NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.

ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent)
filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso
Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her
son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December
28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time,
enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making
her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an
apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all
expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost
of caesarian operation and hospital confinement.
However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the
mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further
alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but
still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and
monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative
defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent
as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child
also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy.
Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent
time riding on petitioners jeepney which was then being
utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima
de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police
officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse
against said police officer was later withdrawn in
exchange for the quashing of drug charges against
respondents brother-in-law who was then detained at
the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent
introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for
charity as she was pregnant with another child.
Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo;
he was motivated by no other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for
the delivery of said child, unaware of respondents
chicanery and deceit designed to scandalize him in
exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo
testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right
to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the

house of his kumadre Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy.
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a
widower and he has no more companion in life because
his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a
housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their
family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time
already knows that she is a single mother as she had a
child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought
her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and
marry her. She believed him and yielded to his
advances, with the thought that she and her child will
have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other
weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child.
When she became pregnant with petitioners child, it was
only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower.
She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it
because he wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented
an apartment where she stayed with a housemaid; he
also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to
their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan
Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner
even walked her at the hospital room and massaged her
stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She
filled out the form for the childs birth certificate and
wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It
was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove
her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a
son at his advanced age who is his look-alike, and this
was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace
Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented.
However, on the 18th day after the babys birth,
petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He
confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was
also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child.
His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give
respondent money so she can go abroad. When she
refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and
sending money to her. She and her baby survived
through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she
tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was
brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill.
Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police
Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However,
it was only petitioners wife who showed up and she was
very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the
payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly
visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondents baby,
respondents attempted suicide through sleeping pills
overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill,
her complaint before the police authorities and meeting
with petitioners wife at the headquarters.7

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in

favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant as follows:
Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of
TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child
Christian Paulo through the mother;
Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and
To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial

court decided the case without affording him the right to
introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court
erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of
Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly
support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners appeal. The appellate court found no reason
to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in
denying petitioners motion for postponement on April
17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial
presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.

him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to

him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been
corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on
record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or
documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez
vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it
clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation
of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision
provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child x x 3) when the child has in his favor
any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was
held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket
provision that practically covers all the other cases in the
preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that
the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When
the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of
the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under
the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court,
with respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that
Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso Salas,
he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA,
supra).

On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts

ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in
granting respondents prayer for support. The appellate
court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It shall be demandable from the time the person who

has the right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of the
Philippines).10

Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the

benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry which
bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He
cannot claim open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child.

Hence, this petition submitting the following

arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however,

that during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by
Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00
which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso
provided her with a household help with a salary of
P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He also
provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00
(Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital
while the latter was in labor, walking her around and
massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home
Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelles
discharge from the hospital. People living in the same
apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to
father a son at his age which was his look alike. It was
only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was

denied by the CA.

1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY

LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL
RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO,
NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED
THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT
CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE
RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN
PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE
FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND
THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE
PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.

It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal

actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle
that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules
give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself
or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found.13 The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place
where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue
for the first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion
to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the
Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an
objection to an improper venue must be made before a
responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioners
objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by
his counsel for the resetting of the initial presentation of
defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was
not the first time petitioners motion for postponement
was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the
testimony of respondents last witness on November 29,
1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the
continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for
the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3,
and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December
17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his
evidence at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the
hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioners former
counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the
cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in
order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which
request was granted by the trial court which thus reset
the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On
March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and
without objection from respondents counsel, Atty.
Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing
to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance of
both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial
court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared
their absence as a waiver of their right to present

evidence and accordingly deemed the case submitted

for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for
petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his
appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the
same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa
filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997
Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial
court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas
failure to appear for the initial presentation of their
evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its
March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner
a chance to present his evidence. On August 26, 1997,
Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September
22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial court received
his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to
October 10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested
the postponement of a hearing in another case which
was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24,
1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to
October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing
was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February
16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April
17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco
received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to
appear but the trial court received on April 16, 1998 an
urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa.
The reason given by the latter was the scheduled
hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order issued by
the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case
No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was
the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of
the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the
RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment
considering that the April 17, 1998 hearing was
scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the
motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the
second time petitioners motion for postponement. Even
at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the
April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty.
Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another
motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered
that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the
case had long been pending and that petitioner and his
counsel have been given opportunities to present their
evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late
during the hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement
have absolutely no right to assume that their motions
would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the
day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an order declaring a party
to have waived the right to present evidence for
performing dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty
to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay
and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20

Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected

by the trial court in view of his own negligence in failing
to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules.
As we held in Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon
by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or
inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The
inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take
note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial
court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It
should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his
counsels conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling
the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in
the trial courts denial of the motion for postponement
filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners contention that
he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail.
The essence of due process is that a party is given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate
in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity
is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial
and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents
evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo
is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24
(Exhibit A-1) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the
name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not
signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who
filled up the entries and signed the said document

though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the

information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25
Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or
other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged
father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of
Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists
of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside
their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with
the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner
and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus
have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of
Account33 (Exhibit C) from the Good Samaritan
General Hospital where respondent herself was
indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove
that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered
the expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an
act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of
petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are
not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to
petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and
contained no statement of admission by petitioner that
he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2)
vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission
of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of
Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear
admission that he is the father of private respondents
daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein
considered the totality of evidence which established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the
father of private respondents daughter. On the other
hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained

the appellate courts finding that private respondents

evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of
petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latters
public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with
private respondents mother, and private respondent as
his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that
respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could
not claim open and continuous possession of status of
an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the
testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his
filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondents evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the
circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners
financial support while respondent lived in Murillos
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not
approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary
and testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we
sustained the appellate courts ruling anchored on the
following factual findings by the appellate court which
was quoted at length in the
ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital.
Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33,
5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their
residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth
without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that
since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had
always known and called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN,
pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was
at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her
for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping
with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a
father should do for his child bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a
child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic)
(TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized
by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh.

E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a

frog test to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for
Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form
of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-6),
or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and
sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the
signature appearing therein which was identified by
Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives
her checks and Artemio would write the check at home
and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73).
Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and
signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the
father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio
signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for
the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and H2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at
their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas
(sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28,
10/1/73). x x x.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board
of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the
following dedication: To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20, Appellants Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not
sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably
showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and
Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not
mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter. This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and
Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of
paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed
to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard
of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by
petitioners counsel informing this Court that petitioner
had died on May 6, 2010.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court
when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under
Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held
that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the
action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to
be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of
parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, thus applies.

2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Antipolo City, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 96-3952,
ordering him to give monthly support to respondent
Randy Perla (Randy). Likewise assailed is the CAs May
5, 2006 Resolution5 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereto.

SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a

party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

Factual Antecedents

The action must be brought within the same period

specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative
or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and
Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26
is DISMISSED.

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING

and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
"An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence."1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 is the
March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 which dismissed petitioner
Antonio Perlas (Antonio) appeal from the February 26,

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor

son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before the
RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio
lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As
a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on
November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a
job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give
any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 Antonio, who is now
married and has a family of his own, denied having
fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known
Mirasol, he averred that she never became his commonlaw wife nor was she treated as such. And since Mirasol
had been intimidating and pestering him as early as
1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son,
Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages by way of
counterclaim from respondents.
During trial, Mirasol testified that from 1981 to 1983, she
lived in Upper Bicutan, Taguig where Antonio was a
neighbor.8 In the first week of January 1981, Antonio
courted her9 and eventually became her first
boyfriend.10 Antonio would then visit her everyday until
1982.11 Upon clarificatory question by the court whether
she and Antonio eventually lived together as husband
and wife, Mirasol answered that they were just
sweethearts.12
When Mirasol became pregnant in 1983, Antonio
assured her that he would support her.13 Eventually,
however, Antonio started to evade her.14 Mirasol last
saw Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the
particular month.15
On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy.16
She presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth17 and
Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as
parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and
Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates.19 Antonio supplied his name and birthplace
after Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the "hilot" who assisted in
Mirasols delivery of Randy, went to his house to solicit
the said information.20 Mirasol also claimed that it was
Erlinda who supplied the date and place of marriage of
the parents so that the latter can file the birth
certificate.21 Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the
same "Mirasol Perla" who signed as the informant
therein.22

