Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

April 29, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90
percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the
so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in
Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is
that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same
means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own
forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the
maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field-in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all
about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know
how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other
than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by
the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In
doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil
Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as
the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the

phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban
the fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property
that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He
further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by
Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the

name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified
that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.
This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was
based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had
already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession
prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the
period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on
oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the
correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that
in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd.
For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites
the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it
would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been
"converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite
extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG
notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from
time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according
to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies
the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended
by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
"agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG
submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of
"lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier."
The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the
registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes
the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that
one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed
by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the
pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to
assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that
has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his
title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of
the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it
is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act
limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently
reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this
Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may
be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to
seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the
applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have
been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as
alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly
or remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in
Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and
reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of
the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn

Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again
stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified
as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for
over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value
with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1),
since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto
provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the
latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two
years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the
ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over
a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited
Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to
be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map
2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the
land subject of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was
the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject
of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a
rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction
the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirtyfive (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the
application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision
reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even
then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[ 30 ] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[31 ] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on
a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have
based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively
establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for
application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides
legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands
that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property
through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
years,32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is
whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of
the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of

the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to
1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that
there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38similar to our earlier finding
with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation
the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to
Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing
laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the
Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case
of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion
and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial

property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable
and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands.
Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all
lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to
be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution
and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is
the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act
No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes
the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law
mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President
is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law
itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly
makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the
former American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or
"the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained

property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that
such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly
enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of
such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before
the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under
Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way
that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is
no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended
under the aegis of theProperty Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The
period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the
latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to
Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code
when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
Section 14(1).
IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of
the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of
the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such
a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is
just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the
State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the
completion of the required period of possession." 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed
that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation,
succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure
converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the
Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be

remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a
mode of confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,
that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And

only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can
date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality

on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of
said properties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the
most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive
idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to
set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such
lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble.
This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood
are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24440

March 28, 1968

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,defendants-appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39
was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act
also provided that
Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed
thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties were
being utilized as follows
No. of Lots

Use
1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque

23 ................................................ vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. 3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two
(2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old
province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the
obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and
obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner proindiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price
thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13,
1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as
of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an
amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the
quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first
quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05 due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that
All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed for emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039,
P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.

This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint
entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of
Finance and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for.
After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment was
rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039
unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties,
consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates of title
(Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering
defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof
to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25%
thereof every quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant
Secretary of Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25%
from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to
remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have
been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials
the corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels
of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49")
upon payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June
4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion
to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump
sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff
province's motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of declaratory relief filed in the
lower court on the assertion that the law had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it
coercive effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of
the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the more important and principal question of
the validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in
question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its

private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 6
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide:

1wph1.t

ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as
High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under theejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the
first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was
without jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and
in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites
in municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because, unlike
in the classification regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are
not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower
court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is
enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc. 10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for
public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other
necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from
the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only
as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for governmental
purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the
police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as
markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial

properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot
which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not
patrimonial property of a municipality.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as
capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in
its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots
considered as public property are the following:
TCT
Number
2200
2816
3281
3282
3283
3748
5406

......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

4-B
149
1224
1226
1225
434-A-1
171

......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

5564

......................................

168

......................................

5567

......................................

157 & 158 ......................................

5583

......................................

167

......................................

6181
11942
11943
11944
5557
5562
5565
5570
5571
5572
5573
5585
5586
5587

......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

(O.C.T.)
926
927
925
170
180
172-B
171-A
172-C
174
178
171-B
173
172-A

......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

Lot Number

Use
Capitol Site
School Site
Hospital Site
Hospital Site
Hospital Site
School Site
School Site
High School Playground
Trade School
High School Playground
Curuan School
Leprosarium
Leprosarium
Leprosarium
Burleigh School
Burleigh School
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh
Burleigh

We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each other and in turn
are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per records appearing herein and
in the Bureau of Lands. Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute the
appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools, and partake of the nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not
disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to
authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be

assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence,
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in
question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands,
i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province
then and its successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the
value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots are:

5577
13198
5569
5558
5559
5560
5561
5563
5566
5568
5574
5575
5576
5578
5579
5580
5581
5582
5584
5588
5589
5590
5591
5592
5593
7379

TCT Number
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

177
127-0
169
175
188
183
186
191
176
179
196
181-A
181-B
182
197
195
159-B
194
190
184
187
189
192
193
185
4147

Lot Number
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................
......................................

Use
Mydro, Magay
San Roque
Burleigh 15
Vacant
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are
truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also
registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the
domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations State vs. Province than along that of Civil Law.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service

is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties
other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code
is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles,
obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is without
merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga
Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question.
While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved. As
successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to
get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected
subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present
controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga
the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to
computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated
March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already
returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic
Act 3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been
made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed
act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited in the
complaint 17 clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly
payments from the internal revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on
reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has
been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the
registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in
lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of
P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance
remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the
sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal
Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17898

October 31, 1962

PASTOR D. AGO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF SURIGAO and GRACE PARK
ENGINEERING, INC., respondents.
Jose M. Luison for petitioner.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
The Provincial Fiscal of Surigao for respondent Sheriff of Surigao.
LABRABOR, J.:
Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26723-R
entitled "Pastor D. Ago vs. The Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, et al." which in part reads:
In this case for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it appears from the
records that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan rendered
judgment (Annex "A") in open court on January 28, 1959, basing said judgment on a
compromise agreement between the parties.
On August 15, 1959, upon petition, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated October 12, 1959 alleges that he, or his
counsel, did not receive a formal and valid notice of said decision, which motion for
reconsideration was denied by the court below in the order of November 14, 1959.
Petitioner now contends that the respondent Judge exceeded in his jurisdiction in rendering
the execution without valid and formal notice of the decision.
A compromise agreement is binding between the parties and becomes the law between
them. (Gonzales vs. Gonzales G.R. No. L-1254, May 21, 1948, 81 Phil. 38; Martin vs. Martin,
G.R. No. L-12439, May 22, 1959) .
It is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a judgment based on a compromise agreement is
not appealable and is immediately executory, unless a motion is filed on the ground fraud,
mistake or duress. (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Lapena vs. Morfe, G.R. No. L10089, July 31, 1957)
Petitioner's claim that he was not notified or served notice of the decision is untenable. The
judgment on the compromise agreement rendered by the court below dated January 28,
1959, was given in open court. This alone is a substantial compliance as to notice. (De los
Reyes vs. Ugarte, supra)
IN VIEW THEREOF, we believe that the lower court did not exceed nor abuse its jurisdiction
in ordering the execution of the judgment. The petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore dissolved, with costs against the petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows: In 1957, petitioner Pastor D. Ago bought
sawmill machineries and equipments from respondent Grace Park Engineer domineering, Inc.,
executing a chattel mortgage over said machineries and equipments to secure the payment of
balance of the price remaining unpaid of P32,000.00, which petitioner agreed to pay on installment
basis.
Petitioner Ago defaulted in his payment and so, in 1958 respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. To enjoin said foreclosure,
petitioner herein instituted Special Civil Case No. 53 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The
parties to the case arrived at a compromise agreement and submitted the same in court in writing,
signed by Pastor D. Ago and the Grace Park Engineering, Inc. The Hon. Montano A. Ortiz, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, then presiding, dictated a decision in open court on January
28, 1959.
Petitioner continued to default in his payments as provided in the judgment by compromise, so
Grace Park Engineering, Inc. filed with the lower court a motion for execution, which was granted by
the court on August 15, 1959. A writ of execution, dated September 23, 1959, later followed.
The herein respondent, Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, acting upon the writ of execution issued by the
lower court, levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill machineries and equipments in
question. These machineries and equipments had been taken to and installed in a sawmill building
located in Lianga, Surigao del Sur, and owned by the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc., to whom,
petitioner alleges, he had sold them on February 16, 1959 (a date after the decision of the lower
court but before levy by the Sheriff).
Having been advised by the sheriff that the public auction sale was set for December 4, 1959,
petitioner, on December 1, 1959, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals, alleging that a copy of the aforementioned judgment
given in open court on January 28, 1959 was served upon counsel for petitioner only on September
25, 1959 (writ of execution is dated September 23, 1959); that the order and writ of execution having
been issued by the lower court before counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment, its
resultant last order that the "sheriff may now proceed with the sale of the properties levied
constituted a grave abuse of discretion and was in excess of its jurisdiction; and that the respondent
Provincial Sheriff of Surigao was acting illegally upon the allegedly void writ of execution by levying
the same upon the sawmill machineries and equipments which have become real properties of the
Golden Pacific sawmill, Inc., and is about to proceed in selling the same without prior publication of
the notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of general circulation as required by the Rules of
Court.
The Court of Appeals, on December 8, 1959, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
sheriff but it turned out that the latter had already sold at public auction the machineries in question,
on December 4, 1959, as scheduled. The respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc. was the only
bidder for P15,000.00, although the certificate sale was not yet executed. The Court of Appeals
constructed the sheriff to suspend the issuance of a certificate of sale of the said sawmill
machineries and equipment sold by him on December 4, 1959 until the final decision of the case. On
November 9, 1960 the Court of Appeals rendered the aforequoted decision.
Before this Court, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding that the rendition of
judgment on compromise in open court on January 1959 was a sufficient notice; and (2) in not
resolving the other issues raised before it, namely, (a) the legality of the public auction sale made by
the sheriff, and (b) the nature of the machineries in question, whether they are movables or
immovables.

