1)Underthedoctrineofseparability,anarbitrationagreementisconsideredasindependent

ofthemaincontract.Sincethetwoareseparate,thearbitrationagreementdoesnot
automaticallyterminatewhenthemaincontractcomestoanend.Moreover,thedoctrineof
separabilityholdsthattheinvalidityofthemaincontract,alsoknownasthe
containercontract,doesnotaffectthevalidityofthearbitrationagreement.Hence,
regardlessoftheinvalidityofthemaincontract,thearbitrationagreementthereinremains
validandenforceable.
2) SUBPOENA:
A SUBPOENA IS A PROCESS DIRECTED TO A PERSON REQUIRING HIM TO ATTEND AND
TO TESTIFY AT THE HEARING OR TRIAL OF AN ACTION OR AT ANY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, OR FOR THE TAKING OF HIS
DEPOSITION. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum
and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to
compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in
H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: The subpoena duces tecum is, in all
respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or
things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy);
and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness).
3) DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT:
ONCE A JUDGMENT ATTAINS FINALITY, IT BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE. IT
MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO
CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW, AND
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MODIFICATION IS ATTEMPTED TO BE MADE BY THE COURT
RENDERING IT OR BY THIS COURT.
4) PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:
In Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509, the
Supreme Court stated that under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that
which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial
Question to exist. :yellow;mso-highlight: yellow;mso-ansi-language:EN-PH;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidilanguage: AR-SA'>Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to
exist.

5) PROHIBITION:
The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion"
and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs
governed by Rule 65 certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition are extraordinary remedies designed to
correct not mere errors of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of
jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction). Unlike the first category of errors which the lower tribunal

commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is committed by a lower tribunal
devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By
conflating "abuse of discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to follow the
rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors.
6) THE TERMS "ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE" AND "ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT," AS DEFINED
UNDER THE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT OF 2000, DO NOT INCLUDE A FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence. When congress drafted the law, it excluded the earlier forms of technology like
telegraph, telex, and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes) when the law defined electronic data
message.
7) ARREST:
IN THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST, THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS
FOR THE JUDGE TO PERSONALLY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
The words "personal determination," was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406)
- the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the
existence of probable cause.
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or
(b) if on the basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.
8) PARAFFIN TEST:
A NEGATIVE FINDING ON PARAFFIN TEST IS NOT A CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT ONE HAS NOT FIRED A
GUN BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A PERSON TO FIRE A GUN AND YET BEAR NO TRACES OF NITRATES OR
GUNPOWDER, AS WHEN THE CULPRIT WASHES HIS HANDS OR WEARS GLOVES.

9) GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
AS A GENERAL RULE, LAWS SHALL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT. HOWEVER,
EXCEPTIONS EXIST, AND ONE SUCH EXCEPTION CONCERNS A LAW THAT IS PROCEDURAL IN
NATURE. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure
does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or
arises from procedural laws.