court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had
a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening
when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing
the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in
the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7
Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the

negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the
cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the
lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the
care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under
article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government
in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had
been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence,
but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33
Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's
servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as

a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle.
This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison
vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for
damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little
boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell
from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo
Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and
1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year
1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which
had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held
(p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation
as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion
that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article
1902, of the Civil Code.

Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study
first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision
between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took
place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay
a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the
City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the
defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in
part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that
the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from
crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of
the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up
with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words,
the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises
and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to
the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code
should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because
the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary

responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability
arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila
vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the
subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas
the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen
that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay
the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability.
But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that
the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all
who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to
the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause
of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention
because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability
under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed
by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil
action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability
arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasidelitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a

distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this
case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property
through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise,
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to

facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers
and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to
the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from
the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As
Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their
weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon
the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and
not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd
Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already
cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a
ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien
le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire
a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need
of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural

channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights
because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of
a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of
said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,

upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of

damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in resadjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was
issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record
on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for
Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -

I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF
THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendantappellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the
basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint
against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of
their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented
for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained

of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was
already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source
of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by
Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of
our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also
to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either
of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or
of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we

caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own

natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the
Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it
clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter
2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence,
the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should
be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29
to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to
hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered
opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility
cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
(See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by
their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy,
when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly
board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to
be developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant
tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the
same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco,
74 Phil. 576, 579).

G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasidelict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular
accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes
Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent
Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol
and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The
race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it
at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car,
which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the
Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar
overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion
of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that
before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that

Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's
version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by
Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion
of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic;
that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck
driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the
left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria,
rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie
Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in
the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with
costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged
in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered
canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's
car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven
by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant
against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil
Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeepowner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and
sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car
as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truckowner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was
entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No.
80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal

cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint
against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to
Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that
dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge
also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that
"while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from
which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires
an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise,
the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the
issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3

On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to
review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar
to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing
petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained
Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal
Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to
prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state
a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeepowner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must
have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the
first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of
cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we
agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case
No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case
truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage
to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial
Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from
the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo
Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action
was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As
held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality

of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities
above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case
the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasidelict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving
his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by
Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the
sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of
skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand
truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the
collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that
he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's
fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely:
(1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2)
defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right,
i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee,
Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with
petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-

owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar)
that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking
section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasidelict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always
had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view
that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict
may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in
Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not
provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further
observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil
liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence
under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal

case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is
not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article
2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No.
80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action,
his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case
No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpacriminal under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminalunder section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved
for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner
had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil
liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being
the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate
civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal
Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this
wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused
Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear
portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,

Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar
and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this
Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the
damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeepowner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's
car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly,
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar isexdelictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held
to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included
in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were
not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the
criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly
provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we
sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint,
albeit on different grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No.
80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or
his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the
Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose
Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk,
with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of
Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming
daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a
pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains
free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose
from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through

the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail
with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a
cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away
from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance
sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off
the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose
Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after
the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it
came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad
station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the
platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person
emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these
melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market.
They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row
one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons
and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact
that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to
be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it
appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore
brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was
made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and
the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It
appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.

Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon
the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the
security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of
First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated,
and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit,
the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the
contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff
has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct
and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil
Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its
decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In
commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between
"culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an
obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing . . . ."

In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon
the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence
which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable
are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to
one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law,
is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by
the negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract,
is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle ofrespondeat superior
if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon
the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making
good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a
servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences
of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant
that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the
injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been
guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not
liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or
not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of
the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that
proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68)
the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of
his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the
discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage.

True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that
he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption
is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the
Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extracontractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon
the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage
caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity
of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the
American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant
in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extracontractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of
article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created
by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special
relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair
the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages
which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the

master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extracontractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties
which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations,
other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in
the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the
existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of
these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of
injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so
elected whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary,
for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts
or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise
an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions
to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in
the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who,
by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person
made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render
service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the
sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent
act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he
does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by
defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused
to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of

the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing
creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon
which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove
negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show
that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even
though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the
part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the
breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of
servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from
contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of
agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position
than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who
contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction,
he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation
of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If
such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete
immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or
servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had
been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a
banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of
some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank
to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the
payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and
direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa
contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been
recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November
20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it
appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail
himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:

These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault
or negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but
of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings
imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for
damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the
court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to
constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a
carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that
case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial
court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he
had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep.,
215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge
belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's
servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held,
citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of
articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the
defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of
defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was
riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of
the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was
present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver
to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes
the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co.
(33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the
defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of
by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of
transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in
dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the

distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the
law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of
servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been
overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's
action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract
of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the
questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of
the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof
disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared
that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion
in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by
plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its
essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently,
when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise
due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and
direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it
follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that
defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was
negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court
would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved
that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the
relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of noncontractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to
carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil
code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its
non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a
breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving
its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop
before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the
Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no
liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important
to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant
contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is
negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to
subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this
proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life.
In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is
shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place
where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff
would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed
in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary
or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person,
of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care
has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent
man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under

similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on

Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith
(37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which
would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under
the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted
from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
1awph!l.net

