Debate Drills

VBI 2010
skills & drills
DRILL BATTERY
The following document is a compilation of drills used during the 2010 VBI Skills & Drills
Program as well as several additional drills submitted by the VBI teaching faculty. There is no
one way to use all of the materials and drills compiled here except, of course, to make sure you
use them. We hope this is valuable to you in your competitive season and wish you the very
best.
While this document is the sum of many different contributions, we wanted to acknowledge two
individuals who worked tirelessly to make this resource available to you: Karlyn Gorski & Earl
St Sauver. Without their efforts, this large and hopefully important project would never have
reached you. We owe them big time! Thanks for all you did this summer, and good luck this
year!
-Anjan Choudhury & Todd Liipfert, Co-Directors, VBI 2010 Skills and Drills Program
1 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills
Contents
1AC Drills
Link Mapping
The Long Prepout
Argument Mapping
Framework Drills
Link Mapping
Definition Mini-Debate
Minesweeping
Standards Takeout/Isolating Assumptions
Deont v Util Mini-Debate
Mini-Debates
Comparing/Ordering Standards
Cross-Examination Drills
CX Battles
Gooooaaalllll
Drill Leader CX
Strategic CX
Refutation Drills
1-2-3
Layered Weighing
Hold the Line
Crushing Confusing Positions
Offense Only
1AR vs. Counter-Plan
Stand-Up Rebuttal
Straight-Ref Synthesis
Argument Mapping
Circle Blocking
Impromptu Refutation
Weighing Warrants
Weighing the Weighing Standards
Limited Refutation
Indicting Evidence
Be Unique
Intro Offense Drill
The Grab Bag
Positional Takeouts
Straight Ref to Ref Drills
KISS - Keep it simple, stupid
1AR Drills
Theory Hell 1AR
Link Comparison
Extending Offense
Dealing with Inevitability DAs
Hell 1AR
Crystallization Drills
Extemp the Position
Extending Offense
Story Time
Layered Weighing
All In
Weighing Warrants
Voting Issue Crystallization
Speaking Drills
Filler Killer
Extemp the Position
Seven-Point Extensions
Flow to Lay
Decision Calculus
The Parent Test
BuzzWord
Written Rebuttal
Selling a Story
The Perfect Argument
Fairy Tale Dominance
Dont Screw Up Your Answer
Speed/Stamina Drill
Theory Drills
Building a Shell
Answering the Theory Skeptic
Answering a Shell/Advancing a Counter-Interp
Theory Hell 1AR
Drill Props
Drill Props A
Drill Props B
Drill Props C
Drill Props D
Drill Props E
Drill Props F
Drill Props G
Drill Props H
Drill Props I
Drill Props J
Drill Props K
Drill Props L
Drill Props N
Drill Props M
Drill Props O
Drill Props P
Drill Props Q
Drill Props R
Drill Props S
Drill Props T
1AC Drills
Link Mapping
Skill Served: Casing, Framework
Skill Level: All Students
Average Time for Drill: 15 minutes
Materials Needed: Student Case(s)
Description: Students map out the links for all of the arguments in their framework: they
identify each individual argument, what it warrants, and implications of the argument. Students
should see the connections between each of their arguments, as well as be aware of where one
argument ends and another argument begins. Students may choose to write short blurbs for
each argument and draw arrows between connected arguments, draw out actual chain links
accompanied by short descriptions of arguments, or use any other method for visually
displaying the connections between arguments. Students should understand that multiple links
may lead to one impact, that one link may lead to multiple impacts, and that some link chains
separate into two different chains. This drill will help students to identify different arguments and
their interactions with other arguments in framework debate.
The Long Prepout

Skill Served: 1AC
Skill Level: Varsity, Advanced Varsity
Average Time for Drill: 3 hours
Materials Needed: ACs, computers, paper, pens, timer
Description: Students should spend 1-2 hours preparing arguments against another students
case. Each student should re-read the articles that the cards in their partners case to find any
contradicting arguments or qualifiers that the author uses; each student should also cut at least
five new directly responsive carded answers to their partners case. The point of this is to give
each student the opportunity to extensively prep out their partners case. Then, the students
should debate a round using their prep-outs (for practice running and debating a full prep-out).
After the round, the prep-outs should be exchanged so that students can use the prep-outs for
case revisions and frontlining. Also, the prep-outs can be used as starters for blocks. This drill
helps students with targeted researching, answering prepouts, running prepouts, case revision,
and frontlining.
Argument Mapping
Skill Served: Casing, Refutation
Materials Needed: Pen, paper
Drill Props: Drill Props B
Description: Drill instructors read a case with at least one long link chain (Drill Props B). All
students will map out the link chain for each argument and identify the functions of each
argument in case (warrant, internal link, impact). For less advanced students, a group
discussion occurs about the functions and interactions of arguments in case, and it is
diagrammed on the board. For middle-range students, there should be time for all students to
individually diagnose the arguments themselves, followed by a group discussion to ensure that
all students understand the components of each argument. For advanced students, the
diagnosis should be done individually, and each student should flow not only the content of the
argument but the function of the argument (i.e. offense, defense, spike, weighing, apriori,
solvency, brink, uniqueness etc), and do so in real time (i.e. as the case is being read).
Advanced students will then be given five minutes to construct multiple layers of argumentation
against the case. For all other students, the group discussion should turn into a group effort to
prepare layered argumentation against the case. Students should identify the most crucial links
in the case, write out arguments against those links, and write out an explanation for why those
links are the most crucial.
Optional : Right after mapping the entirety of the case, new to moderately experienced debaters
can practice refuting the affirmative case with a very clear understanding of every piece of the
entire 1AC. Without additional prep or any written materials besides their flow, the students
should refute the case. The speech should not last longer than 4:30. For all students, after each
speech, a discussion should happen that isolates weaknesses in the speech and ways to
improve argument diversification and layering so that the following speech can incorporate the
suggestions. The last speech should represent a culmination of all preceding speeches.
Framework Drills
Link Mapping
Skill Served: Casing, Framework
Materials Needed: Student Case(s)
Description: Students map out the links for all of the arguments in their framework: they
identify each individual argument, what it warrants, and implications of the argument. Students
should see the connections between each of their arguments, as well as be aware of where one
argument ends and another argument begins. Students may choose to write short blurbs for
each argument and draw arrows between connected arguments, draw out actual chain links
accompanied by short descriptions of arguments, or use any other method for visually
displaying the connections between arguments. Students should understand that multiple links
may lead to one impact, that one link may lead to multiple impacts, and that some link chains
separate into two different chains. This drill will help students to identify different arguments and
their interactions with other arguments in framework debate.
Definition Mini-Debate
Skill Served: Framework
Approximate Time For Drills: 30 minutes
Materials Needed: Drill Props Q
Description: We want students to be able to engage the definitional debate, particularly as it
relates to the substance of the debate. Thus, the drill is to have one kid stand up and define all
key relevant terms in the resolution. Then another student must stand up within 45 seconds
and attack the case with respect to definitions. The attack should take no longer than 45
seconds and should explain the in-round implications for adopting one definition over another.
The first student gets 45 seconds prep and then 45 seconds to defend his/her original definition
and explain the in-round implication.
IF YOUR STUDENTS DO NOT HAVE DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS IN THEIR CASES, OR

DONT HAVE CASES WITH THEM: Make the mini-debate over ought. In this version of the
drill, assign one to ought as a moral obligation and one to ought as desirability. Let the
moral obligation speak first, then give the desirability student 45 seconds prep to give no
longer than a 45 second speech on why to prefer that definition. Then, let the moral
obligation debater have a 45 second speech to answer back. Use the remaining time on this
drill to teach them reasons to prefer one definition to another.
Minesweeping
Skill Served:Framework
Materials Needed: Pen, Paper
Drill Props: Drill Props A
Description: The purpose of this drill is to help students learn to identify and answer spikes
(short framework arguments intended to be ignored by the negative) in an affirmative
constructive and answer them. Students should identify which framework arguments function to
preclude possible negative arguments, how they function, and exactly what arguments they take
out.
Drill instructors read a framework-heavy case (Drill Props A) that includes several spikes.
Students isolate and answer the spikes in a speech lasting 1.5-2 minutes. For less advanced
students, you can allow the students a cross-examination period to help find the spikes.
Advanced students will be asked to do this drill without prep time. This case should be read a
rate that does not obstruct students ability to isolate and answer spikes. This is not primarily a
flowing drill. However, more advanced students can be read to at a more rapid rate to replicate
the conditions under which these cases are often read.
Standards Takeout/Isolating Assumptions

Skill Level: All students
Materials Needed: Pen, Paper, Timer
Drill Prop: Drill Props Q
Description: Find and read the attached Drill Props Q to the students in your group. After
having them flow the case (and a short clarification period if necessitated by the skill level), the
students should be given 2 minutes of prep time to prepare responses only to the framework.
They each then must get up and give a positional takeout that includes (1) announcing the
takeout; (2) explain the link in the opponents case the debater will attack; (3) explain why the
opponent must win the necessary link; (4) refute the link; (5) explain its importance to the round
as a whole. For this particular drill, one ideal and hopefully intuitive takeout would be to answer
back the Reiman 2 evidence and prove that the status of the actor IS relevant to the punishment
they receive in a criminal justice system.
Deont v Util Mini-Debate

Materials Needed: Pens, paper, timer
Drill Props: Drill Props I
Description: Read the cards from the Drill Props I file at a pace that is appropriate for the skill
level of the students. Split the debaters into pairs and have them each choose a side. In each
pair, one kid should give a speech arguing against the Kamm deontology card from the position
of the Cummiskey utilitarianism card. Then, the other kid in the pair should defend and extend
the Kamm card and attack Cummiskey. Finally, the first debater should rebuild their attack
against the Kamm card and defend and extend the Cummiskey card. The students should be
directly engaging the warrants in the card as well as the larger ethical assumptions that the
cards rely upon.
Mini-Debates
Materials Needed: Two debaters, an affirmative and a negative case (or at least the framework
and standards analysis of two cases.)
Description: These mini-debates will simulate a full-fledged standards debate through the 2NR.
One student will read the affirmative standards analysis (as it appears in their case), and
another student will explain the negative standard and, in roughly 90 seconds, refute the
affirmative standard. Negatives should emphasize reasons to prefer their standard and
responsive answers to the affirmative standard that go well beyond the hackneyed toolbox
approach of no bright line, its vague, etc. The goal of this drill is not to have debaters recite
their usual pile of bad criterion answers. The affirmative will then answer back the negative
responses and extend their own framework in about 90 seconds to simulate the 1AR, and the
negative will do the same to simulate the 2NR. In the 1AR and the 2NR, students should be
adding analysis to resolve the standards debate rather than simply extending what they said in
the previous speech. Repeat/modify the drill to make sure that everyone does this drill. Time
permitting; students should do both sides of the debate. In the event that debaters standards do
not clash, clash should be constructed by borrowing from somebody elses standards analysis
in the group or by artificially constructing a standard that does clash.
Optional: Advanced students, if relevant, after defending a particular metaethical justification of
their standard (such as the intuitiveness, the popularity, or the consistency with truth of an
ethical system) should be comparing standards according to the strength of link they have to
that metaethics.
Comparing/Ordering Standards
Skill Served: Standards Analysis
Materials Needed: Drill Props Q
Re-read the value and value criterion analysis to the students from the case. Then give them 2
minutes to prep the best standards debate they could possibly imagine that compares their
own negative case standard/framework to that of the affirmative. They must then give a 2
minute speech in which they attack, compare, and order their negative case standard as
compared to the standard in Drill Props Q. Give them feedback on all 3 components of
standards debate refutation, comparison, ordering of standards in the round.
Cross-Examination Drills
CX Battles
Skill Served: Cross-Examination
Materials Needed: Any Case
Description: A drill leader reads a case and divide the students into two teams. Each team
creates a goal for their cross-examination period, and then cross-examines the drill leader for
ninety seconds. If they achieve their goal in their ninety second cross-examination, the team
receives a point. Teams alternate cross-examining the drill leader; if a team is unsuccessful,
they can attempt to achieve the same goal in their next turn, or they can change their goal.
Goals should be specific and realistic (i.e. Expose the lack of a warrant in the Smith card
instead of Get her to admit that Contention 2 is wrong). Students may help others on their
team during their cross-examination period, but every student should be in control of at least
one turn.
GooooaaalllllSkill Served: Cross-Examination

Skill Level: Junior Varsity
Materials Needed: Case, Pens, Paper, Timer
Description: This drill is to enhance student cross-examination skills. A case is read and
students have 2 minutes of prep time after the 1AC to create 3 goals that they would like to
accomplish in the CX period. Under each goal, they will create a flow chart that helps them see
how they get from point A to point B in trying to achieve that goal. For instance, the student may
Students will then get 3 minutes of normal CX time. After, a discussion will occur to see why or
why not the goals were achieved, as well as the purpose of each goal.
Drill Leader CX
Materials Needed: Case, pens, paper, timer
Description: The drill leader should read a case to the students. Then, the students should take
a small amount of prep time (30-60 seconds) to prepare a goal for CX and plan some questions
to ask to achieve the goal. Then, each student should be given 1.5-3 minutes to cross-examine
the drill leader. The drill leader should vary her your level of response based on the student skill
level. The focus should be on building up student confidence and assertiveness in asking
questions and certainly congratulate the kids when they execute your previous suggestions well.
Each student should go through this against the drill leader with a small discussion of what
works and what doesnt after each time.
Strategic CX
Materials Needed: Case, pens, paper, timer
Description: Have one student read a case at a pace that is easy to flow and for others to
understand while you and the others flow it. After the case is finished, each student should take
a minute to collect ones thoughts and isolate a particular goal to reach in a short period of CX.
Emphasis should be placed on realistic goals rather than huge concessions before they start.
Have the student write that goal down and then cross-examine the one who read the case for
60-90 seconds (depending on skill level) attempting to reach that goal. After each student has
gone, there should be a group discussion on other possible strategies to achieve a goal as well
as how to be reasonable but firm both in asking and answering questions in CX. Some possible
goals for the students: isolate the function of the standard and how to link negative turns to it,
making the importance of impacts in the AC concrete, clarifying affirmative and negative
burdens per the framework, and exposing tension between two possibly contradictory
arguments.
Refutation Drills
1-2-3
Skill Served: Refutation
Skill Level: Varsity, JV, Novice
Materials Needed: Flow, pen, timer
Description: This classic rebuttal drill contains three parts and helps debaters work through both
more positional and more line-by-line means of refuting arguments; generally, after all, a good
rebuttal will include some combination of these skills. First, the debater should construct a single
argument as a take-out to try to holistically argue against the case in question. Second, the
debater should make two arguments to each of the case's major sections. (Generally, this would
include the value, the standard, and each contention.) Finally, the debater should make three
responses to each and every argument in the case. Following these different versions, the
debater should craft a final rebuttal that combines the best elements of the three "drafts."
Layered Weighing
Skill Served: Refutation, Crystallization
Skill Level: Advanced Varsity
Materials Needed: Flows, pens, paper, timer
Description: Using a flow from a previous round, prepare a 1AR that is entirely comprised of
extensions out of the AC. In each extension, strive to make use both technical and substantive
weighing standards. (Ie. Explain how your argument utilizes more explicit links AND why the
impact of your argument is a bigger issue in terms of the standard.) In terms of substantive
weighing, try to use multiple weighing standards for each extension. (Some examples include,
but are not limited to, magnitude, probability, durability, scope, reversibility, and time frame.)
Warning: do not just spit out standards! Explicitly compare the impacts by describing the extent
of each. After youve completed the 1AR, assume that the negative is winning a single piece of
offense and has left you a single piece of offense. Each of you is claiming to outweigh the
others argument with a particular weighing standard. (Ie. The NC outweighs on magnitude.
The AC outweighs on probability.) Conclude by giving a 2AR in which you extend that one aff
argument, extend the weighing analysis, and then explain why your weighing standard is a more
important weighing standard in terms of the framework than your opponents weighing standard.
Hold the Line

Skill Level: Advanced Varsity, Varsity
Average Time for Drill: 1 hour
Materials Needed: AC and NC
Description: Debate yourself! Ignore normal time limits
(NC) Make 25 answers to the affirmative case, at least 10 of which should be offensive.
(1AR) Make 10 answers to the negative case and 2-point every argument made on the
affirmative case (60 arguments total). Extend offense and weigh.
(NR) 2-point every argument made on the negative case, then pick the 5 best arguments on the
affirmative case and 3-point each of the affirmative's responses to those arguments (50
arguments total). Extend offense out of the NC, weigh and crystallize.
(2AR) Go for the 5 best answers to the negative case and 2-point each of the negative's
responses. Then answer the 5 arguments the negative extended on the affirmative case (50
arguments total). Conclude with 5 unique reasons to prefer aff offense over neg offense.
Crushing Confusing Positions

Drill Props: Drill Props J and/or K
Description: Read this case to the students and have them flow it. (With mid-level students, you
should allow for a brief group cross-examination time of about 3 minutes total to go over the
case and answer any glaring flowing problems). After this, you should give them an appropriate
amount of prep time to prepare responses to the AC (2-4 minutes depending on skill). They
should then try to give a speech against the case (from 2-4 minutes, once again, by skill). In this
speech, your comments should focus on the facts that they should be only engaging arguments
that they understand, working on isolating the thesis and the terminal impact of the case, and
being clear about their sign posting, even if they are grouping large portions of the case (this is
a good thing).
Optional: After you have heard form each kid and they have all AT LEAST attempted to attack
the case, you should have a discussion of which arguments work and which dont. Then, after
the discussion the each kid should give one more three-minute speech incorporating the
answers that have been discussed.
Offense Only
Skill Served: 1AR, Refutation
Skill Level: Junior Varsity, Varsity, Advanced Varsity
Materials Needed: AC, pen, paper, timer
Drill Props: Drill Props C
Description: The drill leader reads a case to the students. Students should identify links, internal
links, and impacts in the case. After flowing the case, students are given a limited amount of
prep time (2-4 minutes, depending on skill level) to prepare turns to the case. Then, students
will give a 4-minute speech refuting the case with offensive arguments only (an offensive
argument is defined as an argument that proves that the action defended by the affirmative
makes the harm/impact worse; turn you dont solve and turn -- no impact are not offensive
arguments). Students will be allowed to make defensive arguments (e.g. interpretation
challenges) to leverage their offense but the emphasis should be on generating responsive
turns that are actually turns on the case. Debaters may either link turn or impact turn
arguments, but they may not do both (turn, this actually causes less government power and
turn, government power is good) so as not to give their opponent offense. Drill instructors
should pay close attention to debaters who may err and double-turn themselves.
Optional: To make this drill easier for new students, this drill can be performed after the
Argument Mapping drill located in this document.
1AR vs. Counter-Plan

Skill Served: 1AR, Refutation
Materials Needed:Pen, Paper, Timer
Drill Props: Drill Props M, Drill Props N
Description:Read the Drill Props M and then the Drill Props N, which is the negative speech
that responds to the AC that includes an advantage CP. Then, after answering any clarification
questions the students may have about extending the AC (author names, basic explanations of
the warrants [they should have this flowed], etc.), give the students a short amount of prep time
2-3 minutes maximum to prepare to give the 1AR in the full four minutes. The focus of this drill
is to practice giving 1ARs in response to counter plans. You should emphasize clarity in signposting as well as using extensions effectively and efficiently to answer back arguments from
the NC.
Stand-Up Rebuttal
Description: The drill leader reads a case to the students. While flowing the case, students
should also be identifying the weaknesses in the case and the links that are necessary for the
impacts to occur. They should be thinking of answers to the case while it is being read.
Immediately after the drill leader finishes reading the case, the students should begin to give a
four-minute speech in which they layer responses, point out weaknesses, and sever link chains.
To vary the difficulty of this drill based on students needs, the drill leader can pick a case that is
the appropriate difficulty for the students. After the speech, the drill leader should ask the
student about their strategy, identify arguments that were particularly strategic, and point out
any problems with the refutation.
Straight-Ref Synthesis
Drill Props: Drill Props E
Description: This drill is meant to give students an idea of what it is like to respond to a case via
straight-refutation (only answering their opponents case without reading a case of their own,
while still generating offense such that they could win the round). The drill leader should read
the Drill Props E and give the students prep time (which should vary based on skill level).
Then, each student should give a four-minute speech in which he/she effectively refutes the AC
and generates offense for him/herself. The focus should be on making nuanced and welldeveloped positional takeouts, generating a significant amount of offense, and giving even if
stories.
Argument Mapping
Materials Needed: Pen, paper
Drill Props: Drill Props B
Description: Drill instructors read a case with at least one long link chain (Drill Props B). All
students will map out the link chain for each argument and identify the functions of each
argument in case (warrant, internal link, impact). For less advanced students, a group
discussion occurs about the functions and interactions of arguments in case, and it is
diagrammed on the board. For middle-range students, there should be time for all students to
individually diagnose the arguments themselves, followed by a group discussion to ensure that
all students understand the components of each argument. For advanced students, the
diagnosis should be done individually, and each student should flow not only the content of the
argument but the function of the argument (i.e. offense, defense, spike, weighing, apriori,
solvency, brink, uniqueness etc), and do so in real time (i.e. as the case is being read).
Advanced students will then be given five minutes to construct multiple layers of argumentation
against the case. For all other students, the group discussion should turn into a group effort to
prepare layered argumentation against the case. Students should identify the most crucial links
in the case, write out arguments against those links, and write out an explanation for why those
links are the most crucial.
Optional : Right after mapping the entirety of the case, new to moderately experienced debaters
can practice refuting the affirmative case with a very clear understanding of every piece of the
entire 1AC. Without additional prep or any written materials besides their flow, the students
should refute the case. The speech should not last longer than 4:30. For all students, after each
speech, a discussion should happen that isolates weaknesses in the speech and ways to
improve argument diversification and layering so that the following speech can incorporate the
suggestions. The last speech should represent a culmination of all preceding speeches.
Circle Blocking
Average Time for Drill: Varies; 10 minutes.
Materials Needed: Paper, pens, timer
Description: Circle blocking is a great way to create a set of team blocks that can be expanded
upon later, and it works well with anywhere from 5-15 students. In circle blocking, each person
in a circle gets a sheet of paper and writes an aff or a neg argument at the top (each person
should write a different argument for purposes of diversity), the timer is set anywhere from thirty
seconds to two minutes, and everyone must write one unique response to the argument. When
the timer beeps, everyone passes their sheet to the right. The timer is reset, everyone must
write another response, and then pass the sheet again. This can continue for as long as people
are writing original responses. The point of circle blocking is to improve general skill at
refutation, and to that end, different conditions can be set each time you pass the sheet (like,
only make an offensive argument, positional takeout, etc). At the end of the drill, everyone types
up the sheet they ended with, and can improve upon the responses with evidence, additional
analytics, etc. The ultimate result should be shared with everyone who participated in the drill.
Impromptu Refutation
Average Time for Drill: At least 5 minutes; can continue indefinitely
Materials Needed: None
Description: Impromptu refutation is simple, but can be really effective, and is also a way to get
better without spending an inordinate amount of time. In impromptu refutation, another person
gives a debater an argument to which he/she must respond immediately without taking time to
think about responses, and must continue responding until a given amount of time has passed
(up to the participants in the drill). This forces debaters to improve their ability to speak off the
cuff and improves general refutation skills. This drill can also be done with a focus on refuting
evidence (one person reads a card) or framework, and the drill can be repeated with less time to
emphasize word economy and efficiency.
Weighing Warrants
Materials Needed: Cases (or just cards), pens, paper, timer
Description: Students select two arguments, one from each of their cases. They should analyze
the arguments and choose the one that is more well-warranted. Each student then gives a 90
second speech in which they compare the two arguments (focusing on things like reasons to
prefer cards or analytics, internal warrants in cards, qualifiers, minimized text, author
qualifications, post-dating, empirical versus speculative, etc. ) and explains the significance of
winning the better argument.
Alternate Option for Drill: Instead of using pieces of evidence from cases on opposite sides of
the resolution, this drill may be done with any two cards or well-developed analytical arguments.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to students to do evidence comparison for arguments on the
same side of a resolution, it is just as good practice for weighing warrants and will give students
a way to identify which of their arguments are strongest.

Description: The drill leader and the students should generate a list of weighing standards (a
baseline list should include probability, magnitude, risk, reversibility, duration, scope, cyclical,
active vs passive harm, strength of link). Then, the students are assigned different weighing
standards. Students are paired up and each student must speak for 45 seconds comparing their
weighing standard to their partner's. Students can swap partners and repeat the drill as many
times as time permits. Comments should focus on isolating the standard for why one weighing
mechanism is better (i.e. probability is more RELIABLE or ACCURATE than magnitude because
we know how much of the time this happens, etc) and making that explicit and clear to the judge
rather than just vague arguments as to why one is better. This drill gets students to think about
weighing mechanisms and how to make the judge prefer their weighing over their opponents.
Limited Refutation
Materials Needed: Pens, paper, case
Description: This drill simulates an NC/NR refutation of an affirmative case, but the negative
debater is forced to limit the total number of responses they can make to the case. The
refutation of the case should still be complete - the purpose of the drill is to force students to
make general case takeout response and to identify/refute the foundational assumptions of an
affirmative case. The number of responses allowed should generally be between three and five.
The drill setup is simple: an AC is read, the student gets a small time to prep the allotted
number of responses, then the student delivers those responses. The amount of prep time can
also vary depending on skill level. After the delivery, the student(s) and the drill instructor should
discuss the efficacy of the refutation in taking out the entirety of the case. To vary the difficulty of
this case, the drill leader may choose to read a case that relies on an obvious assumption (for
less advanced students), one that is multi-warranted and lack a clear foundational assumption
(for more advanced students), or anything in between.
Indicting Evidence
Drill Props: Drill Props F
Description: After the instructor reads the first card in the Drill Props F document, students
should take a minute of preparation time to construct a 45 second speech that solely indicts the
affirmative card concerning legal rights (Fabian). This speech should not include any reference
to the negative card, but rather should independently indict the affirmative card. Advanced
students should focus on problematizing the affirmative card on multiple levels, indicting every
internal warrant and possibly mentioning issues such as the year of the evidence, etc. After
each student has delivered their 45 second speech, the instructor should read the negative card
on the legal rights issue (Beresford). Then, students should take another minute of preparation
time and construct a 45 second speech that has the same function, except that it indicts the
negative card on the legal rights issue. After each student has delivered their speech, they
should discuss which types of arguments constitute substantive, strategic evidence comparison.
Optional (15 minutes): The group should discuss which answers to the affirmative card (Fabian)
that were made by group members were the best. The students should take 1:30 of prep time to
construct a 1:15 speech that extends the Fabian evidence (as if in a 1AR), indicts the Beresford
evidence, and explicitly compares the two pieces of evidence. Advanced students should aim to
have at least 3 unique levels of nuanced evidence comparison. Less advanced students should
focus on having at least one level of welldeveloped evidence comparison.
Optional (15 minutes): Repeat the same drill as if this were a 2NR, extending the Beresford
evidence. Assume that the indictments of the Fabian evidence were already made in the 1N. In
a 1:30 speech, the student should extend the Beresford evidence, respond to the indictments
they wrote against the Beresford evidence, extend responses to the Fabian evidence, and
compare the pieces of evidence. After this drill is complete, students should discuss what were
the most effective methods of evidence comparison that can be applied to future drills.
Be Unique
Skill Level: JV, Novice
Materials Needed: Flows, pens, paper, timers
Description: Many debaters, especially less experienced ones, make the same arguments over
and over in their rebuttals. In this drill, debaters should prepare responses to a case in a limited
amount of prep time. Each argument should be able to be summarized in 1-2 words that the
student will write next to their response (imperialism, realism, side constraint, etc.). The student
should ensure that none of the argument summaries are the same. If possible, the student
should give the rebuttal to a drill leader who will verify that each of the arguments is unique.
Optional: Debaters should review their old flows and label their arguments with 1-2 word
summaries. Any time that they make the same argument (or multiple arguments with the same
theme), they should highlight the arguments. This will give the debaters a visual idea of how
repetitive they are being in their rebuttals.
Intro Offense Drill

Skill Level: JV, Novice
Average Time for Drill: 30-60 minutes
Drill Props: Drill Props G; Optional: Drill Props H
Description: Read Drill Props G to the students. You should read the case fairly slowly and
have a small discussion about easy arguments that could be turned or manipulated for offense.
Then, they should speak and try to go for 3 minutes. The overall emphasis of the drill should be
not only to have strong offense but also very clear links to the standard of the AC as well as the
ballot. These links should be as explicit as possible by the kids in their explanations. However,
they should also be making clarifying arguments in the framework (dont worry its short) about
what the negative has to do to get offense and to win the round. Also, they should be trying to
generate a diversity of responses to the AC and as many consistent link turns as possible or
impact turns if they so desire. HOWEVER, be sure to look out for double turns and try to help
them catch themselves. They should be trying to get as much offense on different parts of the
AC as possible, but must maintain a consistent focus overall in terms of NC strategy.
Optional: Same drill as above, but with the Drill Props H. Students should try to fill up two
minutes of responses to the NC. Clarifying links and explaining decision calculus is key.
The Grab Bag

Materials Needed: Scraps of paper, pen
Description: Write stock arguments on different small scraps of paper. Then put all the pieces of
paper in a bag. Then pull out a piece of paper, read the argument, and then make multiple
responses to it with no prep time. This can be done over the course of an hour or two on an
individual level. This drill can also be completed over the course of several weeks. For example,
pulling 1-2 arguments out of the bag and responding to them each day is also effective to keep
your mind focused on refutation and debate. This drill will help you memorize responses to the
stock arguments on the topic so you don't have to waste your prep time writing the answers to
your opponent's stock contentions and can focus your efforts to more nuanced parts of their
case. Moreover, this drill helps you learn to articulate responses to the stock arguments in a
clear and concise fashion.
Positional Takeouts
Drill Props: Drill Props D
Description: Begin by explaining the concept of a positional take-out (indicting a foundational
assumption or argument that the AC makes that, if you win, delinks the AC from the resolution)
Then, read the Drill Props D to the students from the drill file. The students should take a small
amount of prep time and then speak for 1-3 minutes (both amounts should be tailored to their
skill level) and your advice should help them to articulate the arguments better as well as make
sure that they are clear and direct with the parts of the case they are talking about. Also, makes
sure that they are spending time developing the arguments fully rather than just making blippy
contradictions of what the AC said. Some arguments to suggest center on the lack of focus on
the conflict implicit in the resolution instead just focusing on human rights in general, lack of
clear advocacy, etc. Each student should speak twice and each speech should last no longer
than a minute. Remember, they can make take-outs having to do with framework arguments or
overviews about how the way that the contention functions doesnt actually affirm.
Straight Ref to Ref Drills

Drill Props: Drill Props R
Description: Read the Drill Props R. It is on the economic sanctions topic. The students should
have 4 minutes of prep time to come up with a straight-ref strategy to fill up a 7-minute speech.
The emphasis should be on consistently attacking each individual component of a case as well
as diversity of responses. The instructor should listen to one drill from a student while the others
are giving theirs. After the students have given their 7-minute speech ONCE (time is a factor),
they need to give the speech again in 5 minutes, and then after that in 3 minutes. They should
give the shorter speeches more than once so that all students are critiqued, but with a focus on
including as many of the original arguments from the 7-minute speech in a more concise
manner (summarize cards with analytics, make arguments shorter, etc.) however, this should
not be done at the expense of argument development. They will have to choose better
arguments, which is fine. By the end of the drill, the speeches should sound like something
given by a negative in a regular round having read a case.
KISS - Keep it simple, stupid

Average Time for Drill: 30 Minutes
Materials Needed : Pen, Paper, Timer, AC, and/or NC
Description : The staff member reads an NC or an NC, and the debater takes a limited amount
of prep time [2 minutes] to prepare as many answers are possible for the speech time [4
minutes if they are responding to the AC, 2 minutes if they are responding to the NC]. Once the
prep time is up, the debater gives the speech while the staff member flows it. Once that is
finished, the staff member and student review the flow, looking for arguments that were
unstrategic, unhelpful, or at worst, arguments that helped the other side. The goal is to
recognize the crutch defensive arguments that students often make.
The staff member/student should eliminate about half of the responses, so that only the ""meat""
is left. The student will then regive the speech in half the time [2 minutes / 1 minute], only
making the "good arguments." This drill helps students further their strategic understanding. It's
great for enabling them to see what bad defensive or useless arguments they rely on and how
to eliminate them.
1AR Drills
Theory Hell 1AR

Skill Served: Theory, 1AR
Materials Needed: Pen, Paper, Theory Shells
Drill Props: If necessary, the Drill Props S theory shell can be used, but be aware that having
other theory arguments is necessary as well.
Description: The drill leader will read a case that is susceptible to multiple theory violations and
then read 4 to 12 minutes of theory arguments against the AC. This should involve fewer, welldeveloped theory arguments rather than a lot of brief ones. Students should then be given 5 to
10 minutes to prepare a 1AR that wins the round. The length of the NC speech should vary
based on the skill level of the students.
Alternate Option for Drill: Less experience students may benefit from a discussion prior to their
preparation period. They may also benefit from being initially given an extra long 1AR with the
goal of bringing it down to 4 minutes by the end of the drill.
Link Comparison
Skill Served: 1AR
Skill Level: Varsity
Description: Link turns requires a comparison between the links. (Simply saying "No, I do that
impact" is not enough of a response. You must explain why you better access the impact.) This
drill will help you to sharpen your skills in comparing the links in your case to potential links in
your opponent's turns.
Begin by making a link map of your affirmative case. To map the argument, write a brief
summary of each part of the argument, drawing lines as you move between each link and
impact. (Ie. Economic sanctions decrease financial resources. Decreased financial
resources cause governments to reroute funding away from social services The poorest
members of society suffer.) This works best if you make your link map vertically, as you'll be
expected to add to it in the next step. Be as specific as you possibly can, isolating internal links
in longer chains.
Next, take five to ten minutes making as many link turns as you can. (Remember, link turns are
turns that give you access to the impact that the aff is claiming.) After writing the turns, map
each turn in a different color on your original map. Visually, this will look like a new link
extending from one part of the argument to a different impact/the opposite impact given in the
AC. (So, a new link could be drawn from the original example. Economic sanctions decrease
financial resources --- Governments cannot continue financing military efforts.) Then, give the
speech to yourself, or to someone else, so that you can solidify the argument you are making in
your mind.
To conclude this drill, you'll need to compare the links. Directly explain what each link is, and
explain why yours is more probable, more warranted, etc. (In the example, you'd need to
compare the links of governments being unable to sufficiently finance military efforts and
governments resorting to taking money from social services. Which will happen?) Give the
1AR in 3 minutes, assuming that your standard is the only one remaining.
Extending Offense
Skill Served:1AR, Crystallization
Skill Level:All Students
Materials Needed: Affirmative Case, Pen, Paper
Description: Have each student take out an affirmative case and chose one piece of offense to
go for. Then, they should take about 30 seconds of prep time to prepare a 90 second speech in
which they extend their framework and then their offense fully, including a link and weighing to
their standard as well as a reason as to why that offense is sufficient to justify an affirmative
ballot through their standard. The emphasis should be on full extensions and important
argument development as well as explanation of the story of the affirmative. Each student
should give the speech twice.
Dealing with Inevitability DAs

Skill Served: 1AR
Materials Needed:Pen, Paper, Timer
Drill Props: Drill Props O, Drill Props P
Description:Read the Drill Props O and have the debaters flow it. Then read the Israel Strikes
DA in response to the AC. Same scenario as before, but the debaters should have less time to
speak in the 1AR, more like a minute or 90 seconds. Then after you have heard from each
debater, you should gather them back together and have them flow the Drill Props P block
against the DA and have them discuss and give minute long speeches debating about how the
offense then functions. The optimal strategy is to win that an Israeli strike is inevitable, so the
only question is whether it's better for Israel to strike sooner rather than later.
Hell 1AR
Skill Served: 1AR
Materials Needed: AC, NC, pen, paper, timer
Description: A student reads their AC. Another student the drill leader has 10 minutes to write
answers to the AC. The drill leader or another student reads the NC and responds to the AC in
as much time as it takes to complete all of the prepared answers. The student takes a small
amount of prep time (at drill leader's discretion) and delivers a 1AR. The focus of this drill should
is on efficiency, issue selection, weighing, and strategic extensions.
Optional: The 1AR speech time can be decreased for successive repetitions of the speech (eg 4
minutes, then 3 minutes, then 2 minutes, etc).
Crystallization Drills
Extemp the Position

Skill Served: Crystallization, Speaking
Description: Students pick any case or speech and explain the story of the case or rebuttal in 24 minutes without using any technical jargon or filter words. The student should focus on
creating complete link stories and identifying key issues. Often, students rely on debate jargon
as a crutch -- they sacrifice content for terminology. This drill forces students to explain the
function of arguments without being dependent on these labels. Student should avoid using
words or phrases like card, turn, extension, voter, internal link, standard, etc. This drill forces
debaters to speak more slowly than usual and focus on persuasion and complete
argumentation.
Extending Offense
Skill Served:1AR, Crystallization
Skill Level:All Students
Materials Needed: Affirmative Case, Pen, Paper
Description: Have each student take out an affirmative case and chose one piece of offense to
go for. Then, they should take about 30 seconds of prep time to prepare a 90 second speech in
which they extend their framework and then their offense fully, including a link and weighing to
their standard as well as a reason as to why that offense is sufficient to justify an affirmative
ballot through their standard. The emphasis should be on full extensions and important
argument development as well as explanation of the story of the affirmative. Each student
should give the speech twice.
Story Time
Skill Served: Crystallization
Materials Needed: Any case, timer
Description: Using one of their cases, students will give an extemporaneous 3-minute speech to
simulate the 2AR or the end of the 2NR. For non-advanced students, there should be no
reference to an opponents arguments; the speech should be entirely the crystallization of the
case. For advanced students, the crystallization should involve not only simply extending their
case arguments but answering the assumed common arguments on the other side, as well.
Much like the syllabus of a Supreme Court decision, students should isolate the pertinent
questions that inform the big picture and deliver answers without relying on the flow. The
emphasis should be on telling an effective story. Drill instructors should critique students on the
following grounds: vividness of impacts, coherence of link chains, command of the major issues,
and the sufficiency of arguments for winning the round (i.e. there should be an explanation for
why the argument is sufficient to warrant the judge voting for them).
Layered Weighing
Materials Needed: Flows, pens, paper, timer
Description: Using a flow from a previous round, prepare a 1AR that is entirely comprised of
extensions out of the AC. In each extension, strive to make use both technical and substantive
weighing standards. (Ie. Explain how your argument utilizes more explicit links AND why the
impact of your argument is a bigger issue in terms of the standard.) In terms of substantive
weighing, try to use multiple weighing standards for each extension. (Some examples include,
but are not limited to, magnitude, probability, durability, scope, reversibility, and time frame.)
Warning: do not just spit out standards! Explicitly compare the impacts by describing the extent
of each. After youve completed the 1AR, assume that the negative is winning a single piece of
offense and has left you a single piece of offense. Each of you is claiming to outweigh the
others argument with a particular weighing standard. (Ie. The NC outweighs on magnitude.
The AC outweighs on probability.) Conclude by giving a 2AR in which you extend that one aff
argument, extend the weighing analysis, and then explain why your weighing standard is a more
important weighing standard in terms of the framework than your opponents weighing standard.
All In
Materials Needed: Cases and/or flows, pens, paper, timer
Description: A student uses old flows or an AC and an NC and picks one affirmative argument
to go for. The student should give a 2AR in which they go all in on one affirmative argument
and weigh it against all possible negative arguments. The student should be able to extend the
entirety of the affirmative argument and give 2-3 compelling reasons to prefer it to each
negative argument in the time allotted. The weighing should be directly comparative (this
outweighs the negative impact about cycles of violence instead of generic claims like "this
outweighs all negative impacts") and explicit ("this outweighs in terms of reversibility" rather than
"this is worse than all negative impacts). Students should link to both standards, if possible, and
make the weighing specific to the standards (ie don't use duration if both standards are
deontological).
Weighing Warrants
Materials Needed: Cases (or just cards), pens, paper, timer
Description: Students select two arguments, one from each of their cases. They should analyze
the arguments and choose the one that is more well-warranted. Each student then gives a 90
second speech in which they compare the two arguments (focusing on things like reasons to
prefer cards or analytics, internal warrants in cards, qualifiers, minimized text, author
qualifications, post-dating, empirical versus speculative, etc. ) and explains the significance of
winning the better argument.
Alternate Option for Drill: Instead of using pieces of evidence from cases on opposite sides of
the resolution, this drill may be done with any two cards or well-developed analytical arguments.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to students to do evidence comparison for arguments on the
same side of a resolution, it is just as good practice for weighing warrants and will give students
a way to identify which of their arguments are strongest.

Description: The drill leader and the students should generate a list of weighing standards (a
baseline list should include probability, magnitude, risk, reversibility, duration, scope, cyclical,
active vs passive harm, strength of link). Then, the students are assigned different weighing
standards. Students are paired up and each student must speak for 45 seconds comparing their
weighing standard to their partner's. Students can swap partners and repeat the drill as many
times as time permits. Comments should focus on isolating the standard for why one weighing
mechanism is better (i.e. probability is more RELIABLE or ACCURATE than magnitude because
we know how much of the time this happens, etc) and making that explicit and clear to the judge
rather than just vague arguments as to why one is better. This drill gets students to think about
weighing mechanisms and how to make the judge prefer their weighing over their opponents.
Voting Issue Crystallization

Average Time for Drill: 5-10 minutes
Materials Needed: A flow or any case, timer
Description: Have each student take one voting issue from one of their debates and then give a
90-second speech on that issue alone. If they do not have their flows from a debate and they
cant remember their voting issues, then have them make an offensive argument out of their
1AC a voter. They should be packaging the issue as a voting issue and include all seven
components of a complete voting issue: (1) identifying that it is a voting issue, (2) giving an
exact reference on the flow, (3) extending and explaining the warrant in its entirety, (4)
answering back all of the ink, (5) impacting it to their standard, (6) weighing the argument
against all other arguments in the debate, and (7) impacting it to the opponents standard as an
even-if scenario.
Optional: Students should repeat the drill with another voting issue from the other side of one of
their debates.
Speaking Drills
Filler Killer
Skill Served: Speaking
Materials Needed: Flows, pens
Description: While one person gives a rebuttal, her partner flows, listening for filler words (like,
um, so, insofar as, at the point which, right, etc.). When the debater says one of the words, the
partner says it aloud. After five filler words, the two switch sides. The drill ends when one
debater gives a smooth rebuttal that contains no fillers.
Alternate Option for Drill: Change the number of filler words allowed before switching off, and/or
add punishments such as getting hit with crumpled-up paper or water guns when filler words
are used.
Extemp the Position

Skill Served: Crystallization, Speaking
Description: Students pick any case or speech and explain the story of the case or rebuttal in 24 minutes without using any technical jargon or filter words. The student should focus on
creating complete link stories and identifying key issues. Often, students rely on debate jargon
as a crutch -- they sacrifice content for terminology. This drill forces students to explain the
function of arguments without being dependent on these labels. Student should avoid using
words or phrases like card, turn, extension, voter, internal link, standard, etc. This drill forces
debaters to speak more slowly than usual and focus on persuasion and complete
argumentation.
Seven-Point Extensions
Materials Needed:Pen, Paper, Timer, AC or NC (ideally with a flow from a round with that case)
Description:
The students should all have an affirmative or a negative case that they can use for this drill
PREFERABLY they use their flow from the practice round. Much like in the story time drill, the
kids should take about a minute of prep time to get familiar with their cases/flow and isolate the
seven key elements of a single voter to give in 90 seconds: (1) location on the flow or in their
case, (2) tag of the argument, (3) extending and re-explaining the warrant, (4) extending and reexplaining the impact, (5) explaining the link to the standard, (6) weighing to the standard, and
(7) if possible, linking and weighing to their opponents standard. The emphasis of the drill is on
technical proficiency and full extensions. These extensions should be self-contained and
complete. The students should all give this speech multiple times to practice and internalize the
components.
Optional:For more advanced students, have them re-give the entire 2AR or 3 minutes of the NR
and extend their framework in a similar manner. The emphasis should be the same and the
focus should be on perfect, word economical, technically sound extensions.
Flow to Lay
Average Time for Drill:30 minutes
Description:Have the debaters isolate one particular argument out of the affirmative case. Then
the debaters should take one minute of prep time to look over their flows and prepare to give
their 90-second speech to a completely lay person minimizing the use of jargon and focusing on
explanation of the argument and making it accessible to any audience unfamiliar with debate.
They should still be doing all seven components of the voter that were in the previous drill, but
not using the jargon. Emphasis should be on vivid impacts as well as argument development
and speaking clarity.
Optional: For advanced students, you can have them discuss the main components of their
entire case as a linear link chain (including interpretation and framework issues) while
explaining what it means to win a value-criterion and have them come up with empiric examples
of their arguments on the fly. These examples should be illustrative and well explained. They
should also be used in conjunction with warrants, not as a substitute.
Decision Calculus
Approximate Time for dill: 30 minutes
Materials Needed: AC, pens, paper, timer
Description: Using a case the students should now abstract from the particular piece of offense
from the last drill and explain generally why they are winning the round in a debate speech. This
should model the final 90 seconds of an NR or the final minute or so of a 2AR. This should
include a summary/recap of what their framework says, why it is better than their opponents,
and what the judge evaluates for the round. Encourage the debaters to begin this speech with
commanding statements such as This round comes down to one issue which will mean an
affirmative/negative ballot for me because or This round is a question of who best deters
future criminals and that is the affirmative because Not only should debaters be explaining
why they are winning, but you should help them use commanding rhetoric so that they can
convey dominance in the round. Also, help the debaters rephrase the vague resolution into a
particular question that the judge can easily answer for their side.
The Parent Test

Materials Needed: 1AC, adult friend or relative with no debate background
Description: Without referencing your case or any other notes, explain your 1AC in 3 minutes to
your mom/ dad (or other relative/ friend who has no debate background). The goal is to explain
your case well enough that the person you're explaining it to understands the story your position
is telling very clearly by the end of your 3 minute speech. This means that you'll have to avoid
jargon and focus on a logical progression (a story) that moves fluidly from argument to
argument as you explain your case. After your 3 minute speech, ask your lay relative/ friend
what they think and where they are confused -- this will give important insight into what
arguments you should improve upon in terms of making better extensions and providing the
clearest possible analysis. Pay attention to their feedback and adapt your preparation and
emphasis in extensions accordingly -- for while it's certainly true that most rounds on the
national circuit won't require you to go this old-school, being able to explain your arguments
fluently to any judge goes a long way towards improving one's articulateness.
BuzzWord
Average Time for Drill: At least 5 minutes, can continue indefinitely
Materials Needed: Flows, buzzer or something capable of producing an annoying sound (a
computer on a website that makes a buzzer sound, a cell phone with a buzzer app, etc.)
Description: A student prepares a rebuttal redo from a round or practice round. Another student
or coach is equipped with a buzzer or a computer capable of making some sort of loud, buzzing
sound effect. If no buzzer is available, vocal sound effects are acceptable. The student delivers
the speech, and every time they use a crutch phrase (like, um, insofar as, at the point where,
etc.) or are generally inefficient and lack word economy, the other student or coach presses the
buzzer. Every time the buzzer is pressed, the student must start the speech over, aiming to get
as far into the speech as possible without any inefficiencies.
Optional: If the student already has an idea of his or her crutch phrases, the student can list
them on an index card before delivering the speech so that the other student or teacher can
know which words in particular should trigger a buzz.
Written Rebuttal
Materials Needed: Flows, paper, pen, timer
Description: A student prepares a rebuttal redo from a round or practice round (4 minutes). The
student delivers the rebuttal redo for another student or coach without being stopped throughout
the speech (6, 4, or 3 minutes, depending on speech given). After the speech is finished, the
student and the other student or coach have a discussion about how the speech could have
been faster or more efficient. Then, the student types or writes out the entire speech, word for
word, in the most efficient manner possible (15 minutes). After finishing, the student goes back
and edits the written speech for word economy (5 minutes). Then, the student reads the speech
word for word, aiming to go as fast as they would want to go in a round, and emphasize words
as if this were a real rebuttal, and not a fully written out speech (6, 4, or 3 minutes, depending
on speech given). The student and the other student or coach have a discussion about what
made that speech quicker and more efficient (5 minutes). Then, the student take 2 minutes of
preparation time to re-prepare the redo on their flow, using all of the arguments from the written
out version. The student gives the speech one more time, using their flow and not referring to
the written out version of the speech (6, 4, or 3 minutes depending on speech given). The goal
should be to maintain the speed, word economy, and vocal emphasis that was present when
the speech was read.
Alternate Option for Drill: If another student or coach is not available, the student can record
original rebuttal redo and watch it to see ways in which the speech could have been faster or
more efficient.
Selling a Story
Materials Needed: A book, short story, or newspaper
Description: The student should read the text as persuasively as possible without sounding
insincere. The student should focus on identifying key words, not being overly animated, and
not stumbling over any words. Note that persuasively doesnt necessarily mean slowly -students can still speak at a brisk pace while commanding the attention of the room.
Optional: After practicing with a text, the student should repeat the drill with flows from an old
round. They should incorporate these persuasive techniques in selling the story of their case.
The Perfect Argument

Materials Needed: Case or flow
Description: Give an offensive response to an argument on the flow or an argument in case
using PERFECT word economy. This means you must (1) signpost the argument, (2) tag the
argument, (3) explain the argument's warrant, (4) explain the argument's implication, (5) relate
the implication to a decision calculus, and (6) weigh the argument without:
(a) filler words/sounds - "uhh," "like," "insofar," "uhm"
(b) unnecessary phrases - "you can extend/turn/flow," "this is going to be/you are going to/this is
always going to," "go to,"
(c) explaining your opponent's argument - "my opponent says [ENTIRE ARGUMENT]"
(d) redundant extensions or explanations
(e) using the passive voice - "this is harming" vs "this harms"
Work up from one argument all the way through a 2ar, if possible. This drill is extremely difficult
if done correctly.
Fairy Tale Dominance

Materials Needed: None
Drill Props: Drill Props T
Description: Being able to be dominant is important for all debaters, and one thing that makes
dominance difficult is when debaters are not confidence in their arguments. Reading a fairy tale
dominantly forces debaters to focus on the key words of a story -- much like the key words of
an argument -- without focusing on the silliness of the tale. This drill is especially useful for
debaters who get easily distracted and for debaters who are unable to pick out t he key words of
an argument.
Dont Screw Up Your Answer

Materials Needed: Case
Description: Read your case as fast and loud as you can. At random points in the case the drill
leader should ask you to clarify or explain the significance of the part you just read. Answer the
question at the same rate you were reading without pausing or stumbling then go back to
reading until the drill leader asks another question. If you make a mistake or stumble, do a predetermined number of push ups (two or three is suggested) then go back to reading.
Optional: The drill leader can ask you random questions instead of ones related to the case.
Speed/Stamina Drill
Materials Needed: Something to Read, Pen
Description: The student doing the drill should get out something long to read - enough that 10
minutes at their fastest speed wouldn't cover it. Good examples include Wikipedia articles, short
stories, or books.
The drill should then follow the following rubric, as timed and instructed by a coach, teammate,
mother, sister, aunt, grandmother, or by the student him/herself:
One Minute: Full Speed, Normal
45 Seconds: Pen in Mouth (The pen should be held in the students mouth by their back teeth,
but be sure the student still enunciates with the pen. Prompt the student to ""speak through the
pen"" if they seem to be having difficulty)
One Minute: Full Speed
45 seconds: Alternating "Aah"s (ex: "I aah affirm aah that aah resolved aah")
45 seconds: Backwards (Start from the end of the case, read words normally, but sentences
backwards. (ex: ""Affirm I Therefore Unjust Is Conscription Military"")
45 seconds: Deep Breathing (The student should take as deep a breath as possible, then speak
as long on that breath as possible, then repeat for the 45 seconds. Make sure the breaths are
deep, but quick.)
30 Seconds: Repeat ahh-bahh-dee over and over as quickly as possible.
30 Seconds: Blitz (Absolute top speed. Make them finish strong.)
The point of the drill is to have no time in between the sections of the drill, building the student's
stamina in speaking quickly. The drill runs longer than any speech, and if followed correctly, it
should help the stamina of the participating student.
Theory Drills
Building a Shell
Skill Served: Theory
Skill Level: All students, but better suited to intermediate or advanced students
Materials Needed:Pen, paper.
Drill Props: Drill Props S
Description: All students will construct a shell indicting an affirmative case that exclusively
defends that the US should take the resolutional action (ie The US should prioritize universal
human rights over national interest). Emphasis should be on fleshing out the technical aspects
of the shell without sacrificing an understanding of how the interpretation fits into a broader
evaluative paradigm. Students should not be allowed to simply rant about how unreasonable the
affirmative interpretation of the resolution is the argument should be grounded in terms of a
technical, rigorous objection. For non-advanced students, the shell should be generated on the
basis of a group discussion and written out clearly on the board if one is available. Mid- range
students should write a shell individually but with lots of consultation with the instructors.
Advanced students should write out a shell individually. After each shell is constructed, students
should deliver 90-second speeches advancing the shell. Really advanced students should be
given additional shells to write and should be given limited time to prepare them in order to
simulate writing a shell during prep-time. If an example theory shell is needed, Drill Props S may
be used.
Answering the Theory Skeptic

Drill Props: Drill Props L
Description: Have each student read a theory shell. Then read the skeptical objections to
theory. Give students prep time, varied based on skill level. They should have 3-5 minutes of
prep time. Then, have each student give a 3-4 minute speech where they extend the shell and
beat back the objections and extend their theory shell. Give comments and repeat until satisfied
with the quality of the responses.
Optional: After each speech, give the student more prep time to construct better responses. By
the end of the drill, each student should have had about 20 minutes to come up with responses
to these objections.
Answering a Shell/Advancing a Counter-Interp

Materials Needed:Pen, paper, theory shell
Drill Props: Drill Props S
Description: Students should either bring pre-written theory shells or use this drill to supplement
the Building a Shell drill. If none is available, the Drill Props S shell may be used. After selecting
the best theory shell from the group, all students will answer that theory shell in 90 seconds.
JV/Novice students will participate in a group discussion only about how to answer a shell and
advanced a counter-interpretation. All other students will give 90-second speeches advancing
the counter-interpretation. In doing so, all students should do more than simply defusing the
voting issue. Mid-range students should be expected to play defense against the negative
interpretation in addition to articulating the counter-interpretation shell. Advanced students
should be expected to be generating offense off of the shells standards, and weighing between
the standards. Really advanced students should be doing all of the above and defending a
particular evaluative paradigm (e.g. competing interpretations, reasonability). If there is enough
time, repeat this drill using another students theory shells.
Theory Hell 1AR

Skill Served: Theory, 1AR
Materials Needed: Pen, Paper, Theory Shells
Drill Props: If necessary, the Drill Props S theory shell can be used, but be aware that having
other theory arguments is necessary as well.
Description: The drill leader will read a case that is susceptible to multiple theory violations and
then read 4 to 12 minutes of theory arguments against the AC. This should involve fewer, welldeveloped theory arguments rather than a lot of brief ones. Students should then be given 5 to
10 minutes to prepare a 1AR that wins the round. The length of the NC speech should vary
based on the skill level of the students.
Alternate Option for Drill: Less experience students may benefit from a discussion prior to their
preparation period. They may also benefit from being initially given an extra long 1AR with the
goal of bringing it down to 4 minutes by the end of the drill.
Drill
Props
Drill Props A
I affirm.
Thihan Nyun writes that: [Thihan Myo Nyun (Fellow , Frederick K. Cox International Law
Center,
Case
Western
Reserve University School of Law), Feeling Good or

Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Against the
Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, Washington University
Global Studies Law Review, 2008]
A further synthesis of the literature reveals the follow ing definition, w hich will be used for this Article: economic
sanctions
withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations imposed by the sender
against the target, for foreign policy purposes. Under this approach, economic sanctions are limited to
restrictions on trade, investment, and other cross-border economic activity that reduce
the target countrys revenues thereby facilitating the desired change without resorting to
military action. Because one of the primary rationales behind economic sanctions is to avoid
military conflict altogether measures that are used in concert with military engagement are
not considered economic sanctions under this definition. Likew is e, diplomatic protests and economic coercions
are the
actual or threatened
that are meant to obtain general leverage in trade negotiations are not economic sanctions. In addition, threatened or actual
retaliations w ithin the international trading system that are undertaken in the course of trade disputes are outside the parameters of
economic sanctions. The reduction and suspension of economic aid and other trade preferences, depending on whether they are
considered carrots or stic ks, can sometimes be w ithin the confines of economic sanctions.
The topic questions the use of sanctions generally without modifiers like all or
some. Thus the only textually legitimate burdens are ones that requires us to affirm or
negate in general or on balance. Textuality precedes other standards since the text of the
topic is all were given before the round and thus the only grounds for any degree of
predictability or pre-round prep. Debating on balance means we weigh impacts
quantitatively to see if sanctions ought be used in a given case, but numerically across
cases to see how often they ought be used and thus whether they ought be used on
balance. If I like chocolate a bit better than vanilla nearly all the time but theres one kind
of chocolate I really hate, I would still say that I prefer chocolate to vanilla on balance
regardless of whether my distaste for that one kind is quantitatively greater than my
preference for every other kind. Similarly, it would be absurd to say that one case where
we really ought use sanctions shows that we ought use them in general even if theyre a
bad idea in every other case.
Just as it would be unfair to let the neg win just by showing that sanctions should
be kept as a tool in the toolbox even if that tool only gets used in a few exceptional
cases, it would be unfair to let me win by showing that they ought not be used for the
vast majority of foreign policy goals where no one would ever suggest using them in the
first place. Thus, the question posed by the topic is whether sanctions ought be used
more often than not, with respect the cases where their use is actually contemplated.
While its hard to quantify the percentage of cases being affirmed or negated by a given
argument, the actual use of sanctions in the status quo provides a baseline against
which to measure on balance burdens, which should be preferred in terms of
debatability since it provides a clear and adjudicable brightline for the ballot, as well as
real-world relevance and access to lit since it focuses the debate on those borderline
sanction cases most discussed in the lit. Thus, my burden is to show that sanctions
ought be used significantly less often than they are in the status quo, while neg can
defend either the squo use of sanctions or an expansion thereof.
[Apart from their non-textuaity, arguments for negation based solely on one or a few use s
of sanctions should be excluded in terms of (a) reciproci ty, since they force one debater to win all
case s of the topic while the other only has to win one, and (b) predictability since there are a
plethora of case s debaters can choose to prep in far greater depth than their opponents, making
such debates lopsided and structurally unfair. ]
[The qualifier to achieve foreign policy objectives limits the range of justifications for
sanctions were debating. Showing that sanctions are j ustified by deontic moral rules or by their
protective effect on dome sti c industrie s in the sanctioning country, for instance, wouldnt negate
since it show s that sanctions ought be used for those reasons, but not to achieve foreign policy
objectives. Letting the neg claim any desirable outcome or feature of a foreign policy as a foreign
policy objective clearly violates the textual meaning of the topic in that it make s the qualifier
vacuous, so that the topic might as well just have said ought not be used. ]
The aff has the right to frame the debate in order to facilitate AC argumentation
and compensate for time skew, so you prefer my reading of the topic so long as my
arguments are reasonably topical and open to substantive answers. [Theoretical objections
to AC framework should be viewed as que stions of abuse rather than competing interpretation,
since Im forced to adopt some reading of the topic in the AC, and letting the neg simply argue
that another reading might have been slightly better i s non -reciprocal in that it gives negs the
option of winning by debating either my arguments for the re solution or my interpretation of it
while I have to defend both. ]
The topic questions a particular means of achieving policy goals. Such policy
questions are framed not just by a set of substantive goals and values, like human rights
or national interest, but also by a process for imple menting those goals through things
like legislation and bureaucratic execution. Regardless of the goals of policy, and thus
independent of values like morality or justice, the procedures for selecting policy tools in
a given case must be sound for any goals to be consistently achieved. Further, policy
tools have no inherent efficacy apart from the means by which policymakers decide
how to implement them, since the existence of such decision structures and the fallibility
of the humans who inhabit the m are inherent features of all policy. Thus, we ought to
prefer policies that are implemented through sound decision procedures, so the
necessary standard is optimizing the internal rationality of policymaking.
This standard demands that we try to minimize both the role of human error in
policy decisions, and agency problems that arise when decision-makers have political
incentives to act in ways that dont best serve the interests of the nation. Its a
prerequisite to any neg standard since even if sanctions can serve some normative goal
when used right, if I show that theyre used wrong more often than not then their ability
to serve those goals is undercut and in general they ought not be used.
I contend that most sanctions result from a hugely non-optimal policy decision
process, and thus that they ought not be used in general both since they are uniquely
prone to misuse and thus should be dispreferred relative to other policy tools, and since
theyre prone to overuse, meaning that an ideally rational policy process would take
steps to compensate for that trend and limit their use. Simon Cox explains why sanctions
pose a unique challenge for effective policy-making: [Simon Cox (Economics correspondent for The
Economist), Are Economic Sanctions Good Foreign Policy?, Council on Foreign
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13853/are_economic_sanctions_good_foreign_policy.html]
Relations,
27
July
2007,
That w is h aside, I share much of your bracing skepticism about sanctions. If I w ere to express this skepticism crudely, I w ould say
[T]he problem with economic diplomacy is that it is carried out by diplomats not
economists. They think of states as unitary actors, hence it makes perfect sense to
them to disable a sewage plant in order to punish a dictator, because both are Iraq in
their eyes. Because they do not understand how economies work, they fail to understand
that sanctions can be both more damaging than one might expectdisrupting the
delicate mechanisms by which a society provisions itselfand less effectivebecause as
you say, economies adapt. To a diplomat, trade belongs to the low politics of profit not
prestige. Economists, on the other hand, prize trade and are used to thinking about who gains
and who loses from it [and] understand that to let trade continue unimpeded is not to do
nothing. International commerce can be subversive in its own way, nibbling at the cozy
monopolies that sustain many powerful figures, imposing the discipline of the market on
leaders accustomed to getting their own way. Thus, decision-makers miss both ways in
which sanctions might fail and ways in which continued trade might better achieve the
intended goals of sanctions.
,
. They
Further, time constraints on the policy process prejudice actors in favor of

sanctions despite the lack of sufficient information to determine their full effects. Gavin
writes: [Joseph G. Gavin III (associate Washington representative and manager, trade policy, for the U.S. Council for
International Business), Economic Sanctions: Foreign Policy Levers Or
November 7, 1989, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa124.html]
Signals?, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No 124,
Policymakers review menus of possible responses that are often rapidly prepared
[rapidly]. Military responses are usually ruled out as too drastic or unviable ; for example, there
is w idely reported Pentagon opposition to military action against Noriega. Among the remaining [choices,]
possibilities, economic sanctions usually appear tougher than traditional diplomatic moves that are
widely perceived as weak. Moreover, [T]here may [also] be arguments that it is necessary to keep
diplomatic channels open or to maintain intelligence sources in the target ed country. There
may also be a need to demonstrate that the grievance is so serious that the United States is not afraid to rise above its commercial
intereststhat it is willing to make economic sacrific es to make its policy point (consistent w ith the rough hierarchy of values posited
above). Economic responses loom large on the list and within this category some types of sanctions loom larger than others. For
example, grain export controls leap out from any list of economic measures against the Soviet Union because grain sales generally
account for the lion's share of U.S. exports to the Soviets and because Soviet harvests are so unpredictable. (In 1979 U.S. g rain
Typically, there is
little chance to thoroughly explore the possibility of multilateral cooperation, to
determine availability of the denied goods in the global market , or to consult with
affected U.S. businesses. While there is relatively little written on the decisionmaking that underlies various economic
sanction policies, the outlines of the dynamic are suggested by Carswell: Foreign [P]olicymakers do not always
give weight to the appropriateness, or cost-effectiveness, of the imposition of a unilateral economic
sanction[s] by the United States. Rather than w ork through rigorous analysis , they [but rather] justify the[ir]
imposition of a sanction by some variation of sonorous themes: some action is necessary;
there is no other appropriate response available, a political or military response is too ris ky; the U S must
and soybean exports accounted for about 77 percent of the total value of U.S. exports to the USSR-[29])
place
nited
tates
show leadership
and it w ill take too long, or it is too doubtful a prospect, to attempt a coordinated response w ith one's
allies.
Next, perverse political incentives drive the overuse of sanctions to give the
appearance of action even if cases where theyll do no good . Hufbauer et al write: [Hufbauer,
Shott, and Elliott 1990 Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.
Schott. Washington Institute for International Economics.]
Indeed one suspects that in some cases domestic political goals were the motivating
force behind the imposition of sanctions. Such measures often succeed in galvanizing public
support for the sender government, either by inflaming patriotic fever (as illustrated by US
sanctions against Japan just prior to World War II) or by quenching the public thirst for action (as illustrated by
,
US sanctions against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafis adventurism in norther Afric a and elsewhere, and later against Manuel
US, European, and British

Commonw ealth sanctions against South Africa, as well as US, EC, and Japanese sanctions
against China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, were principally designed to
assuage domestic constituencies, to make a moral and historical statement, and to send
a warning to future offenders of the internal order , whatever their immediate effect on the target
country.
Noriega for many months prior to the actual invasion of Panama). It is quite clear that
Margaret Doxey writes:

Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Food and Fuel
[Margaret Doxey, Oil and Food as International Sanctions, Canadian International

(Spring, 1981), pp. 311-334, http://www.js tor.org/stable/40201958]
Finally [T]he resort to economic punishment or coercion may be intended to satisfy public
opinion at homewhether this is to reassure the public that its country is still a great
power and that its leadership is capable of taking retaliatory action or to meet a general
demand for collective action against international law-breakers. Part of the British government's readiness to
,
support League action against Italy in 1935 seems to have deriv ed from the strong pro-League position revealed by the Peace
Ballot; certainly the United States government's response to the hostage crisis in Iran and to the Soviet intervention in Afghanis tan
was a response to public outrage. Given this wide range of objectives whic h are not mutually exclusive, it can be argued that
[T]he direct impact bite of the sanctions may not be of paramount importance. Indeed [I]f the
prime objective is to satisfy the demand for action from external or internal sources, the
availability of some link which can be conspicuously and inexpensively severed will be
most relevant.
('
')
And, sanctions protect incumbent politicians by letting them show leadership.

Hufbauer 2: [Ibid.] Sanctions also serve important domestic political purposes iin addition to sometimes
changing the behavior of foreign states. As David Lloyd George , then a leader of the British political opposition, remarked
of the celebrated League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1935, [that] They came too late to
save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the Government (Row land 1975,
723). The same is true today. What president or Kremlin leader for that matterhas not been
obsessed with the need to demonstrate leadership, to take initiative to shape world affairs,
or at least to react forcefully to adverse developments? And what presidentor Kremlin
leaderis eager to go to war to make his point? The desire to be seen acting forcefully, but
not to precipitate [without] bloodshed, can easily overshadow specific foreign policy goals.
s
Further, experts and policymakers systematically overestimate the causal efficacy

of sanctions by ignoring the role of other policy tools in cases where sanctions correlate
with target concessions. Gavin writes: [Joseph G. Gavin III (associate Washington representativ e and manager,
trade policy, for the U.S. Council for International Business), Economic Sanctions: Foreign Policy Levers Or
Institute Policy Analy sis No 124, November 7, 1989, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa124.html]
Signals?,
Cato
A fundamental logic governs judgments about the success of sanctions In cases in w hich [where] sanctions are
imposed to cause a change of policy, it is clear that they are not working if the desired
policy change is not forthcomingalthough the result may take a w hile to play out. However, the positive
case is not so simple. Even if the desired result does occur, it may not be caused by the
sanctions. In such cases there is a correlation between the sanctions and the desired
result, but the causative role of the sanctions is uncertain. In political practice that
problem is neatly finessed by policymakers who quickly declare the success of the
sanctions.
.
log ical
And, the resulting overuse of sanctions trades off with the efficacy of other
foreign policy tools. Moore writes: [Ronald Moore, OSD, The Paradox of Sanctions as a Tool of
Statecraft, report for the National War College (National Defense University, Washington DC), 2000,
http://www.dtic .mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430993&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]
In recent years, expressive sanctions have been overused and misused, and on
balance I believe this has had a negative effect on U.S. statecraft. The sheer carelessness of our use of
expressive sanctions rais es serious doubts regarding their ability to promote the worthy goals we set for them. Lee Hamilton has
observed that, One of the most
alarming aspect of U.S. sanctions policy is the weak information

base on which most sanctions decisions are made. This lack of deliberation is not lost on
international opinion. As a consequence of our misuse of sanctions, we have
undermined U.S. credibility and prestige in the international arena, eroded our leadership
and the alliance relationships we rely upon to promote shared values and intere sts
throughout the world, and flouted the system of collective security. These strains on our liberal
s
hegemony are exacerbated by attempts to extend sanctions extra-territorially. Because economic globalization extends the reach of
[E]xpressive sanctions have had the further drawback

of undercutting the reliability and the competitive position of U.S. business. This constrains the
U.S. role in economically and geographic ally strategic markets, and complicates the pursuit of
domestic consensus [on] foreign policy [goals] objectives. This assessment of expressive sanctions can be
foreign commercial interests as well as our own,
for
summed up in the words of a former senior official in the Commerce Department, w ho wrote, Unfortunately, the idea of using
economic policy as an instrument of foreign policy has been degraded through misapplication. Sanctions have become the lazy
mans foreign policy.
Thus, sanctions have hidden costs for the whole system of foreign
policy, making their frequent use antithetical to the internal rationality of policy.
Next, democratic publics support sanctions too readily since their costs are less
evident than those of other policy tools. Cox 2 writes: [Simon Cox (Economics correspondent for The
Economist), Are Economic Sanctions Good Foreign Policy?, Council on Foreign
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13853/are_economic_sanctions_good_foreign_policy.html]
Relations,
27
July
2007,
Its customary in these debates to invoke Woodrow Wilson so let me be the first to do so. He described
embargoes and boycotts as a peaceful silent, deadly remedy. Its partly the silence that makes
them so deadly. When a country bombs or invades its enemies, everyone pays attention.
The costs and rewards of the venture are agonized over. But a big economy, such as
Americas, can lay siege to a small one for years without its citizens paying too much
attention to the embargos grim but unspectacular effects. This is partly because people suffer from a
lack of economic imagination. They [People] can readily picture the damage of a bomb blast, but
struggle to think through the indirect and insidious ramifications [effects] of a boycott.
,
Cox furthers: [Dan G. Cox (Department of Government, Social Work, and Sociology, Missouri Western State
College) and A. Cooper Drury (Department of Political Science, University of Missouri), Democratic Sanctions: Connecting
the
Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions, Journal
of
Peace
Research
2006,
http://web.missouri.edu/~drurya/artic lesandpapers/JPR2006.pdf]
A second reason [D]emocracies sanction often is that [because] sanctions are non-violent.
When a democratic public takes note of an international dispute, it seems more likely that they
will support the non-violent alternative sanctionsover military force. While the recent
devastating effects of the sanctions against the former Iraq regime as well as [and] Haitian military junta
in the 1990s call into question their humanitarian nature and show that sanctions can have
deadly effects, economic sanctions are still less directly violent and deadly than military
action, especially at the outset (Weiss, 1999) .
i
This failure to appreciate costs is a critical barrier to rational policymaking since

those costs are potentially enormous. Justin Stalls writes: [Justin Stalls, Economic Sanctions,
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003.]
The instrumental effects of economic sanctions upon the target State are in part economic but
also include the human costs of suffering and death. Severe economic sanctions are bound to
impoverish the majority of the population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural,
industrial, educational and health systems while spreading crime and corruption. Sending
States ultimately believe that denying a nation the benefits of trade will cause it to suffer, and that suffering will
induce a willingness to bargain. As [and as] a result of this belief, sending States aim to make the
consequences suffered by the target State as dire as possible. In fact, economic [S]anctions may have
contributed to more deaths during the post-Cold War era than all weapons of mass
destruction throughout history. For example, various agencies of the United Nations . . . have [The UN has]
estimated that they [economic sanctions against Iraq] have contributed to hundreds of
thousands of deaths. This massive cost is a direct result of economic sanctions.
,
human
Lastly, even if the choice to use sanctions were made with full rationality as
regards the goals and values of the sender state, their use to resolve disputes is still
irrational since it presumes without justification that the policy preferences of the sender
should supersede those of the target. Babic et al write: [Babic, Jovan and Aleksandar Jokic. Economic
sanctions, morality and escalation of demands on Yugoslavia. International
126.]
Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 119-
The rationality of sanctions precisely presupposes this kind of [an] initial inequality of power in
the case of comparable power structure the war-like character of the conflict would have been fully vis ible from the outset. What
country would voluntarily tolerate the blockade of its borders and restrictions on its
freedom and well-being that ensues from it? Thus, clearly [I]n a case of power equilibrium sanctions
could play no role what ever. The disproportionality of power is an element of the logic
of decision making in this context. Thus, insisting in any given case that sanctions are
unfair carries no weight. For if the side imposing sanctions did not believe itself to be in
the rightthe proof of which is only in the effectiveness of accomplishing the [its] set
goals, and nothing elsethey would not get involved in this activity in the first place. This only goes to
show that [Thus] sanctions, as a dis tribution of power, are a way of making a claim that one is entitled
to construct on behalf of others what their definition of value ought to be. That means
coercive policies like sanctions should at best be reserved for cases like genocide where
senders can have legitimate moral confidence that successfully coercing the target state
so
to change its policies would in fact be a net good and not just a case of might making
right. This would restrict the use of sanctions for low-politic goals like leveraging trade
policy, substantially limiting their status quo use.
Thus, since sanctions are uniquely prone to misuse, and so should therefore be
used rarely if at all, I affirm.
Drill Props B
I affirm. Adiss defines economic sanctions.
[Adeno Addis [Professor of Public and Constitutional Law at Tulane University Law School]. Economic Sanctions and the Problem of
Evil. Human Rights Quarterly 25.3 (2003) 573-623]
The phrase "economic
sanctions" means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a

target country, such as trade, investment, and other cross-border activities.
I value optimal foreign policy since the resolution is a question of state policy.
Ought is typically defined as one of the following four definitions
used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself >, natural
expectation <ought to be here by now >, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>.
All collapse into desirability. A state, the actor, exists primarily to solve collective action
problems. As such, a state cannot be obligated to act in a manner that is inadvisable.
And states care about utility over following principles. Hasnas writes [Hasnas, John. Ass. Prof.
Business Ethics at Georgetown University
and a Senior Research Fellow at the Kennedy Institute, 1995] ,
The individual rights that our society acknowledges often conflict in this way, and when they do it is the
job of government to discriminate. If the Government makes the right choice, and protects the more important at
the cost of the less, then it has not weakened or cheapened the notion of a right; on the contrary it w ould have done so had it failed
to protect the more important of the two. So we must acknow ledge that the Government has a reason for limiting rights if it plausibly
Thus, although the government may not abridge

fundamental rights on utilitarian grounds, when rights conflict it may do so to preserve
the more important underlying interest.(108) But consider now that if the government is required to resolv e
believes that a competing right is more important.(107)
conflicts of rights, it must first determine w hich of the interests underlying the conflicting rights is of greater moral significance. What
the only ethical theory

that is definite and simple enough to serve as a practical political morality is
utilitarianism.(109) The government is comprised not of philosophers, but of practicallyminded lawyers, economists, statisticians, and other social scientists who are neither
trained in nor familiar with the vagaries of moral philosophy. Whether politician, bureaucrat, or judge,
virtually all government officials have been trained that when their actions are not constrained by people's
rights or other constitutional barriers, their duty is to produce the greatest good for the greatest number- - to promote
general utility. Furthermore, because governmental decision-making must be capable of
objective justification to the public, the nature of the job simply precludes any approach
that relies primarily upon a person's moral intuitions. Therefore, as a practical matter, the only basis the
basis does the government have for making such value judgments? As we have previously seen,
government has for making comparative assessments of value is its judgment as to w hat w ill best serve the common good. As
remarked earlier, for the government, utilitarian analysis is necessarily standard operating procedure.(110) This means that when
the government is called upon to resolve a conflict of rights by deciding w hic h of the underly ing interests are of greater relative
importance, it w ill appeal to the only basis for making comparative value judgments that is available to it, utilitarianism. Thus, this
determination w ill be made on the basis of whic h interest is more productive of general utility.
As a result, conflicts of
rights will typically be resolved by an appeal to what will

best promote social welfare.
Thus, states must look towards a utility calculus. However, States cannot justify rights as
being domestic jurisdiction only, for this allows other states to ignore any morality in
international affairs and attack that states citizens AND If we wish to view ourselves as
rational agents capable of having moral worth this view is only sensible if we view all
other humans in the same way because it is our humanity that allots us this worth in the
first place. Thus the value criterion is maximizing the protection of the rights.
I defend removing all existing and future economic sanctions on Iran. Sanctions on Irans
gasoline imports are coming. Support in congress is very strong.
Patrick Disney & Lara Friedman 4/22/10 [Changing course on Iran sanctions. THE HILL. April 22, 2010.
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/93905-changing-course-on-iran-sanctions]
New sanctions on Iran are about the surest bet in Washington these days. Both the House and
the Senate have passed a crippling gasoline embargo, and the administration has all
but given up talk of negotiations in favor of pressing for UN Security Council sanctions
that bite. In fact, the only thing left that the administration and Congress disagree on is whether the new
sanctions should target all of Iranian society or just the hardliners in power not an
insignificant dis agreement by any measure, but one that underscores the broader acceptance of the argument that new
sanctions are the only game in town.
And, the House has set a deadline for senate actions on the new sanctions bill for May
28th. These new sanctions would be disastrous. Iran would interpret a US gas embargo
as an act of war, likely causing a naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz.
Christian Science Monitor 4/23 [Editorial Board of The Christian Science Monitor Sanctions on Iran's gasoline
imports? That's war talk. CSM. April 23, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2010/0423/Sanctions-onIran-s-gasoline-imports-That-s-war-talk]
In this post-9/11 age, the idea of preemptive war against a terroris t-prone country supposedly went out of favor after the 2003 US
Congress is now pushing President Obama toward steps that could easily
be interpreted as an act of war against Iran over its nuclear ambitions. The House and Senate are moving
invasion of Iraq. Yet
quickly on a bill to force US sanctions on the sale of gasoline to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In theory, the measure would only
punish US and foreign companies that export ref ined oil products to Iran whic h, despite being a major exporter of petroleum, lacks
The only way to really enforce such a crippling sanction

against the Iranian economy would be through an American-led naval blockade which, by
international law, is an act of war. In recent days, Irans regime has made it pretty clear that it is
preparing to fight such a blockade , if it comes to that. Irans Revolutionary Guard Corps began a fiveday sea, land, and air military exercise April 22 in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The w ar
games may even extend to the Strait of Hormuz, the watery chokepoint through whic h a fif th of the worlds oil flows on
sufficient oil refineries. But theres a big problem:
giant tankers, and which is guarded by the US Navy. History is instructive here: It w as a US ban on the export of oil to Imperial
Japan for its invasion of China that triggered the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. And a US naval blockade of Cuba in 1962 almos t led
on April 22, the House of Representatives voted by a huge

403-11 margin to set a deadline of May 28 for an agreement with the Senate on the gasoline
sanctions. In the Senate, too, patience with President Obamas slow and often faltering approach to
Iran is running thin. We have waited long enough for diplomacy to work, says Senate
majority leader Harry Reid. Iran is a festering sore in the world. Mr. Obama may be able to fend off
to nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Also
pressure from Congress to strangle Irans economy w ith sanctions on its gasoline imports. But much depends on whether countries
like China, Russia, and even Germany are willing to impose other types of penalties that are more targeted at top members of the
regime, especially the Revolutionary Guard and its affiliated companies. The toughest ones proposed by Obama focus on Irans
access to banking, insurance, and credit. The White House hopes the UN Security Council w ill agree by early May to a package of
new sanctions. The US has been successful since 2006 in having the Council ratchet up pressure on Iran as that country further
defies calls for it to open its secret nuclear program to international inspections . The West is especially w orried about Irans rush to
produce bomb-grade uranium. Chinas cooperation is essential. It recently hinted that it is ready to support some of Obamas
proposed sanctions. Critical to Chinas support are offers from Arab oil exporters to make up for its loss of oil exports from Iran.
Another signal of Chinas support was a visit by its Navy to the United Arab Emirates last month. Hovering over these moves is the
threat of Israeli air attacks on Irans nuclear facilities. Israel did strike Iraqs nuclear plant in 1981 and a Syrian one in 2007. The US
opposes such an Israeli operation, whic h could create an uncertain escalation of conflict in the Middle East. But some experts say
the US w ould have a tough time restraining Israel if that country attacks Iran before the US elections this November. Support for
US sanctions on gas imports

to Iran could lead to a naval confrontation. Such a measure should only be taken with the widest international
Israel is very high in Congress. US law makers need to be concerned that any unilateral
support and only if Iran appears ready to deploy a nuclear weapon that would destabilize the region. Similar conditions w ere not in
place before President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq, and that war effort suffered for it. Preemptive war, even if it
only a naval blockade, should never be done lightly.
The risk of conflict in the Strait of Hormuz is high.

Ian Bremmer and David Gordon 1/6 [president of Eurasia Group, Head of research for the Eurasia Group. Top Risk No.
2: Iran Foreign Policy. January 6, 2010. http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/06/top_ris k_no_2_iran]
By far the biggest purely geopolitical risk in 2010 comes from Iran.
Its government now faces

grow ing pressure on three fronts. At home, the regime has had a tough time since last June's presidential election; hardliners had
initially consolidated, but are now under intensifying pressure as domestic protests continue. Regionally, Tehran has lost
considerable influence, with elections in Lebanon turning against Hizbullah, rising Iraqi nationalism making it harder for Tehran to
exert influence upon their principal his toric competitors, and Iran's financial outpost in Dubai put at risk by the grow ing influence of
Globally, Iran faces a considerably tougher sanctions regime over its nuclear
program, a push spearheaded by the United States, Europe, and Japan, w ith even Russia and China unhappy
Abu Dhabi.
over Tehran's aggressive rhetoric . A Western push for negotiations w ill continue, but divis ive local politics and insufficient leadership
coordination make it very unlikely that Iran's leadership could reach a negotiated settlement even if it wanted one. And it doesn't.
Even under considerable domestic pressure, the hardliners in charge of the regime will continue
to try to buy time to achieve their nuclear ambitions. That's why the government is likely
to overreact to sanctions when they hit. 2010 carries the highest risk to date of Iranian
provocation in the region, in the form of harassment of shipping in and around the Strait
of Hormuz, support for radic al organizations in neighboring countries, and instigation of trouble for Iraq and other neighbors in
demonstrations of muscle. The Iranian regime looks increasingly like a cornered, wounded animal. In 2010, it's likely to act like one.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz would provide an ideal way for Iran to retaliate to US or UN
sanctions. The resulting conflict would likely escalate to full blown conflict.
The Strauss Center
[Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the Persian Gulf The Robert S. Strauss
Center
for
International
Security
and
Law,
The
University
of
Texas
at
Austin.
August
2008.
http://hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/ir an_first]
Since the Bush administration took office, Iran has faced increased international scrutiny concerning the objectives of its nuclear
programs. The United Nations Security Council has imposed a series of economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iran, demanding
Iran could try to use military leverage

over the Strait of Hormuz as part of its strategy to respond to tightening sanctions.
Analysts often consider tit-for-tat retaliation against sanctions: the U.S. (or UN) is hurting
Iran's economy, and at some point, the Iranians may decide they want to try to relieve that pressure by
hurting the U.S. (or global) economy. But Iran earns most of its income from its oil exports, so instead of sanctioning the U.S.
(and the world) with an oil embargo, Iran might prefer to try to keep selling its own oil but to take a few shots at
other oil exporters' tankers as they pass through the Strait of Hormuz perhaps with an
isolated missile attack on one ship in the Gulf or a quick deployment of a few mines to cause
alarm in the shipping community. Alternativ ely, Iran could use military activity in the Strait to create a
greater transparency and more rigorous inspections of its nuclear installations.
quick crisis to pressure the international community to negotiate an end to the

sanctions. But it is difficult to modulate the intensity of military attacks, and this military
"signaling" might easily escalate to uncontrolled warfare in the Strait of Hormuz.
AND, US actions to unblock the Strait of Hormuz would likely lead to military escalation.
Caitlin Talmadge writes: [Doctoral candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she
is a member of the Security Studies Program. During the 200708 academic year, she was a fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for
Strategic Studies at Harvard University." Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz" International Security,
volume 33, issue 1, pages 82-117. Summer 2008]
U.S. intervention in defense of the sealanes. Given that the United States has staked its credibility on promises to do just that, this is a threshold that Irans
significant and growing littoral warfare capabilities can cross , even w ith fairly conservativ e
assumptions about Iranian capabilities.13 In particular, Iran possesses a larger stockpile of missiles and
mines ten times as pow erful as those used in the tanker w ars of the 1980s, the last period of sustained naval conflict in the gulf.
If Iran managed to lay even a relatively small number of these mines in the strait, the
United States certainly would act to clear the area. But the experience of past mine warfare campaigns suggests that it could take many weeks, even months, to restore the full
flow of commerce, and more time still for the oil markets to be convinced that stability
had returned. More important, once the United States decided to clear the strait of mines, the
potential for further military escalation would be high, especially given U.S. casualty sensitivity. The United States
mine w arfare assets are designed to be used only in permissivethat is , nonthreateningenvironments. The United States
would want to locate and destroy any sources of Iranian are on its mine countermeasure (MCM) ships. In particular,
it w ould want to eliminate Irans land-based, antiship cruise missile (ASCM ) batteries and targeting
radars, which are mobile and likely protected by Iranian air defenses. The aerial hunt for
these assets could add days, weeks, or even months to the time needed to clear the strait, and
quickly develop into a large and sustained air and naval campaign , depending on Irans strategy for
expending the missiles and its skill in hiding the batteries and radars. The United States might then face the
dilemma of continuing this difficult search, or ending it by engaging in an even broader coercion
campaign against other targets in Iran or escalating to the use of ground forces. These options would be about
The question is whether Iran can harass shipping enough to prompt
as palatable to the United States as they would be comforting to the world oil market
A war with Iran would be catastrophic. The US would sustain terrible losses in both lives
and global Influence. The end result of this disaster would leave the US irrelevant.
Arnold Evans 1/31 [ What w ould a US w ar w ith Iran Look Like? Middle East Reality. January 31, 2010.
http://mideastreality.blogspot.com/2010/01/what-would-us-war-w ith-iran-look-like.html]
Once the actual overt attack on Iran happens, Iran is able to move its conflict with the United
States into the open. Now there are Iranian units operating at least in Afghanis tan and Iraq, possibly als o in Pakistan, but
possibly Iran will continue operating through proxies in Pakistan. Also, because the US escalated hostilities and attacked Ir an
against the advice and request of the Iraqis and Afghans, Maliki and Karzai, the political w ill to help the US fend off the Iranians,
even if it was possible to do so, does not exist in either country, especially Iraq. The US cannot count on Iraqi troops to s upply its
bases any more. Now US troops have to come out and defend the convoys. I don't know if the US is going to try to take and hold
Iranian territory, but if it does, it w ill find a dug-in prepared and resource-rich insurgency pre-positioned that w ill immediately surpass
the worst insurgency-based fighting the US has faced so far in Iraq. If not, US activity in Iran w ill be limited to air strikes. Air strikes
did not remove Hussein from power, did not remove Hezbollah from power, didn't even remove Hamas from power. All air str ikes
accomplish practically is build an image of a cowardly armed forces that are only effectiv e when targeting civ ilians and civ ilian
infrastructure. The US w ill get some hospitals, some pow er plants, some water-purif ication plants but these will outrage the world.
There w ill not be direct consequences for this outrage the colonies of Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Turkey w ill be under
tremendous pressure to end its alliance with the United States and Israel, possibly irretrievably . That w ill be the most important
immediate diplomatic consequence, but the rest of the free Muslim w orld will turn against the US in ways that w ill be harmful later.
There may or may not be attacks on mainland US targets. There very likely w ill be attacks on Western European allies of the US.
These w ill not be decisive, but will cause the citizens of Western countries to feel some discomfort from this w ar. I honestly do not
think Hamas or Hezbollah w ould need to be activ ated against Israel, even if it was Israel that launched the first attack because Iran
can attack the US directly more effectively while holding Hamas and Hezbollah capabilities in reserve, so that they can continue to
deter Israeli attacks on their territories. Eventually the situation will stabilize w ith the US taking constant casualties in defending the
supply lines to its forces in Iraq and/or Afghanistan while Iran is under US bombing but not nearly enough to dis place the regime.
With direct Iranian involvement I think it would be conservative to project a death rate for
US troops of twice the peak death rate from the Iraq occupation. Iran already produces surface to air
missiles, but not the most advanced in the world. On the other hand, Russia produces state of the art shoulder fired anti-air missiles.
Russian "organiz ed crime" groups could "smuggle" w eapons to the Iranians, just because the longer the US remains in a losing
stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan, the less able it is to influence Russia's regions of interest. Hillary Clinton can complain to the
Russians about the "smuggling" but the Russian reply would be "or what?". Once
firing starts, Russia wants and

likely can achieve a reversal of World War II. The US post war advantage over Europe and
Russia, that has been eroding since that war, can be fully dissolved before the US gets out of Iraq and Afghanistan. If Iran
needs help to cause this to happen, it has good internal supply lines, connections and resources
to do so. Russia also has its own nuclear deterrent. The US has no leverage to prevent Russia from
draining it the way the US did when the USSR invaded Afghanistan. This means Russia
has an interest in preventing Iran from running out of material to continue its war effort
and may w ell do so. We have not talked about the Persian Gulf. At some point, shipping is likely to stop because tankers, one way
or another, w ill be destroyed as they try to pass. More importantly though, the
US Navy has not come under

serious fire in a long time and how it fares under fire is important information that both
the Russians and Chinese have an interest in acquiring. If Chinese "triads" "smuggle" antiship weapons to Iran, they will be able to experiment on active US Naval defense
syste ms that will provide data for Chinese planners of contingencies involv ing Taiw an and designers of
future weapons systems. Possibly an attack will get lucky and cause huge financial damage and
hundreds or thousands of US troop deaths. Clinton w ill complain but China's reply will be "or what?" The US
does not have a credible response to unprovable Chinese activity while it is already engaged in a war w ith Iran. In Iraq, the US
has to decide to continue trying to supply the troops, or fight their way out of the country. Either w ay, the US is no longer
effectively able to influence Iraq's government or armed forces and Iraq will now be a
fully Iran-friendly state bordering Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Israel is committed to defending Jordan and while there will
not be a set-piece invasion, Iranian and Iraqi teams w ill be able to enter nearly at will and apply pressure to the Jordanian colonial
Iran certainly will direct all of the country's

scientific resources toward building a [nuclear] weapon. Pakistan, outraged by the US'
attacks on Iranian civilians will be difficult to deter from assisting in any way the y can. It
is very unlikely that Iran has not built a weapon two years after the shooting started . It w ill
dictatorship. Lastly we have not talked about Iran's nuclear program.
not use the weapon in this conflict, but once it has it, the situation on the ground has changed permanently. Iran will not give up the
weapon once it has it under any circumstances, under any government even if in the distant future somehow the US gets regime
change somehow . Iran will be bombed the w ay Lebanon, Iraq and Gaza were bombed. Unlike Gaza, the US w ill not be able to
prevent rebuilding. The
US will face, conservatively, 200 US deaths a month until US voters decide
they've had enough. Leaving means either suing for peace and paying reparations to Iran or the soldiers evacuating under fire,
Once the US is gone, its positions in Afghanistan and Iraq will be

gone with it. It w ill also have lost Turkey and the colonies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia w ill be under more pressure than
leaving their material behind.
they've ever been under. Iran w ill rebuild, be fully nuclear and by the calculations of the Iranians, the war can be expected to
produce both national cohesion and in some engineering schools and seminaries w ill be Khomeinis and Ahmadinejads for who have
been radicalized and taught the importance of ideological sacrif ice preparing them as leaders of future generations. With the US
Iran will regain its position as

the dominant power of the region. The US ability to project force into the Middle East will
be permanently diminished and US financing of this expanded war will accelerate the US'
having no further appetite to intervene in the Middle East, it w ill be relatively soon that
decline as an economic power. How did this war start again? The US didn't w ant Iran to have the capability, in
theory, the make a nuclear weapon because that would mean Israel w ould lose what it considers its necessary ability to threaten its
neighbors? It is very likely that a generation of Americans further removed from WWII w ill reconsider the US commitment to Israel
after this war. Russia w ill be the undisputed winner as it benefits not only from the US losing position relatively and the US' inability
to concentrate on Europe or other objectives while fighting Iran, but it w ill also benefit from the spike in energy pric es. Russia may
lock in its gains with a nice color revolution in Poland just to complete the symmetry of historical justic e being done for US
a war with Iran would be the worst mistake

in the history of the United States and would set in motion a process that would result in
the US being no more globally relevant than Brazil. I'm also pretty sure US strategists are aware of the ris ks
intervention in its previous invasion of Afghanistan. I'm pretty sure
hostilities escalating to war with Iran entail. I likely got some details wrong, I also likely missed some problems a war would cause
for the US. I'm fairly confident that a decade after the end of the war, it will be generally acknow ledged that between Iran and the
US, Iran ended up being the victor.
MOREOVER, a naval confrontation of any kind would lead to sky rocketing oil prices.
Although oil prices are rising they are currently much lower than during the economic
crisis and their steady rise has allowed consumers to adjust.
The Financial Times 4/8
[Gregory Meyer and Michael Mackenzi Oil could give kiss of death to recovery Financial
Times. April 8 2010. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28f1e2a6-432e-11df-9046-00144feab49a.html]
Nicholas Colas, ConvergEx Group chief market strategis t, says: With crude oil prices marching steadily higher, portfolio exposure
Oil
prices first hit $100 a barrel in January 2008, before continuing their rapid ascent to peak at $147 in July of that
year. They fell to a low of $32 in December 2008, before recovering again. On Thursday oil traded at
about $85 a barrel. The latest rise comes as the economic recovery fuels a jump in oil demand after the first global decline
to the energy sector could well become a key determinant of overall investment performance through the balance of 2010.
in a quarter century. Supply is not a worry, as the Opec oil cartel has more than 6m b/d of capacity to spare in a pinch. One
difference from last year is that then the oil price w as rising against the backdrop of a w eaker dollar. This year crude and the dollar
have risen together. Policymakers seem untroubled. Energy ministers at the International Energy Forum in Mexico last w eek
Lawrence Summers, director of the US National Economic

Council, in remarks this w eek bemoaned his countrys dependence on foreign oil supplies, but did not complain
about prices. Some economists do not view $80 oil as a threat to global growth, w hich the
International Monetary Fund projects at 4 per cent this year. James Hamilton, an economist at the University
of California, San Diego, is author of a paper that found oils 2008 surge to $147 a barrel helped
tip a housing-led slowdown into a recession. This time, the relatively steady nature of the
price rebound has allowed consumers to adjust.
embraced less volatility, not lower prices.
AND prices will remain steady for the next decade.

Reuters 3/9 [Nadim Kaw ach Oil sector may need $3.08trn investments Emirates Business 24/7 (Reuters) March 9, 2010.
http://www.business24-7.ae/companies-markets/energy-utilities/oil-sector-may-need-3-08trn-investments-2010-03-09-1.65398]
Oil prices could stay in the range of $70 (Dh257) to $80 a barrel for the next 10 years and
expand to $70 to $100 in the longer term as the market is likely to be well-supplied by both Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) and other producers, according to the 12-nation oil group. In a study
to be presented at an oil conference in Mexico later this month, Opec, whose members control over
70 per cent of the world's proven crude deposits, estimated investments totalling $3.08 trillion w ould have to be made in the
hydrocarbon sector for the next 20 years, of which $2.3 trillion w ould be needed in the upstream sector and $780 billion w ould have
to be pumped into the downstream sector. Opec, which groups the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
and non-GCC oil producers, said it currently controls nearly six million barrels per day (bpd) in spare crude oil capacity and that
such capacity would remain comfortable even if there was a shortage in investment in the next few years.
However, the closing of the strait of Hormuz would result in sky rocketing oil prices.
Reuters 3/28
[Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent Scenarios: Global impact if Israel strikes Iran March 28, 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE62S1E320100329]
CLOSING HORMUZ- - Iran
makes good its threat to close the Straits of Hormuz to traffic,

blocking the flow of some 17 million barrels a day of oil, roughly 40 pe rcent of all
seaborne oil trade -- but likely inviting sw if t retaliation from United States forces. "Iran doesn't even need to
be successful in their threat," said Michael Wittner, global head of energy research at Societe Generale. " Even a
credible threat or near miss and insurance rates will spike. Then no one's going to send
any oil through there for a couple of weeks until somebody's navy can re-establish control." -analysts estimate this could push oil prices up toward $150 a barrel. Alternative oil producers such
as Russia, Nigeria and Angola might benefit, but rising fuel costs would likely undercut growth
everywhere. China, Iran's main export destination, would have to seek supplies els ewhere. -- Other financial
markets would suffer and fall sharply if they believed disruption would be long term
Although prices are sustainable now, a sudden rise in oil prices had been a significant
cause of almost all recessions is the last century. An oil shock now would likely plunge
us back into economic decline.
James Hamilton 4/12 [Economist at University of California, San Diego Do Rising Oil Prices Threaten the Economic
Recovery? Econbrowser. April 12, 2010. http://www.oilprice.com/article-do-rising-oil-prices-threaten-the-economic-recovery269.html]
Ten of the 11 recessions in the United States since World War II have been preceded by a sharp
increase in the price of crude petroleum. Oil had been holding around $80/barrel over the last month, but traded as
high as $87 last week, leading the Financial Times to ask w hether oil could give the "kiss of death to recovery." Here is how I w ould
answer that question. Americans buy a little less than 12 billion gallons of gasoline in a typical month. With gas prices now about a
dollar per gallon higher than they were a year ago, that leaves consumers w ith $12 billion less to spend each month on other things
than they had in January of 2009. On the other hand, the
U.S. average gas price is still more than a dollar

below its peak in July of 2008. Changes of this size can certainly provide a measurable drag or boost to consumer
spending, but are not enough by themselves to cause a recession. My view is that it is not just the level of consumer
spending but also a sudden change in its composition that sometimes contributes to an economic recession. When oil price
increases are sufficiently sudden and dramatic, we see abrupt drops in consumer
sentiment, postponement of purchases of consumer durables, and important changes in the kinds of
vehicles consumers buy. Because labor and capital can not costlessly shift out of the affected
industries, the result is unemployment in those sectors which is an important additional factor
bringing the economy down. UCSD Professor Valerie Ramey and Federal Reserve Economist Dan Vine have a very
interesting new paper demonstrating how shifts in the demand for light vehicles contributed to the U.S. recession of 2007-2009 in a
similar w ay to w hat we observed in earlier dow nturns. If these spending shif ts are indeed an important part of the transmission
mechanism, w e would expect the economy to respond to changes in oil prices according to a nonlinear relation. A rise in oil prices
may induce some consumers to postpone purchasing a car, but a fall in oil prices does not lead them to go out and buy two new
ones. Moreover, an oil pric e decline can induce some other sectoral adjustments such as layoffs for those who wor k in the oil
industry. I've recently completed a paper review ing some of the academic literature in w hich I conclude that the empirical ev idence
for a nonlinear response is pretty compelling.
AND, the global economy is fragile a spike in oil prices could collapse it again.
Nouriel Roubini 4/22 [Professor, Stern Business School, NYU & Chairman of Roubini Global Economics], Camilla Webster
[journalist; covered the Middle East, international business and U.S. foreign affair s for Forbes, CNBC, The Wall Street Journal, and
CBS New s], Shai Baitel [Served in Israel's Ministry of Justice]. A Global Tsunami. April 22, 2010. Forbes.com:
the world is barely recovering from a recent severe economic and financial crisis. The
by summer 2008 oil had
soared to $145 a barrel. Such rising crude prices were a huge shock to the terms of trade
and the real incomes of all the oil-importing countries including the U.S., most of Europe, Japan, China
and India. As the price of oil rose sharply, the global economy tipped into a deep recession;
and it will spiral downward again alongside a rise in oil prices.
Today
collapse of Lehman Brothers was not the only factor that caused a global recession in late 2008;
An economic collapse would lead to resource wars, nuclear wars, and extinction it
comes before all other impacts
Newsflavor 4/9 [New sflavor is a network of journalists that cover current events, political coverage, world news, and opinions,
April 9, 2009 Will an Economic Collapse Kill You? http://newsflavor.com/opinions/w ill-an-economic-collapse-kill-you/]
It may or may not sound likely to you, but the economy is on the brink of collapse. The stock market is riding a sled down a steep
hill. The United States government is spending money faster than it can print it. opinRight now the government is passing bills and
proposals that will give trillions of dollars to failing companies and bankrupt manufacturers. They believe that by giving th ese
companies resources to invest and expand, the economy w ill expand. The problem w ith this plan is that the same companies that
are receiving billions of dollars in aid arent prepared to handle this money better than they used capitol in the past. Chances are
these companies still have the same investors and management that they did pre-bailout, so w hos to say that they wont make the
same mistakes theyve made in the past? The most likely thing to happen is that these companies are going to spend this money
the same w ay they have in the past and that these companies are going to go bankrupt, again. These companies are the lynchpin of
the economy, such as major insurance providers, banks, investment firms, manufacturers, etc. If these companies or firms were to
collapse, the economy would be falling down the same pit as these companies. Not just the United States economy, because the
U.S. is a major trade partner in this w orld, and most other countries are dependent on the United States one w ay or another , a
If the United States economy failed,

we could see Iraq, Iran, and Russia fall with them, because all of their
economies are reliant off the selling of oil. Then the nations who are reliant on their
economies would fail, etc. Now its time to look at the consequences of a failing world economy.
With five offic ial nations having nuclear weapons, and four more likely to have them there
could be major consequences of another world war. The first thing that will happen after an
economic collapse will be war over resources. The United States currency will become useless and will have
United States collapse would cause a domino effect on the worlds economy .
for example,
no way of securing reserves. The United States has little to no capacity to produce oil, it is totally dependent on foreign oil. If the
United States stopped getting foreign oil, the
government would go to no ends to secure more, if there

were a war with any other major power over oil, like Russia or China, these wars would
most likely involve nuclear weapons. Once one nation launches a nuclear weapon, there
would of course be retaliation, and with five or more countries with nuclear weapons
there would most likely be a world nuclear war. The risk is so high that acting to save the
economy is the most important issue facing us in the 21st century.
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props C
Because I believe morality applies to everyone equally, regardless of nationality, I affirm.
Resolved: When forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal human
rights over its national interest. I offer the following definitions and clarifications to be
used in todays debate.
Ought is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as expressing duty or obligation.
Forced to choose means that we can only accomplish one goal, either universal human
rights or the national interest. If we were able to do both, the debate would have no clash.
National interest is most commonly defined as the goals of a country, whether economic,
cultural, or military. Goals may consist of anything from increasing foreign trade to
building the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, to the colonization of other countries.
This is the most fair definition because it doesnt exclude any ground for either side,
allowing for a fairer, more educational debate.
My value for the round is Morality, as implied by the resolution. Any and all moral codes
are predicated on the worth, or rights, of humans. The fact that morality exists is proof
that a base set of universal rights exists.
My standard for the round is Protecting Basic Human Rights, meaning that we dont
violate the core rights the world, on whole, believes to be absolutely necessary to
humanity. Morality presupposes that people have rights. By violating these rights, we
violate morality. These are the rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
I contend that the most important right of an individual, or at the very least one of the
most important rights an individual can have, is the right to a nationality. This is true
because a nationality is essential to the exercise of any and all other rights. Without a
nationality, a stateless persons rights to life and liberty are not being protected, nor are
they able to be expressed. Society affords them no rights whatsoever, their rights are
violable insofar as they are unprotected by any governing body. This means that people
who do not have a nationality are classified as sub-human, or lesser than other people,
because their rights are viewed as violable. This is a condition that must be prevented
and rectified at all costs. As such, ethics must regard this as vitally important.
David Weissbrodt, author of The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, explains:
The human right not to be stateless, or the right to a nationality, is important because
many states only allow their own nationals to exercise full civil, political, economic, and
social rights within their territories. Further, nationality enables individuals to receive
their nation's protection both domestically and internationally and allows a state to
intercede on behalf of a national under international law. In this manner, "the rules of
international law relating to diplomatic protection are based on the view that nationality
is the essential condition for securing to the individual the protection of his rights in the
international sphere." For these reasons, the right to be a citizen of a state has been
called "man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights." With
citizenship being the "right to have rights," stateless persons have traditionally been
seen as having no rights. This traditional concept of statelessness, whic h comes from an international law perspectiv e,
follows the logic that because one generally needs to be a citizen in order to receive diplomatic protection from a state, no
international wrong is committed if another state's citizen is wronged (i.e., if a stateless person is wronged).25 While international
law scholars might claim that the right to a nationality is the right to have rights, the principles of human rights would indicate
otherwise. The principles of human rights would maintain that being human is the right to have human rights. As one human rights
scholar has noted, "[h]uman rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being." 26 Although
"[n]ational governments may have the primary responsibility for implementing internationally recogniz ed human rights in their own
countries . . . [End Page 248] [h]uman rights are the rights of all human beings, w hether they are citizens . . . or not. "27
Because being human is the sole requirement entitling one to human rights, whether or
not one possess a nationality should have no bearing on whether one enjoys all of her or
his human rights. As a practical matter, however, this artic le demonstrates that international protection is still a problem.
The notion that statelessness should not bar one from realizing her human rights is embodied in the 1954 Convention. This
Convention provides that, within certain domains, states parties should grant stateless persons rights on par with the rights that the
state gives to its own nationals or to foreign nationals legally residing w ithin its territory. For example, states parties should grant
stateless persons rights in areas such as religion, elementary education, access to courts, public rationing of scarce goods, labor
legislation, public relief, and intellectual property that are "at least as favourable as [those] accorded to their nationals."28 Similarly,
states parties should grant stateless persons rights in areas such as housing, the right of association, freedom of movement, w ageearning employment, and ow nership property that are "not less favourable than [those] accorded to aliens generally in the same
circumstances."29 It should be noted, however, that stateless persons unlawfully residing w ithin the territory of a state party are only
granted a limited set of the rights and protections by the 1954 Convention.30
He makes the simple argument that mans basic right is the right to have rights. On a
theoretical level, the right to life should come before all other rights. But in practice, the
right to a nationality is the only thing that can guarantee the safety of the rights of an
individual. It is the only way that the rights of an individual have someone protecting
them.
According to the United Nations, UNHCR. Web. 14 July 2010. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c155.html>.
"Statelessness is a massive problem that affects an estimated 12 million people
worldwide. Statelessness also has a terrible impact on the lives of individuals.
Possession of nationality is essential for full participation in society and a prerequisite
for the enjoyment of the full range of human rights."
By negating, we perpetuate the problem of statelessness, causing the dehumanization of
millions of people. Far more people are affected by this than were dehumanized by
Hitlers Holocaust. And by negating, we allow the problem to continue, infinitely
dehumanizing people from all over the world, affording them fewer rights than a
murderer, rapist, or even a warlord.
Neither genocides nor the Holocaust has claimed as many victims as statelessness will.
As such, it should be treated as tantamount to such awful events. This means that the
Negative has to defend prioritizing our national interest over what amounts to a second
Holocaust.
The affirmative contends that by negating, we commit the most degrading, awful
violation of human rights, reducing individuals to less than tools, people who are without
a use or value to anyone.
So because the affirmative world neither violates morality nor allows it to be violated, I
urge an affirmative vote.
Drill Props D
I affirm. Resolved: when forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal
human rights over its national interest.
Observation 1: The phrase when forced to choose places a quandary upon the nations
and demands they make a certain choice between the two actions. Thus, negative
arguments about how we can uphold national interest through universal human rights
are abusive because they do not follow the resolution by picking only one action.
Second, this argument demands that we know the intention of the state of whether it is
truly acting out of a humanitarian perspective or on its own national interest. Since
intentions are almost impossible to tell, it is impossible to tell whether the debater
affirms or negates. Thus, reject those argumentss.
Observation 2: The resolution is not wholly ascribed to a certain framework, but we
should follow an utilitarian calculus as deontology is self-defeating because it holds that
we cannot trample on anyones rights if it harms them. In the real world, this is
problematic because we will have to step over some individuals rights in take an action.
James Bailey writes: [James Wood 1997; Oxford University Press; Utilitarianism, institutions, and Justice pg 9]
A consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision about
whether a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of
expression. 16 In some circumstances the effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to justify our banning it, but
in others they may be not malign enough to justify any interference in freedom. I? A deontological theory, in contrast,
would be required either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agents from interfering in the free expression of others and
from impairing the moral equality of others, or to admit defeat and claim that no adjudication between the
two rights is possible. The latter admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no
principled resolution of a serious policy question. But the former conclusion is hardly attractiv e either.
Would w e really wish to establish as true for all times and circumstances a lexical ordering between tw o side constraints on our
actions w ithout careful attention to consequences? Would we, for instance, really wish to establish that the slightest malign
inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of expression is adequate grounds for an intrusive and costly censorship? Or would w e,
alternatively, really wish to establish that we should be prepared to tolerate a society horrible for women and children to live in, for
the sake of not allow ing any infringement on the sacred right of free expression?18 Consequentialist
accounts can
avoid such a deontological dilemma. In so doing, they show a certain healthy sense of
realism about what life in society is like. In the w orld outside the theoris t's study, we meet trade-offs at
every tum. Every policy we make w ith some w orthy end in Sight imposes costs in terms of diminished
achievement of some other plausibly worthy end. Consequentialism demands that we grapple with these
costs as directly as we can and justify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them w ith moral
sophistries or to ignore them as if we lived in an ideal world.
Universal human rights are those as prescribed by the UN Declaration of Human Rights.
Prefer this definition because a) it is the most predictable and common definition on this
topic and b) it is heavily rooted in the topic literature.
Ought is defined as a moral obligation (Merriam Websters Dictionary).
The resolution questions what ought a just nation do. But nation borders are arbitrarily
defined by conquerors and further perpetuate conflict and rights violations. Ernst
Frankel explains: [[Professor Emirtus at MIT] Challenging American leadership: impact of national quality on ris k of losing
leadership. Page 106. 2006. ]
In some parts of the world such as Russia or Yugoslavia, ethnic pressure has resulted in the formation of new national states , which
more needs to be done to correct the injustices of

arbitrary borders, and rulers imposed for political or strategic reasons without concern
for the rights of the indigenous population. The majority of recent conflicts have this as
their root cause and until this problem is resolved, there is little hope for peace in the
world. Peace cannot be maintained without justice, and all proclamation of human rights
are hollow as long as these fundamental rights are not given. It is curious that borders arbitrarily drawn
in cases have become independent nations. But
by politicians or the military become sacrosanct and untouchable- as if god given. It is important to reconsider the borders of the
They should represent the facts on the ground and not the arbitrary
agreements of rulers or the bounty of conflict.
world and make them just.
Thus, the negative has a necessary but insufficient burden to prove why borders are
good and dont perpetuate violence; if not, then borders are the ultimate source of
conflicts and even if we prioritize national interest then we would cause infinite harm to
occur.
My value is morality derived from the resolutions use of the word ought.
My criterion is avoiding human suffering for the following reasons:
1. Suffering is the most immoral thing on this planet and suffering is how we derive
morality. Robert Meister explains: [Robert Meister [Professor, UC Santa Cruz]. NEVER AGAIN; THE
ETHICS OF THE NEIGHBOR AND THE LOGIC OF GENOCIDE. 2005.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v015/15.2meister.html ]
In ethical discussion of bodies--and especially bodies that suffer --the greate[st] danger is
now w idely seen to be false relativism. (Lvinas, "Useless Suffering" 99). A principled Resistance to
moral relativism when it comes to the suffering of bodies is, thus, the specific ethical
view that underlies the present-day politics of human rights. For proponents of this politics, The
suffering body is the ultimate wellspring of moral value, the response to bodily
suffering the ultimate test of moral responsibility. "The supreme ordeal of the will is not death, but
suffering," said the French philosopher Emmanuel Lvinas, w ho took the primacy of ethic s to its extreme by putting it
ahead, even, of ontology and God (the world itself and its Creator) (Totality and Infinity 239). He argued that The
suffering of another is alw ays "useless," always unjustified, and,. and that attempting to
rationalize the neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality ("Useless Suffering"
98-9).
2. Just nations are based on the premises of justice, which is defined as

giving
each their due. However, suffering inherently disobeys that principle by
unnecessarily causing pain when the individual was not due to receive pain.
3. Thomas Pogge explains that since we have formed and belong to this global
world order, we have a responsibility to protect the people in it from human rights
abuses, and thus avoid suffering. [Thomas Pogge [Professor of Philosophy + Intl Relations
@ Yale].
COSMOPOLTAINISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. Ethics, Vol. 103, 48-75, October 1992.]
One may think that a shared responsibility for the justice of the social institutions in w hic h
we partic ipate cannot plausibly extend beyond our national institutional scheme, in which we
participate as citizens, and which we can most immediately affect. But such a limitation is untenable
because it treats as natural or God-given the existing global institutional framework, which is
in fact imposed by human beings who are collectively quite capable of changing it.
Therefore at least weprivileged citizens of powerful and approximately democratic countries
share a collective responsibility for the justice of the existing global order and hence
also for any contribution it may make to the incidence of human rights violations.
Avoiding suffering is a prerequisite for any other standard because suffering is the
ultimate test of morality and thus in order to achieve morality, we have to avoid suffering
first.
My thesis is that prioritizing human rights over national interests avoids human
suffering.
The sole contention is that prioritizing universal human rights we best fight the AIDS
pandemic.
AIDS is a human rights concern due its stigmatizing nature to certain groups that causes
disproportionate suffering. The Program on International Health and Human Rights5
explains: [Human Rights Nexus [NGO funded by WFUNA (World Federation of UN Association)]. HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HIV/HEALTH. 2010. http://www.humanrightsnexus.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=133&Itemid=151
]
The incidence and spread of HIV/AIDS are disproportionately high among groups who
already suffer from a lack of human rights protection and experience discrimination. This
includes groups that have been marginalized socially, culturally and economically; for example injecting drug users
(IDUs), sex workers and men who have sex with men (MSM). People living with HIV/AIDS
(PLWHA) or those affected by it will not seek counseling, testing, treatment and support if this
means facing stigma, discrimination, and lack of confidentiality or other negative
consequences. Discriminatory measures and other coercive actions drive away the
people most in need of services. When human rights are protected, civil society
organizations working on HIV/AIDS are able to respond to the pandemic more effectively,
fewer people become infected, and PLWHA [People living with HIV/AIDS] and their communities
can better cope with the disease.
AIDS needs to be prioritized due to its virulent nature; unchecked AIDS that spreads as a
result of human rights violations will eventually cause human extinction. Michael
Munchuri writes: [Michael, Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi, Will Annan finally put out Africas fires?
Jakarta Post, March 6, lexis]
The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat
the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn
lamented that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that AIDS w as now more effectiv e than war in
Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in sub-Saharan Africa,

surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998, 200,000 people died from armed conflicts
destabilizing African countries.
compared to 2.2 million from AIDS. Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world,
70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive
members and decimating entire villages. About 13 million of the 16 million people w ho have died of AIDS are in
Afric a, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a holocaust if this number is not a sure measure? There is no
doubt that AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than hurricanes,
earthquakes, economic crises, capital crashes or floods. It has no cure yet. We are
watching a whole continent degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally succumb to a
most excruciating, dehumanizing death. Gore said that his new initiative, if approved by the U.S. Congress,
would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does this mean that the UN Security
Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, AIDS was seen as threat to world peace, and
Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to make politic al
capital out of this by painting the usually dis agreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck stops on
the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salv age in Africa after all and this talk is
about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve all
Afric an problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out man. The challenge is not one of a single
continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in
the AIDS challenge.
Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before another
continent is on the brink of extinction. Sure as death, Africa's time has run out, signaling
the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race.
This links to my value criterion as the discrimination due to AIDS as well as the death
that results from AIDS results in unimaginable pain and suffering, both mental and
physical.
Not only do we have a responsibility to prioritize human rights over the
national
interest because we are part of and use the world order, but also because we have made
it into an unjust world order. Thomas Pogge explains: [Thomas Pogge [Prof essor of Philosophy + Intl
Relations @ Yale]. THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1/2 2000.]
We can assign responsibility for such insecurity to the governments and citizens of the
countries in which it occurs; and doing so makes good sense. But leaving it at this does not make good
sense. For the hope that these countries will, from the inside, democratize themselves and
abolish the worst poverty and oppression is entirely naive so long as the institutional context of these
countries continues to favor so strongly the emergence and endurance of brutal and corrupt elites. And the primary
responsibility for this institutional context, for the prevailing world order, lies of course
with the governments and citizens of the wealthy countries, because we maintain this
order, with at least latent coercion, and because we, and only we, could relatively easily
reform it in the directions indicated. We must be read as a recognition of these points: a clear repudiation of the
common and ever so convenient convic tion that human rights do not reach beyond national borders, that the human rights of
The institutional understanding of

human rights thus tends to undermine the self-satisfied detachment with which the
governments and peoples of the wealthy West tend to look down upon the sorry state of
human rights in many of the so-called less developed countries: This disaster is the
responsibility not only of their governments and populations, but also ours, in that we
continuously impose upon them an unjust global order instead of working toward a
reformed one in which the human rights of all could be fully realized.
foreigners (living abroad) normally involve no moral claims against me.33
Due to the gigantic impact of AIDS, we have to prioritize promoting human rights over
national interest. Once we contain these human rights violations worldwide, we will help
decrease the spread of AIDS and contain its impacts. AIDS will outweigh on a- scope as
about 23 million people have already died and 38 million are currently infected worldwide
and b- timeframe as AIDS has developed into a pandemic in only the last 20-30 years and
critically demands our attention, c- Reversibility as the death of millions of people cannot
be reversed. Further, AIDS outweighs any other impact because even if we find a
vaccination for it, it is extremely vulnerable to creating mutations that can generate a
new virus AIDS 2.0 Other impacts such as nuclear war cannot mutate or change to
become more lethal. Paul Echlric explains: [Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, Professors of Population studies at
Stanford University, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION, 1990, p. 147-8]
Whether or not AIDS can be contained will depend primarily on how rapidly the spread of
HIV can be slowed through public education and other measures, on when and if the medical community can find
satisfactory preventatives or treatments, and to a large extent on luck. The virus has already shown itself to be
highly mutable, and laboratory strains resistant to the one drug, AZT, that seems to slow its lethal course have already been
reported." A virus that infects many millions of novel hosts, in this case people, might
evolve new transmission characteristics. To do so, however, would almost certainly
involve changes in its lethality. If, for instance, the virus became more common in the blood (permitting insects to
transmit it readily), the very process would almost certainly make it more lethal. Unlike the current version of AIDS,
which can take ten years or more to kill its victims, the new strain might cause death in
days or weeks. Infected individuals then would have less time to spread the virus to others, and there would be strong
selection in favor of less lethal strains (as happened in the case of myxopatomis) . What this would mean epidemiologically is not
clear, but it could temporarily increase the transmission rate and reduce life expectancy of infected persons until the system once
If the ability of the AIDS virus to grow in the cells of the skin or the
membranes of the mouth, the lungs, or the intestines were increased, the virus might be
spread by casual contact or through eating contaminated food. But it is likely, as Temin points out,
again equilibrated.
that acquiring those abilities would so change the virus that it no longer efficiently infected the kinds of cells it now does and so
would no longer cause AIDS. In effect it would produce an entirely different disease. We hope Temin is correct but another Nobel
a relatively minor mutation could lead to the virus infecting

a type of white blood cell commonly present in the lungs. If so, it might be transmissible
through coughs.
laureate, Joshua Lederberg, is worried that
At the end of the round, if there is no net offense, then default aff because the affirmative
is burdened with less rebuttal time compared to the neg and cannot emulate a strategy
based in the round as they dont hear their opponents speech until they have already
given their constructive, which gives the neg considerable lee-way.
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props E
A just government is a state that on balance avoids rights abuses and acts under
legitimate desires to distribute due correctly. This doesnt mean that each act the state does is right, just that
on balance the state is better than others . For instance, the US is considered to be just but can still have bad policies in place since
that reflects upon the politicians, not the state as a whole.
National interest is what a government presumes to be good for its constituents,

however, this does not necessarily mean it is objectively good, just that it is valued in
that society. Universal human rights refer to the UN charter that dictates proper
standards of living for all persons across borders, because this is the most common
usage of the term.
We assume the actions of both worlds are on comparable levels making policy impacts
negligible; otherwise the resolution wouldnt be triggered since states wouldnt face a
real choice, they would just default to minimizing the more serious threat.
The resolution asks if a claim is just regardless of the assumptions that statement may entail. Answering the question what color
should I w ear? with colors are indeterminate would not answer the fundamental question, only offer reasons to ask a different
when forced to choose means there is an inherent tradeoff between protecting

rights and furthering the national interest; so, the negative cannot advocate prioritizing
both.
one.
Because the resolution questions what ought to be done, I value morality, defined as
standards of right conduct.
1. Government is in place to arbitrate between competing rights claims, so until
power imbalances are corrected, there is always a potential for unfairness and
therefore violations, thus evaluation of government action is necessary
2. Idealized concepts like justice or morality always need criticism because of how
transfixing they are. Concepts that simply seem good in of themselves must be
provided in environments where they can be analyzed in order to upkeep the m
3. Any type of state-citizen contract requires political discourse in order to make
sure that the obligations within the contract are actually being upheld
Thus, the standard is fostering criticism of government.
Part A: National interests inhibit transparency

1. National interest is a vague term that is constantly shifting based on various factors.
To negate is to approve of prioritizing an unpredictable policy, while affirming is a more
concrete policy, as it is founded upon UN doctrine. It is easier to criticize a predictable
government, because you understand it.

2. National interest is naturally an appealing term that people psychologically cannot be
against because that would require them to challenge a policy that is good for them.
Noam Chomsky writes:
[Noam Chomsky, Carlos Peregrn Otero Language and Politics pgs 541-542. 2004]
One important fact to bear
in mind w hen one listens to or is subjected to political discourse
is that most terms are used in
a kind of technical meaning thats really very much divorced from their actual meaning, sometimes even the opposite of it. For
term like national interest. The term national interest is commonly used as if its
something good for us, and the people of the country are supposed to understand that. So if a political leader says that
Im doing this in the national interest, youre supposed to feel good because thats for me. However, if you look closely, it
turns out that the national interest is not defined as whats defined in the interest of the
entire population; its whats in the interests of small, dominant elites who happen to be able to
command the resources that enable them to control the state-basically, corporate-based elites . Thats whats
example, take a
called the national interest. And, correspondingly, the term special interests is used in a very interestingly related way to refer to
The population is called the special interest and the corporation elite are
called the national interests; so youre supposed to be in favor of the national interests
and against the special interests . In both the 1980 and 1984 elections, they identified the
Democrats as the party of special interests, and thats supposed to be bad, because
were all against the special interests. But if you look closely and ask who the special interests were,
the population.
they listed them: women, poor people, workers, young people, old people, ethnic minorities -in fact, the entire population. There was
only one group that w as not listed among the special interests: corporations [were not listed]. If youll notice the
campaign rhetoric, that was never a special interest, and thats right, because in their terms thats the national interest. So if you
think through it, the population is the special interests and the corporations are the national interests, and since everyones in favor
of the national interests and against the special interests, you vote for and support someone whos against the population and is
the way the framework of thought is consciously

manipulated by a n effective choic e and reshaping of terminology so as to make it difficult to understand whats
happening in the w orld. A very important function of the ideological institutions-the media, the schools, and so on-is to prevent
people from perceiving reality, because if they perceived it they might not like it and might act
to change it, and that would harm privileged people who control these things.
working for the corporations. This is a typic al case of
This creates difficulty for citizens to criticize anything that is ever done in the national interest
Part B: Prioritizing national interest induces major nationalism that mitigates criticism,
and also causes much conflict.
First, prioritizing the national interest over universal goals sets the norm for nationalism,
or the belief that one state is inherently more deserving than another. Negating furthers
this in two ways:
1. The pronoun its in the resolution reflects the personification of the state, which
fuels citizens sense of national needs. Jamie Mayerfield explains the implication:
To identify with the nation is to convert it into a larger self. One endows it with
human traits a nd claims them vicariously . One assigns it f eelings and motives, needs and aspirations,
deeds and experiences, memories and achiev ements, which one then imagines as being one's own.
Identification with a personified nation is a common denominator of all
nationalisms.3 Liberal nationalists partake of this tendency . Michael Walzer calls nationalism a f orm of "collectiv e
celebrates the pride one can take in one's nation's

accomplishments.25 Dav id Miller [they] emphasize s that what sets the nation apart
from other collectivities is its capacity to act and will.26 On e of the most striking examples is f ound in
indiv idualism."24 Y ael Tamir
Charles Tay lor's essay , "The Politics of Recognition." Tay lor speaks of the modem indiv idual's need f or the recognition of hi s or her
distinctiv e identity, of the f act that "there is a certain way of being human that is my way ."27 But t he discussion soon equates recognition of
the individual projects the need for recognition

nation), and does not feel secure in his or her
the indiv idual with recognition of the group. It seems that
onto the group (which often takes the f orm of the

identity until the identity of the group is properly recognized.
2. By drawing the distinction between universal human rights and national interest
the resolution posits a state that views location as a constraint on obligation and
views problems through the lens of an us or them mentality. This is problematic
since it defines the other as the international community, increasing chances of
nationalistic tendencies.
Nationalism at the expense of human rights is harmful since:
1. Nationalism allows biases to develop framing global issues such as human rights
problems as another states fault and assigning themselves a victim status
precluding the state from acting responsibly or reflecting on its own involvement.
Mayerfeld 2: Journalists covering the war in the former Yugoslavia tell the same
story ov er and ov er again: each side is driven by the furious cer-tainty that it is the
aggrieved party. This is true not least of the Serbs, who suff er the added injury that the whole worl d has turned against them.
Many similar examples could be prov ided. More often than not, aggressors see them-selves as
victims. [E.g](The Nazis built much of their support by appealing to the German
sense of victimhood, by promising to stand up for the nation that had been
"stabbed in the back" in 1918, humiliated at Versailles, and historically snubbed by the great powers.) Some people
may think that Lockean war is less terrible than Hobbesian war, but that would be a mistake. In one respect it is worse. At l east Hobbesian
Lockean anger carries us beyond what is

necessary for self-protection, and often exposes us to harm in its unalterab le
determination to see that justice is done. I think this may be the principal danger of national consciousness. If
people's interpretations of justice are hopelessly biased in their own favor,
chances are that when they identify themselves with the nation it will receive the
benefit of the same bias. Indeed, the bias is likely to be stronger at the national level
than at the individual level. Because we are social animals, because we hav e to get along with
each other, we hav e, as indiv iduals, to reach some f orm of mutual accommodation. We learn to become somewhat tolerant of
other people's biases, and to be reticent about expressing our own [biases]. Indeed, giv en the extent of our
aggression is constrained by the instinct of self -preserv ation.
social needs, we of ten f ind that lif e procedes more smoothly and pleasantly if we challenge and correct our biases to some de gree.
These restraints are lifted at the national level, where the same bias is shared with
our compatriots. Indeed the very social dynamic that constrains individual bias
reinforces national bias. At the national lev el, we can express our bias openly and expect
to hear it affirmed and applauded. The other, with whom our bias places us in
conflict, is kept at a convenient distance .
Even in nations like the US, a sense of victimhood gives politicians blank checks
to abuse human rights, such as after the September 11 attacks politicians used
global sympathy to justify acts in Iraq.

2. The nations sense of entitlement to its own interests above others increases
conflict: Mayerfeld 3
National bias encourages conflict between nations and makes the outbreak of violent conflict more likely . It does this in various way s.
Because it inhibits self-criticism, it [national bias] creates the conditions in which

governments can continue to pursue unjust policies, often involv ing violence, against foreign
nations. For an example of nationalist resistance to self-examination, recall the outcry that greeted a proposed
Smithsonian exhibit on the dropping of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The exhibit
[and] was canceled, and the director of the National Air and Space Museum resigned after eighty-one members of the
House of Representatives called for his ouster. Speaker of the House New t Gingric h commented that the controversy was
"a fight, in effect, over the reassertion by most Americans that they're sic k and tired of being told by some
cultural elite that they ought to be ashamed of their country." Bias also fosters or intensif ies the
feeling that one's nation has been treated unjustly by other nations. Conflict arises whenever
[nations feel with way]nation A believes it has been unjustly treated by nation B, and B denies the claim, or, w orse yet,
believes that it has been unjustly treated by A. Bias does not alw ays lead to conflict, nor does the conflict it engenders always break
out into violence. Locke thought that the state of nature does not invariably lead to war. But the danger is alw ays there. Territorial
disputes are particularly dangerous: when two nations believe that each has a just claim to the same land, the risk of vio-lent conflict
is greatly heightened. And once violence has broken out, for whatever reason, bias
makes it extremely difficult to put

an end to violence. For bias [since it] tells us that our enemy has resorted to violence
unjustly, which makes us think both that it deserves to be punished and that violence is
the only language it can understand. It is a commonplacet hat nations at war can only per-ceive the atrocities
committed by the other side.
The damage of nationalism spreads quickly to other nations, which leads to massive
conflict. Also, this outweighs negative solvency with probability- this is warranted
analytically to show inherency as well as empirically meaning the impact is likely to
occur. Probability matters insofar as looking solely to a speculative end would assign
states infinite positive obligations since events can occur in numerous ways.
Part C: Reducing nationalistic tendencies then reduces both the probability of conflict
since nations are more likely to compromise and make peaceful decisions as well as the
duration since counterattack is less likely.
1. Nationalism blocks ideological progression since nationalism quiets selfcriticism. This is especially true in the negative world as international norms of
right and wrong are pushed away in favor of pursuing its own interests: Meyerfeld
4
This route, however, is unavailable to liberal nationalists. Their ow n arguments prevent it; in fact, they exacerbate the problem.
Liberal nationalists tell us that national consciousness is good for individuals; it satisfies their deep
psychic needs. National consciousnes helps construct individual identity. It makes possible a healthier and happier
sense of self . It [and] is a source of self-esteem. But none of this is possible if the nation with
which one identifies oneself is perceived to be bad. Tamir puts her finger on this in the passage I quoted
earlier: "The ability of individuals to lead a satisfying life and to attain the respect of others is contingent on, although not assured by,
their ability to view themselves as activ e members of a worthy community."36 The same idea is present in other versions of the
liberal nationalist argument:
positive self-identity is linked to a positive image of the nation with
which one identifies oneself. Consider the scruples that must be overcome in order to form a positive image of the
nation. Dostoyevski's Raskulnikov must suffer years of agoniz ed guilt and unsparing self -condemnation before he can hope to live
at peace with himself again. For the crime of killing tw o women, w e do not think this an inappropriate response; we would be
alarmed if he did not experience a prolonged and painful self -estrangement of some kind. Now what nation, especially what armed
nation, can lay claim to such a slight criminal record? The
crimes that have been carried out by the nation

and in the name of the nation are [great], in almost all cases, incomparably greater. Yet if we are to believe the
[according to] liberal nationalists, this should not prevent identification with the nation
from being a source of emotional comfort and self-esteem. The psychological program of liberal
nationalism has the unavoidable implication, it seems to me, of [letting citizens inevitably] minimize[e] ing,
even trivialize[e]ing, the crimes committed by one's own nation. The pressure is for us to
remember the good deeds of the nation while forgetting the bad deeds.
The effects are long term; as reform is a slow process, even with self-criticism. Plus, the
lack of it further distances the nation from the international community as it is unwilling
to compromise.
In order to solve these harms, states must prioritize human rights to shift their ideologies
from nationalistic to one of civic consciousness: Meyerfeld 5
That something better is civ ic consciousness. Fellow citizens should be united by a commitment to a constitutional order that
protects individual rights, authoriz es a fair scheme of social cooperation, and establishes procedures for democratic
decisionmaking.54 The
mutual trust needed to sustain democracy should emerge from the

sense of being engaged in a common democratic project and a mutually acknowledged
commitment to the moral principles that underlie the constitution. Over time, this can give
rise to a spirit of democratic partnership, as citizens accumulate the experience of working together to uphold
and perfect a constitutional order, and as they draw on the memory of past successes or on lessons learned from past failures to
improve future performance. Principle,
not identity, should be the glue that binds the polity.

Citizens should continually recall the universalistic commitment to the freedom and
equality of persons that lies at the heart of every just constitution. Reflection on this
principle can reduce the imagined importance of territorial divisions between states and
bring to mind their historically arbitrary character. It can discourage the feeling of
separateness and encourage citizens to extend social cooperation across international
borders. It may even inspire citizens to undertake the pursuit of global justice. The democratic ideal, rightly understood, can
provide a basis for resistance to national identification.5
Additionally, policy action involving universal human rights is always checked more than
that of national interest because policies abroad are always checked more, because they
directly involve the nations involved, and surrounding ones. While some policy in the
national interest may be international, more often than not, universal human rights will
be more transnational than national interest, by its very nature.
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props F
Set 1: Legal Rights
AFFIRMATIVE: Discretionary waiver hearings deprive juveniles of Supreme Court
dictated rights to a greater extent than does adult treatment. John Fabian writes,
John Matthew Fabian. A Legal and Neuroscientific Inquiry: Applying Roper v. Simmons in Juvenile Transfer and Waiver
Proceedings. Int J Offender Ther Comp Criminol published online 4 June 2010. DOI: 10.1177/0306624X10371283.
http://ijo.sagepub.com/content/early /2010/06/03/0306624X10371283
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet established any significant changes in the
past 43 years in juvenile waiver law since Kent, states have made profound changes to their
legislation in this area. Yet a review of current state and Distric t of Columbia statutes demonstrates
that they genuinely embrace punitive objectives on juvenile crime, fail to reflect the
holding in Roper pertaining to juvenile offender culpability issues, and do not comply
with various Kent factors (Mallett, 2007). For example, no current state recognizes adolescents
malleable personality and character in its waiver criteria. About 27.5% of states consider
the youths mental and/or emotional condition and about 46% consider the youths
likelihood of successful rehabilitation. A youths maturity is considered by half of the
states and vulnerability to peer pressure is considered in two states. Only about 15% of
states require a review of information regarding the youths mental, physical,
educational, and social history (Mallett, 2007). Therefore, most state laws do not follow the
spirit of Kent in how they deal with juvenile waiver criteria, including issues such as
maturity and rehabilitation, deficiencies in maturity, susceptibility to peer influences, and
the general malleability of adolescents personality and neurological development.
NEGATIVE: Juveniles tried as adults lose many civil rights that they would retain in the
juvenile system. Lisa Beresford writes,
Lisa S. Beresford [J.D., University of San Diego Law School]. Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult
Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment. San Diego Law Review, Summer, 2000, 37 San
Diego L. Rev. 783.
Another consequence of transferring increasingly younger juveniles to adult criminal

court is that if the minor is found guilty of the offense, she loses many rights normally
afforded to minors in juvenile court. For example, some states have eliminated or reduced
protection for anonymity and confidentiality for juveniles. When a minor is adjudicated in
a juvenile court, most often the proceedings remain confidential for the rest of the
juvenile's life . Federal law now permits fingerprinting and photographing of juveniles who
commit "adult felonies." n273 In California, a new law permits disclosure of the name of a juvenile over the age of
fourteen who commits certain offenses. n274 In Witkowski v. M.D.N., n275 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "Trying a
juvenile as an adult is a severe sanction w ith harsh consequences. The status of "juvenile' carries a shield from publicity, protection
against extended pre-trial detention and post-conviction incarceration with adults, and guarantees that confinement w ill not extend
beyond the age of twenty." n276 Also, just as with adults who are convicted of a felony, juveniles
convicted as adults
lose certain civil rights, such as disqualification from public employment and restrictions
placed on other legitimate opportunities.
Set 2: Rehabilitation
AFFIRMATIVE: Retaining all juveniles in the juvenile system ruins its rehabilitative
function, making juvenile courts more like adult courts. Joseph Sanborn writes,
Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr. Hard Choices Or Obvious Ones : Developing Policy for Excluding Youth From Juvenile Court. Youth
Violence and Juvenile Justice 2003 1: 198. DOI: 10.1177/1541204002250879. http://yvj.sagepub.com/content/1/2/198
Total retention also could wreak havoc with the internal dimensions of juvenile court
sentencing. That is, prosecuting all juvenile offenders in juvenile court could encourage
greater adoption of minimum, mandatory, and longer (but w ithin the upper age limit) sentences,
provisions that historically are more characteristic of criminal court. Historically, juvenile
courts have been able to maintain a mostly rehabilitative and mostly moderate
dispositional scheme (together with a mostly best-interests-of-the-child focus) because the most
problematic/violent youth have been subject to transfer to adult court. The abolition of
exclusion certainly could prompt legislatures to restructure juvenile court dispositions
so as to resemble a mini criminal court. This increased criminalization development
would appear to be unavoidable. As word would spread through the neighborhood that
no youth will ever again be prosecuted in criminal court, chances are that some juveniles
would perceive no disincentive (or at least much less of one) to committing crime. The
likely reaction within the juvenile justice system would be to raise the ante for
punishments a youth could receive in that forum.
NEGATIVE: Juvenile court systems focused on rehabilitation have yielded positive
results. Ellis Close gives the example of Missouri, which has focused far more on
rehabilitation than other states.
Ellis Close. Children Are Not Too Old to Change. Newsweek. January 15th, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/14/childrenare-not-too-old-to-change.html.
It does not have to be this way. And, indeed, there are some places where it is not. The most w idely recognized exception is
Missouri, which has spent decades constructing a juvenile system that puts other states' to
shame. Its emphasis is not on punishing young people but on saving them. And it has
yielded impressive results. Three years after leaving the system, only 8 percent are back
in it (a statistic that has held up, within a percentage point or two, for years). There are no
national juvenile-recidivism statistics, but the average is likely much higher; some states
report that well over 50 percent of those released are locked down again within a few
years. Missouri was not alw ays a model of enlightenment. During the 1960s its juvenile system w as embroiled in laws uits,
violence, and sundry scandals. One judge indignantly declared he would no longer send kids there. So offic ials decided it w as time
to experiment w ith something different. That decis ion coincided w ith Matthew Steward's 1970 graduation from college. Steward was
assigned as a counselor to a small pilot program that put kids in small housing units instead of cells. His task was to try to forge
them into law -abiding citizens. So he endeavored to create "a kid-friendly environment w here kids were engaged, not put in
uniform," he says. And to the astonis hment of many, the new program w orked. Eventually it became the model for the entire sys tem,
whic h Steward ended up heading.
Set 3: Cognitive Abilities

AFFIRMATIVE: Juveniles can make autonomous decisions and therefore are
just as culpable as adults. Tom Campbell writes,

Tom Campbell. The rights of the minor: as person, as child, as juvenile, as future adult. International Journal of Law and the
Family. 1992.
Nevertheless, it seems misguided to deny altogether the signific ance for the growing human individual of the transitional period from
paradigmatic childhood to full-blow n adulthood. In this phase of development there are elements of both the earlier and the later
stages, which means that there are distinctive interests which emerge and claim attention at this period. Further the emerging
capacities for different sorts of adult acitvity vary with the sphere in question so that there is no one threshold of adulthood for every
aspect of life in society. There are grounds, therefore, for recogniz ing a 'juvenile' stage of human life whic h may properly be brought
within the scope of the concept of minors' rights. The characteristic aspect of this stage is a largely adult physical development and
significant capacities for autonomous choice and conduct guided by the juvenile's own perceptions of the social w orld and her own
scheme of values and beliefs. As
a juvenile the child has considerable autonomy interests and

many of the rights of the child may be seen as recognizing this fact. Indeed, unless we
adopt a highly restrictive analysis of what it is to be capable of autonomy, it is a feature
of all but the very earliest stages of human development. The capacity for autonomy
involves the ability to select what it is we wish to do and to have, in the light of some
information as to the alternatives and their consequences. On this analy sis , the autonomy
interests of the child stretch right back into the heart of early childhood. Lack of physical
independence at these early stages is erroneously confused with lack of the capacity for
choice autonomy, which is an everyday feature of a child's life even in conditions of
extreme dependency. Here w e might draw attention to Art 26 'the right to a standard of living adequate for physical,
mental, spiritual, moral and social development' as embodying a reference to the stages of autonomy and not simply to preparation
for future adult life.
NEGATIVE: Juveniles are not equally culpable for crimes as compared to adults because
they perform faulty risk-reward analysis. Steinberg and Scott write,
Laurence Steinberg (Temple University) & Elizabeth S. Scott. (University of Virginia School of Law). Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty. December 2003 American
Psychologist Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/03/$12.00 Vol. 58, No. 12, 10091018
DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.12.1009 http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/58/12/1009.pdf
it is well established that over an extended period between childhood and young
adulthood, individuals become more future-oriented. Studies in which individuals are asked to envis ion
Second,
themselves or their circumstances in the future find that adults project out their visions over a signific antly longer time f rame than do
in studies in which individuals are queried about

their perceptions of the short-term and longer term pros and cons of various sorts of risk
taking (e.g., the risk of having unprotected sex, Gardner & Herman, 1990) or asked to give advice to others
about risky decisions (e.g., w hether to have cosmetic surgery; Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001), adolescents
tend to discount the future more than adults do and to weigh more heavily short-term
consequences of decisions both risks and benefitsin making choices. There are at
least two plausible explanations for this age difference in future orientation. First, owing to cognitive
limitations in their ability to think in hypothetical terms, adolescents simply may be less
able than adults to think about events that have not yet occurred (i.e., events that may occur
sometime in the future). Second, the weaker future orientation of adolescents may reflect
their more limited life experience. For adolescents, a consequence 5 years in the future
may seem very remote in relation to how long they have been alive; teens may simply
attach more weight to short-term consequences because they seem more salient to their
adolescents (Greene, 1986; Nurmi, 1991). In addition,
lives (Gardner, 1993).
Drill Props G
I affirm, Resolved: in the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to
be treated as adults in the criminal justice syste m
The value is morality, as the evaluative term ought is a moral obligation.
The United States government has the moral obligation to protect the security and
fundamental rights of its citizens.
Therefore, the standard is maximizing the protection of citizens rights.
Because the purpose of the government is to protect its own citizens, it is necessary to
maximize those rights to the greatest number of people. Treating felonies as adults in the
criminal justice system decreases crime rates and thus maximizes the protection of the
rights all other citizens have.
Contention 1: Treating juveniles like adults in the criminal justice system prevents crime.
Subpoint A: the possibility of being tried in an adult court helps deter crimes
Chamberlin explains,
Second, in addition to providing more focus on punishment, Massachusetts' legislative
waiver and youthful offender statutes also expand the focus of the juvenile justice
syste m to provide greater deterrence. The increased focus on punishment through
legislative waiver also provides deterrence because of the possibility that a juvenile will
receive an adult sentence of life in prison for the crime of murder. Additionally, the
possible blended juvenile and adult sentences or extended juvenile sentence should
deter older juveniles from committing crimes that would qualify them as youthful
offenders.
If juveniles know they will be treated as adults and have to face harsher crimes there will
be more of an incentive to avoid committing the crimes in the first place. This stops the
problem at the source, and is thus the best way to reduce the amount of crimes
committed.
This is empirically affirmed.
Shari Miller- Johnson and Joel Rosch explain,
Another study of general deterrence used national data to see how the probability of
being punished aff ected future crime rates among juveniles and adults. It found that
increasing the probability of punishment lead to decreases in crime. The greater the
difference between the stricter adult systems and the more lenient juvenile systems, the
more the crime rate declined. In the few states where the probability of punishment was
greater in the juvenile system than in the adult system, crime increased when juveniles
moved into the adult system. These findings support the idea that for young off enders,
when there is less likelihood of punishment there is more crime, and when there is more
likelihood of punishment there is less crime.
Subpoint B: Allowing violent felons to go into juvenile courts poses too great a threat to
society because these courts do not have the power to incapacitate criminals. Christine
Chamberlin writes,
To allow a juvenile between the ages of fourteen and seventeen who is found guilty of
murder to receive a juvenile sentence or even a blended sentence poses too great a risk
to the publics safety. A juvenile disposition could mean less than two years in juvenile
detention and then automatic release, and a blended sentence could mean less than five
years in juvenile detention with a suspended adult sentence.214 Neither sentence
imposes enough punishment for the adult crime of murder.
The jurisdiction of adult courts allows longer sentences so even if jail does fail to stop
the criminal mindset, it is still better than juvenile courts because adult courts would
delay the return of said criminal.
Subpoint C: Rehabilitation does not help prevent crime and in fact makes it worse.
David Milward,
Restorative justice strives to create a less adversarial process and with less emphasis on
formal rules. A side effect of this is that without rules to impose consistency and
fairness, and without lawyers as advocates, a stronger party can impose its will on a
weaker party.43 For example, some crimes, such as sexual assault and domestic
violence, involve a considerable power imbalance between offender and victim. Barbara
Hudson argues that there is a danger to applying restorative justice to such offences because it
reinforces the power differential between offender and victim by removing the buffer of
state power to prosecute as a source of victim protection.44 Annalise Acorn points out that
domestic abuse often follows patterns of apology (by abuser) and forgiveness (by the
victim) that sustain a relationship of power over the victim. Restorative justice
exacerbates this by imposing standardized expectations of extending forgiveness to the
offender and accepting apology. The restorative process can end up reinforcing that
relationship of power whereby the abuser continues the abuse.4
The impact is that rehabilitation programs in juvenile systems further the criminal
mindset and power relationships. At a minimum, rehabilitation programs are ineffective.
Contention 2: The adult system maximizes the protection of juvenile rights.
Subpoint A: Minors must be treated as adults to show they are rights holders. Federle
explains,
Finally , abolishing the juvenile court enables us to see that children should have status as
rights holders. The juvenile court's emphasis on rehabilitation and reform not only
masks the coercive effects of state intervention but also permits the state to do things to
children on the grounds that it is in the children's best interests. Of course, coercive
state interventions rarely benefit those at whom such interventions are aimed and often
do more harm than good (Federle 1994). Moreover, claiming to act on behalf of a child allows
the claimant to do certain things without regard to the rights of that individual.
Consequently, children often experience coercive and even punitive sanctions under the
guise of best interests (Federle 1994).
Juveniles must be treated as adults if they are to maintain the same rights given to them,
just as theyre given to anyone else.
Subpoint B: The juvenile system denies juveniles the right to trial
The American Bar Association writes:
Because juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial unless tried as an
adult, judges hear most juvenile cases. Juveniles also do not have a right to a public trial or to bail. Under
most state laws, juvenile offenders do not commit "crimes." They commit delinquent
acts, some of which are acts that would constitute crimes if committed by an adult. The
trial phase of a juvenile case is an adjudication hearing. This means that the judge hears
the evidence and determines whether the child is delinquent. The court may then take
whatever action it deems to be in the child's best interest. The purpose is to rehabilitate, not punish.
Thus, judges have the unchecked power to determine juveniles punishment.
Juries however, are very important.
Feld writes:
Although the right to a jury trial is a crucial procedural safeguard when states punish
offenders, the vast majority of jurisdictions uncritically follow McKeiver's lead and deny
juveniles access to juries.s6 Because judges and juries decide cases and apply Winship's
"reasonable doubt" standard differently, it is easier to convict youths in juvenile court
than in criminal court with comparable evidence.37 Moreover, McKeivers imply ignored
the reality that juries protect against a weak or biased judge, inject the communit y's
values into the law, and increase the visibility and accountability of justice
administration.38 These protective functions acquire even greater importance in juvenile
courts, which typically labor behind closed doors immune from public scrutiny.
Thus, negating violates juveniles rights to a fair and objective trial.
Therefore, I affirm.
Drill Props H
I negate.
The value is governmental legitimacy. Ought is defined as duty or obligation, and the
value is contextualized to a government. In the obligation of governments, there is no
distinction between acts and omissions, governments are only concerned with the
outcomes of actions. Sunstein and Vermule write,
[U]nlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible
policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not
be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally
relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions
and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not
omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.
Thus, the government always has to make a choice of action. The only way to evaluate
this choice is through consequences. A government will always violate side-constraints
to some degree in the permission and prohibition, so the consequences of action is the
only possible way to judge a just government action.
Treating juveniles as adults increases recidivism. The criminals are more likely to
commit crimes again. David Myers1 [The Recidivism of Violent Youths in Juvenile and Adult Court : A
Consideration of Selection Bias. David L. Myers. Youth
Violence and Juvenile Justice 2003.
(Ph.D.
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, 1999.
Professor at Indiana University of Pennsylv ania.
Justice Policy Review .)] writes:
A final potential consequence of transferring and publicly labeling juveniles as criminals
is that their personal identities may be altered (Paternos ter & Iovanni, 1989). Rooted within l abeling theor y is the s ymbolic
interactionist tradition, whic h holds that the application of a deviant label and efforts to formally control
deviant acts serve to produce a deviant self-image (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1972). This, in turn, leads to
worsened future behavior. Although labeling juveniles as delinquents and processing
them in the juvenile system may create a certain amount of stigmatization, the stigma
associated with criminal court processing would appear to have a stronger and more
lasting effect on a youths personal identity. Moreover, this change in personal identity may be
exacerbated by the presence and influence of those who both support and exemplify the
status of being a criminal (e.g., adult prison inmates).
Editor of Criminal
Thus, the adult prison system will create a stigma that changes the youths identity. Also,
they are influenced by criminals during their time spent. This is specifically applicable to
labeling the juveniles violent felons, worse than all other criminals, because it will only
foster a more pervasive deviant self-image.
Myers 2 [The Recidivism of Violent Youths in Juvenile and Adult Court : A Consideration of Selection Bias. David L. Myers.
Youth
Violence and Juvenile Justice 2003.
(Ph.D.
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, 1999.
Professor at Indiana University of Pennsylv ania. Editor of Criminal
an empirical warrant.
Justice Policy Review .)]
continues with
The results of a Cox regression survival analysis (again in two separate models, without and
with the control for selection bias) for the determinants of postdispositional survival time
may be found in T able 7, and they essentiall y mirror the findings from the logit models presented i n Table 5. The positive
and significant effects of transfer in these models indicate that at any point in time
following disposition, waived offenders experienced an increased risk of rearrest (i.e.,
decreas ed sur vi val ti mes) as compared to retained youths. In other words , youths transferred to adult court
were rearrested more quickly following final disposition than were their counterparts
who remained in juvenile court. Under the ass umption that higher rate offenders woul d have s horter times until rearrest, the results
also suggest that transferred youths were more frequent offenders following final
disposition than were retained juveniles. The effec t of the standardized residuals variable again was insignificant.
Thus, recidivism and repeat offense occurrences are increased when juveniles are tried
as adults. The empirical analysis is preferable to any analytical argument in the round. It
forces arguments to pass the reality test, as any argument can be justified analytically.
Furthermore, it accounts for humans acting as they are not expected to in the real world,
which is relevant in terms of policy implementation. Also, this empirical analysis
contains 19 control variables and has a data set of about 500 juveniles. Analytical
arguments may focus on one type of person and cannot account for the intervening
factors that the empirical study does. At worst, the study has worth, and the links in the
NC should be preferred because of both analytical and empirical warrants. Thus, I
negate.
Drill Props I
1. DEONTOLOGY CARD: Inviolability of persons is a value that must be ultimately
respected. Kamm explains [F. M. Kamm --Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance
of Status Reviewed work(s): The Limits of Morality. by Shelly Kagan , Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing
and Allow ing. by Warren Quinn Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Autumn, 1992), pp. 354-389. Formerly
published by Princeton University Press.]:
If we are inviolable in a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable ones; such
a higher status is itself a benefit to us. Indeed, we are creatures whose interests as
recipients of such ordinary benefits as welfare are more worth serving. The world is, in a sense, a
better place, as it has more important creatures in it.32 In this sense the inviolable status (against being harmed in
a certain way) of any potential victim can be taken to be an agent-neutral value. This is a nonconsequential value. It does not follow (causally or noncausally) upon any act, but is already present in the status that persons have.
Ensuring it provides the background against which we may then seek their welfare or
pursue other values. It is not our duty to bring about the agent-neutral value, but only to
respect the constraints that express its presence. Kagan claims that the only sense in which we can show
disrespect for people is by using them in an unjustified way. Hence, if it is justif ied to kill one to save fiv e, we will not be show ing
disrespect for the one if we so use him. But there is another sense of disrespect tied to the fact that we owe people more respect
than animals, even though we als o should not treat animals in an unjustif ied way. And this other sense of dis respect is, I believe,
tied to the failure to heed the greater inviolability of persons .
2. UTILITARIANISM CARD: The value of inviolability is something that ought ot be

promoted. David Cummiskey writes,
Kantian Consequentialism By David Cummiskey Published by Oxford University Press US, 1996 ISBN 0195094530,
9780195094534 192 pages
In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational being
choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the exis tence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and
choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kants principle is rational nature exis ts as an end-in-itself ,
the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings . If
I
sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny
the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have dignity, an unconditional
and incomparable value that transcends any market value, but, as rational beings, persons
also have a fundamental equality, which dictates that some must sometimes give way for
the sake of others. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that
we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses
on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one may
sacrifice some to save many.
Drill Props J
I affirm.
Accept reasonable aff interpretations to offset the negative time skew and because the
negative is able to adapt to affirmative interpretations in their constructive, whereas I can
never adapt to exclusive interpretations presented by the negative since Ill have already
read my case. ODonnell explains:
And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framew ork Choice and the Future of Debate. Timothy M. ODonnell. Director of Debate.
University of Mary Washington.
AFC preserves the

value of the first affirmative constructive speech. This speech is the starting point for the
debate. It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at
all. Failure to grant AFC is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative teams labor
when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting
point, the opening speech act is essentially rendered meaningless while the rest of the
debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about. History is instructiv e here. The
There are several reasons why the affirmative should get to choose the framew ork for the debate. First,
brief and undistinguished lif e of both counter warrants and plan-plan have amply demonstrated the chaos that results w hen the
negative refuses to engage the affirmative on its chosen starting point.
The value is justice is defined as the quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, or moral
rightness: to uphold the justic e of a cause (All definitions are Oxford American Dictionary).
Affirm is defined as to state or assert positively; maintain as true and truth is defined a verified
or indisputable fact, proposition, principle , or the like: mathematical truths. These two definitions
necessitate any topical affirmative to evaluate ethical considerations by referencing truth
as the implicit standard. Additionally, truth is the litmus test for any ethical theory on
epistemological grounds. Since ethics are constructions of our minds, they are also
limited by the permanent constraints on our logic. This justifies evaluating ethical
theories by their consistency with objective rationality and truth and avoidance of
subjectivity.
Since the resolution is a question of ethics, we first need to delve into the meta-ethical
and limits of logic to construct an appropriate moral theory. Every philosophical
perspective is an analysis of the world from a perspective within it. We are fundamentally
and permanently constrained to our vantage point, as a being in this universe, and that
uniquely affects our capabilities to interpret it. Steinhart 1 explains,
On Nietzsche, Eric Steinhart, Wadsworth Philosophical Series, William Paterson University.
In human consciousness, a part of the world is naturally aware of the whole world. The
human mind is the eye with which the world looks at itself. It is the self-mirroring, the
self-reflection, of the world. But since our minds are in the world, they are eyes that see
themselves. We are self-aware. In human self-consciousness, the mirror reflects itself.
But when a mirror reflects itself, it reflects its own reflection: it reflects itself reflecting
itself forever, making a series of endlessly nested self-reflections The series of
reflections in reflections is like a series of steps leading down into the deep underworld
of the mind. Caves are labyrinths. Plato said that the world in which we live, move, and have our being is like a cave in whic h
we are prisoners, and that all our experience is only shadows cast on cave-walls. For Nietzsche, the subterranean inner world is a
cave haunted by vampires and ghosts. It is haunted by superstitious fears: fear of death, of ghosts, of hell, and of God Nietzsche
argues that there
are no interpretations or maps of the world from the outside. There are no
external perspectives on the world. Nietzsches perspectivism is the theory that the
human mind strives for realistic internal conceptual maps of the world. It is an example of what
Putnam, the 20th century American thinker, calls i nternal realism.
This limited perspective and the virtual lack of context while examining the world poses a
major obstacle in setting up an objective moral interpretation of the universe. Steinhart 2
further assesses and describes the difficulty and ambiguity of our limited perspective of
reality:
Some sentences have more than one interpretation. For instance, Ronald loves jelly
beans more than Nancy has two interpretations: either it means that Ronald loves jelly
beans more than Nancy loves jelly beans, or it means that Ronald loves jelly beans more
than he loves Nancy. Without further information, there is no way to decide which
interpretation is correct. Given only the sentence as evidence, both interpretations are
equally valid. Nietzsche thinks the world is like an ambiguous book, that it is text with
multiple interpretations. Given the world as evidence, its different interpretations are all
equally valid. Existence is ambiguous; there are infinitely many equally true
perspectives.
This analogous situation describes the infinite amount of equally un-verifiable moral
theories. Macintyre supplements this analogy with an explicit justification of the nonverifiability of morals:
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 1981. Page 20.
http://books.google.com/books?id=7bLuAAAAMAAJ&q=After+Virtue&dq=After+Virtue&hl=en&ei=tFdOTNi8FouWsgPOmvTDw &sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA
An agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from
which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from
some more general rule or principle; but on this view since every chain of reasoning must be
finite, such a process of justif icatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some
rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt
his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the
end an expression of the preferences of for that will its principles have and it them by adopting them. However,
that does not mean morality in and of its self cannot exist, therefore, I present the follow ing burden analysisan individual will and
can have only such authority as [one] chooses to confer upon [it] .
In conclusion, any ethical theory that asserts its own verifiability via arbitrary and
subjective criteria fails the implicit standard of truth as described earlier in the
framework.
Therefore, the sole and sufficient affirmative burden is to demonstrate consistency with
Dionysian ethics since it is the only compatible ethical theory that avoids the pitfalls of
an arbitrary interpretation of ethics. Dionysian ethics are descriptive since it has already
been established that our entire moral vocabulary is a process of reflection and
identification of reality. More importantly, prescriptive interpretations fail the implicit
truth standard by making arbitrary judgments on ethical accountability.
Steinhart 3 presents why Dionysian ethics avoid the falsity of arbitrary standards
through the absolute affirmation of all realities:
Dionysian naturalism smooths rough souls and lets them taste a new desire to lie still
as a mirror, that the deep sky may mirror itself in them. (BGE 295) Dionysian mirroring is the
true self-interpretation of the world; it is not a privileged perspective, but the affirmation
of every perspective. It is a perfectly accurate reflection of the world from every angle
without any distorting negativity.
While most ethical theories look into the suffering, and use arbitrary criteria to determine
due, Dionysian ethics examines every possibility, suffering or pleasure, and affirm every
reality. Steinhart 4 furthers:
Nietzsches own response to the problem of suffering is the absolute affirmation of
everything that occurs. The ultimate moral principle of existence is affirmation: it is
better to exist than not to exist. Say Yes to every possibility, affirm every destiny. Instead of
affirming some supernatural world, Nietzsche says that we ought to affirm this world. This is religious naturalism. Nietzsche thinks
Instead of denying our lives, our bodies, our

sexualities, our earth, we ought to affirm our lives, our bodies, our sexualities, our earth.
We ought to affirm our destinies. His name for it is amor fati: love of fate. His name for religious naturalism plus amor
fati is Dionysus. Nietzsche thinks we ought to affirm everything that happens to us, no matter how
pleasurable or painful. We ought to affirm without subtraction, exception, or selection
(WP 1041). Affirmation is not a feeling or an emotional reaction. Affirmation has nothing to
do with feeling. Affirmation is a moral judgment: you affirm regardless of what you feel.
Nietzsche thinks that we ought to affirm what feels good as well as what feels bad.
that ancient Greek religion came close to naturalism.
Steinhart 3 and 4 explain the solution to the meta-ethical dilemma presented at the top of
the affirmative case. The process of delineating between moral affirmation, and moral
condemnation requires subjective and arbitrary standards that have no objective merit.
As such, they fail the implicit standard for an ethical theory since we measure these
theories via truth. Hence, a moral theory that avoids the pitfalls of all others would be
one that assigns the same moral value to all actions, since it would not arbitrarily
distinguish between right and wrong. That is what Dionysian ethics does. By morally
affirming every reality we encompass all of reality and dont interject non-verifiable
delineations between right and wrong.
Steinhart 5 explains why the Dionysian moral judgment must be positive as opposed to
negative, to avoid self-defeating nihilism.
Suppose a person looks into a mirror and says: everything reflected in this mirror does
not exist. Suppose that what the person says is true. Since the person who is looking
into the mirror is reflected in the mirror, the person who makes the statement does not
exist if the statement is true. But people who do not exis t dont talk. They dont make true statements . The
persons statement is absurd, because if it is true, then the reflective power of the mirror
negates itsince we are wholly in the world, if we deny the value of the world, we deny
the value of our own denial. If we condemn the world, we condemn our condemnation.
Nihilism undermines itself.
Hence, while an ethical theory that advocated charging every action with a negative
moral judgment would not arbitrarily distinguish between affirmation and condemnation,
it would be internally inconsistent and negate its own negation.
Also, if ethical theories do not exist you still affirm since an action is only judged unjust
for violating an ethical constraint. Hence, if no ethical constraints existed all actions
would be considered default ethically permissible.
In conclusion, the unconditional moral affirmation of every possibility meets the
affirmative criterion by presenting a positive moral judgment of governments prioritizing
Universal Human Rights over national interest.
Drill Props K
I affirm
Without sanctions wed go straight to war- Marinov 05
/Nikolay Marinov, 2005 ( Prof. Of PolySci at Yale) Do Economic Sanctions Destabalize Country Leaders. American Journal of
Political Science. Volume 49, Issue 3 (July 2005)/
Economic coercion occupies the middle ground between words and war. Its relatively
frequent use can be explained as the intersection between high demand and available
supply. The need to intervene is a practical necessity in a world in which the leaders and
citizens of some states choose to (or are forced to) take interest in activities beyond the border
of the territory they live in. The multiple ties of interdependence in the world system make economic coercion an
available policy option, partic ularly to countries with large economies and generous budgets. Economic coercion is
often chosen over the alternatives on the perception that it may succeed where words
would not be enough, and the use of force is either infeasible or undesirable.
Sanctions represent the only means of leverage other than war. Helms 99/Jesse Helms 1999 (fmr US Senator R NC; Chair of the Foreign Relations Cmte) What Sanctions Epidemic? Foreign Affairs Vol
78 No 1, pg. Online
Jefferson is right. There
are , indeed, three tools in foreign policy: diplomacy, sanctions, and war.
Take away sanctions and how can the United States deal with terrorists, proliferators,
and genocidal dictators? Our options would be empty talk or sending in the marines. Without sanctions, the
United States would be virtually powerless to influence events absent war. Sanctions
may not be perfect and they are not alw ays the answer, but they are often the only weapon. Unilateral
sanctions, in fact, are the linchpin of our nonproliferation policy. According to a recently declassified analysis by the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, "the history of U.S.-China relations shows that China
has made specific

nonproliferation commitments only under the threat or imposition of sanctions." Short of
war, sanctions are the main leverage the United States has over China
Sanctions decrease the duration and intensity of war- Folch 08

/Abel Escriba-Folch 2008 (Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals) "Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts", pg.
SSRN
sanctions may shorten conflict through their impact on the beliefs over
costs, on the incentives facing the parties involved to continue the fight and on the feasibility of their doing so. If some civil wars
effectively contain a greed component (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), then, as Collier et al. propose, a key predic tion is that the
higher the payoff from victory, the longer would be the warranted rebellion (2004: 254). Rebellion
is seen as an investment in this case, and economic sanctions, by restricting the expected benefits of
resource control and export, may alter parties incentiv es to prolong a conflict. Likewise, in the conceptualization
of war and rebellion as a business, groups have an incentive to continue fighting when the
general state of lawlessness makes contraband and other illegal activities possible and highly profitable
(Collier, 2000). Perhaps the clearest example of measures seeking to limit such incentiv es is diamond
sanctions which seek to control illicit trade and thus limit the funding of rebel groups.
On the other hand,
PS Im still affirming. Heres how-
Observation 1: Links
The status quo is obscured by a fundamental misunderstanding of war. We run from it as
if it is the problem, without realizing that WE are the problem. To truly comprehend and
escape its horror we must adopt a paradigm shift. We can no longer treat war a
disturbing abridgment of humanity, an accident of human naturebut instead as
something that we are in love with, and only understanding that love will allow us to
escape it- Hillman 1If we want wars horror to be abated so that life may go on, it is necessary to understand
and imagine. We humans are the species privileged in regard to understanding. Only we have the faculty and
the scope from comprehending the planets quandaries. Perhaps that is what we are here
for: to bring appreciative understanding to the phenomena that have no need to
understand themselves, it may even be a moral obligation to try to comprehend war. That
famous phrase of William James, the moral equivalent of war, with which he meant the mobilization of moral effort, today means
the effort of imagination proposed by Lif ton and ducked by Sontag.
The failure to understand may be may be because our imaginations are impaired and our
modes of comprehension need a paradigm shift. If the ponderous object war does not
yield to our tool, then we have to put down that tool and search for another. The
frustration may not lie simply in the obduracy of war-that it is essentially ununderstandable, unimaginable. Is it wars fault that we have not grasped it meanings? We
have to investigate the faultiness of our tool: why cant our method of understanding
understand war? Answer: according to Einstein, problems cannot be solved at the same level of
thinking that created them.
You would expect that the war-w is e, the masters of war, like Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Machiavelli, and Clausew itz, would have come
to conclusions about war beyond advic e for its conduct. For them, how ever, it is a matter of practical science. The elements of the
art of war are first, measurement of space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations ; fourth, comparisons; and fif th,
chances of victory. Long before there were glimmerings of modern scientific method, that mind-set was already applied to w ar. The
empirical mind-set is timeless, archetypal. It starts from the given-war is here, is now, so whats to do? Speculations about its
underlying reason, and why or what it is in the first place, distract from the huge task of how to bring war to victory. No theorist and
no commander, writes Clausew itz, should bother himself with psychological and philosophical sophis tries. Even though the
rational science of war admits the obvious, that in military affairs reality is surprisingly elusive,: it omits from its calculations the
elusive-and often determining-factors such as fighting spirit, weather, personal proclivities of the generals , political pressures, health
of participants, poor intelligence, technological breakdowns, misinterpreted orders, residues in memory of similar events. War is the
playground of the incalculable. As flies to wanton boys, are we to the Gods, /They kill us for their sport (Lear 4.1.39). A key to
understanding war is given by the normality of its surprisingly elusive unreason.
War demands a leap of imagination as extraordinary and fantastic as the phenomenon

itself. Our usual categories are not lore enough, reducing wars meaning to explaining its
causes. Tolstoy mocked the idea of discovering the causes of war. In his postscript to War and Peace, widely considered the
most imaginative and fullest study of war ever attempted, he concludes: Why did millions of people begin to kill one another? Who
told them to do it? It w ould seem that it was clear to each of them that this could not benefit any of them, but would be wor se for
them all. Why did they do it? Endless retrospective conjectures can be made, and are made, of the causes of this senseless event,
but the immense number of these explanations, and their concurrence in one purpose, only proves that the causes were
innumerable and that not one of them deserves to be called the cause. For Tolstoy war was governed by something like a collective
force beyond individual human w ill.
AND This misunderstanding adopts another level of complexity in that it is matched by

foreign policy tools that triumph peace as an end of war, not as a oh-so-temporary break
from it- We need to stop fighting for peace and start fighting for fightings sake- Hillman
2:
I will not march for peace, nor will I pray for it, because it falsifies all it touches. It is a
cover-up, a curse. Peace is simply a bad word. Peace, said Plato, is really only a name.
Even if states should cease from fighting, wrote Hobbes, It is not to be called peace; but
rather a breathing time. Truce, yes; cease-fire, yes; surrender, victory, meditation, brinkmanship, standoff
these words have content, but peace is darkness falling.
The upshot of this excursion into peace is simple enough: it is more true to life to
consider war more normal than peace. Not only does peace too quickly translate into
security, and a security purchased at the price of liberty. Something more sinister also
is justified by peace which de Tocqueville superbly describes as a new kind of servitude where a
supreme power covers the surface of society with a network of small, complicated
rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic
characters cannot penetrate to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered but
softened, bent and guided; men are seldom force by it to act, but they are constantly
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does
not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes and stupefies a people, till
each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrial animals,
of which government is the Sheppard.
War must stay on our minds, its weight press us into thinking and imagining. Machiavelli is
right: A princeshould have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other things for his
study, but war; [he] oughtnever let his thought stray from the exercise of war; and in
peace he ought to practice it more than in war. Otherw is e, psychic numbing, the term Lifton
conceived for the paraly sis of the mind and blunted feelings in everyday life. Peace in our contemporary society is
characterized both by the tranquility of soporific and sophomoric teddy-bearism and by
the frantic overload of stimuli. This ever-shifting involvement from one set of stimuli and engagements to the net
Lifton calls Protean after the Greek sea-god who defended himself by taking on a different form from moment to moment, never still
long enough to be apprehended. The protean defense mechanis m is like surfing, like multiple tasking, like attention deficit,
hyperactivity. The prince, as generous metaphor for responsible citizen and concerned member of the plis, will keep a focused mind,
a mind undistracted by the multiple diversions of peace, and a psyche neither numbed nor in denial. And he will maintain this clarity
not merely by meditating or praying to benefit his own mental health, but for the common good and the defense of the community.
Hence, the
prince ought never let his thoughts stray fromwar.

AND Economic sanctions are themselves a mechanism of distancing ourselves from war,
contributing to the misunderstanding. Hillman 3:
Yet, for all this, has ever a major Western philosopher-w ith the great exception of Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan was published
three and a half centuries ago-delivered a full-scale assault on the topic, or given it the primary importance war deserves in the
hierarchy of themes? Immanuel Kant came to it late (1795) w ith a brief essay written when he was past seventy and after he had
published his main w orks. He states the theme of this chapter in a few words much like Hobbes: The state of peace among men
living side by side is not the natural state; the natural state is one of war. Though war is the primary human condition, his focus is
upon perpetual peace which is the title of his essay. About peace philosophers and theologians have much to say, and we shall
Fallen from the higher minds central contemplation, war tends to be

examined piecemeal by specialists, or set aside as history where it then becomes a
subchapter called military history in the hands of scholars and reporters dedicated to the record of facts. Or its study
is placed outside the mainstream, isolated in policy institutions (often at war themselves with riv al institutions).
take ago peace in our stride.
The magic of their thinking transmutes killing into taking out, bloodshed into body
counts, and the chaos of battle into scenarios, game theory, cost benefits as
weapons become toys and bombs smart. Especially needed is not more specialist
inquiry into past wars and future wars, but rather an archetypal psychology-the myths,
philosophy, theology of wars deepest mind. That is the purpose of this book.Cant understand,
cant imagine is unacceptable. It gets us off the hook, admitting defeat before we have
even begun. Lif ton has said the task in our times its to imagine the real. Robert McNamara, secretary of defense during
much of the Vietnam War, looking back, writes: we can now understand these catastrophes for what they were: essentially the
products of a failure of imagination. Surpris e and its consequents, panic and terror, are due to the poverty of expectations - the
failure of imagination, according to another secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld. When comparing the surprise at Pearl Har bor
with that of the Tw in Towers, the dir ector of the National Security Agency, Michael Hayden, said perhaps it was more a failure of
imagination this time than last.
Observation two: Alternative

The plan: The US Federal Government should eliminate economic sanctions.
The elimination of sanctions and fighting of wars for wars sake allows us to comprehend
this paradigm shift. Once that soft-core bullshit is out of the way we make sincere
progress in moving towards a true understanding of war- Hillman 4
A nagging question still persists. Could
the state of war become normal were it not in tune with

something in the human soul, a force, a factor other than aggression and selfpreservation, other than group bonding? It is as if a recognition occurs: so this is it.
This is Hell; the Kingdom of Death; the ultimate truth below all else. This is terror this is a
love more than my life, this is panic and madness. I know war already before I have gone
to it. The psyche normalizes because it is archetypally in tune a priori, prior to the event;
the event, like love in a flash, like the response to beauty, like taking the newborn to the
breast, or when the temper boils at an instance of injustice. Perhaps we do come into the
world knowing it all and that war is in us not because of a fighting instinct, but in our
souls knowledge of the cosmos of which war is a foundation. The great realities are
given; life displays and confirms them. If war is present to the archetypal imagination, we
dont need wars to know them.
We do not have to search for wars causes in an id erupting against a superego, in male
castration anxieties, in splitting, paranoid projections, overcompensated inferiority
feelings, nor load it onto testosterone. The unconscious grounds of war are more likely
the neglect of grasping the full extent of our animal natures that our animality is not
sheerly nasty and brutish, but in tune harmoniously with war because we are each a politikon zoon.
If war fathers the cosmos (Heraclitus), if being reveals itself as war (Levinas), if the natural state is one of
war (Kant), it must be the first of all norms, the standard by which all else is measured,
permeating existence and therefore our existence as individuals and as societies. War
then is permanent, not irruptive, necessary, not contingent; the tragedy that makes all
others pale, and selfless love possible . Was it Yeats who said something like, You only begin to live
when you conceive life as a tragedy ? And Conrad: Immerse yourself in the destructive
element.
AND We can never prevent it- we must understand it. Hillman 5

Hillman, 2004 (James, Internationally renow ned psychologist, has taught at Yale, Syracuse, and the University of Chicago, A
Terrible Love of War, p. 1-3)
One sentence in one scene from one film, Patton, sums up what this book tries to
understand. The general walks the field after a battle. Churned earth, burnt tanks, dead
men. He takes it up a dying officer, kisses him, surveys the havoc, and says: God help
me I do love it so. I love it more than my life. We can never prevent war or speak
sensibly of peace and disarmament unless we enter this love of war. Unless we move our
imaginations into the martial state of soul, we cannot comprehend its pull. This means going to
war, and this book aims to induct our minds into military service. We are not going to war in the name of
peace as deceitful rhetoric so often declares, but rather for wars own sake: to
understand the madness of its love.
Our civilian disdain and pacifist horror-all the legitimate and deep-felt aversion to
everything to do with the military and the warrior-must be set aside. This is because the
first principle of psychological method holds that any phenomenon to be understood
must be sympathetically imagined. No syndrome can be truly dislodged from its cursed
condition unless we first move imagination into its heart.
War is first of all a psychological task, perhaps the first of all psychological tasks
because it threatens your life and mine directly, and the existence of all living beings.
The bell tolls for thee, and all. Nothing can escape the thermonuclear rage, and if the
burning and its aftermath are unimaginable, their cause, war, is not.
War is also a psychological task because philosophy and theology, the fields supposed to do the heavy thinking for our species
have neglected wars overriding importance. War is the father of all, said Heraclitus at the beginnings of Western thought, whic h
Emmanuel Levinas restates in recent Western thought as being reveals itself as war. If it is primordial component of being, then
war fathers the very structure of existence and our thinking about it: our ideas of the universe, of religion, of ethic s; war determines
the thought patterns of Aristotles logic of opposites, Kants antinomies, Darw ins natural selection, Marxs struggle of classes, and
even Freuds repression of the id by the ego and superego. We think in w arlike terms, feel ourselves at war w ith ourselves, and
unknow ingly believe predation, territorial defense, conquest and the interminable battle of opposing forces are the ground rules of
existence.
Observation 3: Impact
If we dont understand we will always be creating a new enemy! New enemies here, and
there, and their reality is irrelevant to the quelling of the spring of love of war. We will
always be at war unless we quell that spring- Hillman 6:
The idea of otherness or alterity that currently dominates thinking about gender and race
and ecology is too abstract to unleash the dogs of war. Can you imagine a war without
first imagining an enemy? Whether the focus be upon prey, sacrificial victim, evil spirit,
or object of desire, enmity mobilizes the energy. The figure of the enemy nourishes the
passions of fear, hatred, rage, revenge, destruction, and lust, providing the supercharged
strength that makes the battlefield possible
The enemy provides the constellating image in the individual and is necessary to the
state in order to collect individuals into a cohesive body. Ren girards violence and the sacred
elaborates this point extensively : the emotional foundation of a unif ied society derives from violent unanimity, the collectiv e
destruction of a sacrif icial victim, scapegoat, or enemy upon who all together, w ithout exception or dissent, turn on and eliminate.
Thereby, the inherent conflicts within a community that can lead to internal violence become exteriorized and ritualized onto an
enemy. Once
an enemy has been found or invented, named, and excoriated, the

unanimous violence without dissent, i.e., patriotism and the pre-emptive strikes of
preventative war, become opportune consequents
Mind you now : there
may not actually be an enemy! All along we are speaking of the idea of
an enemy, a phantom enemy. It is not the enemy that is essential to war and that forces
wars upon us, but the imagination. Imagination is the driving force, especially when
imagination has been preconditioned by the media, education, and religion, and fed with
aggressive boosterism and pathetic pieties by the states need for enemies. T he
imagined phantom swells and clouds the horizon, we cannot see beyond enmity. The
archetypal idea gains a face. Once the enemy is imagined, one is already in a state of
war. Once the enemy has been named, war has already been declared and the actual
declaration becomes inconsequential, only legalistic. The invasion of Iraq began before the invasion of
Iraq; it had already begun when the nation was named among the axis of evil.
Enmity forms its images in many shapes the nameless women to be raped, the f ortress to be razed, the ric h houses to be pillaged
and plundered, the monstrous predator, ogre, or evil empire to be eliminated. An element of fantasy creates the rationality of war.
Like the heart, war has its reasons that reason does not comprehend. They exfoliate and
harden into paranoid perceptions that invent the enemy, distorting intelligence with
rumor and speculation and providing justifications for the violent procedures of war and
harsh measures of depersonalization at home in the name of security.
How can the living cells in any person at the extreme of exhaustion amid dying friends and mangled dead, howitzer shells
whooshing past like freight trains, accommodate to this normality? How can any person thrice wounded climb back on his hors e
and continue the charge straingt into the cannons mouth? The human psyches capacity to normalize the most adverse
conditions, adapt to them, find them usual ( people in extreme climates rarely move to another geography; very few captives r esis t
their imprisoners) has kept the species globally spread, diverse, and alive through millennia. Nor malization may allow survival and,
normalization may also be one of the dumbest of human faults. How does it differ from denial, w illful unconsciousness, ignorance,
psychic numbing? Doesnt accepting all also lead to pardoning all? The shadow side of tolerance is the loss of the sense of the
intolerable. To normalize may mean to take the side, not of surviv al, but of death.
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props L
1AR Theory is a theoretically illegitimate strategy for three reasons.
1. No matter how many arguments I put out, the 2AR can just respond to everything
and I have no chance to answer it back. Thus, the aff gets to synthesize, extend,
and weigh dropped arguments on the theory debate. All of these are essential
components of argumentation and all are impossible for the negative to do. Theory in the
AR is legitimate in policy debate because there are two negative speeches afterwards
that the neg can use to extend arguments and respond to answers. Because LD lacks
this structure, AR theory is not acceptable. Dont let them say that I made too many
arguments for him to respond tothat just shows that he cant cover arguments, and
doesnt refute this argument about the general concept
2. Theory in the 1AR is equivalent to a new argument. Theory is an offensive
argument that is not a direct substantive turn on the NC to the NC or AC
standard, and its not an extension of the affirmative. It
would be as if they read part
of a new AC in the AR which is fundamentally unfair.
3. Going for theory in the 1AR allows the affirmative to make the first 13 minutes of the
debate completely irrelevant. However, this takes away half of my speeches and 7
minutes, whereas it only gets rid of 6 minutes of affirmative time and 1/3 of the
speeches. Thus, it uniquely puts me at a disadvantage. This also outweighs all
affirmative theory standards since it has the clearest brightline
ever, given that it is
actually a mathematical disparity.
The ability for the affirmative to check abuse is not denied by this argument.
1. They couldve used cross-examination to effectively remove arguments from the flow
and expose obvious errors in logic to take out the burdens before even beginning the
AR.
2. They couldve outlined what fair negative strategy was in the text of
the AC. This
would not have to be an exhaustive list of preempts, they would just have to justify the
same standards that they are running in the theory shell. If those standards are really
that
important to them, they should take the time to outline them in the AC. Theyre
going to say that they dont want to waste time on that in the text of the AC. However, if
they think that theory is a
waste of time then you ought to vote against them for
wasting our time, taking away a chance to have a fair or educational debate. This is also
the only fair way to run theory (cross-apply the first Turn Theory argument).
Thus, you should vote now my opponent has already committed the abuse by running theory
in the AR. If my arguments make sense to you now, you should sign your ballot now to prevent
the 2AR from making responses to this that are impossible for me to answer. So, VOTE NOW.
At the very least you should err negative on the theory debate if you are having trouble resolving
it, since I dont get a chance to answer the 2AR.
This precludes all of the arguments in the their theory, since they all commit the 1AR theory
violation, which means that its impossible for them to extend their theory.
Because of the disadvantage that 1AR theory puts me at, if you are ignoring the 1AR theory bad
stuff, my only option is now to dump turns against the theory. So, here we go.
Section Two:
Introducing theory is fundamentally unfair.
1. The rules established by theory are only initiated after the round has begun. This is
unfair since it puts an impossible burden on me. There is no pre-set rulebook that
determines what the fair rules of debate are. So, there would have been no way for me
to conform to this rule in my first speech, so I never had a chance not to commit the
violation. This is unfair because it precludes any potential NC
strategy from being
deemed legitimate.
2. Arguments take away affirmative ground because they prove the resolution false. An
argument that did not take away affirmative ground would not be a negative argument.
That means that their theory argument would put the burden on me of giving them turns
to read against the NC in order to show how Im not taking away any ground. This is
absurd, because that would mean that I would have to refute myself in the NC.
This is the worst competitive disadvantage possible, because it means I have to literally
show that I lose in order for my arguments to be fair.
3. Every argument in a debate round limits ground in some fashion framework
arguments set out acceptable limits of argumentation, standards define relevant offense.
Since theres no clear
brightline between these acceptable scope-narrowing
mechanisms and the groundskew my opponent is talking about, the logical extension
of his argument would be to eliminate any negative argumentation,
which
is unimaginably unfair.
The goal of theory is to assert a fair rule of debate. Using theory in a debate round is contrary to
this purpose.
a. Everything within a round is shaped by a desire to win, or we wouldnt be
participating in a competitive activity. Thus, the rules created are unfairly
skewed towards whoever introduces them. Cross-apply their fairness voter.
b. A game cannot be coherently governed by rules established in the process of
playing it. This is because a game is defined by the rules that govern it, and
those rules are what allow us to determine the winner. However, if the rules are
constantly being developed, there is no way for the players to know how to
become the winners.
c. Theory is supposed to be a fair rule, but the rule that gets established is
determined by who does a better job on the theory debate. This is not
necessarily the result of the rule being asserted being qualitatively superior, it
could simply be the result of the debater having superior strategy or speaking
faster. So, the project of theory fails.
d. Theory
often just annoys judges and competitors, rather than convincing

them that they should change their style of debate. Im certainly
aggravated that Im having to read this instead of engaging in a substantive
debate about the issues in the resolution. So, if the purpose of theory as
establishing rules is important, vote against them since they are contrary to the
establishment of rules.
Even though you are voting based on fairness, these harms are unique to my opponent.
1. These harms link to introducing the theory flow, and s/he is introducing it, not me.
2. Im not
trying to establish rules for the debate, Im showing how the way s/he
attempts to do so is illegitimate.
Section Three: Textuality

Textuality is the most important standard for fairness and education.
1. Advocacies outside the resolution are entirely unpredictable since the topic is the only
thing that guides debaters research before the round. Predictability links to fairness
because limited preparation time necessitates that debaters be able to research
arguments beforehand to be adequately prepared.
2. The resolution defines what ground both sides have. As such, disregarding it commits
the biggest violation of ground, both exploding affirmative ground and severely limiting
negative ground. This impacts to fairness since if ground distribution isnt equitable,
debaters dont have an equal chance to win.
3. The judge lacks the jurisdiction to vote on arguments outside the resolution; for example,
it would be interventionist for the judge to vote on a case about biology, even if it were
well constructed, since anything outside the resolution would be arbitrarily established by
the
debater. Thus, textuality is necessary to prevent judge intervention, which is the
biggest violation of fairness since it takes the course of the round entirely out of the
hands of the competitors.
4. Linguistics is necessary to understand fairness arg. For ex, it would be absurd for me to
evaluate their predictability standard and saywhat the actual fair interpretation of
predictability is. What this points to is that theory always has to appeal to the
linguistic interpretation that justifies textuality.
Now textuality also has a net benefit as an evaluative mechanism because it avoids the
problems articulated in the number 4 off section two.
Now extend their time skew argument. I have justified why they have skewed the time as a
result of forcing the debate off textual positions, so their voter now generates a negation.
Thus, the fact that my position is textually justified means that it is proactively unfair to attempt
to exclude it. So, the his strategy of using theory against the NC justifies why he is proactively
unfair.
Drill Props N
I negate.
The affirmative proposes that the U.S. submit to the jurisdiction of the ICTY in order to
reduce tensions among Serbian nationals. While I agree with the goal, I disagree over the
method.
A) My counter-advocacy is that the European Union should waive the pre-condition that
Serbia cooperate with the ICTY and extend membership to Serbia immediately.
B) U.S. submission to the ICTY will deter peacekeeping operations, alienate key NATO
allies, and entrench the power of an illegitimate and ineffective court. Any of these harms
serve as a net benefit to the counter-advocacy.
First, civilian and military defense officials fear the precedent set by submitting to an
unfettered international court.
Victoria K. Holt and Elisabeth W. Dallas, [Senior Associate and Research Associate]. On trial: The US military
and the International Criminal Court. The Henry L. Stimson Center. March 2006. Report no. 55
A consistent concern raised was that the Court would look over the shoulder of a
solider and judge his or her actions during the heat of battle. One military police officer
cast it as having a second bite of the apple, where the Court could judge US actions, even after
appropriate authorities had conducted an investigation domestically. This concern drove nearly all
questions about the Court and its operations at some level. It also led to questions about the Courts
accountability, its impact on future US missions, and its potential for being abused by
Americas critics and enemies. Some military officers, including a few who recently served in leadership or policy
positions, equated the ICC w ith European courts claiming universal jurisdiction, such as those in Belgium. They w orried about being
apprehended while traveling abroad by an institution that mirrors existing European national courts. One retired Colonel w ondered if
he could be grabbed in Spain for his work promoting US policies that differed w ith European views on landmines.89 More
than one officer familiar with the Court suggested that everything changed in 1998,
when the ICTY considered cases about the NATO air strikes conducted during the
Kosovo War. While the Court dismissed the charges, it served as a wake-up call to
what the US could face with the ICC. Another retired Army officer said that at first he was
firmly in favor of the Court, yet after word of accusations of war crimes against the USled coalition in Kosovo, he said it changed his mind about the potential for there to be
politically-based accusations made against the U nited States. He cautioned that this was not a display of
US arrogance, asking, Who are we to be special?90 For the same reason, another retired Colonel suggested that the US should
be first in line to support the Court, in order to demonstrate US commitment to the laws of war and human rights internationally.91
Advocates of the Court argued that the charges against NATO w ere rightfully dropped, demonstrating the fairness of such tribunals
and the future ICC.92 Yet, critics seized on the case to demonstrate the opposite point: such courts were innately political and could
be used again against other unpopular military actions.93
This fear of prosecution deters peacekeeping operations.

William L. Nash 2000 [Fellow and Visiting Lecturer at Harvards JFK School of Government], The ICC and the Deployment
of U.S. Armed Forces, The United States and the ICC.
First, U.S. concern about avoiding such charges could lead to unwise operational
constraints. For example, if the military were directed to adopt as operationally policy stricter
interpretations of proportionality, this could reduce the speed, mass, and dominance
that have characterized U.S. military operations in the past decade (and lower casualties).
Concerns about incidental loss of life could result in even more conservative targeting. Some w ould call this a positive development,
but repeated piecemeal efforts increase the ris ks to both parties and are usually more harmful in the long run. Returning
to
the recent Kosovo experience, the slow and limited buildup of NATOs air campaign can
explain, in part, the length of the war and the resulting incidental loss of life an
unintended consequence of proportionality. In fact, the United States already subjects its military
operations to a high degree of sensitivity to target selection and other related legal concerns. Second, a more likely effect of
ICC interference in U.S. policy would be to increase the frequency and visibility of internal
U.S. military investigations. The Clinton administration has implied that it w ould not investigate the legality of military
operations that it regards as valid official actions to enforce international law . If the United States ultimately felt compelled
to better insulate itself from ICC jurisdiction by investigating ICC concerns, the Department of
Defense (DOD) could find itself launching investigations on the flimsiest of charges.
Investigations might be considered a relatively inexpensive insurance policy, but they would absorb time and money. If taken to
extremes, internal
investigations would undermine morale and appear to constitute secondguessing of military decision-making. They could ruin individual careers and [which could] ultimately
decrease public confidence in the military.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS are more important than retrospective prosecution by an

international court. NATO stopped the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans the ICTY hasnt
done anything nearly as important.
Jack Goldsmith 2003 [Professor of Law at the University of Chicago], The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court,
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 1, Centennial Tribute Essays (Winter), pp. 89-104.
We have already seen these perverse effects in the United States' threat to pull out of UN
peacekeeping missions unless U.S. troops receive immunity before the ICC. However this is
resolv ed, peacekeeping w ill suffer at least at the margin. To the extent that ad hoc international tribunals have been important in
protecting human rights, they too have suffered, and w ill continue to suffer, from a general U.S. w ithdrawal for reasons alr eady
the greatest effect will be on U.S. humanitarian and quasi-humanitarian

interventions, such as in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia. Human rights advocates increasingly view
such interventions as legitimate and necessary to protect human rights. It is hard
enough to generate domestic support in the United States for these interventions when
there is no threat of liability. U.S. intervention will now be much harder. Such
interventions invariably involve combat against irregular forces interspersed in civilian
populations and thus invariably run the risk of war crime accusations. The fatal
compromise appears to expose the only nation practically able to intervene to protect
human rights to the greatest potential liability for human rights violations.
canvassed. But perhaps
Independent of the rest of the counter-advocacy, this argument turns the AC. Without
peacekeeping operations, there wouldnt even be the opportunity for prosecution since
international courts only possess retroactive jurisdiction and dont have an enforcement
mechanism to stop the conflict. Without peacekeeping operations, atrocities, like the
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, will continue unabated, and U.S. submission
to ICTY makes those very same peacekeeping operations less likely in the future.
Second, the ICTY is illegitimate, ineffective, and promotes national unrest. U.S.
submission to the ICTY doesnt change any of this.
James Meernik. Journal of Peace Research 2005. Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects
Societal Peace in Bosnia
Legal scholars have also questioned the institutional fairness of the ICTY, focusing particularly on the lack of equality of arms
between the prosecution and the defense (Creta, 1998; Harvard Law Review, 2001; Johnson, 1998). They note that the
resources and legal expertise of the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor are so supe rior in
quantity and quality, which, coupled with perceived problems of legal due process at the
ICTY (e.g. allowing hearsay testimony), may lead to the deck being stacked against the
defendants. As Johnson writes (1998: 190) , Even when at full strength, a defense team cannot
compete with teams of investigators and legal advisors in the OTP. An added benefit to
continuity is the body of knowledge on the subject of the Yugoslav conflict, rules of
engagement, tactics and 'signature' techniques of the warring parties that give OTP
investigators a distinct advantage over even the most competent defense investigator
working on a single case. If members of Bosnia's ethnic groups perceive the ICTY's trials
and verdicts as procedurally biased or predetermined by the vast disparity in resources
between the Office of the Prosecutor and the defense, the arrests and judgments against
their ethnic brethren may be viewed with suspicion and anger. Other scholars have also
argued that the ICTY is biased and its justice flawed (see Crocker, 2001; Jokic, 2001). Therefore, we
should take seriously the notion that international justice may unfortunately lead to
national unrest.
Therefore, there is a damn good reason the Serbs oppose the ICTY, and they should not
be expected to cooperate. Having the U.S. submit to the ICTY will not solve the key
underlying problem, so the AC will not solve the problem of Serbian nationalism. There
are two impacts:
1. This argument is a total solvency take-out to the AC. The affirmative ignores the
alternative causal variable described by the Meernik evidence and therefore fails
to
address the root cause of the legitimacy problem.
2. Independent of the reason of the counter-advocacy, this argument also turns the
AC since any acquittal of a U.S. national charged with crimes against humanity
will only make the trials seem more biased against Serbs. There is simply
no way to rectify the legitimacy problem that is so engrained in the way the Serbs
view the ICTY, so its not worth the risk of making it worse.
C) Extending EU membership to Serbia will obviate the need for the U.S. to submit to the
ICTY by providing Serbia with a carrot it desperately wants. Continuing the policy of
forcing the Serbs to comply with the ICTY only intensifies the problem of Serbian
nationalism.
The Serbian electorate desperately wants EU membership, but the EU continues to

condition the invitation to join on Serbians cooperation with the ICTY.
Atlantic Council of the United States, Serbia Urges No Further Conditions on EU Membership, November 7, 2008, available at
http://www.acus.org/atlantic _update/serbia-urges-no-further-conditions-eu-membership.
RFE/RL said Wednesday that Serbia
has urged Brussels to stop adding conditions to the criteria

for its EU membership. Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the
EU in April of this year, but the EU also demands that accused Bosnian Serb war criminal
and fugitive General Ratko Mladic be arrested. Mladic has been charged with genocide by the Hague and
remains a major obstacle to Serbia's EU accession. Croatian Serb leader Goran Hadzic is
also wanted as a precondition to accession.
NATIONALISTS ARE USING THE EUS REFUSAL TO INCLUDE SERBIA AS A WAY TO
DRUM UP DANGEROUS NATIONALISTIC SPIRIT EXTENDING MEMBERSHIP WOULD
DESTROY THIS SOURCE OF SUPPORT.
Andrew Wander, Nationalistic Debate as Serbia Heads to the Polls, Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 2008.
the speeches made by Radical leaders were full of signs that the concerns of
Western countries that nationalist elements may strengthen were justified. "Kosovo is ours,"
In Nis,
Radical Party leader Tomislav Nikolic said. "We didn't w in it in the lottery. It's Serbian by history. European Union? Yes but not
without Kosovo." The
European Union is so anxious to see a Democrat victory that last week

they signed a crucial pre-membership accord, the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with Serbia in an attempt to boost the prospects of the beleaguered proWestern parties. But observers warn that because the EU is seen as one of the principal architects of Kosovo's
independence, the move could have the opposite effect. "Tadic is trying to make this election a referendum on the EU but he
hasn't sold the EU to the Serbian population," says James Lyon of the Brussels-based think tank International Crisis Group. "In
contrast, Kostunica has successfully defined the SAA as signing away Kosovo." The tactic seems to have worked.
The SAA is
seen by many as a betrayal of Serbia. Graffiti in Belgrade denounces Tadic as a traitor, and earlier this week he
receiv ed death threats. The polls are yet to show the breakthrough for his [Democratic] party that
the EU hoped for. Meanwhile, the nationalist lobby has concentrated on expanding its
support base.
D) The alternative competes via net benefits. While it may be possible for the U.S. to
submit to the ICTY at the same time that the EU extends membership to Serbia, it would
be undesirable for both to happen. An invitation to join the EU solves the AC advantages,
while avoiding the problems with the ICTY. Put simply, neither Serbia nor the U.S. should
be expected to submit to the jurisdiction of such an illegitimate and ineffective court, and
theres no need for the AC when there is a net beneficial alternative.
JUST IN CASE THE AC ADVANT AGE SCENARIO IS NOT SERBIAN NATIONALISM (READ
THIS BEFORE D AND USE IT TO OUTWEIGH THE AC:
The impact of rising Serbian nationalism is economic collapse, regional instability, and
ethnic cleansing.
Enver Hasany: [Enver Hasany, Peceptions, Journal of

January
International Affairs, December 1999-
2000.]
Ethnic cleansing, as a means of forcefully removing a population, appeared only when nationalism
became a leading idea and the driving force of the socio-political redefinition in Europe after
the seventeenth century. From the beginning of this century, the Balkans witnessed most of this obscure crime and the newly
The
Project of Greater Serbia set up by Garasanin (1844) through to the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts of 1986, prepared the ground for the Serbian crime of ethnic
cleansing. It was planned and, at certain times, put into effect against those territories
where Serbs were not in the majority. After the end of Cold War, though, the Project of Greater Serbia was
shattered but not defeated once and forever. [] Lastly, the ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs is a
continuation of the policy of the Memorandum of 1986 but by violent means. This means that it has been and
remains a typical Clausewitzian war. From this stems the fact that the ethnic cleansing is not the
result of War, but its very aim. Serbian movements in Kosovo at the beginning of 1998 proved exactly this and the
formed Orthodox-majority states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro) have been the main locations of the crime.
international community could not continue to maintain any longer that the causes of tragedy lie somewhere other than in the policy
of the Belgrade regime. The international community, NATO especially, was this time determined to recall the lessons from the past.
From now onwards, Serbian society has to face the bitter reality of being isolated to tackle the root causes of its own irrationality.
Without the help of the international community, though, the prospects for democratization of Serbia remain very bleak indeed.1
Rising tensions are responsible for Serbias recent U-Turn toward disaster. The
International Crisis Group: [International Crisis Group, Serbias U-Turn,
http://www.crisisgroup. org/library/documents/europe/balkans/154_serbia_s_u_t urn. pdf.]
In politics and policies, Serbia
increasingly resembles the Milosevic-era without Milosevic. Its

reaction to the catastrophic mid-March 2004 near collapse of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the strong showing by
ultra-nationalists in the 28 December 2003 parliamentary elections and the subsequent twomonths of squabbling before democratic parties could form a minority government that
depends for survival on the support of Milosevic's old party all are signs that more
trouble lies ahead. In 2004 Serbia can anticipate continued political instability, increasingly
strained relations with the West and further economic decline. The spasm of ethnic
cleansing of Serbs by Albanians in Kosovo has raised the prospect of Kosovo partition,
strengthened the nationalist right wing and increased anti-Western sentiment. Instability
and economic weakness could hasten moves by Montenegro towards independence,
while Kosovo tensions could spill over into the Presevo Valley, Sandzak and even
Vojvodina.2
The situation in Serbia is on the brink. The Economist on February 12, 2009: [The
Economist, A Year in the Life of Kosovo, February 12, 2009.]
A common thread can be traced here. The
Balkans may not be in the international headlines as much

as in the 1990s, but the underlying tensions and atavistic nationalism that helped to
ignite several regional wars after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia remain.
Admittedly, there is no serious appetite for a new war in the Balkans, even among the
most radical Serb nationalists. But the danger of violence and political instability is still
high and it holds back the whole region by making it less appealing to investors. 3
Drill Props M
Observation 1 presents my interpretation of the resolution and defines the affirmative
advocacy.
All definitions are from Oxford American Dictionary.
Ought is used to indicate duty, and duty means a moral or legal obligation; a
responsibility.
Submit means accept or yield to a superior force or to the authority or will of another
person.
Designed denotes purpose, planning, or intention that exists or is thought to exist behind an
action, fact, or material object.
International means existing, occurring, or carried on between two or more nations.
Court is a tribunal presided over by a judge , judges, or a magistrate to civil and criminal cases.
An is used to indicate membership of a class of people or things.
One court designed to prosecute crimes against humanity is the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute gives the court jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity. Created by the UN Security Council, the ICTY is an
international court that includes or cooperates with Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and
Kosovo. Therefore, my advocacy is that the U.S. ought to submit to the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Specifically, the U.S. will waive existing
immunity for U.S. troops, explicitly declare that the U.S. will yield to the ICTY prosecution
without threat of retaliation, and accede to all relevant provisions of the ICTY Statute.
Observation 2 is that the U.S. has not submitted to the ICTY in the status quo.
The ICTY is not prohibited from prosecuting Americans. The ICTY Statutes states,
The territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to the territory of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and territorial
waters. The temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to a period
beginning on 1 January 1991.
During NATOs 1998 intervention in Kosovo, the U.S. Air Force flew thousands of
bombing runs over two months.
The U.S. has not yet submitted to the ICTY. Ian Traynor: [Ian Traynor, NATO Force Feeds Kosovo Sex
Trade, The Guardian, Friday 7, 2004.]
International personnel in Kosovo enjoy immunity from prosecution unless this is waived
by the UN in New York for UN employees or by national military chiefs for NATO-led
troops.1
Furthermore, NATO has essentially blackmailed the ICTY into not investigating NATO
members. Edward Herman: [Edw ard S. Herman, David Peterson, and George Szamuely, Human Rights
Watch in
Service of the War Party: Including a Review of Weighing
2007.]
the Evidence: Lessons from Slobodan Milosevic Trial, February 25,
chief of public relations during the 1999 war, admitted that NATO
countries are those that have provided the finance to set up the Tribunal, [and] are amongst the majority
financiers .I am certain that when [the Chief Prosecutor] Justice Arbour goes to Kosovo and
looks at the facts she will be indicting people of Yugoslav nationality and I don't
anticipate any others at this stage. But nowhere was the truth of this point more dramatically
evident than in the ICTY's own performance, as when [the] Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
refused to open an investigation of possible NATO war crimes on the grounds that the 495 dead
Even Jamie Shea, NATO's
Serbs documented by the ICTY's investigation were an insufficiently large number there is simply no evidence of the necessary
crime base for charges of genocide or crimes against humanity, in the words of the Prosecutor's Final Report. But under the ICTY's
Statute, the Prosecutor is obligated not only to investigate but to prepare indictments where a prima facie case for crimes against
humanity exists. There is also the awkwardness that Milosevics initial indictment rested on a crime base of 344 dead Kosov o
Albanians, and of these, only 45 were reported to have died prior to the start of NATO's war.2
Observation 3 is the standard proper. My value is responsibility, defined as the state or

fact of having a duty to deal with something. In the context of the resolution, the debate
turns on the question of how the U.S. should respond to crimes against humanity. Since
crimes against humanity are wrong, my standard is accountability for crimes.
Accountability is prerequisite for any ethical system for two reasons.
First, accountability respects the rational choice of the criminal. Criminal behavior is the
product of a rational decision-making procedure, and a voluntary decision by the
offender to subject themselves to punishment. Respecting the ability of agents to make
choices is a prerequisite to responsibility because otherwise there would be no point to
formulating rules for conduct.
Second, rights are meaningless if there is no remedy when they are violated. If a system
of rights can be violated at will, ethical rules that prescribe non-violation of others could
be categorically violated. Absent a system of accountability, there would be no
disadvantage to violating the rights of others, making any ethical system impossible.
Contention 1: The U.S. has an a priori obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICTY
and that obligation cannot be overridden by any external advantage or disadvantage.
The ICTY is obligated to investigate every situation where there is substantial evidence
of crimes against humanity. Herman-2: [Ibid.]
Even Jamie Shea, NATO's chief of public relations during the 1999 war, admitted that NATO countries are those that have provided
the finance to set up the Tribunal,[and] are amongst the majority financiers.I am certain that w hen [the Chief Prosecutor] Justice
Arbour goes to Kosovo and looks at the facts she w ill be indicting people of Yugoslav nationality and I don't anticipate any others at
this stage. But nowhere was the truth of this point more dramatically evident than in the ICTY's own performance, as when
[The]
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte refused to open an investigation of possible NATO war crimes
on the grounds that the 495 dead Serbs documented by the ICTY's investigation were an insufficiently
large number there is simply no evidence of the necessary crime base for charges of genocide or crimes against
humanity, in the words of the Prosecutor's Final Report. But under the ICTY's Statute, the Prosecutor is
obligated not only to investigate but to prepare indictments where a prima facie case for crimes
against humanity exists. There is also the awkwardness that Milosevics initial indictment rested on a crime base of
344 dead Kosovo Albanians, and of these, only 45 were reported to have died prior to the start of NATO's war.3
As the major force of the NATO air campaign and led by Americans Wesley Clark and
James Ellis, the U.S. Air Force committed crimes against humanity. Herman-3: [Ibid.]
Michael Mandel has pointed out that during the war against Yugoslavia, NATO convicted itself out of its own
mouth, its leaders repeatedly acknowledging the goal of breaking civilian morale, and targeting
[targeted] bridges, schools, factories, livestock, crops, power grids, media centers,
religious buildings, including early Christian and medieval churches, chemical plants, and fertilizer
factories. Only a U.S.-war apologist could claim that this objective and these targets did
not point to intentionality as well as reveal war crimes. Amnesty International had no trouble finding and
naming plenty of war crimes.4
There is indisputable evidence implicating U.S. personnel in crimes against humanity.

Robert Hayden: [Robert Hayden, Director of the Center for Russian & East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hayden.htm.]
Evidence that the attacks have targeted mainly civilians can be seen in casualty figures.
As mentioned above, after 60 days of bombing and more than 7,000 attacks, Serb military
losses were "in the hundreds," while civilian casualties were as high as 1,500 killed and
6,000 wounded. NATO claims that less than one percent of its bombs miss their targets,
so if Serb civilian casualties outnumber military losses, the reason must be that NATO is
targeting civilians more than it is the military.5
The preponderance of evidence establishes that there is a prima facie case for crimes
against humanity because U.S. personnel intentionally targeted civilians in a systematic
and widespread way during the NATO bombing campaign.
There are two different duties that justify the resolution.
First, the U.S. has a moral duty to submit to the ICTY on the basis of its obligation to the
victims of crimes against humanity. Darryl Robinson: [Darryl Robinson, Justice: Amnesties, Truth
Commissions, and the International Criminal Court, Bringing
Criminal Court, 2006.]
Power to Justice? The Prospects of the International
there is
sometimes a tendency to treat the crimes in a rather abstract manner, focusing on lesser
crimes and overlooking serious international crimes. Is it therefore vitally important to
bear firmly in mind that the ICC deals only w ith the most serious international crimes, crimes which
imply inconceivable horror and cruelty. These are situations of mass murder, gang rape, and torture. There
is a profoundly important deontological basis for punishing such atrocious crimes: as a
moral obligation to the victims, and to denounce and repudiate the violations, and reassert basic moral values. The intensity of the natural need for justice not only truth should not be underestimated.
Third, there is an important moral dimension. In discussions about amnesties, forgiveness, and truth commissions,
This is why victims groups have continued to press vigorously for justic e even when truth has been uncovered and acknowledg ed
through a truth commission process.6
Second, the U.S. has a legal duty to submit to the ICTY on the basis of its international
legal responsibilities. Robinson-2: [Ibid.]
Even among international lawyers who argue that prosecution should sometimes give way to alternativ e means of dealing w ith the
past, many or most would also allow that there are exceptionally serious crimes for which prosecution may be required under
international law . The first pertinent
question is which crimes are covered by duty. To summarize very

briefly , it is relatively clear that states are under a duty to bring justice to those responsible for
genocide, acts of torture, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These
obligations are derived from treaties, but are now widely considered to be reinforced by
equivalent customary international law obligations. 7
Both of these obligations are side constraints since they stem from the most serious
breaches of human dignity, and neither duty can be overridden by an abstract social
good. Put simply, there is a difference between the right and the good and to say that it
would be better for the U.S. not to submit to the ICTY ignores the fact that the U.S. has a
duty under morality and international law to submit. Side constraints may not be
categorically absolute, but in cases of crimes against humanity, they are undeniable.
Contention 2: Regardless of the U.S.s obligation to submit, the status quo is headed
toward economic collapse, regional instability, and ethnic cleansing.
The U.S.s refusal to prosecute NATO has hurt the legitimacy of the ICTY. Hayden-2: [Ibid.]
The independence and impartiality of the ICTY w as in any event utterly compromised by the indictment on May 27 of Yugoslav
President Miloevi and four of his political associates. While there is little question that Miloevi is guilty of war crimes, "justic e" that
is not impartial cannot be seen as just. The
failure of the Prosecutor to indict NATO or its clients would

seem to confirm[s] Jamie Shea's message that he who pays the prosecutor determines who is
charged. It is particularly noteworthy that while the Prosecutor has been reported unable to indict Croatian generals for the 1995
ethnic cleansing of the Krajina because the U.S. government has refused to provide requested information, she made w ell
publicized vis its to American and British officials to gather information w ith which to indict Miloevic. When a Prosecutor w ho is a
citizen of one NATO country seeks assistance from the governments of other NATO countries in order to indict the President of the
country that NATO is attacking, not
even the pretence of prosecutorial independence remains. 8
The perception of an illegitimate ICTY feeds Serbian nationalism. Eileen Simpson: [Eileen
Simpson, Stop to the Hague: Internal Versus External Factors Suppressing the Advancement of the Rule of Law in Serbia,
Georgetown Journal of International Law, Summer 2005.]
[The Serbian President] Kostunica also points to popular support and the supposed rise of
nationalism for his anti-tribunal tendencies. The president has tapped into a prevalent
feeling of victimization that exists amongst the populace. While Milosevic was handed over to The
Hague in June 2001, many Serbs continue to ignore their nation's prior actions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia. A feeling of
domination by the international community prevailed as most Serbs, even the
intellectuals, regarded themselves as the major victims of the Balkan Wars: Serbian
politics are still conducted in an atmosphere that reflects the legacy of radical nationalism and isolation, a large element of
whic h is distrust of anything foreign. The ICTY is viewed as a[n] basically anti-Serbian
institution. International community pressure in spring 2001 pushed public opinion towards favoring the extradition of
Milosevic, but this shift was based on expectations that extradition would be ric hly rewarded with financial assistance. Thus , many
Serbs connect Hague compliance with the receipt of international financial support, and
not the pursuit of justice. This disconnect on behalf of the populace between the tribunal and a sense of justice stems
from their disbelief that serious war crimes were committed. While the majority of Serbs polled [in June 2003] believed that
Milosevic should be tried for abuse of power and corruption, only 2 percent thought he was responsible for war crimes.
Furthermore, although television broadcasts showed mass graves containing bodies transported from Kosovo to Serbia, no strong
Adding to this popular

disconnect with the tribunal is the feeling amongst some that the forum is one-sided,
excluding victimized Serbs from adequate representation. Kostunica has expressed the skepticism
connection was made between these graves and Milosevic by the media or the Serb population.
shared by many democratic Serbs about the tribunal's justness: Although it can and must be explained that the tribunal has had
difficulty bringing charges on behalf of victimized Serbs because Serbia has denied it access to information, Serbs do not alw ays
accept this explanation.9
The impact of rising Serbian nationalism is economic collapse, regional instability, and
ethnic cleansing.
Enver Hasany 2: [Enver Hasany, Peceptions, Journal of International Affairs, December 1999-January 2000.]
Ethnic cleansing, as a means of forcefully removing a population, appeared only when nationalism
became a leading idea and the driving force of the socio-political redefinition in Europe after
the seventeenth century. From the beginning of this century, the Balkans witnessed most of this obscure crime and the newly
The
Project of Greater Serbia set up by Garasanin (1844) through to the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts of 1986, prepared the ground for the Serbian crime of ethnic
cleansing. It was planned and, at certain times, put into effect against those territories
where Serbs were not in the majority. After the end of Cold War, though, the Project of Greater Serbia was
shattered but not defeated once and forever. [] Lastly, the ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs is a
continuation of the policy of the Memorandum of 1986 but by violent means. This means that it has been and
remains a typical Clausewitzian war. From this stems the fact that the ethnic cleansing is not the
result of War, but its very aim. Serbian movements in Kosovo at the beginning of 1998 proved exactly this and the
formed Orthodox-majority states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro) have been the main locations of the crime.
international community could not continue to maintain any longer that the causes of tragedy lie somewhere other than in the policy
of the Belgrade regime. The international community, NATO especially, was this time determined to recall the lessons from the past.
From now onwards, Serbian society has to face the bitter reality of being isolated to tackle the root causes of its own irrationality.
Without the help of the international community, though, the prospects for democratization of Serbia remain very bleak indeed.10
Rising tensions are responsible for Serbias recent U-Turn toward disaster. The
International Crisis Group: [International Crisis Group, Serbias U-Turn,
http://www.cris isgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/154_serbia_s_u_turn.pdf.]
In politics and policies, Serbia
increasingly resembles the Milosevic-era without Milosevic. Its

reaction to the catastrophic mid-March 2004 near collapse of the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the strong showing by
ultra-nationalists in the 28 December 2003 parliamentary elections and the subsequent twomonths of squabbling before democratic parties could form a minority government that
depends for survival on the support of Milosevic's old party all are signs that more
trouble lies ahead. In 2004 Serbia can anticipate continued political instability, increasingly
strained relations with the West and further economic decline. The spasm of ethnic
cleansing of Serbs by Albanians in Kosovo has raised the prospect of Kosovo partition,
strengthened the nationalist right wing and increased anti-Western sentiment. Instability
and economic weakness could hasten moves by Montenegro towards independence,
while Kosovo tensions could spill over into the Presevo Valley, Sandzak and even
Vojvodina.11
The situation in Serbia is on the brink. The Economist on February 12, 2009: [The Economist,
A Year in the Lif e of Kosovo, February 12, 2009.]
A common thread can be traced here. The
Balkans may not be in the international headlines as much

as in the 1990s, but the underlying tensions and atavistic nationalism that helped to
ignite several regional wars after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia remain.
Admittedly, there is no serious appetite for a new war in the Balkans, even among the
most radical Serb nationalists. But the danger of violence and political instability is still
high and it holds back the whole region by making it less appealing to investors. 12
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props O
I negate.
Subpoint A: Israel is prepared to strike Iran over its nuclear program but is holding off on
the hope that sanctions will work.
Chris
Strathmann and Kate McCarthy, Netanyahu Calls for Crippling Sanctions Against Iran, ABC News, April 19,
2010.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called

for President Obama and the international community to consider "crippling sanctions" to prevent Iran from
developing a nuclear weapons program. In an exclusiv e interview with "Good Morning America's " George
Stephanopoulos, the Israeli prime minister said the possibility that Iran could develop a
nuclear weapons program is the "biggest issue facing our times." Last week China agreed in
Amid recent tensions between the United States and close ally Israel,
principle that it would join the four other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to support sanctions against
Iran, w hich the Obama administration offic ials have said they hope w ill be passed before the end of April. But while Netanyahu
wants sanctions to be effectiv e, he has doubts and said the international community could deliver tougher ones if they chose to. "If
you stop Iran from importing petroleum, that's a fancy word for gasoline, then Iran simply doesn't have refining capacity and this
regime comes to a halt. I think that's crippling sanctions," Netanyahu said. China and Russia do not support harsh sanctions against
Iran, but Netanyahu instead suggested going outside the U.N. Security Council for support. "There's a coalition of the w illing and
you can have very powerful sanctions. I think this is
[are] a minimal requirement right now to not really to
send messages but to actually make this regime begin to make choices. Because right now they feel they don't have to make
choices," Netanyahu said. "They understand that the spotlight is on them but they're not doing anything."
Subpoint B: Lifting sanctions on Iran will provoke Israel to strike.

ISRAEL BELIEVES WASHINGTON IS WILLING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN NOW
LIFTING SANCTIONS WILL CONFIRM THAT SUSPICION
Levinson, Israel Weighs Merits of Solo Attack on Iran: Offic ials, Seeing Impending Policy Split With U.S., Debate
21, 2010.
Some senior Israeli officials say in interviews that they see signs Washington may be willing to live
with a nuclear-armed Iran, an eventuality that Israel says it won't accept. Compounding
Israeli concerns were U.S. statements this past weekend that underscored U.S.
resistance to a military option. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday discussed a memo to
Charles
Prospect of a Military Strike Without Washington's Consent, Wall Street Journal, April
National Security Adviser James Jones warning that the U.S. needed new strategies, including how to contain a nuclear Iran
suggesting that Iran could reach nuclear capability without any foreign military force
trying to stop it. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated Sunday the U.S. position that a military
strike against Iran is a "last option." Israel says it supports the U.S.-led push for new economic sanctions against Iran. But Israeli
officials have increasingly voiced frustration over the slow pace of diplomatic efforts to get sanctions in place.
LIFTING SANCTIONS ON IRAN WILL GUARANTEE AN ISRAELI STRIKE THEY VIEW

IRAN AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT, AND THE ONLY THING HOLDING THEM BACK IS
THE BELIEF THAT US SANCTIONS MIGHT WORK THE AFF DISENGAGES
Steven Simon, An Israeli Strike on Iran, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 5 Center for Council on Foreign Relations
Center for Preventive Action, November
2009.
In assessing the likelihood of an attack, it is useful to look back on the origins of the Six Day War in 1967 and the
raid on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. In each case, Israel attacked only after a long period of
procrastination. In 1967, Washingtons hands-off posture tipped the balance in the cabinet
in favor of preemption. In the case of Osirak, the Carter and Reagan administrations [U.S.] unwillingness or
incapacity to intervene left Israel feeling cornered and compelled to act unilaterally. One lesson
to be learned from this is that Israel is more likely to use force if it perceives Washington to be disengaged.
Subpoint C: An Israeli strike would be devastating.

Strikes cause Syria to retaliate against Israel with smallpox
Corsi 2007 (Jerome,- writer for Wordnet daily, citing Jill Bellamy-Dekker, director of the Public Health Preparedness program
for the European Homeland Security Association under the French High Committee for Civil Defense Syria ready w ith bio-terror if
U.S. hits Iran http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/artic le.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54542)
Syria is ready to
respond with weapons of mass destruction specifically biological weapons. "Syria is
positioned to launch a biological attack on Israel or Europe should the U.S. attack Iran [be
attacked]," Jill Bellamy-Dekker told WND. "The Syrians are embedding their biological weapons
program into their commercial pharmaceuticals business and their veterinary vaccine research facilities. The intelligence service oversees Syria's 'bio-farm' program and the Ministry of Defense is well
interfaced into the effort." Bellamy-Decker currently directs the [director of] Public Health Preparedness
program for the European Homeland Security Association under the French High Committee for Civil
Defense. She anticipates a variation of smallpox is the biological agent Syria would utilize.
An American biodefense analyst living in Europe says if the U.S. invades Iran to halt its nuclear ambitions,
A SMALLPOX OUTBREAK WOULD KILL MILLIONS

Singer 2001 (Clifford,- is a professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm)
In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western
culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man w ould
survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium w as about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However
fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused w ith the admittedly terrif ying, but much different
matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globes population through the
disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, w hat is now
know n to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so-called nuclear w inter, substantially
reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a
number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fif ty thousand years even if older cultures or civ ilizations have sometimes eventually
given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publiciz ed by
widely seen works such as "On the Beach," was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological
lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistic ally detectable except in immediate fallout plumes.
The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full-scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War
would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a
number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global w arming or other insults to our physical environment
resulting from currently used technologies w ill challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily
survived through the past fif ty thousand years. There are, however, tw o technologies currently under development that may pose a
more serious threat to human surviv al. The first and most immediate is biological w arfare combined w ith genetic engineering.
Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the
end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented
since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to
spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as
nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage.
Otherw is e mortality there may
match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared
developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available know ledge and technology, the
simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffectiv e, but
this would otherw is e not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological
technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than
natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known
upper limit to the pow er of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in
question when and if this is achieved.
SYRIAS BIOLOGICAL ATTACK OUTWEIGHS NUCLEAR WAR

Singer 2001 (Clifford,- is a professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm)
In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western
culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man w ould
survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium w as about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However
fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused w ith the admittedly terrif ying, but much different
matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globes population through the
disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, w hat is now
know n to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so-called nuclear w inter, substantially
reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a
number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fif ty thousand years even if older cultures or civ ilizations have sometimes eventually
given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publiciz ed by
widely seen works such as "On the Beach," was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The
epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are
barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in
radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full-scale nuclear exchange at the
height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural
background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human
populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to
our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the
survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the
past fifty thousand years. There are, however, tw o technologies currently under
development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most
immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most
fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global
immunity to smallpox w ill likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the
opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe w ill be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear
war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherw ise
mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic
engineering using currently available know ledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat pr otein
variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffectiv e, but this would otherw is e not be expected to substantially increase
overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of inf ectious
agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently
available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the pow er of this type of technology base, and thus the
survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.
Thus, I negate.
Drill Props P
Because lifting sanctions on Iran will trigger a chain reaction that will save the world, I
affirm.
Contention 1: A nuclear Iran is the single biggest threat to global stability.
IRAN HAS THE DELIVERY-SYSTEMS TO STRIKE CRITICAL ALLIES AND IMPORTANT
U.S. BASES
Inbar 08 [Efraim, Professor in Political Studies at Bar-alan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic
Studies], Iranians Like the Bomb: Some Tastes are Dangerous, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 3 (December 2008),
pp. 565-568.
Irans nuclear program coupled with long-range delivery systems, in particular, threatens
regional stability in the Middle East. Iran possesses long-range missiles such as the Shehab-3
(range of 1,300 km) and the Ashura (range of 2,000 km), which can probably be nuclear-tipped, and is
working on extending the range of its ballistic arsenal. American allies, such as Israel, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States are within range, as well as several important US bases. Further
improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put most European capitals, and
eventually, the North American continent, within range of a[n] potential Iranian attack. Iran has
an ambitious satellite-launching program based on the use of multi-stage, solid propellant launchers, with intercontinental ballistic
missile properties to enable the launching of a 300 kg satellite.
If Iran achieves this goal, it will put many more
states at risk of a future nuclear attack.

A NUCLEAR IRAN WILL EMBOLDEN IRANIAN SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM, TRIGGER
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION, COLLAPSE MUTUAL DETERRENCE, AND INCREASE THE
RISK OF NUCLEAR TRANSFER TO OTHER GROUPS
Kittrie 09 [Orde, Professor of Law at Arizona State University and Former Member of the U.S. State Department, w here he
was a specialist on sanctions and nuclear non-proliferation], New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasurys Innovativ e Us e of
Financial Sanctions, 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 789 (Spring 2009).
First, the Iranian government is already the world's

leading state sponsor of terrorism. An Iranian nuclear arsenal could serve Iran as a
"nuclear umbrella," making countries victimized by Iranian-sponsored terrorism even
more reluctant to retaliate against Iran. This could make Iran an even more self-confident
sponsor of terrorism. Second, an Iranian nuclear arsenal could spur proliferation by its
neighbors. The fear that an Iranian nuclear arsenal will unleash a cascade of proliferation
across the Middle East has been heightened by at least twelve Arab states in the last
two-and-a-half years announcing plans to pursue nuclear technology. An editorial in the Egyptian
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons rais es four major concerns.
government daily newspaper Al-Ahram put it as follows: "Iran's nuclear capability ... w ill spur many powers in the region to develop a
nuclear program." Such
a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East would likely lead to the

worldwide collapse of the already tottering nuclear non-proliferation treaty ("NPT ") regime. In addition,
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East tinderbox, with its border
disputes, religious fanaticism, ethnic hatreds, unstable governments, terrorist groups,
and tendency for conflicts to spiral out of control, seems likely to result in a devastating
nuclear war. Some have also rais ed a third set of concerns: that while mutual deterrence kept the United States and the
Soviet Union from attacking each other during the Cold War, significant elements of Iran's leadership may,
by virtue of their apocalyptic messianism and exaltation of martyrdom, be impossible to

deter from using nuclear weapons. The fourth major concern raised in response to Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons is that, even if the top echelon of the Iranian government turns out to be deterrable,
there would be a considerable risk of rogue elements within Iran taking it upon
themselves to transfer nuclear arms to Iran's terrorist allies. As was seen with Pakistan's
A.Q. Khan, who proliferated under the comparatively secular and responsible Musharraf government, one key rogue
figure can be sufficient to share an insecure country's nuclear technology with others.
Contention 2: Lifting sanctions on Iran will provoke Israel to strike Iran.
ISRAEL BELIEVES WASHINGTON IS WILLING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN NOW
LIFTING SANCTIONS WILL CONFIRM THAT SUSPICION
Levinson 1 April 21 [Charles, Jerusalem Bureau Chief of the WSJ], Israel Weighs Merits of Solo Attack on Iran:
Officials, Seeing Impending Policy Split With U.S., Debate Prospect of a Military Strike Without Washington's Consent, Wall Street
Journal, April 21, 2010.
Some senior Israeli officials say in interviews that they see signs Washington may be willing
to live with a nuclear-armed Iran, an eventuality that Israel says it won't accept.
Compounding Israeli concerns were U.S. statements this past weekend that underscored
U.S. resistance to a military option. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday discussed a
memo to National Security Adviser James Jones warning that the U.S. needed new strategies, including how to contain a nuclear
Iransuggesting that Iran could reach nuclear capability without any foreign military force
trying to stop it. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated Sunday the U.S. position that a military
strike against Iran is a "last option."Israel says it supports the U.S.-led push for new economic sanctions against Iran. But Israeli
officials have increasingly voiced frustration over the slow pace of diplomatic efforts to get sanctions in place.
THE U.S. CANT DISSUADE ISRAEL FROM STRIKING NOW RELATIONS ARE AT AN
ALL-TIME LOW
Relations between the two allies have soured in recent weeks, with Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu's government pushing back against Obama administration pressure to freeze
building in Jewish areas of East Jerusalem, w hich Washington says is counterproductiv e to its Mideast peace
efforts. In another sign of a split, Israeli officials say they believe Iranwhose president has
called for the destruction of Israelcould develop a warhead to strike the country within
a year if it decides to, though outside experts say such capability is years away. Tehran says its nuclear program is for
peaceful uses. Such divisions have played into fears in Israel that if Washington's sanctions
effort fails, the Israeli and American positions on Iran could rapidly divergeand Israel, if
it chooses to attack Iran, would have no choice but to do so on its own.
LIFTING SANCTIONS ON IRAN WILL GUARANTEE AN ISRA ELI STRIKE IMMEDIATELY THEY VIEW IRAN AS AN
EXISTENTIAL THREAT, AND THE ONLY THING HOLDING THEM BACK IS THE BELIEF THAT US SANCTIONS MIGHT WORK
Simon 1 09 [Steve, Former Director for Global Issues and Senior Director of Transnational Threats at the National Security
Council & Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at CFR] , An Israeli Strike on Iran, Contingency Planning
Memorandum No. 5 Center for Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventiv e Action, November 2009.
In assessing the likelihood of an attack, it is useful to look back on the origins of the Six
Day War in 1967 and the raid on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. In each case, Israel attacked
only after a long period of procrastination. In 1967, Washingtons hands-off posture tipped
the balance in the cabinet in favor of preemption. In the case of Osirak, the Carter and Reagan
administrations [U.S.] unwillingness or incapacity to intervene left Israel feeling cornered and
compelled to act unilaterally. One lesson to be learned from this is that Israel is more likely to use force if it perceiv es
Washington to be disengaged.
Contention 3: An Israeli strike on Iran will decimate Irans nuclear program.

ISRAEL KNOWS WHERE TO STRIKE
An Israeli attack would likely concentrate on three locations: Isfahan, w here Iran produces
uranium hexafluoride gas; Natanz , where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the eight thousand centrif uges located
there; and Arak, w here a heavy water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in 2012, w ould be ideal to produce weaponsgrade plutonium. It is conceiv able that Israel may attack other sites that it suspects to be part of a
nuclear weapons program if targeting data were available, such as the recently disclosed
Qom site, whose location is known, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the location(s) of whic h have not
yet been identif ied. The latter would be compelling targets since their destruction would hobble
Irans ability to reconstitute its program. But attacks against the sites at Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak alone would
likely stretch Israels capabilities, and planners would probably be reluctant to enlarge the raid further.
ISRAEL CAN CARRY OUT THE ATTACKS UNILATERALLY

Israel is capable of carrying out these attacks unilaterally. Its F-16 and F-15 aircraft, equipped
with conformal fuel tanks and refueled with 707-based and KC-130 tankers toward the beginning and end of their flight
profiles, have the range to reach the target set, deliver their payloads in the face of Iranian
air defenses, and return to their bases. The munitions necessary to penetrate the targets
are currently in Israels inventory in sufficient numbers; they include Bomb Live Unit (BLU)-109
and BLU 113 bombs that carry tw o thousand and five thousand pounds, respectively, of high-energy explosiv es. These GPSguided weapons [which] are extremely accurate and can be lofted from attacking aircraft
fifteen kilometers from their target, thereby reducing the attackers need to fly through air
defenses. Israel also has a laser-guided version of these bombs that is more accurate
than the GPS variant and could deploy a special-operations laser designation unit to
illuminate aim points as it is reported to have done in the attack on the al-Kibar facility in
Syria.
ISRAEL COULD WIPE OUT ALL THREE SITES EVEN THOSE UNDERGROUND AND
EVEN IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN AIR DEFENSES
Simon 4 09 [Steve, Former Director for Global Issues and Senior Director of Transnational
Threats at the National Security Council & Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at
CFR] , An Israeli Strike on Iran, Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 5 Center for
Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, November 2009.
These munitions could be expected to damage the targets severely. Natanz is the only
one of the three likely targets that is largely underground, sheltered by up to tw enty-three meters of soil
and concrete. BLU-type bombs, used in a burrowing mode, however, could penetrate
deeply enough to fragment the inner surface of the ceiling structures above the highly
fragile centrifuge arrays and even precipitate the collapse of the entire structure. Burrowing
requires that attacking aircraft deliver their second and third bombs into the cavity created by the first. GPS-guided munitions are
accurate enough to do this a little less than half of the time. The probability of successful burrow ing increases with the number of
shots. The
use of three bombs per aim point would confer better than a 70 percent
probability of success. (Laser-guided munitions are more capable of a successful burrow on the first try.) The
uranium conversion facility in Isfahan and reactor at Arak are not buried and could be
heavily damaged, or completely destroyed, relatively easily. This would be possible even
if Iran managed to down a third of the Israeli strike package, a feat that would far exceed
historical ratios of bomber losses by any country in any previous war.
FEARS OVER CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION ARE WRONG ISRAELI MISSILE DEFENSE
WILL STOP IRANIAN RETALIATION
Iran's
medium-range rockets would cause damage and casualties in Israel, but they aren't very
accurate, and Israel's sophisticated missile-defense system would likely knock many out
midflight. Israel has similarly proved it can handle attacks against Israel by Hezbollah
and Hamas. Israel also hosts a contingent of U.S. troops attached to a radar system to
help give early warning against incoming rocket attacks.
Many Israeli military experts say Israel can easily cope with any military retaliation by Iran in response to a strike.
Contention 4: An Israeli strike is inevitable, so the only question is whether they should
do it sooner or later.
THE QUICKER ISRAEL STRIKES, THE BETTER
Bolton May 2 [John, Senior Fellow
at the American Enterprise Institute], Get Ready for a Nuclear Iran, Wall Street
Journal, May 2, 2010.
Negotiations grind on toward a fourth U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran's
nuclear weapons program, even as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrives in New York to address the NonProliferation Treaty review conference. Sanctions advocates acknow ledge that the Security Council's ultimate product will do no
more than marginally impede Iran's progress. In Congress, sanctions legislation also creaks along, but that too is simply going
through the motions. Russia and China have alr eady rejected key proposals to restrict Iran's access to international financial
markets and choke off its importation of refined petroleum products, whic h domestically are in short supply . Any new U.S. legislation
will be ignored and evaded, thus rendering it largely symbolic. Even so, President Obama has opposed the legislation, arguing that
unilateral U.S. action could derail his Security Council efforts. The
further pursuit of sanctions is tantamount

to doing nothing. Advocating such policies only benefits Iran by providing it cover for
continued progress toward its nuclear objective. It creates the comforting illusion of
"doing something." Just as "diplomacy" previously afforded Iran the time and legitimacy it needed, sanctions talk now
does the same. Speculating about regime change stopping Iran's nuclear program in time is
also a distraction. The Islamic Revolution's iron fist, and willingness to use it against dissenters (who are currently in
disarray), means we cannot know whether or when the regime may fall. Long-term efforts at regime change ,
desirable as they are, will not soon enough prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons with the
ensuing risk of further regional proliferation. We therefore face a stark, unattractive
reality. There are only two options: Iran gets nuclear weapons, or someone uses pre emptive military force to break Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and paralyze its program, at least
temporarily. There is no possibility the Obama administration w ill use force, despite its confused and ever-changing formulation
about the military option alw ays being "on the table." That leaves Israel, which the administration is implicitly threatening not to
resupply with airplanes and weapons lost in attacking Iranthereby rendering Israel vulnerable to potential retaliation from
Hezbollah and Hamas. It is hard to conclude anything except that the Obama administration is resigned to Iran possessing nuclear
weapons. While U.S. policy makers will not welcome that outcome, they certainly hope as a corollary that Iran can be contained and
deterred. Since they have ruled out the only immediate alternative, military forc e, they are doubtless now busy preparing to make
lemonade out of this pile of lemons. President Obama's likely containment/deterrence strategy will feature security assurances to
neighboring countries and promises of American retaliation if Iran uses its nuclear weapons. Unfortunately for this seemingly
muscular rhetoric, the simple fact of Iran possessing nuclear weapons would alone dramatically and irreparably alter the Middle East
balance of power. Iran does not actually have to use its capabilities to enhance either its regional or global leverage. Facile
analogies to Cold War deterrence rest on the dubious, unproven belief that Iran's nuclear calculus w ill approximate the Soviet
Union's. Iran's theocratic regime and the high value placed on life in the hereafter makes this an exceedingly dangerous
nuclear
proliferation doesn't stop with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others
will surely seek, and very swiftly, [seek] their own nuclear weapons in response. Thus, we
would imminently face a multipolar nuclear Middle East waiting only for someone to
launch first or transfer weapons to terrorists. Ironically, such an attack might w ell involve Israel only as an
assumption. Even if containment and deterrence might be more successful against Iran than just suggested,
innocent bystander, at least initially. We should recognize that an Israeli use of military force would be neither precipitate nor
disproportionate, but only a last resort in antic ipatory self -defense. Arab governments already understand that logic and largely
share it themselves. Such
a strike would advance both Israel's and America's security interests,

and also those of the Arab states. Nonetheless, the intellectual case for that strike must be better understood in
advance by the American public and Congress in order to ensure a sympathetic reaction by Washington. Absent Israeli
action, no one should base their future plans on anything except coping with a nuclear
Iran.
Thus, I affirm.
Drill Props Q
I affirm, Resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to
be treated as adults in the criminal justice syste m.
The affirmative does not need to defend a policy implementation of the resolution, as it
gives no qualifiers about how the juveniles or adults ought to be treated. As, in the
resolution, is a preposition with the meaning, In a manner similar to. The only
affirmative burden is to prove that juveniles ought to go through the same system as
adults, the negative to prove that they be in separate systems.
The value is justice as the resolutions questions what the criminal justice system ought
do. The system is designed to properly assess and carry out responses to actions
people have taken. Justice is defined as giving each her due.
Due requires punishment for crime. Jeffrey Reiman writes:
Since reason (like justice) is no respecter of the sheer difference betw een individuals, when a rational being decides
to act in a certain way toward his fellows, he [she] implicitly authorizes similar action by
his fellows toward him. A version of the golden rule, then, is a requirement of reason: acting rationally, one
always acts as he [she] would have others act toward him. Consequently, to act toward a
person as he [she] has acted toward others is to treat him as a rational being, that is, as if his act
were the product of a rational decision. From this, it may be concluded that we have a duty to do to offenders
what they have done, since this amounts to according them the respect due rational
beings. this is supported by the fact that we can conclude from Kant's argument that a rational being cannot
validly complain of being treated in the way he [she] has treated others, and where there
is no valid complaint, there is no injustice, and where there is no injustice, others have
acted within their rights.
Thus, an action that humans take requires an equal reaction be taken back against the
initial actor. Rational beings define their acceptance of moral and state norms through
action, and this definition of compliance justifies reciprocal action in return.
Moreover, the response is based only off the action, not the agent. Reiman 2 writes:
Crime upsets the equality between persons and retributi ve punishment restores that equality by
annulling the crime. As we have seen, acting according to the golden rule implies treating
others as your equals. Conversel y, violating the golden rule implies the reverse: Doing to
another what you would not have that other do to you violates the quality of persons by
asserting a right toward the other that the other does not possess toward you. Doing
back to you what you did annuls your violation by reasserting that the other has the
same right toward you that you assert toward him. A crime, rather than repres enting a unit of s uffering added to the
already c onsi derable s uffering in the world, is an assault on the sover eignty of an indi vidual that temporaril y plac es one person (the crimi nal) in a position of illegitimate
The victim (or his representati ve, the state) then has the right to rectify this loss of
standing relative to the criminal by meting out a punishment that reduces the criminal's
sovereignty in the degree to which he vaunted it above his victim's.
sovereignty over another (the victi m).
Thus, reciprocal responses are required to maintain equality in a system, and the
equality is defined only in terms of the crime, the actor is irrelevant. All rationality or
what the actor deems desirable is not important in terms of punishment, because the
action creates inequity and is what requires the moral response, not the agents
decision-making process.
Furthermore, retributive punishment is preferable to a strict utilitarian calculus. Louis
Pojman writes:
The ans wer to thes e puzzling questions leads us to the deepes t regions of human experience. N o doubt one can give a parti al expl anation of our belief in the propriety of
Rewarding good works encourages

further good works and punishment deters bad actions. By recognizing and rewarding
merit, we promote efficiency and welfare. We want the ver y best surgeons to perform vital surger y, the very best judges to decide har d
rewardi ng and punis hing people acc ording to the natur e of their acts by utilitarian c onsiderations.
legal cases, the ver y best busi ness persons to lead c orporations in which we have inves tments , the very bes t engineers to design our bridges, nucl ear power pl ants , airplanes
Even the most ardent advocate of affirmative action on university campuses refrains from
advocating that positions on the football, basketball or trac k team be based on any other criterion
than merit. Where utilitarian grounds are strong, merit-based operations generally go unquestioned. Generally, a
society that has a commitment to rewarding those who contribute to its well-being and
punishing those who purposefully undermine it will survive and prosper better than a
society that lacks these practices. But, of course, as we noted above in discussing Nagel, if we are driven simpl y by utilitarian c onsi derati ons,
and automobiles.
we may have reason to override merit.
Thus, retribution is more important than utilitarianism, because it is normatively better in

real-world decisions. Furthermore, punishment is necessary in order to promote good
consequences.
For these reasons, the standard is reciprocity of punishment for crime. Reciprocity is the
most important normative value, and the duty of the criminal justice syste m is to punish
criminals. Only impacts that discuss the difference in the action regardless of the actor
link to the standard, as that is the concern of reciprocal responses.
My thesis is that the juveniles must be treated as adults to have reciprocity.
First, the age limits of autonomy are entirely arbitrary. Tom Campbell explains:
Regrettabl y, the ass umed obvi ousness of the premise that all children are persons is disputed by those whos e anal ysis of personhood centre on the c apacity for rational c hoice,
capacities come into play only in the case of

mature persons who have attained and retain certain capacities which are characteristic
of human beings in their developed state. Such capacities may then serve as the basis
for ascribing certain rights to some but not to all human beings. Very young children may thus be excl uded from
the very idea whic h lies behi nd the full version of the power theor y of rights. Yet, thes e
thes e rights by their lac k of the relevant c apacities, as may others who, for one reason or another have either not developed them or, having developed, have l ost them. If, as
, these are all the rights that there are, then children can have
these rights only as they develop the capacities which will characterize them as adults.
Now, much talk of the rights of children is to the effect that older children ought to be
ascribed rights in so far and to the extent that they approximate to mature capacities. Hence
arguments for the lowering for the age of consent in various contexts, the right to vote,
to marry and to work at a younger age, and the objection to arbitrary age limits, such as
sixteen or eighteen at which developing individuals attain the rights of adulthood. It
seems discriminatory to deny to 'children' that is persons under a certain age (eg 'minors' in law)
the full power theor y tends towards asserting
rights which they would have if they were over that age and in possession of the
capacities they already possess. Indeed it can be argued that 'children' should be required to meet only
the level of attainment of the lowest capacities of adults who are accorded rights, wher eas in
fact, higher standards of rational capacity are required of them than of 'grown ups' when
they are assessed for their ability to exercise the normal legal powers of adults, such as c ons ent
to medic al treatment.6
Thus, juveniles should be treated the same as they have similar capacities to adults.
Furthermore, the evaluation based off of age is flawed, as capacities is the relevant
factor. Negating is inherently flawed, as age makes no relevant distinction, only rational
capacity does. Affirming better respects rationality
Moreover, juveniles can make autonomous decisions and therefore the actors are the
same, requiring equal treatment. Campbell 2 writes:
Neverthel ess, it s eems misguided to deny altogether the significance for the growing human i ndi vidual of the transitional per iod from paradigmatic childhood to full-blown
adulthood. In this phase of devel opment there are elements of both the earlier and the later s tages, which means that there are distincti ve inter ests which emerge and claim
attention at this period. F urther the emerging capacities for different sorts of adult acitvity var y with the sphere i n questi on s o that there is no one thres hol d of adulthood for every
aspec t of life in society. There are grounds, ther efore, for rec ognizing a 'juvenile' stage of human life which may pr operly be brought withi n the sc ope of the concept of minors'
rights. The characteristic aspect of this stage is a l argely adult physical development and significant c apacities for autono mous choice and conduct guided by the j uvenile's own
As a juvenile the child has considerable autonomy

interests and many of the rights of the child may be seen as recognizing this fact. Indeed,
unless we adopt a highly restrictive analysis of what it is to be capable of autonomy, it is
a feature of all but the very earliest stages of human development. The capacity for
autonomy involves the ability to select what it is we wish to do and to have, in the light of
some information as to the alternatives and their consequences. On this anal ysis, the autonomy
interests of the child stretch right back into the heart of early childhood. Lack of physical
independence at these early stages is erroneously confused with lack of the capacity for
choice autonomy, which is an everyday feature of a child's life even in conditions of
extreme dependency. Here we might dr aw attention to Art 26 'the right to a standard of li ving adequate for physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social
perceptions of the soci al world and her own sc heme of values and beliefs .
devel opment' as embodying a reference to the stages of autonomy and not simply to preparation for future adult life.
Thus, juveniles have autonomy, or basic freedom of choice, that ought to be respected.
They have the same capacity as adults, and their actions should be held to the same
moral standard.
Second, proportionality is related to the action committed rather than the person
committing the crime. Simon Singer writes:
There is little reas on l eft for not holding juveniles responsible under the same laws that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old
mugger is as much mugged as the victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, victim of a fourteen- year-old
murderer rapist is as dead or as raped as the victim of an older one. The need for social defense of protection is the same.
In arguing that the victims are the same whether the offenders are juveniles or adults, Van den Haag first
emphasiz es the need to do j ustice. H e as ks us to ignore the age of juveniles and instead focus on the harm they
inflict upon their victims and society. Sec ond, Van den Haag in stating the need for social defens e shifts direction by suggesting that
society s houl d concentrate on punis hing chronic delinquents.
Thus, punishing all actors equally is important. The rights violated are equivalent, so the
rights correction ought to be equivalent as well. Justice requires equal treatment to
correct for harm, and the actor is irrelevant in this judgment.
Third, the juvenile system is inherently nonreciprocal, as the judge decisions are
arbitrary and rely on personal characteristics. Barry Feld writes:
Quite apart from its uns uitability as a social welfare agenc y, the individualized justice of a rehabilitative juvenile court
fosters lawlessness and thus detracts from its utility as a court of law as well. Despite
statutes and rules, juvenile court judges make discretionary decisions effectively
unconstrained by the rule of law. If judges intervene to meet each child's "real needs,"
then every case is unique and decisional rules or objective criteria cannot constrain
clinical intuitions. The idea of treatment necessarily entails individual differentiation,
indeterminacy, a rejection of proportionality, and a disregard of normative valuations of
the seriousness of behavior. But, if judges possess neither practical scientific bases by
which to classify youths for treatment nor demonstrably effective programs to prescribe
for them, then the exercise of "sound discretion" simply constitutes a euphemism for
idiosyncratic judicial subjectivity. Racial, gender, geographic, and socio-economic
disparities constitute almost inevitable corollaries of a treatment ideology that lacks a
scientific foundation. At the least, judges will sentence youths differently based on
extraneous personal characteristics for which they bear no responsibility. At the worst,
judges will impose haphazard, unequal, and discriminatory punishment on similarly
situated offenders without effective procedural or appellate checks.
Thus, the juvenile court system is inherently nonreciprocal. The juveniles should be
treated as adults merely to avoid the juvenile system. These problems are inherent to the
juvenile system and cannot be reformed to avoid them. Treating juveniles as adults is the
only way to solve for these problems.
Even in the adult system, age can be used as a mitigating factor. Feld 2 concludes:
Contemporary juvenile courts typically impose shorter sentences on serious young offenders than adult offenders convicted of
comparable crimes receive.58 These
shorter sentences enable young offenders to survive the

mistakes of adolescence with a semblance of life chances intact.59 The juvenile court reifies the idea
that young people bear less criminal responsibility and deserve less punishment than adults. Shorter sentences recogniz e that
young people do differ somewhat from adults. These differences stem from physic al, psychological, or developmental
characteristics of young people, and as by-products of the legal and social construction of youth. Adolescents differ from adults
physic ally and psychologically, and their immaturity affects their judgment. A formal
mitigation of punishment
based on youthfulness comprises a necessary component of a criminal justice system in
order to avoid the equally undesirable alternatives of excessively harsh penalties
disproportionate to culpability on the one hand, or nullification and excessive leniency
on the other. Youthfulness provides a rationale to mitigate sentences to some degree
without excusing criminal conduct. But, shorter sentences for young people do not
require a separate justice system in which to try them. Both juvenile and adult courts
separate adjudication of guilt or innocence from sentencing, confine consideration of
individual circumstances largely to the latter phase, and criminal courts may impose
lenient sentences on young offenders when appropriate.
Thus, even if age is relevant, the juveniles can be tried in the adult system, and it avoids
the harmful impacts of the juvenile system. The shorter sentences account for the
problems of difference. There is no other reason to separate the system, and treating
them the same can garner the impacts of separation through the use of mitigating
factors.
Therefore, I affirm.
Drill Props R
Since sanctions cause massive loss of life, I affirm that economic sanctions ought not be
used to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Thihan Nyun writes that: [Thihan Myo Nyun (Fellow , Frederic k K. Cox International Law
Center, Case Western Reserve

University School of Law), Feeling Good or Doing
Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military
Government of Burma/Myanmar, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008]
economic sanctions are the

withdrawal of
normal trade or financial relations
economic sanctions are
limited to restrictions on trade, investment, and other cross-border economic activity
that reduce the target countrys revenues facilitating
change without resorting to
military action. Because one of the primary rationales behind
sanctions is to avoid
military conflict
measures that are used in concert with military engagement are not
considered economic sanctions
A fur ther synthesis of the litera ture reveals the following defini tion, which will be used for this Ar ticle:
actual or threatened
, imposed by the sender against the target , for foreign policy purposes. Under this approach,
, thereby
the desired
econo mic
al together,
under this defin ition . Likewise, diploma tic protests and economic coercions that are meant to ob tain general leverage in trad e negotia tions are no t economic sanctions. In
addition, threatened or actual retalia tions with in the in ternational trading system tha t are undertaken in the course of trad e disputes are outside the parame ters of economic sanctions. The reduction and suspension of economic aid and other trade preferences,
depending on whether they are considered carrots or st icks, can somet imes be w ithin the confines of economic sanctions.
From Merriam-Websters, ought expresses obligation. [http://m-w.com/dictionary/ought [used to

express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advis ability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by
now >,
or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>]]
This definition is most contextually appropriate, since we use ought to express

advisability or desirability only with respect to self-regarding actions, e.g. in MerriamWebsters the case given for that use is ought to take care of yourself. In the topical
context of potentially thousands of lives saved or lost, its absurd to talk about acts as
merely desirable.
Not just negates ought, meaning first, that the neg has a textual burden to prove the
converse of the topic, namely that sanctions ought be used; second, that moral neutrality
is aff ground, in that I have to show that sanctions are not obligatory but not that theyre
morally proscribed, meaning you presume aff in absence of clear neg offense; and third,
that arguments about the emptiness of normative language are grounds to affirm, in that
they render all positive moral assertions false and thus their negations true.
I value morality as implied by the word ought.
There is no concrete distinction between action and inaction in terms of the moral
responsibility for harms, since the act-omission distinction produces paradoxical
conclusions that render moral judgments impossible. Ingmar Persson writes: [Ingmar Persson
(Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset), Two act-omission paradoxes, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
vol. 104 (2), pp. 147-162, 2004]
There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be [is] permissible
to let people die or be killed w hen it is [but] wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it
may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the
assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong
of you [to] let yourself act in this fashion, this yields the paradox that it is both permissible and
impermissible to let yourself act in this fashion. Second, you may let yourself kill somebody
by letting an action you have already initiated cause death, e. g., by not lending a helping
hand to somebody you have pushed. This, too, yields [a contradiction] the paradox that it is both
permissible and impermissible to let yourself kill if you are in a situation in which [when] killing is impermissible but
letting be killed permissible.
But further, since a categorical affirmation involved both the action of repealing
sanctions and the inaction of not imposing new ones, while negation involves the action
of creating new sanctions and the inaction of leaving current ones in place, there's no
meaning distinction between doing and allowing in either world, making a
comparison of end states the only coherent system of ethics. The standard is minimizing
the imposition of suffering.
First, all moral theories presuppose the moral value of persons as grounds for
demanding that we treat them in some ways and not others. Further, since moral truths
are neither observed in the empirical world nor arrived at by pure deduction, theyre
necessarily developed by persons and societies to serve human interests and restrict
harmful behavior. Failure to minimize suffering is thus immoral since it fails to treat the
interests and wellbeing of persons as morally compelling grounds for action, negating
the fundamental purpose of morals as guides to action.
Second, in addition to being a utilitarian bad, the imposition of suffering violates
deontic, rights-based standards of morality since imposing unnecessary suffering on
others in the pursuit of social goods treats them as expendable means to the pursuit of
external ends in which they may or may not share.
Third, empathy for the suffering of others and unwillingness to let unnecessary
suffering occur is the only psychological barrier against the worst moral atrocities like
genocide. Basing state action on a willingness to cause suffering to achieve policy goals
allows such atrocities to be justified whenever they putatively serve some pressing
national interest.
Finally, death is the worst form of suffering since it precludes moral theorizing
and the search for moral truth. Since we lack definitive grounds for believing any
particular moral theory, the only moral rule we can follow with confidence is to maximize
our continued ability to engage in moral reasoning and chances of finding demonstrable
moral truths, so moral agnosticism should lead us to default to the preservation of life as
a presumptive moral good.
Contention One: Sanctions directly impose suffering on the civilian population of target
states. The direct denial of resources linked to the use of sanctions has caused one of
the greatest humanitarian crises in history. Justin Stalls writes: [Justin Stalls, Economic Sanctions,
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11, 2003.]
The instrumental effects of economic sanctions upon the target state are in part economic but also include the
human costs of suffering and death. Severe economic sanctions are bound to impoverish the
majority of the population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural, industrial,

educational, and health systems while spreading crime and corruption. Sending States ultimately
believe that, denying a nation the benefits of trade w ill cause it to suffer, and that suffering will induce a willingness to bargain. As a
result of this belief, sending States aim to make the consequences suffered by the target state as dire as possible. In fact,
economic sanctions may have contributed to more deaths during the post-Cold War era than all
weapons of mass destruction throughout history. For example, various agencies of the United Nations. .
.have estimated that they [economic sanctions against Iraq alone] have contributed to hundreds of
thousands of deaths. This massiv e human cost is a direct result of economic sanctions.
Even attempts to limit the financial cost of citizens are futile. Financial sanctions just
worsen the situation in the target state since target leaders will shift the burden of
sanctions onto their people through taxation and confiscations. The impact is magnified
since the people theyll shift the burden onto will be the ones with the least power to
resist, who are already worst off.
Further, both comprehensive and targeted sanctions raise the threat perception to
incumbent regimes by generating dissent against the state. Wood writes: [Wood, Reed M. A
hand upon the throat of the nation: Economic sanctions and state repression, 1976-2001. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52,
2006.]
The first element of the theory constructed herein is that [S]anctions contribute to state -sponsored repression
by constraining the resource flows of target leaders. In short, I argue that [A]s sanctions reduce
the ability of incumbents to provide resources to supporters, the likelihood of defections
increase. In order to deter defections and maintain stability, target incumbents in turn augment their
level of repression. This effect is signif icantly influenced however by the political institutions of the target state. Political
structures influence the probability that a state is the target of a sanctions event, as well as their duration. They likew is e affect the
ability of incumbents to use repression as a strategy to compel cooperation from a civilian population. Finally, institutions determine
incumbents ability to allocate resources and redis tribute costs. Incumbent survival is in large part a function of the ability to maintain
a flow of resources to core supporters. Failing to maintain the flow of goods to the winning coalition threatens the stability of the
regime because the incumbent must credibly promise more to her winning coalition than can any potential challenger. Costly
sanctions make the credible promise of continued resources more diffic ult, which helps explain w hy costlier sanctions are mor e
likely to destabilize target regimes. As the pool of available resources diminishes, sanctioned leaders must choose between
conforming to the preferences of the sender and redistributing resources in a manner that protects supporters. If incumbents
concede, the flow of resources presumably returns to normal and they can more easily reaffirm the stability of the r egime. Often,
how ever, targeted leaders already the most recalcitrant regimes refuse concessions and instead opt to redis tribute available
resources in the hope of weathering sanctions and waiting out their adversaries. Such [R]edistributions result[s] in net losses for
some members of the winning coalition (as well as those excluded from the coalition), thereby reducing their loyalty to the
incumbent. Falling
loyalty
raises the incentives for incumbents to use
coercion to prevent defections. Rather than promoting regime change, this increases
rights violations by creating an incentive to violently put down opposition.
de grades the stabi lity of the regi me a nd
Dursun Peksen quantifies the impact: [Dursun Peksen (Department of Political Science, East Carolina University),
Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 5977
]
According to the [our] results or the economic sanctions (all) variable, moving from no sanction to
extensive sanctions leads to a 115% increase in the predicted probability of frequent violations of
disappearances,while it becomes 50% more likely when targets are facing partial sanctions. In the case of
[E]xtrajudicial killings, frequent violations become 64% and 29% more likely under extensive
and partial sanctions, respectively. Similarly, moving from no sanctions to extensive
sanctions increases the predicted probability of frequent integrity right abuses by 57% for political
f
imprisonment and 61% for torture , while frequent violations become 27% more likely for political imprisonment and
30% for torture under partial sanctions. Thus, sanctions exacerbate ongoing repression in target
states, worsening violations of rights.
Contention Two: The imposition of sanctions risk escalation to global conflict. Imposing
sanctions empirically increases the likelihood of militarized violence. Sprecher et al
write: [David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict, American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 415-431
http://www.js tor.org/stable/4620074]
Published by: Midw est Political Science Association Stable URL:
Table 2 summarizes the substantiv e effect of sanctions on the probability of a us e of military force. Scenario 1 shows that the
effect of sanctions initiated by a nondemocracy in a crisis is to reduce the probability of militarized conflict by about 58% . As we can
see in scenarios 2 and 3, the result is changed greatly when the initiator of sanctions is a democracy. The
probability of a
militarized conflict increases by 195% when a democracy initiates sanctions in a crisis.
Scenario 3 reveals the substantive difference betw een a democracy and a nondemocracy using sanctions in a cris is.
Democracies are an astonishing 600% more likely to be involved in a militarized conflict

following the use of sanctions than are nondemocracies. Observing these changes in predicted
probabilities confirms our earlier expectation that the strength of the coeffic ient on sanctions in Model 4 is w eakened due to the
difference in dispute propensity after sanctions for democracies and nondemocracies. Scenarios 4-6 assess the effect of weak
sanctions, designed for the sender to gain economically, on the probability of militarized conflict in a crisis . In scenario 4, we see that
the overall effect of such [weak] sanctions, regardless of sender regime type, is to increase
the probability of militarized conflict by 366%. As predicted, the change in probability of militarized conflict
after weak sanctions is greater for nondemocratic states, whose ability to signal is governed solely by their ability to incur sunk
costs. Nondemocratic states are generally better able to avoid militarized conflict follow ing the use of sanctions because they do not
when
nondemocracies send weak signals with sanctions, by crafting the sanctions in a way in
which they will gain economically, they increase their probability of being involved in a
military conflict by 420%. Democracies, on the other hand, are more likely to be involved in a
militarized dispute following sanctions because of their propensity to accumulate
audience costs that prevent them from backing down. Furthermore, scenario 6 shows that when a
democracy sends a weak sunk-cost signal while simultaneously facing audience costs, the
probability of a militarized dispute occurring reaches near certainty, at a level greater
than 90%. This helps confirm our expectation that the most conflict prone scenario is when a democracy signals weakly by
using costless sanctions, but simultaneously ties its hands through the accumulation of audience costs.
tie their hands through the accumulation of audience costs as democratic leaders do. However, as seen in scenario 5,
And, the humanitarian cost of sanctions breed hatred of the sanctioning states, leading
to terrorist backlash. David Cortwright notes: [David Cortright (chair of the Board and Senior Fellow of the
Fourth
Freedom Forum in Goshen, Indiana and codirector of its Sanctions and Sec urity Research Program; director of Policy
Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame), A Hard Look at Iraq Sanctions, The
Nation, 3 December 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/artic le/170/42275.html]
The humanitarian disaster resulting from sanctions against Iraq has been frequently
cited as a factor that motivated the September 11 terrorist attacks. Osama [B]in Laden himself
mentioned the Iraq sanctions in a recent tirade against the United States.
Even if financial sanctions dont have the same impact as those in Iraq, they still feed the
perception of the West as bullying the Muslim world and thus make it easier for terrorists
to find recruits and funding. Further, the only policy that gets 100 percent solvency for
terrorism is disengagement from Mideast politics, which would remove any motivation
for future attacks and which sanctions prevent, so at best theyre always sub-optimal
policy. But the failure of anti-terrorism sanction regimes increases the threat that
terrorists pose.
James Gurule9 writes: [Gurule, Jimmy. The demise of the UN economic sanctions regime to deprive terrorists of
funding. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 41:1, 2009, p. 19-63.]
The Security Council's international asset freeze program has reached a critical juncture.
Seniorcounter-terroris m officials are less enthusiastic about the economic sanctions regime than
ever before and Member States are reluctant to submit names for inclusion on the
Consolidated List. Terrorist related assets are no longer being frozen. As a result, al Qaeda
and the Taliban retain[s] ample funding to sustain their operations and finance deadly terrorist attacks. Based on
every objective measure ment, the intemational economic sanctions program appears to be
failing.
-
And, the availability of weapons with devastating potential makes terrorism an existential
risk. Oscar Falconi writes: [Oscar Falconi (BS in Physics from M.I.T., physicist and consultant in the computer and
electro-optical fields, has published artic les on the theoretic al limits of optic al devices), The Case For Space
Now !and why it should be our generation's #1 priority, 1981]
Colonization
Less than a thousandth of an ounce of a certain bacterial toxin is enough to kill the
entire human population. Bacteria their toxins, and other substances that are even more
deadly, very probably exist in many of the chemical, bacteriological, biological, and germ warfare
laboratories of the world. Important questions are: Can these substances kill ALL human life? How [We do not
know how] secure [they] are they from theft or leakage? Can [or if] they [can] be controlled if used? In 1974, at
,
the now-famous Asilomar meeting, a group of 140 leading genetic researchers discussed the hazards of genetic manipulation, set
guidelines, and pledged themselves to restrict certain aspects of their work in order to protect mankind from the potentially
disastrous consequences of what modern science can create in a test tube. These scientists realized that they could produce a
The threat of
disseminating new infectious germs that have never existed in nature could prov oke
uncontrollable epidemics.
deadly virus or strain of bacteria against which there was no protection. From France: [concluded that]
Even if sanctions are 100% effective in cutting off funding, weapons are already available
and open to theft in the status-quo, making fund freezing ineffective. Shane Green
furthers: [Shane Green (40 years of work in the nuclear industry, including 7 years as Chairman of a Nuclear Technology
Program at a major southern college, 2 years at the DOE PANTEX FACILITY, 5 years at Los Alamos National Laboratory and 2
Years at Oak Ridge National Laboratory), Nuclear War Unthinkable?, KI4U, 5 January 2007, online,
http://www.ki4u.com/unthinkable.htm]
There are over 200 documented cases of persons attempting to purchase special nuclear
material stuff to make bombs) or tactical nuclear weapons on the black market. There are over 100
suitcase bombs missing from the Soviet nuclear inventory. This last item is probably the most
(
important. The former head of Soviet National Security, Alexander Lebed testified to that fact before congress. He stated that the
devices measure[s] approximately [about two feet] 24" x 16" x 8" and can be set off by an individual in
less than 30 minutes, producing a 1 kilo ton yield. Such a device, set off in New York Harbor would
produce a 15 to 20 foot wave that would destroy New York City. Other sources have confirmed that
the number of suitcase bombs missing from the Soviet inventory is correct. Now , how do we detect such a device coming into the
U.S.? Weapons grade plutonium, 94% Pu-239 produces a 414 KeV gamma ray, detectable and identif iable by gamma
spectroscopy. It also contains approximately 6% Pu-240 that undergoes spontaneous fission, producing neutrons that can be
detected by neutron detectors. It also contains Am-241 that produces 60 KeV gamma rays, again detectable by gamma
spectroscopy. The significant quantity of weapons grade Pu is about 8 kilograms. The physical size of 8 [kilos of plutonium] Kgm of
Pu 239 is about the size of a baseball. (Try to find that in a sea/land container.) Weapons grade uranium is approximately 93% U235, producing a 186 KeV gamma ray detectable by gamma spectroscopy and 7% U-238, producing a 1001 KeV gamma ray from
it's daughter Pa-234m, also detectable by gamma spectroscopy. The signific ant quantity is about 25 Kgm, a sphere about 7" in
diameter. (Again, try to find that in a sea/land container.) The
radiological signature of any of the gamma emitters

could easily be shielded by a few inches of lead or tungsten. Four or five inches of steel would
effectively reduce the radiations to background.
Thus, since sanctions inflict massive suffering and generate existential risks, I affirm.
Drill Props S
AT TAINT OF INJUSTICE
A INTERPRETATION: Debaters must evaluate justice as a comparative concept.
B VIOLATION: Her conception of justice says that any risk of being unjust means that
something is unjust, and is sufficient to affirm/negate.
C STANDARDS:
1. Turn ground. Her advocacy denies me turn ground because she can sever out of large
portions of her advocacy, despite any turns on those segments of the case, and argue
that they are irrelevant because she proves a risk of injustice elsewhere. However, she
has turn ground against my position, because anywhere where she can claim that my
advocacy is unjust would be a place for you to vote under her advocacy. Thus, I am
structurally disadvantaged because I
don't have access to turn ground, while she
does, which makes the round inherently unfair. The interpretation gives both debaters
turn ground because comparative conceptions of justice allow for dispute over what is
more just rather than what is absolutely just.
2. Implicit standards. If her burden is simply to win that there is a risk of her advocacy
being true, while I have to show with 100% certainty that my advocacy is true, you as the
judge are holding us to different implicit standards. Her advocacy asks you to hold my
arguments to a MUCH higher threshold that of absolute truth than her arguments,
which require only a risk of possibility. It is academically disingenuous to claim that a
debater who proved a
minute risk of possibility that her position is true is a better
debater than one who proved with 99.9% certainty that hers is. This invites
absurd and underdeveloped positions, which is uneducational. Further, her advocacy
asks you to evaluate our arguments on two different levels truth versus mere
possibility while my interpretation requires judges to evaluate arguments on equal
ground, which is significantly more fair.
3. Time skew. Her advocacy requires her to win only one piece of unweighed
offense, which allows her to nullify 7 minutes of my speech time if she can win
any risk of an extension of any of her arguments. I, however, must answer every single
argument she makes, and still extend offense of my own. With comparative conceptions
of justice, both debaters must win complete extensions. If she only has to win a risk of
an impact, the time skew makes the round structurally favor her, which is unfair.
D VOTERS:
1. Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity which is predicated on
debaters having equal opportunity to win the round. Without
fairness, the
competition is undermined because one debater is always favored. Second, fairness is
a voter because as a judge, you are asked to determine who is the better debater.
Absent fairness, you could not make that evaluation because debate would become a
game of who is a better cheater.

2. Education is a voting issue because debate uniquely gives high school students an
adversarial forum in which to seek the best solutions to different issues this unique
educational atmosphere allows us to learn in a way which no other activity provides, so
undermining the educational aspect of the activity robs it of its unique value.
Further, while the impacts that we discuss in this round don't actually occur based off of
how you vote, the education which we gain from debate is of lasting importance. Thus,
the
paramount and most lasting outcome of debate is education.
Drill Props T
Once upon a time there was a prince who wanted to marry a princess; but she would have to be
a real princess. He travelled all over the world to find one, but nowhere could he get what he
wanted. There were princesses enough, but it was difficult to find out whether they were real
ones. There was always something about them that was not as it should be. So he came home
again and was sad, for he would have liked very much to have a real princess. One evening a
terrible storm came on; there was thunder and lightning, and the rain poured down in torrents.
Suddenly a knocking was heard at the city gate, and the old king went to open it. It was a
princess standing out there in front of the gate. But, good gracious! what a sight the rain and the
wind had made her look. The water ran down from her hair and clothes; it ran down into the toes
of her shoes and out again at the heels. And yet she said that she was a real princess.
Well, well soon find that out, thought the old queen. But she said nothing, went into the bedroom, took all the bedding off the bedstead, and laid a pea on the bottom; then she took twenty
mattresses and laid them on the pea, and then twenty eider-down beds on top of the
mattresses. On this the princess had to lie all night. In the morning she was asked how she had
slept. Oh, very badly! said she. I have scarcely closed my eyes all night. Heaven only knows
what was in the bed, but I was lying on something hard, so that I am black and blue all over my
body. Its horrible! Now they knew that she was a real princess because she had felt the pea
right through the twenty mattresses and the twenty eider-down beds. Nobody but a real princess
could be as sensitive as that. So the prince took her for his wife, for now he knew that he had a
real princess; and the pea was put in the museum, where it may still be seen, if no one has
stolen it. There, that is a true story.
There was once a prince, and he wanted a princess, but then she must be a real Princess. He
travelled right around the world to find one, but there was always something wrong. There were
plenty of princesses, but whether they were real princesses he had great difficulty in
discovering; there was always something which was not quite right about them. So at last he
had come home again, and he was very sad because he wanted a real princess so badly. One
evening there was a terrible storm; it thundered and lightninged and the rain poured down in
torrents; indeed it was a fearful night. In the middle of the storm somebody knocked at the town
gate, and the old King himself sent to open it. It was a princess who stood outside, but she was
in a terrible state from the rain and the storm. The water streamed out of her hair and her
clothes; it ran in at the top of her shoes and out at the heel, but she said that she was a real
princess. Well we shall soon see if that is true, thought the old Queen, but she said nothing.
She went into the bedroom, took all the bed clothes off and laid a pea on the bedstead: then she
took twenty mattresses and piled them on top of the pea, and then twenty feather beds on top of
the mattresses. This was where the princess was to sleep that night. In the morning they asked
her how she slept.
Oh terribly bad! said the princess. I have hardly closed my eyes the whole night! Heaven
knows what was in the bed. I seemed to be lying upon some hard thing, and my whole body is
black and blue this morning. It is terrible! They saw at once that she must be a real princess
when she had felt the pea through twenty mattresses and twenty feather beds. Nobody but a
real princess could have such a delicate skin. So the prince took her to be his wife, for now he
was sure that he had found a real princess, and the pea was put into the Museum, where it may
still be seen if no one has stolen it. Now this is a true story.
Once upon a time down on an old farm, lived a duck family, and Mother Duck had been sitting
on a clutch of new eggs. One nice morning, the eggs hatched and out popped six chirpy
ducklings. But one egg was bigger than the rest, and it didn't hatch. Mother Duck couldn't recall
laying that seventh egg. How did it get there? TOCK! TOCK! The little prisoner was pecking
inside his shell.
"Did I count the eggs wrongly?" Mother Duck wondered. But before she had time to think about
it, the last egg finally hatched. A strange looking duckling with gray feathers that should have
been yellow gazed at a worried mother. The ducklings grew quickly, but Mother Duck had a
secret worry. "I can't understand how this ugly duckling can be one of mine!" she said to herself,
shaking her head as she looked at her last born. Well, the gray duckling certainly wasn't pretty,
and since he ate far more than his brothers, he was outgrowing them. As the days went by, the
poor ugly duckling became more and more unhappy. His brothers didn't want to play with him,
he was so clumsy, and all the farmyard folks simply laughed at him. He felt sad and lonely,
while Mother Duck did her best to console him. "Poor little ugly duckling!" she would say. "Why
are you so different from the others?" And the ugly duckling felt worse than ever. He secretly
wept at night. He felt nobody wanted him. "Nobody loves me, they all tease me! Why am I
different from my brothers?" Then one day, at sunrise, he ran away from the farmyard. He
stopped at a pond and began to question all the other birds. "Do you know of any ducklings with
gray feathers like mine?" But everyone shook their heads in scorn. "We don't know anyone as
ugly as you." The ugly duckling did not lose heart, however, and kept on making inquiries. He
went to another pond, where a pair of large geese gave him the same answer to his question.
What's more, they warned him: "Don't stay here! Go away! It's dangerous. There are men with
guns around here!" The duckling was sorry he had ever left the farmyard.Then one day, his
travels took him near an old countrywoman's cottage. Thinking he was a stray goose, she
caught him. "I'll put this in a hutch. I hope it's a female and lays plenty of eggs!" said the old
woman, whose eyesight was poor. But the ugly duckling laid not a single egg. The hen kept
frightening him. "Just wait! If you don't lay eggs, the old woman will wring your neck and pop
you into the pot!" And the cat chipped in: "Hee! Hee! I hope the woman cooks you, then I can
gnaw at your bones!" The poor ugly duckling was so scared that he lost his appetite, though the
old woman kept stuffing him with food and grumbling: "If you won't lay eggs, at least hurry up
and get plump!" "Oh, dear me!" moaned the now terrified duckling. "I'll die of fright first! And I
did so hope someone would love me!" Then one night, finding the hutch door ajar, he escaped.
Once again he was all alone. He fled as far away as he could, and at dawn, he found himself in
a thick bed of reeds. "If nobody wants me, I'll hid here forever." There was plenty a food, and the
duckling began to feel a little happier, though he was lonely. One day at sunrise, he saw a flight
of beautiful birds wing overhead. White, with long slender necks, yellow beaks and large wings,
they were migrating south. "If only I could look like them, just for a day!" said the duckling,
admiringly. Winter came and the water in the reed bed froze. The poor duckling left home to
seek food in the snow. He dropped exhausted to the ground, but a farmer found him and put
him in his big jacket pocket. "I'll take him home to my children. They'll look after him. Poor thing,
he's frozen!" The duckling was showered with kindly care at the farmer's house. In this way, the
ugly duckling was able to survive the bitterly cold winter. However, by springtime, he had grown
so big that the farmer decided: "I'll set him free by the pond!" That was when the duckling saw
himself mirrored in the water."Goodness! How I've changed! I hardly recognize myself!" The
flight of swans winged north again and glided on to the pond. When the duckling saw them, he
realized he was one of their kind, and soon made friends. "We're swans like you!" they said,
warmly. "Where have you been hiding?" "It's a long story," replied the young swan, still
astounded. Now, he swam majestically with his fellow swans. One day, he heard children on the
river bank exclaim: "Look at that young swan! He's the finest of them all!" And he almost burst
with happiness.

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skills & drills

1 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

2 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

3 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

4 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

5 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

6 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

The Long Prepout

7 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

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9 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

10 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

IF YOUR STUDENTS DO NOT HAVE DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS IN THEIR CASES, OR

11 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

12 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

Standards Takeout/Isolating Assumptions

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Deont v Util Mini-Debate

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GooooaaalllllSkill Served: Cross-Examination

19 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

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Hold the Line

25 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

Crushing Confusing Positions

26 | Drill Battery VBI 2010 Skills & Drills

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1AR vs. Counter-Plan

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Weighing the Weighing Standards

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Intro Offense Drill

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The Grab Bag

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Straight Ref to Ref Drills

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KISS - Keep it simple, stupid

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Theory Hell 1AR

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Dealing with Inevitability DAs