The Court of Appeals held that as a judgment was entered by the court below in open court upon the
submission of the compromise agreement, the parties may be considered as having been notified of
said judgment and this fact constitutes due notice of said judgment. This raises the following legal
question: Is the order dictated in open court of the judgment of the court, and is the fact the petitioner
herein was present in open court was the judgment was dictated, sufficient notice thereof? The
provisions of the Rules of Court decree otherwise. Section 1 of Rule 35 describes the manner in
which judgment shall be rendered, thus:
SECTION 1. How judgment rendered. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall
be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, filed with the clerk of the court.
The court of first instance being a court of record, in order that a judgment may be considered as
rendered, must not only be in writing, signed by the judge, but it must also be filed with the clerk of
court. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court with the stenographer taking note
thereof does not, therefore, constitute a rendition of the judgment. It is the filing of the signed
decision with the clerk of court that constitutes rendition. While it is to be presumed that the
judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify
said order as the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been
put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing it is still subject to
amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the judge is actually filed
with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be
subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court.
Regarding the notice of judgment, the mere fact that a party heard the judge dictating the judgment
in open court, is not a valid notice of said judgment. If rendition thereof is constituted by the filing
with the clerk of court of a signed copy (of the judgment), it is evident that the fact that a party or an
attorney heard the order or judgment being dictated in court cannot be considered as notice of the
real judgment. No judgment can be notified to the parties unless it has previously been rendered.
The notice, therefore, that a party has of a judgment that was being dictated is of no effect because
at the time no judgment has as yet been signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.
Besides, the Rules expressly require that final orders or judgments be served personally or by
registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 27 provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. Final orders or judgments shall be served
either personally or by registered mail.
In accordance with this provision, a party is not considered as having been served with the judgment
merely because he heard the judgment dictating the said judgment in open court; it is necessary that
he be served with a copy of the signed judgment that has been filed with the clerk in order that he
may legally be considered as having been served with the judgment.
For all the foregoing, the fact that the petitioner herein heard the trial judge dictating the judgment in
open court, is not sufficient to constitute the service of judgement as required by the above-quoted
section 7 of Rule 2 the signed judgment not having been served upon the petitioner, said judgment
could not be effective upon him (petitioner) who had not received it. It follows as a consequence that
the issuance of the writ of execution null and void, having been issued before petitioner her was
served, personally or by registered mail, a copy of the decision.

The second question raised in this appeal, which has been passed upon by the Court of Appeals,
concerns the validity of the proceedings of the sheriff in selling the sawmill machineries and
equipments at public auction with a notice of the sale having been previously published.
The record shows that after petitioner herein Pastor D. Ago had purchased the sawmill machineries
and equipments he assigned the same to the Golden Pacific Sawmill, Inc. in payment of his
subscription to the shares of stock of said corporation. Thereafter the sawmill machinery and
equipments were installed in a building and permanently attached to the ground. By reason of such
installment in a building, the said sawmill machineries and equipment became real estate properties
in accordance with the provision of Art. 415 (5) of the Civil Code, thus:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements tended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
This Court in interpreting a similar question raised before it in the case of Berkenkotter vs. Cu
Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil. 683, held that the installation of the machine and equipment in the central of
the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. for use in connection with the industry carried by the company,
converted the said machinery and equipment into real estate by reason of their purpose.
Paraphrasing language of said decision we hold that by the installment of the sawmill machineries in
the building of the Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs carried on in said building,
the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building or real estate on which the same
was constructed, converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the
meaning of Article 415(5) above-quoted of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Considering that the machineries and equipments in question valued at more than P15,000.00
appear to have been sold without the necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a
newspaper, as required in Sec. 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is as follows:
SEC. 16. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of property on
execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) In case of real property, by posting a similar notice particularly describing the property for
twenty days in three public places in the municipality or city where the property is situated,
and also where the property is to be sold, and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds
four hundred pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week, for the same period, in
some newspaper published or having general circulation in the province, if there be one. If
there are newspapers published in the province in both the English and Spanish languages,
then a like publication for a like period shall be made in one newspaper published in the
English language, and in one published in the Spanish language.
the sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and
We declare that the issuance of the writ of execution in this case against the sawmill machineries

and equipments purchased by petitioner Pastor D. Ago from the Grace Park Engineering, Inc., as
well as the sale of the same by the Sheriff of Surigao, are null and void. Costs shall be against the
respondent Grace Park Engineering, Inc.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ.,concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137705

August 22, 2000

SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, petitioners,

vs.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal
or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a
proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 6, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 47332 and its February 26, 1999 Resolution 3 denying
reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1998 and Resolution
dated March 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33500 are hereby AFFIRMED. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued on June 15, 1998 is hereby LIFTED."4
In its February 18, 1998 Order,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 218)6 issued
a Writ of Seizure.7 The March 18, 1998 Resolution8 denied petitioners Motion for Special Protective
Order, praying that the deputy sheriff be enjoined "from seizing immobilized or other real properties
in (petitioners) factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their original place whatever immobilized
machineries or equipments he may have removed."9
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: 10
"On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. ("PCI Leasing" for short) filed
with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex E), with an application for a writ of
replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33500.
"On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of
replevin (Annex B) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI
Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
"On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory,
seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other machineries.

"On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order (Annex C), invoking the
power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying
for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
"This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex F), on the ground that the properties [were] still
personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
"In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They
argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further
stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the
contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical.
"On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the
remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking
the rest.
"On April 7, 1998, they went to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Agreement of the parties, the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal
property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that the "words
of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."
Observing that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced businessman who was "not unfamiliar with
the ways of the trade," it ruled that he "should have realized the import of the document he signed."
The CA further held:
"Furthermore, to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon the
case below, since the merits of the whole matter are laid down before us via a petition whose sole
purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC] in
issuing the assailed Order and Resolution. The issues raised herein are proper subjects of a fullblown trial, necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. The contract is being enforced by
one, and [its] validity is attacked by the other a matter x x x which respondent court is in the best
position to determine."
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS became real property by
virtue of immobilization.
B. Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a lease. "12

In the main, the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property
which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. As a preliminary matter, the Court will also
address briefly the procedural points raised by respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Matter:Procedural Questions
Respondent contends that the Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it was being filed under
Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It further alleges that the Petition erroneously impleaded
Judge Hilario Laqui as respondent.
There is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45. This conclusion finds support in the
very title of the Petition, which is "Petition for Review on Certiorari."13
While Judge Laqui should not have been impleaded as a respondent,14 substantial justice requires
that such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of the present Petition. In this light, the
Court deems it proper to remove, motu proprio, the name of Judge Laqui from the caption of the
present case.
Main Issue: Nature of the Subject Machinery
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the
Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Serious policy considerations, they
argue, militate against a contrary characterization.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal
property only.15 Section 3 thereof reads:
"SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an
order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be
wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody."
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows:
"ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
xxx

xxx

x x x"

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential
and principal elements in the industry."16 In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said
machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. 17
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not
proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal.18After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying
the truth of any material fact found therein.
Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio,19 the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a
personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled:
"x x x. Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet
by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could
only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so
that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise."
Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills20 also
held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a
proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract.
Pertinent portions of the Courts ruling are reproduced hereunder:
"x x x. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be
considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the
parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only
by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has
so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage."
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows: 21
"12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding
that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or
attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or
attached in any manner to what is permanent."
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as
personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed personal
property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned.22 Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith
are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. 23 In any event,
there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.
Validity of the Lease Agreement
In their Memorandum, petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not a lease. 24 Submitting
documents supposedly showing that they own the subject machines, petitioners also argue in their
Petition that the Agreement suffers from "intrinsic ambiguity which places in serious doubt the
intention of the parties and the validity of the lease agreement itself." 25 In their Reply to respondents
Comment, they further allege that the Agreement is invalid. 26
These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the
civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is effectively a
resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the trial, not in the
proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure.
Indeed, in La Tondea Distillers v. CA,27 the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that
questions involving title to the subject property questions which petitioners are now raising -should be determined in the trial. In that case, the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under
Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond. They
were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to the subject property. The Court ruled:
"In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ
of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon
therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby put at issue the
matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied, the policy
apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the
merits."28
Besides, these questions require a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence, both of
which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 or in a petition for review in
this Court under Rule 45.29
Reliance on the Lease Agreement
It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease Agreement, for nothing on
record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC
proceedings, which had ironically been instituted by respondent. Accordingly, it must be presumed
valid and binding as the law between the parties.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation30 is also instructive on this point. In that case, the Deed of
Chattel Mortgage, which characterized the subject machinery as personal property, was also
assailed because respondent had allegedly been required "to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage

which was in a blank form at the time of signing." The Court rejected the argument and relied on the
Deed, ruling as follows:
"x x x. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract
void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant
to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code, by a proper action in court. There is nothing on record to show
that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the
same. x x x"
Alleged Injustice Committed on the Part of Petitioners
Petitioners contend that "if the Court allows these machineries to be seized, then its workers would
be out of work and thrown into the streets."31 They also allege that the seizure would nullify all efforts
to rehabilitate the corporation.
Petitioners arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. As earlier discussed, law and
jurisprudence support its propriety. Verily, the above-mentioned consequences, if they come true,
should not be blamed on this Court, but on the petitioners for failing to avail themselves of the
remedy under Section 5 of Rule 60, which allows the filing of a counter-bond. The provision states:
1wphi1

"SEC. 5. Return of property. -- If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicants bond,
or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if
he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant,
require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the
applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicants affidavit for the delivery
thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as
may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy bond on the applicant."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136438

November 11, 2004

TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner,

vs.
VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO,
ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES CARINDERIA, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883, affirming in toto the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 259, dated November 14, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-044.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are:
Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro Manila with
an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453
issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.

Petitioners lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to
the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the
adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at
several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del
Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In
November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corporation and Marites
Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square
meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name
as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City.
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Paraaque City, a complaint for accion publiciana
against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He alleged inter alia that respondents
structures on the government land closed his "right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and
encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations, claiming that they have
been issued licenses and permits by Paraaque City to construct their buildings on the area; and
that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it belongs to the government.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the defendants to have a better right of possession over the subject land
except the portion thereof covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 of the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the portion of the subject premises described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74430 and gives its possession to plaintiff; and
3. Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiff against the defendants, and
likewise dismissing the claim for attorneys fees of the latter against the former.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."3
The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in
question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in actual possession of the
area. According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of his "right of way" as he could use the
Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the highway.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision in
toto, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the judgment hereby appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED."4
In this petition, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignments of error:
"I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS CONTAINED A
CONCLUSION WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE SAME
WAS BASED.
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE ONLY ISSUE IN
THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS ACQUIRED A
RIGHT OF WAY OVER THE LAND OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS BETWEEN HIS
PROPERTY AND THE NINOY AQUINO AVENUE.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA
IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT CARRY POSSESSION OVER
THE SAME.
V
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS
THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LAND BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES." 5
In their comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that petitioners
action for accion publiciana is not the proper remedy in asserting his "right of way" on a lot owned by
the government.
Here, petitioner claims that respondents, by constructing their buildings on the lot in question, have
deprived him of his "right of way" and his right of possession over a considerable portion of the same
lot, which portion is covered by his T.C.T. No. 74430 he acquired by means of exchange of real
property.
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioners alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or
property of public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
follows:
"ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite
public."6 Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as
passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or
leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription
against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any
voluntary easement.7
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it
can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its
use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot
appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from
Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession."
Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents have better
right of possession over the subject lot.
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants buildings were constructed
on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in petitioners name. Being its owner,
he is entitled to its possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that
neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where the
stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152115

January 26, 2005

NIMFA USERO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR, respondents.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 155055

January 26, 2005

LUTGARDA R. SAMELA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 152115, filed by Nimfa Usero, assails the September
19, 2001 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 64718. The second petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 155055, filed by Lutgarda R. Samela, assails the January 11, 2002 decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP NO. 64181.
The undisputed facts follow.
Petitioners Lutgarda R. Samela and Nimfa Usero are the owners respectively of lots 1 and 2, Block
5, Golden Acres Subdivision, Barrio Almanza, Las Pias City.

Private respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land at no. 18 Anahaw
St., Pilar Village, Las Pias City, behind the lots of petitioners Samela and Usero.
Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water
filled with floating water lilies; abutting and perpendicular to the lot of petitioner Samela, the lot of the
Polinars and the low-level strip of land is the perimeter wall of Pilar Village Subdivision.
Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of land rises and the
strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of respondent Polinars.
Frustrated by their predicament, private respondent spouses, on July 30, 1998, erected a concrete
wall on the bank of the low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-rapped the
soil on that portion of the strip of land.
Claiming ownership of the subject strip of land, petitioners Samela and Usero demanded that the
spouses Apolinar stop their construction but the spouses paid no heed, believing the strip to be part
of a creek. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, the Polinars offered to pay for the land being
claimed by petitioners Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences.
On November 9, 1998, petitioners filed separate complaints for forcible entry against the Polinars at
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City. The case filed by petitioner Samela was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5242, while that of petitioner Usero was docketed as Civil Case No. 5243.
In Civil Case No. 5242, petitioner Samela adduced in evidence a copy of her Transfer Certificate of
Title, plan of consolidation, subdivision survey, the tax declaration in her name, and affidavits of
petitioner Usero and a certain Justino Gamela whose property was located beside the perimeter wall
of Pilar Village.
The spouses Polinar, on the other hand, presented in evidence their own TCT; a barangay
certification as to the existence of the creek; a certification from the district engineer that the western
portion of Pilar Village is bound by a tributary of Talon Creek throughout its entire length; boundary
and index map of Pilar Village showing that the village is surrounded by a creek and that the Polinar
property is situated at the edge of said creek; and pictures of the subject strip of land filled with water
lilies.
On March 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Samela:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering the defendants to vacate and remove at
their expense the improvements made on the subject lot; ordering the defendants to pay the
plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the portion encroached from
the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated; and to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as
reasonable attorneys fees plus costs of suit.3
1vvphi1.nt

In a parallel development, the Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, issued an order on
February 29, 2000, directing petitioner Usero and the Polinar spouses to commission a professional
geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey and to submit the report to the trial court.

On April 24, 2000, Mariano Flotilde, a licensed geodetic engineer, conducted a relocation survey of
Useros property covered by TCT No. T- 29545. The result of the said relocation survey, as stated in
his affidavit, was as follows:
1. That I executed a relocation survey of Lot 2, Block 5, (LRC) PCS-4463 covered by TCT
No. T-29545 registered in the name of Nimfa O. Usero;
2. That according to my survey, I found out that there is no existing creek on the boundary of
the said lot;
3. That based on the relocation plan surveyed by the undersigned, attached herewith,
appearing is the encroachment on the above-mentioned lot by Spouses Herminigildo and
Cecilia Polinar with an area of FORTY THREE (43) SQUARE METERS;
4. That this affidavit was made in compliance with Court Order dated February 23, 2000 of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch LXXIX. 4
On August 25, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of petitioner Usero:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering them:
a) To vacate and remove at their expense the improvement made on the subject lot;
b) To pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the portion
encroached from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is finally vacated;
c) To pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
The Polinar spouses appealed the decisions of the two Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias, Branch 253 which heard the appeals separately.
On December 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, deciding Civil Case No. 5242, reversed the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It confirmed the existence of
the creek between the northwestern portion of the lot of petitioner Samela and the southwestern
portion of the lot of the spouses Polinar:
Finding the existence of a creek between the respective properties of the parties, plaintiff-appellee
cannot therefore lay claim of lawful ownership of that portion because the same forms part of public
dominion. Consequently, she cannot legally stop the defendants-appellants from rip-rapping the
bank of the creek to protect the latters property from soil erosion thereby avoiding danger to their
lives and damage to property.
1a\^/phi1.net

Absent a lawful claim by the plaintiff-appellee over the subject portion of that lot, defendantsappellants are not duty bound to pay the former compensation for the use of the same. As a result,
they may maintain the said improvements introduced thereon subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations and/or ordinances appurtenant thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision rendered by Branch 79 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Las Pias is REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, also reversed the finding of the
Municipal Trial Court:
From the foregoing, defendants-appellants may maintain the improvements introduced on the
subject portion of the lot subject to existing laws, rules and regulations and/or ordinances pertaining
thereto. Consequently, no compensation may be awarded in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-mentioned Decision rendered by Branch 79 of the
Las Pias City Metropolitan Trial Court is REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.
From the adverse decisions of the Regional Trial Court, petitioners filed their respective petitions for
review oncertiorari to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Samelas case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
64181 while that of petitioner Usero was docketed as CA-G.R. SP 64718.
1awphi1.nt

Both petitions failed in the CA. Thus the instant consolidated petitions.
The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the disputed strip of land, allegedly encroached
upon by the spouses Polinar, is the private property of petitioners or part of the creek and therefore
part of the public domain. Clearly this an issue which calls for a review of facts already determined
by the Court of Appeals.
The jurisdiction of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.7 This is obviously not the case here.
A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the assailed decisions are founded on sufficient
evidence. That the subject strip of land is a creek is evidenced by: (1) a barangay certification that a
creek exists in the disputed strip of land; (2) a certification from the Second Manila Engineering
District, NCR-DPWH, that the western portion of Pilar Village where the subject strip of land is
located is bounded by a tributary of Talon Creek and (3) photographs showing the abundance of
water lilies in the subject strip of land. The Court of Appeals was correct: the fact that water lilies
thrive in that strip of land can only mean that there is a permanent stream of water or creek there.

In contrast, petitioners failed to present proof sufficient to support their claim. Petitioners presented
the TCTs of their respective lots to prove that there is no creek between their properties and that of
the Polinars. However, an examination of said TCTs reveals that the descriptions thereon are
incomplete. In petitioner Samelas TCT No. T-30088, there is no boundary description relative to the
northwest portion of the property pertaining to the site of the creek. Likewise in TCT No. T-22329-A
of the spouses Polinar, the southeast portion which pertains to the site of the creek has no described
boundary. Moreover the tax declaration presented by petitioner is devoid of any entry on the "west
boundary" vis-a-vis the location of the creek. All the pieces of evidence taken together, we can only
conclude that the adjoining portion of these boundaries is in fact a creek and belongs to no one but
the state.
Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. 8 Concomitantly, Article 420 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It is
property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. 9 Being public
water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual 10 .
Accordingly, the Polinar spouses may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the
erosion of their property.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby denied. The assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 64181 and CA-G.R. SP 64718 are affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.