DONATION

Central Phil. University v. CA

246 SCRA 511
DOCTRINE:
Onerous Donation: one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the
equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value
of the donation.
When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the
land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition
but a resolutory one.
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., then a member of the Board of Trustees of CPU, executed a
deed of donation in favor of CPU over a parcel of land, with the following annotations
1 The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment
and use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2 The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any
way encumber said land;
3 The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college
shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from
the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building
thereon.
50 years later, private respondents, the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for
annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that the latter had not
complied with the conditions of the donation. They also argued that CPU negotiated with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property with another land. In its
answer CPU alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed and it
denied any violation of the conditions in the deed of donation.
In 1991, the RTC ruled against CPU and ordered it to reconvey the property in favor of the heirs
of the donor. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that the
annotations at the petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions, breach of which
should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable. The CA also ruled
that while the first condition mandated the use of the donated property for the establishment of a
medical school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence,
until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not be considered as
having failed to comply with its part of the bargain. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation was onerous and the conditions therein resolutory, although such conditions
were given no fixed period. -- YES
HELD:

Based on the conditions in the deed of donation, the donation was onerous. When Don Ramon
Lopez donated the parcel of land but imposed an obligation upon CPU to establish a medical
college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, in conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the
event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the
condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.It is not correct to say that
the school had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee
could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the
donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition.If there was no
fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall
be deemed lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is
unavailing. When the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it
can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance
and such period has arrived.
This general rule, however, cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances
existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of 50 years has allowed petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more
need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere
technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary
and expensive multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up
to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as
donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor by means of reconveyance.
DISSENTING OPINION (Davide):
I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation in question is onerous considering
the conditions imposed by the donor on the donee which created reciprocal obligations upon
both parties. Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority opinion's description of the donation
in question. In one part, it says that the donation in question is onerous. Yet, later on it states
that the donation is basically a gratuitous one.
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is unnecessary. There is no conditional
obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that the "conditions" imposed by the donor and as
the word is used in the law of donations is confused with "conditions" as used in the law of
obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil Code on Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino

states clearly the context within which the term "conditions" is used in the law of donations, to
wit:
The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to uncertain events on which the birth or
extinguishment of a juridical relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations or
chargesimposed by the donor on the donee. It is used, not in its technical or strict legal sense,
but in its broadest sense.
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of "conditions" of a donation, what
are referred to are actually the obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the
donee and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In the present case, the donation
is, quite obviously, onerous, but it is more properly called a "modal donation." A modal donation
is one in which the donor imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the
medical college as the condition of the donation in the present case is one such prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines neither the existence nor
the extinguishment of the obligations of the donor and the donee with respect to the donation. In
fact, the conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee are the very obligations of
the donation to build the medical college and use the property for the purposes specified in
the deed of donation. It is very clear that those obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment,
performance, existence or extinguishment of which is not dependent on any future or uncertain
event or past and unknown event, as the Civil Code would define a conditional obligation.
It is incorrect to say that the "conditions" of the donation in the present case are resolutory
conditions because, applying Article 1181 of the Civil Code, that would mean that upon
fulfillment of the conditions, the rights already acquired will be extinguished. Obviously, that
could not have been the intention of the parties. What the majority opinion probably had in mind
was that the conditions are resolutory because if they are not complied with, the rights of the
donee as such will be extinguished and the donation will be revoked. To my mind, though, it is
more accurate to state that the conditions here are not resolutory conditions but, for the reasons
stated above, are theobligations imposed by the donor.
Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that the provisions of Article 1197 cannot be applied here.
The conditions/obligations imposed by the donor herein are subject to a period. I draw this
conclusion based on our previous ruling in Barretto vs. City of Manila, in which we said that
when the contract of donation has no fixed period in which the condition should be fulfilled, the
provisions of what is now Article 1197 are applicable and it is the duty of the court to fix a
suitable time for its fulfillment. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the
conditions/obligations of the present donation, it can be inferred that a period was contemplated
by the donor. Don Ramon Lopez could not have intended his property to remain idle for a long
period of time when in fact, he specifically burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a
medical college therein and thus put his property to good use. There is a need to fix the duration
of the time within which the conditions imposed are to be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the performance of the conditions/obligations
in the donation in resolving the petitioner's claim that prescription has already barred the
present action. I disagree once more with the ruling of the majority that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. The mere fact that there is no time fixed as
to when the conditions of the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the
statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.

Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous donation and is governed by the law on
contracts (Article 733). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be upheld, except
its ruling that the conditions of the donation are resolutory.

