SAMPAYAN v.

DAZA
A petition for disqualification was filed with the SC against Daza from
running in the 1992 Congressional elections (Northern Samar) for being a
greencard holder and a permanent resident of US since Oct. 1974. No
renunciation of such status was done so he is disqualified under Sec 68 OEC and
Sec. 18 Art 11 Const. They cited the case of Caasi v. COMELEC and presented in
evidence the letter from US DOJ, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
certifying that Daza became a permanent resident for his possession of a
greencard (but he did not apply for a citizenship)
A petition for prohibition was also filed against Daza to prohibit him from
exercising his functions of Congressman.
Daza replied that his permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a
US non-immigrant visa (did not say what year). Furthermore, he renounced the
same when he returned to the Phils on August 1985.
issue
WON Daza should be disqualified? NO, the case is moot and academic.
ratio
The first petition is moot and academic because of the second petition filed
seeking to unseat Daza in Congress.
Assuming arguendo that this case has basis, still, the proper jurisdiction is with
House Electoral Tribunal. Art. 6 Sec. 17 Const. states that HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its
members.
What is the proper remedy? Either:
(1)
To file a petition for cancellation of CoC before election or
(2)
Quo warranto case with HRET within 10 days after his proclamation.
Is the writ of prohibition proper? Nope, as it cannot be applied for acts already
consummated. Daza is a de facto officer who is entitled to his salary for his actual
services rendered.
Republic v. Dela Rosa and Frivaldo
-

Frivaldo seeks to be reelected as Governor of Sosrosogn. However, during

the Marcos regime, he was compelled to seek asylum in the US and thus lost
his PH citizenship. Because of this he filed for PH naturalization in 1991.

MOVED HEARING EARLIER SO HE CAN FILE COC (against law) Jan

1992: Frivaldo filed a motion to set hearing ahead of schedule, manifesting his intent to run for
public office in the May 1992 elections, that the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy was
March 15 which was a day before the scheduled hearing, thus asking that the hearing be moved to
January 24. Frivaldos motion was granted, and the hearing moved to Feb. 21, but such order was
neither published nor posted.

Other irregularities = he was only witness, and only documentary evidence

presented=== naturalization GRANTED but MR filed by Hermo and OSG
raised case to SC.
HE WON 1992 Election and was proclaimed on May 22, 1992 >>>
Lee, losing candidate, filed with COMELEC petition to annul proclamation
(June 1, 1992) on ground that he was an alien and that naturalization case
still pending.

COMELEC en banc dismissed petition for being filed out of time. RA 7166 sec.
19 provides that period to appeal ruling of the BoC or proceedings was 3 days.
Lee filed another petition for Mandamus for immediate resolution of
naturalization case and for the cancellation of CoC. >>>> COMELEC said this
was filed out of time because the issue of disqualification of a candidate
is not among the grounds allowed in a pre-proclamation controversy.
SC DQ is proper.
First, his naturalization was in fact full of irregularities.
Because Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen, insofar as Lee assails his
eligibility, the petition is one for quo warranto questioning Firvaldos
title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor.
Thus, it is not covered by the 10-day period (Sec. 253, OEC) and
COMELEC had no basis to dismiss Lees petition.
Besides, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure; once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.
1. Unseating Frivaldo will not frustrate the will of the electorate, because both the
LGC and the Constitution require that only Filipno citizens can run and be
elected to public office; the electorate must have been under the mistaken
belief that Frivaldo had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
2. That said, where the candidate who obtained the highest number votes is later
declared to be disqualified to hold office, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number votes is not entitled to be declared winner. (LABO v.
COMELEC)
HELD: Frivaldo is declared not a citizen of the Philippines and is thus disqualified
from continuing to serve as Governor of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his
office and surrender the same to the Vice-Governor.

Tan v. COMELEC (before the Election Protests, there were numerous PPCs filed)
Tan, Jikiri and Loong were candidates for Governor of Sulu
Petition to exclude election returns and certificates of canvass (PE):
Tan filed petitions (Municipal Board of Canvassers and Provincial BoC) for the
exclusion of election returns and certificates of canvass. All were
dismissed by the BoCs thus Tan filed appeal with the COMELEC 1st Division.
Petition for Declaration of Failure of Election (PDFE): Tan, Burahan and
Jikiri (along with other 2004 local candidates in Sulu) filed PDFE in the towns of
Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao before COMELEC 2nd division.
Grounds for PDFE: systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes, and
machinations allegedly perpetrated by Loong and their supporters resulting
in massive disenfranchisement of voters [specific acts: voters were forced to
affix their signatures and thumbmarks, ballots filled out by poll watchers
and supporters of Loong; evidence: affidavits of poll watchers and photos
showing election irregularities]
COMELEC 2nd Divisions action on PDFE: Suspended proclamation but
lifted suspension 3 days later and ordered completion of canvass and
proclamation of winning governor.
COMELEC 1st Divisions action on PE: Ordered BoCs to suspend their
proceedings and to refrain from proclaiming any winning candidate.
Proclamation of Loong: On the same day that the 1st div issued above
Order, Loong was proclaimed the winning governor of Sulu and he assumed
office.
Petition for Annulment of Proclamation (PAP) and Election
protest: Tan filed a Petition for Annulment of the Proclamation which was
granted by COMELEC 1st Division. Jikiri filed an election protest which was also
granted by 1st division.
COMELEC en bancs ruling on the PDFE (Commissioner Sadain
dissented): dismissed all because none of the grounds relied upon by
petitioners fall under any of the three instances 1 justifying a declaration of
failure of election. Petitioners grounds (see above) are best ventilated in an
election protest. Also, evidence presented (affidavits) were self-serving.
Commissioner Sadains dissent: there was failure of elections as the voters were

allegedly not sufficiently informed about the change and transfer of polling places
(clustering of precincts) approved on the eve of the May 10, 2004 elections. [Note:
This was used by petitioners as a ground in their appeal with SC. Court said they cant
use this anymore since they failed to raise it earlier]
1 Based on evidence, a valid election was held as scheduled, there was no suspension of
the election as voting continued normally, Loong was elected by a plurality of votes as
proclaimed by the PBC

 Loongs Motion to Dismiss: Loong filed MtD against Tans PAP and Jikiris EP
on the ground that COMELEC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of EP filed
out of time.
COMELEC 1st divisions action on MtD: denied MtD ruling that the protest
was not filed out of time as there were still pending pre-proclamation
cases before it, the result of which could affect Loongs motion.
issues
1. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain electoral protests filed beyond 10
days after the proclamation of the results of an election for a given provincial
office - YES
2. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain simultaneously pre-proclamation
controversies and electoral protests - YES
3. WON COMELEC committed GAD in dismissing the consolidated PDFE despite
the evident massive disenfranchisement of the voters NO
a) WON the proclamation of Loong, albeit patently null and void, bars the
filing of the instant PDFEs - issue is moot
ratio
LOONGs petition
1. COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain electoral protest filed by Jikiri
LOONGS THEORY: Citing Sec. 250 OEC (EP shall be filed w/in 10 days after
proclamation of the election results), the period for filing election protest was
until June 3, 2004 or 10 days from his proclamation on May 24, 2004. Thus,
Jikiris EP filed on July 19 effectively deprived COMELEC of jurisdiction to
entertain protest.
COURTS RULING: Loongs theory did not take into consideration Sec. 248
OEC which provides that filing of certain petitions works to stop the running of
the reglementary period to file an election protest. EP was filed on time.
Interpretation (harmonize 2482 and 2503): Sec. 248 contemplates 2
points of reference i.e. pre- and post-proclamation.
Pre-proc - petition to suspend or stop an impending proclamation
(purpose: nip in the bud the occurrence of grab the proclamation,
prolong the protest situation)
Effect of filing: tolls 10-day period for filing EP
Post- proc - petition to annul or undo a proclamation made
Effect of filing: interrupts the running of the 10-day period
2 SECTION 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation. The
filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings.
3 SEC. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city
official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.

 In other words, in a Sec. 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day

period did not start to run at all, the filing of a Sec. 250 election contest
after the 10th day from proclamation is not late. On the other hand, in a
Sec. 248 petition to annul, the party seeking annulment must file the
petition before the expiration of the 10-day period.
As applied: Loongs arguments on the belated filing of the
respondents EP may merit consideration had the petitions
against him been only for the annulment of his May 24,
2004 proclamation. However, the numerous election-related
petitions, which were filed against petitioner Loong by the
other Sulu gubernatorial candidates, sought to suspend his
then impending proclamation which, as turned out, was
eventually made on May 24, 2004. And as events unfolded,
some of the petitions adverted to resulted in the issuance
on May 17, 2004 of an Order suspending the proclamation
of the governor-elect of Sulu. Also, COMELEC 1st division
actually annulled Loongs proclamation.
In short, EP filed on July 19 (56 days after Loongs
proclamation) was filed on time because the 10-day
reglementary period to file such protest which ordinarily
would have expired on June 3 did not start to run at all. In
fact, the pre-proclamation controversy filed by Tan was only
resolved on March 2005. Also, it did not matter that the preproc controversy was filed not by Jikiri but by Tan because
Sec. 248 does not require such.
2. Simultaneous prosecution of pre-proclamation controversies and
election protests is allowed and encouraged by court
LOONGS THEORY: an election contest should be put on hold until preproclamation controversies are concluded
COURTS RULING: Loongs argument has no legal basis.
o There is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution or
adjudication of pre-proclamation controversies and elections protests.
Allowing the simultaneous prosecution scenario may be explained by
the fact that pre-proclamation controversies and election protests
differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible in
each case and the objective each seeks to achieve.

ROQUERO v. COMELEC (10 day period tolled when pre-proclamation MR filed but
he only had 5 more days)
-

Roquero and Villano were candidates for Mayor of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan for the May 8 1995 elections

On July 18 1995 COMELEC issued an order directing the Municipal Board of

Canvassers (MBC) to reconvene, prepare the certs of canvass (COC) and
proclaim the winning candidates. Roquero was proclaimed winner with
20k votes over 18k on July 19.
- On July 24 1995, Villano tried to file a pre-proclamation MR of the
COMELECs order directing the MBC to reconvene. Such was denied. The
case reached the SC by certiorari but it was ultimately denied by the highest
tribunal, even on MR. Said decision reached Villano on May 7 1996.
-

Thats why Villano filed an election protest before the RTC of Malolos
on May 17 1996. Before summons could be served on Roquero, Villano
filed a supplemental petition enumerating the 104 precincts of San Jose Del
Monte he was contesting.
DEFENSE - Roquero filed a MTD on July 15 1996 on the ground that the
election protest did not allege facts constituting a cause of action for an
election protest and that the election protest was filed beyond the 10day reglementary period for filing the same
August 29 1996, Judge Barrientos denied the MtD. Judge then ordered the
parties to name their representatives as members of the Committee on
Revision which was set to start its revision and recount of ballots.
Thats why Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition re the RTC
Case with COMELEC. Comelec just set aside Roqueros petition. Anent the
filing of the protest before the reglementary period, the COMELEC just cited
the common civil law rule that for computation of the period, the 1 st day
shall be excluded and the last day included. Since Villano received the SC
decision (anent his 1st complaint with the COMELEC) on May 7, then his
election protest on May 17 was filed on time.

issue
Whether the election protest was filed by Villano on time? YES OR NO PARA
KITA AGAD.
Ratio
- The SC held that the COMELEC failed to consider the running of the period to
file an election protest from the date of proclamation of Roquero. The
COMELEC counted the period from the time VIllano received the decision of
the SC.
- Section 251 of the OEC provides that the election protest contesting the
election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper RTC by any
candidate who has filed his own CoC and has been voted for the same office,
within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election
- When Villano filed a pre-proclamation MR before the COMELEC after
Roqueros proclamation, he only had 5 days left in the 10-day reglementary
period. BUT, according to Section 248 of the OEC:

Section 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or suspend the

proclamation The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or
suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of
the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto
proceedings
It thus appears that during said time, Villanos 5 day deadline was
suspended. BUT, since he only filed the election protest 10 days (not 5) from
the receipt of the SCs decision denying his pre-proclamation motion, he is
deemed to have belatedly filed the same. The rule prescribing the ten-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of a protest beyond the
period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest.
Such is a strict procedure that must be followed. In Lim v COMELEC, the
court reiterated that a counterprotest must also be filed within the period,
otherwise the court acquires no jurisdiction.
Minor Issue
o Roquero was also trying to argue that upon receipt of COMELECs 1st
decision denying VIllanos pre-proclamation MR, the 5 day period
should have begun to run again
o SC said that the running of the reglementary period to file an election
protest is tolled by a partys elevation the SC of a COMELEC decision of
a pre-proclamation case. The appeal by certiorari to the SC is part of
an entire proceeding. The case is not terminated until the SC has
rendered judgment.

DAGLOC v. COMELEC
Salambai Ambolodto and Sukarno Samad were mayoralty candidates in the
May 11, 1998 election in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Following the casting of
votes, Samad was declared the mayor and he, along with Salipongan Dagloc
(candidate for Vice-Mayor), was proclaimed on May 14, 1998.

On May 23, 1998, Ambolodto filed a petition to declare a failure of

election and/or annul the election results in their locality before the
COMELEC.
Subsequently, On June 19, 1998, she filed an election protest ex
abundanti cautela with the RTC. She would eventually withdraw her initial
petition before the COMELEC in order to focus on her election protest with the
RTC.

DEFENSE - In response to the election filed against him, Samad sought to have
it dismissed on the ground that it was filed more than 10 days from the date
of proclamation on May 14, 1998. According to him, unless suspended by the
filing of a case concerning a pre-proclamation controversy, a losing candidate has
just 10 days after proclamation to file an election protest. As applied, he was
proclaimed on May 14, 1998 while the election contest was lodged only on June
19, 1998.
RTC = denied Samads motion to dismiss; following this ruling and pending the
appeal before the COMELEC, Samad passed away and Dagloc, as vice mayor,
succeeded him as mayor and was substituted in Samads place in the case at bar.
COMELEC = The 10 day period was indeed suspended by the first case. While the
petition filed by Samad was denominated as petition to declare a failure of
election and/or to annul the election results in their locality, the case was actually
a petition for annulment of proclamation which, under 248 of the Omnibus
Election Code, suspended the running of the period for filing an election
protest.
Primary arguments
Petitioner: COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
filing of the petition to declare a failure of election and/or annul the election
results suspended the running of the 10-day period for filing an election contest
Respondent: Sec. 248 of the Election Code is not limited to the filing of a

pre-proclamation controversy but includes the filing of a petition to declare

a failure of election among the causes that will suspend the running of the
10-day period for the filing of election contests.
issue
WON the election contest filed by Ambolodto was timely filed NO
ratio
First, the Court discussed the rationale behind Sec. 248 of the Election

Code4:
unless the proclamation of a winning candidate is suspended or, if it has been
held, set aside, the policy behind the allowance of pre-proclamation controversies,
i.e., to prevent losing candidates from grabbing the proclamation and delaying the
resolution of the electoral contest, will be defeated The suspension of the 10day statutory period for the filing of an election protest until such time as the
Commission on Elections has finally decided the pending pre-proclamation
controversy is but logical and just, since if the protestant prevails in the pre4 The filing with the Commission [on Elections] of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend
the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

proclamation controversy, there would be no further need for him to file a regular
election protest.
This line of reasoning has been upheld by and adhered to by numerous rulings of
the Court.
Second, the Court made it clear that the suspension of the 10-day period for
filing election controversies is not limited to the application of Sec. 248. There are
two other causes for the suspension of such period under RA 6646 (Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987), namely:
(1) Under 6 of the statute, the COMELEC may, upon motion of the complainant in
an action for disqualification, suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate if the evidence of his guilt is strong, and
(2) Under 7 thereof, the COMELEC may likewise suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate if there is ground for denying or canceling his certificate
of candidacy.
According to the Court, these two sections contemplate situations that are in the
nature of pre-proclamation controversies. Being of the same nature as preproclamation cases, they ought to have the same effect as regards the suspention
of the 10-day period for filing election protests.
Third, the petitioner was correct in argument that a petition that seeks to
declare a failure of election and/or annul the election results. As previously held in
Matamalam vs. COMELEC an action for a declaration of the failure of
election is not in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy.
Pre-proclamation Cases
The COMELEC is restrictedto an
examination of the election returns on
their face and is without jurisdiction to
go beyond or behind them and
investigate election irregularities

Petitions to Declare a Failure of

Election
The COMELEC is duty bound to
investigate
allegations
of
fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous
causes
The COMELEC may conduct technical
examination of election documents and
compare and analyze voters signatures
and fingerprints in order to determine
whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean

Not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the

running of the period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto .

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the filing by private respondent of a

petition for declaration of failure of election (SPA No. 98-356) did not suspend the
running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest or quo
warranto proceedings. The period for private respondent to do so expired on May
24, 1998, 10 days from the proclamation of Sukarno Samad and petitioner as
mayor and vice-mayor, respectively.
ROCES v. HRET
Roces and Ang Ping were congressional cadidates for the 3rd district of
Manila in the 2004 elections. Some guy named Alejandro Gomez, a registered
voter, challenged Ang Ping's candidacy before the COMELEC by petition to deny
due course to COC under Sec. 78. Ground: Ang Ping not a natural-born
citizen.
Before the scheduled promulgation of the decision of the COMELEC, Ang Ping
withdrew his COC. The next day, the NPC manifested to substitute Ang Ping
with his wife Zenaida (*cough* DUTERTE *cough*), and also sought to have the
petition thrown out.
Despite all of this, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition to
deny due course of CoC. The motion to dismiss filed by Ang Ping was denied
because it was filed after the promulgation of the resolution. While all this was
happenning, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution 6283 declaring moot the
affidavit of withdrawal and the substitution. The Ang Pings had no
knowledge of these developments. When they found out, they immediately filed a
Rule 65 petition challenging the COMELEC resolutions.
On Election Day, the Manila City Board of Canvassers resolved not to count the
Ang Ping votes by virtue of Resolution 6283 and proclaimed Roces as the
winner despite counting only 6,347 votes/150,387 registered voters.
Ang Ping appealed this board resolution and sought to annul the
proclamation, and also filed an election protest ad cautelam with the
HRET. When the SC dismissed the Rule 65 petition, they converted the HRET
proceedings to a regular protest.
DEFENSE - Roces filed a petition to dismiss on the ground that Mrs. Zenaida
Ang Ping had no personality to file the election protest. HRET denied the
motion as the substitution of Mrs. Ang Ping was legally permissible.
issue
Whether the HRET committed GAD when it denied Roces' motion to dismiss. NO.
ratio

The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives and has the power
to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it.
It has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own
jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all
questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine
the question of jurisdiction.
One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties
must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive
jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the
election of Roces.
The HRET did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a
proper party to contest the election of Roces.
PROMULGATION is important because it determines when the
reglementary period begins to toll.Under COMELEC rules, the procedure of
promulgation of a decision or resolution is as follows:
SECTION 5. Promulgation. The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the
Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
For mysterious reasons, the COMELEC First Division of Garci did not promulgate
the resolution on May 5, 2004 in accordance with its notice of promulgation. In
violation of the abovecited rule, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by
Commissioner Borra to a date to be set by the COMELEC First Division, the
resolution was deemed promulgated by the COMELEC on April 30, 2004.
To make matters worse, the COMELEC en banc usurped the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC First Division when it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 which
ordered the deletion of Mr. Ang Pings name from the Certified List of Candidates
and denied the spouses Ang Pings motions to withdraw and substitute despite the
fact that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not
yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a motion for reconsideration
of the preceding order. The COMELEC en banc may not take cognizance motu
proprio of a case pending in a division.
The COMELECs resolutions are void ab initio for violating Mrs. Ang
Pings constitutional right to due process.

GATCHALIAN v. CA
Background of election: Petitioner Gatchalian and Respondent Aruelo were
candidates for Vice Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 11, 1992 elections.
May 13 Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Gatchalian the winner by a
margin of 4 votes.
Aruelo then filed 2 petitions:
May 22 (first case) filed a petition to annul the proclamation with COMELEC
June 2 (second case) filed an election protest with the RTC of Bulacan. In said
election protest, Aruelo alleged that the protest was filed ex abundante cautela5,
there being a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. He also filed
for damages in amount of P100k. On the same date, Aruelo paid the amount of
P610.00 as filing fees. (filing fees is relevant for the 2nd issue in this case)
June 15 Instead of filing an Answer, Gatchalian filed a MTD on the following
grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending preproclamation case before the COMELEC, and hence the protest was premature;
and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit upon filing
of the petition.
COMELEC ruling on Aruelos first case (June 17) Denied Aruelos petition for
annulment of proclamation.
RTC ruling on Gatchalians MTD (July 10) Denied MTD and ordered
Gatchalian to file Answer within 5 days. >>> MR also denied >>> He thus filed
certiorari to CA alleging GAD on part of RTC.
CA ruled that RTC not in GAD in denying the MTD. Also, the election protest
before the RTC was timely filed. >>>> Hence this current case.
issue
WoN the election protest before the RTC was filed on time. YES.
WoN proper filing fees were paid. NO.
ratio
1) Aruelos election protest before the RTC was filed on time.

5 Tranquil notes ex abundante cautela filed w/ caution --- used by lawyers when they file an answer to avoid being declared in
default even when in reality they dont want to file such answer.

ARGUMENT: Gatchalian claims that the election protest was filed only on June 2,
1992 or nineteen days after his proclamation on May 13, 1992 as Vice Mayor
in violation of Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SC: Nope. Section 3, Rule 35 provides as follows: Period to file petition. The
petition shall be filed within ten (10) days following the date of
proclamation of the results of the election.
Aruelo had ten days from May 13, 1992 to file an election protest. However,
in this case, instead of filing an election protest, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a
pre-proclamation case (first case) against Gatchalian on May 22, 1992,
or nine days after May 13, 1992.
The filing of the pre-proclamation case suspended the running of the period
within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings (B.P. Blg. 881,
Sec. 248). Aruelo received the COMELEC resolution denying his pre-proclamation
petition on June 22, 1992.
Hence, Aruelo had only one day left after June 22, 1992 within which to file
an election protest. However, it will be noted that Aruelo filed on June 2, 1992
with the trial court an election protest ex abundante cautela, which was within
such period.
2) However, Aruelo did not pay proper filing fees.
ARGUMENT: Court of Appeals should have dismissed the election protest for
failure of Aruelo to pay the filing fee of P300.00 as required by Rule 35, Section 9
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SC: Yup. Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Filing fee. No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention shall be
given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three
hundred pesos (P300.00) for each interest.
Each interest shall further pay the legal research fee as required by law.
If a claim for damages and attorney's fees are set forth in a protest, counterprotest or protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee shall be paid in
accordance with the schedule provided for in the Rules of Court in the
Philippines.
APPLIED: Aruelo, upon filing the election protest with the trial court on June 2,
1992, paid the following amounts:
O.R. No. Amount
2084419-R
8760129S
1,407,317.00

