Lawyers Duties in Handling Clients Cause

A. Entire Devolution within the law

Santiago v. Fojas (1995)
Facts:
1. Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin
Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista
were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and
Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They expelled
from the union Paulino Salvador where the latter
commenced
a
complaint
with
DOLE
the
expulsion.

- That respondent failed to act accordingly, or seriously

neglected to answer the civil complaint against them in
the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong that they were
deduced in default.
- That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured them
that everything was in order. That he had already
answered the complaint so that in spite of the
incessant demand for him to give them a copy he
continued to deny. Only to disclose later that he never
answered it after all because according to him he was
a very busy man.

Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal

Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and
all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the
roll of union members with all the rights and
privileges appurtenant.

6. The respondent admits his "mistake" in failing

to file the complainants' answer but he alleges
that it was cured by his filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. He asserts that
the case was a "losing cause" and claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him
because he refused to share his attorney's fees
in the main labor case he had handled for them.

Paulino Salvador filed with RTC, a complaint

against the complainants for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed culpable

negligence as would warrant disciplinary action for
failing to file complainants answer. YES

2. As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed

a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of
(1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of
the Med-Arbiter and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since
what was involved was an intra-union issue
cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility.

3. RTC dismissed the case of Salvador but upon

latters motion for reconsideration, it was reinstated
and required complainants to file an answer.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the
case but it was denied and the case was
elevated to the CA.
Respondent still did not file the complainants'
answer and the RTC and CA held that
complainants pay jointly and severally plaintif
Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's
fees; plus cost of suit.
5. Complainants now filed a disbarment case
against respondent for "malpractice, neglect and
other ofenses.
They alleged that the serious misconduct of their
attorney Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice
and negligence in the performance of his duty
obligation to defend them in the case.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,

the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.
In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of
the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in
this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to
question the denial order of the trial court.
Whether it is the first or the second ground, the fact
remains that the respondent did not comply with
his duty to file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide

no excuse for the respondents inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his
duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free.

Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility which requires him
to serve his clients, the complainants herein,
with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by his
claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
losing cause. The Supreme Court held that he
should have seasonably informed the complainants
thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A
lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED.

PANGASINAN ELECTRIC
MONTEMAYOR (2007)

COOP

VS

AYAR

appeal abandoned due to the failure of Atty.

Montemayor to serve and file the required
Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the
two extensions of time granted. The funds
of PANELCO I deposited in banks were
garnished until the judgment award of
P13,836,676.25 was paid.
After
a year Montemayor
informed
the
complainant about the judgment of the RTC of
Quezon City, and that he had filed his appeal and
he uttered napabayaan ko itong kaso...ano
ang gagawin natin. As a consequence of the
negligence
of
Atty.
Montemayor,
the
complainant was forced to settle with the
plaintifs without the benefit of an approved
time-table, and is presently in a dire
financial situation, which has caused
difficulty in meeting its monthly power bills
with the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR).

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by
Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I)
charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with
negligence in handling the cases assigned
to him which caused unwarranted financial
losses to the complainant, approximately in
the total amount of sixteen million pesos
(PhP 16,000,000).
Records show that for several years, PANELCO I, a
rural electric cooperative with principal office
address at Brgy. San Jose, Bani, Pangasinan,
retained the services of Atty. Juan Ayar
Montemayor as its counsel.
PANELCO I stated that while acting as counsel for
the cooperative, respondent was negligent in
handling its cases.
1. A case was assigned to Montemayor wherein
the RTC decision was adverse to PANECO I and
was appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the
appeal for failure of Montemayor to serve
and file the required number of copies
within the time provided by the Rules of
Court. RTC and CA rendered a decision wherein it
became final and executory and P2,179,209.18
was paid by the complainant.
2. Another case was assigned to him and again
was appealed to the CA. CA considered the

ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT COMMITTED

GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR MISCONDUCT IN
MISHANDLING COMPLAINANTS CASES ON
APPEAL WHICH LED TO THE DISMISSAL OF
THE COMPLAINT. YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE,
Atty.
Juan
Ayar
Montemayor is DISBARRED from the practice of
law. As counsel for complainant, respondent
had the duty to present every remedy or
defense authorized by law to protect his
client. When he undertook his clients cause, he
made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for
its prosecution until its final conclusion. He
should undertake the task with dedication
and care.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY

EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN
THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in

which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed the
petition.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining

extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so.

Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of

preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family
house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and to the highest bidders,
the petitioners Castaeda and Henson.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE

CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS
CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE
LAW.

CASTANEDA VS AGO
FACTS:
Petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas
Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago to recover certain machineries. And a
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay
definite sums of money. Ago appealed and the
court affirmed previous judgment. After remand,
the trial court issued, a writ of execution for the
sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy
was made on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City.

Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu

Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint to annul
the sheriff's sale on the ground that the
obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment
was rendered against him in the replevin suit was
his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's
one-half share in their conjugal residential house
and lots which were levied upon and sold by the
sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes
was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution
was issued only against husband Pastor, and that
wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's
venture in the logging business which failed and
resulted in the replevin suit and which did not
benefit the conjugal partnership.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale
(civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands
that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their
victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them,
for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their
lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners.

The respondents, with the assistance of

counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
years to doggedly resist execution of the
judgment thru manifold tactics in and from

one court to another

Supreme Court).

(5

times

in

the

ISSUE: WON ATTY. LUISON IS LIABLE FOR

MISUSING
LEGAL
REMEDIES
AND
PROSTITUTED THE JUDICIAL PROCESS TO
THWART THE SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.
YES
RULING:
The Court condemns the attitude of the
respondents and their counsel who, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the
very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public
servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator
for
concord
and
a
conciliator
for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in
the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsels assertiveness in espousing with
candor and honesty his clients cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the
SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of
his clients position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his
client on the merit or lack of his case. If he
finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is
his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and
submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate.
The costs are assessed against the spouses
Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall
be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.

B. Employment of Honorable Means

RBCI Bohol v. James Florido (June 18, 2010)
Facts:
1. On 18 April 2002, a complaint for disbarment was
filed by the members of the Board of Directors of the
Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against
respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido for violating
his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
2. According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and
his clients,
Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr.
Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos,
and Felix Rengel, through force and intimidation,
with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the
management and the premises of RBCI. They also
forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank
manager, destroyed the banks vault, and
installed their own staf to run the bank.
3.
Respondent
denied
RBCIs
allegations.
Respondent
explained
that
he
acted
in
accordance with the authority granted upon him
by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully
and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI.
- That he was merely efecting a lawful and valid
change of management.
- That a termination notice was sent to Garay but
he refused to comply.
On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of
managerial operations, respondent and the NazarenoRelampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay
to step down. However, Garay reacted violently
and grappled with the security guards long
firearm.
Respondent then directed the security guards to
prevent entry into the bank premises of
individuals who had no transaction with the
bank.
Respondent, through the orders of the NazarenoRelampagos group, also changed the locks of the
banks vault.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for
malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was
already dismissed; while the complaint for grave
coercion was ordered suspended because of the
existence of a prejudicial question.
Respondent said that the disbarment complaint
was filed against him in retaliation for the
administrative cases he filed against RBCIs
counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any

evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that
the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified,
affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

4.

IBP Commissioner Villadolid submitted his report declared

that respondent failed to live up to the exacting
standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice. He recommended the imposition on respondent of a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six
months to one year with a warning that the repetition of
similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe
penalty.
According to IBP Commissioner, respondent knew or
ought to have known that his clients could not just
forcibly take over the management and premises of
RBCI without a valid court order. And noted that the right
to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the
issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628.
Respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of
RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any
semblance of legality whatsoever.
IBP Commissioner added that the administrative complaint
against respondent before the IBP is independent of
the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases
against respondent.

5. IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII2006-120 which declared that respondent dismally
failed to live up to the exacting standards of the
law profession and suspended respondent from
the practice of law for one year with a warning
that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a
more severe penalty. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether respondent is liable. YES

Ruling:

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to

maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is
the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of
the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall

represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code
requires a lawyer to impress upon his client
compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to
use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional
wrong to their adversaries.
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice
and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily,
when they appear before a tribunal, they act not
merely as representatives of a party but, first and

foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to

protect their clients interests is secondary to their
obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. While they are obliged to
present every available legal remedy or defense, their
fidelity to their clients must always be made within the
parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of
truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even
in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido is GUILTY of
violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, hes SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of the Decision.

C. Protecting Clients Interest

Santiago v. Fojas (1995)
Same; same; same
RULING: The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.
In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of
the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in
this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to
question the denial order of the trial court.
Whether it is the first or the second ground, the fact
remains that the respondent did not comply with
his duty to file an answer.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide
no excuse for the respondents inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his
duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free.

Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility which requires him
to serve his clients, the complainants herein,
with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by his
claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
losing cause. The Supreme Court held that he
should have seasonably informed the complainants
thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A
lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED.

filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months

later. The complaint was signed by respondent alone.
However, he withdrew it and filed a second
complaint, with Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff,
praying for the same relief.
On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was
filed were: Ramon S. Alisbo, assisted by his judicial
guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and joined with eight (8)
others. The amended complaint was signed by
Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the
plaintiffs.
On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
action for revival of judgment in Civil Case had already
prescribed.
On October 3, 1973, the CFI of Negros Occidental
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription
as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on
May 30, 1961.
On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged
respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with having
deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case with
having concealed from them the material fact that he
had been the former legal counsel of Carlito Sales,
their adversary in the probate proceedings.

RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO

S. ALISBO vs. ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR.
(1991)
Facts:
A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with
then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile
on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and
Norberto S. Alisbo against their former counsel,
Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with
deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity.
The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General,
are the following:
On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged
respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his
counsel because Alisbo failed to file a motion for
execution of a judgment in his favor within the
reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules
of Court). The judgment was for the recovery of his
share on the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina
Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been
adjudicated to him by Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental.
On April 18, 1970, Atty. Jalandoon prepared a
complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil Case but

The respondent filed a general denial of the charges

against him. According to him to Attorney , it was only
on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was
called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous
professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the
ten-year prescriptive period for revival of the judgment
in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon
asked Alisbo's permission to allow him (Jalandoon) to
withdraw from the case. He also informed the court
about his untenable position and requested that he be
allowed to retire therefrom. His request was granted.
The Solicitor General who investigated the matter
made the following observations:
Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling
the case for Ramon S. Alisbo which eventually led to its
dismissal, respondent committed several errors,
among which are:
1.
He did not verify the real status of Ramon
Alisbo before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack of
capacity to sue would not have been at issue.
2.
He postponed the motion to revive judgment
and gave way instead to a motion to resolve pending
incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered
away precious time.

3.
He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and
impleaded them as defendants. Otherwise, the
complaint would have been defective only in part.
Issue:
Whether
Atty.
Jalandoon
be
held
responsible for the dismissal of the case and had
betrayed his clients trust. Yes.
Ruling: Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client Ramon
Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with that
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer
is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from
a client. There is more than simple negligence resulting
in the extinguishment and loss of his client's right of
action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in
his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise
of this Court's disciplinary power.

have overlooked his own participation in that case as

counsel for Carlito Sales, et al.
3.
To prepare the complaint for revival of
judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he had to inform
himself about the personal circumstances of the
defendants-Carlito Sales, et al. The fact that they had
been his clients could not have eluded him.

After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on

the case. While he allegedly found out about Ramon
Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the
complaint to implead Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff
on December 8, 1971 only, or almost five (5) months
later. By that time the prescriptive period had run out.
In view of his former association with the Saleses,
Attorney Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have
declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the
ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon
enough, the Alisbos (herein complainants) would have
had enough time to engage the services of another
lawyer and they would not have lost their case through
prescription of the action.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
The Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend
him for a period of two (2) years from the finality of this
decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know

before the pre-trial that the Sales defendants had been
his clients in the past, is unbelievable because:
1.
Before he filed the complaint for revival of
judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon
S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No.
4963.
2.
He must have done some research on the
court records of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not

ALFONSOVISITACION
vs.
VICTOR
MANIT,
substituted by his widow LEONARDA MANIT and
daughters
VIRGINIA
DUNGOG,
VICTORIA
BATUCAN and MERLINDA MANIT (1969)
Facts:
The case originated on January 18, 1956 when Alfonso
Visitacion filed a case against Victor Manit to hold him

liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of

Visitacions son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of
injuries sustained in a vehicular collision involving
Manits driver Rudolfo Giron, who was found insolvent
after having been convicted and sentenced in a
previous criminal case arising out of said death, to
indemnify the victim's heirs in the amount of P3,
000.00.
Atty. Garcia filed an Answer to the complaint on behalf
of defendant.
On June 1, 1956, the case was heard, without
defendant or his counsel being present, and plaintiff
presented his evidence and the case, was submitted
for decision.
On June 6, 1956, defendant, however, filed a motion for
new trial which was granted by the trial court on June
9, 1956.
Atty. Garcia presented defendant's wife, Leonarda
Manit who testified that her husband, Victor Manit "had
no business of his own, because he is sickly" and that
she was the one operating and managing their
transportation business of three trucks.
On October 14, 1958, when the case was scheduled for
continuation of the trial, Atty. Garcia manifested
that the original defendant, Victor Manit had
recently died, and the trial court on the same
date directed him to furnish plaintif's counsel
the names of the said defendant's heirs, so that
plaintif could amend the complaint accordingly.
On August 11, 1959, Visitacions counsel submitted
a Motion to Admit the Amended Complaint,
furnishing copy of said pleadings to Atty. Garcia, who
acknowledged receipt thereof as "Attorney for the
defendant."
The only amendment in the complaint consisted in
impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased
original defendant in substitution for him,
pursuant to Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court.
There was no opposition by Atty. Garcia, so the
trial court admitted the Amended Complaint in
its Order and counsel for the defendants, defendants
were fifteen (15) days' time within which to file an
answer to said amended complaint.
No answer to the amended complaint having
been filed.
The case was again set for hearing with notice to the
parties through their counsels of record.
One day before the hearing, Atty. Garcia filed a
"Motion to Withdraw as Counsel", alleging that
"the heirs of Victor Manit have not hired (him) to

represent them and consequently, (his) continued

appearance in representation of a dead client would be
illegal" and asking the trial court "that he be relieved
as counsel.
When the case was called on the next day, neither
defendants nor Atty. Garcia appeared, and the
trial court noting "defendants' apparent lack of interest
as can be gleaned from the records" considered
them to have renounced their right to appear
and present evidence to contest plaintif's claim.
The trial court did not pass upon Atty. Garcia's
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and proceeded to
render judgment in favor of plaintif and
sentenced the defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintif the amount of P3,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Delano Visitacion, plus
P3,000.00 in concept of moral damages, and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well
as the costs of the action.
Atty. Garcia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied by the trial court, Hence the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
IGNORING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL FILED BY ATTY. GARCIA. NO.
Ruling:
In the face of Atty. Garcia's previous representations
and appearance as counsel of record for the
substituted defendants, his last hour motion to
withdraw as counsel and disclaimer that said
defendants have hired him to represent them
which he filed one day before the date set for
resumption of the hearing came too late and
was properly ignored by the Court.
The Court could not accept this turn-about on his mere
"say-so." His motion was not verified. His motion
was likewise fatally defective in that it carried no
notice to his clients on record, the defendantsappellants, as required by Rule 138, section 26
of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, it is well settled that "(A)n attorney
seeking to withdraw must make an application to
the court, for the relation does not terminate
formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at
least so far as the opposite party is concerned,
the relation otherwise continues until the end of
the litigation."
Atty. Garcia's unexplained failure to appear was
inexcusable. He had no right to presume that the
Court would grant his withdrawal. If he had then
appeared and insisted on his withdrawal, the
trial court could then have had the opportunity
to order the appearance of defendants-

appellants and verify from them the truth of his

assertion that they had not "hired him to
represent them."
Having failed to appear on the day set for trial without
any justifiable explanation to the Court nor having
presented an affidavit of merits as to the existence of
valid and lawful defenses, they cannot now complain of
having been deprived of their day in Court.

The circumstances of the case and the appeal taken all

together lead to the conclusion that the last-hour
withdrawal application of Atty. Garcia and his
appeal "as officer of the Court and then counsel
of thedeceased" was but a device to prolong this
case and delay in the execution of the judgment,
which should have been carried out years ago.
The imposition of double costs is therefore in
order.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with double costs to be paid by the attorney
for defendants. So ordered.

SUB- Issue: WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED

IN CONTINUING WITH THE CASE WITHOUT THE
NEW
DEFENDANTS
BROUGHT
TO
ITS
JURISDICTION BY SUMMONS AND WITHOUT EVEN
INFORMING SAID DEFENDANTS THAT THEY HAVE
BECOME PARTIES TO THE CASE. NO
No error was committed by the trial court in continuing
with the case and handing down its decision against
defendants-appellants. The contention re: summons is
fallacious. Record shows that Atty. Garcia at the time
acknowledged receipt of the Amended Complaint
substituting said defendants-heirs for the deceased
original defendant as "Attorney for the defendants",
presented no opposition. Having been duly impleaded
and having submitted to the Court's jurisdiction
through their counsel, Atty. Garcia, the issuance of a
summons was unnecessary.
The other contention that "there is oven no record
showing that these defendants were at all informed
that they had become parties to the above-captioned
case" is equally fallacious. Nowhere in appellants' brief
is there an assertion by Atty. Garcia, that, he, as their
attorney of record, and in compliance with his duty as
such and as an officer of the Court, failed or neglected
to inform them of the admission of the Amended
Complaint substituting them for the deceased original
defendant.

SUB- ISSUE: WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED

IN RENDERING A PREMATURE JUDGMENT IN AN
UNFINISHED
CASE
WHERE
THE
NEW
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT GIVEN THEIR DAY IN
COURT. NO.

The trial court did not render a "premature judgment.

The record shows that the original defendant's widow,
LeonardaManit was placed by Atty. Garcia on the
witness stand during the deceased's lifetime and
testified that her husband "has no business of his own,
because he is sickly" and that she was the one
operating and managing their transportation business
of three trucks since as early as 1952, some years
before the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1956.
In effect, the widow, LeonardaManit had then
submitted herself to the Court's jurisdiction, asserting
as she did that she was the one operating the business
and that her husband had no business of his own.
The widow and her three children of age as heirs of the
deceased cannot therefore claim ignorance of the
pendency of the case, and that notwithstanding that
she was the actual operator and manager of the
business, that she has been kept in complete
ignorance of its subsequent developments, after her
husband's death over 10 years ago. Almost 10 years
have elapsed since they were substituted in 1959 as

defendants for the deceased, and it taxes all credibility

for them to claim now in their brief that "said new
defendants did not even know that they became
parties in the Amended Complaint," and that all this
time not the slightest effort was made by them to find
out from Atty. Garcia or from the Court for that matter
what had happened to the case nor did Atty. Garcia in
compliance with his duty as an officer of the Court
inform them of the decision handed down by the Court
Over 9 years ago.

D. STANDARD OF DUTY IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS

PP. NADERA (DIGEST from lawphilreviewer, edited)
7.25. Duty to render effective legal service.
FACTS: The accused was charged for raping his two
daughters.
He pleaded guilty.
Atty. Brotonel, as
counsel de oficio (PAO) of the accused did not crossexamine the first daughter because he was convinced
that she was telling the truth. The cross examination
of the second daughter centered on what she did when
she saw her sister being raped. Atty. Brotonel also did
not present any evidence, and expressed his
conformity for the admission of the evidence of the
prosecution.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Brotonel failed to fulfill the standard
duty required by him as counsel de oficio of his client.
HELD: The case should be remanded because of the
neglect of the lawyer of the accused in representing his
cause.
While an accused may be given a counsel de oficio
which is not a lawyer of his own choice because he
could not afford the services of a de parte lawyer, only
the faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards
his client can give meaning and substance to the
accuseds right to due process and to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyers
duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be
taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and
vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the
accuseds fundamental rights. The cavalier attitude of
Atty. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed.
It is discernible in [a] his refusal to cross-examine
Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE); [b] the

manner in which he conducted Maricris Naderas crossexamination; and [c] his failure not only to present
evidence for the accused but to inform the accused of
his right to do so, if he desires.
The duty to make the accuseds right to counsel
meaningful and its enjoyment effective rests largely on
the defense counsel. While a lawyer may, in
accordance with the canons of the profession and his
duty to aid in the administration of justice, properly
decline to handle a civil suit when he is convinced that
it is intended to harass or injure the opposite party or
to work oppression or wrong, an attorney for the
defense in a criminal action, whether as counsel de
parte or counsel de oficio, has the right and the duty to
render effective legal assistance to the accused,
irrespective of his personal opinion as to the guilt of his
client. It is only by performing his duties faithfully and
well will the right to counsel becomes meaningful. The
Court held:
The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in a courtroom or there
propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause of the defense an acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement
by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on
the case and his knowing the fundamental procures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of
an accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity
to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance and not a simply perfunctory
representation.
MORE DISCUSSION BY THE COURT:
Indeed, cross
examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if her
testimony is viewed together with the results of her
medical examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she
was last raped by her father on April 24, 1995. [35] Yet,
the medical examination conducted on her on April 30,
1996[36] revealed the presence of spermatozoa in the
vaginal canal on that date. This was a year after the
last rape allegedly committed by her father. This may
not necessarily mean that she was lying when she said
that on April 24, 1995 she had been raped by accusedappellant, but it does indicate a necessity-that of cross
examining her in order to ferret out the truth.
The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment
of Maricris' testimony. While she was cross examined
by defense counsel, the examination was at best a
half-hearted attempt to comply with a lawyer's
obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required
considering that a man's life is at stake. It was

nonetheless important to probe Maricris' testimony,

especially since it was substantially similar to the first
incident of rape narrated by her sister, and thus raised
the possibility that it was a rehearsed, if not
concocted, story.
Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution,
according to the trial court's decision, he even
expressed his conformity to the admission of the same.
Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of
accused-appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is
it shown that accused-appellant was informed, either
by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present
evidence, if he so desires.
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to
defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how
guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The
performance of this duty was all the more imperative
because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the
balance. His duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio.

rendered him administratively liable. In a different

case, a certain Norma Trajano alleged that she paid
20k to private complainant and the balance of 16.5k
was delivered to Atty. Uy, the lawyer of private
complainant in the different case.
Complainant Del Rosario manifested that she did not
receive the 16.5k pesos paid to Atty. Uy. Uy however
argued that his client did not like to accept the money.
But such an assertion was disproved when Del Rosario
manifested her willingness to accept the money.
Uy alleged that the amount was safely in his office in
the same building. As such, the proceedings were
suspended in order for Uy to get the money from his
office. Yet, Uy never returned hence the administrative
case against him.
In his comment, Uy contends that he kept the money in
his office because it was the wish of his client. He
allegedly informed them of such money and tried to
give it to them but they insisted that he retain it in
order for them to not spend it.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that Uy
be suspended for one month. It was decided that the
complainants side of the story had more merit.
ISSUE: WON Uy is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the
CPR.
HELD: YES. He is guilty. The Court agreed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly
fiduciary. It requires a high degree of fidelity and good
faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and
to prevent everything of that kind from being done for
the protection of the client.
Canon 16 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Furthermore, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall
account for al the money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Respondent failed to promptly report and account for
the 16.5k he had received from Trajano on behalf of his
client.

E. Consequences of Failure to Perfume

No case
X. Lawyers Fiduciary Obligations
A.

EFFECTS OF FIDUCIARY RELATION

Angeles v. Uy (Digest from SCRIBD, edited)

If it were true that Del Rosario was informed about the

payment and that she entrusted Uy, she would have
known his whereabouts. That she did not know it
showed falsity of the claim.
In Aya v. Bigornia, the Court ruled that money collected
by a lawyer in favor of hisclients must be immediately
turned over to them.

FACTS:

In Daroy v. Legaspi, the Court held that lawyers are

bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure
to do so constitutes professional misconduct.

Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan City charged Atty.

Thomas Uy with violation of Canon 16 of the CPR.
Complainant states that respondents acts also

Principles of expediency and those of justice demand

that the attorney derive no advantage whatsoever
from such act, when done by him, as may operate to

8.01. Generally.

the prejudice of or occasion a loss to client, and that all

the advantages which otherwise would have arisen
therefrom to the attorney inure to the benefit of the
client.

Pentiscostes v. Ibanez (1999)

c/o Therese
C. Restriction against Buying Clients Property

Cruz v. Jacinto (2000)

Diaz v. Kapunan (1932)
c/o Nikka
B. Accounting of Clients Funds
Gonoto v. Adaza (2000)
c/o Nikka
Celaje v. Soriano (2007)

Rubias v. Batiller (1973)

Mananquil v. Villegas (1990)
Ordonio v. Eduarte (1992)
c/o Eliz
XI. Lawyers Duty to Preserve Clients
Confidence