Proofs and Refutations

The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Proofs and Refutations (I)

Author(s): I. Lakatos
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, No. 53 (May, 1963), pp. 1-25
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of
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The
British
Journal
Philosophy of
VOLUME XIV
for
the
Science
May, 1963
No. 53
PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS (I)t*

I. LAKATOS
ForGeorgePdlya's75thandKarlPopper's6othbirthday
Introduction
iI. A Problem and a Conjecture.
2. A Proof.
3. Criticismof the Proof by Counterexampleswhich are Local but not
Global.
4. Criticism of the Conjecture by Global Counterexamples.
(a) Rejection of the conjecture. The method of surrender.
(b) Rejection of the counterexample. The method of monsterbarring.
(c) Improving the conjecture by exception-barring methods.
Piecemeal exclusions. Strategicwithdrawal.
(d) The method of monster-adjustment.
(e) Improving the conjecture by the method of lemma-incorp oration. Proof-generatedtheorem versus naive conjecture.
* Received3.x.6o
?
?
t Thispaperwaswrittenin 1958-59at King'sCollege,Cambridge.It wasfirst

read in KarlPopper'sseminarin Londonin March1959. The paperwas then
and widely circulated. An improvedversionhasbeenincludedin
mimeographed
the author'sCambridgePh.D. thesispreparedunderProfessorR. B. Braithwaite's
Discovery,1961). The authoralso
supervision(Essaysin theLogicof Mathematical
receivedmuchhelp, encouragement
and valuablecriticismfrom Dr T. J. Smiley.
The thesiswouldnothavebeenwrittenbutfor the generoushelp of the Rockefeller
Foundation.
Whenpreparing
thislatestversionat the LondonSchoolof Economicsthe author
triedto takenote especiallyof the criticismsand suggestionsof Dr J. Agassi,Dr I.
Hacking,ProfessorsW. C. Knealeand R. Montague,A. Musgrave,ProfessorM.
andJ. W. N. Watkins. Thetreatmentof theexception-barring
methodwas
Polainyi
G. P61lya
andB. L.
improvedunderthe stimulusof the criticalremarksof Professors
van der Waerden. The distinctionbetweenthe methodsof monster-barring
and
was suggestedby B. MacLennan.
monster-adjustment
The papershouldbe seenagainstthe background
of P61lya's
revivalof mathematicalheuristic,andof Popper'scriticalphilosophy.
A
I. LAKATOS
?5.
Criticismof the Proofby Counterexamples

whichareGlobalbut not
Local.
and theorem(a) The role of refutationsin proof-elaboration
formation. The allianceof proofandrefutations.
(b) Reductivestructures.
(c) Fallibilism.
( 6.
Concept-formation.
Introduction
IT frequentlyhappensin the history of thought that when a powerful

new method emerges the study of those problemswhich can be dealt
with by the new method advancesrapidly and attractsthe limelight,
while the rest tends to be ignored or even forgotten, its study despised.
This situationseemsto have arisenin our centuryin the Philosophy
of Mathematics as a result of the dynamic development of metamathematics.
The subjectmatterof metamathematicsis an abstractionof mathematicsin which mathematicaltheoriesare replacedby formal systems,
proofs by certain sequencesof well-formed formulae, definitions by
'abbreviatory devices' which are 'theoretically dispensable' but
'typographically convenient'.1 This abstraction was devised by
Hilbert to provide a powerful techniquefor approachingsome of the
problemsof the methodology of mathematics. At the sametime there
are problems which fall outside the range of metamathematical
abstractions. Among these are all problems relating to informal
mathematicsand to its growth, and all problemsrelatingto
(inhaltliche)
the situationallogic of mathematicalproblem-solving.
I shallreferto the school of mathematicalphilosophywhich tendsto
identify mathematicswith its metamathematicalabstraction(and the
philosophy of mathematicswith metamathematics)as the 'formalist'
school. One of the cleareststatementsof the formalistposition is to
be found in Carnap[1937].2 Carnapdemandsthat (a) 'philosophy is
to be replacedby the logic of science . . . ', (b) ' the logic of scienceis
nothing other than the logical syntax of the languageof science . . . ',
Church[1956]I, pp. 76-77. Also cf. Peano [1894],p. 49 and Whitehead-Russell
12. This is an integralpartof the Euclideanprogrammeas formulated
[19Io-I3], I, p.
Pascal
[1657-58]: cf. Lakatos[1962],p. 158.
by
2 For full detailsof this and similarreferencessee the list of works at the end of Part
III of this article.
1
PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS
(I)
(c) ' metamathematicsis the syntax of mathematicallanguage' (pp. xiii

and 9). Or: philosophy of mathematicsis to be replacedby metamathematics.
Formalismdisconnectsthe history of mathematicsfrom the philosophy of mathematics,since, according to the formalist concept of
mathematics,thereis no historyof mathematicsproper. Any formalist
would basicallyagree with Russell's'romantically' put but seriously
meant remark,accordingto which Boole's Lawsof Thought(I 854) was
' the first book ever written on
mathematics'.1 Formalismdenies the
statusof mathematicsto most of what has been commonly understood
to be mathematics,and can say nothing about its growth. None of
the 'creative' periods and hardly any of the ' critical' periods of
mathematicaltheories would be admitted into the formalist heaven,
where mathematicaltheoriesdwell like the seraphim,purged of all the
impurities of earthly uncertainty. Formalists,though, usually leave
open a small back door for fallen angels: if it turnsout that for some
'mixtures of mathematicsand something else' we can find formal
systems' which include them in a certainsense', then they too may be
admitted (Curry [s95I], pp. 56-57). On those terms Newton had to
wait four centuriesuntil Peano, Russell, and Quine helped him into
heaven by formalising the Calculus. Dirac is more fortunate:
Schwartz saved his soul during his lifetime. Perhaps we should
mention here the paradoxicalplight of the metamathematician:by
formalist, or even by deductivist, standards,he is not an honest
mathematician. Dieudonn6talksabout 'the absolutenecessityimposed
on any mathematicianwho caresfor intellectualintegrity'[my italics]to
present his reasonings in axiomatic form ([1939], p. 225).
Under the present dominance of formalism, one is tempted to

paraphraseKant: the history of mathematics,lacking the guidance of
philosophy, has become blind,while the philosophy of mathematics,
turning its back on the most intriguing phenomena in the history of
mathematics,has become empty.
'Formalism ' is a bulwarkof logical positivistphilosophy. According to logical positivism, a statement is meaningful only if it is
'tautological' or empirical. Since informal mathematicsis neither
1 B. Russell [1901]. The essay was republishedas Chapter V of Russell's[1918],
under the title 'Mathematics and the Metaphysicians'. In the 1953 Penguin Edition
the quotationcan be found on p. 74. In the prefaceof [I918] Russellsays of the essay:
' Its tone is partly explained by the fact that the editor begged me to make the article
" as romantic as possible".'
I. LAKATOS
'tautological' nor empirical,it must be meaningless,sheer nonsense.'

The dogmas of logical positivism have been detrimentalto the history
andphilosophy
of mathematics.
The purposeof theseessaysis to approachsome problemsof the
I use the word 'methodology' in a sense
of mathematics.
methodology
akin to P6lya's and Bernays' 'heuristic '2 and Popper's 'logic of

discovery' or ' situationallogic '. The recent expropriationof the
term 'methodology of mathematics' to serve as a synonym for
'metamathematics' has undoubtedly a formalist touch. It indicates
that in formalistphilosophy of mathematicsthere is no proper place
for methodology qua logic of discovery.4 According to formalists,
1 Accordingto Turquette,G6deliansentencesare meaningless([1950],p. 129).

TurquettearguesagainstCopi who claimsthatsincethey area prioritruthsbut not
analytic,they refutethe analytictheoryof a priori([1949]and [I95o]). Neitherof
themnoticesthatthe peculiarstatusof GiSdelian
sentencesfromthispointof view is
that these theoremsare theoremsof informalmathematics,
and that in fact they
discussthestatusof informalmathematics
in a particular
case. Neitherdo theynotice
that theoremsof informalmathematicsare surelyguesses,which one can hardly
' guesses.
as ' a priori' and' a posteriori
classifydogmatist-wise
2 P6lya [1945],especiallyp. 102, and also [I954],[I962a];Bernays[I947], esp.
p. 187
3
Popper[I934],then[I945],especiallyp. go (or the fourthedition(1962) p. 97);
andalso [1957],pp. 147ff.
4 One canillustratethis, e.g. by Tarski[I93oa]and Tarski[I93ob]. In the first
asashorthand
for ' formalised
paperTarskiusestheterm' deductivesciences' explicitly
deductivesciences'. He says: ' Formaliseddeductivedisciplinesform the field of
researchof metamathematics
roughly in the same sensein which spatialentities
form the field of researchin geometry.' This sensibleformulationis given an
twistin thesecondpaper: ' The deductivedisciplinesconstitute
intriguingimperialist
of the methodologyof the deductivesciencesin muchthe same
the subject-matter
sensein whichspatialentitiesconstitutethe subject-matter
of geometryandanimals
that of zoology. Naturallynot all deductivedisciplinesare presentedin a form
suitablefor objectsof scientificinvestigation.Those,for example,arenot suitable
whichdo not reston a definitelogicalbasis,haveno preciserulesof inference,andthe
theoremsof which are formulatedin the usuallyambiguousand inexacttermsof
colloquiallanguage-in a wordthosewhicharenot formalised. Metamathematical
areconfinedin consequence
to the discussionof formaliseddeductive
investigations
The
innovationis that while the first formulationstatedthat the
disciplines.'
of metamathematics
is theformalised
the second
deductivedisciplines,
subject-matter
statesthatthesubject-matter
formulation
of metamathematics
is confinedto formalised
deductivedisciplines
deductivesciencesarenot suitable
only becausenon-formalised
at all. Thisimpliesthatthepre-history
of a formaobjectsforscientificinvestigation
of a scientificinvestigation-unlikethe
liseddisciplinecannotbe the subject-matter
of a zoologicalspecies,whichcanbe thesubject-matter
of a veryscientific
pre-history
4
(I)
mathematicsis identicalwith formalisedmathematics. But what can

one discoverin a formalisedtheory? Two sorts of things. First,one
can discover the solution to problems which a suitably programmed
Turing machine could solve in a finite time (such as: is a certain
alleged proof a proof or not?). No mathematicianis interested in
following out the dreary mechanical ' method' prescribedby such
decision procedures. Secondly,one can discover the solutions to
problems (such as: is a certain formula in a non-decidabletheory a
theorem or not?), where one can be guided only by the 'method' of
'unregimented insight and good fortune'.
Now this bleak alternativebetween the rationalismof a machine
and the irrationalismof blind guessing does not hold for live mathematics:1 an investigation of informalmathematics will yield a rich
situationallogic for working mathematicians,a situationallogic which
is neither mechanicalnor irrational,but which cannot be recognised
and still less, stimulated,by the formalistphilosophy.
The historyof mathematicsandthe logic of mathematicaldiscovery,
theoryof evolution. Nobodywill doubtthatsomeproblemsabouta mathematical
afterit has been formalised,
theorycan only be approached
just as some problems
abouthumanbeings(say concerningtheiranatomy)can only be approached
after
theirdeath. Butfew will inferfromthisthathumanbeingsare' suitableforscientific
investigation'only whenthey are'presentedin " dead" form', andthatbiological
areconfinedin consequence
to the discussion
of deadhumanbeingsinvestigations
although,I shouldnot be surprisedif some enthusiastic
pupil of Vesaliusin those
gloriousdaysof earlyanatomy,whenthepowerfulnewmethodof dissection
emerged,
hadidentifiedbiologywith the analysisof deadbodies.
In the prefaceof his [1941]Tarskienlargeson his negativeattitudetowardsthe
possibilityof anysortof methodologyotherthanformalsystems:' A coursein the
and
methodologyof empiricalsciences. . . mustbe largelyconfinedto evaluations
criticisms
of tentativegropingsandunsuccessful
efforts.' Thereasonis thatempirical
sciencesareunscientific:for Tarskidefinesa scientifictheory' asa systemof asserted
statements
arrangedaccordingto certainrules' (Ibid.).
1 One of the most dangerous
vagariesof formalistphilosophyis the habitof (I)
statingsomething-rightly-aboutformalsystems;(2) thensayingthatthis applies
to ' mathematics
'-this is againrightif we acceptthe identification
of mathematics
andformalsystems;(3) subsequently,
with a surreptitious
shiftin meaning,usingthe
term' mathematics'in the ordinarysense. So Quinesays([1951],p. 87),that'this
reflectsthe characteristic
situation:the mathematician
mathematical
hits upon his
proof by unregimented
insightand good fortune,but afterwardsothermathematicianscan checkhis proof'. But often the checkingof an ordinary
proofis a very
delicateenterprise,
andto hit on a ' mistake'requiresas muchinsightandluckas to
hit on a proof: the discoveryof' mistakes'in informalproofsmay sometimestake
decades-if not centuries.
S
I. LAKATOS
i.e. the phylogenesis and the ontogenesis of mathematicalthought,1

cannot be developed without the criticism and ultimate rejection of
formalism.
But formalistphilosophy of mathematicshas very deep roots. It is
the latest link in the long chain of dogmatistphilosophies of mathematics. For more than two thousand years there has been an argument between dogmatists
and sceptics. The dogmatistshold that-by
the power of our human intellect and/or senses-we can attain truth
and know that we have attainedit. The scepticson the other hand
either hold that we cannot attain the truth at all (unlesswith the help
of mystical experience),or that we cannot know if we can attainit or
that we have attainedit. In this great debate,in which argumentsare
time and again brought up-to-date, mathematicshas been the proud
fortress of dogmatism. Whenever the mathematicaldogmatism of
the day got into a 'crisis', a new version once againprovided genuine
rigour and ultimate foundations, thereby restoring the image of
authoritative, infallible, irrefutable mathematics, 'the only Science
that it haspleasedGod hithertoto bestow on mankind' (Hobbes[165I],
p. 15). Most scepticsresignedthemselvesto the impregnabilityof this
strongholdof dogmatistepistemology.2 A challengeis now overdue.
The core of this case-studywill challengemathematicalformalism,
but will not challenge directly the ultimate positions of mathematical
dogmatism. Its modest aim is to elaboratethe point that informal,
quasi-empirical,mathematicsdoes not grow through a monotonous
increaseof the numberof indubitablyestablishedtheoremsbut through
the incessantimprovement of guessesby speculationand criticism,by
the logic of proofs and refutations. Since however metamathematics
is a paradigm of informal, quasi-empiricalmathematicsjust now in
rapid growth, the essay, by implication, will also challenge modem
mathematicaldogmatism. The student of recent history of metamathematicswill recognisethe patternsdescribedhere in his own field.
1 Both H.
Poincar6 and G. P61lyapropose to apply E. Haeckel's 'fundamental
biogenetic law ' about ontogeny recapitulatingphylogeny to mental development, in

particular to mathematical mental development. (Poincar6 [1908], p. 135, and
P6lya [1962b].) To quote Poincar6: 'Zoologists maintain that the embryonic
development of an animal recapitulatesin brief the whole history of its ancestors
throughoutgeologic time. It seems it is the same in the development of minds. ....
For this reason, the history of science should be our first guide' (C. B. Halsted's
authorisedtranslation,p. 437).
2 For a discussionof the
r6le of mathematicsin the dogmatist-scepticcontroversy,
cf. my [1962].
6
PROOFS
AND
REFUTATIONS
(I)
The dialogueform shouldreflectthe dialecticof the story; it is

reconstructed
or ' distilled'history.
meantto containa sort of rationally
Therealhistorywillchimein in thefootnotes,
mostof whichareto betaken,
as an organicpart of the essay.
therefore,
I A Problemand a Conjecture
Thedialoguetakesplacein animaginaryclassroom. The classgets

interestedin a PROBLEM:is therea relationbetweenthe numberof
verticesV, the numberof edgesE andthe numberof facesF of polyhedra-particularlyof regularpolyhedra-analogousto the trivial
relationbetweenthe numberof verticesandedgesof polygons,
namely,
that thereare as many edgesas vertices: V=E? This latterrelation
enablesus to classifypolygonsaccordingto the numberof edges(or
vertices): triangles, quadrangles,pentagons, etc. An analogous
relationwouldhelp to classifypolyhedra.
Aftermuchtrialanderrortheynoticethatforall regularpolyhedra
V-- E+ F = 2.1 Somebodyguessesthat this may apply for any
1 First noticed
by Euler [1750]. His original problem was the classificationof

polyhedra, the difficultyof which was pointed out in the editorialsummary: ' While
in plane geometry polygons (figuraerectilineae)
could be classifiedvery easily accordto
number
which
is always equal to the number
the
of
their
of
course
sides,
ing
of their angles, in stereometry the classificationof polyhedra (corporahedrisplanis
inclusa) represents a much more difficult problem, since the number of faces
alone is insufficient for this purpose.' The key to Euler's result was just the
invention of the concepts of vertexand edge: it was he who first pointed out that
besides the number of faces the number of points and lines on the surface of the
polyhedron determinesits (topological) character. It is interesting that on the one
hand he was eager to stressthe novelty of his conceptualframework, and that he had
to invent the term ' acies' (edge) instead of the old ' latus' (side), since latuswas a
polygonal concept while he wanted a polyhedral one, on the other hand he still
retained the term ' angulussolidus' (solid angle) for his point-like vertices. It has
been recentlygenerallyacceptedthat the priority of the resultgoes to Descartes. The
ground for this claim is a manuscriptof Descartes [ca. I639] copied by Leibniz in
Paris from the original in 1675-6, and rediscovered and published by Foucher de
Careil in i86o. The priority should not be granted to Descartes without a minor
qualification. It is true that Descartesstates that the number of plane angles equals
2, + 2a - 4 where by 0 he means the number of faces and by a the number of solid
angles. It is also true that he statesthat there are twice as many plane angles as edges
(latera). The trivial conjunction of these two statementsof course yields the Euler
formula. But Descartesdid not see the point of doing so, since he still thought in
terms of angles(planeand solid) and faces, and did not make a consciousrevolutionary
change to the concepts of o-dimensionalvertices, I-dimensionaledges and 2-dimensional faces as a necessaryand sufficientbasisfor the full topological characterisation
of
polyhedra.
I. LAKATOS
polyhedron whatsoever. Others try to falsify this conjecture,

try to test it in many different ways-it holds good. The results
the conjecture,and suggest that it could be proved. It is
corroborate
at this point-after the stagesproblemand conjecture-thatwe enter
the classroom.1 The teacheris just going to offer a proof
2.
A Proof
arrivedat a conjectureconcerning
for
all
that
F= 2, where V is
polyhedra V-polyhedra,namely,
E-+
the number of vertices,E the number of edges and F the number of
faces. We tested it by variousmethods. But we haven't yet proved
it. Has anybody found a proof?
PUPIL SIGMA: 'I for one have to admit that I have not yet been
able to devise a strict proof of this theorem. . . . As however the
truth of it has been establishedin so many cases,there can be no doubt
that it holds good for any solid. Thus the proposition seems to be
satisfactorilydemonstrated.'2 But if you have a proof, please do
presentit.
TEACHER: In fact I have one. It consistsof the following thoughtexperiment. Step 1: Let us imagine the polyhedronto be hollow, with
a surfacemade of thin rubber. If we cut out one of the faces,we can
stretchthe remainingsurfaceflaton the blackboard,without tearingit.
The faces and edges will be deformed, the edges may become curved,
but V, E and F will not alter,so that if and only if V--E + F =- 2 for
the original polyhedron, then V-- E+ F - I for this flat networkremember that we have removed one face. (Fig. I shows the flat
network for the caseof a cube.) Step 2: Now we triangulateour map
-it does indeed look like a geographicalmap. We draw (possibly
curvilinear)diagonals in those (possibly curvilinear)polygons which
TEACHER: In our last lesson we
1 Eulertestedthe conjecture
quitethoroughlyfor consequences.He checkedit
for prisms,pyramidsand so on. He could have addedthat the propositionthat
of the conjecture. Another
thereareonly five regularbodiesis alsoa consequence
is the hithertocorroborated
propositionthatfourcoloursare
suspectedconsequence
sufficientto coloura map.
The phaseof conjecturing
andtestingin thecaseof V-- E + F- 2 is discussedin
P6lya([1954],Vol. I, the firstfive sectionsof the thirdchapter,pp. 35-41). P6lya
stoppedhere,anddoesnot dealwith thephaseofproving-thoughof coursehe points
out the needfor a heuristicof' problemsto prove' ([1945],P. 144). Ourdiscussion
startswhereP61lya
stops.
2 Euler
([1750],p. 119 andp. 124). But later[1751]he proposeda proof.
8
(I)
are not already (possibly curvilinear) triangles. By drawing each

diagonalwe increaseboth E and F by one, so that the total V-- E+ F
will not be altered (Fig. 2). Step 3: From the triangulatednetwork
we now remove the trianglesone by one. To remove a triangle we
either remove an edge-upon which one face and one edge disappear
(Fig. 3a), or we remove two edges and a vertex-upon which one face,
two edges and one vertex disappear(Fig. 3b). Thus if V-- E+ F=
FIG. I
FIG. 2
FIG.3a
FIG.3b
before a triangleis removed, it remainsso afterthe triangleis removed.

At the end of this procedure we get a single triangle. For this
V- E-- F = I holds true. Thus we have proved our conjecture.
PUPIL DELTA: You should now call it a theorem. There is nothing
conjecturalabout it any more.2
PUPILALPHA: I wonder. I see that this experiment can be performed for a cube or for a tetrahedron,but how am I to know that it
can be performed for any polyhedron? For instance, are you sure,
Sir, that anypolyhedron,
afterhavingaface removed,canbestretched
flat on
the blackboard?I am dubious about your first step.
1
Thisproof-ideastemsfromCauchy[1811].
2 Delta'sview that this
has established
the 'theorem'
proof
beyonddoubtwas
sharedby manymathematicians
in the nineteenthcentury,e.g. Crelle[1826-27],
II,
pp. 668-671,Matthiessen
[1863],p. 449,Jonquieres[189oa]and[189ob]. To quotea
characteristic
passage:' AfterCauchy'sproof,it becameabsolutelyindubitablethat
the elegantrelation
F= E + 2 appliesto all sortsof polyhedra,just as Euler
V-+all indecisionshouldhavedisappeared.'Jonquieres
statedin 1752. In 1811
[189oa],
pp. 111-112.
9
I. LAKATOS
Are you sure that in triangulatingthe map one will

a
new
always get
face for any new edge? I am dubious about your
second step.
PUPIL GAMMA: Are you sure that thereare only two alternativesthe disappearance
of one edgeor else of two edgesand a vertex-when one
the
drops trianglesone by one? Are you even sure that one is left with
PUPIL BETA:
a singletriangleat the endof thisprocess?I am dubiousabout your
third step.1
Of course I am not sure.

But then we are worse off thanbefore! Insteadof one
TEACHER:
ALPHA:
conjecturewe now haveat leastthree! And thisyou call a 'proof'!

TEACHER: I admit that the traditionalname 'proof' for this
thought-experiment
may rightly be considereda bit misleading. I
do not thinkthatit establishes
the truthof the conjecture.
DELTA: Whatdoesit do then? Whatdo you thinka mathematical
proofproves?
TEACHER: This is a subtle questionwhich we shall try to answer

later. Till then I propose to retain the time-honouredtechnicalterm
' quasi-experiment
'-which suggests
'proof' for a thought-experiment-or
a decomposition
the
into
or lemmas,thus
of
originalconjecture subconjectures
embeddingit in a possibly quite distant body of knowledge. Our
'proof', for instance, has embedded the original conjecture-about
crystals,or, say, solids-in the theory of rubber sheets. Descartesor
Euler, the fathers of the original conjecture, certainly did not even
dream of this.2
1The classis a ratheradvancedone. To

Cauchy,Poinsot,and to manyother
excellentmathematicians
of the nineteenthcenturythesequestionsdid not occur.
2 Thought-experiment
was the most ancientpatternof mathematical
(deiknymi)
Greekmathematics
proof. It prevailedin pre-Euclidean
(cf. A. Szab6[1958]).
That conjectures(or theorems)precedeproofs in the heuristicorder was a
commonplacefor ancientmathematicians.This followed from the heuristicprecedenceof 'analysis'over 'synthesis'. (For an excellentdiscussionsee Robinson
to knowbeforehand
what
[1936].) Accordingto Proclos,'. . . it is . . . necessary
is sought' (Heath[1925], I, p. 129). 'They said that a theoremis that which is
of the very thing proposed'-says
proposedwith a view to the demonstration
whichthey
Pappus(ibid.I, p. io). The Greeksdid not thinkmuchof propositions
in
to
the
hit
deductive
direction
without
happened
upon
havingpreviouslyguessed
them. They calledthemporisms,corollaries,incidentalresultsspringingfrom the
proof of a theoremor the solutionof a problem,resultsnot directlysoughtbut
appearing,as it were,by chance,withoutanyadditionallabour,andconstituting,as
or bonus(kerdos)
Proclussays,a sortof windfall(ermaion)
(ibid.I, p. 278). We read
in the editorialsummaryto Euler[1753]thatarithmetical
theorems'were discovered
IO
(I)
whichareLocalbutnotGlobal
3. Criticism
oftheProofbyCounterexamples
TEACHER:
This decompositionof the conjecturesuggestedby
the proof opensnew vistasfor testing. The decompositiondeploys
the conjectureon a widerfront,so thatour criticismhasmoretargets.
for counterexamples
instead
We now haveat leastthreeopportunities
of one!
GAMMA:I alreadyexpressedmy dislikeof your thirdlemma(viz.
thatin removingtrianglesfromthe networkwhichresultedfromthe
stretchingand subsequenttriangulation,we have only two possibilities: eitherwe removean edge or we removetwo edgesand a
vertex). I suspectthatotherpatternsmay emergewhen removinga
triangle.
TEACHER:Suspicion is not criticism.
GAMMA:Then is a counterexamplecriticism?
TEACHER:Certainly. Conjectures ignore dislike and suspicion, but
they cannot ignore counterexamples.

THETA
(aside): Conjecturesare obviously very differentfrom those
who representthem.
GAMMA:I propose a trivial counterexample. Take the triangular
network which resultsfrom performingthe first two operationson a
cube (Fig. 2). Now if I remove a trianglefrom the insideof this network, as one might take a piece out of a jigsaw puzzle, I remove one
trianglewithout removing a single edge or vertex. So the thirdlemma
'. Both the
long beforetheir truthhas been confirmedby rigid demonstrations
' instead
EditorandEulerusefor thisprocessof discoverythe modernterm' induction
of the ancient'analysis'(ibid.). The heuristicprecedenceof the resultover the
folklore.
argument,of the theoremover the proof,has deeprootsin mathematical
is saidto havewritten
on a familiartheme: Chrysippus
Letus quotesomevariations
to Cleanthes:' Justsendme the theorems,thenI shallfindthe proofs'(cf. Diogenes
Laertius[ca. 2oo], VII. 179). Gaussis saidto have complained:'I have had my
resultsfor a long time; but I do not yet know how I am to arriveat them' (cf.
Arber[1954],p. 47),andRiemann:' If onlyI hadthe theorems! ThenI shouldfind
the proofs easily enough.' (Cf. H6lder [1924],p. 487.) P61lyastresses: 'You
theorembeforeyou proveit ' ([1954],Vol. I, p. vi).
haveto guessa mathematical
editorialsummaryto
The term ' quasi-experiment
' is fromthe above-mentioned
Euler[1753]. Accordingto theEditor: 'As we mustreferthe numbersto the pure
how observations
andquasi-experiments
can
intellectalone,we canhardlyunderstand
be of use in investigatingthe natureof the numbers. Yet, in fact, as I shallshow
herewith very good reasons,the propertiesof the numbersknowntodayhavebeen
translation;he mistakenlyattributes
by observation. . .' (P61lya's
mostlydiscovered
the quotationto Eulerin his [1954],I, p. 3).
II
I. LAKATOS
is false-and not only in the case of the cube, but for all polyhedra
except the tetrahedron,in the flat network of which all the triangles
are boundary triangles. Your proof thus proves the Euler theorem
2 for
for the tetrahedron. But we already knew that V- E+
F-=
the tetrahedron,so why prove it?
TEACHER:You are right.
But notice that the cube which is a
counterexampleto the third lemma is not also a counterexampleto

the main conjecture,since for the cube V-- E+ F= 2. You have
shown the poverty of the argument-the proof-but not the falsity of
our conjecture.
ALPHA: Will you scrap your proof then?
TEACHER:No. Criticism is not necessarily destruction.
I shall
improve my proof so that it will stand up to the criticism.

GAMMA:
HOW?
TEACHER:Before showing how, let me introduce the following
an example which
terminology. I shall call a ' local counterexample'
refutes a lemma (without necessarilyrefuting the main conjecture),
an example which refutesthe
and I shall call a 'global counterexample'
main conjecture itself. Thus your counterexampleis local but not
global. A local, but not global, counterexampleis a criticismof the
proof, but not of the conjecture.
GAMMA:So, the conjecturemay be true, but your proof does not
prove it.
TEACHER:But I can easily elaborate,improvetheproof,by replacing
the false lemma by a slightlymodifiedone, which your counterof any

examplewill not refute. I no longercontendthat theremoval
but merelythatat each
mentioned,
followsoneof thetwopatterns
triangle
follows
triangle
stageof the removingoperationthe removalof any boundary
one of thesepatterns. Coming back to my thought-experiment, all
thatI haveto do is to inserta singlewordin my thirdstep,to wit, that

' fromthetriangulated
networkwe now removethe boundary
triangles
will
You
one
'.
one by
agreethatit onlyneededa triflingobservation
to put the proofright.1
wasso trifling;in factit
I do not thinkyourobservation
GAMMA:
was quiteingenious. To makethis clearI shallshow thatit is false.
Takethe flatnetworkof the cubeagainandremoveeight of the ten
Lhuilier,when correctingin a similarway a proofof Euler,saysthathe made
only a 'triflingobservation'([1812-13],p. 179). Eulerhimself,however,gave the
'.
proofup, sincehe noticedthe troublebutcouldnot makethat' triflingobservation
1
12
(I)
trianglesin the order given in Fig. 4. At the removal of the eighth

triangle, which is certainlyby then a boundarytriangle, we removed
two edges and no vertex-this changesV- E + F by I. And we are
left with the two disconnectedtriangles9 and Io.
FKII7
7\
I 1
'
17
2\.a
L?i8~
FIG. 4
TEACHER:
Well, I might save face by saying that I meant by a
boundary triangle a triangle whose removal does not disconnect the

network. But intellectual honesty prevents me from making surreptitiouschangesin my position by sentencesstartingwith 'I meant
S. ' so I admit that now I must replacethe second version of the
.
triangle-removingoperationwith a thirdversion: that we remove the
trianglesone by one in such a way that V-- E + F does not alter.
KAPPA: I generously agree that the lemma correspondingto this
operationis true: namely, that if we remove the trianglesone by one
in such a way that V - E - F does not alter, then V- E + F does
not alter.
The lemma is that the trianglesin ournetworkcan
TEACHER: No.
that
in
beso numbered
removingthemin therightorderV- E+ F will not
altertill we reachthe lasttriangle.
KAPPA: But how should one constructthis right order, if it exists
at all?1 Your original thought-experiment gave the instructions:
remove the trianglesin any order. Your modified thought-experiment gave the instruction: remove boundary trianglesin any order.
Now you say we should follow a definite order, but you do not say
which and whether that order exists at all. Thus the thought-experiment breaksdown. You improved the proof-analysis,i.e. the list of
lemmas; but the thought-experimentwhich you called 'the proof'
has disappeared.
RHO: Only the third step has disappeared.
1
to findat eachstagea trianglewhichcanbe
Cauchythoughtthattheinstructionl
removedeitherby removingtwo edgesand a vertexor one edge can be trivially
carriedout for any polyhedron([18II],p. 79). Thisis of courseconnectedwith his
with the sphere.
inabilityto imaginea polyhedronthatis not homeomorphic
13
I. LAKATOS
KAPPA:Moreover,did you improve

the lemma? Your firsttwo
simpleversionsat leastlookedtriviallytruebeforethey wererefuted;

your lengthy,patchedup versiondoesnot even look plausible. Can
you reallybelievethatit will escaperefutation?
TEACHER:
'Plausible' or even 'trivially true' propositionsare
maturedin
soon
refuted:
usually
sophisticated,
conjectures,
implausible
on
the
truth.
criticism,mighthit
OMEGA:And what happensif even your 'sophisticatedconjectures' are falsifiedand if this time you cannotreplacethem by
unfalsifiedones? Or, if you do notsucceedin improvingthe argumentfurtherby localpatching? You havesucceededin gettingovera
local counterexample
which was not globalby replacingthe refuted
lemma. Whatif you do not succeednext time?
Good question-it will be put on the agendafor toTEACHER:
morrow.
4. Criticism
of theConjecture
by GlobalCounterexamples
ALPHA:I havea counterexample
whichwill falsifyyourfirstlemma
to the mainconjecture,i.e.
-but this will also be a counterexample
thiswill be a globalcounterexample
as well.
TEACHER:
Indeed! Interesting. Let us see.
ALPHA:Imaginea solidboundedby a pairof nestedcubes-a pair
of cubes,one of whichis inside,but doesnot touchthe other(Fig.5).
FIG.5
This hollow cube falsifiesyour firstlemma,becauseon removinga

on to
facefromthe innercube,the polyhedronwill not be stretchable
a plane. Nor will it helpto removea facefromtheoutercubeinstead.
Besides,for eachcube V- E+ F= 2, so that for the hollow cube
V- E+ F= 4.
TEACHER: Good show. Let us call it Counterexample1.1 Now
what?
1 was firstnoticedby Lhuilier([1812-13],P. 194). But
1 This Counterexample
Gergonne,theEditor,added(p.186)thathe himselfnoticedthislongbeforeLhuilier's
14
(I)
of surrender
of theconjecture.Themethod
(a) Rejection
GAMMA:Sir, your composurebafflesme. A single counterexamplerefutesa conjectureas effectivelyas ten. The conjectureand
its proof have completelymisfired. Handsup! You have to surrender. Scrapthe falseconjecture,forgetaboutit andtry a radically
new approach.
hasreceiveda severe
I agreewith you thatthe conjecture
TEACHER:
criticismby Alpha'scounterexample.But it is untruethat the proof
has 'completelymisfired'. If, for the time being,you agreeto my
earlierproposalto use the word 'proof' for a 'thought-experiment
which leads to decompositionof the originalconjectureinto sub', insteadof usingit in the senseof a ' guaranteeof certain
conjectures
truth', you need not draw this conclusion. My proof certainly
in the
provedEuler'sconjecturein the firstsense,but not necessarily
second. You areinterestedonly in proofswhich'prove' whatthey
haveset out to prove. I am interestedin proofseven if they do not
accomplishtheirintendedtask. Columbusdidnot reachIndiabut he
discoveredsomethingquiteinteresting.
ALPHA:So accordingto your philosophy-whilea local counterexample(if it is not globalat the sametime)is a criticismof the proof,
is a criticismof the
butnot of theconjecture-aglobalcounterexample
of
but
not
the
You
agreeto surrender
conjecture,
necessarily
proof.
as regardsthe conjecture,but you defend the proof. But if the
conjectureis false,whaton earthdoesthe proofprove?
GAMMA:Youranalogywith Columbusbreaksdown. Accepting
a globalcounterexample
mustmeantotalsurrender.
Themethodof monster-barring
of thecounterexample.
(b) Rejection
DELTA:But why acceptthe counterexample?We proved our
conjecture-now it is a theorem. I admit that it clasheswith this
so-called'counterexample'. One of them has to give way. But
why shouldthe theoremgive way, when it has been proved? It is
the 'criticism' thatshouldretreat. It is fakecriticism. Thispairof
paper. Not so Cauchy,who publishedhis proofjust a year before. And this
was to be rediscovered
counterexample
twentyyearslaterby Hessel([1832],p. 16).
Both LhuilierandHesselwere led to theirdiscoveryby mineralogical
collectionsin
whichthey noticedsome doublecrystals,wherethe innercrystalis not translucent,
but the outeris. Lhuilieracknowledges
the stimulusof the crystalcollectionof his
friend ProfessorPictet ([i812-13],p. 188). Hesselrefersto lead sulphidecubes
enclosedin translucent
calciumfluoridecrystals([1832],p. 16).
15
I. LAKATOS
nested cubes is not a polyhedron at all. It is a monster,a pathological

case, not a counterexample.
GAMMA:Why not? A polyhedronis a solidwhosesurfaceconsistsof
polygonalfaces. And my counterexample is a solid bounded by
polygonal faces.
TEACHER:
Let us call this definition Def. 1.1
DELTA: Your definition is incorrect. A polyhedron must be a
surface:it has faces, edges, vertices, it can be deformed, stretchedout

on a blackboard,and has nothing to do with the concept of' solid'.
A polyhedronis a surfaceconsistingof a systemof polygons.
2.2
TEACHER:Callthis
Def.
one
DELTA: So reallyyou showedus twopolyhedra-twosurfaces,
completelyinsidethe other. A womanwith a childin her womb is

to the thesisthathumanbeingshaveone head.
not a counterexample
So! My counterexample has bred a new concept of
polyhedron. Or do you dare to assert that by polyhedron you
alwaysmeant a surface?
ALPHA:
TEACHER:For the moment let us accept Delta's Def. 2.
Can you
refute our conjecturenow if by polyhedron we mean a surface?

ALPHA: Certainly. Take two tetrahedrawhich have an edge in
common (Fig. 6a). Or, take two tetrahedrawhich have a vertex in
common (Fig. 6b). Both these twins are connected, both constitute
one singlesurface. And, you may checkthat for both V-- E+ F= 3
TEACHER:Counterexamplesza and 2b.3
'
Definition1 occursfirstin the eighteenthcentury;e.g.: One gives the name
to anysolidboundedby planesor planefaces'
solid,or simplypolyhedron,
polyhedral
(Legendre[1794],p. i6o). A similardefinitionis given by Euler([175o]). Euclid,
while definingcube,octahedron,pyramid,prism,doesnot definethe generalterm
usesit (e.g. Book XII, SecondProblem,Prop.17).
polyhedron,but occasionally
2 We find
2 implicitlyin one of Jonquieres'
papersreadto the French
Definition
Academyagainstthosewho meantto refuteEuler'stheorem. Thesepapersare a
thesaurusof monsterbarring
techniques. He thundersagainstLhuilier'smonstrous
pairof nestedcubes: ' Sucha systemis not reallya polyhedron,but a pairof distinct
polyhedra,each independentof the other.. . . A polyhedron,at least from the
classicalpoint of view, deservesthe nameonly if, beforeall else,a point can move
overits entiresurface;herethisis not thecase . . . Thisfirstexception
continuously
of Lhuiliercanthereforebe discarded'([189ob],
p. 170). Thisdefinition--asopposed
to DefinitionI-goes down verywell with analyticaltopologistswho arenot interfor the theoryof
estedat all in the theoryof polyhedraas suchbut as a handmaiden
surfaces.
3 Counterexamplesand2bweremissedby Lhuilierandfirstdiscoveredonly by
2a
1
Hessel ([1832], p. 13).
16
PROOFS
AND
REFUTATIONS
(I)
DELTA:I admire your pervertedimagination,but of course I did

not mean that anysystemof polygons is a polyhedron. By polyhedron
I meant a systemof polygonsarrangedin sucha way that (1) exactlytwo
polygonsmeetat everyedgeand(2) it is possibletogetfrom the insideof any
polygonto the insideof any otherpolygonby a routewhichnevercrossesany
edgeat a vertex. Your firsttwins will be excludedby the first criterion
in my definition, your second twins by the second criterion.
FIG.6b
FIG. 6a
TEACHER:
Def. 3.1
ALPHA:I admire your perverted ingenuity in inventing one

definition after another as barricadesagainst the falsificationof your
pet ideas. Why don't you just define a polyhedron as a system of
polygons for which the equation V- E + F= 2 holds, and this
Perfect Definition. . .
KAPPA: Def P.2
ALPHA: . . . would settle the dispute for ever?
There would be
no need to investigatethe subjectany further.

DELTA: But there isn't a theorem in the world which couldch'tbe
falsifiedby monsters.
1
Definition3 first turns up to keep out twintetrahedrain M6bius ([1865], p. 32).
We find his cumbersome definition reproduced in some modern textbooks in the
usual authoritarian' take it or leave it' way; the story of its monsterbarringbackground-that would at least explain it-is not told (e.g. Hilbert-Cohn Vossen [1956],
p. 290).
2 DefinitionP according to which Euleriannesswould be a definitionalcharacteristic of polyhedra was in fact suggested by R. Baltzer: ' Ordinary polyhedra are
occasionally (following Hessel) called Eulerian polyhedra. It would be more
appropriateto find a specialname for non-genuine (uneigentliche)
polyhedra' ([I86o],
Vol. II, p. 207). The referenceto Hessel is unfair: Hessel used the term 'Eulerian'
simply as an abbreviationfor polyhedra for which Euler's relation holds in contradistinction to the non-Eulerianones ([1832], p. 19). For Def. P see also the Schlifli
quotation in footnote pp. 18-I9.
B
17
I. LAKATOS
TEACHER:
I am sorry to interruptyou. As we have seen, refutation by counterexamplesdepends on the meaning of the terms in
question. If a counterexampleis to be an objectivecriticism,we have
to agree on the meaning of our terms. We may achieve such an
agreementby defining the term where communicationbroke down.
I, for one, didn't define 'polyhedron '. I assumedfamiliaritywith the
concept, i.e. the ability to distinguisha thing which is a polyhedron
from a thing which is not a polyhedron-what some logicians call
knowing the extension of the concept of polyhedron. It turned out
that the extension of the concept wasn't at all obvious: definitionsare
emerge. I
frequentlyproposedand arguedabout when counterexamples
suggest that we now considerthe rival definitionstogether, and leave
until later the discussion of the differences in the results which
will follow from choosing differentdefinitions. Can anybody offer
something which even the most restrictivedefinitionwould allow as a
real counterexample?
KAPPA: IncludingDef. P?
TEACHER:Excluding Def. P.
GAMMA:
I can. Look at this Counterexample
3: a star-polyhedron
-I shall call it urchin(Fig. 7). This consists of 12 star-pentagons
(Fig. 8). It has 12 vertices, 30 edges, and 12 pentagonal faces-you
E
~tf~
=5
-z-~?----
rrrrcr
;-=trt
FIGS.7 and 8. Kepler (Fig. 7) shaded each face in a differentway to show

which trianglesbelong to the same pentagonalface.
may check it if you like by counting. Thus the Descartes-Eulerthesis

is not true at all, since for this polyhedron V - E + F - - 6.1
1
was first discussedby Kepler in his cosmological theory ([1619],
The
on p. 52 and p. 60 and Lib. V, Cap. I, p. 182, Cap. III,
and
Lib. II, XIX
XXVI,
'urchin.'
The name' urchin' is Kepler's(' cuinomenEchinofeci').
and
IX,
187
XLVII).
Cap.
p.
Fig. 7 is copied from his book (p. 52) which containsalso anotherpicture on p. 182.
18
(I)
DELTA: Why do you think that your 'urchin' is a polyhedron?

GAMMA:Do you not see? This is a polyhedron, whose faces are
the twelve star-pentagons. It satisfiesyour last definition: it is 'a

system of polygons arranged in such a way that (i) exactly two
polygons meet at every edge, and (2) it is possible to get from every
polygon to every other polygon without ever crossinga vertex of the
polyhedron '.
DELTA: But then you do not even know what a polygon is! A
star-pentagonis certainly not a polygon! A polygon is a systemof
in sucha way that(1) exactlytwo edgesmeetat everyvertex,
edgesarranged
and(2) the edgeshavenopointsin commonexceptthe vertices.
TEACHER: Let us
callthisDef 4.
GAMMA: I don't see why you includethe secondclause. The
rightdefinitionof the polygonshouldcontainthe firstclauseonly.
TEACHER:
Def. 4'.
GAMMA: The second clause has nothing to do with the essence of
a polygon. Look: if I lift an edge a little, the star-pentagonis already

a polygon even in your sense. You imagine a polygon to be drawnin
chalk on the blackboard, but you should imagine it as a wooden
structure: then it is clearthat what you think to be a point in common
is not really one point, but two differentpoints lying one above the
other. You are misled by your embedding the polygon in a planeyou should let its limbs stretchout in space!x
rediscovered
Poinsotindependently
it, andit was he who pointedout thatthe Euler
term'small stellated
formuladid not applyto it ([1809],p. 48). The now standard
in general,
polyhedron'is Cayley's([1859],p. 125). Schllifliadmittedstar-polyhedra
but nevertheless
as a monster. According
rejectedour smallstellateddodecahedron
to him 'this is not a genuinepolyhedron,for it does not satisfythe condition
V- E+ F= ' ([1852],
? 34).
1The disputewhetherpolygonshouldbe definedso as to includestar-polygons

ornot(Def.4 orDef.4')is a veryold one. Theargumentputforwardin ourdialogue
-that star-polygonscan be embeddedas ordinarypolygonsin a spaceof higher
a modemtopologicalargument,butonecanputforwardmanyothers.
dimensions--is
ThusPoinsotdefendinghis star-polyhedra
arguedfor the admissionof star-polygons
with arguments
takenfromanalytical
(between
geometry: '... allthesedistinctions
" ordinary" and " star"-polygons)aremoreapparent
thanreal,andtheycompletely
in the analyticaltreatment,in which the variousspeciesof polygonsare
disappear
an equation
quiteinseparable.To the edge of a regularpolygontherecorresponds
with realroots,whichsimultaneously
yieldsthe edgesof all the regularpolygonsof
the sameorder. Thusit is not possibleto obtainthe edgesof a regularinscribed
heptagon,withoutat thesametimefindingedgesof heptagonsof thesecondandthird
species. Conversely,given the edge of a regularheptagon,one may determinethe
19
I. LAKATOS
Would you mind telling me what is the area of a

