V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 22.

07

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Currentness

Penal Code (Refs & Annos)

Title 5. Offenses Against The Person (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 22. Assaultive Offenses (Refs & Annos)

� 22.07. Terroristic Threat

(a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense involving

violence to any person or property with intent to:

(1) cause a reaction of any type to his threat by an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with emergencies;

(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;

(3) prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building, room, place of

assembly, place to which the public has access, place of employment or occupation,
aircraft, automobile, or other form of conveyance, or other public place;

(4) cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public

transportation, public water, gas, or power supply or other public service;

(5) place the public or a substantial group of the public in fear of serious
bodily injury; or

(6) influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the federal

government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state.

(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class B misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is a Class B misdemeanor, except that the
offense is a Class A misdemeanor if the offense:

(1) is committed against a member of the person's family or household or otherwise

constitutes family violence; or

(2) is committed against a public servant.

(d) An offense under Subsection (a)(3) is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the actor
causes pecuniary loss of $1,500 or more to the owner of the building, room, place,
or conveyance, in which event the offense is a state jail felony.

(e) An offense under Subsection (a)(4), (a)(5), or (a)(6) is a felony of the third
degree.

(f) In this section:

(1) "Family" has the meaning assigned by Section 71.003, Family Code.

(2) "Family violence" has the meaning assigned by Section 71.004, Family Code.

(3) "Household" has the meaning assigned by Section 71.005, Family Code.

(g) For purposes of Subsection (d), the amount of pecuniary loss is the amount of
economic loss suffered by the owner of the building, room, place, or conveyance as
a result of the prevention or interruption of the occupation or use of the
building, room, place, or conveyance.

CREDIT(S)

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, � 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts
1979, 66th Leg., p. 1114, ch. 530, � 2, eff. Aug. 27, 1979; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg.,
ch. 900, � 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 139, � 1, eff.
Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 388, � 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003,
78th Leg., ch. 446, � 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 728, �
16.003, eff. Sept. 1, 2005.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update

2003 Legislation

Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 139, in subsec. (b), inserted ", except that an offense
under Subdivision (2) of Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is
committed against a member of the person's family or household or otherwise
constitutes family violence or if the offense is committed against a public
servant"; and added subsec. (c).

Section 2 of Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 139, provides:

"(a) The change in law made by this Act applies only to an offense committed on or
after the effective date of this Act. For purposes of this section, an offense is
committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense
occurs before that date.

"(b) An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the
law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in
effect for that purpose."

Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 388, added subsecs. (a)(5) and (a)(6); in subsec. (b),
inserted ", (5), or (6)"; and made other nonsubstantive changes.

Section 3 of Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 388 provides:

"(a) The change in law made by this Act applies only to an offense committed on or
after the effective date of this Act. For purposes of this section, an offense is
committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense
occurs before the effective date.

"(b) An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the
law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in
effect for that purpose."

Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 446 inserted ", unless the actor causes pecuniary loss
of $1,500 or more to the owner of the building, room, place, or conveyance, in
which event the offense is a state jail felony" in subsec. (b) and added subsec.
(c).

Section 2 of Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 446 provides:

"(a) The change in law made by this Act applies only to an offense committed on or
after the effective date of this Act. For purposes of this section, an offense is
committed before the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense
occurs before the effective date.

"(b) An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the
law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in
effect for that purpose."

2005 Legislation

Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 728 reenacted this section, and as reenacted,
redesignated the subsections and made nonsubstantive changes.

2003 Main Volume

Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 1114, ch. 530, � 2, in subsec. (a), added subd. (4); in
subsec. (b), inserted "Subdivision (1) or (2) of Subsection (a) of" and
substituted the second and third sentences for "unless it is committed under
Subsection (a)(3) of this section, in which event it is a Class A misdemeanor".

Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, � 1.01, in subsec. (b), following "subsection A",
in three places, deleted "of this section".

Prior Laws:

Rev.P.C.1879, arts. 809 to 813.

Rev.P.C.1895, arts. 600, 962 to 966.

Rev.P.C.1911, arts. 1021, 1442 to 1446.

Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 11, ch. 10, � 1.

Vernon's Ann.P.C. (1925) arts. 1146, 1265 to 1268a.

CROSS REFERENCES

"Agency" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

Causation, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 6.04.

Coercion of public servant or voter, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 36.03.

Disorderly conduct, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 42.01.

Disrupting meeting or procession, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 42.05.

False alarm or report, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 42.06.

Harassment, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 42.07.

"Person" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

"Public place" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

Punishment,

Class A misdemeanor, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 12.21.

Class B misdemeanor, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 12.22.

Third degree felony, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 12.34.

"Serious bodily injury" defined, see V.T.C.A., Penal Code � 1.07.

LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES

Annual survey of Texas law:

Assault offenses. Shirley W. Butts, 35 Sw. L.J. 511 (1981).

Criminal law--Terroristic threats. Mike McColloch and David W. Coody, 37 Sw.L.J.

388 (1983).

Impact of new Penal Code on First Amendment freedoms. 38 Tex.B.J. 245 (1975).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

2003 Main Volume

Extortion and Threats 25, 33.

Westlaw Topic No. 165.

C.J.S. Threats and Unlawful Communications �� 2 to 20, 26 to 28.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update

ALR Library

45 ALR 4th 949, Validity and Construction of Terroristic Threat Statutes.

169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to
Explain and Define Offense Charged.

Encyclopedias

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 480, in General; Degree of Offense.

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 482, Prosecution -- Evidence.

TX Jur. 3d Criminal Law � 1142, Degree of Offense; Lesser Included Offenses.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series � 11.4, Aggravated Kidnapping.

Charlton, 6 Tex. Prac. Series � 13.7, Terroristic Threat.

McCormick, Blackwell & Blackwell, 8 Tex. Prac. Series � 116.7, Terroristic Threat.

Brooks, 23 Tex. Prac. Series � 22.19, Criminal Offenses.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Admissibility of evidence 13

Capability to carry out threat 6

Construction with other laws 2

Imminence 5

Indictment, information or complaint 8

Instructions 11

Intent 3

Lesser included offense 9

Nature of threat 4

Presumptions and burden of proof 9.5

Review 12

Sufficiency of evidence 10

Unlawful arrest 7

1. In general
It was the sending or delivering of a threatening letter knowingly that
constituted the offense of sending a threatening letter, not knowingly
threatening. Castle v. State (App. 1887) 4 S.W. 892.

The offense of terroristic threats is completed if the accused, by his threat,

sought as a desired reaction, to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And
Threats 25.1

For the purpose of the offense of terroristic threats, it is not necessary for the
victim to actually be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or for the
accused to have the capability or the intention to actually carry out the threat.
Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats
25.1

Offense of making a terroristic threat does not require the victim or anyone else
to be actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; it is immaterial
whether the defendant had the capability or the intention to carry out his threat.
Zorn v. State (App. 12 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 841146, petition for discretionary
review granted, review dismissed as improvidently granted with per curiam opinion
2005 WL 3307042. Extortion And Threats 25.1

2. Construction with other laws

A conviction under Texas statute proscribing terroristic threats is not a

conviction of a "crime of domestic violence" for purposes of the federal statute
proscribing possession of a firearm after conviction of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, as the Texas offense does not have as an element the use or
attempted use of physical force, because it is immaterial to the offense whether
the accused had the capability or the intention to carry out his threat and it is
not necessary that the victim or anyone else was actually placed in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury, nor does offense have as an element the threatened
use of a deadly weapon. U.S. v. White, C.A.5 (Tex.) 2001, 258 F.3d 374. Weapons 4

3. Intent

In order to commit offense of terroristic threat, accused must have specific

intent to place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Dues v.
State (Cr.App.1982) 634 S.W.2d 304; George v. State (App. 1 Dist.1992) 841 S.W.2d
544, petition for discretionary review filed.

A conviction in a prosecution for a threat to extort money, was not authorized

unless it appeared that defendant intended to execute his threat to kill if the
money be not paid. Haynie v. State (1877) 2 Tex.Crim. 168.

Person threatening to kill or inflict serious bodily injury with intent of

extorting money, who obtains money from person laboring under fear of such threat,
is guilty of extortion, notwithstanding that no weapon may have been used or
exhibited in connection with threat, that there may not have been present
intention to carry out threat, and that no money may have been immediately
obtained. Burleson v. State (Cr.App. 1936) 131 Tex.Crim. 76, 96 S.W.2d 785.
Extortion And Threats 25.1
Defendant's intent cannot be determined merely from what victim thought at time of
charged terroristic threat; it is not necessary for victim or any one else to be
actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and all that is
required for completion of offense is that defendant, by his threat, sought as a
desired reaction to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
George v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1992) 841 S.W.2d 544, petition for discretionary
review granted, affirmed 890 S.W.2d 73. Extortion And Threats 25.1

Specific intent of defendant, an essential element of offense of terroristic

threat, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, where it was shown that defendant
threatened victim, and directed obscenities at him, and where victim testified
that he was in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Hadnot v. State (App. 9
Dist. 1994) 884 S.W.2d 922. Extortion And Threats 32

While specific intent of defendant is essential element of offense of terroristic

threat, state is not required to have and to prove actual admission by defendant
of his specific intent; rather, intent can be inferred from acts, words, and
conduct of an accused. Hadnot v. State (App. 9 Dist. 1994) 884 S.W.2d 922.
Extortion And Threats 32