Lagazo v. CA
287 SCRA 18

DOCTRINES:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is indispensable, its absence makes the donation null
and void.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from private respondent Cabanlit a parcel of land
which the former claims to have acquired from his grandmother by donation. Private
respondent, on the other hand, put up the defense that when the alleged donation was
executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment from a transferee of
plaintiff-appellee's grandmother.
After trial, the lower court decided in favor of plaintiff-appellee and against defendant-appellant,
rationalizing that the evidence presented by the former is more credible than that of the latter.
Respondent Court of Appeals reversed trial courts decision and anchored its ruling upon the
absence of any showing that petitioner accepted his grandmother's donation of the subject land.
Citing jurisprudence that the donee's failure to accept a donation whether in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void, Respondent Court
denied petitioner's claim of ownership over the disputed land. The appellate court also struck
down petitioner's contention that the formalities for a donation of real property should not apply
to his case since it was an onerous one he paid for the amortizations due on the land before
and after the execution of the deed of donation reasoning that the deed showed no burden,
charge or condition imposed upon the donee; thus, the payments made by petitioner were his
voluntary acts.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not
be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose
any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in
fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by
Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his
right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the acceptance of a donation made in a separate instrument but not formally

communicated to the donor may be considered complete, valid and subsisting. -- NO

Whether or not the deed of donation which did not expressly impose any burden (the expressed
consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity) but the recipient actually paid
charges imposed on the property like land taxes and installment arrearages may be deemed
onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts. -- NO
HELD.
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an
onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
The Supreme Court ruled that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that
petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such
payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee.
Supreme Court agrees with the respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were
merely his voluntary acts.
As a pure or simple donation, the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee (Art. 734 of the Civil Code). Acceptance of the donation by the donee
is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void. Furthermore, if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

De Luna v. Abrigo
181 SCRA 150
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and
conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the
donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said
donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from
the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a
Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with

the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The
Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the
conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The
heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation
of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)
HELD:
10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed
not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions
for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply.
The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules
on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

Cruz v. Court of Appeals

140 SCRA 245
DOCTRINE: In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously
donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or
reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the
legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the
adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege
and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction
of the donation can be adjudged.
FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq.m residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay
Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces private
respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The property was
accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents.
Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke

the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that: (a) the property in question was co-owned
by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the
latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another property, an
agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the
donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the CFI.
Trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
Thus, prompted herein petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. -- YES
HELD:
In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or
all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation
within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil
Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who
must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment
or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the
total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is
unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the CA
that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land,
the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken
from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA

198 SCRA 300
DOCTRINE: There is no need for prescription to be applied where a stipulation for automatic
reversion is expressly provided for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there is no need
for a judicial declaration for the rescission of a contract because the law of the contract governs.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation
in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land wherein a
resolutory condition was imposed that donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise would

render ipso facto null and void and such deed and property would revert back to donors.
However, prior to the exhaustion of the period of one hundred (100) years, the Bishop of Imus
executed a deed of absolute sale to spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao for P114,000.00.
Rieta then filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation, reconveyance of the
property with damages, and for the rescission of the contract.
Ignao, in his answer said that the action for the rescission of the contract and reconveyance of
the property has already prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action in the case at bar has already prescribed. -- NO
HELD:
As a general rule, article 764 of the New Civil Code provides that "(t)his action shall prescribe
after 4 years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. But in the case at bar, there is no need
for prescription to be applied where a stipulation for automatic reversion is expressly provided
for in the terms of the deed of donation. Hence, there is no need for a judicial declaration for the
rescission of a contract because the law of the contract governs. Judicial action is proper only
when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.
However, the resolutory condition is held to be an undue restriction on the rights of ownership
and is contrary to public policy. A donation is an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of
donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.

Eduarte v. CA
253 SCRA 391
DOCTRINE: All crimes which offend the donor are considered manifests of ingratitude and are
cause for revocation of donation.
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine donates half a parcel of his land to his niece, Helen Doria. For this benevolent
act, he is blessed tenfold by greed and disloyalty. He willingly and knowingly gave only half of
said land. However, there materialized a donation from him supposedly as well giving the other
half to make whole said parcel. Moreover, these lands "donated" were made for profit and
ironically enough, spirituality. This is when the Eduartes Romulo and Sally fall prey also.
Furthermore, a certain Calauan Christian Reform Church (CCRC) enters the fray. The niece,
Helen, had the audacity to falsify said donation and donate yet again to attain false pretense of
forgiveness. This, by way of giving the land to a church except of course the residence. The
Eduartes, unknowingly trust Doria and purchase the lot altogether. Pedro then moves to
reprimand his niece by setting forth machinations to effectively revoke his donation.