Next to take the witness stand was Randy who at that

time was just 15 years old.23 Randy claimed that he
knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as
his father.24 He recounted having met him for the first
time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt Lelita, Antonios
sister, where he was vacationing.25 During their
encounter, Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his
hand while the latter hugged him.26 When Randy asked
him for support, Antonio promised that he would support
him.27 Randy further testified that during his one-week
stay in his Aunt Lelitas place, the latter treated him as
member of the family.28
For her part, Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both
Mirasol and Antonio as they were neighbors in Upper
Bicutan, Taguig. Presently, Antonio is still her neighbor in
the said place.29 According to her, she knew of Mirasols
and Antonios relationship because aside from seeing
Antonio frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked
Antonio about it.30 She further narrated that the two
have a son named Randy31 and that Antonios mother
even tried to get the child from Mirasol.32
Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents,
Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol
in February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with
Randys Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he
had a hand in the preparation of the same, Antonio
answered in the negative.35
Testifying for himself, Antonio denied having courted
Mirasol on January 5, 1981 because during that time, he
was studying in Iloilo City. He graduated from the Iloilo
Maritime Academy in March of 198136 as shown by his
diploma.37 It was only in May 1981 or after his
graduation that he came to Manila. Further, he denied
having any relationship with Mirasol.38 He claimed that
he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol only once which
happened in the month of September or October of
1981.39
Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the
father of Randy only when Mirasol charged him with
abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first
time he saw Randy.40 Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor
her sister, Norma, whom he met a few times told him
about the child.41
Anent Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified
as to several inaccuracies in the entries thereon.
According to him, his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as
appearing in the said certificate of live birth.42 Also, he is
not a protestant and a laborer as indicated in said
certificate.43 Antonio likewise alleged that Mirasol only
made up the entries with respect to their marriage on
October 28, 1981.44
Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy), for her part, testified
that she came to know Mirasol through her mother
Erlinda who was the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth to
Randy.45 She narrated that her mother asked Mirasol
the details to be entered in the childs Certificate of Live
Birth such as the names of the parents, date and place
of marriage, and the intended name of the child.46 Her

mother also told her that Mirasols son has no

acknowledged father.47 Daisy likewise claimed that
Mirasol later left to her care the then infant Randy until
Mirasol took him away without permission when the child
was almost five years old.48

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision49 dated
February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy.
The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the
relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had
sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old
Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his
father. The RTC opined that Mirasol would not have
gone through the trouble of exposing herself to
humiliation, shame and ridicule of public trial if her
allegations were untrue. Antonios counterclaim was
denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on
the part of Mirasol and Randy.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff Randy Perla and against the defendant
Antonio Perla, ordering the latter to give a reasonable
monthly support of P5,000.00 to Randy Perla for his
sustenance and support to be given to him from the time
of the filing of this Complaint.
Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.50

Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal51 which was given due

course by the RTC.52

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision53 of March 31, 2005, the CA upheld
Randys illegitimate filiation based on the certified true
copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal
certificate identifying Antonio as his father. According to
the appellate court, while these documents do not bear
the signature of Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is
the known, imputed and identified father of Randy. The
CA also affirmed the trial courts findings on the
credibility of the witnesses and its appreciation of facts,
as there was nothing to suggest that the RTC erred in
such respects. It highlighted Antonios vacillation in his
testimony regarding the number of times he had sex with
Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear badge of
his lack of candor - a good reason to disregard his
denials. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the

appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

paternity or filiation is established by clear and

convincing evidence."59

SO ORDERED.54

Antonio filed a Motion for Reconsideration55 which was

denied by the CA in its Resolution56 of May 5, 2006.

Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate

filiation to Antonio.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles

172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as
follows:

Issue

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following:

The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether

the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support
Randy.

Our Ruling

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a

final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

There is merit in the petition.

A re-examination of the factual findings

of the RTC and the CA is proper in this
case.
"Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed
by the CA, are binding on this Court."57 However, this
rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts.58 As this case falls under
these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine
the factual findings of the lower courts.

Since respondents complaint for support is anchored on

Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the lower
courts should have first made a determination of the
same.
Respondents Complaint for support is based on Randys
alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy
to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established
with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the
RTC would show that it is bereft of any discussion
regarding Randys filiation. Although the appellate court,
for its part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate
filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of
Randys birth certificate and baptismal certificate both
identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his
filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is despite the
fact that the said documents do not bear Antonios
signature. "Time and again, this Court has ruled that a
high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for x x x support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate

filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of
Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said
certificate has no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the
same.60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate."61 We also cannot lend
credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain
information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial
in having any participation in the preparation of the
document as well as the absence of his signature
thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm
that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys
birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as
reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its
preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed
as informant thereon which she confirmed on the
witness stand.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his

illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in
1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand
while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him;
or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was
good to him during his one-week stay in her place,
cannot be considered as indications of Randys open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article
172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence
of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection
and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity.1wphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in
all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously."62 Here, the single instance that Antonio
allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him
cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession
of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he fathers
conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for
that singular occasion in which they met, there are no
other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.64
Neither can Antonios paternity be deduced from how his
sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelitas
actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree
with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios
paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack
of participation of the supposed father in the preparation
of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal
certificate may be considered a public document, it can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of
the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x
x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove
the same."66
This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTCs
conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the
basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters
with Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the
inconsistencies in Antonios testimony with regard to the
number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol
are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold
the respondents claims. It is well to stress that as
plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative
allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy.67
She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense.68 As Randy was born on
November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to
prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior
to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before
the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during