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be
drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped
off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while
the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should
not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the
obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed;
and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its
passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume,
in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was
clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is
proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by
it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these
sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their
presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore,
the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place
was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train

at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either
to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a
month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently
disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any
other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that
a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the
sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum
of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures
connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for
the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 1719

January 23, 1907

M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
A. D. Gibbs for appellant.
F. G. Waite, & Thimas Kepner for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a
rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg,
which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the
negligence of the defendant. The detailed description by the defendant's witnesses of
the construction and quality of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of
tramways of that character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces
of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground,
upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to 30
feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were the ties to
which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks or
crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending from one side to
the other. The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the two inside rails of the
parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or

guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also
where the stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not effectually
overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails were immediately above
the joints between the underlying stringers.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the
immediate occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by the
trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the argument to have been the dislodging
of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent
typhoon. The superintendent of the company attributed it to the giving way of the block
laid in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence.
According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of the track, varying from one half inch
to one inch and a half, was therafter apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the
plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna, the
foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the block
under the stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as
before. It has not proven that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or had
any proper system of inspection.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of
duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles
transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or
to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became
visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice
of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
This case presents many important matters for our decision, and first among them is
the standard of duty which we shall establish in our jurisprudence on the part of
employees toward employees.
The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led many countries to enact
designed to put these relations on a fair basis in the form of compensation or liability
laws or the institution of insurance. In the absence of special legislation we find no
difficulty in so applying the general principles of our law as to work out a just result.
Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
And article 568 of the latter code provides:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished.
And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:
4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any
infraction of regulations, shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened,
would have constituted a crime or misdemeanor.
And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults of
their servants and representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character.
It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company
accountable for not repairing the tract, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should
have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence
not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title XVI. Section
1902 of that chapter reads:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damages.
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point
out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide
or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not
punished by the law " and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt
a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant,
that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection
for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason
of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had
always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is
thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though n ever in actual force in these Islands,
was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the
penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had
been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a
crime that could be enforced by only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and
133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citations of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the inured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution
must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded
as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are
process of prosecution, or in so far as they determinate the existence of the criminal
act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement
in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by election of the injured person.
Inasmuch as no criminal in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect
this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions survived the laws that fully regulated it or

has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears
from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article
1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive
definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that
the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the
offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within
the meaning of articles 1092 and 1093. More than this, however, it can not be said to
fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles
are applicable are understood to be those and growing out of preexisting duties of the
parties to one another. But were relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the same code. A typical application of the distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage. while that to that
injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is thus
clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be
understood in two difference senses; either as culpa,
substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as
an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can
not be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability
arising from the already exiting obligation.
Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be
also considered as a real source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2,
title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to presume that the
reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not extend
to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature
of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)
And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of
negligence may be somewhat inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual,
the letter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and not entailing so strict an
obligation as the former. This terminology is unreservedly accepted by SanchezRoman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, Chapter XI, Article II, No. 12), and the principle

stated is supported be decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among them those of
November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not one of mandate.
(March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 107.)
Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of the Working Men's Accident Law of
January 30, 1900, throws uncertain light on the relation between master and workman.
Moved by the quick industrial development of their people, the courts of France early
applied to the subject the principles common to the law of both countries, which are
lucidly discussed by the leading French commentators.
The original French theory, resting the responsibility of owners of industrial enterprises
upon articles 1382, 1383, and 1384 of the Code Napoleon, corresponding in scope to
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Code, soon yielded to the principle that the true
basis is the contractual obligation of the employer and employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196,
Title Travail, 331.)
Later the hardships resulting from special exemptions inserted in contracts for
employment led to the discovery of a third basis for liability in an article of he French
Code making the possessor of any object answerable for damage done by it while in
his charge. Our law having no counterpart of this article, applicable to every kind of
object, we need consider neither the theory growing out of it nor that of "professional
risk" more recently imposed by express legislation, but rather adopting the
interpretation of our Civil Code above given, find a rule for this case in the contractual
obligation. This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so
inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe
appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to English and
American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from
unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty,
otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the negligence of the
defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk
incident to his employment and, as such, one assumed by him. It is evident that this
can not be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to
duly inspect, it for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer
might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused upon the ground that the
negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is
not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the defendant from
the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or
omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as "the fellow-

servant, rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence. Adopted in
England by Lord Abinger in the case of Prescottvs. Fowler (3 Meeson & Welsby, 1) in
1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by "the Employers' Liability Acts" and the
"Compensation Law." The American States which applied it appear to be gradually
getting rid of it; for instance, the New York State legislature of 1906 did away with it in
respect to railroad companies, and had in hand a scheme for its total abolition. It has
never found place in the civil law of continental Europe. (Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858, Title
Responsibilite, 630, and vol. 15, 1895, same title, 804. Also more recent instances in
Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)
The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down the contrary principle in its judgment
of June 28, 1841, in the case of Reygasse, and has since adhered to it.
The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the plaintiff,
contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to
be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
the boards, either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a serious or a rival
difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the
displaced timber underneath the sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a
conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable condition of things
not before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony. While the method of
construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was
otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A man may
easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers.
The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and
that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant,
working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in the track and
never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but
that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to
repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression
of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery
under the severe American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial
judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being
lower than then other" and "it does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before
the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place."

Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would, nevertheless, be
binding upon us, because not "plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence,"
as those words of section 497, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure were
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the De la Rama case (201 U.
S., 303).
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below
is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding
that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon
it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons
necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that,
therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they
could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by the defendant to its
employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting
himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. Therefore the
findings of the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of
the loaded car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to
proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the
officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the
car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made
known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause. This conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be
given such an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to
the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction of damages?
While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent the
doctrine of comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act
contributed to his injury, provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of
the defendant, and some others have accepted the theory of proportional damages,
reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for the accident, yet
the overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes the principle in American
jurisprudence that any negligence, however slight, on the part of the person injured
which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery.
(English and American Encyclopedia of law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and
Contributory Negligence.")

In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme
Court of the United States thus authoritatively states the present rule of law:
Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the
injury complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the
proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of
ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this qualification, which
has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann,
10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured
party's negligence.
There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was
exonerated, but when analyzed they prove to have been decided either upon the point
that he was not negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate
cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to casus fortuitus. Of the first class
in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38 Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a
railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and killed by the shock
following the backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of the train
and engine being in conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on its
part.
Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and
the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the
decision of the 4th of June, 1888 (64Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking
down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of the defendant impelled against it by the Tajo
River, was held due to a freshet as a fortuitous cause.
The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two
bases, one, that the defendant was not negligent, because expressly relieved by royal
order from the common obligation imposed by the police law of maintaining a guard at
the road crossing; the other, because the act of the deceased in driving over level
ground with unobstructed view in front of a train running at speed, with the engine
whistle blowing was the determining cause of the accident. It is plain that the train was
doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the only fault lay with the injured
man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of such an efficient
nature that without it no catastrophe could have happened.
On the other hand, there are many cases reported in which it seems plain that the
plaintiff sustaining damages was not free from contributory negligence; for instance,
the decision of the 14th of December, 1894 (76Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 134), in which

the owner of a building was held liable for not furnishing protection to workmen
engaged in hanging out flags, when the latter must have perceived beforehand the
danger attending the work.
None of those cases define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff which
contributed to his injury as one of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are
left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries.
In France in the case of Marquant, August 20, 1879, the cour de cassation held that
the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the
accident could not have happened, but that the contributory negligence of the injured
man had the effect only of reducing the damages. The same principle was applied in
the case of Recullet, November 10, 1888. and that of Laugier of the 11th of November,
1896. (Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Cirile, 411, 412.) Of like tenor are citations
in Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail, 363, 364, and vol. 15, 1895, Title Responsibilite,
193, 198).
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has retained for the most part the French
Civil Law, now embodied in a code following the Code Napoleon, a practice in accord
with that of France is laid down in many cases collected in the annotations to article
1053 of the code edited by Beauchamps, 1904. One of these is Luttrell vs. Trottier,
reported in La Revue de Jurisprudence, volume 6, page 90, in which the court of Kings
bench, otherwise known as the court of appeals, the highest authority in the Dominion
of Canada on points of French law, held that contributory negligence did not exonerate
the defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the accident, but entitled
him to a reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts have been
overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common law judges drawn from other
provinces, who have preferred to impose uniformally throughout the Dominion the
English theory of contributory negligence. Such decisions throw no light upon the
doctrines of the civil law. Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in legislation; for
instance, section 2 of article 2398 of the Code of Portugal reads as follows:
If in the case of damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the person
injured or in the part of some one else, the indemnification shall be reduced in
the first case, and in the second case it shall be appropriated in proportion to
such fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 2372.
And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly
changeable with the accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but
when that proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability equally
with the person principally responsible. The principle of proportional damages appears
to be also adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code. Even in the United States in

admirality jurisdictions, whose principles are derived from the civil law, common fault in
cases of collision have been disposed of not on the ground of contradictor negligence,
but on that of equal loss, the fault of the one part being offset against that of the other.
(Ralli vs. Troop, 157 U. S. 386; 97.)
The damage of both being added together and the sum equally divided, a decree is
entered in favor of the vessel sustaining the greater loss against the other for the
excess of her damages over one-half of the aggregate sum. (The Manitoba, 122 U. S.,
97)
Exceptional practice appears to prevail in maritime law in other jurisdictions. The
Spanish Code of Commerce, article 827, makes each vessel for its own damage when
both are the fault; this provision restricted to a single class of the maritime accidents,
falls for short of a recognition of the principle of contributory negligence as understood
in American Law, with which, indeed, it has little in common. This is a plain from other
articles of the same code; for instance, article 829, referring to articles 826, 827, and
828, which provides: "In the cases above mentioned the civil action of the owner
against the person liable for the damage is reserved, as well as the criminal liability
which may appear."
The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one, not adjustable with respects of the
faults of the parties, appears to have grown out the original method of trial by jury,
which rendered difficult a nice balancing of responsibilities and which demanded an
inflexible standard as a safeguard against too ready symphaty for the injured. It was
assumed that an exact measure of several concurring faults was unattainable.
The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can
maintain an action against the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off against
the wrong of the other; it that the law can not measure how much of the damage
suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault. If he were allowed to recover, it
might be that he would obtain from the other party compensation for hiss own
misconduct. (Heil vs.Glanding, 42 Penn. St. Rep., 493, 499.)
The parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages.
The law has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed
most in the compound that occasioned the mischief. (Railroad vs. Norton, 24
Penn. St. 565, 469.)
Experience with jury trials in negligence cases has brought American courts to review
to relax the vigor of the rule by freely exercising the power of setting aside verdicts
deemed excessive, through the device of granting new trials, unless reduced damages
are stipulated for, amounting to a partial revision of damages by the courts. It appears
to us that the control by the court of the subject matter may be secured on a moral