For purposes of proving defendant had requisite specific intent to commit offense
of terroristic threat, reaction of complainant, regardless of whether threat is
real or carried out, constitutes some evidence of the defendant's intent. Hadnot
v. State (App. 9 Dist. 1994) 884 S.W.2d 922. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence did not entitle defendant charged with aggravated assault in connection
with shooting to instruction on lesser included offenses of terroristic threat and
reckless conduct, notwithstanding defendant's contention that jury could have
found that he only made oral threat and that another individual was responsible
for actual shooting, and further that defendant may have merely recklessly fired
warning shot; there was no evidence that discharge of weapon was not intentional,
and there was no evidence that other individual in fact fired shots. Salinas v.
State (App. 13 Dist. 1994) 888 S.W.2d 93, rehearing overruled, petition for
discretionary review refused, for concurring opinion on refusal of review, see 897
S.W.2d 785, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 85, 516 U.S. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 42. Criminal
Law 795(2.30)

Accused's threat of violence, made with intent to place victim in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury, establishes offense of terroristic threat. Bryant v. State
(App. 10 Dist. 1995) 905 S.W.2d 457, petition for discretionary review refused.
Extortion And Threats 25.1

Defendant must act with specific intent to place victim in fear of serious bodily
injury that was "impending" or "close" or "on the point of happening" or "near at
hand." Bryant v. State (App. 10 Dist. 1995) 905 S.W.2d 457, petition for
discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 25.1

Requisite intent to make terroristic threats can be inferred from acts, words, and
conduct of defendant. Cook v. State (App. 7 Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing
overruled, petition for discretionary review refused, rehearing on petition for
discretionary review denied. Extortion And Threats 32

Requisite intent to place victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, as

element of terroristic threat, can be inferred from defendant's acts, words, and
conduct. Poteet v. State (App. 2 Dist. 1997) 957 S.W.2d 165. Extortion And Threats
32
Conviction for terroristic threat does not require the victim or anyone else to be
actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, but the reaction of the
victim, regardless of whether the threat was real or was carried out, is some
evidence of the defendant's intent. In re A.C. (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 48 S.W.3d 899,
review denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1

An actual admission by accused of his specific intent is not required under

statute setting forth requirements for terroristic threats, but requisite intent
may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct of accused. In re C.S. (App. 6 Dist.
2002) 79 S.W.3d 619. Extortion And Threats 32

Desired reaction of listener, or of complainant, regardless of whether threat is

real or whether threat is carried out, may also constitute some evidence of intent
of person making statement under statute setting forth requirements for
terroristic threats. In re C.S. (App. 6 Dist. 2002) 79 S.W.3d 619. Extortion And
Threats 32

The requisite intent for the offense of terroristic threats can be inferred from
the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist.
2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 32

The accused's threat of violence, made with the intent to place the victim in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury, is what constitutes the offense of terroristic
threats. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And
Threats 25.1

Evidence existed that indicated defendant made threat that she would kill victim
and her children with intention that such threat cause fear of imminent bodily
harm, and as such evidence of defendant's threat to kill was required to prove
great offense of retaliation but probative of dissimilar element required to
establish lesser included offense of making a terroristic threat, defendant was
properly convicted of lesser included offense of making a terroristic threat. Zorn
v. State (App. 12 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 841146, petition for discretionary review
granted, review dismissed as improvidently granted with per curiam opinion 2005 WL
3307042. Extortion And Threats 32

Whether the victim thought himself endangered, or whether the defendant had the
capability or the intention of carrying out the threat, are facts not necessary to
showing the defendant's "intent" to commit offense of terroristic threat. Henley
v. State (App. 10 Dist. 2003) 98 S.W.3d 732, petition for discretionary review
refused. Extortion And Threats 25.1

4. Nature of threat

Offense of extortion may be committed by either verbal or written threats.

Goulding v. State (Cr.App. 1934) 126 Tex.Crim. 73, 70 S.W.2d 200. Extortion And
Threats 25.1

A "threat to take life" is a definite, single act, capable of being performed in

different ways by use of different words, just as in the case of an assault, but
however variant the modes and means of performing the act, it is single and
definite, and therefore it is not required that particular mode or means in any
case shall be set out in indictment or information. Levy v. State (Cr.App. 1940)
138 Tex.Crim. 373, 136 S.W.2d 838. Homicide 736; Homicide 868; Homicide 843

