V.

CAPACITY TO ACT
A. NATURAL PERSONS
II. CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency
requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELECs head
office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an honest
misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found
Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her
original certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted
on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the office should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was
reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said
Congressional election.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the
first district of Leyte. (this is the relevant issue)
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution) 2. The confusion of the honest mistake
made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the
candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed
to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and
Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual
residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply
for voters registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be
argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further

contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to wherever
he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile
of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when
she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs.
Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22,
1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of
Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does
not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the
question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile
became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has
been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived
in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
Romero, J. (Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this case. Marcos living
in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.
Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain
from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.
Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they
lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of
candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).
Padilla, J. (Dissenting):

Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by academic
disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified.
And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.
Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does not
automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of
law.
Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular
agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: womans domicile.