The Transcendental Argument for the

Nonexistence of God
Michael Martin
[This article originally appeared in the Autumn 1996 issue of The New Zealand
Rationalist & Humanist.]
Some Christian philosophers have made the incredible argument that logic, science and
morality presuppose the truth of the Christian world view because logic, science and
morality depend on the truth of this world view [1]. Advocates call this argument the
Transcendental Argument for Existence of God and I will call it TAG for short. In what
follows I will not attempt to refute TAG directly. Rather I will show how one can argue
exactly the opposite conclusion, namely, that logic, science and morality presuppose the
falsehood of the Christian world view or at least the falsehood of the interpretation of his
world view presupposed by TAG. I will call this argument the Transcendental Argument
for the Non Existence of God or TANG for short.
If TANG is a sound argument, then obviously TAG is not, for it is logically impossible
that there be two sound arguments with contradictory conclusions. On the other hand, if
TANG is unsound, it does not follow that TAG is sound. After all, both arguments could
be unsound. Perhaps, logic, science, and objective morality are possible given either a
Christian or a nonChristian world view. In any case, the presentation of TANG will
provide an indirect challenge to TAG and force its advocates to defend their position. The
burden will be on them to refute TANG. Unless they do, TAG is doomed.
How might TANG proceed? Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are
necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God
created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent
on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary -- it is
contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not
logically necessary. Moreover, if principles of logic are contingent on God, God could
change them. Thus, God could make the law of non-contradiction false; in other words,
God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same
time. But this is absurd. How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south of
China and that New Zealand is not south of it? So, one must conclude that logic is not
dependent on God, and, insofar as the Christian world view assumes that logic so
dependent, it is false.
Consider science. It presupposes the uniformity of nature: that natural laws govern the
world and that there are no violations of such laws. However, Christianity presupposes
that there are miracles in which natural laws are violated. Since to make sense of science

one must assume that there are no miracles, one must further assume that Christianity is
false. To put this in a different way: Miracles by definition are violations of laws of
nature that can only be explained by God's intervention. Yet science assumes that insofar
as an event as an explanation at all, it has a scientific explanation -- one that does not
presuppose God [2]. Thus, doing, science assumes that the Christian world view is false.
Consider morality. The type of Christian morality assumed by TAG is some version of
the Divine Command Theory, the view that moral obligation is dependent on the will of
God. But such a view is incompatible with objective morality. On the one hand, on this
view what is moral is a function of the arbitrary will of God; for instance, if God wills
that cruelty for its own sake is good, then it is. On the other hand, determining the will of
God is impossible since there are different alleged sources of this will (The Bible, the
Koran, The Book of Mormon, etc) and different interpretations of what these sources say;
moreover; there is no rational way to reconcile these differences. Thus, the existence of
an objective morality presupposes the falsehood of the Christian world view assumed by
TAG.
There are, of course, ways to avoid the conclusions of TANG. One way is to reject logic,
science and objective morality. Another is to maintain belief in God but argue that logic,
science and morality are not dependent on God's existence. However, the first way is
self-defeating since Christian apologists use logic to defend their position and the second
way presumes that TAG is invalid since it assumes that logic, science, and morality do
not assume God's existence. Finally, one can object to particular aspects of TANG, for
example, the claim that there is no rational way to reconcile different interpretations of
the Bible. However, this tack would involve a detailed defence of TAG -- something that
has yet to be provided.
Michael Martin is Professor of Philosophy at Boston University.
Notes:
[1] The primary advocate of this argument in contemporary thought is the Christian
apologist Greg Bahnsen. For exchanges between Douglas Jones, a follower of Bahnsen,
and Keith Parsons and me, see Douglas Jones, The Futility of Non-Christian Thought,
Antithesis, Vol II, July/August, 1991, pp 40-42, Keith Parsons, Is Non-Christian Thought
Futile? Antithesis, Vol II July/August, 1991, pp 42-44, Michael Martin, Is a NonChristian Worldview Futile? Antithesis, Vol II, July/August 1991, pp. 44-46. See also
Jones' response in Antithesis, Vol II, July/August 1991, pp 46-47.
[2] This is compatible with the view that certain microevents are undetermined and, thus,
have no explanation scientific or otherwise.

A Brief Response to Michael Martin's Transcendental

Argument for the Non-Existence of God

By John M. Frame
John Frame is professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology at Westminster
Seminary, Escondido California. His published books include The Doctrine of the
Knowledge of God, Apologetics to the Glory of God, and Cornelius Van Til, An Analysis
of His Thought. The following is his brief reply to Michael Martin's caricature of the
Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God which he has labeled his
Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God. Frame's comments were
contained in a letter to the maintainer of this site.
Other Replies to Martin's article are in the works at the Southern California Center for
Christian Studies, as well as by the Center for Reformed Theology and Apologetics.
In the comments which follow, Frame follows Martin's convention of labeling the
Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God "TAG", and labeling his
Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God as "TANG."
Dear Mr. Barlow,

Thanks for sending me the Martin piece. Here's my response, in brief:

1. Logic is neither above God nor arbitrarily decreed by God. Its ultimate basis is in
God's eternal nature. God is a rational God and necessarily so. Therefore logic is
necessary. Human logical systems don't always reflect God's logic perfectly. But insofar
as they do, they are necessarily true.
2. (a) Science does not presuppose any absolute uniformity of nature; indeed modern
science allows for areas of randomness in the universe. (b) Miracles are not necessarily
violations or exceptions to natural law; sometimes they even have natural explanations
(e.g. Ex. 14:21, the "strong east wind"). (c) There is no scientific consensus that scientific
explanations must never presuppose God. This supposition is entirely groundless. Of
course, divine providence is not in itself a scientific explanation. But there is no scientific
rule to the effect that proper scientific explanations may not in turn presuppose divine
providence.
3. (a) The question of morality is like that of logic. Morality is first based in God's
nature, not on his arbitrary fiat, nor on some principle independent of Him. God could
not will that cruelty is good, for cruelty is not good; it is incompatible with God's own
nature. (b) To say that there "is no rational way" to deal with the differences between
Bible, Koran, etc., is an arbitrary assumption. This is an assumption which most all
Christians and Muslims reject. The Bible, at any rate, teaches that there is sufficient
evidence for the Christian revelation. So at this point Martin is rejecting the Christian
revelation without argument, by a bare assumption.

I do agree that a full defense of TAG would require a more complete apologetic. That's
why in my two apologetics books I warn against using TAG as a "magic bullet." TAG
presupposes a whole system of definitions and sub-arguments. But it is good in that it
describes the fundamental direction of any legitimate apologetic, namely to show that any
meaningful thought presupposes the Christian God.
Do let me know if I can be of further help.
Blessings,
John Frame

A Response to John Frame's Rebuttal of The

Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence
of God (TANG)
Michael Martin

My article, "The Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of God," was
originally published in the New Zealand Rationalist and Humanist (Autumn
1996, p. 4). It recently appeared on the Internet and was replied to by John
Frame in his paper, "A Brief Response to Michael Martin, The Transcendental
Argument for the Non Existence of God"
In my original paper I maintained that a good case can be made for the thesis
that science, logic, and objective ethics presuppose the nonexistence of God. I
called this argument The Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of
God (TANG). I used this argument to argue indirectly against the
Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God (TAG) -- the argument that
logic, science and objective ethics presuppose the existence of God. I argued
that if TANG is sound, TAG is refuted. However, I pointed out that if TANG is
refuted, TAG is not established since both arguments could be unsound. In this
paper I show that John Frame's rebuttal of TANG is inadequate.

A. Science
1. In my paper I argued that science is incompatible with Christianity because,
on the one hand, science assumes the uniformity of nature and, on the other
hand, if anything has an explanation, it has a scientific one. However, these
assumptions are incompatible with the belief in miracles that is part of the

Christian worldview. Frame has argued correctly that science does not
presuppose the absolute uniformity of nature, but I do not suppose that it does.
In my paper I said that science assumes that insofar as an event has an
explanation at all, it has a scientific explanation -- one that does not presuppose
God. As I said in footnote 2, "This is compatible with the view that certain
microevents are undetermined and, thus, have no explanation scientific or
otherwise." My point was that what science does rule out are supernatural
explanations. Any scientist who claimed that some event could only be
explained by God's intervention would have stopped doing science.
2. By a miracle I mean an event that can only be explained in terms of divine
intervention. By definition such events do not have natural explanations. This I
take to be the standard sense of miracle. Frame says that sometimes miracles
have natural explanations. Yes, in another sense they do. But this is not the
sense I was using. In any case, this other sense of miracle -- what I call an
indirect miracle -- is criticized in my book Atheism: A Philosophical
Justification, pp. 207-8.
3. Frame has said that "divine providence is not itself a scientific explanation."
Indeed, it is not. However, he insists that science can still presuppose divine
providence. But if divine providence allows for miracles in the sense I was
employing, scientific explanations cannot presuppose divine providence.
Explanations in terms of miraculous intervention of divine providence exclude
scientific ones.

B. Logic
1. I argued that according to advocates of TAG, logic presupposes God. But
what could this mean? One obvious interpretation is that logical principles are
created by God and are contingent on Him. This view is clear but absurd.
Logical principles are not contingent; they are necessary. To his credit, Frame
rejected this view. He says that logic is not arbitrarily decreed by God and that
logic is necessary.
2. However, Frame's less clear alternative construction of what it means for
logic to presuppose God is problematic. He says that logic is not "above" God
and that the "ultimate basis" of logic is God's "eternal nature." In one obvious
sense logic is above God: God presupposes logic and not the reverse. God's
action and His attributes presuppose the law of contradiction. God cannot do
act A and not A at the same time; God cannot have property P and not P at the
same time, and so on. On the other hand, there is no inconsistency in both
denying that God exists and affirming the law of contradiction. Moreover,

basing logic on God's nature does not overcome the problem. If God's character
were different, logical principles would be different, and the law of
contradiction would not hold. But this is absurd. Could Frame reply that God's
nature could not be such the law of contradiction would fail? The only reason
for making such an assumption about God's nature is that it must exemplify
some independent standard of logic. This is just to say that logic does not
presuppose God.

