Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
February 7, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Vicente T. Ong was the Sales Manager of
petitioner Wiltshire File Co., Inc. ("Wiltshire") from 16 March 1981 up
to 18 June 1985. As such, he received a monthly salary of P14,375.00
excluding commissions from sales which averaged P5,000.00 a
month. He also enjoyed vacation leave with pay equivalent to
P7,187,50 per year, as well as hospitalization privileges to the extent
of P10,000.00 per year.
On 13 June 1985, upon private respondent's return from a business
and pleasure trip abroad, he was informed by the President of
petitioner Wiltshire that his services were being terminated. Private
respondent maintains that he tried to get an explanation from
management of his dismissal but to no avail. On 18 June 1985, when
private respondent again tried to speak with the President of Wiltshire,
the company's security guard handed him a letter which formally
informed him that his services were being terminated upon the ground
of redundancy.
Private respondent filed, on 21 October 1985, a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal alleging that his position could not
possibly be redundant because nobody (save himself) in the company
The termination letter clearly spelled out that the main reason in
terminating the services of complainant isREDUNDANT and not
retrenchment.
The supposed duplication of work of herein complainant and Mr.
Deliva, the Vice-President is absent that would justify
redundancy. . . .
On the claim for moral damages, the NLRC pointed out that the
effective date of private respondent's termination was 18 July 1985,
although it was only 18 June 1985 that he received the letter of
termination, and concluded that he was not given any opportunity to
explain his position on the matter. The NLRC held that the termination
was attended by malice and bad faith on the part of petitioner,
considering the manner of private respondent was ordered by the
President to pack up and remove his personal belongings from the
office. Private respondent was said to have been embarrassed before
his immediate family and other acquaintance due to his inability to
explain the reasons behind the termination of his services.
In this Petition for Certiorari, it is submitted that private respondent's
dismissal was justified and not illegal. Petitioner maintains that it had
been incurring business losses beginning 1984 and that it was
compelled to reduce the size of its personnel force. Petitioner also
contends that redundancy as a cause for termination does not
necessarily mean duplication of work but a "situation where the
services of an employee are in excess of what is demanded by the
needs of an undertaking . . ."
Having reviewed the record of this case, the Court has satisfied itself
that indeed petitioner had serious financial difficulties before, during
and after the termination of the services of private respondent. For
one thing, the audited financial statements of the petitioner for its fiscal
year ending on 31 July 1985 prepared by a firm of independent
auditors, showed a net loss in the amount of P4,431,321.00 and a
total deficit or capital impairment at the end of year of P6,776,493.00.
2
Thus, what the letter was in effect saying was that because of financial
losses, retrenchment was necessary, which retrenchment in turn
resulted in the redundancy of private respondent's position.
In the second place, we do not believe that redundancy in an
employer's personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to
duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same
position that private respondent held prior to the termination of his
services, does not show that his position had not become redundant.
Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it would be
surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing
the work of one person. We believe that redundancy, for purposes of
our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of
the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is
xxx
xxx
This is not to say that the employee may not contest the reality or
good faith character of the retrenchment or redundancy asserted as
grounds for termination of services. The appropriate forum for such
controversion would, however, be the Department of Labor and
Employment and not an investigation or hearing to be held by the
employer itself. It is precisely for this reason that an employer seeking
to terminate services of an employee or employees because of
"closure of establishment and reduction of personnel", is legally
required to give a written notice not only to the employee but also to
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month before
effectivity date of the termination. In the instant case, private
respondent did controvert before the appropriate labor authorities the
grounds for termination of services set out in petitioner's letter to him
dated 17 June 1985.
We hold, therefore, that the NLRC's finding that private respondent
had not been accorded due process, is bereft of factual and legal
bases. The award of moral damages that rests on such ground must
accordingly fall.
While private respondent may well have suffered personal
embarrassment by reason of termination of his services, such fact
alone cannot justify the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
simply a species of damages awarded to compensate one for injuries
brought about by a wrongful act. As discussed above, the termination
of private respondent's services was not a wrongful act. There is in
this case no clear and convincing evidence of record showing that the
termination of private respondent's services, while due to an
authorized or statutory cause, had been carried out in an arbitrary,
capricious and malicious manner, with evident personal ill-will.
Embarrassment, even humiliation, that is not proximately caused by a
wrongful act does not constitute a basis for an award of moral
damages.
8
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22,
1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 48578, reversing that of the voluntary arbitrator which ordered
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) to reinstate
petitioners. Also impugned is the resolution dated May 24, 1999, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
[1]
The undisputed facts, as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Petitioner Zel T. Zafra was hired by PLDT on October 1, 1984 as Operations Analyst
II with a monthly salary of P14,382 while co-petitioner Edwin B. Ecarma was hired as
Junior Operations Analyst I on September 16, 1987 at a monthly rate of P12,032. Both
were regular rank-and-file employees assigned at the Regional Operations and
Maintenance Control Center (ROMCC) of PLDTs Cebu Provincial Division. They were
tasked to maintain the operations and maintenance of the telephone exchanges in the
Visayas and Mindanao areas.
[2]
In March 1995, petitioners were chosen for the OMC Specialist and System
Software Acceptance Training Program in Germany in preparation for ALCATEL 1000
S12, a World Bank-financed PLDT project in line with its Zero Backlog Program.
ALCATEL, the foreign supplier, shouldered the cost of their training and travel
expenses. Petitioners left for Germany on April 10, 1995 and stayed there until July 21,
1995.
[3]
On July 12, 1995, while petitioners were in Germany, a certain Mr. R. Relucio,
SwitchNet Division Manager, requested advice, through an inter-office memorandum,
from the Cebu and Davao Provincial Managers if any of the training participants were
interested to transfer to the Sampaloc ROMCC to address the operational requirements
therein. The transfer was to be made before the ALCATEL exchanges and operations
and maintenance center in Sampaloc would become operational.
Upon petitioners return from Germany, a certain Mr. W.P. Acantillado, Senior
Manager of the PLDT Cebu Plant, informed them about the memorandum. They balked
at the idea, but PLDT, through an inter-office memorandum dated December 21, 1995,
proceeded to transfer petitioners to the Sampaloc ROMCC effective January 3, 1996.
[4]
Petitioners left Cebu for Manila on December 27, 1995 to air their grievance to
PLDT and to seek assistance from their union head office in Mandaluyong. PLDT
ordered petitioners to report for work on January 16, 1996, but they asked for a
deferment to February 1, 1996. Petitioners reported for work at the Sampaloc office on
January 29, 1996. Meanwhile PLDT moved the effectivity date of their transfer to March
1, 1996. On March 13, 1996, petitioners again appealed to PLDT to no avail. And,
because all their appeals fell on deaf ears, petitioners, while in Manila, tendered their
resignation letters on March 21, 1996. Consequently, the expenses for their training in
Germany were deducted from petitioners final pay.
On September 11, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch No. 7 for alleged constructive
dismissal and non-payment of benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In
an order dated November 10, 1996, the presiding labor arbiter referred the complaint to
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Cebu City, for appropriate action. On
January 17, 1997, the parties agreed to designate lawyer Rolando M. Lim as their
voluntary arbitrator.
[5]
[6]
[7]
Respondent PLDT, for its part, averred that petitioners agreed to accept any
assignment within PLDT in their application for employment and also in the
undertaking they executed prior to their training in Germany. It prayed that petitioners
complaint be dismissed.
[9]
[10]
After submission of their respective position papers and admission of facts, the case
was set for hearing. Petitioners presented their witnesses and made their formal offer of
documentary evidence. PLDT, however, requested for a re-setting of the hearing from
October 9 and 10, 1997 to November 10 and 11, 1997. But on those dates PLDT did
not appear.Nor did it file any notice of postponement or motion to cancel the hearings.
[11]
[12]
Upon petitioners motion and pursuant to Article 262-A of the Labor Code, the
voluntary arbitrator issued an order admitting all documentary exhibits offered in
evidence by petitioners and submitting the case for resolution. In said order, PLDT was
[13]
[14]
declared to have waived its right to present evidence on account of its unjustified failure
to appear in the November 10 to 11 hearings.
On December 1, 1997, the voluntary arbitrator issued a decision which reads:
SO ORDERED.
[15]
PLDTs motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied on July 10,
1998. On August 7, 1998, PLDT initiated a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was treated as a petition for review. On December 22, 1998,
the CA ruled in favor of PLDT and reversed the voluntary arbitrators decision, in this
wise:
[16]
[17]
[18]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby given due course. Accordingly, the
assailed Order is hereby REVERSED with the exception of the refund, which is
hereby ordered, of the amount of P35,721.81 to respondent Zafra and P24,186.67 to
respondent Ecarma representing unauthorized deductions from their final pay.
SO ORDERED.
[19]
Briefly, the issues in this case may be restated as follows: (1) whether or not the CA
erred in treating the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent as a petition for
review, and (2) whether or not the CA erred in its appreciation of facts and the decision
it rendered.
Petitioners invoke Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, et al. and Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in arguing
that an appeal and not a petition for certiorari should be the proper remedy to question
the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator. Even assuming that Rule 65 applies,
petitioners argue that PLDT, nevertheless, erred in not including the voluntary arbitrator
as one of the respondents in the petition and in not serving him a copy thereof. These
procedural flaws, they aver, merit the outright dismissal by the CA of the petition.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
A perusal of the petition before the CA shows that the mode chosen by PLDT was a
petition for review under Rule 43 and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65. While it was captioned as a petition for certiorari, it is not the caption of the pleading
but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action. The appellate court
was not precluded from granting relief as warranted by PLDTs allegations in the petition
and the evidence it had presented to support the petition.
[26]
A perusal of the petition before the CA discloses the following: First, under the
heading Nature of the Action, the PLDT averred it was a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision dated December 1, 1997 and Order dated July 10, 1998 of
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Rolando M. Lim. Second, while the assigned errors alleged
that the voluntary arbitrator acted with grave abuse of discretion, nevertheless, the issue
set forth was whether or not there existed sufficient evidence to show that
complainants [herein petitioners] were constructively dismissed, and whether
they were entitled to reinstatement, back wages and other monetary awards.
Clearly, the issue was factual and not limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion. Third, the petition was filed within the 15-day period to perfect
an appeal and did not implead the voluntary arbitrator as a respondent. All of
these indicate that the petition below was indeed one for review.
[27]
[28]
Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention that the voluntary arbitrator was not
furnished a copy of the petition, the records reveal otherwise. Attached to the petition
filed before the appellate court was a registry receipt of the copy sent to the voluntary
arbitrator.
[29]
Coming now to the substantive merits of the petition before us. Considering that the
CAs findings of fact clash with those of the voluntary arbitrator, with contradictory
results, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case as well as the
submissions of the parties. Having done so carefully, we are not convinced that the
voluntary arbitrator erred in his factual conclusions so as to justify reversal thereof by
the appellate court. We are persuaded to rule in favor of the complaining workers,
herein petitioners, following the well-established doctrine in labor-management relations
that in case of doubt, labor should prevail.
[31]
xxx
To : Atty. E.D. Perez, SEVP & COO
Thru : J.P. de Jesus, EVP - Meet Demand Group
From : FVP - Program Planning & Engineering Sector
Subject: NON-ASSIGNABLE TRAINED PERSONNEL
=====================================================
During the Group Heads Meeting on 03 April 1996, Mr. R.R. Zarate reported on the
case of some provincial personnel who had foreign training for functions intended for
Manila Operations but refused to be relocated and assigned to Manila, and who
eventually resigned on account of the said transfer. In view of this situation, two (2)
issues were raised as follows:
1. Network Services to be involved in the planning of facilities, specially when
this involves trainees from Network.
2. Actual training to be undertaken only after the sites where such training will be
utilized have been determined.
xxx
A total of 53 slots (for the Exchange O&M, System Software/Acceptance Engineering
and OMC Specialist Courses) were allocated to Network Services by the Steering
Committee composed of representatives from ProgPlan and TechTrain. The O&M
slots were equally distributed to Provincial Operations on the basis where Alcatel
switches will be geographically installed. With regards to NSC, since the contract has
defined its location to be in Sampaloc and considering that its monitoring function
would focus on provincial exchanges, slots were opened both for Provincial and
Metro Manila Operations. Please note that all these relevant informations were
disseminated to concerned parties as inputs, to enable them to recommend the
appropriate training participants.
The choice of trainees were made by Network and, therefore, it is incumbent upon
them to brief the participants or trainees they selected on the nature and assignment of
their employment after training.
To prevent similar instances in the future, we strongly recommend the following:
1. Prior to the training, all concerned groups should conform with the standard
practice of informing personnel regarding the nature and/or location of their
future assignments after the training.
2. The contractual obligation of the trainees should include a provision on their
willingness and commitment to perform the related training functionalities
required by the company.
x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
The want of notice of transfer to petitioners was the subject of another inter-office
memorandum dated November 24, 1995, from one Mr. Relucio, SwitchNet Division
Manager, to a certain Mr. Albania, First Vice President-Regional & Toll Network. It
states:
As the cheaper option is to relocate personnel who have attended the training already,
we have solicited the desire of the Cebu and Davao-based provincial personnel to
transfer to SwitchNet Sampaloc ROMCC which they declined, x x x We should note
that these personnel were not made aware prior to start of training, that they will be
transferred to Manila.
[33]
Alternative 1: Require the four Jones and Davao ROMCC personnel to transfer [to]
the Sampaloc ROMCC, as service requirement. This is the least cost alternative. x x
x We should note however, that these personnel were not aware that they would
relocate after training.
[34]
Under these circumstances, the need for the dissemination of notice of transfer to
employees before sending them abroad for training should be deemed necessary and
later to have ripened into a company practice or policy that could no longer be
peremptorily withdrawn, discontinued, or eliminated by the employer. Fairness at the
workplace and settled expectations among employees require that we honor this
practice and commend this policy.
The appellate courts justification that petitioners transfer was a management
prerogative did not quite square with the preceding evidence on record, which are not
disputed. To say that petitioners were not constructively dismissed inasmuch as the
transfer was effected without demotion in rank or diminution of salary benefits is, to our
mind, inaccurate. It is well to remember that constructive dismissal does not always
involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefits, and privileges.
For an act of clear discrimination,insensibility, or disdain by an employer may become
so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forego his continued employment. The insensibility of private respondents is
at once deducible from the foregoing circumstances.
[35]
Despite their knowledge that the lone operations and maintenance center of the 33
ALCATEL 1000 S12 Exchanges would be homed in Sampaloc, PLDT officials
neglected to disclose this vital piece of information to petitioners before they acceded to
be trained abroad. On arriving home, they did not give complaining workers any other
option but placed them in an either/or straightjacket, that appeared too oppressive for
those concerned.
[36]
All sites where training will be utilized are already pre-determined and pinpointed in
the contract documents and technical protocols signed by PLDT and the contractor.
Hence, there should be no reason or cause for the misappointment of the training
participants.
[37]
Needless to say, had they known about their pre-planned reassignments, petitioners
could have declined the foreign training intended for personnel assigned to the Manila
office. The lure of a foreign trip is fleeting while a reassignment from Cebu to Manila
entails major and permanent readjustments for petitioners and their families.
We are not unaware that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit
of management prerogatives. However, a transfer amounts to constructive dismissal
when the transfer is unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and
involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges. In
the present case, petitioners were unceremoniously transferred, necessitating their
families relocation from Cebu to Manila. This act of management appears to be arbitrary
without the usual notice that should have been done even prior to their training
abroad. From the employees viewpoint, such action affecting their families are
burdensome, economically and emotionally. It is no exaggeration to say that their forced
transfer is not only unreasonable, inconvenient, and prejudicial, but to our mind, also in
defiance of basic due process and fair play in employment relations.
[38]
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48578, dated December 22, 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated December 1, 1997, is
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
The Facts
On 22 October 1979, Del Rosario was employed as Instrument
Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS). Sometime in 1996, MWSS was reorganized pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, and its
implementing guidelines Executive Order No. 286. Because of the
reorganization, Manila Water absorbed some employees of MWSS
including Del Rosario. On 1 August 1997, Del Rosario officially
became an employee of Manila Water.
NLRC are set aside. The Decision dated May 30, 2002 of the [L]abor
[A]rbiter is reinstated, subject to the modification that the computation
of the award of separation pay [to] private respondent shall be
counted from August 1, 1997 x x x up to June 2000.
13
Del Rosario for his part maintains that there is no legal ground to
justify his termination from employment. He insists that his admission
pertaining to his involvement in the loss of the water meters was
merely coerced by the company. Since his dismissal was without valid
or just cause, Del Rosario avers that Manila Water is guilty of illegal
dismissal rendering it liable for the payment of backwages and
separation pay.
17
19
20
21
Our focus will be on the propriety of the award for separation pay.
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the
just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not
entitled to a separation pay. Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides:
22
23
25
29
30
While [this] Court commiserates with the plight of Tirazona, who has
recently manifested that she has since been suffering from her poor
health condition, the Court cannot grant her plea for the award of
That Del Rosario rendered 21 years of service to the company will not
save the day for him. To this case, Central Pangasinan Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission is on all
fours, thus:
1wphi1
- versus -
DECISION
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] dated January 30,
2004 and Resolution[3] dated May 13, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73076, which affirmed the May 30, 2002 Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the Labor Arbiters dismissal of the illegal dismissal
complaint filed by petitioner Dannie M. Pantoja against respondent SCA Hygiene
Products Corporation.
Factual Antecedents
In a Notice of Transfer dated March 27, 1999,[5] respondent informed petitioner of its
reorganization plan and offered him a position at Paper Mill No. 5 under the same terms
and conditions of employment in anticipation of the eventual closure and permanent
shutdown of Paper Mill No. 4 effective May 5, 1999. The closure and concomitant
reorganization is in line with respondents decision to streamline and phase out the
However, petitioner rejected respondents offer for his transfer. Thus, a notice of
termination[6] of employment effective May 5, 1999 was sent to petitioner as his position
was declared redundant by the closure of Paper Mill No. 4. He then received his
separation pay equivalent to two months pay for every year of service in the amount
of P356,335.20 and thereafter executed a release and quitclaim[7] in favor of respondent.
On April 5, 1999, respondent informed the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) of its reorganization and partial closure by submitting with the said office an
Establishment Termination Report[8] together with the list[9] of 31 terminated employees.
On June 20, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent
assailing his termination as without any valid cause. He averred that the alleged
redundancy never occurred as there was no permanent shutdown of Paper Mill No. 4 due
to its continuous operation since his termination. A co-employee, Nestor Agtang,
confirmed this fact and further attested that several contractual workers were employed to
operate Paper Mill No. 4.[10] Petitioner also presented in evidence documents pertaining
to the actual and continuous operation of Paper Mill No. 4 such as the Paper Mill
Personnel Schedule for July 2-8, 2000[11] and 23-29, 2000[12] and Paper Machine No. 4
Production Report and Operating Data dated April 28, 2000[13]and May 18, 2000.[14]
In its defense, respondent refuted petitioners claim of illegal dismissal. It argued that
petitioner has voluntarily separated himself from service by opting to avail of the
separation benefits of the company instead of accepting reassignment/transfer to another
position of equal rank and pay. According to respondent, petitioners discussion on the
alleged resumption of operation of Paper Mill No. 4 is rendered moot by the fact of
petitioners voluntary separation.
Upon appeal by petitioner, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision by finding
petitioners separation from employment illegal. The NLRC gave credence to petitioners
evidence of Paper Mill No. 4s continuous operation and consequently opined that the
feigned shutdown of operations renders respondents redundancy program legally infirm.
According to the NLRC, petitioners refusal to be transferred to an equal post in Paper
Mill No. 5 is of no consequence since he would not have had the need to make a choice
where the situation, in the first place, never called for it. The NLRC further disregarded
the validity of the quitclaim because its execution cannot be considered as having been
done voluntarily by petitioner there being fraud and misrepresentation on the part of
respondent. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
Respondent sought reconsideration of the NLRCs ruling. It denied the fact that Paper
Mill No. 4 continued to be fully operational in 1999. Respondent asseverated that when
Paper Mill No. 4 was shut down in 1999 due to its low production output as certified in
an affidavit[17] executed by SCAs VP-Tissue Manufacturing Director, there was a
necessity to occasionally run from time to time the machines in Paper Mill No. 4 only for
the purpose of maintaining and preserving the same and does not mean that Paper Mill
No. 4 continued to be operational. It was only in 2000 that Paper Mill No. 4 was
subsequently reopened due to a more favorable business climate, which decision is
recognized as a rightful exercise of management prerogative. Moreover, respondent
maintained that this is a case of voluntary separation and not illegal dismissal.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. On January 30, 2004,
the CA reversed the NLRCs Decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision
dismissing the compliant. It ruled that there was no illegal dismissal as the act of
petitioner in rejecting the transfer and accepting the separation pay constitutes a valid
basis for the separation from employment. Respondents Motion to Annul the NLRCs
Entry of Judgment was granted by the CA.
The lone issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not respondent is
guilty of illegal dismissal.
Our Ruling
Respondent presented evidence of the low volume of sales and orders for the production
of industrial paper in 1999 which inevitably resulted to the companys decision to
streamline its operations. This fact was corroborated by respondents VP-Tissue
Manufacturing Director and was not disputed by petitioner. Exercising its management
prerogative and sound business judgment, respondent decided to cut down on operational
costs by shutting down one of its paper mill. As held in International Harvester
Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19]the determination of the need to phase
out a particular department and consequent reduction of personnel and reorganization as
a labor and cost saving device is a recognized management prerogative which the courts
will not generally interfere with.
In this case, the abolishment of Paper Mill No. 4 was undoubtedly a business
judgment arrived at in the face of the low demand for the production of industrial paper at
the time. Despite an apparent reason to implement a retrenchment program as a costcutting measure, respondent, however, did not outrightly dismiss the workers affected by
the closure of Paper Mill No. 4 but gave them an option to be transferred to posts of equal
rank and pay. As can be seen, retrenchment was utilized by respondent only as an
available option in case the affected employee would not want to be
transferred. Respondent did not proceed directly to retrench. This, to our mind, is an
indication of good faith on respondents part as it exhausted other possible measures other
than retrenchment. Besides, the employers prerogative to bring down labor costs by
retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic
means have been tried and found wanting. Giving the workers an option to be transferred
without any diminution in rank and pay specifically belie petitioners allegation that the
alleged streamlining scheme was implemented as a ploy to ease out employees, thus, the
absence of bad faith. Apparently, respondent implemented its streamlining or
reorganization plan with good faith, not in an arbitrary manner and without prejudicing
the tenurial rights of its employees.
Petitioner harps on the fact that there was no actual shutdown of Paper Mill No. 4
but that it continued to be operational. No evidence, however, was presented to prove that
there was continuous operation after the shutdown in the year 1999. What the records
reveal is that Paper Mill No. 4 resumed its operation in 2000 due to a more favorable
business climate. The resumption of its industrial paper manufacturing operations does
not, however, make respondents streamlining/reorganization plan illegal because, again,
the abolishment of Paper Mill No. 4 in 1999 was a business judgment arrived at to
prevent a possible financial drain at that time. As long as no arbitrary or malicious action
on the part of an employer is shown, the wisdom of a business judgment to implement a
cost saving device is beyond this courts determination. After all, the free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
[20]
Petitioner claims that he had no choice but to resign on the belief that Paper Mill
No. 4 will be permanently closed as misrepresented by respondent and thus can
invalidate the release and quitclaim executed by him.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is DENIED. The
assailed January
30,
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73076 dismissing petitioner
Dannie M. Pantojas complaint for illegal dismissal and the May 13, 2004 Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.