the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However,

nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she had
sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time.
She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in
1983 but could not remember the particular month.69
Plainly, this hardly means anything not only because it
was not established that the said meeting took place
during that crucial period but also because Mirasol never
mentioned that they had sexual contact during their
meeting.
Antonios admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol
does not likewise by any means strengthen respondents
theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as
an adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that
he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and
August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own
behalf, he mentioned that he had a one night affair with
Mirasol which happened in the month of September or
October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual
contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none
of these sexual congresses could have led to the
conception of Randy who was born two years later in
1983.
All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish
Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order
for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 31,
2005 and Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 are REVERSED and
SER ASIDE and the Decision dated February 26, 2003
of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, in
Civil Case No. 96-3952 is VACATED. A new one is
entered DISMISSING the Complaint for Support filed by
Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla against Antonio Perla.
SO ORDERED.

TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA

CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as
mother of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA,
CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA,
Respondents.
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution2
dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court had affirmed
with modification the Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held
petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as well
as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit.

The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are

as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young
lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime
in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I.
Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the
Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a
job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a
casual employee in the mayors office starting on
September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986,
with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime
and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to
Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. They
stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner
fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers Place" where the
seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her
that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their
companions who had gone ahead. When they reached
the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner
ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a
comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked.
She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of
the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on
as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went
to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay
projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to
Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who
asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They
met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said
he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door,
led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her
that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce"
her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a
municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to
his advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she
feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February
1987, she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten
letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:

My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I
should have no regret, because I love you and you love
me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall
take care of it and let him/her see the light of this
beautiful world.

We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.

Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874

Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and

addressed her as "Chris," probably because of their
twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified
petitioners penmanship which she claims she was
familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters5 sent
to her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead
as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures6
petitioner gave her of his youth and as a public servant,
all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware
of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket
money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she
would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In
June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave
her another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents
learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On
September 23, 1987,7 she gave birth to a baby girl,
Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas
story. She said they learned of their daughters
pregnancy through her husbands cousin. She added
that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed by her
daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled
with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac,
Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in
their favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and
against the [petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he
was proved to be the natural father of the above-named
minor as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the
[respondents];
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

5. to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.9

Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which

affirmed the judgment with modification, specifying the
party to whom the damages was awarded. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED
with modification by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I.
Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of
P15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and
Francisca Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents]
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner now presents the following issues for
resolution:
I. WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO
PROVE THAT APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE
FATHER OF THE CHILD?

II. WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?

III. WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED

JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANTS
PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE
COLLATERAL TO THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11

In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether

or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action
for damages with support pendente lite; (2) whether or
not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate
child of petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not
respondents are entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of
paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been
duly established or proved in the proceedings; that the

award for damages and attorneys fees has no basis;

and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a
direct and not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of
Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was respondent
Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as
father without his consent. He further contends the
alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not
admissions of paternity but mere expressions of concern
and advice.12 As to the award for damages, petitioner
argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages
because she was in pari delicto, being a willing
participant in the "consensual carnal act" between
them.13 In support of his argument that the issue on
filiation should have been resolved in a separate action,
petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14
where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum
maintain that the Court of Appeals committed no error in
its decision. They reiterate that Clarissas clear narration
of the circumstances on "how she was deflowered" by
petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by
petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating testimony of
Clarissas mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no
countervailing evidence, are preponderant evidence of
paternity. They cited the case of De Jesus v. Syquia16
where we held that a conceived child can be
acknowledged because this is an act favorable to the
child.17 They also argue that damages should be
awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to
succumb to his sexual advances.18
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for
damages? On this score, we find petitioners stance
unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the
nature of a pleading. In a string of cases we made the
following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts
alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are
called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance
thereof.19 In determining the nature of an action, it is not
the caption, but the averments in the petition and the
character of the relief sought, that are controlling.20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that
although its caption states "Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein,
her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his
amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her
pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for
support for her child, all clearly establish a case for
recognition of paternity. We have held that the due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.21

The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are

declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that
he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in
these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these
letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioners
fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an
inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they
were all written by one and the same person, petitioner,
as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner
admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love
letters between them, and his giving her money during
her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private
handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish
Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family
Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies,
to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that
Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence
presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own.
His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that
denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.23
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled
to damages. Article 221924of the Civil Code which

states moral damages may be recovered in cases of

seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa
was already an adult at the time she had an affair with
petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages.
Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that
entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a
love child to damages. Respondents Constantino and
Francisca Posada have not cited any law or
jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in
consonance with Article 2208 (2)25 and (11)26 of the
New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30,
2003 and the Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN

"JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP
(Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the
successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN,
MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA
and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN,
JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR.,
respondent.
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil
Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil
Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
However, if there are material discrepancies between
them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General
prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking
the reversal of the September 13, 2000 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which
affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special
Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the
trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as
the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven
(11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died
intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E.
Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
(docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that
he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is
an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings,

current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6

portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned
by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel
Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester
Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of
the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order
setting the petition for hearing on January 13, 1992,
which order was duly published,[2] thereby giving notice
to all persons who may have opposition to the said
petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992,
the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin,
Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the
lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondents petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name .
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition
was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria
Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin
alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is
barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother
of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the
estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This
was followed by an appearance and opposition dated
January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another
sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no
filial relationship between herein respondent and the
deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be
appointed administrator of the intestate estate,
respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D"
contains the information that respondent's father is Juan
C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts
stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit
"D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity
of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D"
was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J.
Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She
produced and identified in court the bound volume of
1957 records of birth where the alleged original of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
(Exhibit "C")[4] showing him and his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's
dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows
that he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of

Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They
submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro
Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that the birth
of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the
signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as
anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on
October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January
30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447
(Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958
revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears
on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's
birth. This scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was
falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L.
Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa
(then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus
concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious
document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume
of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph
(Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's
illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on
September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is
hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr.
is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon
his filing of a bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this Court.
"SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the

challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial
court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however,
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated
January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by
petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two
documents - Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is
genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal[7] does
not apply when there appears in the record of the case
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence

which have been overlooked, or the significance of

which have been misinterpreted, that if considered,
would affect the result of the case.[8] Here, the trial court
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would
have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the persons preferred who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
a person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that
a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.[9]
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin"
refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.[10] In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[11] this
Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of
the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C.
Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for
issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an interested person in the estate and
is considered as next of kin. But has respondent
established that he is an acknowledged natural son of

the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr.

Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with
the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph
(Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of
Exhibit "D", the trial court made the following findings,
affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the
original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists
in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner
since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an
acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he
together with his mother was summoned to attend to the
burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the
coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in
the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the
standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in
public document and may also be called questioned
document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477,
the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or
primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate
of live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was
testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in
1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent
to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said
their office usually paste the pages of the bound volume
if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and
genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and
Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the
bound volume were erased due to the explanation of
Rosita Vencer."

This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a
Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the
records of births cover several decades and come from
all parts of the country, to merely access them in the
Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one
single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if
not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that
any of these employees in Metro Manila would have
reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating
from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by
interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving
the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence
than those considered by the trial court should have
been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the
genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the
testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994
was the record of respondent's birth which took place on
October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa.
Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth
record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil
Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her
general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in
the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the
copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant
to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified
in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard,
we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form.
Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that
"xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were
already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958
Revised Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an
event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised
Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on
January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found
in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on
Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956. We find
no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that
the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years

thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is

unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to
Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in
the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is
merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the
other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original
copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged
original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the
entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all
other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of
those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's
religion, race, occupation, address and business. The
space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks
calling for the date and other details of his Residence
Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound
volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not
aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." As to why
Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she
explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees
would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live
Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just
to replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted
in the record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound
volume to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are
detached so we have to paste them."[14] (Emphasis
ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates,
this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with
the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from
explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding
Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the suspicious
circumstances surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a
finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not
respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more
faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil
Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and

documents presented to them for entry to the Civil

Registrar General, thus:
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall
(a) file registrable certificates and documents presented
to them for entry; (b) compile the same monthly and
prepare and send any information required of them by
the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or
copies of any document registered upon payment of
proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of
all certificates or documents registered during the year;
(e) send to the Civil Registrar-General, during the first
ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made
during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same
to facilitate search and identification in case any
information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of
charge, for civil register purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document
sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar
General should be identical in form and in substance
with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case,
Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General
is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have
impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was
made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the
signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as
respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement
in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar[16] that:
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only
the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock,
when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed
or made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further
elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where

this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not
competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.[18] Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of
the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without
doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was
removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of
Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section
23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this
case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the
Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother
near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will
not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set
a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his
filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed,
respondent is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters
of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.