Hum Stud (2014) 37:505528

DOI 10.1007/s10746-014-9327-z
THEORETICAL / PHILOSOPHICAL PAPER

The Philosophical Roots of Donna Haraways Cyborg

Imagery: Descartes and Heidegger Through Latour,
Derrida, and Agamben
Gavin Rae

Published online: 10 September 2014

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the main philosophical
roots of Donna Haraways thinking, an issue she rarely discusses and which is
frequently ignored in the literature, but which will allow us to not only better
understand her thinking, but also locate it within the philosophical tradition. In
particular, it suggests that Haraways thinking emanates from a Cartesian and Heideggerian heritage whereby it, implicitly, emanates from Heideggers destruction
of metaphysical anthropocentrism to critique the divisions between human, animal,
and machine that Descartes insists upon in his Discourse on Method. While suggesting that Haraway is, implicitly, influenced by Heideggers critique of the binary
logic constitutive of Descartes anthropocentrism, I first argue that her support for
Jacques Derridas, Bruno Latours, and Giorgio Agambens critical readings of
Heidegger lead her to jettison Heideggers suggestion that overcoming this logic
requires a re-questioning of the meaning of being to, instead, develop an immersed,
entwined ontology that aims to call into question the fundamental divisions
underpinning Cartesian-inspired anthropocentrism, before, second, concluding by
offering a Heideggerian critique of Haraways thinking.
Keywords

Haraway
Heidegger
Anthropocentrism
Descartes
Latour
Derrida

The general orientation of Donna Haraways work aims to break-down the barriers
that have hitherto dominated thinking. Indeed, on one occasion, Haraway even
dismisses the privileging of binary oppositions as the Greatest Story Ever Told
(1997: 4), a clearly ironic claim. Haraways early work on cyborg imagery was
crucial to the development of posthumanist and feminist thinking insofar as it used
G. Rae (&)
Department of Philosophy, American University in Cairo, AUC Avenue, PO Box 74,
Cairo 11835, Egypt
e-mail: gavinrae@aucegypt.edu

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the imagery of the cyborgpart human, part machineto show that the old
humanist division between human and machine was no longer valid (if indeed it
ever was), as a precursor to showing that binary oppositions in general need to be
overcome to recognize the entwined nature of beings. There was political intent
behind this, insofar as Haraway claims that binary oppositions entail an unjustified
privileging of one aspect which is used to justify the actual repression of various
non-privileged others, including animals, women, non-Westerners and so on.
Criticising binary logic means that we have to re-think the political privilegings that
arise from it. The aim of her thinking was, therefore, to focus on those entities that
have historically been downgraded in the binary opposition (machine, woman,
animal, etc.) to (1) show that this downgrading is unjustifiable, and (2) argue that the
monadic ontology, whereby two distinct entities face one another and define
themselves independently of the other, that underpins humanist thinking fails to
properly understand the true relational nature of entities. The monadic ontology of
humanism needs to be replaced with a relational ontology, whereby each entity
only is by virtue of and through its relationship to another. This does not entail the
simple reversal of the term privileged; the division inherent to the binary
oppositions needs to be overcome by re-thinking the terms of the relation and,
indeed, the nature of the relationship itself.
While Haraways thinking on cyborg imagery was hugely influential to the
development of posthumanist theory, which, in its early manifestations, examined
the ways the human is becoming machinised, and transhumanist theory, which aims
to use technology to enhance human capabilities (Bostrom 2005; Gray 2002; Clark
2003; Pepperell 2009), she latterly criticised both for (1) forgetting that her cyborg
imagery was an ironic thinking, meaning it aimed not to undertake a serious
thinking of the ways in which the human and machine were intersecting, but was to
use this synthesis to call into question the binary oppositions upon which humanist
thinking is based, and (2) continuing to think from the perspective of the human
thereby unjustifiably privileging the human over the other. Haraways cyborg
imagery was not intended to analyse how the human and machine were synthesising
to create a post/trans-human, but was intended to be used as a metaphor to show
how the binary oppositions of humanism were and had to be undone to overcome an
understanding that, due to its unjustifiable privilegings, perpetuates modes of actual
repression. This not only led to Haraways famous claim that I am not a
posthumanist (2008: 19), but also to a re-focusing of her work away from cyborg
imagery towards the humananimal relationship. The aim was to re-think the
humananimal relationship in a non-humanist way to show the intimate and
entwined relationship between human being and animal at both the ethical and
ontological levels. This is both complementary to her earlier work on cyborg
imagery and developmental of it, insofar as it (1) continues the work started with her
cyborg imagery by questioning the binary opposition between a privileged human
and downgraded animal inherent to humanist understandings of this relationship, to
(2) think the humananimal relationship in relational, rather than oppositional,
terms. Needless to say, Haraways work on animality has been highly influential in
the field of animal studies where it is primarily used to think the human and
animal from their relationship as opposed to thinking it from two pre-determined

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terms that subsequently come into relation with one another. Her thinking is,
therefore, used to call into question the strict binary opposition between a privileged
human and downgraded animal that is thought to lie at the root of perceived wrongs
committed against animals.
While influential, however, Haraways thinking tends to significantly downplay
if not altogether ignore its philosophical heritage. Indeed, Haraway admits as much
when she writes that, while she reads philosophy, she feels more comfortable in
the materialities of instrumentation of organisms and laboratories (2006a: 135f.).
While she aims to break-down barriers between disciplines, there is, by Haraways
own admission, a privileging of the social sciences in her thinking. Correcting this
requires that we engage with the philosophical history that informs Haraways
analyses. To this end, my suggestion will be that Haraways thinking is profoundly,
if implicitly, influenced by Heideggers critique of the binary oppositions
underpinning Cartesian anthropocentrism. Bringing this to light will highlight the
philosophical heritage that informs her analyses and in so doing contribute to her
attempted destruction of the philosophy/social science divide.
The secondary literature on Haraways thinking also usually fails to engage with
the philosophical history her thinking responds to and, when it does, tends to focus
on merely mentioning her relationship to thinkers that she herself mentions, such as
Bruno Latour, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben, or links it to figures other
than Heidegger. For example, Margaret Toye (2012: 186189) attempts to develop
an ethical dimension to Haraways work by appealing to Luce Irigarays notion of
sexual difference, which, as Toye recognises, brings Haraways work into
confrontation with Heidegger. Toye does not, however, provide a detailed
discussion of the Heidegger-Haraway relationship. In contrast, Casper Jensen and
Evan Selinger (2003) focus on Haraways Nietzschean heritage to show the
similarities and differences between the two. In contrast, I will suggest that the
dominant philosophical figure we need to focus on to understand Haraways
philosophical heritage is not Nietzsche, but Heidegger because (1) he offers the
most sustained and explicit critique of Descartes and the Cartesian heritage of
binary oppositions; a heritage that Haraway explicitly criticises, (2) he develops a
reading of Nietzsche that shows that Nietzsche remains an inherently metaphysical
thinker because his thinking continues to be based on metaphysical premises, such
as the valorization of willing and, more importantly for our purposes, binary
oppositions such as master and slave, meaning that to locate Haraways thought
in Nietzsches is, on this understanding, to perceive her thinking to be a mere
continuation of the Cartesian project she aims to overcome; a conclusion that seems
to downplay the radicality of Haraways position(s), and (3) those contemporary
thinkers whom she celebrates, such as Latour, Derrida, and Agamben, explicitly
develop their thinking from a number of critical readings of Heideggers work. My
suggestion is that through her engagements with Latour, Derrida, and Agamben,
who develop their positions from readings of Heidegger, Haraway is, implicitly,
engaging with and responding to the strict divisions between the human and nonhuman that Rene Descartes affirms at the beginning of modern philosophy and
which Martin Heidegger attempts to overcome as part of his destruction of
metaphysics. It seems, therefore, that, through her own explicit comments on the

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nature of her endeavour and the figures that she admits influenced her theoretical
development, Heidegger looms large as an important, if often-ignored, figure in the
heritage that influenced the development of Haraways thinking. By exploring this
relationship we will better understand some of her philosophical companions,
what her thinking is and is not trying to do, and identify some suggestions regarding
how to develop from Haraways thinking.
At this stage, two objections have to be dealt with: first, that Haraway is
responding to categories of modern thought that cannot be reduced to a singular
point, such as Heideggers thinking. In other words, the reason Haraway only
mentions Heidegger in passing (Haraway 2008: 334n.16, 367368n.28; 1997:
280n.1) is because his thinking is but one manifestation of a wider trend in the
intellectual atmosphere that she writes from. In response, Id like to suggest that,
in a sense, this is accurate; Haraways approval of aspects of Latours, Derridas,
and Agambens work, each of whom, in their own way, works from Heidegger to
challenge the binary logic of Descartes shows that Haraway was writing from a
cultural milieu that, like Heidegger, sought to undermine the binary logic inherent to
Descartes thinking. But I want to suggest that Latours, Derridas, and Agambens
work is itself located from an encounter with Heideggers critique of the binary
oppositions Descartes instantiated and that, far from being a manifestation of a
wider cultural milieu, Heideggers thinking, under the banner of the destruction of
metaphysics, plays a particular and foundational role in the formation of the cultural
milieu that Haraway writes from. However, even if my privileging of Heidegger is
rejected, I dont think that any serious historian of twentieth-century philosophy
would fail to appreciate both the originality of Heideggers thinking or his impact
on subsequent philosophy, including, as I have shown elsewhere (Rae 2014), on
contemporary posthumanist theory, of which Haraways work is, rightly or wrongly,
taken to be a foundational source. As such, even if my privileging of Heideggers
destruction of the metaphysics is rejected, meaning that Heidegger cannot be
thought to be the source of Haraways thinking, but merely an instantiation of a
wider cultural happening, that traces of Heideggers thinking continue to influence
posthumanist theory and that the thinkers that Haraway explicitly mentions and
approves of developed their thinking from their reading of Heidegger, points to an
overlooked connection between Heidegger and Haraway.
Secondly, it may be objected that, even if this connection is established,
Haraways failure to mention Heidegger to any great degree means that any
connection is at best implicit and tenuous so we dont actually gain anything from
exposing and/or dwelling on it. Indeed, it may be thought that anyone interested in
Haraways work would already know that she is responding to a range of issues that
have a long philosophical history so we dont gain from making this explicit.
Assuming that we accept the tenuousness of the relationship, I will suggest that
exposing and discussing the connection between Heideggers thinking and
Haraways will be beneficial to not only understanding Heideggers intellectual
legacy, but also Haraways thinking. Simply showing that Haraway works on
problems that occupy Heidegger not only makes Heidegger Haraways companion
and helps place her in the philosophical tradition, but also offers the possibility of
exploring Heideggers thinking to enrich Haraways; it offers another way to read

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Haraway and in so doing remains consistent with her emphasis on multidimensionality. Furthermore, as Heidegger reminds us, one of the biggest dangers
to thinking is to assume that the background heritage informing thought is either
clear or unimportant. To truly understand a position requires that we bring to light
those concealed, but nevertheless real, assumptions that inform our reflective
understanding. Making explicit her assumed, implicit Heideggerian influence will,
therefore, allow us to better understand the issues and problems that Haraways
thinking attends to.
To do so, the methodology used will work in two directions: first, I will work
towards Haraways thinking by briefly charting a history of Western post-Cartesian
philosophy that sees the binary oppositions that inform Descartes thinking on the
human-other relationship as the primordial co-ordinates against which Heidegger
and Haraway develop their analyses. This will show the cultural milieu within
which Haraway works. Second, I will work from Haraways thinking to show the
philosophical influences that she admits inform her thinking to show they
themselves are working from Heideggers thinking. This will not only show that
traces of Heideggers work inform Haraways, but will also claim that Heideggers
thinking continues to be the implicit heritage informing Haraways analyses. This
does not mean that Haraway is Heideggerian nor will it aim to reduce her thinking
to his. It means that Haraway is both close to Heidegger yet distinguished from him,
a distinguishing that I will claim is more problematic than might be initially
thought. To show this, the Heidegger-Haraway relationship will be explored using a
comparative approach that will show some of the ways in which Haraways
thinking is related to and distinguished from Heideggers and a critical approach
that will suggest that, despite these differences, her thinking is actually far closer to
Heideggers than she realizes. Indeed, I will suggest that this closeness reveals ways
in which Heideggers thinking can be used to develop Haraways own thinking.
In terms of structure, I start by briefly outlining Descartes position on the
relationship between the human, machine, and animal, before moving to Heidegger
who not only outlines the historical consequences of the logic underpinning
Descartes position, but, in so doing, offers a radical critique of this logic as part of
his wider destruction of metaphysical anthropocentrism. This leads to a brief outline
of Heideggers understanding and critique of metaphysical anthropocentrism which
reveals that, for him, metaphysical anthropocentrism is problematic because it: (1)
ignores the question of being; (2) privileges the human being over other entities; and
(3) entails a thinking that occurs through strict binary oppositions. While Heidegger
attempts to overcome anthropocentrism through a re-focusing and re-awakening of
thought to the question of being, not only does he himself admit its success will be
for others to decide, but others, most notably Jacques Derrida, Bruno Latour, and
Giorgio Agamben, suggest that there are serious problems with Heideggers attempt
to overcome anthropocentrism and the binary logic it depends upon. While I will
only be able to very briefly discuss these three thinkers, I use them as the mediation
between Haraway and Heidegger because, in a number of places, Haraway
approvingly cites their arguments against Heidegger. While not the place to engage
in an in-depth discussion of their critiques, these are important because (1) they
reveal that, while Heideggers diagnosis of the problem of anthropocentrism was

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highly influential, his cure was not and led subsequent thinkers to search for an
alternative way out of anthropocentrism, and (2) as Heidegger reminds us, simply
rejecting a position to build another remains trapped within a logic of binary
opposition (for or against) that forgets that any countermovement remains, as does
everything, anti, held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves
(1977c: 61). As such, Derridas, Latours, and Agambens anti-Heideggerianism
actually remains bound to and so returns us to Heidegger, a position that, because
she approvingly cites these thinkers, also brings Haraways thinking back to
Heideggers.

Descartes Anthropocentrism
While Rene Descartes is most famous for his cogito argument in the Second
Meditation, wherein he takes off from the method of doubt established in the First
Meditation, to argue that, because he doubts and because doubting requires a being
that thinks which, in turn, requires a being that exists, thinking proves his own
existence and essence. By establishing the human being as a privileged, rational
entity, Descartes laid down the ontological premises, based on a mind/body dualism,
that shaped modern philosophy (Martin and Barresi 2006: 122). While Descartes
cogito argument has a legitimate claim to being the locus of Haraways critique,
insofar as she calls into question its mind/body dualism and human privileging, I
will focus on his earlier Discourse on Method because it is in this text that Descartes
offers a brief discussion of the relationship between humans, animals, and machines
that not only accords with his later Meditations, but, so it seems to me, is far more
determinate for Haraways thinking. Space constraints will prevent a detailed
engagement with Descartes arguments, but a schematic synopsis will be sufficient
for our purposes.
Descartes maintains that there is a fundamental rupture between the human,
animal, and machine. While different in kind, Descartes does, however, think the
animal/machine from the perspective of humans, thereby revealing a privileging of
human being. In relation to the machine, Descartes starts by recognising that
humans can make machines. The problem is, however, that the machine made is
simplistic in comparison to the complexity of human being. In short, the machine is
objective and runs according to programmed ends, whereas the human is organic
and capable of spontaneous action, which not only gives the human being a different
flow than machines, but also means we easily spot machines that look like humans
(1998: 31). There are two reasons why this distinction is easily identifiable: (1)
while machines can utter words, they do not have the flexibility of language that
allows them to express themselves spontaneously; and (2) while machines are able
to do a number of tasks very well, Descartes claims these are pre-programmed and
rigid. When the machine tries to act in a way not pre-programmed into its
algorithms, it is unable to do so. The conclusion reached is that humans are
distinguished from machines through their organism, use of language, and
spontaneity.

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While animals in general are distinguished from machines by the formers

organicism, Descartes claims they are distinguished from humans by their inability
to speak in a rational, informed manner. This is not because animals lack the organs
to enable to them to utter words. Descartes notes many animals make sounds, but is
because, while they have the component parts to allow them to utter words, they
lack the reason constitutive of human being (1998: 32). As a consequence, not only
is there a radical and irreducible difference between the three, but Descartes
introduces a number of distinctions between the human, animal, and machine that
reveal the humans privileged position. Not only is the human more spontaneous
and free than the machine, but the human is constituted by language, both of which
allow the human a freedom not found in the machine. In relation to animals,
Descartes maintains that while they too are defined by a greater spontaneity than
machines, and can utter words, not only are their languages simplistic in comparison
to humans, but they lack reason. As a consequence, human being occupies a
particular, special place in relation to other entities defined by spontaneity, reason,
and language.
While the particularities of Descartes understanding were questioned by
subsequent thinking, its underlying logic, based on a radical cleavage between
the privileged human and other entities, was highly influential. Indeed, Descartes
privileging lies at the base of modern philosophys thinking about human being; a
thinking that is fundamentally different to the pre-modern (Seigel 2005: chapter 2).
While it may be tempting to chart the impact of Descartes analysis by engaging
with detailed comparative accounts of Descartes relation to X, a comparative
analysis that would no doubt call into question aspects of Descartes thinking, the
danger is that such questioning would leave its underlying logic intact. For this
reason, I now turn to the work of Martin Heidegger who produced one of the most
sustained critiques of the binary logic upon which Cartesian anthropocentrism rests.
Again, the discussion will not aim to be, nor does it need to be, holistic (for this, see
Rae 2010); it will be sufficient to chart the main threads of Heideggers critique as a
precursor to suggesting that Haraways critique of anthropocentrism, while arriving
at different conclusions, is influenced by Heideggers questioning.

Heideggers Critique of Anthropocentrism

Heideggers critique of anthropocentrism emanates from and feeds into his critique
of, what he calls, metaphysics, which details not an account of the nature of reality,
but a framework through which being is thought. Heidegger sets out the generalities
of his project in Being and Time, where he aims to raise anew the question of the
meaning of being (1962: 1) through an initial questioning of human being in
combination with a detailed historical engagement with the way being has been
thought. Heideggers subsequent destruction of metaphysics entails critiques of the
technological being and way of thinking associated with metaphysics, both of which
engender a view of being based on a quantifiable, objective, fixed essence. By
linking being to time, he shows that being is not fixed but is, essentially,
becoming. While the ramifications of this are wide-ranging, we will focus on what

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they mean for anthropocentrism by briefly outlining the key aspects of Heideggers
critique of anthropocentrism as this is detailed in his 1947 Letter on Humanism.
Heideggers verdict on Descartes is that, for all his innovation, he remains a
metaphysical thinker (1977a: 234). To understand this, we need to understand what
Heidegger means by metaphysical. First, thinking is metaphysical if it operates from
certain, fixed, unquestioned assumptions which act as the ground from which that
particular worldview emanates (1977a: 225). The reason why this occurs is because,
second, thinking fails to remember Heideggers ontological difference between
being and entities and, rather than engage with entities as a precursor to answering
the question of being, remains as a questioning of entities (1977a: 226). In other
words, metaphysical thinking does not ask about the truth of being itself (1977a:
226), but simply takes over an assumed interpretation of being, which then provides
the foundation for its analysis of entities. Not only does focusing on entities close
thinking off to being, that which allows entities to be, but thinking fails to realise
this choice has been made ensuring that that particular way of proceeding seems to
be the only option. The third aspect of metaphysics, for Heidegger, relates to its
logic. According to Heidegger, metaphysics is based on binary oppositions, wherein
one aspect of the opposition is privileged. Not only has no analysis of the being of
each being been undertaken meaning this privileging is based on an assumption, but
Heidegger suggests two binary oppositions dominate: the division between essence
and existence and that between subject and object (1977a: 232, 234). This leads him
to claim modern thinking is defined by the fact that man becomes the measure and
the centre of beings. Man is what lives at the bottom of all beings; that is, in modern
terms, at the bottom of all objectification and representability (1991: 28). The great
problem with this, for Heidegger, is that it forgets the question of being, that which
will allow thinking to truly understand the object under discussion, and simply
distinguishes humans from other entities. We will see what this means for the
human being shortly, but, from this, it is not difficult to see why Heidegger thinks
that Descartes thinking is metaphysical: not only does Descartes fail to engage with
the question of being, but he defines the human by differentiating it from other
entities so as to reveal human beings privileged place as the rational animal.
In-line with his idea that each critique reveals an alternative concealed aspect of
being, Heideggers critique of anthropocentrism is accompanied by the revelation of
an alternative understanding of human being. Again, there is not enough space to do
justice to the complexities of Heideggers position so I will focus on a schematic
overview. As mentioned, Heideggers great problem with anthropocentrism is that it
forgets/ignores the question of being. Rather than overcome metaphysics through
more metaphysics, Heidegger steps back to think the human being through the
question of being (1977a: 234). As a consequence, he comes to a particular
revelation: rather than being defined by its difference to other entities, human being
is defined in relation to being because human being has a unique relationship to
being in that it, and it alone out of all entities, ek-sists in the open clearing of being.
To see what this means it is perhaps easiest to engage with Heideggers critique of
binary oppositions, which are problematic for Heidegger because they fail to engage
with the being of each aspect of the opposition. By positing the opposition human
animal, thinking becomes locked in an opposition, wherein even a reversal of the

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privileged term fails to truly understand the between that brings them into relation.
Given that both the human and animal are different forms of being, Heidegger will
claim that, for all their differences, each entails a particular manifestation of being
(1991: 192f.). Once this is recognised, Heidegger maintains that the key question for
understanding both aspects is to engage with the being of each. Importantly,
understanding this relationship does not emanate from looking within the entity or
by comparing entities; it comes from looking at the type of being each entity has.
Heidegger claims that doing this will reveal a fundamentally different
understanding of human being, including its relationship to other entities. In
particular, it reveals the human is the only being defined by ek-sistence, by which he
means a particular relationship to being which is intimately connected to the
possibility emanating from beings temporality (1977a: 228). For this reason, and
contrary to Descartes assertion, human being is not defined by a fixed, internal
essence, such as reason, but lies in ek-sistence (1977a: 248). Lying between being
and other entities means human being is fundamentally different to animals. Indeed,
he agrees with Descartes that the human and animal are separated by an abyss
(1977a: 230), but rejects Descartes ignoring of the question of being to insist that
revealing what human being and animal being entail does not result from thinking
the relation between them, but requires that thinking think each entitys relation to
being. The abyss between the two entities lies here and ensures that, while animals
exist in an environment, human being exists in a world, meaning human being is
intimately connected to the possibilities inherent to beings becoming (1977a: 230,
252).
By examining human beings ek-sistence, Heidegger is led to a fundamental
insight: whereas Descartes anthropocentrism holds that human being is unique and
occupies a privileged place amongst entities that allows it to shape being for its own
ends, Heidegger maintains that human beings ek-sistence reveals otherwise. Its
dependence on being means that human being does not determine being, but rather
is determined by being. Rather than being the lord of being, deciding and shaping
being in terms of its desires and ends, human being is the shepherd of being
(1977a: 234). Human being looks after being; it does not determine being. While
this initially appears to be a demotion for human being, in so far as human being
goes from being the central pivot point for entities to a position of subordination in
relation to being, such is beings importance that Heidegger claims that this rethinking actually elevates human being. Such is the importance of being that eksisting in a position of subordination to being is still far more privileged than being
dominant over entities. As a consequence, and while defining humans in relation to
entities, such as animals, may reveal an aspect of human being, it doesnt reveal its
true ek-sistential essence. For this reason, Heidegger maintains that, even as he
displaces human being from its central position, thinking human beings ek-sistence
allows thinking to recognise the proper dignity of man (1977a: 233). The dignity
of human being is not found in being the master of entities, but in being the
shepherd of being.
As Heidegger recognises, this re-thinking does not, nor does it aim to, obliterate
the notion of human being, nor does it even displace human beings special place in
relation to entities. It is a re-thinking that occurs through a re-positioning of human

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being in relation to being not entities and, as such, remains humanistic. However, by
distinguishing between the metaphysical humanism of anthropocentrism and his rethinking of humanism based on human beings ek-sistence, Heidegger is able to
conclude that not only are there different forms of humanism, but the proper way to
reveal the dignity of human being is by thinking of human being in the service of
the truth of being (1977a: 254). While anthropocentrism insists on a fixed
definition of human being based on its difference to entities, this locks human being
within a particular world-view and conceals alternatives which are open to it given
its nearness to being. Rather than being locked within a binary opposition and
reduced to two alternatives, recognising human ek-sistence opens up other vistas
(1977a: 250). The challenge his thinking on the human sets up is to think the
possibilities inherent to human ek-sistence.

Challenging Heidegger on Being: Derrida, Latour, and Agamben

For all its originality, however, Heideggers critique of anthropocentrism was not
uncritically accepted. Jacques Derrida, Bruno Latour, and Giorgio Agamben stand
out as three of his most powerful critics, an occurrence of particular importance to
our inquiry because of their influence on Haraway. While Michelle Bastion (2006:
1032) notes that Haraway was influenced by Derridas notion of undecidability,
and Chris Vanderwess (2009: 75) focuses on the role that Derridas notion of
dissemination plays in Haraways thinking, Haraway herself recognises that she has
something of an uneasy relationship to Derrida. On the one hand, she specifically
mentions that she travels with Derrida (2006a: 140), in particular recognising (1) his
tremendous contribution to attempts to breakdown (Cartesian-inspired) humanist
oppositions, (2) that his notion of sacrifice is important (2008: 334n.15), (3) that
feminist work has much need of the kind of thinking Derrida employs (2008:
334n.15), and (4) that her own method works from inside the belly of the monster,
trying to figure out what forms of contestation for nature can exist there (1990: 12)
which, to my mind, sounds suspiciously like Derridas method of deconstructive
reading. On the other hand, however, she claims that she always found it much more
useful to think from a Marxist heritage (1995: 510, 1997: 8) and suggests that while
Derrida gives us the most important and powerful tools for overcoming binary
oppositions, he stops short of showing us how to apply them (2006: 99103). Ive
stressed the HarawayDerrida relationship to this extent because of Derridas
continued work on Heidegger, which we see from the sheer number of times Derrida
returns to Heideggers thinking to develop his own. For example, we see detailed
discussions of Heidegger in the essays The Ends of Man, Heideggers Hand
(Geschlecht II), Heideggers Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV), and Of an
Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy, in the interview Heidegger,
the Philosophers Hell found in Points : Interviews, 19741975, in the recently
published seminar The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, and in the books Aporias,
Rogues, The Animal that Therefore I am, and, of course, Of Spirit, which, to my
mind, justifies Leonard Lawlors claim that Derridas thought would not exist
without that of Heidegger (2007: 46). Haraways intimate relationship to Derrida,

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and Derridas relationship to Heidegger can, therefore, shed light on Haraways

relation to Heidegger.1
While Derrida returns again and again to Heidegger, it is his 1968 essay The
Ends of Man that interests us here because it is in this famous essay that Derrida
most explicitly engages with Heideggers Letter on Humanism. In this essay,
Derrida addresses himself to then current understandings of the human through a
critique of Heideggers raising of the question of the meaning of being and resultant
critique of anthropocentrism. While Derrida recognises the originality of Heideggers account, he criticises Heidegger on three counts: first, in a line of critique
developed most explicitly in the essay Differance but which finds implicit
expression in The Ends of Man, Derrida criticises Heideggers notion that the
question of being is foundationally important. If being can only be thought through
its difference to entities, Derrida concludes this means difference is more primordial
than being.2
Second, Derrida suggests that Heidegger doesnt go far enough in destructing
anthropocentrism. Far from moving beyond human being, the magnetic attraction
(1982b: 124) of human being means that Heidegger bases his questioning of being
around the human, thereby giving it the same privileged status as anthropocentrism.
As a consequence, Heideggers thinking of being, the thinking of the truth of
being, in the name of which Heidegger de-limits humanism and metaphysics,
remains as thinking of man (1982b: 128). While Derrida recognises that Heidegger
privileges the question of being over human being, human being continues to
maintain a privileged status over other entities. What is at issue is not human beings
exalted status, but a kind of re-evaluation or revalorization of the essence and
dignity of man (1982b: 128). This leads Derrida to conclude that, for all his
originality, Heidegger does not think deeply enough about the overcoming of
anthropocentrism because his thinking of being remains locked within certain
assumed privilegings, such as its privileging of human being over other entities, that
prevent it from truly thinking difference.3
The third line of critique builds on this to suggest that, while Heidegger
privileges being, which leads him to wrongly downplay difference and privilege
human being, Heideggers thinking on being remains ambiguous. This is not
necessarily because of a failing on Heideggers part, but because being itself cannot
be thought except through entities. This means that Heideggers talk of being is
inherently empty for being is not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except
in ontic metaphor (1982b: 131). For Derrida, this shows the limit of Heideggers
thinking about being and re-affirms his insistence that thinking must overcome its
fascination with being to think difference not only as the relation between two
entities, but the relation from where these entities emanate. Indeed, in many
respects, this third line of critique is recognised by Heidegger himself who, on
1

Rae (forthcoming) has a more detailed engagement with the HeideggerDerrida relationship.

See Derrida (1982a: 22) for his most explicit comments on this.

This early Derridean critique underpins Derridas later critique, most explicitly found in The Animal
that Therefore I am, of Heideggers thinking on animality. Cary Wolfe (2012: 7386) offers a good
description of the main points of Derridas later critique. Indeed, Haraway claims that Im with Derrida
more than others, and with Cary Wolfes reading of Derrida (2006a: 140).

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numerous occasions, makes reference to the difficulty and ambiguity of thinking

being. For example, and putting aside the difficulty thinking has in thinking
something it is so unaccustomed to, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that being
remains mysterious (1977a: 236), and is nothing but It itself (1977a: 234) to
suggest that whether and how being is must remain an open question for the
careful attention of thinking (1977a: 238), whose validity can only be confirmed or
denied after [each] has tried to go the designated way, or even better, after he has
gone a better way, that is, a way befitting the question (1977a: 247). Now
admittedly, Heidegger continued to grope with the question of being, but the point is
that Heideggers valorization of the question of being, as that which overcomes
anthropocentrism, does not appear to enlighten us on what being is. The issue is
not the validity of these criticisms, but that these criticisms arose at all, especially in
relation to the ambiguity surrounding the possibility of questioning being as a
precursor to thinking human being. While Heidegger thinks such a question is
foundational, given he himself was led to define being as simply it is It itself, it is
not difficult to see how readers were left with the impression that the question of
being is a dead-end, ambiguous at best, incomprehensible, and empty at worst.
This brings us to Bruno Latours critique of Heidegger. While Jeff Kochan
(2010: 580) and Kasper Schilin (2012: 775.) have both done a good job of showing
that Latour continually returns to Heideggers thinking, for our purposes, it will be
sufficient to highlight Latours critique of Heidegger as this is manifested in We
Have Never Been Modern because it is here that Latour engages with the relation
between being and entities to offer an understanding of the ontological difference
that I will suggest is influential to Haraways thinking. While Haraway has
continuously noted her affinities to Latour,4 the importance of Heidegger for Latour
re-enforces my argument that Heidegger is the background figure implicitly
influencing and informing Haraways position.
Latour starts by noting that, initially, Heideggers ontological difference, the
difference between being and entities, seemed like a good way to open up our
understanding. By asking what it means to say that an entity is, we realize that being
is temporal, meaning that, rather than each entity entailing a fixed, determined
essence, each becomes. The problem Latour identifies is that this supposedly simple
question (what is being?) is too abstract, too indeterminate. Despite Heideggers
assertion that being is always the being of an entity, Latour claims that Heidegger
turns away from the real world of entities to ask about the abstract being of
entities. As a consequence, Heidegger and his epigones do not expect to find being
except along the Black Forest Holzwege (1993: 65). In other words, Heidegger has
such difficulty finding and describing being because he has turned away from the
empirical world, with its different manifestations, to the question of being. For
Latour, however, the question of being is found in and through the world of entities;
in fact, it appears that the question of being does not entail an analysis of entities to
subsequently reveal the essence of being as (the early pre-Kehre) Heidegger
4

For example, in a number of places over the years, Haraway has continually made reference to Latours
influence on her (2008: 305n.9, 349n.29, 377n.2; 1997: 33, 43, 163f.; 1990: 9), while being careful to note
differences (1992: 304, 313).

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maintains, but a flat ontology whereby to examine the empirical manifestation of

being reveals what the being of that entity entails. While Heidegger would claim
that this perfectly reveals Latours metaphysical understanding because, by focusing
on entities as opposed to the question of being, Latour produces ontic descriptions
of our everyday entities, as opposed to asking the more fundamental ontological
question (i.e., what understanding of being reveals entities in that way?), for Latour,
the question of being is empty and obtuse. Privileging the empirical methodology of
the social sciences, Latour claims that, rather than retreat to the Black Forest of
abstract (philosophical) thinking, we must simply immerse ourselves in empirical
studies of objects. Only those who turn to philosophy forget being; those social
scientists who offer empirical studies carry out the impossible project undertaken
by Heidegger (1993: 67). While Heidegger would no doubt insist that there are
serious problems with Latours understanding, most notably that his reliance on
empirical observation to reveal being fails to recognize that empirical observation is
(1) based on certain presuppositions about the nature of being, and (2) logically
problematic insofar as the claim that empirical observation provides access to the
truth is not based on empirical observation but philosophical interpretation,
Latours analysis is important for our purposes because in claiming that Heideggers
thinking on being is abstract, privileging the social sciences over philosophy, and
claiming that, rather than raise the question of being to reveal the truth of entities, it
is sufficient to appeal to empirical observation to reveal the fluid, hybridized nature
of entities, Latour develops a methodology that shares much in common with
Haraways.
Noting the three senses of metaphysics in Heidegger, I will suggest that
Haraways thinking abandons the perceived ambiguity inherent to the question of
being to focus on thinking entities in a way that is not constrained by the logic of
binary oppositions. In other words, it will be my suggestion that while Haraway is
initially implicitly influenced by Heideggers critique of anthropocentrism, she
shares Derridas and Latours rejection of Heideggers conclusion that the
overcoming of anthropocentrism can only occur through the re-raising of the
question of the meaning of being to look at the ways in which entities are, pace
Descartes, ontologically entwined. Support for this understanding is found in
Haraways work, where, in one of her few explicit comments, placed in a marginal
endnote to When Species Meet, on Heidegger, she claims that Heideggers notion
of the open is quite different from mine (2008: 367n.28), before going on to
explain that her reading of Heidegger is based on Giorgio Agambens reading5
which claims that (1) the notion of profound boredom is crucial to Heideggers
understanding of the open, and (2) understanding the humans capacity for profound
boredom emanates from a comparison of the human to animal. From here, Haraway
claims that her notion of the open is quite different, insofar as it is not based on
5

This is problematic because, by basing her own theory of the open on Agambens reading of Heidegger,
Haraway develops her non-Heideggerian understanding from Agamben, which appears to contradict an
earlier endnote that explains that Agamben is no help at all for figuring out how to get to another kind of
opening, the kind feminists [of which Haraway is surely one] and others who never had Heideggers
starting point for Dasein of profound boredom can discern (2008: 334n.16).

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Heideggers negativity (human minus profound boredom leads to animal who

cannot suffer boredom), but on pure affirmation.
While Krzysztof Ziarek (2008: 189f., 196, 201) raises serious concerns over
Agambens reading of Heidegger, claiming that Agamben forgets the role the
question of being plays in Heideggers analysis of the humananimal relation,
Haraways support for Agambens reading reveals that she develops her thinking
from (a reading of) Heideggers. This appears to lend support to my claim that she is
developing her thinking from a Heidegger-inspired heritage, a relationship that, if
Heideggers notion of trace is accurate, would ensure that a trace of Heideggers
thinking finds expression in her thinking. Indeed, we see this further once we
recognize that Haraway develops her hybrid-ontology from Agambens suggestion
that Heidegger develops his notions of profound boredom, the open, humans, and
animals by comparing humans to animals to reveal the abyss between them. Again,
this reading of Heidegger has been criticised by, for example, Tracy Colony (2007:
7, 10) who argues that Agambens and, by extension, Haraways reading of
Heidegger on this point fails to recognize that Heidegger not only actually aims to
undermine the binary oppositions upon which modern metaphysics depends, but
does so by questioning and comparing the being of humans to the being of
animals to show that profound boredom is a possibility that emanates from human
beings unique ek-static relationship to being, a relationship that the non-ek-sistence
of animality cannot share. In contrast, Haraway takes Agamben to be showing that
Heidegger simply compares humans to animals to privilege the former over the
latter. From here, she depends on Latours privileging of empirical observation of
entities over philosophical speculation into being, claims that to properly understand
entities requires that we examine the ontological entwinement of entities devoid of
the ambiguity inherent to passing this re-thinking through a questioning of being,
and, in so doing, calls into question the radical division between human, animal, and
machine through which Descartes (and, according to her reading, Heidegger) thinks
and privileges human being. To show this, I will now explore some aspects of
Haraways thinking to draw out those currents that show her Cartesian and
Heideggerian heritage. Again, there is not sufficient space to engage with all aspects
of her thinking and so the presentation will be rather brief and schematic, but it will
be sufficient to show that Haraways thinking emanates, but also departs, from
Heideggers critique of the binary oppositions underpinning Descartes thinking on
the humanmachine/animal relationship.

The First Wave: Haraways Cyborg Imagery

In her much discussed A Manifesto for Cyborgs, Haraway, without ever explicitly
mentioning either figure, returns to Descartes questioning of the humanmachine
relationship and follows Heideggers claim that the new fundamental science [is]
cybernetics (1977b: 434), to explain that, such is the dominance of technology,
informational flows, and cybernetic systems in contemporary society, that the
human being is no longer merely organic, but is also part machine (1991: 57). The
conclusion reached is that by the late twentieth-century, our time, a mythic time,

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we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in
short, we are cyborgs (1991: 150). Michelle Bastion (2006: 1030) points out that
there are two aspects to this claim: a serious aspect that aims to break down binary
oppositions between human and machine and a playful side that uses metaphor and
cyborg figuration to describe this overcoming. Haraways point is not to glorify
cyborgs, but entails an ironic thinking that plays with long dominant boundaries.
This is important because Haraway is sufficiently reflexive to recognize that critique
is itself intimately bound up with the logos of Western philosophical thinking. In
other words, critique is itself a part of the logic to be overcome meaning that to
engage in critique is to perpetuate the logic to be overcome. While Heidegger is also
aware of this and suggests that its resolution requires a prior historical analysis that
destructs the history of metaphysical thinking to subsequently make the leap beyond
metaphysical thinking,6 Haraway disagrees on the need for this prior historical
engagement and instead turns to irony as a means of disrupting long established
oppositions. The reasoning behind this is never made explicit, but runs something
like this: if criticising the logic of Western thinking itself perpetuates this logic then
the only way out of this logic is to subvert it from within by playing with its
categories, focusing on double meanings, and so on. The use of irony in Haraways
critique not only distinguishes her thinking from Heideggers, but is also an integral
part of the critique she aims at the binary logic underpinning Western thinking. In
particular, she notes that certain dualisms have been persistent in Western thinking
[and have] been systematic to the logics and practices of domination of women,
people of color, nature, workers, animalsin short, domination of all constituted as
others, whose tasks is to mirror the self (1991: 177). Haraway mentions that the
cyborg challenges the humanmachine dichotomy, a challenging best summarized
by her comment that late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly
ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, selfdeveloping and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply
to organisms and machines (1991: 152). As a consequence, Haraway argues that
the anthropocentric opposition pitting a human subject against a machinised object
is redundant as our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves
frighteningly inert (1991: 152).
Right from its inception, we see that Haraways work re-engages with Descartes
thinking on the human/animal/machine relationship, both in terms of its content and
logic. In particular, Haraway criticises the binary oppositions upon which
Descartes thinking rests and, as a consequence, re-engages with these relationships
to re-think them. Mathew Wilson (2009: 499f.) quite correctly notes that there is an
ontological aspect to this, in that Haraway aims to show that the notion of purity (a
pure human contra a pure other) fails to understand our hybrid natures, and an
epistemological aspect that takes account of what our ontological hybridness means
for how we think. Rather than continue to think through pure categories, thinking
has to follow being in learning to think through hybrid, messy categories of
relations. Combining both aspects, Haraway suggests that cyborg imagery can
suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies
6

For more on Heideggers destruction of metaphysics, see Rae (2014a: 102108).

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and our tools (1991: 181), a comment re-affirming my argument that her thinking
operates from Descartes anthropocentric categories by way of Heideggers critique
of anthropocentrisms binary logic. However, while addressing herself to Descartes
problematic and while influenced by Heideggers critique of anthropocentrisms
binary oppositions, Haraway departs from their conclusions, in the case of Descartes
from his strict divisions and in the case of Heidegger from his insistence they be
overcome through an re-raising of the question of being. Instead, Haraway
implicitly suggests a return to Descartes, by way of (a number of readings of)
Heidegger, to re-think the fundamental oppositions that Descartes insists exist
between the human, animal, and machine. While Heidegger would no doubt reject
such thinking for remaining ontic and not engaging with the ontological
understanding that brings entities to be revealed in that way, Haraway ignores
this to echo Latours claim that the dichotomy Descartes poses between humans,
animals, and machines only ever entails a false dichotomy. Rather than engage
with the question of being to re-think these anthropocentric oppositions, it appears
that Haraway is claiming that these oppositions simply no longer hold, if, indeed,
they ever did. We do not need to engage with the question of being to overcome
them; thinking simply has to properly attend to the complex inter-relationship
between human, animal, and machine.
Two points stand out from the presentation of Haraways position so far: first, by
identifying and criticising the underlying binary oppositions of Western thinking,
Haraway can be read as taking aim at Descartes and, in so doing, sharing a
similarity with Heidegger who also criticises and aims to overcome the binary logic
upon which Descartes thinking operates. Second, Haraway links cyborg imagery to
struggles for political emancipation. Cyborg imagery is not to be glorified in-itself,
but is meant to stimulate our thinking in ways that overcome the binary oppositions
upon which, she maintains, relations of domination are based (1991: 154). For this
reason, cyborg imagery is inherently political. However, while Haraways use of an
ironic cyborg imagery to undermine the binary oppositions of Cartesian-inspired
thinking was hugely influential, it quickly morphed into a serious post/transhumanist thinking charting the ways human being and technology were influencing
one another (Bostrom 2005; Gray 2002; Clark 2003; Pepperell 2009). In other
words, the purpose behind Haraways cyborg imagery was co-opted away from its
primary purpose of offering a critique of anthropocentric binary oppositions to a
thinking that charted the various potential opportunities and consequences of human
beings continuing cyborgisation. Of course, this re-thinking did continue to
challenge anthropocentric binary oppositions, but my suggestion is that this was no
longer its primary purpose.
On the one hand, that subsequent post/trans-human thinking no longer addresses
or justifies itself through this problematic but simply takes the critique of binary
oppositions as a given, shows how influential Haraways cyborg imagery was. On
the other hand, however, and while there was the recognition that the human and
machine were changing, there was still a tendency to think the changing nature of
both from the perspective of the human. In short, cyborgisation tended to be
anthropomorphized with the result that anthropocentrism was re-admitted leading to
the dominance of what has been called humanist or anthropocentric approaches to

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posthumanism (Wolfe 2010: 62). Furthermore, by downplaying cyborg imagerys

challenging of anthropocentrism, and focusing on the various ways the human and
machine were melding together, post/trans-human theory often turned to science
fiction to think the cyborg with the consequence that the political intent behind
Haraways use of cyborg imagery was downplayed.7 While recent posthuman
theory has taken a noticeable political turn that returns to and emphasises the
political strand in Haraways cyborg imagery (Campbell 2011; Cohen 2009; Eposito
2008; Fukuyama 2003; Gray 2002; Protevi 2009; Rose 2007; Thacker 2010), the
initial downplaying of the political implications of cyborg imagery contributed to an
alteration in Haraways own thinking.

The Second Wave: Haraways Companion Species

While the serious, apolitical uses of cyborg imagery, failure to overcome
anthropocentrism in all its guises, and personal interest in the question of animality
all contributed to a change in Haraways focus (1995: 514), there was something
about cyborg imagery itself that Haraway felt was inadequate. First, focusing on the
humanmachine relationship downplays the other ways in which human being is
entangled with the other. Second, and more fundamentally, by unquestioningly
taking over cyborg imagery to think how the male, female, human, and animal are
being mechanised, thinking failed to recognise that we need to take a more patient
look at the troubled categories of woman and human (2008: 17). Simply taking
over these categories and showing how they are being cyborgised does not truly
entail a radical thinking of the fluid, embedded, and entangled nature of these
categories, but risks simply maintaining pre-determined entities that are complicated through their machinisation; a thinking that tends to simply re-affirm the
binary oppositions of the anthropocentrism Haraway questions.
Rather than focus on cyborg imagery through the humanmachine relation,
Haraway denounced the way post/trans-human thought had co-opted her earlier
work, going so far as to state I am not a posthumanist (2008: 19), and
subsequently altered her thinking from the humanmachine relation to the human
animal relation. As a consequence, she could be said to, implicitly, return to
Descartes problematic, a problematic split into two strands engaging with human
machine differences and humananimal differences, to complement her earlier work
on the humanmachine opposition by engaging with the humananimal opposition
(2006a: 140).8 This is not a rupture from her early work on cyborgs, but entails a
7

See Abrams (2004: 255) for a defence of the turn to science fiction and Bergsma (2000: 401f.) and
Thacker (2003: 78) for a critique.

There is, of course, a third division (animal-technology) inherent to Descartes schema. While space
constraints prevent extensive discussion of it, it is important to note that Haraway recognises that the
animal-technology division is also an issue and so tentatively discusses it in Modest Witness discussion
of OncoMouseTM (1997: 7984) and the relationship between animality and technoscience in general
(1997: 98f.), and in When Species Meet where, while appreciating its general message regarding the
entwined relationship between animality-technology, she criticises the National Geographic show
Crittercam for imposing technology onto animality rather than exploring the entwined relationship
between animality and technology (2008: 262f.). While underdeveloped in relation to her comments on

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distancing that complements her previous thinking by (1) appealing to the logic of
cyborg imagery to call into question the anthropocentric division between human
and animal; (2) re-engaging with the Cyborg Manifestos fleeting talk of the
humananimal relation; and (3) appealing to boundary creatures (1991a: 21) or
monsters (1990: 12), to complicate our thinking on things. This re-focusing is,
therefore, at one and the same time a development resulting from her disagreement
with the way subsequent thinkers co-opted her initial cyborg imagery and
complementary to her earlier work, in so far as she now comes to claim that
studying companion species (more specifically dogs) as opposed to cyborgs, will
better cut through the binary oppositions that modern, Cartesian-inspired thinking
has operated from (2003: 60f.).
While Descartes maintains a strict division between the human and animal based
on the latters lack of language and reason, and Heidegger calls into question the
logic of anthropocentric binary oppositions upon which this division is based before
re-instantiating the human over the animal based on their different relationships to
being (Derrida 2008: 40f.), Haraway rejects both, instead maintaining that the
human and animal exist with and through one another. Indeed, she claims this
thinking of becoming with [is] a much richer web to inhabit than any of the
posthumanism[s] on display after (or in reference to) the ever-deferred demise of
man (2008: 16f.). Again distancing herself from post/trans-humanism, Haraway
claims her analysis calls for a new style of thinking wherein human embeddedness,
as opposed to exceptionalism, is the basis that grounds thought. In other words, she
asks us to think an ontology of human entanglement as opposed to an ontology of
human exceptionalism. Here, Haraway follows Karen Barads distinction between
inter-action, defined as the idea that there are separate individual agencies that
precede their interaction, and intra-action which recognizes that distinct
agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action with the
distinct agencies of intra-action only being distinct in a relational, not an absolute
sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement;
they dont exist as individual elements (Barad 2007: 33). In other words, human
being is an effect of relations with others as opposed to the cause of these
relations, meaning we must study these relations to determine what the human being
is (2006a: 146; 1997: 37; 1991a: 21). Far from species-distinction, there is speciesentanglement.
Jacob von Uexkull famously describes this concept by offering the example of
the oak [which] offers a changing shelter for hundreds of guests, feathered or not,
in its canopy and bark, sometimes for summer guests and sometimes for winter
guests (2010: 170). The oak tree is not singular nor is it distinct from others, but is
composed of the swarming creatures (bacteria, germs, molecules, parasites,
animals) that not only shape the oaks structure and existence, but who, in turn,
simply could not exist without it. As a consequence, the oak tree is entangled with
Footnote 8 continued
the human-technology, human-animal oppositions, I take this to show that Haraways thinking takes aim
at, and so can be said to be developed from, a re-thinking of all three of the configurations that emanate
from the binary oppositions inherent to Descartes thinking on the relationship between humans, animals,
and technology.

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its environment and those animals constitutive with that environment. Far from
being distinct and individuated, von Uexkulls point, a point Haraway mirrors, is
that entities exist in, from, and because of their environments. They are not
unencumbered from them, nor are they unique monads in them, but are an effect of
their ontological entanglements with the other species and components of their
particular environment. As Haraway concludes, the kinds of relating that these
introductions perform entangle a motley crowd of differentially situated species,
including landscapes, animals, plants, microorganisms, people, and technologies
(2008: 41), which leads her to claim that to be one is always to become with many
(2008: 4).
There are two aspects to this idea of becoming-with both of which work
simultaneously to undermine the central tenet of human exceptionalism: the
premise that humanity alone is not a spatial and temporal web of interspecies
dependencies. That to be human is to be on the opposite side of the Great divide
from all the others (2008: 11). First, far from being a unique, independent monad,
Haraway emphasises the embedded nature of human being. She quickly goes
beyond this, however, because simply insisting on the embedded nature of human
being may mean that the human being is: (1) an embedded individual monad
different to its world; or (2) an uncumbered being from its world. Rather than
maintain that human being is fundamentally other than its world, or an embedded
being different from its world, Haraway points to an ontology of swarming
interaction between beings. As a consequence, and second, entities are not separate
from each other, but are ecosystems of genomes, consortia, communities, partly
digested dinners, mortal boundary formations (2008: 31). In other words, entities
are never singular, but are compound made up of combinations of other things
co-ordinated to magnify power, to making something happen, to engage the world,
to risk fleshly acts of interpretation (2008: 250). In short, entities, whether
technologies or so-called organic entities, are composed of multiple component
parts which constantly become together and through their individual component
parts. From this, Haraway develops the concept companion species, in particular
the companionship of humans and dogs, to address the way entities interact with and
become-with one another.
The notion of companion species has three senses: first, it refers to the old coconstitutive link between dogs and people, where dogs have been actors and not just
recipients of action (2008: 134). In short, companion species refers to the ways
dogs become with human being, meaning that the humandog relation is that from
which both dogs and humans emanate. Of course, two objections open up at this
point: first, the notion that humans exist in relationships of companionship with dogs
may be thought to posit two independent objects who relate to one another and so
does nothing to upset the humandog binary opposition. Haraway recognizes this
possible interpretation but dismisses it claiming that I actually dont think that [the
idea of] companion species reinforces species boundaries but I can see how I set
myself up to be read that way (2006a: 144). Understanding why she rejects this
interpretation must, however, wait until we outline the third sense of companion
species. Second, the humandog relationship Haraway describes is by no means
universal. Not only do many humans despise dogs, but it is not clear that, accepting

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this type of relationship is possible, the humandog relationship is transferrable to

other animals.
As such, Haraway moves to the second meaning of companion species to
highlight that companion species also points to the sorts of being made possible at
interfaces among different human communities of practice from whom love of the
breed or love of dogs is a practical and ethical imperative in an always specific,
historical context, one that involves science, technology, and medicine at every
turn (2008: 134). Here again, we find an empirical relationship based on an
external bond wherein the human cares for the animal, and where this care involves
a complex intersection of science, technology, and medicine coalescing together to
inform a particular ethic based around questions such as how does a companion
animals human make judgments about the right time to let her dog die or, indeed, to
kill her dog? How much care is too much? Is the issue quality of life? Money?
Pain? (2008: 50). Again, however, there are problems with this description: (1) it
remains inherently external, insofar as it involves a relation of two distinct species;
and (2) it seems to depend on some universal ethical imperative emanating across
all humananimal relationships, which not only calls into question Haraways claim
that all knowledge is situated, but is also questionable in terms of whether humans
feel an instinctual empathy towards all dogs (I certainly dont instinctively feel
any empathy for the packs of, obviously malnourished, wild, rabid dogs who are my
companions as I walk through the streets of Cairo), let alone whether, even if it is
granted that this relationship holds for dogs, it is applicable to all animals; and (3) it
appears to be inherently anthropocentric, insofar as the issue concerns how humans
are to treat animals and, specifically, the issues that arise for humans of keeping
animals.
As a consequence, Haraways third sense of companion species refers not to
empirical relations between species or a universal ethical imperative, but to the
webbed bio-socio-technological apparatuses of humans, animals, artifacts, and
institutions in which particular ways of being emerge and are sustained. Or not
(2008: 134). In other words, Haraway moves from the empirico-relational level, a
level that Ive suggested is not applicable to everyone in so far as not everyone cares
for animals, to an ontological level that recognises species are not singular, but are
multiple, moving constellations of different animals, viruses, bacteria, parasites,
each of which combines to create that particular entity. This ontological level aims
to show the applicability of the notion of companion species to those who dont care
for animals, by showing that other species are constitutive of the human body and
being. Far from being individual monads shut off from and unaffected by other
species, human being is created out of our relationship to and companionship with
these species. Some are necessary for our being, others are unwanted. Regardless of
how we view them, however, Haraways point is to show our intimate ontological
connection to our world, including our companionship with other animal species.
From this, we can discern three lines through which Haraway thinks companion
species: (1) an epistemological line that calls into question the hard and fast
oppositions between human and dog constitutive of Cartesian-inspired thinking,
(2) an ethical line in which (some) humans are defined through a relation of care for
other entities or species; and (3) an ontological line based on a radical questioning

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of the human exceptionalism constitutive of anthropocentrism. Rather than being

distinct to other animals, human being only is through its relations to others. While
influenced by Heideggers critique of binary oppositions, Haraway rejects
Heideggers continued glorification of the human over the animal by calling into
question his continued privileging of human being. While Heidegger maintains that
the animal is poor in world because it lacks ek-sistence, Haraway claims that the
human and animal exist in the same world, are constituted by this world, and are
co-shapers of this world (1997: 97). While Heidegger aims to overcome
anthropocentrism by examining the being of each to re-introduce a continued
privileging of the human over the animal, Haraway rejects Heideggers insistence
that the human and animal be thought through the question of being to focus on the
way the human and animal, in their concrete, existential comportment and
companionship, shape and interact with one another. Rather than appeal to an
ambiguous notion of being, Haraway points to the complexity of the humananimal
relationship not to celebrate complexity [for the sake of complexity] but to become
worldly and respond (2008: 41). Becoming aware of our intimate relational and
ontological entwinement with the world around us including our entwinement with
animals will help bring us to examine: (1) the entwined beings we are; (2) our
relationship to the other including animals and the world; and (3) undermine our
previous anthropocentric tendencies.

Concluding Remarks
From this, we see that Haraways project aims to rethink what it is to be human
and dog by thinking each through their entanglement. As Don Handelman
recognizes, Haraway undertakes a meta-inquiry, asking about how to ask about the
dogginess of dog, of dogs in their different breeds and mixtures in relation to human
beings (2007: 256). Put differently, Haraway is attempting to identify the essence
or dogginess of dogs (i.e., what makes a dog a dog and not, for example, a cat), by
thinking this essence through the doghuman relation. If this is what Haraway is
doing, and it seems a good way to think about it, then despite her Latourian-inspired
critique of Heideggers ontological difference, it shares a direct connection to
Heideggers thinking because, as we have seen, his thinking also aims to identify the
being of entities, in this case, the being of dogs, which, put more concretely, seeks to
answer the question: what is it to say that something is a dog, which, in turn,
depends on a prior question: what makes a dog a dog or, put differently, what is the
dogginess (read being) of dog? In other words, if we accept Handelmans
description, we see that Haraways attempt to understand the dogginess of dogs
mirrors Heideggers privileging of being in that she asks about what it is to be a dog
and so echoes Heidegger in recognizing that to understand an entity (dog) requires
an inquiry into the being (dogginess) of that entity (dog). While Haraways
Latourian connection means that she rejects the need to explicitly ask about the
dogginess, or being, of the dog to understand the dog, instead claiming that we
simply have to examine the empirical relations inherent to an actual concrete dog to
understand it, by claiming that the dog is, in its essence, relational, Haraway is

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actually implicitly asking about the dogginess of the dog, which brings her
thinking back to the question of the being of dog and from there to Heideggers
thinking.
Of course, Haraway would most probably argue that she is doing something else,
but, as we saw with Latour, Heideggers rejoinder would be that any questioning of
empirical entities depends on, and so is always brought back to, a questioning of the
essence or being of those entities. To focus on empirical observation alone is to
think from certain assumptions about the essence or being of the thing, such as the
notion that entities are ontologically relational, that empirical observation discloses
what the being truly is, that a mediating aspect exists that allows entities to be
simultaneously entwined and individuated, while also assuming certain understandings of space and time that allow entities to become through one another. By
showing that Haraways thinking assumes a certain ontological understanding and is
inspired by a long philosophical history which she overlooks to privilege the
method(s) of empirical social science, we not only show her intimate companionship to Heidegger, but also open a space to better explore how to become with her
thinking. In particular, I want to conclude by suggesting that Haraways
Heideggerian heritage leads to three lines of future research: first, Haraways
analysis brings us to question the nature of overcoming including whether we can,
in fact, overcome anthropocentrism and what this overcoming will look like given
her recognition that to criticise anthropocentrism is itself to perpetuate the mode of
Western thinking underpinning anthropocentrism. Second, Haraways thinking
brings us to question the nature of identity and the role that relationships play in
the formation of identity. While the notion of relational identity is not new to the
social sciences (think of Latours actor-network theory) or philosophy (think of
Hegels masterslave dialectic), Haraway pushes us to think identity and
relationships non-anthropocentrically. One of the things her analyses shows, and
on this Heidegger would agree, is that this is far harder than it initially appears. And
third, to truly understand and justify her conclusions, the ontological assumptions
upon which her analysis is based need to be brought to the fore and questioned. This
does not entail the slavish replication of Heideggers thinking on being, but the
recognition that the ontological question he brought to the fore continues to offer
possibilities that can deepen Haraways analyses.

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