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BOOK OF THE DEAD: RECONCILING DAVID LEWIS TIME TRAVEL THEORY

AND SHANE CARRUTHS PRIMER

By Elijah Kallett

For PHI-4500
Under the supervision of Dr. Randolph Clarke
At Florida State University

11/10/2015

I.

Abstract

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Having never written a philosophical criticism in an academic setting before, this paper
presented a small challenge for me. Writing about issues of time travel, I assumed my own
preconceived notions about the subject would have colored my ability to present my findings in a
purely analytic way.
However, upon reviewing David Lewis famed 1976 essay on the paradoxes of time travel
(aptly titled The Paradoxes of Time Travel), I found that Lewis himself based his conclusions
off concepts of time travel presented in popular media.
In this critical evaluation of Lewis work, I will attempt to resolve some glaring problems
with assumption and conclusion in the classic theory of time travel. To achieve this goal, this
essay will examine a handful of other diagnostic sources, which also assess the paradoxes put
forth by Lewis. Moreover, this essay will specifically engage the science fiction film Primer,
directed by Shane Carruth, released in 2007, as I believe that it has the best implicit responses to
the problems posed by Lewis theory of time travel.
Consequently, the structure of this essay will focus on Lewis statements first, explaining
them in the context of this essay, and subsequently, will examine the issues that I have with
Lewis claims.
II.

Quarrels: Lewis Theory and its Problems

In order to understand some of the main conflicts of time travel theory and philosophy, it is
important to understand Lewis own main contentions, as well as understanding the unique
structure of Lewis arguments.
First and foremost, Lewis structures his argument around the statement that, because time
travel creates paradoxes, it is not possible:
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P1: Time travel gives rise to paradoxes


C1: If time travel were possible, then paradoxes would be possible.
P3: Paradoxes are not possible
Thus, C2: Time travel is not possible.
Lewis posits that P1 is simply a semantic problem; essentially, the contrary could be equally
as true, and thus Lewis stated goal is to examine which paradoxes specifically can be discarded,
allowing him to reject P1. The problem with this is that, while Lewis is correct, in that P1 is a
subjective statement, not directly provable by any stretch, it is also not disprovable. Lewis
whole theory of time travel is based on the rejection of this statement, theoretically saying that
there are no paradoxes to impinge on the possibility of time travel. So, just as the classical theory
cannot postulate a complete reality where paradoxes must conflict with time travel, Lewis too
cannot postulate any reality where categorically no paradoxes come into conflict with time
travel1.
Lewis first examination is that of the paradox of personal and external time. Basically, in the
classical theory of time travel, the time it takes to travel between two temporal spaces is not
equal to the amount of actual time separating the two instances. Thus, it is impossible for such
travel to occur. Lewis rejection of this paradox comes in the form of his statement of personal
and external time. Personal time is the time as experienced by an individual, which Lewis claims
is relative to external time, which is the actual amount of time that passes. Personal time is not
really time at all. It is simply an operational way to reconcile what someone experiences with
what is actually occurring. To Lewis, it seems possible that someone could, in theory, get in a
1 (Lewis, 2010)
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time machine, experience 5 minutes of personal time, and then emerge from the time machine 40
years in the past. Empirically speaking, this is simply not possible. Albert Einstein, a prominent
theorist on space-time theory, stated that while experiential time was relative to the person
having the experience, the flow of time was essentially a set factor of the universe. Thus, even if
the person in Lewis example only feels like he or she is experiencing 5 minutes of time, they are
still technically bound by the quantum constraints of the world, and must actually pass through
40 years of time.
It should be noted that this does not present a necessary problem. Here, Lewis theory can be
engaged with the film example, Primer. In Primer, the quantum issue of time as an unalterable
property is confronted as such: because time cannot realistically be compressed, the time travel
device in the film actually requires an input of the desired amount of time into the past that the
traveler wishes to go. Thus, if the traveler wants to return to 6 hours in the past, they must spend
6 hours inside the time travel device. Convenience of such a method aside, this idea of time as an
unalterable property is handled quite well by this system, as it reconciles personal and external
time into one, scientifically acceptable structure of time (See Fig. 1 for a detailed look at method
employed in the film)2.
The next step in Lewis argument is to explain the causal loop problem by saying that causal
loops could technically account for any sort of uncaused, and thus unexplained, things in the
world, such as the Big Bang or God. In the classical theory of time travel, causal loops account
for something like a person going back in time to tell a younger version of themselves how time
travel works. The younger person would know because the older version of themselves said so,
and thus it can be assumed that the older version knew because he or she, his or herself, had
2 (Carruth, Primer)
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experienced the older version telling them when they were younger. However, this raises the
question of where the information came from to begin with. Lewis contention here is that this is
not necessarily paradoxical, since there are plenty of elliptical experiences in the human world.
Again, the Big Bang could be an example: even if the Big Bang is was spontaneous, its existence
insinuates that there was something existing before it. However, Lewis argument doesnt really
hold any reasons for how these closed loops could exist, beyond that they could3.