logical basis and its judgment adjusted with greater nicety to the merits of the litigants
through the practice of offsetting their respective responsibilities. In the civil law system
the desirable end is not deemed beyond the capacity of its tribunals.
Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally adopted in Spain or in other countries
under the stress and counter stress of novel schemers of legislation, we find the theory
of damages laid down in the judgment the most consistent with the history and the
principals of our law in these Islands and with its logical development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of
it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the shinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the
damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United
States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his
negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting
sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of both instances, and ten days hereafter let the case be
remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J. Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47772 August 31, 1978

INOCENCIO TUGADE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF PEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Manuel M. Camacho for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael P. de

Pano, Jr. and Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
There is nothing impressive about this petition sinking to justify a review of a decision
of respondent Court of Appeals on the ground that instead of relying on what counsel
considers applicable rulings of: respondent Court,. the judgment was based, on a case
decided by this Tribunal Moreover, counsel for petitioner ignored earlier doctrines of
this Court consistently holding that a mishap caused by defective brakes could not be
considered as fortuitous in character and thus caged for an acquittal of the driver if
subsequently haled to court. This Court, nonetheless, was persuaded to give due
course to the petition primarily for clarifying the state of the law and thus hopefully
avoid any further lurking doubt on the matter. It is quite evident that the reversal of the
decision sought to be reviewed is not justified.
The decision of respondent Court, with Justice Julia Agrava as ponente, set forth the
relevant facto thus: "At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January 4,, 1972, Rodolfo
[Rayan- dayan] was driving a Hodlen Kingswood car (the [Holden] car), plate No. 5219V (L-Rizal '71) owned by the Sta. Ines Corp. and assigned for use of its manager, an
Ayala Avenue in Makati, Rizal, going northwards. At the intersection of Ayala Avenue
will Mabati Avenue, [Rayan-dayan] was going to turn left on Makati Avenue but he
stopped to wait for the left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a
stop ... While in that sup position, the [Holden] car was bumped from behind by Blue
Car Taxi bearing Plate No. 55-71R (TX-QC '71) and by Inocencio [Tugade] causing
damage to the [Holden] car, the repairs of which cost P778.10 ... [Tugade] was then
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. He pleaded not
guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab,
sought to expeculate himself with an explanation that this fault could not and should
not be traced to him. after trial, the lower court held: '[Accordingly], the court finds that
accused Inocencio Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and hereby sentences him to pay a [fine of
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos], with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised, Penal Code, as
amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining Corporation in the amount of P778.10 by
way of actual damages; and to pay the costs.' While [Tugade] admitted the facts of the
case as set out above, he, nevertheless, appealed from the judgment reiterating that
'the malfunctioning of the brakes at the time of the accident was due to a mechanical
defect which even the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family cannot
have prevented.' As the lower court had found: "this witness ([Tugade]) testified that

after the accident, he admitted that his taxicab bumped the car on his front because
the brakes of his vehicle malfunctioned; and that the document, ..., is the handwritten
statement he prepared to this effect." 1 Respondent Court of Appeals, after stating that upon review of the
record, it agreed with the trial court, its decision affirming in toto their judgment appealed from.

As noted at the outset, petitioner is not entitled to acquittal. His plea for the reversal of
the decision reached by respondent Court is not impressed with merit. At the most, as
was likewise previously mentioned, the fine imposed could be reduced.
1. Counsel for petitioner vigorously contends that respondent Court of Appeals ought
not to have applied the pronouncement in La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De
Jesus 2 on the ground that it was obiter dictum. That is not the case at all. A little more time and attention in the study of
the above decision could have resulted in its correct appraisal He would have realized then that respondent Court acted
correctly. This Tribunal passed squarely on the specific issue raised. The opinion penned by the then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Makalintal, is categorical: "Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability
for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez V. Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136,
December 29, 1954, and People v. Palapal, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not
binding on this Court but were based on considerations, quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar." 3 The
above doctrine is controlling. The reference to the Court of appeals decisions is of no moment. 4 It may be printed out that
they were not ignored in the opinion of Justice Agrava, six of its nine pages being devoted to distinguishing them. Even
without the La Mallorca ruling then, the decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed can stand the test of strict
scrutiny. It is this Tribunal, not respondent Court of Appeals, that speaks authoritatively.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not
have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken,
its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt
from Barrera v. Barrera: 5 "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus
discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law.
To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically
and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding
on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial heirarchy. They have to defer and to submit." 6 The ensuing paragraph
of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court,
by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings." 7

