G.R. No.

L-54597 December 15, 1982

FELICIDAD ANZALDO vs. JACOBO C. CLAVE

Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo
recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be
appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil
Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and
which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the
President shall consult the Civil Service Commission."
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5,
1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As
stated earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor
Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service
Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor
Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the
pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo).
In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied
Doctor Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court
the instant special civil action of certiorari.
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated
August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.
In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service
Commission, recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined
to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was
that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with
himself (p. 35, Rollo).
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of
the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co.
vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that
the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon,
affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it
was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative
justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation
as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and

Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted
by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the
appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in
the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo
C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation
for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the
appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in
accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo
to the contested position.

G.R. No. 122389 June 19, 1997

MIGUEL SINGSON vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 7 we laid down the requisites of
procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have
something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must
be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. In addition, administrative due process includes (a) the right to notice, be it
actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's
legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction;
and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence
presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the
parties. 8 It is self-evident from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on
appeal should not be the same person whose decision is the subject of review. Thus,
we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review. 9
In the case at bar, we hold that petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner
Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a
former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, 10 each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act

as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers
sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation
and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation
in this case.
Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution of the respondent NLRC is
void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial
commissioners. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his
appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial
tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial
review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
7 69 Phil. 635 [1940].
8 Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489 [1971].
9 Zambales Chromite v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261 [1979]; Anzaldo v. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 [1982].
10 Promulgated on August 31, 1990 and took effect on October 9, 1990.

G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the decision of the Director of Mines may
be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that
the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a
farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case.
That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is
promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the
subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law).
A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred
Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have
asked his undersecretary to undertake the review.
Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness,
when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. (See Amos
Treat & Co. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 F. 2nd 260, 267.)