Beruflich Dokumente
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International
Political
Science Review
Nozick
(2008),
Revisited:
Vol.
29, No.
The
3, 261-280
Formation
of the
Abstract.
Nozick's
Papaioannou
State,
Anarchy,
(neo-)libertarian
among
right-wing
on distributive
in the current debate
and
Utopia
thinkers.
is still
The
influential
latter
today
are
engaged
the
defending
justice,
insistently
on the
of
social justice
grounds
against
are
inviolable
individual
The
of
their
defense
rights.
premises
explicitly
from Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Therefore,
ifone
is interested
in
derived
one should
be
the
libertarian
arguments
challenging
right-wing
today,
state
minimal
interested
That
iswhat
dimension
consists
and
the
case
in revisiting Nozick,
this article does:
of Nozick's
theory.
political
of the idea of absolute
individual
theory.
of the moral
It argues
that this dimension
and is formed upon
the
of persons.
inviolability
rights
the moral
of full self-ownership
and
premises
are
Both premises
because
problematical
of self-realization.
epistemological
principle
Keywords:
of his
Nozick
Individual
they
rights
Libertarianism
are
abstracted
Morality
from
any
Politics
Introduction
In the field of political theory, the epithet "libertarian" is usually employed to
characterize Robert Nozick, despite the fact that in his laterwritings he had shifted
away from his positions in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. There are two reasons for
this. First, Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), 32 years after its original
publication, has become a classic. As B.H. Fried (2005: 221) points out, "It is not
only the central text for all contemporary academic discussions of libertarianism;
together with John Rawls's A Theory ofJustice (1971), it also arguably framed the
landscape of academic political philosophy in the last decades of the twentieth
century." Second and more importantly,Nozick's early politico-theoretical project
is still very influential today among right-wing libertarians who are actively engaged
in the current academic debate of distributive justice. Especially in the USA, but
DOI:
Sage
10.1177/0192512107088391
Publications
(Los Angeles,
2008
London,
Association
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262
International
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
from
Anarchy,
and
State,
For
Utopia.
instance,
Hasnas
and
Mack
make
dimension
of Nozick's
political
theory
and
refutes
its
key
elements
on
epi
stemological grounds.1 In doing so, the article introduces a distinctive and novel
approach toNozick. In this sense, it implicitly addresses the premises of right-wing
libertarian arguments, offering fresh criticism against inviolable individual rights
and answering questions that the existing body of literature leaves open.
In what follows, itwill be maintained, first, that themoral dimension of Nozick's
political theory consists of the idea of absolute individual rights, formed upon
two premises: full self-ownership and themoral inviolability of persons. Second, it
will be suggested that both premises are problematical not just because, as many
authors have so far shown, they are indifferent toward basic freedoms and welfare
but,
consequences,
above
all, because
they
are
abstracted
from
any
epistemological
principle of self-realization. Only in the context of this principle can the role of
society and external resources in self-development and self-ownership be recognized.
to its problematical
Due
libertarianism is fundamentally
formation, Nozick's
This
has
for
implausible.
negative implications
right-wing libertarians today.
The article is divided into four sections. Section 2 examines the problematical
premises ofNozick's right-based2 morality. Section 3 focuses on the implausibility of
Nozick's
libertarianism.
The
Problematical
Section
4 summarizes
Premises
the main
argument
of
this article.
of Nozick's
Right-Based
Morality
From the preface of his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick stresses that "Individuals
have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without
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Papaioannou:
Nozick
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
Dimension
263
"
violating their rights) (1974: ix). The very idea of rights is concerned with entitle
to H. Steiner (1977: 770), "any possible set of rights contains
ments. According
a set of titles to objects." From this it follows that individual rights contain titles
which individuals may have to objects. What are the titles individuals may have
in terms of Nozick's
theory? To what objects may individuals have titles?What
think
does
Nozick
individuals have?
rights
As many scholars have observed, Nozick's
concept of individual rights is
founded upon the principle of self-ownership.3 According to Cohen and Graham
(1990: 25), "The principle says that every person ismorally entitled to full private
that each person has an
property in his own person and powers. This means
extensive set ofmoral rights ... over the use and fruits of his body and capacities."