3. The lack of merit in this petition becomes even more obvious when it is recalled that
the La Mallorca decision did not enunciate a new principle. As far back as Lasam v.
Smith, 8 promulgated more than half a century ago, in 1924 to be exact, this Court has been committed to such a
doctrine. Thus; "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of
the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to
adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either
by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito." 9 Lasam was cited
with approval in the two subsequent cases of Son v. Cebu Autobus Co. 10 and Necesito v. Paras. 11

WHEREFORE, The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December 15, 1977 is

affirmed. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985

ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL
CAMORO, respondents.
Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.
Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review, on questions of law, of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu which reversed the decision of the City Court of Cebu and
exonerated the respondents from any liability arising from a vehicular accident.
The background facts which led to the filing of a complaint for breach of contract and
damages against the respondents are summarized by the Court of First Instance of
Cebu as follows:
The facts established after trial show that the plaintiff was a passenger of
the public utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the
trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant
Berfol Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant
Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando
Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire
exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who
was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on
the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to
his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm.
Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his
back. (Exh. "D"). Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao
City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost.
Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City
Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to
proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch. In
spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for
P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be found.
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach of contract with
damages before the City Court of Cebu City, Branch I against Clemente Fontanar,
Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that caused
losses to the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking into account
that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it
blew up.
After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner and against the respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants and the latter are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P750.00 as reimbursement for the
lost Omega wrist watch, the sum of P246.64 as unrealized salary of the
plaintiff from his employer, the further sum of P100.00 for the doctor's fees
and medicine, an additional sum of P300.00 for attorney's fees and the
costs.
The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIV.
Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a
finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered exonerating the defendants
from any liability to the plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of First Instance.
The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on appeal
a. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion in
failing to take cognizance of the fact that defendants and/or their employee
failed to exercise "utmost and/or extraordinary diligence" required of
common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

b. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion by

deciding the case contrary to the doctrine laid down by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
The City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu found that the right rear tire of
the passenger jeepney in which the petitioner was riding blew up causing the vehicle to
fall on its side. The petitioner questions the conclusion of the respondent court drawn
from this finding of fact.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from any liability
upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event. The Court of First Instance of
Cebu ruled that:
After reviewing the records of the case, this Court finds that the accident in
question was due to a fortuitous event. A tire blow-out, such as what
happened in the case at bar, is an inevitable accident that exempts the
carrier from liability, there being absence of a showing that there was
misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator in the operation and
maintenance of the vehicle involved. The fact that the right rear tire
exploded, despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of caso fortuito
which can be a proper basis for exonerating the defendants from liability. ...
The Court of First Instance relied on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v.
Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, where the Court
of Appeals ruled that:
A tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless the tire was already
old and should not have been used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear
case of fortuitous event.
The foregoing conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu are based on a
misapprehension of overall facts from which a conclusion should be drawn. The
reliance of the Court of First Instance on the Rodriguez case is not in order. In La
Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus, et al. (17 SCRA 23), we held that:
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise
to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in
Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December
29, 1954, and People v. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958.
These rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were
based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at

bar. The appellate court there made no findings of any specific acts of
negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question
of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to
the causative factors, would generate liability. ...
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents.
The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger
jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the
observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe
speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence
to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The
petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen
(14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the
tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous
event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have
been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential characteristics of
caso fortuito:
xxx xxx xxx
... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso
fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito,
or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
(5 Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence
of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should
teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed

limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the
safety of passengers at all times. Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects,
we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that:
... The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a
passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury
resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the
carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances
was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is
considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as
regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the
good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability' (10
Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; see also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451;
20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. v. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and
Ed Note, 29 ALR 788.: Ann. Cas. 1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has
neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever
with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger
has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical,
therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his
passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his
equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. ...
It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the
contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The
records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.
The respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for
failure to prove such damages during the trial. The respondents submit that if the
petitioner was really injured, why was he treated in Danao City and not in Mandaue
City where the accident took place. The respondents argue that the doctor who issued
the medical certificate was not presented during the trial, and hence not crossexamined. The respondents also claim that the petitioner was not wearing any wrist
watch during the accident.

It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a lacerated
wound on his right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back,
and that on his way back to Danao City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch
was lost. These are findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu which we find no reason
to disturb. More so when we consider the fact that the Court of First Instance of Cebu
impliedly concurred in these matters when it confined itself to the question of whether
or not the tire blow out was a fortuitous event.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the City Court of
Cebu, Branch I is REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn
interest at 12% per annum and the attorney's fees are increased to SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn interests from January 27, 1975.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118971. September 15, 1999]
RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 40, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

The question for determination in this case is the liability for libel of a citizen who denounces a barangay
official for misconduct in office. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, found petitioner guilty and
fined him P1,000.00 on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the truth of the charges and that he was
motivated by vengeance in uttering the defamatory statement. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a
decision[1] dated February 1, 1995, affirmed. Hence, this petition for review. The decision appealed from should
be reversed.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing
Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman,
Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were
met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day,
April 22, 1986, the following news article[2] appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:

Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo
Foreshore Area na umanoy inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan
sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul 1980.

Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo
Foreshore Area, sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa
naturang lugar.
Binanggit ni Rodolfo R. Vasquez, 40, Tagapagsalita ng (mga) pamilyang apektado, na umaabot
lang sa 487.87 metro kuwadrado ang kabuuan ng mga lupa na kinatitirikan ng mga barung-barung
ng 38 pamilya.
Naninirahan na kami sa mga lupang nabanggit sapul 1950 at pinatunayan sa mga survey ng NHA
noong nakalipas na taon na may karapatan kami sa mga lupang ito ng pamahalaan, ani Vasquez.
Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA, sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister
Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya nakalusot ang mga
ginawa nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na
pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok.
Sapin-sapin na ang mga kaso na idinulog namin noong nakalipas na mga taon, pero pinawalang
saysay ang lahat ng iyon, kabilang na ang tangkang pagpatay sa akin kaugnay ng pagrereklamo sa
pangangamkam ng lupa noong 1984, sabi pa ni Vasquez.
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latters
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation. After conducting preliminary investigation, the
city prosecutor filed the following information in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40:

The undersigned accuses RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ of the crime of libel committed as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1986, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with malicious
intent of impeaching the reputation and character of one Jaime Olmedo, chairman of Barangay 66,
Zone 6 in Tondo, Manila, and with evident intent of exposing him to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously caused the publication
of an article entitled 38 Pamilya Inagawan ng Lupa in Ang Tinig ng Masa, a daily newspaper sold
to the public and of general circulation in the Philippines in its April 22, 1986 issue, which portion
of the said article reads as follows:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo
Foreshore Area na umanoy inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan
sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul 1980.

Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo
Foreshore Area sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa
naturang lugar.
x x x Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo
sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA, sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister
Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya nakalusot ang mga
ginawa nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na
pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
with which statements, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact he did mean and
convey false and malicious imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is engaged in landgrabbing and
involved in illegal gambling and stealing of chickens at the Tondo Foreshore Area, Tondo, Manila,
which statements, as he well knew, were entirely false and malicious, offensive and derogatory to
the good name, character and reputation of said Jaime Olmedo, thereby tending to impeach,
besmirch and destroy the honor, character and reputation of Jaime Olmedo, as in fact, the latter was
exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Contrary to law.
Upon being arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon the case was tried. The
prosecution presented Barangay Chairman Olmedo and his neighbor, Florentina Calayag, as witnesses. On the
other hand, the defense presented Ciriaco Cabuhat, Nicasio Agustin, Estrelita Felix, Fernando Rodriguez all
residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area and petitioner as its witnesses.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for
review. Petitioner contends that
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
PINPOINTING PETITIONER AS THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS ARTICLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
PETITIONER IMPUTED THE QUESTIONED ACTS TO COMPLAINANT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE ALLEGED IMPUTATIONS WERE MADE MALICIOUSLY.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
FAILED TO APPRECIATE PETITIONERS DEFENSE OF TRUTH.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
ALL THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL WERE PROVEN.

We will deal with these contentions in the order in which they are made.
First. Petitioner claims he was unfairly singled out as the source of the statements in the article when any
member of the 38 complainant-families could have been the source of the alleged libelous statements. [3] The
reference is to the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:

. . . In his sworn statement, appellant admitted he was the source of the libelous article (Exh. B). He
affirmed this fact when he testified in open court as follows: That his allegation on the act of
landgrabbing by Olmedo was based on the alleged report and pronouncements of the NHA
representatives (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1989); that said allegations were made by him before the local
press people in the pursuit of fairness and truthfulness and not in bad faith (pp. 8-9, id.); that the
only inaccurate account in the published article of Ang Tinig ng Masa is the reference to the 487.87
sq.m. lot, on which Olmedos residence now stands, attributed by the reporter as the lot currently
occupied by appellants and his fellow complainants (pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 15, 1989; pp. 4-5, tsn,
January 15, 1990); and that after the interview, he never expected that his statement would be the
cause of the much-publicized libelous article (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 15, 1989). [4]
It is true petitioner did not directly admit that he was the source of the statements in the questioned
article. What he said in his sworn statement[5] was that the contents of the article are true in almost all respects,
thus:
9. Tama ang nakalathala sa pahayagang Ang Masa maliban na lang sa tinutukoy na ako at ang mga kasamahang
maralitang taga-lungsod ay nakatira sa humigit kumulang 487.87 square meters sapagkat ang nabanggit na
487.87 square meters ay siyang kinatitirikan ng bahay ni Barangay Chairman Olmedo kung saan nakaloob
ang anim na lote - isang paglabag sa batas o regulasyon ng NHA;
10. Ang ginawa kong pahayag na nailathala sa Ang Masa ay sanhi ng aking nais na maging mabuting
mamamayan at upang maituwid ang mga katiwaliang nagaganap sa Tondo Foreshore Area kung saan ako at
sampu ng aking mga kasamang maralitang taga-lungsod ay apektado at naaapi.

This was likewise what he stated in his testimony in court both on direct[6] and on cross-examination.[7] However,
by claiming that what he had told the reporter was made by him in the performance of a civic duty, petitioner in
effect admitted authorship of the article and not only of the statements attributed to him therein, to wit:

Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA, sabi ni Vasquez.
....
Sapin-sapin na ang mga kaso na idinulog namin noong nakalipas na mga taon, pero pinawalang
saysay ang lahat ng iyon, kabilang na ang tangkang pagpatay sa akin kaugnay ng pagrereklamo sa
pangangamkam ng lupa noong 1984, sabi pa ni Vasquez.
Petitioner cannot claim to have been the source of only a few statements in the article in question and point
to the other parties as the source of the rest, when he admits that he was correctly identified as the spokesperson
of the families during the interview.

Second. Petitioner points out that the information did not set out the entire news article as published. In
fact, the second statement attributed to petitioner was not included in the information. But, while the general
rule is that the information must set out the particular defamatory words verbatim and as published and that a
statement of their substance is insufficient,[8] United States v. Eguia, 38 Phil. 857 (1918).8 a defect in this regard may be
cured by evidence.[9] In this case, the article was presented in evidence, but petitioner failed to object to its
introduction. Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire article, not only of the portions quoted in the
information, and sought to prove it to be true. In doing so, he waived objection based on the defect in the
information. Consequently, he cannot raise this issue at this late stage.[10]
Third. On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that what he said was true
and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.
To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be
proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.[11]
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.[12]
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. [13] It is not required that the person
defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard
the libelous statement, for a mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion
which he has of himself.[14]
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a
stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.[15]
Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention

and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or security
duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The statements that Olmedo, through
connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in a
number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were clearly
defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that landgrabbing, as charged in the information, has a technical
meaning in law.[16] Such act is so alleged and proven in this case in the popular sense in which it is understood
by ordinary people. As held in United States v. Sotto:[17]

. . . [F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous that
construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and
obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these
rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the
effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the
offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting,
if any there be, from the words used in the publication.
Nor is there any doubt that the defamatory remarks referred to complainant and were published. Petitioner
caused the publication of the defamatory remarks when he made the statements to the reporters who interviewed
him.[18]
The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that
it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if
the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and
functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he
does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.[19]
In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was
able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with
NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the
letter[20] of NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioners counsel which reads:

09 August 1983
Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
55 Third Street
New Manila, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Sarmiento:
In connection with your request that you be furnished with a copy of the results of the investigation
regarding the complaints of some Tondo residents against Chairman Jaime Olmedo, we are
providing you a summary of the findings based on the investigation conducted by our Office which
are as follows:
1. Based on the subdivision plan of Block 260, SB 8, Area III, Jaime Olmedos present structure is
constructed on six lots which were awarded before by the defunct Land Tenure Administration to
different persons as follows:

Lot 4 - Juana Buenaventura - 79.76 sq. m.

Lot 6 - Servando Simbulan - 48.50 sq. m.
Lot 7 - Alfredo Vasquez - 78.07 sq. m.
Lot 8 - Martin Gallardo - 78.13 sq. m.
Lot 9 - Daniel Bayan - 70.87 sq. m.
Lot 1 - Fortunato de Jesus - 85.08 sq. m. (OIT No. 7800)
The above-mentioned lots were not yet titled, except for Lot 1. Fortunato de Jesus sold the said lot
to a certain Jovita Bercasi, a sister-in-law of Jaime Olmedo. The other remaining lots were either
sold to Mr. Olmedo and/or to his immediate relatives.
Lot 14 is also titled in the name of Mariano Bercasi, father-in-law of Jaime Olmedo, with an area of
47.40 sq. m.
The lot assigned to Chairman Olmedo has a total area of 487.87 sq. m.
2. Block 261, SB 8, Area III
Lot No. 7 is titled in the name of Jaime Olmedo, consisting an area of 151.67 sq. m. A four-door
apartment owned by Mr. Olmedo is being rented to uncensused residents.
3. Block 262, SB 8, Area III
Lot No. 13 is allocated to Delfin Olmedo, nephew of Jaime Olmedo, but this lot is not yet titled.
4. Block 256, SB 5, Area III
Victoria Olmedo, uncensused, is a daughter of Jaime Olmedo. Her structure is erected on a nontitled lot. The adjacent lot is titled in the name of Victoria. It was issued OCT No. 10217 with an
area of 202.23 sq. m. Inside this compound is another structure owned and occupied by Amelia
Dofredo, a censused houseowner. The titled lot of Victoria now has an area of 338.20 sq. m.
For your information.
(s/t) HERMOGENES C. FERNANDEZ
Inspector General
Public Assistance & Action Office

In addition, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda,[21] both dated November 29, 1983, of then NHA
General Manager Gaudencio Tobias recommending the filing of administrative charges against the NHA
officials responsible for the alleged irregular consolidation of lots [in Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo.]
With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that what
petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting
cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been
dismissed. Petitioner was able to show that Olmedos involvement in the theft of fighting cocks was the subject
of an affidavit-complaint,[22] dated October 19, 1983, signed by Fernando Rodriguez and Ben Lareza, former
barangay tanods of Barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo. Likewise, petitioner presented a resolution,[23] dated March 10,
1988, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694, stating that charges of malversation and corrupt
practices had been filed against Olmedo and nine (9) other barangay officials but the same were
dismissed. Indeed, the prosecutions own evidence bears out petitioners statements. The prosecution presented
the resolution[24]in TBP Case No. 84-01854 dismissing the charge of attempted murder filed by petitioner against
Jaime Olmedo and his son-in-law, Jaime Reyes. The allegation concerning this matter is thus true.
It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner only tried to prove that the complainant [barangay
chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the complainant committed
the crimes. For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had
been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue.
In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore
Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that
public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this
right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden
of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malicethat is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling
in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,[25] which this Court has cited with approval in several of its
own decisions.[26] This is the rule of actual malice. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the
charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or
good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the
Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self- governing
community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be
stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people.[27]
Complainant contends that petitioner was actuated by vengeful political motive rather than by his firm
conviction that he and his fellow residents had been deprived of a property right because of acts attributable to
their barangay chairman. The Court of Appeals, sustaining complainants contention, held:

That the said imputations were malicious may be inferred from the facts that appellant and
complainant are enemies, hence, accused was motivated by vengeance in uttering said defamatory
statements and that accused is a leader of Ciriaco Cabuhat who was defeated by complainant when
they ran for the position of barangay captain. . . . [28]
As already stated, however, in accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or
concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be
acquitted.[29]
Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges against complainant, it
would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner. Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition
of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof. . . .
Yet, in this case, neither the reporter, editor, nor the publisher of the newspaper was charged in court. What
was said in an analogous case[30] may be applied mutatis mutandis to the case at bar:

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive
news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The
charge was leveled against the petitioner and, curiouser still, his clients who have nothing to do
with the editorial policies of the newspaper. There is here a manifest effort to persecute and
intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed
special privilegesand perhaps also immunitiesduring those oppressive times. The non-inclusion of
the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of
respect for freedom of expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the
past despotism.[31]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29640 June 10, 1971

GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G.
ABAD, respondents.
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioner.
Jose A. Buendia for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Guillermo Austria petitions for the review of the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeal (in CA-G.R. No. 33572-R), on the sole issue of whether in a contract of agency
(consignment of goods for sale) it is necessary that there be prior conviction for
robbery before the loss of the article shall exempt the consignee from liability for such
loss.
In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received
from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be sold
on commission basis or to be returned on demand. On 1 February 1961, however,
while walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have
been accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on the face, while the other snatched
her purse containing jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry
allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant. The incident became the
subject of a criminal case filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against certain
persons (Criminal Case No. 10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).
As Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value notwithstanding demands,
Austria brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her and her
husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages. Answering the
allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense that the alleged
robbery had extinguished their obligation.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered
defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the former the sum of P4,500.00,

with legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as reasonable attorneys' fees,
and the costs. It was held that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if
indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty of negligence when she
went home without any companion, although it was already getting dark and she was
carrying a large amount of cash and valuables on the day in question, and such
negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry.
Not satisfied with his decision, the defendants went to the Court of Appeals, and there
secured a reversal of the judgment. The appellate court overruling the finding of the
trial court on the lack of credibility of the two defense witnesses who testified on the
occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of robbery and defendant Maria
Abad's possesion of the pendant on that unfortunate day have been duly published,
declared respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a
fortuitous event, and relieved them from liability for damages to the owner. Plaintiff
thereupon instituted the present proceeding.
It is now contended by herein petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
there was robbery in the case, although nobody has been found guilty of the supposed
crime. It is petitioner's theory that for robbery to fall under the category of a fortuitous
event and relieve the obligor from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to Article
1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought to be prior finding on the guilt of the persons
responsible therefor. In short, that the occurrence of the robbery should be proved by a
final judgment of conviction in the criminal case. To adopt a different view, petitioner
argues, would be to encourage persons accountable for goods or properties received
in trust or consignment to connive with others, who would be willing to be accused in
court for the robbery, in order to be absolved from civil liability for the loss or
disappearance of the entrusted articles.
We find no merit in the contention of petitioner.
It is recognized in this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a
person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the
human will (or rather, of the debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the
obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 1 A
fortuitous event, therefore, can be produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of man, such
as war, attack by bandits, robbery, 2 etc., provided that the event has all the characteristics enumerated above.

It is not here disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim of robbery,
and if it were really true that the pendant, which she was obliged either to sell on
commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the robbery, then the
occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished her liability. The point at
issue in this proceeding is how the fact of robbery is to be established in order that a

person may avail of the exempting provision of Article 1174 of the new Civil Code,
which reads as follows:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
It may be noted the reform that the emphasis of the provision is on the events, not on
the agents or factors responsible for them. To avail of the exemption granted in the law,
it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be found or
punished; it would only be sufficient to established that the enforceable event, the
robbery in this case did take place without any concurrent fault on the debtor's part,
and this can be done by preponderant evidence. To require in the present action for
recovery the prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order to establish the
robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact
in a civil case.
It is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor for reason of a
fortutious event, such debtor must, in addition to the cams itself, be free of any
concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. 3 This is apparent from Article 1170 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, providing that:

ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
It is clear that under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila and
its suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes against persons and property that
renders travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable
precaution and protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone
to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable value would be negligent
per se and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are
not persuaded, however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in
1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality had not
by far reached the levels attained in the present day.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that to allow the fact of robbery to be
recognized in the civil case before conviction is secured in the criminal action, would
prejudice the latter case, or would result in inconsistency should the accused obtain an
acquittal or should the criminal case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court
finding that a robbery has happened would not necessarily mean that those accused in

the criminal action should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those
actually accused did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a
robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts would not necessarily be
the same.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review,
the petition in this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.