Sie sind auf Seite 1von 17

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005.]


MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts.
The complaint, 1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of action. The first cause of
action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by
Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged
that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that sometime in
October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the
said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same
assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000.
Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for
P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked "Account Closed."
She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he allegedly
endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and
gave her an additional P323 in cash. aATCDI
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her favor, but
maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she
could show the bank where she was working that she "had money coming to her." Araneta further claims that he warned her that the
checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to
issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two "borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which she managed when
her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to
Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a
desperate bid to turn the tables on her." 3
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant and her counsel appeared.
Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the
hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine o'clock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing
were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did
not appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno, taking
the stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense.
7 No further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973,
however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform of Moreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was
"earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainant's basic grievance."
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission notified 8 both parties of a
hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due
notice. It appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts
were unknown. An inquiry 9 made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988
at two o'clock in the afternoon. 10 Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced,
the case was submitted for resolution on such date. 11
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in part: cEaDTA
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering. The "stop
payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued
for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to
explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records)
before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a
signature which complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the

words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and "H" do not show
definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did
sign the treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same treasury warrant was
given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop payment" or even any written demand by
the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury warrant having been "stopped" he should reimburse her with what
he received as consideration for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to the
complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he
issued said checks that his account with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered
from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act of the respondent in issuing the
two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that
money was coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with
the complainant to make use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the
complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of
a member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent, belittles the
confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the
respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three
(3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of
suspension. AICTcE
The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension from three months to
six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the records of this case
back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a
Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The
Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for
reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division
of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice
of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a
postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta
had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his own admission, the
respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed account. And though
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects
upon his integrity and morality."
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18 as the effect "transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial
papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals." 19

Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of
moral turpitude. 20
In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year's
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. 23
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa
thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals." 25
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are
constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent
has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." 28
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 7332. June 18, 2013.]
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella (complainant) against Ricardo G.
Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T)
before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-010128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered
PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00 as separation pay and P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA's
Decision to the NLRC.
In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon's ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant
to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, including moral damages
and attorney's fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant
was illegally dismissed. 4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRC's ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay
complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service
were not taken into account in the computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded
the case to the LA for the same purpose. 6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory. 7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on October 25, 2004. At this
point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant's motion
remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was
no action on complainant's motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent's office to personally follow-up
the matter. In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former's monetary awards should be;
however, their computations differed. To complainant's surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily fixed" and
thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount of P20,000.00, but respondent replied:
"make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance, complainant acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had
already collected from PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter
P1,500.00. 8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the
amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quash 10 the said writ which was, however, denied
through an Order dated November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the
contents of which were virtually identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on
December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005.
He confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of
execution 15 wherein complainant's monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and
deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution dated March 14, 2006,
16 the NLRC annulled respondent's December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA Decision which
was already final and executory. 17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the instant disbarment complaint 19
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a)
soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and
advantage to PT&T.
In his Comment, 20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely implemented the CA Decision
which did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it
was in fact the latter who offered him the amount of P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner
Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in
order to favor PT&T. 22 He further observed that the confluence of events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left
complainant's efforts to execute the CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award
thereof. Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into
some bidding war which eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross
immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred. 23
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24 adopting and approving
Commissioner Limpingco's recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED. 25
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and
Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer's responsibility to society: Rule 1.01
engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03
proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man's cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile,
Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It is well to note that a
lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. 27
In this light, a lawyer's compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into consideration in determining
his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. 29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's
public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment. 30
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought
to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution twice at that
respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4,
2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the
Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondent's action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of
his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.

The incredulity of respondent's claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the November 7, 2005 writ of
execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T's initial motion to quash through an Order dated November 22, 2005 but
later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T's supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the first
motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing
complainant's monetary awards from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent
Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of reinstatement. 31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC's rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 which both explicitly
awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The only modification was with respect to the order of
reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC's rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations
between the parties as well as the supervening removal of complainant's previous position. 33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC's
rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CA's award of
separation pay in lieu of the NLRC's previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily deduced from the
records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that the CA's award of
separation pay denied complainant's entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion
for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution, 34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to pay complainant his separation
pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other consequential
benefits that were directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained
relationship and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T could offer. . . . .
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 35 There is nothing in the records that could confound
the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same.
Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view
of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent's defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner Limpingco's and the IBP
Board of Governor's pronouncement of respondent's gross immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions constitute gross
misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 36 It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. 37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper
or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:
SEC. 27.Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondent's violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a
matter of course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative
case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39 which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 40 in order to penalize
respondent's transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege 41 accorded only to those who continue
to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to
uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit,

preserve and protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the
Bar holds no place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct in violation
of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay
a FINE of P40,000.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6622. July 10, 2012.]
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first
marriage was subsisting. 1
In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21
March 2005. 3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice 5 setting the mandatory conference of
the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent.
They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1.Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant,
2.Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3.Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6 IcaEDC
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper, 7
on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8
Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical
and financial matters in the latter's numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that
they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would
handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed
that he was entitled to the amount of P900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and
a total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business
Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates
11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married two
other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice:
first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarias, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
cHDEaC
Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office 14 but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder. 15
Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in
the latter's dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also alleged that there was no
verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. 17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter
would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support
this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by

Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, VicePresident for Operations of the said company. 19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the said Motion, he attached the
certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The appended Marriage Contracts
matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and
Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarias, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena
G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third Marriage Contract
referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the
second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status. TcHEaI
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document was
not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus, respondent was supposedly
deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. 26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition
to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270. 27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at
the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered
that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. 29
While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the hearing, 30 respondent manifested his willingness to
attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he
had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name. 31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of
Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. 33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with
having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting. 34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the
criminal cases. 35 cCaEDA
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion
to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC-Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. 36
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent. 37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine
respondent's administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second
charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services
and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the
specific provision he violated. 39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter's first marriage was
subsisting. 40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as
having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that
the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration
of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts. 43 SEAHcT

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April
2008 recommending respondent's disbarment. 44
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if proven to be true is based
on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were
owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter's legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established
the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached. aADSIc
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of
such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer;
or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as the practice of law. 48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial
and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for
corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an
agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered
objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not
as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is
not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected
to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his argument. TEcCHD
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido: 53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves
service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified
true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent
denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the
two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second and
the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of
the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former's marriages to two other women aside
from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent
and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death
of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it
a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents. cTCaEA
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage
Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondent's regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
good moral character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1.The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2.Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3.Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo was charged
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. Respondent admitted the act imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.
The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Although
solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession,
made in a modest and decorous manner that wood bring no injury to the lawyer and the bar. Here, for advertising himself as an
annulment of marriage specialist, Atty. Simbillo undermined not only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, Atty. Simbillo was
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with stern warning against repetition of the same or similar offense.
SYLLABUS
1.LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PROHIBITION AGAINST SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
2.ID.; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS BY THE SUPREME COURT, GROUNDS THEREFOR. Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for
a party without authority to do so.
3.ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS; ELUCIDATED. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice
of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at
the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
4.ID.; LAWYER ADVERTISING HIMSELF AS MARRIAGE ANNULMENT SPECIALIST UNDERMINES THE STABILITY AND
SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE. What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment
of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that
an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might
have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
5.ID.; SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS; PROPER MANNER THEREOF. The solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of
the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief
data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667." 1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone
number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not
served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale
behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and
that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified. 4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, 6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law
for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by
this Court on November 11, 2002. 7 HESIcT
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
dated October 19, 2002 9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court's Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03.A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01.A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves. 15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
much money;
2.A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3.A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;


4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that
he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules.
Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18
Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's authority. TSHEIc
What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice,
as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable. 21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.: 22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. aDHScI
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., abroad, on official business.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191837. September 19, 2012.]
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 1 and March 11, 2010 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.
The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City.
The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim
(Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against
Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under
Deato's name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on December 21,
2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion
on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents. 3
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted by Regional Adjudicator Conchita C. Mias (RA
Mias) in a Decision 4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1)Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased father;
2)Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligation of spouses
Danilo and Divina Deato;
3)Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in peaceful possession and cultivation of
the agricultural land subject hereof;
4)Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section
12 of RA 3844 as [a]mended; and
5)Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for having no proximate tenurial relationship
with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office. aEACcS
SO ORDERED. 5
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final. 6
Upon Consolacion's motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Mias issued a writ of execution on January 8, 2008. 7
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the
issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial
hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892. 8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of
P10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008. 9
Consolacion's petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due course by RA Mias in a Decision 10
dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully redeemed;
2.Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the redemption price consigned with this Office which was
deposited for safekeeping indicated in Manager's Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and
George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3.Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to
execute a Deed of Redemption in favor of petitioner

4.In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of
the Board is hereby ordered to execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and
5.Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of TCT No. V-73892 registered in the name of
respondent spouses Marilyn and George Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of
Redemption.
SO ORDERED. 11
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision 12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA
Mias Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;
2.DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;
3.DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered in the names of the respondents-appellants;
4.ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject landholding[; and]
5.DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV-A to return the Manager's Check No.
0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the
amount of Ten Million pesos to herein petitioner-appellee. IcHTAa
SO ORDERED. 13
On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, 14 which the DARAB denied in a Resolution 15 dated June 8, 2009 for
being filed out of time.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her
counsel received a copy of the Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada[,] the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner[-]appellee[,] filed the Motion for Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion
for Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become final
and executory. . . . 16
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. 17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacion's counsel to submit within five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-ForumShopping. 18 Apparently, Consolacion's counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption
Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion's verification and certification against non-forumshopping failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion's identity apart from her community tax certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution 19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the
petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution. However, the counsel for the petitioner failed
to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite receipt of the notice thereof, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 20
Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution 21 dated March 11, 2010.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CA's summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds is unwarranted.
Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CA's strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE
Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping
defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification document issued by an official agency bearing her
photograph and signature. That there was merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsel's MCLE
Compliance Certificate Number was indicated and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached
to her motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal of her petition and decide the same on its
merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid
application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacion's petition
before it on the ground of petitioner's unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the
opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had
ordered the dismissal of Consolacion's petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her
counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons,
the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.
The CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is
rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation
were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court's intent "to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." 22
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these
rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on
liberal construction. While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by such. cDTCIA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion * and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen