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1. People vs.

De los Reyes
FACTS:
Accused Cresencio Singue, Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo was found guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries, and was sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Perfecto assailed that
the RTC failed to consider his minority in imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion perpetua. He argues that
under P.D. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code", he was still a youthful offender when the
crime was committed, being then only 19 years old, so that the implementation of his sentence should have been
suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the sentence of Perfecto Gulo, being a minor, should be suspended.
HELD:
To benefit from P.D. 603, the accused must be a youthful offender not only at the time of commission of the
crime but also at the time of trial. Perfecto was already 26 years old when he was convicted. Under the Code, where
an accused is no longer a youthful offender at the time of sentencing, he cannot anymore avail of the benefit of
suspension of his sentence, neither can his minority at the time of commission of the crime be appreciated as a
mitigating factor.

2) Baclayon vs. Mutia


FACTS:
Florentina L. Baclayon, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation committed against
the principal of the Plaridel Central School. Baclayon applied for probation which was granted but modified by
imposing conditions, of which "to refrain from continuing her teaching profession" was one of them. Baclayon pleaded
for the deletion of said condition, for it is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but is also not in accordance
with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the probation law, but was rejected.
ISSUE: Whether or not to refrain Baclayon from continuing her teaching profession is a valid condition of probation.

HELD:
Teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself
to a lawful calling and occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would practically
prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation.

3) People vs. Nang Kay


FACTS:
Nang Kay was charged with illegal possession of firearms. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and
one (1) day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs. The Solicitor General questions the correctness of the
penalty imposed, expressing the opinion and making the recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence
should have been applied.
ISSUE:Whether or not the indeterminate sentence law should be applied in the instant case.

HELD:
If we are now to apply the law on indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more than
five (5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be less than five (5) years and the maximum necessarily
would have to be more than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance
with the purpose of the law on indeterminate sentence. In cases where the application of the law on indeterminate
sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on
indeterminate sentence should not be applied.

4. Fascinal vs Cruz Case

FACTS:

The Facinals own a 103-hecatre parcel of land. 20 hectares of it was leased to Jamora and Orbion for 10 years. Upon
expiration of the lease contract, the Jamoras, who subsequently acquired the leasehold rights of Orbion, refused to
vacate the land despite the repeated demands of the petitioner. In the Municipal Trial Court of Sapian Capiz,
petitioners filed for a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents. The MC later on ordered the
respondents to vacate the area. The trial court issued a writ of execution for the judgment which the sheriff delivered
to the respondents for them to vacate the area. Despite the issuance of the writ, the respondents had trespassed the
property for five times after they received the said writ. The petitioners instituted contempt proceedings against the
respondents in the CFI of Capiz, affirming the decision of the trial court. The case was then brought before the CA
which affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The respondents then applied for probation. However, this was
denied by the court because there was no delivery of property to the petitioners, respondents are still in the state of
defiance of the decision which has become final and executory.

ISSUE: W/N the respondents can be granted their petition for probation.

HELD: No. Though respondents are qualified for probation because they do not possess any disqualifications under
the probation act, their continuous defiance of the courts order was a showing of their unwillingness of repentance
nor predisposition for rehabilitation which the probation law sought to achieve (Sec 2, P.D 968). Private respondents
were declared in contempt of court when they repeatedly refused to comply with the final decision of the trial court
which ordered them to vacate the subject property.

5. Sumbilla vs. Matrix Corporation


FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a cash loan from MFC, where she issued 6 checks with uniform face value of P6667. Upon
claiming the amount from the drawee bank, it was dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed
account. The MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks in violation of

BP 22. The penalty of fine was 80k, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was
in the total of P40,002.
Issue:
WON the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may
still be modified.

Held:

The penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may still be
modified. The immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to
suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (P6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of
fine using the total face value of the six checks (P40,002.00).

The petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED. Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is sentenced to
pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (P13,334.00) for each
count, and to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 6%
interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

6. Michael Padua vs. People

FACTS:

Padua and Ubalde were charged before the RTC of Pasig of violation of RA 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. But to avail of the privilege of 1 st time offenders, he pleaded guilty. He filed for a
petition for probation alleging that he is minor and a 1st time offender, and did not possess any of the disqualifications
of the probation law. RTC forwarded the case to the Probation Office, where it recommended his probation. However,
Judge Carpio issued an order denying the petition pursuant to section 24 of RA 9165.

ISSUE:WON Padua can avail a probation

HELD:

No, any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law.

7. Declarador vs. Gubaton

Facts: A 17 years old minor was proven to have committed a crime of murder with evident premeditation and abuse of
strength of stabbing 15 times a teacher, wife of the petitioner, in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President
Roxas, Capiz but the sentenced is suspended by the Judge automatically. A petition that the suspension of sentenced
was not proper because the minor is disqualified as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
suspending
the
sentence
of
a
minor
of
a
crime
committed
punishable
by
death.
Held: Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, will be automatically
suspended without a need for application except when the youthful offender was disqualified on any one of the
following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions,
(2) to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted for an
offense by the Military Tribunals. In the case at bar, the youthful offenders crime of murder is punishable, not the
actual sentence, by death or life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not applicable.

8. People vs. Mantalaba

PP v ALLEN MANTALABA

RTC:
found guilty for violation of RA 9165, Art II (Secs. 5 and 11) = Dangerous Drugs Act 2002
CA:
Affirmed
SC (GUILTY but modified penalty due to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority)

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that Allen
Mantalaba, 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu. A buy-bust team was organized, composed of two
policemen and two (2) poseur-buyers with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills. The two poseur-buyers
approached Allen who was said to be in the act of selling shabu. The appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one
of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to
the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed
to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.

After the operation, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant: (1) one big
sachet of shabu; (2) one small sachet of shabu; and (3) two pieces of P100 marked money and a P50 peso bill.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 (COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002).

RTC Butuan (GUILTY)


CA (GUILTY)
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority)

SC

(GUILTY

but

modified

penalty

due

to

ISSUE: WON there should have been a suspension of sentence by reason of minority
HELD:
YES. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense
was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision. It must be noted
that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14,
2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare Code and The Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because
the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344.
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[ that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of
Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic.

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be
imposed. A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

9. Rura vs. Lopena

Facts:

Rura was found guilty of 5 counts of estafa. She was sentenced to serve 17 months and 25 days, each charge of
estafa which is three months and fifteen days.The case was consolicated, tried as one and had one conviction on the
same date. Rura applied for probation which was not granted upon the recommendation of the probation officer that
she commited several crimes of estafa on different dates.

Issue:

Is Rura qualified for probation?

The accused is qualified for probation. Since the cases were consolidated, tried together, and had only one
conviction, there is no previous conviction which can stop the accused from availing probation. Hence, the accused is
qualified.

10. Santos vs. CA

Facts:

Santos was found guilty of 54 counts of bouncing checks in the amount of 3.9 million pesos. In violation of
B.P 22, Santos was sentenced to 54 years of imprisonment and a fine of five million pesos. Santos applied for
probation and it was granted. However, the accused began to sell his properties to evade possible confiscation.

Issue:

Whether or not Santos is eligible for probation

Held:

Probation is not a rights, but a privilege. Santos action of selling toe properties show that he is not a penitent
offender. Santos did not take seriously the gravity of his offense. Hence, the privilege of suspension is withdrawn.

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