JAMER v.

NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for
having accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor
arbiter ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities
constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment.
The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance
as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law,
in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer.
GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC
FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife
delivered their first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption
in the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was surprised
upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.
ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged
absence without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems
from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy,
where dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the
illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.
PHIL MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS ASSOC. v. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, 92 PHIL 843
FACTS: Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the
ground that the company is losing its operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to
certain individuals. Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the
petitions, thereby leaving the petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do
because of absence of equipment in the studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the
judge, and appealed to the CIR en banc.
ISSUE: Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of
the employees concerned?
HELD: No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of
law. The case was then remanded to CIR for proper hearing.
CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed
the petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with
claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has
already prescribed, since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses
penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from employer-employee

relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause of action arises,
otherwise it will be barred.
ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?
HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is
an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes
a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation,
however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor
Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime
as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to
those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion arises over the use
of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an
employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that
unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or
lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and
illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself
declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not
categorized as an unlawful practice.
MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947
FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work
immediately and stop the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report
will not only lose any concession but the company was authorized by the public
respondent herein to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions
of those who fail to report. The public respondent ordered that picketing under any
guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that the industry was into sugar, a very
important and essential food, lack of supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of
many provinces.
ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to strike?
HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal
picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot
be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Petitioners have not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.

DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789

FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the
plaintiff for the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater
when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee
of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The
defendant-appellees lost their jobs upon termination of the lease contract between De
Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to the theater back to De Leon, the
owner of the lot.
ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?

HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the
establishment, they have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also
to cases where employer-employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of
freedom of expression, is conducted not to disrupt the business of the owner but to
appeal for a humanitarian consideration, after having been laid off due to the
termination of the business of their previous employer.
PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465
FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office
space in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were
annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and
egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as
by their respective employees, clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a
disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the building.
ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?
HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of
peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to
the context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved
in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the
courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v. CAMARA SHOES, 111 SCRA 478
FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the
company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly
getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak
of union activities of the petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices
were filed by the union against the respondent.
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?
HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal
limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the
foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the
unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under
protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his
constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition against what was
obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice
perpetuated by respondent employer herein.
VICTORIANO v. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54
FACTS: Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects
which prohibit its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a
faithful of Iglesia ni Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The
latter, who have pact a closed-shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement
with respondent company sought the separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court
enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting the union to assail the validity of RA 3350
particularly the provision granting exemption to members of above-mentioned sects.

ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?
HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but
also the privilege of not joining one, of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating
from a union. It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign
up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither
does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join.