Fig. 1 Primer time travel diagram

Primer again combats this issue of causal loops in a relatively succinct manner: multiple
timelines that annihilate the loops. As shown by the Fig. 1, the primary actor in the time travel
loop exists concurrently with himself at only one point in temporal space (the 6 hour window
3 (Conee & Sider, 2005)
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after the machine starts). During the 6 hour window, the original, primary actor observes and
studies the causal effects of the double on the world around him, making little to no causative
actions himself. Thus, the original is simply experiencing the actions of the double. However,
when the original enters the time travel device, they effectively end their existence as the
original, thus ending the initial timeline. Once the loop is closed, when the double exits the box
at the time the machine starts, the original actor that emerges is no longer the original actor by
definition, but rather the double. Their actions are then the actions that the original experienced
during the 6 hour waiting period. Yet, once those six hours are over, the original timeline can be
said to have been destroyed, since after the 6 hours, the only fate that can be said to exist for the
original is to enter the time travel device. Thus, only the double can be said to certainly exist,
meaning that, on the new timeline, there is no casual loop.
The final piece of Lewis theory on time travel is concerning the free will of the time traveler.
This conundrum is frequently referred to as the Grandfather paradox. Principally, the
Grandfather paradox relates a parable of a man who attempts to go back in time to kill his
grandfather. However, according to the paradox, the man only exists because his grandfather was
not shot and killed. Thus, the man should be unable to kill his grandfather.
Lewis approaches this subject with the idea of compossibility. Effectively, there are two sets
of factors, by which, in one instance, the man can kill his grandfather, and by the other, in which
the man cannot kill his grandfather. It is important here to understand Lewis distinction on
capability, and the word can. To Lewis, the man in the Grandfather paradox, can do anything
he is capable of as a human being. Typically this is explained as such: an ape cannot speak
Finnish. The man can speak Finnish. He has the vocal faculties and the brain power required to
do such. He may or may not actually speak Finnish, but technically speaking, he could speak
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Finnish. The facts about the mans larynx and his neurodevelopment are compossible with his
speaking Finnish. Thus, Lewis concludes, by one set of standards (the mans willingness to kill
his grandfather, his training with and ownership of a weapon, etc.) is compossible with the
second set of standards (the mans own existence being a result of his grandfather not being
killed).
Professor Kadri Vivhelin of USC presents the obvious contra-argument to this. To Vivhelin,
in order for the statement The man can kill his grandfather to be true, there has to be at least
one instance in which the man could succeed at killing his grandfather. However, Vivhelin argues
that any reality even remotely like the one we live in cannot have such an instance occur4.
III.

Implications

Lewis takes a very Parmenidean view of time: essentially, past, present, and future are all
equally real, and what will be, will be. This is diametrically opposed to the Heraclitan view of
time, wherein the past and the present are held constant, but there can be no discernable
statement of the future. Lewis takes this opposition to its extreme, even so much as to suggest
that causality can be viewed backwards, and that cause does not need to come before effect.
Lewis seems to taunt fatalism, saying that fatalism would dictate his not voting Republican was
directly related to the fact that 450-someodd years ago, it was also true that he wasnt voting
Republican in the present day. Lewis then argues that no matter what fatalism states, it is
irrelevant to the future here.
There are, in my mind, some very distinct issues of free will that rise from this interpretation.
Fundamentally, Lewis theory is stating that time, in all forms past, present, and future, are all
4 (Conee & Sider, 2005)
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accessible, but that choice towards this matter is irrelevant. Lewis disregards the barriers that are
presented by time in dimensionality. He views time as a spatial plane, wherein movement
forward or backward has compossibilities with each other. If you view time as one of a set
number of dimensions, then this understanding makes sense. However, to me, time is more
complicated than such. The past, objectively, is a determinant set of factors that build the present,
while the future is unset. Even though Lewis theory appears to have the upper hand, in saying
that one can accomplish something like time travel, his theory is actually more restrictive,
because it precludes alternatives even more so than a Heraclitan view of time. To Lewis, if the
man in the Grandfather paradox kills his grandfather, it instantly rules out a number of other
possible alternatives (the man is distracted, the rifle jams, etc.), whereas the Heraclitan view only
precludes the single alternative: the man cannot kill his grandfather.
In other instances, such as someone being their own parent, the Heraclitan view only sets
aside the basic concept, versus Lewis conceptualization, wherein many possible outcomes
(having a child of a different gender, having a stillborn child, etc.) are barred.
All in all, by comparison, it would seem that Lewis theory, which ignores many basic
problems with time travel, is actually more restrictive to the fate of existence. In my estimation,
the belief that the past is a fixed set of factors, and that the future is branching alternatives, is far
more conducive to a belief in free will. While I do not quite view myself as holding libertarian
values of free will, I at least see the nature of the universe as compatible. While you cannot
change the past, as the laws of nature have dictated the way that they exist to be unique, I
personally believe that the future is still a beast of change, and that free will has a dictation to it.

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Word Count: 2,075


IV.

Bibliography

Carruth, S. (Director). (2005). Primer [Motion picture]. United States: New Line Home
Entertainment.

Conee, E., & Sider, T. (2005). Lewis on Time Travel. In Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of
Metaphysics (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis, D. (2010, October 1). THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL. Retrieved November 13,
2015, from http://www.csus.edu/indiv/m/merlinos/paradoxes of time travel.pdf

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