Evidence that defendant left three voice mail messages, two of which were in rapid
succession, and of language used in those messages permitted rational jury to find
that defendant intended to put victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury
and supported conviction for making terroristic threats. Cook v. State (App. 7
Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing overruled, petition for discretionary review
refused, rehearing on petition for discretionary review denied. Extortion And
Threats 32

Fact that alleged threats were left in voice mail messages and that intended
victim was out of town at time of calls did not preclude defendant's conviction
for making terroristic threats; messages, considered in their entirety, supported
jury's finding that defendant intended to place victim in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury. Cook v. State (App. 7 Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing
overruled, petition for discretionary review refused, rehearing on petition for
discretionary review denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1

A reasonable official could have believed that citizen violated the Texas
terroristic threat statute in a letter addressed to the court, despite citizen's
claim that letter was protected speech, and thus local government employees were
entitled to qualified immunity on citizen's lawsuit alleging First Amendment
violation and illegal arrest; letter asked whether court employees were "willing
to die" for not recalling a warrant and stated that citizen considered herself "at
war and will act accordingly" and that she would "fight to the death with anyone
who tries to pull me from my home, my car, or my workplace." Barnes v. Madison,
C.A.5 (Tex.)2003, 79 Fed.Appx. 691, 2003 WL 22490383, Unreported. Civil Rights
1376(6); Civil Rights 1376(8)

5. Imminence

In defendant's trial for retaliation, requested jury charge on lesser included

offense of terroristic threat was not warranted since elements of offense of
terroristic threat were not included within proof necessary to establish the
offense of retaliation; while terroristic threat requires proof that person making
the threat intended to place victim in fear of imminent bodily injury, retaliation
offense does not require that threat to harm in retaliation be imminent. Davis v.
State (App. 11 Dist. 1994) 890 S.W.2d 489, rehearing denied. Criminal Law
795(2.26)

Conditioning threat of harm on occurrence or nonoccurrence of future event does

not necessarily mean that harmful consequences threatened are not imminent and
does not prevent threats from amounting to terroristic threats; fact finder must
look to proximity of threatened harm to the condition. Cook v. State (App. 7 Dist.
1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing overruled, petition for discretionary review
refused, rehearing on petition for discretionary review denied. Extortion And
Threats 25.1

Conditioning a threat of harm on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a future event

does not necessarily mean that the harmful consequences threatened are not
imminent for purposes of terroristic threat conviction; the focus of the inquiry
should be whether the complainant was afraid of imminent serious bodily injury at
the time of the offense. In re A.C. (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 48 S.W.3d 899, review
denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1

In gauging imminence, for the purpose of the offense of terroristic threats, the
desired and sought-after reaction of the victim, regardless of whether the threat
was real or was carried out, is some evidence of the defendant's intent to place
the victim in fear of imminent serious injury. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist.
2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 32

In gauging imminence, for the purpose of the offense of terroristic threats, the
focus of the inquiry should be whether the victim was afraid of imminent serious
bodily injury at the time of the offense. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2006)
2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 25.1

In gauging imminence, for the purpose of the offense of terroristic threats, the
Court of Appeals must look to the proximity of the threatened harm to the
condition. Williams v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And
Threats 25.1

For the purpose of the offense of making a terroristic threat, "imminent" means
near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching;
impending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous. Williams v.
State (App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 25.1

6. Capability to carry out threat

In determining whether one is guilty of having threatened life of another it must

be determined that threat was actually made, and that it was made with intent to
be carried out; a rash, inconsiderable threat being insufficient to support
imposition of a penalty. Strong v. State (1923) 95 Tex.Crim. 558, 255 S.W. 432;
Brown v. State (1941) 142 Tex.Crim. 405, 154 S.W.2d 464.

In order to sustain conviction of threatening to take the life of another, the

threat must be seriously made and not merely the outburst of one's temper in heat
of passion, and a rash, inconsiderate threat will not suffice to support a
conviction. Brown v. State (Cr.App. 1941) 142 Tex.Crim. 405, 154 S.W.2d 464.
Homicide 736

Capability to carry out threat is not essential element of offense of terroristic

threats under this section. Jarrell v. State (Cr.App. 1976) 537 S.W.2d 255.
Extortion And Threats 25.1

For offense of terroristic threat to be completed it is not necessary that victim

or anyone else was actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and
it is immaterial to offense whether accused had capability or intention to carry
out his threat. Dues v. State (Cr.App. 1982) 634 S.W.2d 304. Extortion And Threats
25.1

Victim need not be actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury for
defendant's conduct to amount to making of terroristic threat; offense is complete
if defendant, by his threat, sought to place person in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury, regardless of whether defendant had ability or intent to carry out
his threat. Cook v. State (App. 7 Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing overruled,
petition for discretionary review refused, rehearing on petition for discretionary
review denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1

Crime of making terroristic threats is complete if defendant sought, as a desired

reaction, to place victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, regardless of
whether defendant had ability or intent to carry out his threat. Cook v. State
(App. 7 Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing overruled, petition for
discretionary review refused, rehearing on petition for discretionary review
denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1
Offense of terroristic threat is completed if the accused, by his threat, sought
as a desired reaction, to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury, and it is immaterial whether the accused had the capability or the
intention to carry out his threat. In re A.C. (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 48 S.W.3d 899,
review denied. Extortion And Threats 25.1

Statute setting forth requirements for terroristic threats does not require that
intended victim or anyone else actually believe that accused will carry out
threat, or that they be placed in fear that threat may be carried out, or that
their use or occupation of a building actually be interrupted or prevented. In re
C.S. (App. 6 Dist. 2002) 79 S.W.3d 619. Extortion And Threats 25.1

To establish the offense of terroristic threats it is not necessary for the victim
to actually be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or for the accused
to have the capability or the intention to actually carry out the threat; the
offense is completed if the accused, by her threat, sought as a desired reaction,
to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Williams v. State
(App. 14 Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 25.1

7. Unlawful arrest

Even if officers unlawfully entered defendant's home without warrant in violation

of his right to privacy, that would not preclude his conviction for subsequently
committing offense of seriously threatening to take human life when he threatened
officers. Dailey v. State (Cr.App. 1968) 436 S.W.2d 346. Homicide 747

8. Indictment, information or complaint

In prosecution for extortion, indictment which did not state whether threats were
verbal or written or that threats were made directly to person threatened or, if
made indirectly, to whom and by what means threats were communicated to party
threatened, was insufficient. Goulding v. State (Cr.App. 1934) 126 Tex.Crim. 73,
70 S.W.2d 200. Extortion And Threats 30

In prosecution for extortion where proper construction of written instrument

constituting basis of offense was material to determine whether accused made
alleged threats, instrument should have been set out in indictment. Goulding v.
State (Cr.App. 1934) 126 Tex.Crim. 73, 70 S.W.2d 200. Extortion And Threats 30

Allegation that defendant threatened to release snakes into residence of another

was sufficient to state the offense of making a terroristic threat, even though
the information did not allege that the snakes were poisonous, since threat was
calculated to raise reasonable apprehension of bodily harm on the part of person
threatened by threatening an assault. (Per Cornelius, C.J., with one Justice
concurring in the result.) Redfearn v. State (App. 6 Dist. 1987) 738 S.W.2d 28,
petition for discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 30

Test for sufficiency of allegations to state the offense of making a terroristic

threat was what was reasonably communicated to victim, and allegation that
defendant stated that snakes had been placed in a building was sufficient to
communicate to victim a reasonable apprehension of future violence and thus to
constitute a terroristic threat, even though it was not alleged that defendant
stated that snakes "would be" placed there in the future, since implicit in
statement that snakes "had been" placed was fact of future harm. (Per Cornelius,
C.J., with one Justice concurring in the result.) Redfearn v. State (App. 6 Dist.
1987) 738 S.W.2d 28, petition for discretionary review refused. Extortion And
Threats 30

Indictment charging terroristic threats in language of underlying statute was

sufficient even though it did not contain language in which threat was expressed.
George v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1992) 841 S.W.2d 544, petition for discretionary
review granted, affirmed 890 S.W.2d 73. Indictment And Information 110(26)

In prosecution for making a terroristic threat, indictment provided defendant with

fair notice of the offense charged, even though the indictment did not include the
specific words allegedly used by defendant in making threat; indictment alleged
that defendant threatened to bomb a public service facility, and the specific
words used to make threat were merely evidentiary and not required in indictment.
Hackbarth v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2004) 2004 WL 503104, Unreported. Extortion And
Threats 30

9. Lesser included offense

Terroristic threat and assault by threat are not lesser included offenses of
retaliation, where both threat offenses require proof that person making threat
intended to place victim in fear of imminent bodily injury, and retaliation does
not require that threat of harm be imminent. Helleson v. State (App. 2 Dist. 1999)
5 S.W.3d 393, rehearing overruled, petition for discretionary review refused.
Indictment And Information 191(7)

Offense of terroristic threat was not lesser included offense of retaliation and,
thus, defendant in retaliation prosecution was not entitled to instruction on
terroristic threat as lesser included offense; elements of offense of terroristic
threat were not included within proof necessary to establish offense of
retaliation, as terroristic threat required proof that person making threat
intended to place victim in fear of imminent bodily injury, while statute
governing retaliation did not require that threat to harm in retaliation be
imminent. Coward v. State (App. 14 Dist. 1996) 931 S.W.2d 386. Criminal Law
795(2.26); Indictment And Information 191(.5)

Reckless conduct is not a lesser included offense of the offense of terroristic

threat. Beebe v. State (App. 13 Dist. 1988) 756 S.W.2d 759, petition for
discretionary review granted, affirmed 811 S.W.2d 604. Indictment And Information
191(.5)

Making terroristic threats was not lesser included offense of retaliation, and
thus trial court was precluded from finding juvenile defendant who was "charged"
only with retaliation delinquent based upon terroristic threats; fear of imminent
bodily injury was element only of terroristic threats, and, in finding delinquency
based upon terroristic threats rather than retaliation, the trial court impliedly
found the juvenile not delinquent with respect to the sole charged offense. In re
D.D. (App. 3 Dist. 2003) 101 S.W.3d 695. Indictment And Information 191(.5);
Infants 197

Making a terroristic threat cannot be a lesser included offense of retaliation as

a matter of law; question of whether such offense is a lesser included offense of
retaliation will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Zorn v. State (App. 12
Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 841146, petition for discretionary review granted, review
dismissed as improvidently granted with per curiam opinion 2005 WL 3307042.
Indictment And Information 191(.5)

Trial court did not err when it denied jury instruction on terroristic threat as a
lesser-included offense of retaliation; defendant failed to show any evidence that
he was guilty only of terroristic threat. Hughes v. State (App. 1 Dist. 2002) 2002
WL 2025434, Unreported, petition for discretionary review refused. Criminal Law
795(2.26)

9.5. Presumptions and burden of proof

State is not required to prove an actual admission by a defendant as to his own

specific intent to place victim in fear of imminent bodily injury before he can be
constitutionally convicted of making a terrorist threat; requisite intent can be
inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. Zorn v. State (App.
12 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 841146, petition for discretionary review granted, review
dismissed as improvidently granted with per curiam opinion 2005 WL 3307042.
Extortion And Threats 32

10. Sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction for threatening to take the life
of superintendent of farm on which defendant lived, where prosecuting witness did
not testify that defendant said in specific words that he was going to kill him,
and it appeared that defendant was in position to carry his threat into execution
if it were seriously made. Brown v. State (Cr.App. 1941) 142 Tex.Crim. 405, 154
S.W.2d 464. Homicide 1170

Defendant's statement to complaining witness, without anger, that at one time

defendant had an intent to kill complaining witness and had gone to house of
complaining witness on several occasions to do just that, in view of evidence that
five days later defendant called at home of complaining witness and held a
peaceful conversation without mention of the previous conversation, was
insufficient to constitute a "threat" and did not support an order for a peace
bond. Ex parte McCain (Cr.App. 1949) 153 Tex.Crim. 517, 221 S.W.2d 781. Breach Of
The Peace 17

In prosecution for aggravated kidnapping with intent to terrorize, evidence that

defendant pinned victim down in seat of her car and threatened to kill her while
pressing knife against her neck was sufficient to show that defendant abducted
victim with intent to "terrorize" her. Rodriguez v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1982) 646
S.W.2d 524. Kidnapping 36

Evidence, including recording of telephone call from defendant, who was involved
in bitter divorce and custody dispute with victim, and testimony that defendant
had committed a number of violent acts toward victim in past, was sufficient to
support finding that defendant intended to place victim in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury, and thus supported conviction of terroristic threats, even
if defendant were miles away when he made phone call; recording indicated that
defendant stated "I'm going to kill you, you bitch," although defendant claimed
that he called back within minutes after threat and left message that victim would
hear from his attorney the next day. George v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1992) 841
S.W.2d 544, petition for discretionary review granted, affirmed 890 S.W.2d 73.
Extortion And Threats 32
Evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant acted with intent to place
county commissioner in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, as required for
defendant to be convicted of making terroristic threat to commissioner, by
threatening commissioner with serious bodily injury if road in front of his house
was not graded. Bryant v. State (App. 10 Dist. 1995) 905 S.W.2d 457, petition for
discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if, when viewed in light most

favorable to verdict, rational jury could have found essential elements of offense
beyond reasonable doubt. Bryant v. State (App. 10 Dist. 1995) 905 S.W.2d 457,
petition for discretionary review refused. Criminal Law 1159.2(7)

Evidence of voice mail messages that defendant left for victim supported
conclusion that defendant intended to place victim in fear, despite defendant's
claim that threats had been conditioned upon victim's appearance at specified
location; messages could be reasonably interpreted to mean that defendant intended
to place victim in fear, regardless of what victim did in response. Cook v. State
(App. 7 Dist. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 344, rehearing overruled, petition for
discretionary review refused, rehearing on petition for discretionary review
denied. Extortion And Threats 32