The concept of moral rights refers to those rights which are thought to exist
(Lyons, 1984: 111;
independently of social recognition and legal enforcement
1993: 24). For Nozick, moral rights4 are negative rights. This negativity
Waldron,
in terms of Hohfeld's
(1919: 38-43) claim-right: if
might be better understood
A has a moral right toX, then B has a moral duty not to interfere with A's right.
view of right-raise (Waldron, 1984:
Apart from questions that such a Hohfeldian
the
maxim
of
non-interference
8),
normally constitutes the criterion by which
are
from
distinguished
negative rights
positive rights. As Wolff (1991a: 19) says,
"If I have a positive right to something this entails that a particular person, or in
other cases everyone, has a corresponding duty to provide me with that thing or
whatever
is necessary
to secure
it."
In Nozick's theory, the principle of self-ownership upon which the idea ofmoral
rights is based, appears to be abstract and formal. This is something that early
critiques of Nozick also recognize
(Nagel, 1975), but fail to overcome. Nozick
conceives self-ownership without presupposing
any epistemological
principle of
is not founded upon empirical observations or
self-realization. His conception
logical arguments. For Nozick, if I own my self, then I also own my talents and
capacities
(Kymlicka, 1990: 105). This view is rather implausible. Nozick does
not address the concrete problem of self-development. In fact, I cannot be the
owner of my self and the fruits of my talents unless those have been developed.
Self-ownership, especially when connected with certain talents and capacities, has
an inherently developmental
dimension
that iswholly ignored by Nozick.5 For
to
owner
to
the
of
talent
be
instance,
my
play basketball at a competitive level
to realize
I
that
have
had
the
social
and economic means
presupposes
already
and develop my talent through a lot of training in an indoor court to which I
have access. The principle of self-realization refers to self-knowledge through
self-development. Self-development depends on purposeful activities, including
as such is
work.6 Self-development
prior to self-ownership. If I have not realized
not
self
and
I
have
the title to them. As Steiner (1977: 770)
talents,
my
my
may
a relation between two terms: the name of an agent and the
"A
title
is
out,
points
name of an object." Objects such as my capacities and talents may not be named
unless they have been developed
through purposeful activities. But even ifmy
cannot be full,
and
have
been
this development
talents
developed,
capacities
due to scarcity of external resources. A society cannot guarantee that I get what
I need to carry out my preferred project of full self-development since itmight
be impossible to match my demand for external resources with the supply. By
conceiving self-ownership without presupposing any epistemological
principle of
self-realization, Nozick abstracts the former from the substantial presuppositions
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264
International
Science Review
Political
29 (3)
Nevertheless,
outs,
point
term
"The
??/fin
...
self-ownership
has
purely
reflexive significance. It signifies that what owns and what is owned are one and
the same, namely, the whole person"
(1995: 69, emphasis added; also cited in
neither
Cohen nor Kymlicka go any further
1990:105).
Kymlicka,
Unfortunately,
to establish the link between the reflexive self and the traits of rationality, free
will, and moral agency. Itmight be argued, though, that, for Nozick, the capacity
of the self to be, at the same time, the subject who owns and the object that is
is due
owned
moral
to
its
seem
agency
traits.
to be
In
what
the Nozickian
makes
account,
self
capable
of
rationality,
reflexive
free
and
will,
self-reference.
In his Philosophical Explanations, Nozick says that "To be an I, a self, is to have the
capacity for reflexive self-reference" (1981: 105). That view is latent in Anarchy,
State, and Utopia. The question that arises is whether the capacity for reflexive
can
self-reference
come
about
throughout
the
three
traits
aforementioned
that
and
the other
likewise;
thus
each
is the other's
own other."
Hegel's
point
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Papaioannou:
Nozick
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
Dimension
265
depends on whether the division of external resources in that society allows full
or partial interaction between different selves.
Nozick
(1974: 49) does not present any theory concerning the role of society
and external resources in the dialectical development of human rationality, free
will, and moral agency. On the contrary, by following individualist anarchists
such as Tucker
(1911: 23-4) he treats those characteristics
individually and
a
from
As
he
abstracts
its
social
and economic
result,
self-ownership
separately.
a pure and isolated individualistic
as
it
he
understands
and
presuppositions,
thereby
matter.
Nozick
accuse
thinkers
communitarian
Therefore,
of extreme
individualism
of determinism
communitarians
as C.
such
(Taylor, 1985:
since
are
Taylor
right
187). Nevertheless,
they
claim
that
"there
to accuse
one
could
are
social
Communitarians
who
for
argue
cannot
self-determination
resolve
the
is of
central
importance
to
theorists
who
work
within
the
Marxist
and
absolutely
free
self-actualization,
as well
as
full
self-externalization,
are
im
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266
International
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
consequently,
fundamental
to
entitlement
private
in anyone
property
else."
Itmight be argued that the essential difference between Marxists and left-wing
libertarians, on the one hand, and Nozick and right-wing libertarians, on the
other, is that the latter group forms their thesis of self-ownership in abstraction
from conditions of social choice and scarcity of resources. This abstraction might
of Nozick's unwillingness to form his concept of self
be viewed as a consequence
an
principle of self-realization. The
ownership by presupposing
epistemological
latter does not signify a more specific form of the good life that is competing
the question is not whether we ought to pursue
with that of Nozick. Therefore,
self-realization over any alternative form of the good life. Rather, the question
of any specific form
iswhether self-realization is epistemologically
presupposed
form of self-ownership. Self-realization
is
of the good life, including Nozick's
a
interaction between different selves
principle that entails that the dialectical
under
and society, as well as the division of external resources, is developed
certain conditions of social choice and availability of external resources. Since
self-realization is a matter of social interaction and since the latter depends on
external resources, Nozick by abstracting from self-realization also abstracts his
libertarian form of the good life from conditions of social choice and scarcity of
resources.
external
to formulate
of abstract
long-term
principles
to consider
plans for its life, able
or considerations
it formulates
and
decide
to itself and
not
of immediate
that limits its
the plaything
stimuli, a being
merely
or
in accordance
it
behaviour
with some principles
has
of what an
picture
appropriate
and
others,
so on.
(Nozick,
1974:
49)
Nozick does not take into account that the ability to formulate plans for life is a
matter of available external resources. To him, planning exists at the individual
level. Only individuals who possess the traits of rationality, free will, and moral
agency know how to shape their separate lives. In Nozick's view, such an indi
vidual knowledge is full. Even so, itmight be said that individual planning cannot
is
be abstracted from the problem of external resources. In fact, such planning
a
a matter of availability of both external resources and knowledge. Whether
person is able to form a long- or a short-term plan for his life depends on whether
his
amount
of
about
knowledge
resources
natural
available
resources
external
that
amount
are
scarce,
is sufficient
persons
access
are
or small,
is
large
or not. For
instance,
able
to formulate
and
whether
in a world
long-term
his
where
plans
principle
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for
of
Papaioannou:
Nozick
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
principle
than
people,
...
about
"says
nothing
self-ownership
and
in
about
nothing
particular,
anyone's
substances
Dimension
267
correctly observes,
in resources
rights
and
capacities
the
other
of nature,
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268
International
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
(1988:
advantage of their lives (1988: sect. 26), and use requires appropriation
sect. 35). In the Lockean account, the use of the earth for the best advantage of
lives iswhat links the natural right to self-ownership with the right to
people's
In Nozick's theory, a similar link is established through the
private appropriation.
life. Nozick, like Locke, derives the right tomeaningful
of
concept
meaningful
life from the natural right to self-ownership. In this sense, the rights of all men
to meaningful
lifemight be viewed as natural rights to private appropriation.
Nozick is not "willing to rest the case for his theory on biblical authority" (Wolff,
1991a: 27). Behind his concept of the self seems to lie an abstract naturalism
rather than a Christian theology. Nevertheless, Nozick gives the impression that
he agrees with other libertarian thinkers such as A. Rand that "Whether one
believes that man is the product of a Creator or of nature, the issue of man's
- a rational
an entity of a
origin does not alter the fact that he is
special kind
not
imply that Nozick also agrees
being" (Rand, 1961: 94). This agreement does
with Rand that rights are a necessary condition of man's survival (Rand, 1961:
94). On the contrary, in his essay "On the Randian Argument," he argues that if
no answer to
rights are explained as conditions of man's survival, then there is
the question of why they should not be violated (Nozick, 1982: 226-7). Nozick
seems to believe that only if rights are explained as a necessary condition of a
Lockean
type of self-ownership is there an answer to the question of why they
should not be violated. For Locke, property is inviolable. As he says, "I have truly
no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases
against my consent" (Locke, 1988: sect. 138).14 The reality of my moral right to
property is the moral duty of another not to interfere with my property against
my consent (for instance, not to steal my property).
Of course, the aforementioned
difference between Nozick's
and Locke's
metaphysics
should
no
longer
be
overlooked.
Theological
beliefs
matter.
Thus,
those
resources
are
abundant.
By contrast, in Nozick's
theory, the notion of partial self-ownership is not
justified (1974: 172). Since each person by nature possesses the individualizing
of
traits of rationality, free will, and moral agency, and since the development
those traits is abstracted from any dialectic process of self-realization, the life of
each person belongs neither to God nor to society, but to the person himself.16
As Nozick says, "being myself, a property no one else has, is the ground of my
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Papaioannou:
Nozick
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
Dimension
269
value" (1981: 454). From this it follows that persons who by nature are capable
of owning themselves and shaping their lives are values in themselves. Hence,
those
persons
are moral
and
therefore
inviolable.
is: never
use
person
as mere
resource
for
the ends
of others
without
her consent" (Swanton, 1983: 69, emphasis added). Since that interpretation is
based upon the premises of inviolability and the separateness of persons, itdoes
not justify the equal right of all men to use external resources in the Lockean
manner. Such an equality is incompatible with the notion of full self-ownership.
In Nozick's theory, the link between full self-ownership and private appropriation
(that is, themeaningful
life) is possible only ifeach person has unlimited private
property rights in unequal amounts of external resources (Cohen, 1995: 118),
even
in cases
where
those
resources
are
in
scarcity
- as
they
always
are.
of Nozick's
Libertarianism:
Absolute
Private Property
in
and
Freedom
the
State
of
Nature
Equal
Rights
The moral dimension of Nozick's political theory consists of absolute individual
section, it has been shown that the problematical
pre
rights. In the preceding
mises of full self-ownership and themoral inviolability of persons justify unlimited
of external resources. The link between full self
rights to private appropriation
and
unlimited
results inwhat is called Nozick's
ownership
private appropriation
libertarianism. The self-ownership principle entails a particular view of individual
freedom. According toR.J. Arneson, "Under self-ownership, I have themoral right
to behave voluntarily ...Other persons have no moral right to restrictmy liberty"
(1991: 37). From this it follows that if I own my natural capacities and talents,
I have the moral right to appropriate whatever amount of external resources I
voluntarily choose, so long as my choice does not contravene the choices which
Implausibility
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270
International
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
notion
the Lockean
with
of
self-ownership.
The
as
latter,
stated,
previously
is a
nature,
he
person
is
chooses,
voluntarily
equally
so
long
free
to
as his
appropriate
choice
does
amount
whatever
not
contravene
of resources
the
choice
of
No
one
is entitled
to more
resources
than
he
can
use.
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Nozick
Papaioannou:
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
Dimension
271
not
in
he,
ought
competition,
as much
as he
can,
to
preserve
the rest
Mankind'
of
(1988: sect. 6). The relationship between the proviso and the scheme of welfare
that the law of nature introduces seems to be clear. The proviso grants "enough
and as good" to all individuals who are able to use their labor power.21 Hence,
those individuals do not think that it is against their interests to redistribute a
to persons who are unable
to appropriate
external
part of their possessions
resources
by
When
themselves.
resources
external
are
not
scarce,
the
of
problem
an
of one
appropriation
piece
by
one
or
several
persons,
are
non-appropriators
no longer at liberty to use that piece at will and to this extent have been deprived
of an opportunity (Arneson, 1991: 40).
In Nozick's
theory, the Lockean proviso is irrelevant in the original form of
"enough and as good." Nozick believes that even if resources were relatively
abundant "the free activities of individuals would progressively reduce the amount
resources available for latecomers" (Nock, 1992: 682). Through
of unimproved
his critique of the Lockean theory of acquisition, he replaces the original form of
the proviso with a Pare to one. For Nozick, "The crucial point iswhether appro
priation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others" (1974:175). Pareto's
principle of improvement requires thatwhen some individual becomes better off
by appropriating an unowned object, no one becomes worse off in comparison
to his situation before the appropriation. Writers such as Cohen
(1995: 75) and
Arneson
(1991: 44) agree with Nozick that the Lockean proviso faces functional
problems. Therefore, they come to accept the Pareto principle of improvement
as a relevant
of
form
proviso.
Nevertheless,
cause it cannot guarantee
the
Lockean
notion
of
self-ownership
is
partial,
and
if
"enough
and
as
good"
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272
International
Political
Science Review
29(3)
in
The incompatibility between private property and equal liberty appears
of the state
Nozick's
theory. Nozick replaces the theological macro-foundations
of nature with his own metaphysics. The latter does not justify a socially founded
relational context within which equal libertymight be developed
in such a way
as to allow each individual to become a private owner of external resources. In
a hypothetical state of nature characterized by a lack of political organizations,
abundant
macro-foundations,
theological
and
resources,
the Lockean
proviso,
the
situation
of
others,
he
must
them.
compensate
Does
this
proviso
balance unlimited private property rights and equal liberty in the state of nature?
to it,
The answer is negative. The Nozickian
proviso is ambiguous. According
someone who is excluded from the process of original acquisition because there
are no resources left for him to appropriate or because he is physically unable
to achieve
the
is not
appropriation
worse
off
in
comparison
to his
situ
previous
ation. Therefore, Nozick's proviso does not justify the compensation of individuals
those
who are excluded from the process of original acquisition. For Nozick,
individuals
are
in
compensated
terms
of
the
laissez-faire
process
of
the
state
of
nature and this is the reason why they finally consent to their exclusion from the
process of original acquisition.
from the
Nozick may be right in saying that individuals who are excluded
were
not
of
off
before
their
exclusion.
But
better
process
original acquisition
does this imply that those individuals are not worse off after their exclusion?
The answer is negative. Individuals who are excluded from the process of original
acquisition need to be compared not only against their previous situation, but
also against the situation of property owners. The latter constitutes a benchmark
for relative comparisons. The view that as long as they stay in the same place in
to their previous situation individuals who are excluded from the
comparison
of
process
original acquisition cannot be made worse off by falling further and
further behind the property owners is nonsense. Against this view, one might
fully agree with Barry who, in his recent work Why Social JusticeMatters, maintains
that
"becoming
relatively
worse
off
can
make
you
absolutely
worse
off,
in terms
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Papaioannou:
Nozick
The Formation
Revisited:
of theRight-Based
Dimension
275
possession
talents
and
into
capacities
of resources.
ownership
In Nozick's
view,
resources
not
to possess
property.
private
Nozick's argument is not convincing. If it is true that no one can be the owner
in the
of the fruits of his talents and capacities unless those have been developed
relational context of society, then itmust be also true that the individuals who
are excluded from the process of original acquisition because they are physically
incapable of work are likely to starve. The others who are excluded because
there are no resources left for them to appropriate are bound to enter into the
laissez-faire process of the state of nature without owning capacities and talents,
their capacities and talents in that
only their labor power.26 Instead of developing
relational context, individuals who are capable of work are forced to sell their
labor power to those who possess resources with no prospect of becoming private
individuals who are excluded from the process of
property owners. Consequently,
are
worse
not in comparison
to their previous situation,
off,
original acquisition
to the situation of private property owners. Private property
but in comparison
owners who are physically incapable of work have the opportunity to buy welfare
schemes and so they are not likely to starve. Owners who are physically capable of
work have the opportunity to develop their capacities and talents because, since
they possess resources, they are not forced to enter the laissez-faire process in
to work
order
for others.
Apart from the ambiguity of the Nozickian proviso, it should be said that the
as it is introduced inAnarchy, State, and
principle of compensation,
Utopia, is also
not
First
of
that
does
entail
that
the
individual
all,
who,
vague.
through
principle
his appropriation, worsens the situation of others should stop appropriating
resources. Second, full application of the principle of compensation presupposes
that a universal medium of exchange has been already introduced in society and
guaranteed by the state. Third, Nozick does not provide a method by which com
can
pensation
be
In fact,Nozick
measured.
satisfactorily
coerced
into
not
an
doing
act
is neither
necessary
nor
a sufficient
con
dition for being unfree to do it" (Nozick, 1969: 440). Certainly, this argument
is valid in some cases that Nozick describes. Nevertheless, being prevented by
an initial inequality of resources from doing an act is a sufficient condition for
being unfree to do it.27
Equality of resources and equal liberty are interdependent
concepts.28 This
is
the
with
notion
of partial self
fully compatible
conceptual
interdependence
a
is
Since
formed
dialectical
social process
partial self-ownership
through
ownership.
and
since
participation
in
self-ownership29 presupposes
that
process
presupposes
an initial distribution
external
of equal
resources,
external
equal
resources.
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274
International
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
ownership.
autonomy
in terms
of self-realization
means
that
each
person
is
equally free to develop and use his powers inwhatever way he chooses, so long as
his choice does not contravene the set of ways which a free society chooses to be
reproduced. Since a free society claims equal self-ownership for all itsmembers, it
can only choose to be reproduced
inways compatible with that claim. The initial
distribution of equal external resources cannot ignore this.
Conclusion
This article has tried to re-examine the formation of the moral dimension of
Nozick's political theory, refuting its key elements on epistemological
grounds.
In doing so, ithas implicitly addressed the key premises of right-wing libertarian
(talents and
arguments of full and inviolable ownership of internal endowments
capacities) and external resources of the world.
In summary, itmight be said that, indeed, themoral dimension ofNozick's early
theory consists of the idea of absolute individual rights. This right-based dimension
is based upon the premises of full self-ownership and the moral inviolability of
persons.
Both
premises
are
problematical
because
they
are
abstracted
from
any
epistemological
principle of self-realization. This principle immediately points
out the role of society and external resources in the development
of the self and
his ownership of himself.
Itmight be concluded that, due to itsformation upon the problematical premises
of full self-ownership and moral inviolability of persons, Nozick's
libertarianism
is implausible. In the relational context of society and in conditions of scarcity of
external resources, absolute private property rights and equal liberty can never
be
reconciled.
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Nozick
Papaioannou:
Revisited:
The Formation
of theRight-Based
Dimension
275
Notes
as
and
the justification
study of knowledge
on
formulated
grounds
epistemological
are
Answers
beliefs
know? What
include,
justified?
in
can be found
For
of thought.
in different
traditions
to these
instance,
questions
our
of the world
and Hume,
of Locke,
tradition
the empiricist
knowledge
Berkeley,
our sense
comes
around
about
ourselves)
Nothing
experience.
through
(including
we
us can be known
from information
is revealed
its existence
unless
gain directly
or
states
of our subjective
1992:
in sense experience
110). By
(Hunter,
introspection
and
their followers,
of Descartes,
tradition
in the rationalist
Kant, Hegel,
contrast,
can come
of sense
our
about
of the world
reason,
through
independently
knowledge
In his theory, a priori know
iswhat Kant regards as a priori knowledge.
This
experience.
on
that is based
from a posteriori
is distinct
Certainly,
experience.
knowledge
ledge
For Kant
is not clear-cut.
of knowledge
between
the two categories
distinction
Kant's
on
a
in two particular
a
could
known
ways:
experience
depend
priori
proposition
are
sense
involved
in the proposition
second,
first, the concepts
experience;
by
acquired
to entertain
the proposition
1992: 3).
is always necessary
(Casullo,
experience
is generally
1. Epistemology
of belief'
defined
"the
1985:
1). Questions
(Dancy,
can we
can we know? How
what
4. Nozick's
concept
of moral
He
in an out-of-the-way
place.
the
total
supply"
appropriates
of self-ownership,
grounds
he did not stumble
upon
that it effectively
181). Nozick
justifies
that "He does not worsen
discovers
(1974:
arguing
the substance
no
one
else would
treats
a certain
one of this
to me
even more
was made
journal's
apparent
by
point
to him or her for the contribution.
I am indebted
referees.
5. This
disease
and
on the
this appropriation
if
of others;
the situation
have, and the other would
anonymous
"to refer
in the same sense as in Elster
is used
the term "work"
110-11)
(1986:
or
use-values
to any
is to produce
and
purpose
activity whose
regular
organised
of use-value."
for
the
intermediate
production
goods
a
is not
that
7. This
priori
self-development
through
self-knowledge
implies
6. Here
knowledge.
is one
8. Aristotle
9.
in the course
the role ofthat
of those who clearly appreciated
process
a
man
of
the
interaction
with
In his Nicomachean
of self-development.
another,
Ethics,
For Aristotle,
"a friend, being
even
not dialectical,
is a matter
of friendship.
though
own effort" (1925: 238),
that
cannot
another
self, furnishes what a man
by his
provide
and
is, his virtuousness
240-1).
(1925:
happiness
in recent
nature
is also empirically
demonstrated
of self-development
The dialectical
and dizygotic
twins. See,
of
of the behavior
studies
monozygotic
interdisciplinary
for instance,Heller et al. (2005), McCartney et al. (1990), and Patrie (2000).
10. Anarchist
not
escape
themselves
and Kropotkin
do
such as those of Bakunin,
Proudhon,
Godwin,
commit
either. As A. Ritter points out, even though anarchists
the problem
to adjudicate
to
and community,
they lack "a principle
individuality
equally
theories
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
276 International
between
that
there
Political
Science Review
29). Of course,
since
the aims
and
(1980:
community"
for any such principle
individuality
is no need
29(3)
anarchists
believe
many
of individuals
and com
are
cannot
this sort of interdependency
be
Nevertheless,
interdependent.
in large societies.
It should
be noted
full and partial
For him,
that Kant
both
rejects
self-ownership.
see
the whole
of
is
At
this
also
incoherent.
G.A.
Cohen
concept
self-ownership
point,
munity
viewed
11.
(1995:211-12).
12.
Bentham
and
13.
of coercive
requirements
It should be
stated
ismonotheistic.
rules"
legal
that the God
Locke
of Locke
(Lyons,
comes
that one
believes
and
1984:
114). See
from Christian
only
one
God
also Waldron
(1993).
theology. This
theology
exists. His monotheism
is
preserved alongside the belief in the Holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
(Taliaferro, 1998:16). This distinguishes his Christian faithfromothermonotheistfaiths
...
as
and Islam. Specifically,
the people
portrays God
Judaism
"Judaism
calling
to be a
to
merciful
and
dedicated
and serving
community,
just
worshipping
... and Moses"
are Abraham
God.
Its most
(Taliaferro,
1998:15).
early figures
important
was
the
"Islamic
Mohammed
who
(570-632)
By contrast,
teaching
forged by
Prophet
a radical monotheism
that
the
of
his
time
proclaimed
explicitly
repudiated
polytheism
as
such
of Israel
14.
15.
particular
16. Nozick
replaces
deals with
never
free will)
17.
Grunebaum
alsoJ.O.
That
and
Theologically
on
butions
process
Locke's
founded
and
18. Nozick's
reason.
is a priori
through
with
abstract
naturalism.
theology
of the direct will of God
(that does not
Christian
the concepts
the permissive
will
the
libertarianism
of benevolence
redistributions
reflects
of unlimited
19.
property
private
or natural
law of nature
The
of God
redistributions
grounds
second,
forgiveness;
commands.
and
4).
(1987:
of self-realization
he
Therefore,
allow behavioral
for behavioral
free will).
(that allows
take two forms: first, voluntary
redistri
might
and faith to divine values
such as mercy, justice,
on the
to God's
of obedience
choices
grounds
but uncompromising,
passionate,
belief
in the "truth"
rights.
law refers
are
to those moral
to exist
rules which
thought
law of political
that is, positive
law. In
community,
or natural
law prevents
individuals
from unlimited
state of nature
the Lockean
is a state of peace
and not a
of the
by nature,
independently
nature
the
law
of
Locke's
theory,
20.
actions.
Therefore,
egoistic
state of "war of all
all" (Hobbes,
1991).
against
In Christian
it is through
the reason
of God
that the world
theology,
cause
state of nature.
is
first
of
the
God
the
all
effects and
including
was
created,
therefore
his
reason
21.
them.
governs
in Locke's
been
stressed,
already
Since
founded
upon Christian
theology.
As
has
priations
it is the
as
and
22.