star-pentagon? Or would you say that some polygons have no
area?
GAMMA: Was it not you yourself who said that a polyhedron has
nothing to do with the idea of solidity? Why now suggest that the
idea of polygon should be linked with the idea of area? We agreed
that a polyhedron is a closed surface with edges and vertices-then
why not agree that a polygon is simply a closed curve with vertices?
But if you stick to your idea I am willing to define the area of a starpolygon.'
TEACHER: Let us leave this disputefor a moment, and proceed as
before. Consider the last two definitions
and Def.
together-Def. 4
4'. Can anyone give a counterexampleto our conjecture that will
comply with bothdefinitionsof polygons?
ALPHA: Here is one. Consider a picture-frame
like this (Fig. 9).
This is a polyhedron accordingto any of the definitionshitherto proposed. Nonethelessyou will find, on counting the vertices,edges and
0
faces, that V-- E+- F o.
DELTA:
radius of a circle in which it can be inscribed, but in so doing, one will find three
different circles correspondingto the three species of heptagon which may be constructed on the given edge; similarly for other polygons. Thus we arejustified in
giving the name " polygon " to these new starredfigures '([1809], p. 26). Schrbder
uses the Hankelian argument: 'The extension to rational fractions of the power
concept originally associatedonly with the integershas been very fruitfulin Algebra;
this suggeststhat we try to do the same thing in geometry whenever the opportunity
presentsitself ...' ([1862], p. 56). Then he shows that we may find a geometrical
interpretationfor the concept of p/q-sided polygons in the star-polygons.
1 Gamma'sclaim that he can define the areafor star-polygonsis not a bluff. Some
of those who defended the wider concept of polygon solved the problem by putting
forward a wider concept of the area of polygon. There is an especiallyobvious way
to do this in the case of regularstar-polygons. We may take the area of a polygon
as the sum of the areasof the isoscelestriangleswhich join the centre of the inscribed
or circumscribedcircle to the sides. In this case, of course, some ' portions ' of the
star-polygonwill count more than once. In the case of irregularpolygons where we
have not got any one distinguishedpoint, we may still take any point as origin and
treat negatively oriented trianglesas having negative areas(Meister[1769-70],p. 179).
It turns out-and this can certainly be expected from an ' area'-that the area thus
defined will not depend on the choice of the origin (Mibius [1827], p. 218). Of
course there is liable to be a dispute with those who think that one is not justified in
calling the number yielded by this calculationan' area'; though the defendersof the
Meister-M6biusdefinitioncalledit ' theright definition ' which ' alone is scientifically
justified' (R. Haussner'snotes [1906], pp. 114-115). Essentialismhas been a permanent feature of definitionalquarrels.
20
(I)
TEACHER:Counterexample4.1
BETA:So that'sthe endof ourconjecture. It reallyis a pity, since

it heldgood for so manycases. But it seemsthatwe havejust wasted
our time.
ALPHA:
Delta,I am flabbergasted.You saynothing? Can'tyou
out of existence? I thoughttherewas
definethisnew counterexample
no hypothesisin theworldwhichyou couldnot savefromfalsification
with a suitablelinguistictrick. Are you giving up now? Do you
agree at last that there exist non-Eulerianpolyhedra? Incredible!
FIG.9
DELTA:You shouldreallyfind a moreappropriate

namefor your
non-Eulerian
pestsandnot misleadus allby callingthem' polyhedra'.
But I am graduallylosinginterestin yourmonsters. I turnin disgust
from your lamentable'polyhedra', for which Euler's beautiful
theoremdoesn'thold.2 I look fororderandharmonyin mathematics,
but you only propagateanarchyand chaos.3 Our attitudesare irreconcilable.
1
classical
4too inLhuilier's
WefredCounterexample
[1812-13], on p. I85--Gergonne
againaddedthat he knew it. But Grunertdid not know it fourteenyearslater
([1827])andPoinsotforty-fiveyearslater([1858],p. 67).
froma letterof Hermite'swrittento Stieltjes:'I turnaside
2 Thisis paraphrased
with a shudderof horrorfrom this lamentableplagueof functionswhichhaveno
derivatives'([18931).
dealingwith . . . functionsviolatinglaws whichone hopedwere
3' Researches
of anarchyandchaoswherepast
universal,wereregardedalmostas the propagation
order
and
had
generations sought
harmony' (Saks[1933],Preface). Saks refers
that
hereto the fiercebattlesof monsterbarrers
(likeHermite!) andof refutationists
characterisedin the last decadesof the nineteenthcentury(and indeed in the
beginningof the twentieth)the developmentof modernrealfunctiontheory,'the
' (Munroe[1953],Preface).
branchof mathematics
whichdealswith counterexamples
of
Thesimilarlyfiercebattlethatragedlaterbetweenthe opponentsandprotagonists
modem mathematical
logic and set-theorywas a directcontinuationof this. See
alsofootnote2 on p. 24 and I on p. 25.
21
I. LAKATOS
ALPHA: You are a real old-fashionedTory! You blame the

wickednessof anarchists
for the spoilingof your 'order' and 'harand
'solve'
the difficulties
mony',
you
by verbalrecommendations.
Let us hearthe latestrescue-definition.
TEACHER:
ALPHA:You meanthe latestlinguistictrick,the latestcontraction
of the concept of 'polyhedron'! Delta dissolvesreal problems,
insteadof solvingthem.
FIG.IO
FIG.
FIG. IIa
IIb
DELTA: I do not contractconcepts. It is you who expandthem.

For instance,this picture-frameis not a genuine polyhedron at all.
ALPHA:
Why?
Takeanarbitrary
DELTA:
pointin the' tunnel'-the spacebounded
by the frame. Lay a planethroughthis point. You will find that
any such plane has always two differentcross-sectionswith the
22
(I)
picture-frame, making two distinct, completely disconnected

polygons! (Fig. io).
ALPHA: So what?
DELTA: In the case of a genuinepolyhedron,throughany arbitrary
with the
point in spacetherewill be at least oneplane whosecross-section
will consistof one singlepolygon. In the case of convex

polyhedron
whereverwe
all
polyhedra planeswill complywith thisrequirement,
takethe point. In the caseof ordinary
concavepolyhedrasomeplanes
will havemoreintersections,
but therewill alwaysbe somethathave
only one. (Figs. I ia and iib.) In the case of this picture-frame,if
we take the point in the tunnel, all the planes will have two crosssections. How then can you call this a polyhedron?
TEACHER: This looks like another definition, this time an implicit
one.
Call it
Def. 5.1
A series of counterexamples,a matching series of definitions, definitions that are alleged to contain nothing new, but to be
merely new revelationsof the richnessof that one old concept, which
seems to have as many ' hidden' clausesas there are counterexamples.
ForallpolyhedraV- E+ F= 2 seemsunshakable,an old and ' eternal'
truth. It is strangeto think that once upon a time it was a wonderful
guess, full of challengeand excitement. Now, becauseof your weird
shifts of meaning, it has turned into a poor convention, a despicable
piece of dogma. (He leavesthe classroom.)
DELTA: I cannot understandhow an able man like Alpha can waste
his talent on mere heckling. He seemsengrossedin the productionof
monstrosities. But monstrositiesnever foster growth, either in the
world of natureor in the world of thought. Evolution alwaysfollows
an harmoniousand orderly pattern.
GAMMA: Geneticistscan easily refute that. Have you not heard
that mutations producing monstrositiesplay a considerablerole in
macroevolution? They call such monstrous mutants 'hopeful
ALPHA:
monsterbarrer
E. deJonquieres
5 wasputforwardby theindefatigable
Definition
to get Lhuilier'spolyhedronwitha tunnel(picture-frame)
out of the way: ' Neither
is thispolyhedralcomplexa truepolyhedronin the ordinarysenseof theword,for if
one takesany planethroughan arbitrary
pointinsideone of the tunnelswhichpass
the
the
will be composedof two distinct
cross-section
solid,
through
resulting
right
polygonscompletelyunconnectedwith each other; this can occurin an ordinary
positionsof the intersecting
polyhedronfor certain
plane,namelyin the caseof some
concavepolyhedra,but not for all of them' ([i89ob],pp. 170-171). One wonders
whetherdeJonqui&res
hasnoticedthathisDef.5 excludesalsosomeconcavespheroid
polyhedra.
23
I. LAKATOS
monsters'. It seems to me that Alpha'scounterexamples,

though
monsters,are'hopefulmonsters'.'
DELTA: Anyway, Alphahas given up the struggle. No more
monstersnow.
GAMMA: I havea new one. It complieswith allthe restrictions
in
Defs. I, 2, 3, 4, and 5, but V- E+ F= I. This Counterexample
5
is a simple cylinder. It has 3 faces (the top, the bottom and the
jacket), 2 edges (two circles)and no vertices. It is a polyhedron
accordingto your definition:(i) exactlytwo polygonsat everyedge
and (2) it is possibleto get from the insideof any polygon to the
insideof anyotherpolygonby a routewhichnevercrossesany edgeat
a vertex. Andyou haveto acceptthefacesasgenuinepolygons,asthey
complywith yourrequirements:(I) exactlytwo edgesmeetat every
vertexand(2)theedgeshaveno pointsin commonexceptthe vertices.
DELTA: Alpha stretchedconcepts,but you tear them! Your
'edges' arenot edges! An edgehastwovertices!
TEACHER: Def. 6?
GAMMA: But why denythe statusof' edge' to edgeswith one or
possiblyzero vertices? You usedto contractconcepts,but now you
mutilatethemso thatscarcelyanythingremains!
DELTA: But don'tyou seethe futilityof theseso-calledrefutations?
'Hitherto, when a new polyhedronwas invented,it was for some
practicalend; today they are inventedexpresslyto put at fault the
reasoningsof our fathers,andone neverwill get fromthemanything
more than that. Our subjectis turnedinto a teratologicalmuseum
wheredecentordinarypolyhedramay be happyif they can retaina
very smallcorner.'
1 'We mustnot
forgetthatwhatappearsto-dayas a monsterwill be to-morrow
. . . I furtheremphasizedthe importance
the originof a line of specialadaptations.
of rarebut extremelyconsequential
mutationsaffectingratesof decisiveembryonic
processeswhichmightgive riseto whatone mighttermhopefulmonsters,monsters
lineif fittinginto someemptyenvironmental
whichwouldstarta new evolutionary
niche' (Goldschmidt
[I9331,pp. 544and547). My attentionwasdrawnto thispaper
by KarlPopper.
2
fromPoincard
Paraphrased
([90o8],pp. 131-132). The originalfull text is this:
'Logic sometimesmakesmonsters. Sincehalfa centurywe haveseenarisea crowd
of bizarrefunctionswhich seem to try to resembleas little as possiblethe honest
functionswhichservesomepurpose. No longercontinuity,or perhapscontinuity,
etc. Nay more,fromthelogicalpointof view, it is thesestrange
butno derivatives,
functionswhich are the most general,thoseone meetswithoutseekingno longer
cases. Thereremainsfor themonly a very smallcorner.
appearexceptas particular
24
(I)
GAMMA: I think that if we want to learn about anything really
deep, we have to study it not in its 'normal ', regular,usualform, but

in its criticalstate,in fever, in passion. If you want to know the normal
healthy body, study it when it is abnormal, when it is ill. If you
want to know functions, study their singularities. If you want to
know ordinary polyhedra, study their lunatic fringe. This is how
one can carrymathematicalanalysisinto the very heartof the subject.'
But even if you were basicallyright, don't you see the futility of your
ad hocmethod? If you want to draw a borderlinebetween counterexamplesand monsters,you cannot do it in fits and starts.
TEACHER:I think we should refuse to accept Delta's strategy for
dealingwith global counterexamples,althoughwe should congratulate
him on his skilful execution of it. We could aptly label his method
the methodof monsterbarring.
Using this method one can eliminateany
to
the
counterexample
original conjecture by a sometimes deft but
always ad hocredefinitionof the polyhedron, of its defining terms, or
of the defining terms of its defining terms. We should somehow treat counterexampleswith more respect, and not stubbornly
exorcise them by dubbing them monsters. Delta's main mistake is
perhapshis dogmatistbias in the interpretationof mathematicalproof:
he thinks that a proof necessarilyproves what it has set out to prove.
My interpretationof proof will allow for a false conjecture to be
'proved', i.e. to be decomposed into subconjectures. If the conjecture is false,I certainlyexpect at least one of the subconjecturesto be
false. But the decomposition might still be interesting! I am not
perturbed at finding a counterexample to a 'proved' conjecture;
I am even willing to set out to 'prove' a false conjecture!
THETA: I don't follow you.
KAPPA: He just follows the
New Testament: 'Prove all things;
hold fast that which is good' (I Thessalonians 5: 21).
(to be continued)
'Heretofore when a new function was invented, it was for some practicalend;
to-day they are invented expressly to put at fault the reasoningsof our fathers, and
one never will get from them anything more than that.
'If logic were the sole guide of the teacher, it would be necessaryto begin with
the most general functions, that is to say with the most bizarre. It is the beginner
that would have to be set grappling with this teratological museum . . .' (G. B.
Halsted'sauthorisedtranslation,pp. 435-436). Poincar6discussesthe problem with

respect to the situation in the theory of real functions-but that does not make any
difference.
1
Paraphrased from Denjoy ([1919], p. 21).
25

Proofs and Refutations - Part I

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Proofs and Refutations (I)

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS (I)t*

t Thispaperwaswrittenin 1958-59at King'sCollege,Cambridge.It wasfirst

Criticismof the Proofby Counterexamples

IT frequentlyhappensin the history of thought that when a powerful

(c) ' metamathematicsis the syntax of mathematicallanguage' (pp. xiii

Under the present dominance of formalism, one is tempted to

'tautological' nor empirical,it must be meaningless,sheer nonsense.'

akin to P6lya's and Bernays' 'heuristic '2 and Popper's 'logic of

1 Accordingto Turquette,G6deliansentencesare meaningless([1950],p. 129).

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

mathematicsis identicalwith formalisedmathematics. But what can

i.e. the phylogenesis and the ontogenesis of mathematicalthought,1

biogenetic law ' about ontogeny recapitulatingphylogeny to mental development, in

The dialogueform shouldreflectthe dialecticof the story; it is

Thedialoguetakesplacein animaginaryclassroom. The classgets

by Euler [1750]. His original problem was the classificationof

polyhedron whatsoever. Others try to falsify this conjecture,

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

are not already (possibly curvilinear) triangles. By drawing each

before a triangleis removed, it remainsso afterthe triangleis removed.

Are you sure that in triangulatingthe map one will

a singletriangleat the endof thisprocess?I am dubiousabout your

Of course I am not sure.

conjecturewe now haveat leastthree! And thisyou call a 'proof'!

TEACHER: This is a subtle questionwhich we shall try to answer

1The classis a ratheradvancedone. To

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

they cannot ignore counterexamples.

But notice that the cube which is a

counterexampleto the third lemma is not also a counterexampleto

improve my proof so that it will stand up to the criticism.

TEACHER:Before showing how, let me introduce the following

the false lemma by a slightlymodifiedone, which your counterof any

thatI haveto do is to inserta singlewordin my thirdstep,to wit, that

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

trianglesin the order given in Fig. 4. At the removal of the eighth

Well, I might save face by saying that I meant by a

boundary triangle a triangle whose removal does not disconnect the

KAPPA:Moreover,did you improve

simpleversionsat leastlookedtriviallytruebeforethey wererefuted;

This hollow cube falsifiesyour firstlemma,becauseon removinga

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

nested cubes is not a polyhedron at all. It is a monster,a pathological

Let us call this definition Def. 1.1

DELTA: Your definition is incorrect. A polyhedron must be a

surface:it has faces, edges, vertices, it can be deformed, stretchedout

completelyinsidethe other. A womanwith a childin her womb is

TEACHER:For the moment let us accept Delta's Def. 2.

refute our conjecturenow if by polyhedron we mean a surface?

Hessel ([1832], p. 13).

DELTA:I admire your pervertedimagination,but of course I did

ALPHA:I admire your perverted ingenuity in inventing one

no need to investigatethe subjectany further.

FIGS.7 and 8. Kepler (Fig. 7) shaded each face in a differentway to show

may check it if you like by counting. Thus the Descartes-Eulerthesis

PROOFS AND REFUTATIONS

DELTA: Why do you think that your 'urchin' is a polyhedron?

the twelve star-pentagons. It satisfiesyour last definition: it is 'a

GAMMA: I don't see why you includethe secondclause. The

rightdefinitionof the polygonshouldcontainthe firstclauseonly.

a polygon. Look: if I lift an edge a little, the star-pentagonis already