State presented factually sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to place

victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury to support his terroristic threat
conviction, where victim testified that he saw defendant jump through living room
window and yell and scream, that defendant appeared angry, that defendant steadily
moved toward victim threatening to kill him, and that because of defendant's
actions, he was afraid for his life. Poteet v. State (App. 2 Dist. 1997) 957
S.W.2d 165. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence, including victim's testimony that defendant poured gasoline into bug
sprayer, got propane bottle, told her that he was going to burn her, pumped
gasoline into victim's face, tried to ignite it with cigarette lighter, and stated
that he was going to burn house with her in it, was legally sufficient for jury to
infer that defendant intended to place victim in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury, and thus, to establish that defendant made terroristic threat against
victim. Kingsbury v. State (App. 10 Dist. 2000) 14 S.W.3d 405. Extortion And
Threats 32

Evidence was sufficient to support judgment that juvenile intended to place

victims in imminent fear of serious bodily injury, supporting judgment of
delinquency for terroristic threats; juvenile made several threats to victims,
including statements that if they told anybody about his sexual advances he would
"blow [their] brains out" and that if one slapped him for grabbing her chest he
"would . . . put a nine millimeter to your head," both victims feared his threats
and thought he was capable of carrying them out, and "conditioned" threats were
coupled with repeated attempts to touch victim's chest and further statements. In
re A.C. (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 48 S.W.3d 899, review denied. Extortion And Threats
32

Sufficient evidence supported jury's verdict in adjudication proceeding in which

juvenile was charged with committing terroristic threat that juvenile, who was
twelve years old at time, made terroristic threat; juvenile stated "I'm going to
blow up the school," to principal, principal's receptionist, and attendance clerk,
and jury could have reasonably believed that, in order to frustrate and delay his
punishment of being placed in on-campus suspension, juvenile made threat with
intent to cause school officials to react in a way that would interrupt or prevent
their use of school facilities. In re C.S. (App. 6 Dist. 2002) 79 S.W.3d 619.
Infants 176
Evidence was legally and factually sufficiency to establish the "imminent" element
of the offense of making terroristic threats, in support of defendant's conviction
of the offense; defendant referred to a murder/suicide in the community and stated
that if litigation against him was not ceased "he would make the [murderer] look
like a Sunday school teacher," and board members involved in the litigation
stopped attending board meetings, had trouble sleeping, and stated that they
believed that the threat posed by defendant was near at hand. Neagle v. State
(App. 2 Dist. 2002) 91 S.W.3d 832, petition for discretionary review refused.
Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence was legally sufficient to support finding that defendant had requisite
intent to cause impairment or interruption of the public power supply, in
prosecution for making a terroristic threat; there was evidence that defendant
told lineman for electric cooperative, who collected fee for reconnecting
defendant's electricity, that he would shoot everyone at the cooperative, and
cooperative reported incident to sheriff and hired an off-duty policeman to
protect its premises until defendant's arrest. Henley v. State (App. 10 Dist.
2003) 98 S.W.3d 732, petition for discretionary review refused. Extortion And
Threats 32

Evidence that defendant, by his threat to kill electric cooperative employees next
morning, intended to impair or interrupt public power service, as opposed to
merely venting immediate anger to lineman who reconnected defendant's electricity,
was so weak that confidence in finding that defendant had requisite intent was
undermined, and thus was factually insufficient to support conviction for making a
terroristic threat, considering that lineman did not report incident to police or
forgo completing paperwork before leaving defendant's property, prior verbal
altercations with cooperative did not result in physical incidents, and threat was
made at 10 p.m. only to lineman and not called in to cooperative. Henley v. State
(App. 10 Dist. 2003) 98 S.W.3d 732, petition for discretionary review refused.
Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for terroristic threats, even though
defendant's threats were conditional on the future occurrence of several possible
events; teacher's assistant testified that defendant was irate during conference,
threatened to beat her, and that she was afraid, assistant principal testified
that defendant threatened assistant during conference, and defendant's daughter
testified that defendant was very upset with assistant. Williams v. State (App. 14
Dist. 2006) 2006 WL 1071347. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support conviction for

terroristic threat arising from defendant's threat to kill estranged wife; while
defendant conditioned threat on a future divorce, evidence of defendant's history
of using such threats to dominate his family and prevent them from notifying
authorities permitted a finding that he intended to place wife in imminent fear of
serious bodily injury. Guardado v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31526070,
Unreported, petition for discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence was factually sufficient to support finding that defendant had the
"intent" to place victim in fear of serious bodily injury, as element of offence
of terroristic threat, when defendant told victim "I ought to put a cap in your
ass" as he was arguing with the victim and raised and cocked a loaded gun. Peavy
v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31769393, Unreported, petition for
discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 32