C. Ethics
1. I argued that objective ethics presupposes that God does not exist. There are
three problems with basing objective ethics on God. First, ethics would be
based on God's arbitrary commands. For example, God could command cruelty
was good. Second, there would be no objective basis for picking a reliable
source of what God commands. Should we use the Bible or the Koran or the
Book of Mormon? Third, once we picked a source there would be objectively
no way of choosing between conflicting interpretations.
2. Frame has denied that morality is based on God's arbitrary fiat. Rather, he
says, it is based on God's character. So be it. But basing morality on God's
character does not overcome the problem of arbitrariness. Is something good
because it is part of His character or is God's character the way it is because it
is good? Suppose something is good because it is part of God's character. Then
if God's character is cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. On the
other hand, if God's character is the way it is, for example, merciful and just,
because being mercy and justice are good, then there must be an independent
standard of good that God's character exemplifies. In the first case, a religious
foundation of morality is arbitrary; in the second case, morality is not founded
on religion but religion on morality. But would not Frame reply that God could
not be cruel and unjust and thus the first alternative fails? However, the only
reason for supposing that God could not be cruel and unjust is that God's
character must exemplify some independent standard of goodness and this
presupposes the second alternative.
3. Frame maintains that "to say that there is 'no rational way' to deal with the
difference between the Bible, Koran, etc., is an arbitrary assumption. This is an
assumption which most Christians and Muslims reject." Is it an arbitrary
assumption? What then is a rational way? The only way Frame mentions is
revelation. But Christians say that the revelation of the Koran is bogus, and
Muslims give similar compliments to the Christian interpretation of Jesus in the

NT. If there is a rational way to reconcile this controversy, Frame does not
begin to specify what it is.
4. Interestingly enough, Frame has neglected to mention the third part of my
argument. I also pointed out that there are different interpretations of what
these sources say. Let us recall that there are differences among Christians
over, among other things, the morality of the death penalty, war, abortion,
premarital sex, homosexuality, private property, social drinking, and gambling.
Most of these differences are based on different interpretations of Christian
revelation. To suppose that there is a rational way to reconcile these
controversies by appealing to revelation stretches credibility to the breaking
point.

A Second Response to Martin

by John Frame
As a reply to Martin's reply to my reply to him, let me try to clarify matters by arranging his latest points and my
responses as a dialogue. I have eliminated a few of his sentences that I thought unnecessary to the present
exchange.

SCIENCE
MARTIN: In my paper I argued that science is incompatible with Christianity because,
on the one hand, science assumes the uniformity of nature and, on the other hand, if
anything has an explanation, it has a scientific one. However, these assumptions are
incompatible with the belief in miracles that is part of the Christian worldview. Frame
has argued correctly that science does not presuppose the absolute uniformity of nature,
but I do not suppose that it does.
FRAME: If Martin didn't believe in the "absolute" uniformity of nature, why did he bring
the matter up? The uniformity of nature works as an argument against miracles only if it
is absolute and universal.
MARTIN: In my paper I said that science assumes that insofar as an event has an
explanation at all, it has a scientific explanation -- one that does not presuppose God. As I
said in footnote 2, "This is compatible with the view that certain microevents are
undetermined and, thus, have no explanation scientific or otherwise." My point was that
what science does rule out are supernatural explanations.
FRAME: I don't know of any scientific consensus to the effect that "insofar as an event
has an explanation at all, it has a scientific explanation" or that science rules out
"supernatural explanations." Many scientists have written otherwise.

MARTIN: Any scientist who claimed that some event could only be explained by God's
intervention would have stopped doing science.
FRAME: Of course, it is difficult at best for any scientist to identify any conclusion as
the "only" possible explanation for something. I believe that we can reach such
conclusions only with the help of divine revelation. So in one sense Martin is right.
Therefore in this situation we may describe the relation of theology and science in two
ways: (1) Martin is right: science as such may not make such claims. Only theology may
make them. OR (2) Science, understood broadly as including its theological
presuppositions, has a perfect right to make such claims. On the definition of miracle
assumed here, see the next point.
MARTIN: By a miracle I mean an event that can only be explained in terms of divine
intervention. By definition such events do not have natural explanations. This I take to be
the standard sense of miracle. Frame says that sometimes miracles have natural
explanations. Yes, in another sense they do. But this is not the sense I was using. In any
case, this other sense of miracle -- what I call an indirect miracle -- is criticized in my
book Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, pp. 207-8.
FRAME: You can, of course, define the terms as you like. Your definition does agree
with some, but not all, theological definitions of miracle. I think it is not the best way to
describe the events which the Bible presents as miracles. But granting your definition, I
would say that all events are miracles, since divine causality (I prefer not to call it
"intervention") is the ultimate causality of everything that happens (Eph. 1:11). No
explanation is complete unless it includes God. Or, as I said above, science presupposes
theology.
MARTIN: Frame has said that "divine providence is not itself a scientific explanation."
Indeed, it is not. However, he insists that science can still presuppose divine providence.
But if divine providence allows for miracles in the sense I was employing, scientific
explanations cannot presuppose divine providence. Explanations in terms of miraculous
intervention of divine providence exclude scientific ones.
FRAME: I believe my previous responses indicate my answer to this.

LOGIC
MARTIN: However, Frame's less clear alternative construction of what it means for logic
to presuppose God is problematic. He says that logic is not "above" God and that the
"ultimate basis" of logic is God's "eternal nature." In one obvious sense logic is above
God: God presupposes logic and not the reverse.
FRAME: Not if God's nature is the ultimate basis of logic. On this basis, God
presupposes logic and logic presupposes God.

MARTIN:. ... there is no inconsistency in both denying that God exists and affirming the
law of contradiction.
FRAME: True in regard to these two statements taken in themselves. But if logic cannot
exist without God, then to deny that God exists while affirming the law of contradiction
is like denying the existence of the sun while affirming the existence of its rays. Of
course, you will deny my view that logic cannot exist without God. But that is what we
are debating, and you should not therefore beg that question.
MARTIN: Moreover, basing logic on God's nature does not overcome the problem. If
God's character were different, logical principles would be different, and the law of
contradiction would not hold. But this is absurd.
FRAME: Exactly. God is necessarily the kind of being he is. It would be absurd to
imagine him otherwise.
MARTIN: Could Frame reply that God's nature could not be such the law of
contradiction would fail? The only reason for making such an assumption about God's
nature is that it must exemplify some independent standard of logic. This is just to say
that logic does not presuppose God.
FRAME: Why is this "the only reason for making such an assumption?" It is sufficient
for me to believe that God himself testifies to his wisdom and constancy by word and
deed. What more reason do I need?
The chain of justification, of course, must end somewhere. Else we justify A by reference
to "independent standard" B, B by "independent standard" C, ad infinitum. My chain
ends in the personal God of the Bible. Martin's ends in an abstract law of contradiction or
abstract system of logic. Or does that too require an "independent standard?"

ETHICS
MARTIN: 1. I argued that objective ethics presupposes that God does not exist. There are
three problems with basing objective ethics on God. First, ethics would be based on
God's arbitrary commands. For example, God could command cruelty was good. Second,
there would be no objective basis for picking a reliable source of what God commands.
Should we use the Bible or the Koran or the Book of Mormon? Third, once we picked a
source there would be objectively no way of choosing between conflicting
interpretations.
But basing morality on God's character does not overcome the problem of arbitrariness.
Is something good because it is part of His character or is God's character the way it is
because it is good? Suppose something is good because it is part of God's character. Then
if God's character is cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. On the other hand,
if God's character is the way it is, for example, merciful and just, because being mercy

and justice are good, then there must be an independent standard of good that God's
character exemplifies. In the first case, a religious foundation of morality is arbitrary; in
the second case, morality is not founded on religion but religion on morality. But would
not Frame reply that God could not be cruel and unjust and thus the first alternative fails?
However, the only reason for supposing that God could not be cruel and unjust is that
God's character must exemplify some independent standard of goodness and this
presupposes the second alternative.
FRAME: My reply here is the same as my reply to the last objection. Martin's last
sentence is nothing more than sheer dogmatism. What ground does he have for supposing
that his is the "only reason?" My reason is a different one: that God has declared and
displayed his character as a person who could never be cruel or unjust.

COMPETING REVELATIONS
MARTIN: 3. Frame maintains that "to say that there is 'no rational way' to deal with the
difference between the Bible, Koran, etc., is an arbitrary assumption. This is an
assumption which most Christians and Muslims reject." Is it an arbitrary assumption?
What then is a rational way? The only way Frame mentions is revelation. But Christians
say that the revelation of the Koran is bogus, and Muslims give similar compliments to
the Christian interpretation of Jesus in the NT. If there is a rational way to reconcile this
controversy, Frame does not begin to specify what it is.
FRAME: I didn't specify that way because, of course, to do so would require an elaborate
apologetic. I have "begun" to specify a rational way to handle these issues in my book
Apologetics to the Glory of God. My problem with Martin is that he thinks that in one fell
swoop he can dismiss as irrational the entire history of Christian (and Muslim!)
apologetics. That's a tall order to accomplish in a couple of sentences.
To summarize briefly my approach to Islam: (1) Muslims and Christians agree that the
Bible is divinely inspired, but Muslims argue that the Bible has been mistranslated and
distorted, and that God has corrected those distortions in the Koran. (2) However, there is
no historical basis for the claim that the Bible has been distorted in this way. (3)
Therefore, differences between the Bible and the Koran must be resolved in the Bible's
favor. (4) Insofar as Islam compromises the biblical doctrine of God, it loses the only
possible transcendental ground of science, logic, and ethics (TAG).

INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE
MARTIN: 4. Interestingly enough, Frame has neglected to mention the third part of my
argument. I also pointed out that there are different interpretations of what these sources
say. Let us recall that there are differences among Christians over, among other things,
the morality of the death penalty, war, abortion, premarital sex, homosexuality, private

property, social drinking, and gambling. Most of these differences are based on different
interpretations of Christian revelation. To suppose that there is a rational way to reconcile
these controversies by appealing to revelation stretches credibility to the breaking point.
FRAME: I neglected this, because my answer to this point should be obvious from my
last answer. In the previous discussion, Martin arbitrarily dismissed the entire history of
apologetics as non-rational. Here he similarly dismisses the entire history of Christian
theology.
It is worthy of note that (1) although Christians do differ on many of these matters, they
have historically agreed, against Martin, that there are rational ways of resolving these
disputes. (2) There are many things on which all Christians are agreed. Many, but not all,
of these are summarized in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 A. D. (3)
Obviously there are many other issues we are still working on. In this respect theology is
no different from science or philosophy. But Martin says about these issues, "To suppose
that there is a rational way to reconcile these controversies by appealing to revelation
stretches credibility to the breaking point." Why say this about theology and not about
science or philosophy? There are at least as many unresolved issues in the other fields.
Philosophers have been debating realism and nominalism since Socrates. Are we to
conclude that there is no rational way to resolve the issue?

Response to Frame's Response

Michael Martin

My reply to Frame in "A Response to John Frame's Rebuttal of The

Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of God (TANG)" appeared on
the Internet and now Frame has replied to my response in "A Second Response
to Martin. " In my present reply I respond to what I take to new points raised by
Frame.

Science
One aspect of TANG is that science presuppose the non- existence of God
since science excludes miracles which are assumed by Christianity. Frame tries
to combat TANG by using the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of
God (TAG). He says that rather than science presupposing that God does not
exist, science presupposes that God does exist since all events are miracles.
Divine causality, he says, "is the ultimate causality of everything that happens."
Frame's use of "miracle" here seems to be a misleading way of stating the
traditional cosmological argument-- an argument that I refuted in previous

publications.[1] In any case, this sense of "miracle" is not what I was talking
about. Nor is this sense of "miracle" what believers use when they speak of
Jesus performing miracles and of the miracles at Lourdes. If all events are
"miracles," as Frame suggests, then miracles are not unique and remarkable. A
miracle, in the sense relevant to my discussion, is an event that can only be
explained by supernatural intervention, that is where there is a supernatural
cause operating directly on the event in question. Clearly, Christianity assumes
that there are miracles in this sense, for example, the Resurrection, Jesus' cures,
and so on. However, given the fallibalism of science, this is precisely what
science cannot assume. To suppose otherwise would be to suppose that science
knows all the natural causes operating in the universe and thus knows that none
of these are the cause of the event in question. For example, to suppose that
God intervened in the natural course of events and caused the cure of
apparently terminal cancer to occur presupposes that science knows all the
natural causes and cures of cancer. A belief in miracles would stop scientific
examination of those events in which miracles are postulated. For example,
assuming that Jones' cure was a miracle would prevent science from ever
discovering whether the cure was the result of natural causes.
It is not relevant that some scientists have forsaken miracle explanations. Qua
religious believer a scientist might believe in all manner of things. The question
is, however, how a scientist should operate qua scientist, that is, when his or her
behavior is governed by the methodological rules that define scientific
practice?

Logic
I argued that if logic is dependent on God, logical principles are contingent. But
they are not. Frame's counter is that logic is an intrinsic part of God's nature
and thus logic is necessary since God does not change. But how is one to
understand this idea? It seems to imply that if God did not exist, there would be
no logic and this, in turn, would mean that if God did not exist, the law of
contradiction would not hold. Not only is there no reason to maintain this, there
seems to be good reason to reject it. Unless the ontological argument that God
exists by definition is is valid-- and I know of no good reason to accept any
version of the ontological argument--there is nothing incoherent about denying
the existence of God.[2] But it is incoherent to deny the law of contradiction.
Indeed, Frame admits that there is no inconsistency in denying that God exists
and affirming the law of contradiction "in regard to these two statements taken
in themselves." But then he goes on the claim that logic (L) cannot exist
without God (G). I find these two claims incoherent. If L and not G are not

inconsistent, how can L not exist without G? The phrase "in regard to these two
statements taken in themselves" does not in any way dispel the incoherence.

Morality
I argued that objective morality cannot be based on Christianity since morality
is based on God's arbitrary decision. Frame tries to combat this point by a
theory of morality which is similar to his theory of logic. Moral goodness is an
intrinsic part of God's nature, he says, and is thus unchanging and absolute.
Again how is one to understandd this suggestion? The only way I can
understand it is that if God did not exist, objective morality would be
impossible. Indeed, if Frame's idea were true, it would be incoherent to deny
the existence of God and affirm objective morality. But, as far as I can see,
there is nothing incoherent about this. For example, one is not being incoherent
if one says: God does not exist but cruelty is objectively bad.
Moreover, in addition to there being no need to postulate God in order to make
objective moral judgments, such postulation invites moral skepticism. If I
criticize Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does not exist. Why have I justified my judgment only if I go on to add
"Kindness is an intrinsic part of God's nature?" Indeed, moral skeptics would
be less impressed by the theological addition than by the original claim. The
theological addition invites the reply, "Why should I believe that this God
exists? It seems much more likely that cruelty is wrong than that there is a God
with such intrinsic properties. And in any case, why should this theological fact
-- assuming it is fact--provide any additional support for the original claim?"
I also argued that the claim of the objectivity of Christian morality is
undermined by two other considerations: The difficulty of rationally deciding
between conflicting claims of divine revelation from different religions such as
Christianity and Islam, and the conflicting interpretations of revelation within a
given tradition such as Christianity. How does Frame deal with conflicting
claims of divine revelation? Frame maintains that there is good historical
reason to prefer Christian over Islam and, consequently, Christian moral
principles over Muslim ones. (Presumably Frame would also have to claim that
there is good historical reason to dismiss Judaism's rejection of the NT and the
Church of the Latter Day Saints' acceptance of the Book of Mormon and,
consequently, good reason to dismiss any conflicting moral principles that are
derived from Judaism or the Book of Mormon.) But to base his case on
historical evidence for Christianity is a weak foundation indeed for the
objectivity of Christian ethics. As I showed in The Case Against Christianity

the major doctrines of Christianty -- the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, the
Incarnation -- rest on little solid historical evidence. I do not dismiss Christian
apologetics in a couple of sentence, as Frame claims. On the contrary, I argued
for the falsehood of Christianity at great length.
What about the problem of conflicting interpretations of Christian ethic? Frame
indicates that his answer to this problem would be the same as his answer to the
problem of conflicting sources of revelation. Since the latter was an appeal to
historical evidence, presumably his answer to the problem of conflicting
interpretations of Christian ethics would be the same. If so, the identical
problem as that pointed out above arises: the historical evidence is weak and is
itself subject to different interpretations.
Appealing to the two thousand year history of Christian theology hardly
supports Frame's case. A cursory glance at the controversies within Christian
theology must surely banish any illusions of the objective nature of Christian
belief and of the moral doctrines which rest upon them. Although Christians
may agree that an appeal to historical evidence should be used to reconcile their
differences, such appeals have hardly been effective. The many sectarian and
denominational squabbles, the numerous heresies, the schisms within the major
churches show that any objectivity associated with Christian belief is illusive.
Yes, there has been some agreement among Christians. But how does
agreement on the Nicene Creed, for example, help to reconcile differences
among Christians over, among other things, the morality of the death penalty,
war, abortion, premarital sex, homosexuality, private property, social drinking,
and gambling? Frame points out that there have been conflicts in philosophy
and science. Whatever the rational status of philosophy, theology can only be
compared to science to theology's disadvantage. One obvious difference is that
scientific controversies are not settled by appeals to claims about miraculous
events occurring two thousand years ago. In any case, the question is not
whether other disciplines are free from controversy but whether a Christian
foundation of morality is objective. Enough has been said to cast doubt that it
is.

Notes
[1] The misleading implication of Frame's use of "miracle" is shown by
noticing that the argument from miracles to the existence of God is not an
argument from the existence of events in general to their ultimate cause. This is
the cosmological argument. (For a critique of this argument (See my Atheism:
A Philosophical Jusitification, Chapter 4.) The argument from miracles is the

argument from events that no natural laws can apparently explain to the
existence of God.
[2] See my Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Chapter 3.

A Third Response to Martin

by John Frame

SCIENCE
MARTIN: If all events are "miracles," as Frame suggests, then miracles are not unique
and remarkable. A miracle, in the sense relevant to my discussion, is an event that can
only be explained by supernatural intervention, that is where there is a supernatural cause
operating directly on the event in question.
FRAME: It was Martin's decision to define miracle as an event "which can only be
explained in terms of divine intervention." I took "intervention" to mean causality: a
miracle is an event which has God as its cause. But in that sense, on my view, all events
are miracles. Perhaps I misinterpreted M., or perhaps he did not express himself clearly.
However, now he wants to take "intervention" somewhat differently, to refer to a
situation "where there is a supernatural cause operating directly on the event in question."
But I'm not sure what this means either. Does this mean that the feeding of the 5000 is
not a miracle, since in that event Christ did not work "directly" but rather through the
means of loaves and fishes? Or is the point that whatever secondary causes existed,
nothing would have happened unless there were also an exertion of divine energy? I
presume that since M. wants to stay close to our common sense understanding of
miracles he has the second concept in mind. But again that implies for me that all events
are miracles, for nothing can happen without an exertion of divine energy (we call it
"providence"). The second causes cannot operate unless God works in them and with
them.
But perhaps Martin's more serious point is that "If all events are 'miracles,...' then
miracles are not unique and remarkable." Now so far we have been discussing Martin's
definition of miracle. Notice that I have argued that on __Martin's__ definition, every
event in miracle. I haven't presented my own definition. Now I will: it is "an event which
serves as an extraordinary revelation of God."
Obviously, on this definition, miracles are unique and remarkable, so Martin's present
objection fails. On this definition, the uniqueness of miracle is not in its causal origin.
(All events are caused by God, and in all events there is a "direct" divine action.) Rather
the uniqueness of miracle is epistemological. By their unusual nature, miracles shake us
up, contradict our expectations, draw our attention to what God is doing. It is not that

miracles are necessary for human beings to be persuaded of God's revelation; Scripture
testifies otherwise. Miracles are an additional push toward the knowledge of God.
The persuasiveness of miracle is not, as Martin supposes (e.g. in footnote 1), in some
argument that shows that "only God" could have caused the miracle as opposed to other
events which could have nondivine causes. Rather, miracle is a vehicle of revelation (a
"sign," Greek __semeion__) which is especially vivid. In the Bible, some who see
miracles come to believe; others' hearts are hardened.
Of course, according to Scripture, everything is revelatory (Psm. 19:1ff, Rom. 1:18ff).
But miracles are especially vivid. There is no sharp line between miracle and providence.
The difference is a difference in degree.
The implications for science: nature is __basically__ uniform, because God has ordained
a basic uniformity (cf. Gen. 8:22). Without him, there is no basis for assuming any
uniformity (TAG). There are exceptions to this uniformity, because God is after all a
person and, like human persons, works according to his personal intentions, not
according to rigid patterns. Such irregularities mean that scientists must be humble
enough to claim something less than absolute universality for their formulations of
natural laws. But I think that should not be too high a price for them to pay, since the
alternative is no basis for science at all.
LOGIC
MARTIN: I argued that if logic is dependent on God, logical principles are contingent.
But they are not. Frame's counter is that logic is an intrinsic part of God's nature and thus
logic is necessary since God does not change.
FRAME: More than that: logic is necessary, because God's being is necessary, and logic
is an aspect (attribute) of God's Being.
MARTIN: But how is one to understand this idea? It seems to imply that if God did not
exist, there would be no logic and this, in turn, would mean that if God did not exist, the
law of contradiction would not hold.
FRAME: The situation is even more desperate. If God, a necessarily existent being,
doesn't exist, what exactly does follow? That is an odd question. Martin is asking what
the world would be like if we postulate that in it a certain necessarily existent being does
not exist. That's like (not exactly like, of course) asking what the world would be like if 2
+ 2 did not equal 4, or if triangles could have four sides, or if a paper could be both blue
and red all over. Or what if Being itself, the real world, did not exist? What would the
resultant "nothing" be like? Parmenides thought that was a meaningless question:
"nothingness" cannot "be" anything. It cannot be "like" anything.
So my point is not that if God doesn't exist the law of noncontradiction will fail. Rather:
it does not even make any sense even to talk about a world in which God doesn't exist.

With such a supposition, we cannot deduce either the presence or absence of logic. I
grant, of course, that with such a supposition it is more natural to talk about an absence of
logic, so Martin isn't entirely wrong. But he needs to see the radicalness of a
transcendental theism.
MARTIN: Not only is there no reason to maintain this [that God is a necessary condition
of logic -JF] , there seems to be good reason to reject it. Unless the ontological argument
that God exists by definition is is valid-- and I know of no good reason to accept any
version of the ontological argument--there is nothing incoherent about denying the
existence of God.[2] But it is incoherent to deny the law of contradiction.
FRAME: Of course there is more to be said for the ontological argument. Even among
contemporary philosophers, some are more favorably disposed toward it than Martin is.
But I won't get into that here. I only want to point out that whether or not the ontological
argument can be made persuasive to an unbeliever, it is clearly valid within the Christian
worldview. Christians believe that God is the necessary condition of all rational thinking,
just as I above described God as the necessary condition of natural uniformity. To deny
that such a necessary condition exists while engaging in supposedly meaningful discourse
is to contradict oneself.
So again Martin says something that is true on __his__ presuppositions, but not on the
presuppositions of those he is arguing against. That is to beg the question.
To summarize where our discussion is at this point: If TAG is sound, then it is incoherent
to deny the existence of God. In our present exchange, Martin is not attacking TAG
directly, but is trying to counter it with his TANG. My reply is that if TAG is sound, then
TANG is not. Therefore, if Martin is to establish the soundness of TANG, he must first
refute TAG directly. At the relevant points in the argument where such refutation is
required, Martin instead resorts to rough-hewn intuitions: OF COURSE there is nothing
incoherent about denying the existence of God! But that's what our debate is about. What
is obvious here to Martin is obvious only on his own presuppositions, and those are here
in question.
MARTIN: Indeed, Frame admits that there is no inconsistency in denying that God exists
and affirming the law of contradiction "in regard to these two statements taken in
themselves." But then he goes on the claim that logic (L) cannot exist without God (G). I
find these two claims incoherent. If L and not G are not inconsistent, how can L not exist
without G? The phrase "in regard to these two statements taken in themselves" does not
in any way dispel the incoherence.
FRAME: I didn't think I'd have to explain this point to a philosopher. There are many
statements which are consistent with one another "taken in themselves" which become
inconsistent when a larger context is supplied. Example: (1) "Bill has a pet named
Rusty," (2) "Bill does not have a dog." Given only those two sentences, no logician could
show any inconsistency between them. But add (3) "Bill's pet Rusty is a dog," and you
have an inconsistent set. But if you like you can forget my line about the "statements in

themselves." That doesn't add anything to the argument. I was just trying to empathize a
bit with those who think it obvious that there is no contradiction here. But of course in the
most serious sense I maintain that there is a contradiction here. For once the relevant
context is supplied, there certainly is a contradiction.
MORALITY
MARTIN: I argued that objective morality cannot be based on Christianity since morality
is based on God's arbitrary decision. Frame tries to combat this point by a theory of
morality which is similar to his theory of logic. Moral goodness is an intrinsic part of
God's nature, he says, and is thus unchanging and absolute. Again how is one to
understandd this suggestion? The only way I can understand it is that if God did not exist,
objective morality would be impossible. Indeed, if Frame's idea were true, it would be
incoherent to deny the existence of God and affirm objective morality. But, as far as I can
see, there is nothing incoherent about this. For example, one is not being incoherent if
one says: God does not exist but cruelty is objectively bad.
FRAME: Here my reply is the same as in the case of logic, above: (1) Martin is begging
the question by merely asserting a conclusion from his own presuppositions, one which
theists should not grant. (2) The incoherence appears in the "larger context" of these
assertions: "objective badness" has no meaning in an impersonal universe devoid of
normative purpose.
MARTIN: Moreover, in addition to there being no need to postulate God in order to
make objective moral judgments, such postulation invites moral skepticism. If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does not exist.
FRAME: Again, note that Martin is begging the very question at issue.
MARTIN: Why have I justified my judgment only if I go on to add "Kindness is an
intrinsic part of God's nature?" Indeed, moral skeptics would be less impressed by the
theological addition than by the original claim.
FRAME: Why should we be interested in what does and does not impress moral
skeptics? That is irrelevant to the question of whether they are right or wrong.
MARTIN: The theological addition invites the reply, "Why should I believe that this God
exists?
FRAME: And the answer is TAG. Again, Martin is assuming that TAG is unsound,
which he hasn't shown. Note again my formal point: one must show TAG is unsound
before one can show that TANG is sound.
MARTIN: It seems much more likely that cruelty is wrong than that there is a God with
such intrinsic properties.

FRAME: "Seems much more likely" here appears to be a description of nonbelieving

psychology. Again, why should that be of interest? And, of course, I disagree. I believe
that God is clearly revealed, so that his existence is not at all unlikely (Rom. 1:19ff).
MARTIN: And in any case, why should this theological fact -- assuming it is fact-provide any additional support for the original claim?
FRAME: Because the theological fact is the only possible basis of objective ethical
norms (TAG).
CONFLICTING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS
MARTIN: How does Frame deal with conflicting claims of divine revelation? Frame
maintains that there is good historical reason to prefer Christian over Islam and,
consequently, Christian moral principles over Muslim ones. (Presumably Frame would
also have to claim that there is good historical reason to dismiss Judaism's rejection of the
NT and the Church of the Latter Day Saints' acceptance of the Book of Mormon and,
consequently, good reason to dismiss any conflicting moral principles that are derived
from Judaism or the Book of Mormon.) But to base his case on historical evidence for
Christianity is a weak foundation indeed for the objectivity of Christian ethics. As I
showed in The Case Against Christianity the major doctrines of Christianty -- the
Resurrection, the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation -- rest on little solid historical evidence. I
do not dismiss Christian apologetics in a couple of sentence, as Frame claims. On the
contrary, I argued for the falsehood of Christianity at great length.
FRAME: Sure. And I've argued for its truth at great length. But my time now is limited,
and in any case we both have to be somewhat concise in an online discussion. Unless
Martin proposes a thorough examination of all the evidences in this present dialogue,
then he should leave these questions open, or at least be content to discuss them, as I
have, in broad, methodological terms.
Remember, however, that I am not trying to establish the objectivity of Christianity from
historical evidence alone. There is both a posteriori and a priori, both fact and value, both
historical science and historical methodology. Scripture gives us historical evidence, but
it also gives us authoritative methods for handling and evaluating that evidence. So we
are not left alone facing a whirlwind of unidentified brute facts, as in Hume, Lessing,
Kant, and many modern philosophies of history. Methods of dealing with history are
themselves religiously and philosophically problematic. That may account for the fact
that the evidence seems very weak to Martin, but very strong to me.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN

ETHIC
FRAME: Same here.

MARTIN: Appealing to the two thousand year history of Christian theology hardly
supports Frame's case. A cursory glance at the controversies within Christian theology
must surely banish any illusions of the objective nature of Christian belief and of the
moral doctrines which rest upon them. Although Christians may agree that an appeal to
historical evidence should be used to reconcile their differences, such appeals have hardly
been effective. The many sectarian and denominational squabbles, the numerous heresies,
the schisms within the major churches show that any objectivity associated with Christian
belief is illusive. [illustrative? -JF] Yes, there has been some agreement among
Christians. But how does agreement on the Nicene Creed, for example, help to reconcile
differences among Christians over, among other things, the morality of the death penalty,
war, abortion, premarital sex, homosexuality, private property, social drinking, and
gambling? Frame points out that there have been conflicts in philosophy and science.
Whatever the rational status of philosophy, theology can only be compared to science to
theology's disadvantage. One obvious difference is that scientific controversies are not
settled by appeals to claims about miraculous events occurring two thousand years ago.
In any case, the question is not whether other disciplines are free from controversy but
whether a Christian foundation of morality is objective. Enough has been said to cast
doubt that it is.
FRAME: Martin seems to be conceding my point about philosophy at least! At least in
the sense that "silence gives consent." As for science, I think Thomas Kuhn's writings
indicate that science has often shown denominational squabbles very similar to those in
the church, although it has also gone through periods of consensus on some established
principles, as has Christian theology on the doctrine of the Trinity since 381.
But obviously the question of truth doesn't turn on how much disagreement there is in a
particular field. A is A, no matter how many people dispute it. I'll give Martin that point
in relation to philosophy if he'll give it to me in relation to theology.
I will make a few comments about the ethical disagreements he cites, namely "the
morality of the death penalty, war, abortion, premarital sex, homosexuality, private
property, social drinking, and gambling."
(1) On the death penalty, abortion, premarital sex, homosexuality, and social drinking,
the Christian church has actually been very unified until the last hundred years. What
happened then was the advent of theological liberalism which questioned scriptural
authority and tried to reconstruct Christian ethics to agree with secular movements. That,
in my estimation, was not a rift within Christianity, but an invasion of non-Christian
thinking into the church. The rift was not between Christian and Christian, but between
Christian and non-Christian ideas. If one takes the Bible as his ethical authority he cannot
seriously doubt what it teaches about the death penalty (yes), abortion (no), premarital
sex (no), homosexuality (no) and social drinking (yes).
(2) Christians have disagreed about war, mainly because the New Testament says very
little about it, and the church has been unclear about the relevance of Old Testament

teaching (Israel's holy wars) to current government policy. That is just a hard issue. I
think I can give an answer, but I won't try to do it here.
(3) The issue of private property is controversial because the idea of state control of
means of production is fairly recent. I think most serious Bible-believing Christians (as
opposed to the liberals mentioned above) believe in private property, because Scripture
values inheritance, prohibits theft, and assigns to the state no legitimate rights over the
property of the nation it governs.
(4) Gambling also has not been discussed much historically. Some fundamentalists have
taken absolute stands against it (and against social drinking) without, in my view, any
adequate biblical basis, because of the social problems connected with the practice. I
think that as the matter receives more discussion, the church will come to consensus.
In brief, the evidence does not refute my view that the Bible provides consistent and
reliable guidance in ethics. The disagreements within the Christian community are not as
great as Martin supposes, and those disagreements are often the result of alien, nonbiblical principles being brought into the Christian community.
Of course, to reach ethical conclusions from the Bible, one must read it responsibly, just
as one must think responsibly in science or philosophy or any other discipline.

Response TO John Frame

Science
In my previous replies I suggested that on the standard sense of "miracle, " a
miracle is an event brought about by divine intervention in the natural course of
events. Frame seems to understand this to mean simply that God caused the
event in question to occur. Since on his view all events are caused by God, all
events would be miracles. But to say that God caused all events to occur could
mean two quite different things. First, it could mean that God made and
sustains all natural laws. All events are brought about by the working of natural
laws which in turn are brought about by God. On this view God never bypasses natural laws. All events can be explained by natural laws which in turn
are explained by God. Second, it could mean that although God caused and
sustains natural laws, sometimes God by-passes natural laws and directly
causes events in the natural world. On this view some events are not completely
explained by natural laws which are in turn caused and sustained by God, but
are caused in part without the mediation of natural law. It is such cases that I
have in mind when I speak of God's intervening in the natural course of events.
One might also say in such cases that God suspends certain natural laws and
acts without their mediation. This second interpretation is, I believe, the
traditional Christian view.

With respect to the miracle of the feeding of 5000 the difference between these
two views is obvious. On the first view, natural laws completely explain the
feeding although God is posited to explain these laws. On the second, natural
laws do not completely explain the feeding and God acts partially without the
mediation of natural law. It is the second view that I claim is incompatible with
science for the reasons given in my earlier replies. (Of course, I object to the
first view as well since it seems to assume the validity of some version of the
Cosmological or Teleological Arguments. But this is not the basis of TANG.)
It is not clear to me exactly what Frame's position is. His own definition of a
miracle as a sign is neutral with respect to these two interpretations of divine
causality. Does he reject the second interpretation? He seems to. I would claim
that this interpretation is not only the traditional one but the one that is still
standardly assumed by Christians. If he does reject this second view, this would
indirectly grant my point that the standard Christian view of miracles is
incompatible with science.

Logic
In my last reply I pointed out that on Frame's interpretation of logic, logic is
necessary and one aspect of God's being. I argued that an implication of such a
view is that if God does not exist, the law of contradiction does not hold.
However, I argued that this implication is dubious since it makes perfectly
good sense to deny the existence of God but no sense to deny the law of
contradiction.
In Frame's reply he rejects my argument on the grounds that God is a necessary
being and it makes no sense to deny His existence. Indeed, he claims that it is
inconsistent to so. But he gives no argument for this claim and it seems to be
just an assertion. Consider the difference between:
(1) It not the case that it is not that P and not P.
(2) It is not the case that God exists.

From (1) it is easy to derive a contradiction. But Frame provides no

demonstration that a contradiction follows from (2). Of course, such a
demonstration could be achieved in a trivial and question begging way if we
arbitrarily assume that
(3) It is logically necessary that God exists.

Then such a contradiction easily follows. However, it is possible to derive a

contradiction from anything if arbitrary assumptions are made. For example,
from
(4) My dog is brown

one can derive a contradiction by assuming

(5) If my dog is brown, then P and not P.

However, we have no reason to assume (5). In a similar way Frame gives us no

reason to assume (3). Perhaps Frame thinks that there is such a reason in terms
of the larger context of Christian thought. As far as I can determine, however,
most Christian philosophers do not accept (3). For despite Frame's reservations
about getting involved in the Ontological Argument commitment to (3) is
commitment to a sub-conclusion of modal versions of Ontological Argument-without any of the supporting premises. [1] However, this argument has been
rejected even by many Christians theologians and has serious logical
difficulties.
Frame seems to think that the acceptance of (3) is necessary for Christian
belief. One suspects that he is confusing the logical necessity of God's
existence with the logical necessity of God's not beginning to exist and not
ceasing to exist. In other words, Christian do seem to be committed to the
following:
(6) It is logically necessary that if at any time God existed, then at every time He
existed.

But (3) does not follow from (6) since (6) is compatible with God's
nonexistence. Moreover, (6) is compatible with logic existing without God.
Frame was good enough to summarize the debate on logic and science from his
point of view up to this point and I can do so as well. With respect to science
Frame escapes TANG only by assuming an account of miracles that is not the
traditional Christian one. With respect to logic he avoids TANG by assuming
without argument that it is logically inconsistent to deny the existence of God.
Such an assumption would only follow from the presumption that God's
existence is logically necessary-- the unargued sub-conclusion of modal
versions of the Ontological Argument. It would not follow from other
conceptions of God's necessity. His position on science thus implicitly seems to

grant my point and his position on logic rests on an unargued assumption that
even many Christians philosophers reject.

Morality
In my previous replies I argued that Christianity is incompatible with moral
objectivity since morality would be based on the arbitrary will of God. In
Frame's replies he maintained that morality is necessarily based on God's
unchanging intrinsic character. If Frame's idea is true, I argued, it would be
incoherent to deny the existence of God and affirm objective morality. But I
maintained that it is not incoherent. Frame maintains that it is incoherent and
from the above discussion concerning his views on logic one can see why he
thinks so: One cannot deny the existence of God and affirm objective morality
because it is inconsistent to deny the existence of God. In other words, his
views on morality are based on (3): the logical necessity of the existence of
God. This defense of his position has the same problems as his defense of the
dependency of logic on God: it presupposes an unargued assumption that even
many Christians philosophers would reject. In particular, it assumes the
unargued sub-conclusion of modal versions of the Ontological Argument.
I also argued earlier that the objectivity of Christian morality suffers from two
other problems. First, it has no rational way of deciding between conflicting
claims of divine revelation and, second, it has no way of deciding between
conflicting interpretations of allegedly Christian revelation. Frame maintains
that the truth of Christian revelation is shown by historical investigation while I
maintain that historical evidence for the truth of Christianity is very weak.
Frame wisely hesitates to get involved in a protracted historical debate. I too
have no desire to enter such a debate online. Readers of our debate on the
Internet should study our respective works and decide for themselves whether
historical scholarship has established the truth of the Resurrection, the
Incarnation, the Virgin with any acceptable degree of probability.
However, one point should be borne in mind in any examination of the
evidence. The Resurrection, the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth are typically
understood as miracles in the standard sense considered above: they are
brought about by divine intervention in the natural course ofevent s, one that
by-passes natural law. As I argue in a forthcoming paper, even for Christian
historians such events should have extremely low initial probability and should
require extraordinarily strong independent evidence before they are accepted.
Whether such evidence is available is the key question. As I suggested in my
previous replies to Frame, however, as far as science and a scientific approach

to history are concerned, such events cannot be considered miracles in the

standard sense and thus no amount of scientific evidence could establish them
in the sense demanded by the Christian faith.[2]
With respect to conflicting interpretations of Christian morality,Frame's
position is that on some of the moral issues I raised-- for example, the death
penalty-- there was wide agreement among Christian until recent times--until
about 100 years ago. This consensus was undermined by theological liberalism
and an invasion of secular thought. The present rift, he says, is not between
Christians but between Christian and nonChristian ideas. He say that on other
issues--for example, war-- Christians disagree because the NT says little, the
OT is not clearly relevant to present issues, and the church has been unclear in
its position.
With respect to the morality of war Frame seems to admit that referring to
Scripture is a problematic way of coming to a correct answer. However, on
Frame's view what other ways are there? I thought one received moral guidance
only from the revealed word of God which in this case is unavailable. If extra
Scriptural ways are available, why are they not also available to non-believers?
But surely the morality of war is not an isolated case. Many of the moral
problems of contemporary life are not discussed explicitly in Scripture and any
inferences from Scripture is often problematic. Consider, for example, the
moral issues connected with privacy, free speech, reproductive technology,
psychotherapy, democracy, genetic engineering, and the environment.
With respect to moral problems such as the death penalty I doubt that things are
as clear as Frame has suggested. Even among those Christians who advocate
the death penalty there is disagreement concerning the offenses to which the
death penalty applies. The OT explicitly requires the death penalty for murder,
homosexuality, bestiality, blasphemy, cursing one's parents, witchcraft,
working on the Sabbath and non-chastity. As I understand the views of the late
Greg Bahnsen, he maintained that since these requirements have not been
revoked in the NT, they should be made part of the criminal law of all
nations.[3] However, this view would surely be rejected even by the vast
majority of those Christian thinkers who uphold the death penalty today. Are
the differences between the views of someone like Bahnsen and the Christians
who have a more limited view of the death penalty simply a result of the
invasion of nonChristian ideas? Or is it a genuine difference of interpretation as
to what precisely Christianity ethics involves to which there is no clear answer?
Moreover, there are Christians who today reject the death penalty altogether
and trace their views back much farther than one hundred years. For example,
pacifist sects such as the Mennonites, and Quakers have long been opposed to

all taking of human life. These groups do not base their opposition to the death
penalty on recent alien, non-biblical principles. They differ from Christian
death penalty advocates because they interpret the Scriptures according to what
they take to be the true spirit of Jesus' teaching. Yes, Christians should read
scriptures responsibly as Frame suggests. But he seems to think that there is
only one responsible way, namely his.

Notes
[1] By a modal version of the Ontological Argument I mean any version of
such an argument that uses concepts such as logical necessity, logical
possibility and so on. By a sub-conclusion I mean a conclusion from which the
ultimate conclusion (God exists) follows. For example, in the following simple
modal version of the argument (c) is the sub-conclusion.
(a) Either it is logically impossible that God exists or it is logically necessary that
God exists.
(b) It is not impossible that God exists

(c) Hence, it is logically necessary that God exists.

(d) Hence, God exists.

[2] Religious believers who wish to cast doubt on the objectivity and rationality
of science and thus show that science and religion are in the same boat typically
cite the work of the late Thomas Kuhn on the history of science. Predictably
Frame cites this work to support his contention that science has problems
similar to the ones I pointed out in relation to theology such as a lack of
objectivity and the presence of irrationality. However, Kuhn's subjective,
irrationalistic, and relativistic interpretation of the history of science has been
highly criticized in recent philosophy of science. I think that appealing to Kuhn
to establish the lack of objectivity of science is ill-advised unless Frame is
prepared to take on Kuhn's many critics. Moreover, even Kuhn seemed to grant
in his later writings that science has progressed and that there are objective
standards for evaluating this progress. The question is whether anything
analogous is present in Christianity.
[3] See Greg Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Co., Phillipsburg, NJ., 1977), Chapter 21. See also Greg
Bahnsen, No Other Standard: Theonomy and Its Critics (Tyler, TX: Institute
for Christian Economics, 1991)

Frame's Final Response

by John Frame

First, thanks to Michael Martin for the civility and thoughtfulness with which he has carried on the discussion. I
must move on to other things, but I have enjoyed the exchange. Thanks also to all of you who have patiently
waded through these posts. If any of you want to discuss these matters further, please feel free to drop me a line
at 76334.2600@compuserve.com.

SCIENCE
Martin proposes as the definition of miracle most Christians hold: "although God caused
and sustains natural laws, sometimes God by-passes natural laws and directly causes
events in the natural world." He is perplexed as to whether I would accept this definition.
That depends on what you mean by "natural laws." If we mean
(1) the ultimate rules governing events in the natural world,

then I would say God never violates natural laws. The reason is that natural law, on this
definition, is nothing less than his own plan for creation. On the other hand, if "natural
laws" are
(2) generally accepted human judgments (scientific or otherwise) as to how things work and what is likely
to happen,

or
(3) God's usual ways of governing the world
then God does violate natural laws.
Now when some people talk about natural laws, they seem to have a fourth concept in
mind, something like
(4) the basic causal order of nature.

I gather they want to distinguish this from (1), because they don't want to identify it with
the will of God. Rather they see it as something intermediate between God's will and the
actual course of nature. It is as if God created into the world a sort of mechanism by
which things normally happen. Occasionally he will bypass this and work "directly," as
Martin says.
They also want to distinguish this from (2), because (2) is essentially subjective. The
scientist is the one who tries to ascertain what the natural law is, and scientists are not

interested in surveying people's "judgments" or "expectations," not even those of other

scientists. And they distinguish this from (3), because that too seems subjective: it is
closely linked to God's own intentions, which the scientist cannot read directly.
My own view of (4): I'm not convinced that there are any natural laws in that sense. I
have no reason to believe that God rules the universe through the mediation of some such
structure rather than directly. Certainly the biblical writers do not assume any such
structure. Their language, rather, suggests that God "directly" brings about the
thunderstorms, the harvests, the rising and falling of dynasties, etc. And certainly biblical
writers do not identify events as miracles by comparing them with events proceeding
from natural laws so defined. They just didn't have that concept of natural law in their
intellectual vocabulary. Even if we assume that such a law-structure exists, one could not
make many confident statements about that structure in an age before the development of
modern science. Indeed, it would take an almost divine knowledge to define that laworder with any precision and then to judge what events are violations of it. (Martin has
stated this difficulty well in previous posts.) Certainly people claiming to have
experienced miracles have never claimed any such knowledge.
Granted, some theologians have defined miracles in terms of something like (4), but I
think those theologians are misguided. They have not understood the difficulty of
identifying miracles under this definition; they have not understood how far this
definition is from that assumed in Scripture; and they have not understood how
metaphysically problematic such a law-structure is.
Martin thinks that this definition is the traditional Christian one. Well, as I said, I don't
find it in Scripture; nor is it found in Augustine. Some Christians speak of "natural law,"
but really have in mind (2) or (3) rather than (4). Under the influence of Aristotelian
cosmology and later of modern science a number of theologians have adopted something
like (4), but that has never gone unquestioned. In my own theological tradition, Charles
Hodge and B. B. Warfield presupposed (4), but Abraham Kuyper and Herman
Dooyeweerd strongly rejected it.
So I prefer to say that miracles are unusual events in which God reveals himself with
remarkable vividness. He reveals himself everywhere (Rom. 1:18-21, Psm. 19), but in
miracle he provides a spectacular demonstration of his presence. Obviously to be a
miracle in this sense, an event would have to violate natural laws in senses (2) and (3). It
would not violate natural laws in sense (1). If there are natural laws in sense (4), miracles
may sometimes violate them, sometimes not. But a "violation of natural law" in sense (4)
should not be part of the definition of miracle; the concept is just too problematic.
How does God reveal himself in miracles? Not, as Martin supposes, by providing
evidence that the event is contrary to the law-structure of the universe (natural law (4)).
But by graciously opening people's hearts to perceive him in the event. (Notice that in the
Bible many who witness miracles do not come to believe. God illumines whom he will.)

What is "wonderful" about miracles? I think that (2) expresses it best. Miracles go
dramatically against our expectations. As such, they remind us vividly that God rules the
world and they draw our attention to his revelation, which always accompanies the
miracle.
So when Martin argues that violations of natural law in sense (4) are incompatible with
science, that doesn't bother me too much, since I am not sure that there are any natural
laws in this sense to violate, and since, in any case, that question is irrelevant to my
concept of miracle. But just for the record, I am still not convinced of Martin's argument
here. Even granting the existence of natural laws in sense (4), I'm not persuaded that
these laws can never be violated, or that science must assume their inviolability. Again,
science presupposes relative uniformity, but not absolute uniformity.

LOGIC
Martin thinks that I have claimed that God's existence is logically necessary, without
offering any justification for saying it. He thinks that assertion is wrong and not accepted
by many Christian thinkers.
Actually I didn't say that God's existence was logically necessary, only that God was a
necessarily existent being; that is, that he exists in all possible worlds. There are various
kinds of necessity other than logical necessity. But there is, of course, a significant
relationship between God and logic. For in every possible world, logic also exists, and in
every possible world, logic is based on God's character. So, if God doesn't exist, logic
doesn't either, and all is chaos.
But even if you don't presuppose that logic is based on God's character, what happens
when you deny the existence of a necessarily existent being? ANY necessarily existent
being? What would the world be like without the number six? It is impossible to say,
because there is no possible world without the number six. So if there is no number six,
everything is askew. Meaning and rationality are lost. Same, I think, if you deny God.
Martin smells the ontological argument in all of this, which is not too surprising. But
many who have rejected the ontological argument have accepted God's necessary
existence, such as Thomas Aquinas and his many followers. In fact, contrary to Martin,
the necessary existence of God is almost universally accepted by theistic theologians and
philosophers.
What is the ground for saying that God necessarily exists? Scriptural emphases: God is
the creator of all, so he has no cause; he is not dependent on anything other than himself
(so he is non-contingent); he is the "living" God.
We should also keep in mind that TAG (as, e.g., in Bahnsen's formulation) asserts
another relationship between God and logic: theism can account for the universality and
necessity of logic, while nontheistic accounts cannot.

Remember, though, where the burden of proof lies in this discussion. Martin is trying to
use his TANG to disprove the existence of God. To do that in the current context, he
must show that logic cannot be based on God's character. He has tried to do that by
arguing that if logic is based on God's character it will be contingent. I have replied, no,
logic is necessary, because God's existence and character is necessary. At this point, he
can renew his attack only by showing that God's character and existence cannot be
necessary. It is not enough to show that the necessary existence of God is controversial.
He must show that God cannot exist necessarily.

MORALITY
Martin says that on my view "One cannot deny the existence of God and affirm objective
morality because it is inconsistent to deny the existence of God." "In other words," he
adds, Frame's "views on morality are based on (3): the logical necessity of the existence
of God."
Well, that's part of it, and I replied to Martin's arguments about that above. I would also
argue (as in TAG) that an impersonal source of morality can never obligate. The source
of moral obligation must be personal, and therefore morality presupposes God.
But, as in the discussion of logic, we may have lost our perspective on the larger
discussion. I am not obligated to prove that the existence of God is necessary for
objective morality. Rather, Martin is required to prove that the existence of God is
incompatible with objective morality. We discussed his arguments for this thesis in
previous posts. He adds nothing new here.

CONFLICTING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS

Martin summarizes, "Frame maintains that the truth of Christian revelation is shown by
historical investigation while I maintain that historical evidence for the truth of
Christianity is very weak."
Well, yes, that has been the nature of our discussion up to this point. Of course, more can
be said: (1) If TAG establishes the existence of a singular personal absolute, then that
conclusion rules out most all religious claims except those based on the Old and New
Testaments, since this is the only revelation consistent with the conclusion of TAG. (2)
Since Christianity, Judaism, Islam (yes, even Islam), Mormonism, etc. all claim
allegiance to the Scriptures (with some additions and subtractions), the argument between
these religious claims will be largely exegetical.
But of course (1) is a negative argument, and Martin is not wrong to ask for a positive
one as well, before he even enters the discussion in (2). It is at this point that we enter the
historical debate.
But of course our standards of historical possibility and evidence must not be those of
David Hume, D. F. Strauss, Rudolf Bultmann, or Norman Perrin. They must be standards

that are consistent with a theistic view of the world. So we must assume that miracles
(see the above discussion of the definition of miracle) are possible, that God is capable of
illuminating minds to properly receive and interpret revelation, that such events as
incarnation and resurrection are highly probable on the basis of previous revelation, etc.
These are not, I think, the methodological norms that Martin employs in his critique of
biblical history.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SCRIPTURAL

MORALITY
I should not have said that the death penalty was generally accepted until a hundred years
ago. Martin is right that there has been a pacifist tradition for some centuries. My mind
just went on hold at that point. I apologize to pacifist readers. I still maintain, however,
that there has been a pre-1800 Christian consensus concerning the other issues, abortion,
premarital sex, homosexuality, and social drinking, which Martin mentioned last time.
And I do continue to maintain that Scripture gives clear answers to these issues, and also
about the death penalty (pacifists notwithstanding).
Martin asks, "With respect to the morality of war Frame seems to admit that referring to
Scripture is a problematic way of coming to a correct answer. However, on Frame's view
what other ways are there? I thought one received moral guidance only from the revealed
word of God which in this case is unavailable. If extra Scriptural ways are available, why
are they not also available to non-believers? "
Reply: Developing a biblical ethic is problematic in different ways. (1) For one thing, it
requires some hermeneutical (interpretative) skills, and not everybody is equally adept at
that. (2) Further, some extra-biblical knowledge is required. Scripture is a sufficient
source of moral principles, but of course we have the responsibility of applying those
principles to present circumstances. So the Christian moral syllogism goes like this:
Premise one: a Biblical principle
Premise two: statement of a current situation
Conclusion: application of the principle to the situation

Example:
Murder is wrong.
Abortion is murder.
Therefore, abortion is wrong.

People can agree on the authority of Scripture, while disagreeing about the "current
situation."
(3) People can also differ in spiritual discernment. John 3:5: "Unless a man be born again,
he cannot see the kingdom of God."
So there are a number of factors entering into the development of a biblical ethic, and
each of these can lead to disputes. There are both biblical and extra-biblical factors to be

considered; of course the extra-biblical factors must be addressed from biblical

presuppositions. Nevertheless, a high degree of agreement has been achieved.
Martin enlarges the list of ethical problems that he doubts can be resolved biblically:
"Many of the moral problems of contemporary life are not discussed explicitly in
Scripture and any inferences from Scripture is often problematic. Consider, for example,
the moral issues connected with privacy, free speech, reproductive technology,
psychotherapy, democracy, genetic engineering, and the environment." He also mentions
the differences among Christians as to the specific application of the death penalty.
I agree these are difficult. I have lectured on several of these, and others have been
addressed by other Christian writers and teachers. Again, the situation is that Scripture
gives us broad principles (the Ten Commandments, plus some more specific teachings),
and God gives us the responsibility of applying those principles to specific situations.
Norm, situation, conclusion. It isn't always easy to reach definitive conclusions, though
often it is, in my view. But without the authoritative norm, we'd really be at sea. That's
one great advantage of biblical ethics: a revealed authoritative norm. That norm does not
eliminate the need for additional reasoning. But without that norm, the additional
reasoning won't get anywhere.
On the death penalty, by the way, I tend to see the biblical death penalties generally as
maximums rather than minimums. Adultery is not always to be punished by death. In
most cases other than murder, it is possible for one condemned to death to redeem his/her
life, and there is room for flexibility by the judges. I would also argue that the death
penalty for blasphemy does not apply outside the Israelite theocracy. But I realize there
are different views of these things.
Of course all ethical systems recognize questions that are difficult to resolve. The
advantage of Christian ethics is the authoritative norm, as I indicated, and also an
adequate motivation for ethical behavior: not to earn one's salvation, but as a grateful
response for God's gift of forgiveness in Christ. Apart from this norm and this
motivation, I'm convinced that ethics is pointless.

Final Response to Frame

Michael Martin

I would like to thank John Frame for the courtesy and care with which he has
carried on the discussion. Our discussion has been stimulating and has raised
many important issues in the philosophy of religion which believers, atheists,
and agnostics must take seriously. Although it would be too much to hope that
anything has been finally settled, the differences between us have been clarified
and relevant questions have been more clearly posed. I am grateful to Jeff

Lowder for suggesting that my article on TANG should be published on the

Internet and for his assistance in publishing my replies. I am also grateful to the
readers of this discussion who took the time to digest our dialogue.

Science
On my account science is incompatible with the view of a miracle as God's
intervention in the natural course of events. As I have argued in my previous
replies, this view would block scientific inquiry since it would mean that there
are some events that cannot be explained by scientific laws. Thus, if a cure of
cancer is a miracle in this sense, it would be beyond the pale of scientific
investigation. I claim that this view of miracle is the standard Christian view. In
his final reply Frame interprets me to mean that this is the Scriptural view. But
this was not my intention. Presumably the Scriptural view of miracle (whatever
that may be) is closely related to the view of science that was held in Biblical
times. That view of science has changed and with it the view of miracle found
in Christian thought. By the standard view of miracle, I meant the view of
miracle embraced by most Christians since the coming of modern science. To
use Frame's terms, this view of science maintains that there is a "basic causal
order of nature" that is discovered by scientific investigation and is used to
explain natural events. Many Christians have believed that God sometimes bypasses this structure in order to perform miracles. Frame admits that some
theologians have held such a view. I think he underestimates the extent of this
view in modern theological circles. But even ordinary Christians who believe,
for example, that a TV evangelist has brought about a "faith" cure, typically
seem to tacitly assume such a view. They believe that God has acted directly in
curing the cancer or blindness or paralysis and that science has not and will not
be able to explain the cure. Such ordinary believers also hold the same view
about the miracles alleged in the Scriptures-- for instance, the Resurrection, and
Jesus' feeding of the 5000.
To his credit Frame seem to reject this view of miracles. But what does he put
in its place? I am afraid I am still not completely clear about what his own view
entails. On one obvious reading, it has the same unfortunate consequences for
science as the view he rejects. He says that on his view natural laws are simply
God's usual ways of governing the world and are generally accepted human
judgments of how things work. In working a miracle God goes against his usual
ways of governing the world and accepted human judgments and reminds us
vividly that God rules the world. The crucial question is what implications this
has for science.[ 1] Do God's unusual ways of governing the world allow for
scientific knowledge? Does his definition entail, for example, that in the case of

a miraculous event it is possible that science could investigate it and discover

its cause? This seems unlikely since if a scientific cause were found, this would
hardly remind us that God rules the world. For example, if people thought
science could some day find the cause of the Resurrection, they would not
believe that God is needed to explain what happened. If Frame's definition does
rule out the discovery of a scientific cause, this prevents scientific inquiry and
has the same unfortunate practical implications for science as the view Frame
rejects.
In sum, on the standard view of miracles that is connected with modern
science, miracles are beyond the reach of science and, consequently, block
scientific inquiry. On one obvious reading of Frame's Scriptural interpretation
of miracles the same problem would occur.

Logic
I have argued that on the view of God assumed by TAG, logic is dependent on
God. Consequently logic would be contingent, not necessary. In reply Frame
has maintained that logic is an aspect of God's nature. According to him logic is
both dependent on God and necessary since God is necessary. In response to
this I maintained that logic is not dependent on God since one can deny the
existence of God without inconsistency but one cannot deny logical principles
such as the law of contradiction without inconsistency. In his third reply I took
Frame to be saying that I was mistaken since God's existence was logically
necessary and therefore His existence could not be denied without
inconsistency. Frame now says that he never claimed that God's existence is
logically necessary but only that God is a necessarily existing being.
But what does this mean? According to Frame, a necessarily existing being
exists in all logically possible worlds. However, in possible world semantics if
a proposition is true in every possible world, it is logically necessary. So if God
exists in every logically possible world, then the proposition that God exists is
true in every logically possible world and thus the proposition that God exists is
logically necessary. Apparently, I did not misinterpret Frame after all.
So the question is, why should one suppose that God's existence is logically
necessary or (what amounts to the same thing) that one is logically inconsistent
in denying the existence of God? Frame gives no reason except to say that the
Bible says that it is. However, few Christians have accepted this interpretation
of the Bible. If Christians accepted this interpretation, they would believe they
could refute atheists easily. They could simply show that atheists contradict
themselves and there would be no need for the traditional arguments for the

existence of God-- for instance, the Cosmological Argument, Teleological

Argument, Argument from Miracles, etc. However, most Christians have
realized that refuting atheism is not so easy. Indeed, the only Christians I know
who maintain that atheists contradict themselves are those few who uphold the
Ontological Argument, an argument with deep flaws.
Frame says that the Scriptural ground for saying that God is a necessarily
existing being--that is, that He exists in all possible worlds--is that Scripture
says that God has no cause, and is not dependent on anything other than
Himself. However, as I pointed out in my last reply, there is another possible
metaphysical interpretation compatible with these Scriptural claims: God is a
necessarily existing being in the sense that it is logically necessary that if at any
time God existed, then at every time He existed. This analysis does not entail
that God exists in all possible worlds but it does capture one sense of a
necessarily existing being. Briefly stated, this would mean that for any possible
world in which God exists, He will always exist and has always existed. He is
not caused in the possible worlds He exists in and in those worlds He is not
dependent on anything. Such a view of a necessarily existing being is
compatible with both atheism and one plausible reading of Scripture and I
recommend this reading for Frame's consideration. Obviously such a concept of
a necessarily existing being would not capture the sense of necessarily existing
being appropriate for logical and mathematical entities such as numbers. But
this seems to me to be all to the good since there are two concepts of a
necessarily existing being and nothing but confusion results from conflating
them.
Frame also throws out the tantalizing claim that he attributes to the late Greg
Bahnsen that only theism can account for the universality and necessity of
logic. But, as far as I can determine, although Bahnsen often made such a claim
he gave no argument for it. Certainly Frame gives no argument for it.
Frame brings up the interesting question of who has the burden of proof in a
discussion such as ours and what the burden of proof is. It is well to remember
that in a free wheeling discussion the burden of proof shifts and changes in the
course of the dialogue. Frame has tried to meet the challenge of TANG by
using TAG. I would have thought that since he has chosen to proceed in this
way the burden is now on him to give some reasons for accepting the major
premises of TAG. As I have tried to show, with respect to logic one of the
major premises of TAG is that God is a necessarily existing being in the strong
sense that the proposition that God exists is logically necessary. Frame gives no
argument for this claim. Surely I don't have the burden of showing him
mistaken. He must give some reasons to suppose that God is a logically

necessary being in the strong sense he assumes. But for what it is worth, in
Chapter 12 of my book Atheism, I give many arguments to support the view
that, far from God being a logically necessary being, God is a logically
impossible being. I show there that the concept of a theistic God is logically
incoherent. Furthermore, I pointed out in my previous replies that Frame's
claim that God is a logically necessary being in the sense that He exists in
every logically possible world assumes the conclusion of the Ontological
Argument. However, in Atheism, Chapter 3, I refute various versions of this
argument. Given all of this I am surprised that Frame thinks the burden of proof
is on me.
In sum, Frame defends the logical part of TAG by making the unargued claim
that God is a necessarily existing being in the sense that He exists in all
logically possible worlds. Surely he must give some reason for this claim. But
in any case, in my published writings I have shown that this claim is dubious
and that various arguments for it are unsound.

Morality
In TANG I argued that objective morality is impossible on the Christian view
since, if morality is dependent on God as this view upholds, morality would be
arbitrary and capacious. Frame's response was that morality is part of God's
nature and thus is necessary and eternal. I maintained that such a view is
dubious since one could affirm objective morality and deny the existence of
God with perfect consistency. In his third reply Frame argued that I was
mistaken since one could not deny the existence of God without contradiction
for God is necessarily an existing being, a being that exists in all logically
possible worlds. I need not repeat my objections to this view for they are fully
expressed in the above reply to Frame's position on logic.
In his final reply Frame brings up a new point that an impersonal morality can
never obligate and moral obligation can only be personal. I am not sure what he
means and he gives no argument for this view. Thus, I will not pursue this point
except to mention that in the Introduction to Atheism I give arguments for
basing objective ethics on nontheistic foundations.
Again Frame brings up the burden of proof and my reply is similar to the one I
have already made. Since he has chosen to use TAG to defeat TANG and TAG
assumes that God is a necessarily existing being in the strong sense considered
above, Frame must give some arguments to support this assumption. However,
he does not. But independent of this, as I have just pointed out, in my published

writings I have given arguments that such an assumption is dubious and that the
extant arguments for it are unsound.
I also maintained that Christianity has no rational way of deciding between
conflicting claims of divine revelation. Frame maintains that the truth of
Christian revelation concerning morality is shown by historical investigation.
However, it becomes clear in his final reply that, although on his view
historical investigation can come to a decision between different interpretations
of Scriptures (between, for example, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and
Mormonism), TAG is needed to rule out other claims to divine revelation.
Frame writes: "If TAG establishes the existence of a single personal absolute,
then that conclusion rules out most all religious claims except those based on
the Old and New Testaments since this is the only revelation consistent with
the conclusion of TAG." But, by Frame's own admission, TAG assumes that
God exists in all logically possible worlds, However, no argument has been
produced for this assumption. By his own admission, without this assumption
alleged nonscriptural revelations remain unrefuted. Moreover, even with this
assumption it is difficult to see how alleged nonscriptural revelations are
undermined. Suppose that God does exist in all logically possible worlds. How
does this by itself refute nonscriptural revelation? Obviously other assumptions
must be made to carry off the refutation. What are the grounds for these
assumptions?
As noted, Frame claims that historical investigation can decide between
different claims of revelation within the Scriptural tradition. But, as Frame is
well aware, the possibility of this is dependent on other issues considered
earlier. In order to decide between Judaism and Christianty, for example, one
would have to establish that the Resurrection occurred. But the Resurrection is
a miracle. If miracles are ruled out as being incompatible with scientific
investigation, as I have argued that they are on the standard modern view and
probably also on Frame's Scriptural view, a scientific historical investigation
could not decide between these two religious traditions. [2]
With respect to different interpretations of Christian ethics, I argued that the
lack of objectivity in Christian ethics is shown by the difficulties of reconciling
different interpretations of ethics within the Christian tradition. In his third
reply Frame maintained that there is wide consensus on many issues, for
example, on the death penalty and abortion, and where there are deep divisions
these are the result of the recent influence of secular morality. However, he
admitted that in some cases what Christian ethics mandates is unclear. I
maintained in contrast to Frame that his belief that there is a wide consensus on
moral issues within Christianity is too simple, that there are wide unreconciled

divisions among Christians even on the death penalty that cannot be traced to
secular influences, and that the area where what Christian ethics entails is
unclear is much wider than Frame admits.
In his final reply Frame grants my point that the pacifist tradition has been
opposed to the death penalty and that this opposition is not the result of recent
secular influences. But he maintains that, notwithstanding this tradition, the
death penalty is justified on Scriptural grounds. What he means, I am sure, is
that according to his interpretation of Scripture this tradition is wrong. But the
key question that is yet to be answered is whether his interpretation is better
than that of the pacifists. He also implicitly rejects Bahnsen's extreme
interpretation of the death penalty despite Bahnsen's two books defending his
views. Again the question remains unanswered whether his rejection of
Bahnsen's position has any more validity than Bahnsen's argument for his own
position. Frame also grants my point that there are wide areas of uncertainty in
deciding what Christian ethics entails but he thinks that without the
authoritative norms of Christian ethics to guide us the situation would be
hopeless and that Christian ethical principles combined with additional
reasoning helps us find solutions. However, given the great diversity of
Christian moral opinion and the lack of any detailed account of how Christian
ethical principles and additional reason would guide us, one must be skeptical.
The only example Frame gives of how such reasoning works is surely
questionable. His example of a "Christian moral syllogism" is:
Murder is wrong.
Abortion is murder.
Hence, abortion is wrong.

Let us suppose murder is always wrong. Is abortion always wrong? Even to

save the life of the mother? Even to save the mother's health? Even in cases of
incest? Many Christians who are opposed to abortion in many instances would
allow it in some. Have they really been corrupted by secular morality? How are
differences on abortion among Christians to be reconciled? Frame's moral
syllogism is of no help in such cases. In other cases where moral problems arise
such as privacy, free speech, reproductive technology, psychotherapy,
democracy, genetic engineering, and the environment such syllogistic
reasoning seems even less appropriate. For in these cases, even the major
premise of the syllogism is uncertain. What, for example, would be the
unconstroversial Scriptural major premise (analogous to murder is wrong) that
would help us decide moral issues connected with free speech or genetic
engineering?

Given the problems outlined above, is it really so obvious that Christian

morality has any advantages with respect to objectivity over secular ones?

Notes
[1] It has been suggested by Keith Augustine that Frame's definition of miracle
has the strange consequence that what is a miracle is relative to human
knowledge. For example, on Frame's account radio would not have just seemed
a miracle to cave men but would have been a miracle. Although this may be
true I am not sure that Frame assumes that in every case human science could
in time explain a miracle in his sense. God's unusual ways of governing the
universe might in many cases be beyond human ken.
[2] I believe that Frame is mistaken to maintain that on the Christian view the
Resurrection is probable-- at least initially -- even for Christians. Indeed, it
seems to have an initially low probability. Suppose that Christians believe that
God's sacrifice of His Son for the salvation of sinners was likely. It still would
not follow that the Resurrection was likely for this particular historical event
occurred at a particular time and place. God's Son could have died for sinners
in an indefinite number of ways and in an indefinite number of places and
times. There does not seem to be any a priori reason to suppose that He would
have died at one particular time and place rather than many other times and
places. So even if some resurrection or other is likely, there is no a priori reason
to suppose that He would have become incarnated and have died as Jesus in
First Century Palestine. In fact, given the innumerable alternatives at God's
disposal it would seem a priori unlikely that the Resurrection would have taken
place where and when it allegedly did. So even Christian historians must
overcome an initial improbablity of the Resurrection by producing strong
evidence.