FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

Governmental role in reconstruction.

A post-earthquake Comparison between 1985 and 2010 in
Chile.
Introduction
The context is a study of government actions in response to catastrophic
earthquakes, particularly referring to reconstruction plans. The approach is
based on a comparison between two seismic events in Chile: the first was on
March 3rd,1985 during the dictatorship of the General Augusto Pinochet, and
the second was on February 27th, 2010 during the last week of Michelle
Bachelet's government at the beginning of Sebastin Pieras administration.
The aim is understand the role of the government as a manager of the postdisaster recovery process, focusing on the reconstruction strategies and
policies adopted, especially during the first year after the catastrophe, and
interpret which are the political implications of these plans.
This essay tries to clarify if Chilean government has a policy for post disaster,
or if the reaction is just in the hands of the current administration, which deals
with the catastrophe in their own way. Furthermore, the study of these two
cases, which occurred 25 years apart under two different governments with
similar political goals, allows for critical analysis about the readiness of the
state in order to respond effectively in case of an earthquake.
Chile is the most seismic country in the world (ECLAC , 2010) due mainly to its
location along the "ring of fire" in the Pacific Ocean, an area of intense volcanic
and earthquake activity. Every day of the year there is a seism topping 4.0 on
the Richter scale in some place within Chile. The country is located on the
boundary of the Nazca and South American tectonic plates. Consequently,
there have been 13 earthquakes since 1971 with magnitude greater than 7.0
on the Richter scale, which qualifies as mega-seismic events. This phenomenon
allows for interesting research to be conducted of the actions that the Chilean
government has implemented in order to deal with this seismic condition.
It is interesting to examine how a neoliberal country in the global south faces
this events. Since 1983, Chile uses the market to deal with the necessities of
the people, including social housing and basic infrastructure (MAYOL, A., 2012).
The state shifted from being a developer of public buildings and social housing,
to being a facilitator of projects to the private sector, detaching from its
responsibilities a guarantee of quality. This change leads to an interesting
analysis of the government role in dealing with catastrophic events. The
predominance of the market as producer of built environment was tested with
these earthquakes. The capacity to respond and particularly the role of the
government in the management of the private sector responsibility before a
national crisis like a mega seismic event, is of importance and critical to postdisaster policies.
This paper looks at this role through the scope of the two disasters and then
reflects on how the Chilean government should deal with earthquakes in the
future, in the view of preparation of fast and efficient response to catastrophes.
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FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

This paper is not looking to analyse the specificity of each decision from each
administration after the earthquakes, or criticise the technicality of the plans;
the idea is a critical perspective about the attitude assumed and strategic
actions developed by each government with similar contexts.
Facts and context about the earthquakes
The earthquake of March 3rd, 1985 had a magnitude of 7.8 Mw according to the
Seismological Service of Chile. The epicentre was located on the coast
approximately 20 km west of the town of Algarrobo. The quake lasted about 2
minutes. The regions most severely affected by the earthquake were O'higgins,
Valparaiso, and the Metropolitan area of Santiago, covering a surface of 22.500
km2. According to Consolidate Report No. 1 dated September 2009, issued by
the National Office of Emergencies (ONEMI), the death toll stands at 177. This
report states that 142,498 houses were severely damaged and 75,724
completely destroyed. The loss in infrastructure was valued at about US$1.639
millions of dollars (ONEMI, 2009).
The earthquake of February 27 th 2010 had a magnitude of 8.8 Mw according to
the United States Geological Service. The epicentre was located on the coast,
nearly 8 km to the west of Curanipe. This earthquake lasted about 160
seconds. The regions most severely affected by the earthquake were O'higgins,
Valparaiso, the Metropolitan area of Santiago, Maule, Concepcion and the
Araucana, distributed across 98.100 km2. The Situation Report No. 6 dated
March 2010, issued by the United Nation Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), put the death toll at 507 with about 370,000
houses severely damaged, many of which were completely destroyed (ECLAC ,
2010). The amount of loss in infrastructure was about US$24 billion. Both
quakes were long in time length, and with a longer frequency time of the
undulant movement, the destruction of built structures without proper design
becomes hard to prevent.
Other relevant factors are the quality of the new buildings. Many damaged
ones were built after than Directive 433 of 1966, which regulates construction
to ensure quakes resistance up to a magnitude of 9.5 Richter. In addition, the
neoliberalization of the production of infrastructure and buildings reduced the
capacity of the government to supervise and ensure the accomplishment of
that directive. This situation meant that several new buildings were not up to
code and were also damaged during both earthquakes.
The media reaction permits one to understand the impact of this events in the
life of the Chileans, particularly the central zone. In a centralized country like
Chile, if some hazard strikes Santiago, the rest of the country starts to fail. The
press notes of each event related scenarios of desolation and crisis, reflecting
on the fragility of the life in a country used to be hit by this kind of undesired
situations. In some way, that fragility expressed by the press should be
discussed with the government strength and readiness. That is the moment
where the people need their leaders to demonstrate their integrity and
strength.
In the media, Pinochet's government talked about promises of reconstruction
without an institutional framework or even a plan to support the speeches. He

FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

created
aldeas
with
temporary
slowly
made
the
disappear from the
turn back to the
the government. In
Piera's
and the way how
the
reconstruction
every day in the
problem
is
that
information
comes
sources, which have
reality of the people
were
destroyed.
appears
in
the
direct relation with
people in shelters,
confusion
and
credibility
of
the

(small
villages)
shelters
and
earthquake topic
media, in order to
calm and resume
contrast,
the
administration
they dealt with
appears
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The
much
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Therefore, what
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the life of the
producing
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undermining the
government.

Image 1: The main newspaper of Chile the day after the earthquake of 1985, in
this cover page entitled: Death and Destruction. (FORAL, W., 2010)

FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

Image 2: The newspaper of Chile 2010 entitled in: Earthquake and Tsunami put
in mourning Chile on the bicentenary year (FORAL, W., 2010)
Government reaction after the tragedy
It is true that an earthquake is a huge tragedy for a country, and ensuring the
welfare of the victims suffering effects of the tragedies is important for the
state. The institutions are obliged to manage this chaotic scenario, and must
prove how prepared they are to act.
"The reconstructions are opportunities for institutional learning" (VALENZUELA,
N., 2012). In this line the role of the government to respond efficiently to the
problems of the society faces an interesting test how to put into practice their
post-disaster strategies. Considering that Chile is the most seismic country in
the world, one would hope that the state has a pertinent action plan.
About opportunities to encourage the presence of the government with the
people, there is examples of evident contradiction. Pinochet ignored the
important of the damages caused by the seism of 1985, gave scarce help to
affected and did not stimulated research about the causes that triggered the
fail or total collapse of the structures (LAWNER, M., 2011).
The truth is that in 1985, the application of the seismic norm for building was in
the hands of the private actors, and not regulated by the government (Ley
General de Urbanismo y Construcciones, 2012). That was the cause for several
buildings built in the last 2 years to collapse during the quake. Even worse, the
government did not analyse the origin of the problem. It was a group of
scholars at the engineering Department of the Universidad de Chile who
critically and technically analysed the causes and then upgraded the Directive
433, about seismic resistance structures, from their own initiative.
Compared to the weak reaction of Pinochet in 1985, the recently elected
president Sebastian Piera, understood the situation of the earthquake of 2010

FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

as a highly important opportunity to show the capacity of his new government.
With a political team formed by several collaborators of Pinochet in the 80s, it
seems they learned from their experience in 1985. Under the promise of the
reconstruction completion by 2014, they began to create public-private
alliances to accelerate the process of temporary shelter delivery within the first
3 months after the disaster, and then the reconstruction of definitive houses
within the next 4 years.
Unexpectedly, however, the popularity of Piera decreased progressively
during his first two years of government as well as his credibility. The promise
of government excellence in its ability to finish the reconstruction in four years
(as Piera declared in public (CHARPENTIER, D., 2010)) raised the expectations of
the people, which then in turn fell into restlessness because the definitive
houses in many cases were just a promise and not delivered.
One point of comparison that reveals the way to proceed is the financial
strategy of recovery plans. The Pinochet government based the 70% of the
total invested funding of the reconstruction process on international donations
with just 12% of government contribution (ONEMI, 2009). The reconstruction
process in Piera's administration is funding 100% with government fiscal
contribution (MINISTERIO DE DESARROLLO Y PROTECCION SOCIAL, 2010).
The main difference in the financing decisions between one administration and
the other is that Pinochet did not change any law or even create specific
economic tools to deal with the reconstruction. Piera, however, changed the
tax rates on different products and activities, modified the Copper Reserved
Law to get money from the mining exploitation, and created the Reconstruction
Fund to receive donations and manage the costs of reconstruction.
Earthquake
1985

2010

Amount
USD 34.000.000
USD 50.000.000
USD 200.000.000

Origin
Fiscal
Chilean Companies
International Donations

%
12 %
18 %
70 %

USD 19.000.0000.000

Fiscal

100 %

Table 1: Funds to finance the reconstruction process. Based on ONEMI, 2009

and MINISTERIO DE DESARROLLO Y PROTECCION SOCIAL, 2010.
The aim of this essay is not to analyse the financial strategy of each
government, but these are demonstrations of completely different post-disaster
policies. They also indicate the contradicting roles in responsibility assumed by
the different governments of Pinochet and Piera. However, in both cases these
strategies were temporary.
Perhaps the widest difference between one process and the other is in the
planning of the post-disaster recovery. This topic is hard to compare because
on the one hand Piera's administration has an extensive plan of reconstruction
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FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

addressing many issues to resolve, from technical analysis of the problems to a
reformulation of the regulatory plans for each city. On the other hand,
Pinochet's administration only produced a list of priorities and aims without
even a mention about the issues of housing. This issue was in private actors
hands and the government did not got involved in it, taking distance from the
problem.
However, a common lack among the two processes of reconstruction, is that
none considered the creation of a technical body able to coordinate different
ministries in case of emergencies to replace the weak and questioned ONEMI
(National Emergency Office). There is a lack of institutional framework in Chile,
considering the number of hazards that occur each year. Therefore, it is
necessary to have an institutional mechanism of response.
Effects and consequences
With the earthquake of 1985, for first time since 1929, several new buildings
were destroyed. The state control over the building processes was abolished to
facilitate the investment of private actors in the city. Consequently, the
application of Directive 433 was just a criterion, which not all builders were
considering. This lack of control was evident after the seismic event.
On the contrary, in the earthquake of 2010 most of the newer buildings had a
better reaction, avoiding collapse saving many lives. Even, the collapse of the
Alto Rio building in Concepcin, cost the life of 8 people despite being full of
families, resting that early Saturday morning.

Image 3: Alto Rio Building.

Before the earthquake of 2010 and after. (HUALCHASQUI, 2010)
Due to Pinochet's administration ignoring the impact of the earthquake,
offering scarce help and assistance to victims, the people started to create
organizations. These were far from the government and in many cases were
hidden from the public institutions. This process was assisted by different NGOs

FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

whose aims were generally related to human rights. After years, and with the
necessity of shelter, the Chileans were starting to reorganise socially in order to
achieve their goals. Probably, the seed of the dictatorship's defeat in 1988's
plebiscite was planted from the indifference of the government in the face of
the peoples needs in crisis times. In particular, due to the lack of post-disaster
relief, this was unexpected considering a military administration.
In this topic, the reaction of Piera's administration was completely different. It
is noteworthy though that he had an advantage: the earthquake occurred 6
days before he assumed the presidency, which was a proper time to get to the
head of the country with a contingency plan. The public-private alliance to
manage the reconstruction and accelerate the arrival of help to people was
fundamental. Just in few days, they proposed a Reconstruction Plan with short,
middle and long-term measures. The reaction was quick, and due to chaos in
the streets of the main cities of the country, the plan received widespread
political and social support.
Nevertheless, Piera's plan was still a reaction instead a policy of post-disaster
actions. The measures in the matter of reconstruction in Chile depend on the
current administration and not on a law or an established policy. It is not wrong
to say that the reconstruction in Chile is product of improvisation and the skills
of each administration.
Data on the relationship between mega-seism events, and political
administrations, shows that in the 20th century every time one of these
destructive events occurred, the current political alliance in charge of the
presidency lost the next election. The only exception was with the earthquake
of Chillan in 1939, when Chilean president Pedro Aguirre Cerda created
institutional changes in order to face the problem almost immediately after the
earthquake. This made the people thinks that the government was prepared to
handle a catastrophe (LAGOS, R., 2011). For this occasion, even the famous
architect, Le Corbusier, offered a reconstruction plan to Chillan, which at the
end was declined by the Aguirre Cerda's administration, preferring a more local
strategy (MIRANDA, R., 2010).
If the historical pattern continues along this tendency, it is logical to think on
the possibility of a second period of administration headed by the right-wing
parties close to Piera's government. This considering that despite some
problems, mistakes and media confusion; the reconstruction has been correct
within an improvisational framework, which the Chilean institutional system
offers.
Conclusions
After reviewing the government reactions and decisions in the last two
earthquakes in the central zone of Chile, there is some observations and
findings about the processes of reconstruction useful in discussing possible
policies and institutional frameworks.

FRANCISCO VERGARA PERUCICH

Seems to be evident that the role of the Chilean government in the
management of disasters is fundamental. This concern should be
institutionalized through an agency with the political and technical power to
handle disasters. That means that this institution must be able to make
management calls and drive reactions whether to tsunamis, volcanic activity,
floods, drought, quakes, etc. The ONEMI has shown evident incapacity to
address solutions and always depends on the other ministries to make
decisions. Nowadays this is just an informational bureau about the situations
instead of planning resilient cities.
Furthermore, the government reaction should not depend of the current
administration. The decisions and actions must be driven by technical
knowledge and not by political convenience. The presence of a procedure to
manage disasters and post-disaster situations is urgent. Improvisation should
not be allowed in the most seismic country in the world.
The deregulation of the building processes, particularly referring to the private
realm should be reviewed and improved. It should not be possibility that the
application of the structural norms is just in hands of the private sector and
controlled by the same private sector. One of the only ways to lower the
fatalities in cases of earthquakes to zero is by increasing the control measures
in planning, designing and building, and developing research supported by the
government to avoid biased processes of product-promotion or structural
techniques. In a highly seismic country like Chile, the role of the planners,
urban designers, architects, and structural engineers is fundamental in order to
save lives.
It is clear that the technical skill of the government has been improved since
1985. At the end of this essay, the analysis of both cases is clear and
demonstrated the incapacity of Pinochet's government to deal with crisis. On
the other hand, after 25 years, the responses and post-disasters plans are still
dependant on the current administration. There is no post-disaster policy. When
a natural disaster occurs, the destiny of Chileans is in hands of the ability of
each President to make decisions and act properly.
To summarize, the idea of reconstruction as opportunities for institutional
learning must be looked also as opportunities to prove institutional
effectiveness and readiness. If the political world and governments continues
experimenting with peoples lives in order to learn how to react, improvising
creative and quick solutions instead of depending on a qualified technical
institution, with power to rule decisions in crisis moments, the only
consequence of that will be an eternal process of post-disaster institutional
chaos, instead a proper reaction.
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