XVII.

On March 30, 2000, Mariano died intestate and was survived

by his wife, Leonora, and children, Danilo and Carlito.
One of the properties he left was a piece of land in
Alabang where he built his residential house.
After his burial, Leonora and Mariano s children
extrajudicially settled his estate. Thereafter, Leonora
and Danilo advised Carlito of their intention to partition
the property. Carlito opposed invoking Article 159 of
the Family Code. Carlito alleged that since his minor
child Lucas still resides in the premises, the family
home continues until that minor beneficiary becomes of
age. Is the contention of Carlito tenable? (4%)
Answer:
No, PERLA G. PATRICIO vs MARCELINO G. DARIO III,G.R. No. 170829,
November 20, 2006, a case with similar facts, our Supreme Court
ruled that while as a rule Article 159 of the Family Code
provides "that the family home shall continue despite the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for
a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor."
However, it enumerated three requisites that must concur
before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits
of Art. 159:
(1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home, and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
In the above problem, the minor Lucas cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has parents capable of
supporting him.
The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Lucas' parents, especially his father, Carlito, who is the
head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of
the parents, especially the father, and only in their
default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/170829.htm

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of th
e co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor benefi
ciary still resides in the said home.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family
home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a fami
ly; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whethe
r the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family h
ome and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they m
ust be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) th
ey live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon th
e head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall con
tinue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the f
amily for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, a
nd the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or cons
tituted the family home.
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued
existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family
or both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts.
153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and
within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are c
ompelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless
of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: I
f there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will
continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a m
inor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the fam
ily home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the s
pouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the s
pouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as famil
y home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family h
ome shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majo
rity. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the
minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of support
ing himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 1
54 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are depend
ent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the
minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Artic
le 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The hus

band and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationshi
p be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates all descendan
ts of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction;
hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distin
guire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Th
us, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcel
ino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the f
amily home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the d
ecedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or wi
thin 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second req
uisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand
support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of suppo
rting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is th
e head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal su
pport upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in thei
r default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it resu
lts in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be a
fforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent
these situations from arising.