Evidence was factually sufficient to find that defendant's threat of serious

bodily injury was "imminent," as element of terroristic threat; although defendant
may have not pointed the gun directly at the victim, the victim was standing only
two and one-half feet from defendant when defendant raised and cocked his gun and
made an unconditional threat, saying "I ought to put a cap in your ass." Peavy v.
State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31769393, Unreported, petition for
discretionary review refused. Extortion And Threats 32

11. Instructions

When recklessness was not an element of the charged offense of terroristic threat
and was not relied on for conviction, the court properly denied defendant's
request for a jury instruction defining "reckless." Beebe v. State (App. 13 Dist.
1988) 756 S.W.2d 759, petition for discretionary review granted, affirmed 811
S.W.2d 604. Criminal Law 800(1)

Defendant charged with making terroristic threats was entitled to requested

instruction that jury could not consider extraneous offenses unless convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed them. George v. State (App. 1
Dist. 1992) 841 S.W.2d 544, petition for discretionary review granted, affirmed
890 S.W.2d 73. Criminal Law 673(5)

Trial court's error in refusing defendant's requested charge that jury could not
consider extraneous offenses unless convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
defendant committed them was not harmless, in prosecution for terroristic threats.
George v. State (App. 1 Dist. 1992) 841 S.W.2d 544, petition for discretionary
review granted, affirmed 890 S.W.2d 73. Criminal Law 1173.2(9)

Trial court's jury instructions were not fundamentally defective in defendant's

trial for terroristic threat, though judge instructed upon definition of
recklessly, where application of facts to law paragraph showed that trial court
only instructed upon definition of intentionally and knowingly; even if trial
court included definition of recklessly in first part of jury's charge, defendant
did not show that harm was egregious as was required to warrant reversal since
defendant did not object at time of trial. Hadnot v. State (App. 9 Dist. 1994) 884
S.W.2d 922. Criminal Law 1038.1(4)

Inclusion of reasonable doubt definition in jury charge in adjudication proceeding

in which juvenile was charged with committing terroristic threat was error;
juvenile could not have anticipated that court's brief discussion of requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt would necessarily mean that court would later
include formal definition in jury charge. In re C.S. (App. 6 Dist. 2002) 79 S.W.3d
619. Infants 209

Inclusion of reasonable doubt definition in jury charge in adjudication proceeding

in which juvenile was charged with committing terroristic threat did not amount to
harmful error, where there was complete absence of any explicit suggestion by
juvenile as to how definition harmed him. In re C.S. (App. 6 Dist. 2002) 79 S.W.3d
619. Infants 253

Error, if any, of the trial court in failing to provide either a definition of

"aggravated assault" in the instructions or the elements of the offense of
terroristic threat did not require reversal unless it was so egregious and created
such harm that appellant was denied a fair trial, because defense counsel did not
object to the omissions. Peavy v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31769393,
Unreported, petition for discretionary review refused. Criminal Law 1038.2

Trial court's failure to define "aggravated assault" in instructions on

terroristic threat was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of fair and
impartial trial, where each element of the threat to commit aggravated assault was
proven; defendant told victim "I ought to put a cap in your ass," in combination
with raising his gun in the air, and cocking it close to the victim. Peavy v.
State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31769393, Unreported, petition for
discretionary review refused. Criminal Law 1038.2

12. Review

Juvenile charged with terroristic threats waived his right to complain on appeal
of state's untimely disclosure of victim's statements to school principal, as
juvenile did not request a continuance or make any objection to the documents when
state handed him the written victim statements 15 minutes before trial, juvenile
offered one victim's statement into evidence during cross-examination of her,
state offered other victim's statement into evidence during its direct examination
without any objection from juvenile, and juvenile used that victim's statement in
his cross-examination of her. In re A.C. (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 48 S.W.3d 899, review
denied. Criminal Law 1036.2

13. Admissibility of evidence

Evidence of three prior incidents in which defendant had threatened to kill victim
was admissible, in prosecution for terroristic threat arising from a statement to
the same effect, to show defendant's intent to place victim, his estranged wife,
in imminent fear of serious bodily injury; intent was contested issue, there was
no direct evidence of defendant's intent, and admission of the extraneous offenses
allowed jury to understand why victim was in imminent fear of serious bodily
injury. Guardado v. State (App. 14 Dist. 2002) 2002 WL 31526070, Unreported,
petition for discretionary review refused. Criminal Law 371(1)

V. T. C. A., Penal Code � 22.07, TX PENAL � 22.07

Current through the end of the 2006 3rd Called Session of the 79th Legislature.

� 2006 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT

(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.