ISSUE:
W/N the act of Helen Doria of falsification of documents is tantamount to ingratitude towards
Pedro Calapine which would lead to the effective revocation of donation? -- YES
HELD:
This act is of pure treason. Any action that the donor takes offense to is equal to ingratitude. It is
saddening that an individual can have such a shameful display of thanks relating to family. The
mere act of falsifying documents to reserve the right to half the land to which you have already
been granted half of is appaling to say the least.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
Noceda v. CA
313 SCRA 504
DOCTRINE: Usurpation with regard to donee towards donor is a definite act of ingratitude and
neecessitates only to be proved to effect revocation.
FACTS:
Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria Arbizo extra-judicially partitioned a land in Zambales.
Aurora coincidentally donated on the same day of the partition to Rodolfo who happens to be
her nephew. After several surveys conducted by a certain Geodetic Engineer Eugene Quejada
of the Bureau of Lands and specific boundary adjustments, Aurora opted to fence her property
accordingly. This, for reasons of making known and presuppose which of the vast land is indeed
in her rightful possession. Even though there was an apparent exercise of giving and safety
measures so as to avoid conflict, it appears to have been averred by Rodolfo. It was made true
by his actions of passing through said fences and intentionally staying at nipa huts designated
inside Aurora's land. What comes into contention is the manner Rodolfo makes his action.
ISSUE:
W/N usurpation of Rodolfo is enough to suffice revocation of donation? -RULING:
In this case, Rodolfo is directly showing his disregard of Aurora's wishes intentionally going
beyond the boundaries Directo so painstakingly made plain. Usurpation is the undermining of
one's authority. Noceda not only negates her will but makes it obvious in the sense of flaunting it
even with the presence of Maria Arbizo.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully considered the
questions of fact raised below and the respondent Courts conclusions are based on the
evidence on record. No cogent reason exists for disturbing such findings. We also note that
petitioner in this petition merely rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in the
respondent Court in whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to
present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Velasquez v. CA

325 SCRA 552

DOCTRINE: An action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted. the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
FACTS:

Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in

1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless.
Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs)
and Tranquilina deGuzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their
marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties.
The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with
the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina
de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia
told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velasquez that the
documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not
signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario
Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to
support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the
properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to
of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood
sister of Leoncia de Guzman.
Plaintiffs also claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took
possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition,
defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in
question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the
partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition should be sustained. -- NO
HELD:
No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact,
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the nature and
the extent of his title to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
In this case, the properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between private respondents and
petitioners, the court found no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in
support of their petition.

Gestopa v. CA
342 SCRA 105
DOCTRINE: Acceptance makes a donation inter vivos. There cannot be acceptance mortis
causa in the lifetime of a donor because this would be in a form of a will.
FACTS:
The Danlags own six properties of unregistered land in Cebu. They donated four parcels of land
mortis causa with reservations to Mercedes Pilapil who is an illegitimate child of the husband.
After four years, the donors then again donated to Pilapil only this time it was inter vivos
including the remaining two parcels. Afterwhich, the spouses sold two parcels to the Gestopas.
It was first held in favor of the Gestopas and eventually reversed by the CA. It should be noted
also that the husband of Mercedes was forced to purchase two parcels even though it was
contrary to their interest. The Pilapils assumed responsibility over these lands and have tax
declarations which were appreciated but put aside for reasons of them being easily obtained
from the municipal offices, which after all, does not prove ownership. Some of the terms
included in the Danlags issuance of donation was for them to enjoy the fruits of said parcels
during their lifetime. Unfortunately, there were incidents when they were denied from getting
coconuts.
ISSUE:
W/N the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
RULING:
Said donation was absolutely made inter vivos. Spouses knew of the difference between the
two modes and made use of them in remarkably distinguishing actions. To stress the court
continues:
"Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego (father) donated the properties out
of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such
reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society,
indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted
the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime."
The only recourse best available for the spouses were to revoke said donation on
grounds of officiousness or ingratitude, both of which were not invoked.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

Sumipat vs. Banga

FACTS:
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE
TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in
favor of his illegitimate children (defendants-appellees) covering the three parcels of land (the
properties). On the document appears the signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she
gave her marital consent thereto. That time, Lauro was already very sick and bedridden; that
upon defendant-appellee Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipats) hand in affixing his signature on
the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the
same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she
did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all
about.
After Lauro Sumipats death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As
plaintiff-appellants share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received
any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in
favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she
claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after
its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant-appellees, because it found that the subject
properties are conjugal having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida
Tabotabo (Placida). However, because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due
execution of the deed and even admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial court
declared that the entirety of the subject properties, and not just Lauro Sumipats conjugal share,
were validly transferred to the defendants, the petitioners herein.
On appeal, the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the
petitioners herein, as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that
the terms thereof were fully explained to her. This they failed to do.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly
transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
HELD:
Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:

"In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but
it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments."
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20
In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or
in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.