P450.00

150.00
10.00

Docket Fee-Judiciary
Development Fund
General Fund
Legal Research

1,406,063.00
2,084,420.00

5.60
46.00

Summons Fee
Summons Fee

From the above itemization, it is clear that Aruelo failed to pay the
filing fee of P300.00 for the election protest prescribed by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
The amount of P600.00, consisting of P450.00 (Judiciary Development Fund)
and P150.00 (General Fund), refers to the docket fee for Aruelo's claim of
attorney' s fees required under Rule 141 Sec. 7(a) of the RoC
It is the payment of the filing fee that vests jurisdiction of the court
over the election protest, not the payment of the docket fees for the claim of
damages and attorney's fees. For failure to pay the filing fee prescribed under
Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the election protest must
be dismissed.
CONCLUSION CA reversed. Election protest DISMISSED.
PAHILAN v. TABALBA
Pahilan and Tabalba were candidates for mayor of Guinsiliban Camiguin
(May 1192 elections). Tabalba was proclaimed by the MBoC on May 13,
1992 (Tabalba 1087 votes; Pahilan 806 votes).
Pahilan filed an election protest with RTC Mambajao, Camiguin thru registered
mail on May 2392 with P200 docket fees. He was informed that the proper
fees were P620 and that he needed to pay P420 more so that the case
would be docketed. He complied on June 1692.
DEFENSE - Tabalba filed his answer with counterclaim, alleging that the court
lacked jurisdiction cos the election protest was filed beyond the 10-day
period provided by law (A/N: Remember, payment of docket fees is necessary
for the court to acquire jurisdiction). Pahilan then moved to inhibit the judge
(whos an alleged supporter of a group against his candidacy).
RTC: denied motion for inhibition and dismissed the election protest for nonpayment on time of the required fees for filing an intiatory pleading. Pahilan
then filed a verified appeal brief with Comelec.
Comelec: dismissed the appeal for failure to appeal within the prescribed period
(RTC said that Pahilan hadnt filed a notice of appeal with it when Comelec
directed it to transmit the records of the case). MR denied.
issue

(1) WoN the Comelec validly dismissed the Verified Appeal despite it containing
what a Notice of Appeal would (and added to it even) and despite the fact that the
RTC and adverse counsel were served copies of the same - NO
(2) WoN RTC validly dismissed the petition of protest for non-payment on time of
the required fee - NO
ratio
(1) The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief
under the circs of this case.
How does one appeal anyway?
Comelec Rules of Procedure Rule 22 requires that a notice of appeal be filed
within 5 days from the promulgation of the decision of the court (Sec 3). Within 15
days from filing, the Clerk of Court shall transmit the complete records to the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Dept of Comelec (Sec 4). Once the records are
received, appellant is given 30 days from receipt of notice to file 10 copies of his
brief. Appellee is given 30 days as well from the receipt of appellants brief (Sec
5).
What are the grounds for dismissal of an appeal (by motion/motu proprio)?
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee;
(b) Failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief within the time provided by
these rules;
(c) Want of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief; and
(d) Failure to file notice of appeal within the prescribed period.
Here: Pahilan got a copy of the TC order dismissing his election protest on Oct
1292. He filed a verified brief within the 5-day period (instead of a NoA)
with Comelec and served copies to the RTC and adverse counsel on the same date
(Oct 1792).
FIRST: Where a record on appeals required under the RoC, its been held that the
filing or presentation and approval of the record on appeal on time necessarily
implies/involves the filing of a NoA cos the act of perfecting an appeals more
expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of a mere notice to do so.
Since courts are lenient in the interpretation of rules respecting ordinary civ
actions, it should be more so wrt election cases.
An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public
interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the
prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to
keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the
winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing

aside technicalities of procedure with protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.
SECOND: its been shown and not denied that the RTC and Tabalbas counsel were furnished
with copies of the appeal brief through registered mail On Oct 17 (within the appeal period). Its
safe to assume that the mail was received in the regular course and was therefore deemed filed
with the TC as of the date of mailing.
THIRD: applying suppletorily the RoC provisions (R41 S4 which provides for the contents of a
NoA), it can be seen that the verified brief contained the contents of a NoA (ie. parties, fact of
appeal, fact of dismissal of the election contest).

(2) The RTC DID NOT validly dismiss the petition of protest for nonpayment on time of the required fee.
TC relied on rulings of civil cases (not election cases!) in dismissing the election
protest for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees. It also relied on
Malimit v Degamo (a quo warranto case) which is NOT applicable here
because there, the docket fee wasnt attached to the petition when it was mailed
to the Court and was only paid beyond the reglementary period.
Here: the Clerk acknowledged the receipt of the P200 docket fee and even asked
for the balance of the correct fee. There was an honest effort on Pahilans part
to pay the full amount of docket fees so Ct wont insist on a stringent
application of the rules.
Additionally, the cases cited by the RTC are ordinary civil actions which
election cases are not. The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not
necessarily serve the purpose of election cases since ordinary actions
generally involved private interests while election cases are invested
with public interest. In ordinary civil actions, the payment of docket fees is
mandatory for the court to acquire jurisdiction. This is to prevent the defrauding of
the govt.
In the present case, and in election cases in general, it is not the amount of
damages, if any, that is sought to be recovered which vests in the courts
the jurisdiction to try the same. Rather, it is the nature of the action
which is determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the amount of
damages claimed, the action will still have to be filed with the Regional Trial Court
(and will have a set docket fee unlike in civ cases where the docket fee s
based on the amount of damages sought).
ENOJAS v. GACOTT
Complainant Enojas was a candidate for mayor of the Municipality of
Roxas, Palawan in the May 8, 1995 local elections.

 According to the canvass of election returns, complainant obtained (7,329)

votes, lower by fortyeight votes than the (7,377) votes of Jose R. Rodriguez,
who was proclaimed winner on May 26, 1995.
Enojas filed an election protest before RTC 49 in Puerto Princesa City
presided over by Judge Panfilo S. Salva. Alleging massive fraud and
irregularities, complainant sought revision of ballots in 102 precincts of Roxas,
Palawan.
o After completing the revision of (39) contested ballot boxes, Judge Salva
granted protestant's motion to terminate the revision, ordered the
stenographer and revision committee to submit their revision reports
within 30 days2 and set the case for hearing.
o Judge Salva inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground
that the protestee, Jose R. Rodriguez, is related by consanguinity
to his wife. In due time, the case was then reraffled to Branch 47
presided over by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.
Judge Gacott, relying on the case of Manchester et al. vs. Court of
Appeals et. al., issued the following Order dismissing the election case, to wit:

o This Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide this case due to
the deliberate nonpayment by the protestant of the required
or correct fee.

Nature of the case: Administrative Complaint charging Judge Eustaquio Z.

Gacott, Jr. with serious misconduct, inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law.
issue
WON the judge is guilty of the above charges? YES.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of (P15,000.00) Pesos, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be punished more severely.
ratio
Respondent JUDGEs arguments:
The complaint is an exaggeration concocted by Atty. Constante P. Pimentel,
lawyer of the protestant, who was scolded and reprimanded by him
(respondent judge) who got irked at his (Pimentel) grandstanding during court
sessions.
There is no law, rule or regulation requiring him or any other judge, for that
matter, to be perfect in all his orders, judgments or decisions, for he is only a
human being susceptible to innocent errors.
The complainant attempted to bribe him (P200,000.00) Pesos, through a
certain Herbert Bavaria, a "kumpare" of his. Respondent judge claims that the
attempted bribe which he rejected was for a favorable ruling in the same
election protest. As his reaction to the said rebuff, complainant resorted to the
institution of the present administrative case; respondent judge maintained.

 There should be no more reason for the institution of the case as the
same administrative complaint had been the subject of complainant's
Appeal by Certiorari to the Commission on Elections, which gave due
course thereto and decided the same for complainant.
o When the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, he
voluntarily inhibited himself therefrom and subject electoral protest was
reraffled to Branch 50 presided over by Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez, who
decided said election protest for the complainant, who then took his
oath of office as municipal mayor of Roxas, Palawan. (basically,
complainant already got a favorable judgment)
SC:
Withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by the
complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its
dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the
complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be
detestable.
Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide
the complainant against the respondent.
On the question of propriety of dismissal by respondent judge of
subject election case
o The respondent judge ignored applicable pronouncements by this
Court on the matter of payment of docketing fees. Respondent judge
based the assailed dismissal of subject election protest on the ruling in
Manchester Development corporation et al. vs. Court of Appeals6
He erroneously cited and placed reliance on the Manchester case in
dismissing the said election protest, disregarding pronouncements by
the court enjoining the application of such ruling in election
cases.
o In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Asuncion, et al, the ruling in
Manchester was modified in that it is not only the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading but also the payment of the prescribed
docketing fee, that vest jurisdiction in a trial court over the subject matter
and/or nature of the action.
However, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docketing fee, the court may
allow payment of such fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond prescriptive or reglementary period.
o Be that as it may, the Court has categorically said that the doctrine
enunciated in Manchester and in later cases cannot be made to
apply in election cases (Pahilan vs. Tabala et al)
In election cases in general, it is not the amount of damages, if any, that is
sought to be recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction to try the
6 That a case is deemed commenced only upon the payment of the docketing fee, and the court
acquires jurisdiction thereover only upon payment of the prescribed docketing fee

same. Rather, it is the nature of the action which is determinative of

jurisdiction.
o Regardless of the amount of damages claimed, the action will still have to be
filed with the Regional Trial Court. In such a case, the evil sought to be
avoided in Manchester and like cases will never arise.
Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although
the same acts may be erroneous.
However, the charge against the respondent judge is not a mere error of
judgment but utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance
of the law.
o The Pahilan case was decided long before December 19, 1995, when the
respondent judge decided the election protest in question.
o He duty bound to adhere to, and apply, the same, and he cannot feign
ignorance thereof because the Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to be an
embodiment of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence.
The conclusion arrived at by him that there was deliberate nonpayment of the
correct docketing fees was belied by the fact that Judge Salva had already
issued an order for the release of the P30,000.00 deposit of complainant to be
paid to the revisors and stenographer. In the same order, the balance of
P15,000.00 was to be refunded to the protestant.
o The amount totaling P2,572.90 could have been deducted easily from the
refundable amount
GARCIA v. HRET
May 29, 1998: w/in the prescribed 10 day period from Angpings proclamation as
duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners filed a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET against Congressman Angping.
Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the
House of Representatives (HoR), claiming that the latter was not a naturalborn citizen and prayed that Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold
office as member of the HoR and for the candidate who received the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the
winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid required P5,000 filing fee.
HRET: issued resolution dismissing petition for quo warranto for failure to pay
P5,000 cash deposit as required by its rules.
June 26, 1998: paid P5,000 after receiving copy of resolution and attached
receipt in MR.
HRET: MR denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a
P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.
issue

WON this Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari? YES.
WON a petition for quo warranto before the HRET may be summarily dismissed for
failure to pay cash deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified payment
thereof? YES.
ratio
The Supreme Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction upon
showing of grave abuse of discretion (GAD) on the part of HRET, despite
Constitutional provision that HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members.
While the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court
may do so, however, but only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, upon a determination that the Tribunals decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with GAD (Robles v. HRET).
The Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process (Morrero v.
Bocar).
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution expanded judicial power to include the
determination of whether or not there has been a GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
1998 Rules of the HRET:
Rule 32: provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo
warranto proceedings should make a P5,000 cash deposit with the
Tribunal.
Rule 21: governs Summary Dismissal of Election Contests.
(3) the filing fee is not paid within the period provided for filing the protest or
petition for quo warranto;
(4) in case of protests where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit or the
first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest;
Rule 33: Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. If a party fails to make the
cash deposits or additional deposits herein provided within the prescribed time
limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest, counter-protest, or petition
for quo warranto, or take such action as it may deem equitable under the
circumstances.
Applied: Petitioners did not initially pay the required cash deposit; but after their
petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for such non-payment, petitioners
rectified their inadvertence and paid the P5,000 required cash deposit, at the
same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal.
Argument: Unlike in the case of election protests, no period is provided for to
make the cash deposit in the case of petitions for quo warranto.
Answer: The Court differentiated Quo Warranto and Protest cash deposits:
Quo Warranto
Election Protest / Counter-Protest

Cash deposit required is fixed, i.e.,

P5,000.00. It does not vary nor can it be
varied; it is required to be paid together
with the filing fee at the time the
petition is filed.

The amount of the required cash

deposit is yet to be determined since it
has to be based on the number of ballot
boxes and other election documents
and paraphernalia to be collected and
brought to the tribunal. Therefore,
depending on the amount that may be
required for the collection of the ballot
boxes and other election documents
and paraphernalia, the parties are given
specified periods within which to pay.
Thus, when the required amount of cash
deposits does not exceed P75,000, the
party concerned must make the deposit
within 10 days after the filing of the
protest or counter-protest; otherwise,
when it exceeds P75,000 he is required
to make a partial deposit of at least
P75,000 likewise within 10 days and the
balance payable in installments as may
be determined by the Tribunal.

Petition for quo warranto attacks the eligibility of Congressman Angping. In view
of the delicate nature and importance of charge, observance of HRET rules of
procedure must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective of speedy
and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate. Litigants and their
lawyers are duty bound to know and are expected to comply with procedural
requirements. Therefore, HRET did not commit GAD in applying its rules
strictly and dismissing petition for quo warranto