These
state
Locke.
the
term
self-development
not
to
in common,
with
gave
humanity
things that God
the reason
define what
is enough
they got from God,
an
important
state. The
role
latter
in the transition
reflects
from
the dominant
the Lockean
theology
of
as synonymous
with the term "division."
an initial distribution
if
is
of equal
be
there
liberty might
developed
we do not mean
also be secured
in terms
that equal
liberty might
In the course
of time, the initial distribution
of equal
external
"distribution"
Here,
24.
resources
using
play
to the
political
23.
of
who,
for others.
good
macro-foundations
of nature
labor
their
by mixing
individuals
and as good"
is
theory the "enough
proviso
in the state of nature make
individuals
appro
can
is treated
context
in which
the socially founded
relational
partial
safeguard
context
if
be secured
in terms of politics
That
take place.
might
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Papaioannou:
Nozick
Revisited:
The Formation
Dimension
of theRight-Based
277
resources
of
external
is followed
by social redistribution.
equal
a process
of social
interaction
and
since
through
only develop
resources
that development
is always partial,
the social distribution
of external
does
not violate
it prevents
the initial equality
of resources
from
Rather,
self-ownership.
as pure
into what Van Parijs
describes
that is, an
(1995:
12-14)
declining
capitalism,
the initial distribution
Since
25.
26.
the
in which
there is full private
economy
ownership
In the state of nature
there may be some people
Although
who have
Theorists
who
"that
argues
it is not
348-9,
(1997:
and freedom,
actions.
is no
laissez-faire
distinguish
for doing
that unfreedom
"freedom"
particular
so obvious
that we
added).
emphasis
comes
to
Wolff
... concerns
Liberty
doubt
that "freedom"
act
treat "freedom"
It is in this sense
should
concerns
thepossibility
of particular
(Wolff, 1997: 351). There
of types of actions"
less normative
than "liberty"
and
concept
this. Nevertheless,
it is not sure that libertarians
develop
draws
as Wolff's
or
as
with what he describes
synonymous
"liberty."
as Nozick
can be convicted
of dogmatism,
but
lack a concept
that concerns
the possibility
They
should
be
taken
into account
as an
equal
others.
character
theorists
among
freedom
of all persons
other
scholars may not con
case of the
in the
particular
and other
scholars may well
state of nature,
theorists,
political
theologians,
as necessarily
the choice
of God
that Locke
presents
the abstract
what
liberty.
and
theorists,
Generally
theologians,
speaking,
political
as
sider a choice
of God
abstract.
However,
necessarily
recognize
a model
him to provide
for constructing
state of government.
political
So far, this discussion
has been
largely
between
the relationship
of themselves.
32.
and
"freedom"
such
concept
libertarians
such
31.
between
of freedom
of philosophical
incoherence.
of
actions
and therefore
fail to comprehend
particular
as freedom
as
describes
and what he describes
Wolff
Lockean
may
"liberty"
to
thepermissibility
as such
is a
not
Equal
self-ownership
to
partial
ownership
owners
property
to sell their
forced
By criticizing
"that freedom
suggest
as a normative
that
handicaps
to the view
object
For
Wolff
instance,
unequal
liberty.
as
treat
freedom and
liberty
synonymous"
Cohen's
and Steiner's
view of property
and
leads
in stressing
is correct
their arguments
in mind
the distinction
he
by having
of them either
lack an explicit
definition
"liberty." Most
30.
or mental
physical
market.
between
Wolff
29.
resources.
of all external
with
be a boundary
for everyone,
power
may
private
their capacities
and talents are less likely to be
labor
developed
in the
power
labor
27.
self may
such
abstract
of social
in order
as Dworkin
for
in the
choice
(2002),
Sen
in a number
of countries
instance,
the further
involves
Union,
public
policy
as systems of intellectual
property
rights
For
the USA)
of private
(including
tightening
and
in the European
such
regimes,
property
2006).
(Papaioannou,
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
280
International
Biographical
Political
Science Review
29 (3)
Note
Theo Papaioannou
at
is a Lecturer in Innovation and Politics of Development
the Open University. He has published many articles, including
"Towards
a Critique of the Moral Foundations
of Intellectual Property Rights" in the
Global
and
Ethics
"Market
Order and Justice inHayek's Political
(2006)
Journal of
The
Exclusion
and
of
Substantive Politics" in Social Science
Theory:
Requirement
Address:
of
(2003).
Information
Department
Development
Policy and Practice,
The Open University, Pentz Building, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK
[email:
t.papaioannou@open.ac.uk].
Acknowledgments'.
I am
grateful
to
three
anonymous
reviewers
of
International
and suggestions.
This content downloaded from 216.17.119.80 on Fri, 06 Nov 2015 13:06:22 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions