MONTEJO VS.

COMELEC

promulgated the assailed resolution where, among

Facts:

others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of

the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first

4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1

of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain

Issue:

municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates

the principle of equality of representation.

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of

the legislative power of redistricting and

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and

reapportionment is valid or not.

Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is

composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,

Held:

Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San

Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set

aside.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its

subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional

enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the

Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major

municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria,

power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised

Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,

the power. Regarding the first elections after the

Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised

enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission

therein.

who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts

and for the subsequent elections, the power was given

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and

to the Congress.

the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province.

(The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance

approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.)

appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its

As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities

power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as

of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran.

part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states

A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to

that:

five municipalities (underlined above) with a total

population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby

empowered to make minor adjustments to the

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of

reapportionment herein made.

inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of

Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created

with the incumbent representatives of the province and

The number of Members apportioned to the province out

other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it

of which such new province was created or where the

city, whose population has so increases, is geographically

elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San

located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the

Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,

Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not

when

be made within one hundred and twenty days before the

election.

Marcos

won

allocations per district. Examples include error in the

they

lived

in

Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San

Miguel Manila.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the

presidency,

She served as member of the

Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila

during 1978.

correct name of a particular municipality or when a

municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position

of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the

the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,

1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent

section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the

Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a

respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer

candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for

municipalities from one legislative district to another

Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission

district. The power granted by section 3 to the

on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the

respondent is to adjust the number of members (not

constitutional

municipalities.)

petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven

for

residency.

The

months under residency, which she sought to rectify by

QUALIFICATIONS

adding

MARCOS VS. COMELEC

the

words

"since

childhood"

in

her

Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on

March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained

FACTS:

Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,

established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now
Divine

requirement

Word

University

also

in

Tacloban.

Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still

in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he
was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was

She

arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact

that she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year

residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for

election purposes.
conclusion

The court are in favor of a

supporting

petitoners

claim

of

legal

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte

despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in

run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the

the district for the following reasons:

First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned

Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban

25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent

became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law

COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial

when her father brought them to Leyte;

Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly

elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual

BENGZON VS. HRET

removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of

abandoning the former residence and establishing a

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue

new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.

in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement

that no person shall be a Member of the House of

In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

of origin should be deemed to continue.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands

domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.

was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,

however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after

her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one
only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon

country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

returning to the country clearly indicated that she

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization

as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service

chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile

in the U.S. Marine Corps.

of choice.

To add, petitioner even obtained her

residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while

living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating

her

birthdays

and

other

important

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship

through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,
or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in

milestones.

the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson

who was then running for reelection.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto

Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz

possesses the necessary residence qualifications to

was not qualified to become a member of the HOR

commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,

since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under

Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

or after separation from the Armed Forces of the

United States, acquired United States citizenship, may

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for

quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected

reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and

Representative in the said election.

registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the

place where he resides or last resided in the

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who

Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a

renunciation of any other citizenship.

became an American citizen, can still be considered a

natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to

the Republic and having registered the same in the

HELD: petition dismissed

Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in

accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is

YES

deemed to have recovered his original status as a

natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may

however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:

as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that

the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and

TERM OF OFFICE

3. by direct act of Congress.

**

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
HUTCHINSON VS. PROXMIRE

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by

those
who
lost
their
citizenship
due
to:
1.
desertion
of
the
armed
forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World
War
II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any
other
time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A.
No.
2630
provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff research scientist appealed the grant of
summary judgment for defendants, a senator and his
assistant, from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in an action for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, interference with
contractual relations, and infringement of plaintiff's
rights
of
privacy,
peace,
and
tranquility.
CASEFACTS
Plaintiff was a research behavioral scientist who
studied emotional behavior in monkeys. Most of his
research was funded by government grants.
Respondents were a United States Senator and his
legislative assistant. Respondent senator awarded
plaintiff the Golden Fleece Award for presenting an
egregious example of wasteful governmental spending.
Respondents publicized the award through telephone
calls, radio and television interviews, and newsletters.
Plaintiff filed his action for libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with contractual
relations, and infringement of his rights to privacy,
peace,
and
tranquility.

DISCUSSION

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be

to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.

Reversing the district court and the appeals

court, the United States Supreme Court held
that plaintiff was not a "public figure," and
therefore the "actual malice" standard did not
apply to him.
In addition, the Court held that the Speech and
Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution did not protect respondents for
defamatory statements they made or might AT

When a people have elected a man to office, it must be

assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official

That meant that the libelous remarks made by

respondents in followup telephone calls to
executive agencies, and in the television and
radio interview, were not protected.

or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that
since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of

CONCLUSION
The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment

Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of

government to respect his mandate.

and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Issue:

DISQUALIFICATION AND INHIBITION

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Facts:

Held:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged

member

of Congress who

penitentiary

while

his

is

confined

conviction

for

at

the

NO.

national

statutory

rape

and acts of lasciviousness ispending appeal. The accused-

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a

restrictive sense.

appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully

discharge the duties of aCongressman, including attendance

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of

at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his

the people. However, in spite of its importance, the

having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable

privileges and rights arising from having been elected may

offense.

be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted

by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact,

Jalosjos primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign

the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of

will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First

obedience rather than exemption.

District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their

representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of

his

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall,

constituents made possible by the intervention of the State.

in all offenses punishable by not more than six years

He

imprisonment,

a Congressman.
adds

that

He
it

calls

cannot

this
be

covenant

defeated

by

with

insuperable

be

privileged

from

arrest

while

procedural restraints arising frompending criminal cases.

the Congress is in session. xxx

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and

Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that

members of the House of Representatives, arises from a

provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a

restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a

from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any

special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary

time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

meaning

of

its

terms.

It

may

not

be

extended

by

intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions

and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he

virtually make him a free man with all the privileges

should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI

appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not

of the Constitution. The members ofCongress cannot compel

only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special

absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the

class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the

absence

correction system.

is

legitimate

a Congressman charged

with

one.
a

The

confinement

of

crime

punishable

by

imprisonment of more than six years is not merely

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a

authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal

denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that

cases

all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in

rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a

government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility

public officer foracts done prior to his present term of office.

to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be

It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the

displayed.

enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that

preventive

suspension

is

not

removal,

Does being an elective official result in a substantial

confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains

distinction

a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,

a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes

that

allows

different

treatment?

Is

being

disqualified.

the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as

all persons validly confined under law?

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal

or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by

protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to

public officers has never been an excuse to free a person

others.

validly in prison.
The

Court

cannot validate badges

of

inequality.

The

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise

imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.

of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain

groups

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to

may

plausibly

assert

that

their

interests

are

disregarded.

him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling

temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

We,

prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court

of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal

therefore,

find

that

election

to

the

position

orders.

law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are

not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional

liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are

sessions and committee meetings will virtually make

germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those

him a free man

belonging to the same class. (People vs. Jalosjos

G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant

to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge

that

he

could

achieve

only

such legislative results which he could accomplish within the

confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering

QUORUM
AVELINO VS. CUENCO

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they

invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to

cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of

formulate charges against the then Senate President

the separation of powers, the political nature of the

Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next

controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate

session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day

of the power to elect its own president, which power

however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session

should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the

for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by

judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because

Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other

the selection of the presiding officer affects only the

Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He

Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to

however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory

choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering

Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,

his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were

the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,

being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even

his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the

ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out

Supreme Court.

of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the

session due to the disorder. Sanidad however

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,

countered and they requested the said adjournment to

what will be the resolution?

be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and

he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then
stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was
so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.

Taada was

subsequently

recognized

to

deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads

There is unanimity in the view that the session under

Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et
al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto
was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the

Senate President. This was unanimously approved and

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a

was even recognized by the President of the

continuation of the morning session (presided by

Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of

Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was

office

there a quorum constituting such session?

thereafter.

Avelino

then

filed

a quo

warrantoproceeding before the SC to declare him as

the rightful Senate President.

The second session is a continuation of the morning

session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of

journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in

the case.

session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).

Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the

subsequent events which justify its intervention. The

Senate

the

Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys

Constitution declares that a majority of each House

pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,

shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean

under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the

all the members. Even a majority of all the members

constitutional requirement in that regard has become a

constitute the House. There is a difference between a

mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that

majority of all the members of the House and a

any new session with a quorum would result in

majority of the House, the latter requiring less number

Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the

than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all

Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,

the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes

has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing

constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of

compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino

a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not

group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos

constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the

persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional

arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one

processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the

had been so arrested, there would be no doubt

Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the

Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been

requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys

elected just the same inasmuch as there would be

ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with

eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco

of

twenty

three

senators.

When

has been legally elected as Senate President and the

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino

petition is dismissed.

on March 14, 1949)

Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the
SC take cognizance of the case and that they are

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided

willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC

that the majority of all the members of the National

whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that

Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the

there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was

fact

elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are

Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each

absentee senators; one being confined and the other

House shall constitute a quorum to do business,

abroad but this does not change the number of

shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution

senators nor does it change the majority which if

to base the majority, not on the number fixed or

mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half

provided for in the Constitution, but on actual

of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12

members or incumbents, and this must be limited

senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there

to actual members who are not incapacitated to

was no quorum.

discharge

that

said

provision

their

duties

was

by

amended

reason

of

in

the

death,

incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to

house or for other causes which make attendance

assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of

of

the

member

concerned

impossible,

even

through coercive process which each house is

empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a
quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made
for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for
considering the use of the words of all the members
as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5
(5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so
as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
majority.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members

of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'
prerogative
to
discipline its ownmembers: the former is not
punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner
Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified
aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her
suspension effective for 90 days.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive

suspension of an incumbent public official charged
withviolation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has
both
legal
and
jurisprudential
support.
xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension upon determination of
thevalidity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance,
the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a
matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts
about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan
observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees
indicted
before
it.
Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension
vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members
The
pronouncement,
upholding
the validity of
the
information
filed
against
petitioner,
behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith
issue the
order of
preventive
suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
ownranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall
not
exceed
sixty
days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination
by the Senate
or
the
house
of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
COMPOSITION

ISSUE:

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has

authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines

In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the

SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect

RULING:

in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the

COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of

Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the

three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)

Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members

Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of

of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the

the 6 senator members from partaking in the said

case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of

election protest on the ground that all of them are

proportional representation from the political parties

interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that

and the parties or organizations registered under the

considerations of public policy and the norms of fair

party-list system represented therein. The senior

play and due process imperatively require the mass

Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed

following

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed

amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring

by both Justices of the SC and Members of the

the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of

Senate, the Constitution intended that both those

resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that

judicial and legislative components commonly share

where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the

the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating

remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not

to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.

less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may

The legislative component herein cannot be totally

adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.

excluded from participation in the resolution of

Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the

senatorial election contests, without doing violence to

petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of

the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be

that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the

misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of

only three Members who would remain, all Justices of

the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in

this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every

disqualification,

Abbas

suggested

the

Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be

dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a

given due weight.

case where he sincerely feels that his personal

interests or biases would stand in the way of an

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such

objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is

proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the

that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot

Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,

legally function as such; absent its entire membership

creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its

of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can

composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power

Sec.

17.

The

Senate

and

the

House

of

Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal

of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

POWERS

which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

SAMPAYAN VS. DAZA

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction

election contests and
qualifications
members of Congress

over
of

Remedies against a disqualified House of

Representative candidate: (1) cancellation
of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC
before election; (2) quo warranto case filed
with HRET after proclamation

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza,
then incumbent congressman of their congressional
district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza
has not by any act or declaration renounced his status
as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution
(section
18,
Article
III).
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying
the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United
States as evidenced by a letter order of the
US Immigration
and
Naturalization
Service,
Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12,
1985.

The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been

to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate
ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case
with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days
after Dazasproclamation.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
COMPOSITION
GUINGONA VS. GONZALES

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was

composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD

senators,

and

LP-PDP-LABAN

senator. To suffice the requirement that each house

must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators
of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce
7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LPPDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-

ISSUE:

LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA.

Whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code

This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by

Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members
of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

RULING:
The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case,
first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident
from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his
position as Congressman for the duration of his term of
office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,
1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section
17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification
of
its
members.

member

of

compromise.

LAKAS-NUCD,

opposed

the

said

He alleged that the compromise is

against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in
determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that
each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of

Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no

other manner of application. The problem is what to do
with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission

be

based

on

the

proportional

representation of the political parties. The election of

Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS

NUCD or the NPC. A party should

have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senatorsmembers in the CoA. Where there are more than 2
parties in Senate, a party which has only one member
senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to
resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other
in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with
the other party.

ONE BILL, ONE SUBJECT

GUZMAN VS. COMELEC

G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS:
Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that
no election officer shall hold office in a
particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In
accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned
petitioners, who were election officers to other
stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not
expressed in the title of the law, which is An Act
Providing for a General Registration of Voters,
Adopting a System of Continuing Registration,
Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing
the Appropriation of Fund Thereof.

HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is

relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks
to ensure the integrity of the registration process by
providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in
the reassignment of election officers.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof", are:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
information, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. [7]
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the
title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general
objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the
statute are related and germane to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.[8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated
considering that it is related and germane to the
subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of
RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with
a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as
"AN
ACT
PROVIDING
FOR
A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM
OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING
THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR."
Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election
officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is
related to the conduct and procedure of continuing
registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing
that the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the
contents and the minute details therein

SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE

CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

If the title of a bill expresses the general subject, and all
provisions are germane to that subject, then the power
given by the bill is fairly expressed in the title of the
statute and is in sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement of Sec. 26 (1), Art VI, which
states:
Sec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional requirement that every bill
shall be passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction.
The title is not required to be an index of the
content of the bill. It is sufficient if the title
expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to the subject, such as
the reorganization of the remaining
administrative regions.

*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

LEGISLATIVE VETO
IMMIGRATION SERVICE VS. CHADHA
Brief Fact Summary. Chadha was
student who had overstayed his
deportable. The Attorney General
deportation. The House passed a
Chadha should be deported because
the
hardship

an East Indian
visa and was
suspended his
resolution that
he did not meet
requirement.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The one-house veto

violated Article I, Section: 7, the Presentment Clause,
because a bill must be presented to the President to

sign or veto, and it violated Article I, Section:Section: 1

and 7, bicameralism.
Facts. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a
provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorizing one House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive
Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The Immigration Naturalization Service (INS)
suspended Chadhas deportation. A year and a half
later the House passed a resolution to veto the
suspension. Because the resolution was passed
pursuant to Section 244(c)(2) it was not treated as an
Article I legislative act. As a result, it was not submitted
to the Senate nor was it presented to the President for
action. Chadha appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The INS agreed with
Chadhas position before the court of appeals and
joined him in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was
unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order
Chadhas
deportation.
Issue. Is it constitutional for Congress to statutorily
authorize a one-house veto of a decision the Attorney
General made, under authority delegated to him by
Congress, to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States?
Held. Chief Justice Burger opinion. No. The court of
appeals
decision
is
affirmed.
Congress first argued that Section 244(c)(2) was not
severable. Therefore, if that provision was
unconstitutional than the whole statute was, and then
the Attorney General could not suspend Chadhas
deportation order. He would lack standing because he
would receive no relief from an order declaring Section
244(c)(2) invalid. The Court pointed out that Congress
itself had provided for severability in Section 406 of the
Act.
Even if this law or procedure were efficient, convenient
and useful in facilitating functions of government, that
alone would not save it if it is contrary to the United
States Constitution. The very structure of Articles I, II,
and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers.
The Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency. They sought to define and limit the exercise
of the newly created federal powers affecting the states
and
the
people.
The one-house veto violated Article I, Section: 7, the
Presentment Clause, because a bill must be presented
to the President to sign or veto. The Presentment
Clause is an effort to check whatever propensity a

particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,

improvident
or
ill-considered
measures.
The one-house veto was unconstitutional because it
violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7,
Bicameralism. The Framers were trying to balance the
legislative process. The Presidents participation was to
protect the Executive branch from Congress and to
protect the whole people from improvident laws. The
Attorney General is part of the executive branch. When
Congress is vetoing his decision, they are encroaching
upon territory reserved for the Executive branch. Both
Houses had to vote on the bill because splitting the
legislative power means it will be exercised only after
opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings.
This action was legislative in character and effect
because it was to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization, it altered the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons, including the Attorney General,
executive
Branch
officials
and
Chadha.

create an agency that has no governmental power

other than to make laws, because only Congress can
make laws under the Constitution. The court upholding
a pure delegation of legislative power has encouraged
Congress to delegate its lawmaking powers frequently
in the future, particularly over no-win political issues.
Congress could have said that they are giving the
Attorney General a discretionary power and because
discretionary
powers
are
really
Congresss
responsibility, they are putting strings on that power. If
Congress does not like what the Attorney General does
in a given case then they can override it. So, the case
can either be that Congress is giving the executive
power, creating a power which would have a life of its
own, but the nature of the power is limited. Therefore
they are not really taking anything away from the
Attorney General and it is not aggrandizement. If
Congress could not use a legislative veto, then they
might not pass on the power at all.
POWER OF THE PURSE

Dissent. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist

dissenting.
J. White: Todays decision eliminates over 200
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a
legislative veto which is more efficient. The Courts
decision fails to recognize that the legislative veto is
not the type of action subject to the bicameralism and
presentment
requirements
of
Article
I.
J. Rehnquist: Congress could not have intended the
one-house veto provision to be severable from the rest
of the statute. They never intended to permit
suspensions of deportation unless they could retain
some so
rt
of
veto.
Concurrence. Justice Powell concurring. The case
should be decided on a narrower ground. For example,
Congress may not encroach the Judicial branch
because it is a judicial function to determine whether a
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria
for permanent residence.
Discussion.
J. Burger presents the same argument that J. Black did
in Youngstown, just because something is useful, does
not
mean
it
is
constitutional
The Court in Mistretta v. United States held that the
Court would uphold statutory provisions that to some
degree commingle the functions of the branches, but
that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or
encroachment.
The dissent by Justice Scalia in Mistretta stated that
the Commissions guidelines are laws, since any judge
that disregards them will be reversed. Congress cannot

GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds
For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV
of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided
only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is
not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

Issues
1.

Does Congress have the power under the

Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though
that power is not specifically enumerated within
the Constitution?

2.

Does the State of Maryland have the power to

tax an institution created by Congress pursuant
to its powers under the Constitution?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

1.

Yes. Congress has power under the

Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section
8).

2.

No. The State of Maryland does not have the

power to tax an institution created by Congress
pursuant to its powers under the Constitution.

The Government of the Union, though limited in its

powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its
laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in
the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied

POWER OF TAXATION

powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope

of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate

MCCULLOCH VS. MARYLAND

and plainly adapted to that end, and which are not

prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.

Facts
Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all
banks operating in Maryland not chartered by the state.
The statute provided that all such banks were
prohibited from issuing bank notes except upon
stamped paper issued by the state. The statute set
forth the fees to be paid for the paper and established

The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct

sovereign power or end of Government, but only the
means of carrying into effect other powers which are
sovereign. It may be exercised whenever it becomes
an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers
granted to the federal government under the U.S.

penalties for violations.

Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of

any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution

The Second Bank of the United States was established

pursuant to an 1816 act of Congress. McCulloch (D),

to the Government of the Union be an appropriate

measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree

the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the

United States, issued bank notes without complying

of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion,

not of judicial cognizance.

with the Maryland law. Maryland sued McCulloch for

failing to pay the taxes due under the Maryland statute

The Bank of the United States has a right to establish

and McCulloch contested the constitutionality of that

act. The state court found for Maryland and McCulloch
appealed.

its branches within any state. The States have no

power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any
manner control any of the constitutional means
employed by the U.S. government to execute its

powers under the Constitution. This principle does not

1.

extend to property taxes on the property of the Bank of

the United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary

conducted is not related to a purpose within

the jurisdiction of Congress, it was
conducted to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36
or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

interest which the citizens of that State may hold in this

institution, in common with other property of the same
description throughout the State.
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION
BENGZON
VS.
COMMITTEE

SENATE

BLUE

RIBBON

2.

The power of both houses of Congress to

conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the Constitution. As
provided therein, the investigation must be
"in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure" and that
"the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled
to testify against one's self.

3.

The civil case was already filed in the

Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to
probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy would be an encroachment into
the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction
that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been
pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow
the inquiry to continue would not only pose
the possibility of conflicting judgments
between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.

4.

Finally, a congressional committees right

to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action including the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these
rights is the right of an individual to against
self-incrimination. The right to remain silent
is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if it
partakes of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not
be compelled by respondent Committee to
appear, testify and produce evidence
before it only because the inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and if pursued would be

Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a
civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous
sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several
government corporations to the group of
Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2.

By virtue of a privilege speech made by

Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into
the transactions, an investigation was
conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they
know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."

3.

At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on

the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in civil case
before the Sandiganbayan.

4.

Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive

relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended
that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants
in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for
intervention. The Court granted it and
required the respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee to comment on the
petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry
was in aid of legislation
NO.

There appears to be no intended legislation

involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be

violative of the principle of separation of

powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government as
ordained by the Constitution.

The special committee created by the resolution called

and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was

POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT

ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the

Governments paying to Burt the total sum of

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the

Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration,
Buenavista

and

bought

two

Tambobong

estates
for

the

known

as

sums

of

P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000

was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second

P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in

the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before October, 1949. The committee
sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.

sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt

thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as

aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the

represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates

afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date

respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the

he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.

original owner of the estate. He bought the first from

Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he

San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the

deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and

Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was

that on the same occasion he drew on said account

not able to pay the necessary amount of money to

two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to

complete his payments. As such, his contract with said

the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the

owners were cancelled.

Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company

payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate

It was the desire of the committee to determine the

to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute

ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave

deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000.

rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name

The

the

the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a

Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of

resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this

Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as

resolution which brought him to jail and is being

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine

contested in this petition.

Philippine

Government

then,

through

National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,

accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the

ISSUES:

latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for

contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its

to

Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for

investigate the transactions surrounding the estates.

contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative

whom

he

gave

the

P440,000.

session,

which

ended

on

May

18,

1950.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the

3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects

witness to the important question, which is the name of

the petitioner from being questioned.

that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were

obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the

HELD:

Senate that if he should reveal the name he would

1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to

incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew

be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,

the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave

the investigating committee has the power to require a

P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony

witness to answer any question pertinent to that

which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a

inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right

refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,

against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the

assuming that a refusal to testify would be so

jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be

punishable. Since according to the witness himself the

material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it

transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000

vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to

to a representative of Burt in compliance with the

expel a Member; and every question which the

latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon

investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to

which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of

answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of

that person might incriminate him.

the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the

question must be determined by its direct relation to

POWER TO DECLARE EXISTENCE OF STATE OF

WAR

the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation

to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to
be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by
a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is
no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt

in

cases

where

that

power

may

constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond
its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the
witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.

THE PRIZE CASES

Brief Fact Summary. Union ships pursuant to
President Lincolns April 1861 Order declared a
blockade of southern ports seized ships carrying goods
to
the
Confederate
States.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. It is the Congressional
prerogative to declare war under Article , Section: 8,
Clause 11. However, the President has the ability to
take action when attacked.
Facts. In April 1861 President Lincoln declared a
blockade of southern ports. Pursuant to this blockade
in May and July 1861, Union ships seized Confederate
merchant vessels and cargoes of foreign neutrals and
residents of the southern states. The ships were
condemned by federal court order. The owners of the
ships
and
cargo
appealed.
Issue. Did President Lincoln have the authority to
institute a blockade of southern ports?
Held. Justice
Grier.
Yes.
By the Acts of Congress of 1795 and 1807, the
President is authorized to call out the militia and use
the military and naval forces of the United States in
case of invasion by foreign nations and to suppress

insurrection against the government of a state or of the

United
States.
Even if it was necessary to get Congressional sanction
for the existence of war Congress did approve of the
Presidents actions by the Acts they passed in 1861,
which allowed the government to prosecute the war
with vigor and efficiency. In 1861, Congress approved,
legalized and made valid all acts, proclamations and
orders of the President as if they had been done under
the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress. Therefore even if he needed Congress to
ratify his actions, they did so and therefore cured any
defect.
Discussion. The majority opinion held that the
President could resist an attack by a foreign nation.
The fact that the attack in this case came from an
internal part of the Union rather than from a foreign
power does not eliminate the Presidents power to take
action.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
TECSON VS. COMELEC

that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those

whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather

Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was
also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born
in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son
to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino

Facts:

citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the

Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification

respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on

in the presidential elections for having allegedly

citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy

misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate

or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of

of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino

bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent

citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.

was born only before the assailed marriage had no

Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was

bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the

a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of

established paternal filiation evidenced by the public

the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court

documents presented.

may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article

VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish

Issue:

conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born

*Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of

citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still

discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he

cannot be held guilty of having made a material

Ruling:

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in

Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in

violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the

holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

Omnibus Election Code.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing

ELECTION

fundamental law on respondents birth, provided

POE VS. ARROYO

Facts: During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections,

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-

Arroyo was declared as the candidate who garnered

President under this Constitution shall be held on the

the most number of votes for the presidency while FPJ

second Monday of May, 1992.

followed in the second place. July 23, 2004 FPJ filed

an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
contesting the votes of Arroyo. On December 14, 2004,
the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment

at

St.

Lukes

Hospital.

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the

Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear

as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare
and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President

Corazon

Aquino

and

Vice

President

protestant who died during the pendency of the latters

Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand

presidential

E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being

protest

case?

referred to as the incumbent president.

Held:

NO.

Rule

14.

Election

Protest.

Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

President of the Philippines who received the second

or third highest number of votes may contest the

HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or

election of the President or the Vice-President, as the

vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly

case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk

gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and

of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)

common public knowledge that the Constitutional

days

Commission refers therein to incumbent President

after

the

proclamation

of

the

winner.

Since in this case, no real parties such as the vicepresidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come
forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the
deceased protestant, the petition must be dismissed.

Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other

persons, and provides for the extension of their term to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization
of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second Monday

*IN RE: BERMUDEZ

of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the

President

and

Vice-President

under

said

1986

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the

Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the

validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article

government of President Aquino was likewise sought to

XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which

be questioned with the claim that it was not established

provides in full as follows:

pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were

Sec.

5.

The

six-year

term

of

the incumbent

President and Vice-President elected in the February

7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

dismissed outright by the Supreme Court which held

that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made

the

judgment;

they

have

accepted

the

government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in

Courts are not required to proceed against the

effective control of the entire country so that it is not

President as if the President was any other individual.

merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a

de jure government. Moreover, the community of

Courts should review communications claimed to be

privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).

nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present

government.

*US VS. NIXON

Brief Fact Summary. The special prosecutor in the
Watergate scandal subpoenaed tape recordings made
of President Nixon (the President) discussing the

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States

(Supreme Court) had to balance the executive
privilege against the rights of citizens to face their
accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court
made the point that the President is not a normal
citizen, and therefore should receive great deference
regarding executive claims of privilege. However,
executive privilege is not absolute and must be
balanced against the right of the accused in criminal
proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its
opinion because it was delving into a political dispute
between the President and Congress, something the
Supreme Court is loath to do.

scandal with some of his advisers. The President

claimed executive privilege as his basis for refusing to
turn

over

the

*CLINTON VS. JONES

tapes.
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although a President

Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint containing four

deserves great deference regarding his Article II

counts

constitutional privilege, that privilege is not absolute

(Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted

and must be balanced against other constitutional

sexual advances towards her when he was the

interests.

Governor

Facts. The
scandal

special prosecutor

subpoenaed

the

in

the

tape

against

the

Petitioner,

President

of

Clinton

Arkansas.

Watergate

recordings

of

Synopsis

of

Rule

of

Law. The

United

States

conversations involving the President and his advisers

Constitution (Constitution) does not automatically grant

regarding the scandal. The Presidents counsel moved

the President of the United States immunity from civil

to quash the subpoena citing Article II of the United

lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to

States Constitution (the Constitution) and its grant of

his official duties as President.

Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the
Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the
Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions
asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds
of presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent
from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential
immunity argument, but held that no trial would take
place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme
Court),
which
granted
certiorari.

privilege to the President. The Presidents counsel also

argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was
a disagreement between parts of the executive branch.
Issue. Is

the

Presidents Article

II

constitutional

privilege absolute?
Held. The

Presidents executive

privilege

is

not

absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and

Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials
and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers.

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a

lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred
before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?

Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a
lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his
official

duties

as

President.

It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to

order a stay of this lawsuit until after the Presidents
tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay
was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay
takes no account whatsoever of the Respondents
interest

in

bringing

the

suit

to

trial.

Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil

lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public
duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that
ordinary case-management principles were likely to
prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits,
unless supplemented with a constitutionally based
requirement that district courts schedule proceedings
so as to avoid significant interference with the
Presidents

ongoing

discharge

of

his

official

responsibilities.
Discussion. A sitting President of The United States
does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on
the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public
actions as President. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all
private actions against the President until he leaves
office. The doctrine of separation of powers is
concerned with the allocation of official power among
the three co-equal branches of government.
*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
*MYERS, ADMINISTRATRIX VS. UNITED STATES
Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of
the first class in Oregon was forced to resign.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution grants to
the President the executive power of the governmenti.e., the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment
and removal of executive officers-a conclusion
confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the
exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide
for appointments and removals, except only as granted
therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that
Congress is only given power to provide for
appointments and removals of inferior officers after it
has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their
appointment in other authority than the President with
the Senates consent; that the provisions of the second

section of article 2, which blend action by the

legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the
executive, are limitations to be strictly construed, and
not to be extended by implication; that the Presidents
power of removal is further established as an incident
to his specifically enumerated function of appointment
by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such
incident does not by implication extend to removals the
Senates power of checking appointments.
Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get
the Senates permission to remove the postmaster of
Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed
with the Senates advice and consent. The President
asked for the individuals resignation without consulting
the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President
permission
to
do
so.
Issue. [W]hether under the Constitution the President
has the exclusive power of removing executive officers
of the United States whom he has appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States
(the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded opinion,
examining the legislative and adjudicative history of
executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison.
It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far
as it attempted to prevent the President from removing
executive officers who had been appointed by him by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was
invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same
effect was equally so. Dissent. Justice McReynolds
found that it is impossible for me to accept the view
that the President may dismiss, as caprice may
suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed
with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive
inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of
precedent.
Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was May
the President, having acted under the statute in so far
as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment,
ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision
which prescribes the condition under which a removal
may take place? Justice Holmes emphasized the fact
that the office was created by Congress.
Discussion. To hold [an opposite rule] would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or
other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.

*OPLE VS. TORRES

FACTS:
*THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a N
ational Computerized Identification Reference System," was
issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12,
1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate
A.O. No. 308 on several
grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System requires
a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President
is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers
of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes
a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. On
this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308
was issued within the executive and administrative powers of
the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of
congress.

Facts: In the latter part of the Korean war, labor

disputes led to a threatened strike by the steel workers.
President Truman issued an executive order directing
the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills and
keep them running. The Secretary issued orders to the
presidents of the steel companies, directing them to
keep the mills open. The next morning, the President
sent a message to Congress reporting his action and
promising to abide by their decision either way.
Congress took no action. However, there was evidence
that Congress disapproved of allowing the President to
exercise such power because a few years prior, they
removed a clause from the Taft-Hartley act that would

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate

have given the President power to seize an industry in

.RULING:

3. Procedural Posture: The trial court issued a

Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter

and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in
the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress
is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed
by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As
head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement
of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties
effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the w
ork of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. From
these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order.

preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from

case of national emergency.

continuing possession. The court of appeals stayed the

injunction. The Supreme Court accepted the case
promptly due to the importance of the subject matter.
4. Issue: Whether the president had the power under
these circumstances to seize the steel mills of the
country.
5. Holding: No.
6. Majority Reasoning: There is no express power in
the Constitution supporting the presidents actions. The
government claims that the power should be implied
from the aggregate of the presidential powers under
the Constitution. However, the order can not be
sustained under the power of the Commander in Chief
of the armed forces because that power is reserved for
military commanders in the theater of war and is not
broad enough to cover the situation here. This is a job
for the nations lawmakers, not the military authorities.
Also, the presidents power to see that the laws are

faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a

lawmaker. Congress has the exclusive constitutional

citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition

power to make laws necessary and proper to carry out

and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing

the powers vested by the constitution in any officer

the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory

thereof. Thus, this order is unconstitutional.

Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of

the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

7. Concurrence Reasoning: [Frankfurter] felt that the

situation was more complicated and flexible. However,
in view of the Taft-Hartley act, congress has expressed
its will to withhold this power from the president in
cases like this. In effect, the Congress has said, ask
for seizure power from us if you feel it is needed in a

assistants.
Constitutional

The

Preparatory

Reform

(PCCR)

Commission

on

was

by

created

President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of

Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study
and

recommend

proposed

amendments

and/or

revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of

implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the

specific situation. [Jackson] felt that the presidential

constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds

powers were not fixed, but rather fluctuate, depending

that, first, that it is a public office which only the

on their congruence with Congress. There are three

legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly,

categories: 1. where the president is acting pursuant to

petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the

an express or implied authorization of Congress -

President is intervening in a process from which he is

broadest powers, limited only by the Constitution, 2.

totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment

where

of the fundamental charter.

the

president

is acting in

the

face of

Congressional silence - more narrow powers limited by

the zone of twilight where there may be overlap with

HELD:

congressional powers, and 3. where the president is

acting in opposition to Congress - most narrow powers,
supported only by his expressly granted constitutional
powers, and then still limited by any overlap Congress
may have [Congress will is dominant in case of
overlap]. This order falls into the third category, and

The PCCR was created by the President by virtue

of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
appropriated for its operational expenses to be
sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.
The relevant provision states -

since there is no express authority, it must fall, even

when it may be otherwise justified by emergency.
8. Dissent Reasoning: The president has some power
under the constitution to meet a critical situation in the
absence of express statutory authorization. Looking at
history

(particularly

WWII),

there

were

several

instances when the president made similar orders. The

fact that Congress and the courts have consistently
recognized and given their support to such executive
action indicates that such a power of seizure has been
accepted throughout our history.

*GONZALES VS. NARVASA

FACTS:

Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million

Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the
operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced
from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the
usual accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to
the Commission upon submission of requirements for
expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by
the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no
an
appropriation
at
all.
In
a
strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing
more than the legislative authorization prescribed by
the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to
the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment

of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The

funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds
intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise
of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds
pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the
Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the
Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will
entertain a taxpayers suit.[22] In the case at bar, there
being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to
question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case and that
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of its enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must
show that he is a real party in interest - that he will
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that
he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. [24] Nowhere in
his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.
Respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory
duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters
which are unquestionably of public concern that is,

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent

better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be
appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private
respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.
The

petitioner,

invoking

his

earlier

permanent

appointment, questions the order and the validity of the

respondents appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not

temporary but permanent and was therefore protected
by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that
it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it

appointments made to public offices and the utilization

was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and

of public property. With regard to petitioners request

call it temporary.

for copies of the appointment papers of certain

officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides

inspection and copying of the same subject to the

that the Commission shall have inter alia the power

reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct

to approve all appointments, whether original or

of official business.

promotional, to positions in the civil service .and

*GORDON VS. JUDGE SANTOS

disapprove those where the appointees do not

possess

appropriate

eligibility

or

required

(HINDI KO MAKITA KAHIT FULL TEXT NG CASE

NA TO hinanap ko naman siya ng maayos, ano

qualifications.

to mag-aantay nanaman ako? Ayy sorry pol.rev

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or

pala to! )

nature of the appointment extended by the appointing

officer, its authority being limited to approving or

*LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

reviewing

the

appointment

in

the

light

of

the

requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office

qualified and all the other legal requirements are

of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The

satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to

appointment was described as permanent but the

the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final

action taken in the protest filed by the private
respondent and another employee.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment

naval

because of its belief that another person was better

appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion

vested solely in the city mayor.

captain,

Second,

all

and

other

other

officers

of

officers

the

whose

Government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by

SARMIENTO VS. MISON

law;

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution.

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by

In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the

law to appoint;

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the

president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and

Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,

and

professors

of

constitutional

law

questioned

The first group above are the only public officers

the appointment of Mison because it appears that

Misonsappointment was
Commission

not

submitted

on Appointments(COA)

for

to

appointed

the

by

the

president

which

require

confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth

approval.

group do not require confirmation by the COA. The

Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution,

position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of

heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Customs does not belong to the first group hence he

does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo

Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of

*DRILON VS. LIM

Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison

due to the unconstitutionality of Misonsappointment.

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality

of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of

Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil

bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission

companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.

7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-

on Appointment.

compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax

ordinances and for containing certain provisions

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers

contrary to law and public policy.

removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers

needing confirmation by

the

Commission

RTCs Ruling:

on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there

are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

1.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and

sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

Petitioners Argument:

1.

The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that

the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax

*LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO

ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code

had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally

Facts:

dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified

Magallanes was permitted to use and

true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

2.

Grounds of non-compliance of procedure

occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land

a.

No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of

was a forest zone which was later declared as an

Local Government Code

agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to

b.

Not published

LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer

c.

Not translated to tagalong

who asserted his claim over the same piece of land.

The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The

HELD:

Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review

hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.

only the

Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred

constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if

that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already

warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.

conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that

When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he

the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue

is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the

delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts,

judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.

does

Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but

presidential power of control may be delegated to the

he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code

Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the

should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or

constitutional duty of the President to act personally

unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say

upon the matter.

that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only

was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances
and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than
this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

not

contain

any

provision

whereby

the

Issue: whether or not the power of control may be

delegated to the Executive Secretary and whether it
can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary
Held:
The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department
heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to
appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them
at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision
of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be
stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply means "the

power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
It is correct to say that constitutional powers
there are which the President must exercise in person.
Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief
Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary
acts which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view.
The President is not expected to perform in person all
the multifarious executive and administrative functions.
The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has
thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional
setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even
reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands,
may issue.

*DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

This case involves Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring
a state of national emergency (issued on 24 February 2006,
as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I). PP 1017 reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President
of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The
President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care"
power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency. (Phrases in
brackets added)

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three

important provisions, as noted in the brackets above.
1. Calling-out power
The validity of this power is already settled in Sanlakas.
However, there is a distinction between the Presidents
authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and
the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. In
declaring a state of national emergency under PP 1017,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written,
as in Sanlakas.
2. Take Care Power
PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction. The first part is valid. As the Executive in whom
the executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
policies to be embodied in existing laws. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC.17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
However, the President cannot issue decrees similar to those
issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos under PP 1081
(declaring martial law). Presidential Decrees are laws which
are of the same category and binding force as statutes. PP
1017 is, therefore, unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
3. Power to Take Over
PP 1017 authorizes the President to call the military not only
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, but
also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII:
Sec.17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the
above provision when she issued PP 1017? According to the
Supreme Court, the answer is simple - during the existence
of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant
the President, without any authority or delegation from
Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.
However, Section 17 must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. When Section 17 speaks of the
State, it refers to Congress, not the President. The exercise
of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest,
requires a delegation from Congress in accordance with
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, the requirements of
which are:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a

national policy declared by Congress.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the
Presidents authority to declare a state of national
emergency and to exercise emergency powers. The
President is authorized to declare a state of national
emergency. However, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the takeover of
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
Posted by Lifeylicious at 6:18 PM

already released from military confinement. When the

release

of

the

persons

in

whose

behalf the

application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is

effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the
herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant
Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
should

be

dismissed

for

having

become

moot

and academic. But the military court created to try the

case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still
continues to subsist.

*OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a

military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by

the civil courts are open and functioning.

military personnel and they were placed in Camp

Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians.
They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to
assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy
to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the
petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition
for prohibition and habeas corpus.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all

decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals
during the period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.
*IBP VS. ZAMORA
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus

Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,

be granted.

in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and

PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become

deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.

moot and academic because by the time the case

The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and

reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were

utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law

enforcement.

duty to provide the necessary equipment to the

ISSUE:

Marines and render logistical support to these

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the

soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be

necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to

properly argued that military authority is

judicial review.

supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on

deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP

civilian supremacy over the military.

does not unmake the civilian character of the

police force. Neither does it amount to an

RULING:

insidious incursion of the military in the task

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,

of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),

Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Article XVI of the Constitution.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

DECLARATION OF REBELLION
*LACSON VS. PEREZ

legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

FACTS:

whether or not there has been grave abuse of

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced

by an angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other
deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacaang, issuedProclamation No. 38 declaring
that there was a state of rebellion in the
National Capital Region. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police
to suppress therebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders
and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter
effected.

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question
is the lis mota of the case.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the

declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly
gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the
following four related petitions were filed before the
Court. Prior to resolution, the state ofrebellion was
lifted in Metro Manila.
ISSUE:

3. The deployment of the Marines does not

constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy

Whether or not the declaration of a

state of rebellion is constitutional

clause. The calling of the Marines in this case

constitutes permissible use of military assets

RULING:

for civilian law enforcement. The participation

As to warrantless arrests

of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility

As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a

state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to
justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice
denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest
specific persons in connection with the rebellion.
xxx

patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their

responsibility

to

direct

and

manage

the

deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their

With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to

warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the

authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected ofrebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest
feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a state of rebellion.

*BARCELON VS. BAKER

Was there violation of doctrine of separation of

powers?

Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement

against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the
declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers, being an
encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which
has the constitutional prerogative to determine or
interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that
the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an
exception to the general rule on the allocation of the
governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution expressly provides that [t]he President
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August
15, 2000):

In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained

by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned
before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding

why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is

no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was
w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al
acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in
1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The
Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no
rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest
hence he should be set free.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due
process.

xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed

forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts.
Besides the absence of testual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President
might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.

HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political

On the other hand, the President as Commander-inChief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human
lives and mass destruction of property. xxx

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this
power. However, this is no longer feasible at this
time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

peace and order in the countr

question. Only the president can determine the

existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution
for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas
corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not
justiciable. The president has superior competence to
assess the peace and order condition of the country.
Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of
the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the

conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that

the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources
available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better
position than the SC to ascertain the real state of

*LANSANG VS. GARCIA

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as

Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people,

an abandonment or waiver of the appeal.

Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is
a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.
Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation.
Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension
of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet
the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether

or

not

Facts:
On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky
Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of
murder and destructive arson before the RTC of
Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of
Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on

the

suspension

is

constitutional.

March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw

HELD: The

doctrine established

in Barcelon and Montenegro was

subsequently

abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it

had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida

May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion
without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression

by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no

that the motion was necessary for his early release

legal

established. Accordingly,

from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a

hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this

conditional pardon by the President on December 9,

matter, including two closed-door sessions in which

1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted

relevant classified information was

the

conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his

government to the members of the SC and 3 selected

province without consulting her. She prayed that the

lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying

Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.

ground

could

be

divulged

by

itself that there was actually a massive and systematic

Communist-oriented

campaign

to

overthrow

the

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.

government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC

unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
*PEOPLE VS. SALLE

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of

the Constitution which provides that the President may,
except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided

in

the

Constitution,

grant

pardon after

conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending

Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-

appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,

appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of

as in the instant case, executive clemency may not

the enforceability of the conditional pardon and

yet be granted to the appellant.

(2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,

Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it

recommended to the President the grant of the

course, entirely different where the requirement is

conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.

" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original

provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General

Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as

maintains that the conditional pardon granted to

presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the

appellant

because

1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be

thejudgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the

extended before a judgment of conviction becomes

pendency in this Court of his appeal.

final.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o,

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no

submits that the conditional pardon extended to

appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused

Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs.

commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right

Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not

to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where

file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to

the death penalty was imposed by the trial court,

have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the

and (d) when the accused applies for probation,

conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his

thereby

conviction.

the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and

Mengote

is

unenforceable

waiving

his

right

to

appeal. Where

has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant

Issue:

case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to

the appellant.

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during

the

pendency

of

his

appeal

from

a judgment

of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under

Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits

Held:

the

grant

of

pardon,

whether

full

or

conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his

appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

application therefor, if one is made, should not be

acted upon or the process toward its grant should not

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

be

begun

unless

the

appeal

is

withdrawn.

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant

Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the

reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines

Government concerned must require proof from the

and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

accused that he has not appealed from his conviction

or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the

be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court

concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the

or the appellate court, as the case may be.

Congress.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation

an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the

of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after

release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,

conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of

commutation of sentence, or parole before the

withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible

back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to

therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in

the grant of executive clemency.

custody of the accused must not solely rely on the

pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from

HELD:

confinement.

The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for

appointment to public office which was forfeited by

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky

Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days
from notice hereof within which to secure from the
latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to
this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said
appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of

reason of the conviction of the offense. But since

pardon

does

not

generally

result

in

automatic

reinstatement because the offender has to apply for

reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a

Corrections must exert every possible effort to take

new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found

back into his custody the said appellant, for which

guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given

purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine

pardon because he did not truly commit the offense,

National

of

the pardon relieves the party from all punitive

Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and

consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to

Ricky Mengote, G.R. No. 103567, December 4,

him his clean name, good reputation and unstained

Police

or the

National Bureau

1995)

character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial
court was founded not on lack of proof beyond

*GARCIA VS. CHAIRMAN , COA

reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not

FACTS:

commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding

Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV

him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended

Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena

petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public

City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against

servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary

him. The president grated him an executive clemency.

reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,

The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of

bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his

salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service

reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no

on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show

longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;

whether petitioners reinstatement was to the same

he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance

position

of

of

Supervising

Lineman.

the

clemency.

Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of

service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to

afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start

and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a

They are in the best position to do so because hey are

result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right

the ones who know whether there are savings, or

to back wages is afforded to those with have been

illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or
to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against
them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from

deficiencies in appropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE

SENATE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE

ARE

ALLOWED

TO

APPROVE

THE

REALIGNMENT.
Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be

April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to

realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for

March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to

which said transfer is to be made.

*PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

Facts: Petitioners assail validity of RA 7663: The
General Appropriations Act for 1994.

As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief of

Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who may
be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP-

The GAA contains a special provision applicable to

Chief of Staff may not be given such authority.

Congress. It allowed any member of congress the

REALIGNMENT

OF

ALLOCATION

FOR

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the total of

*JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

said allocation is not exceeded.

[hindi ko pa nacheck]
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and
the

Speaker

Constitution to

are

the
realign

ones authorized under the

savings,

*FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS VS. CA

not the

individual members of Congress themselves.

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as

amended provided that appeals from decisions of the

Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOED

Board of

Investments

(BOI)

shall

be

certain provisions of the law and imposed certain

the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months

conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized to

after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987),

use savings to augment the pension funds under the

the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was

Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the

promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such

AFP.

appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later

promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No.

Issue: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art

1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over

6. Whether the enumeration is exclusive?

appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second

Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained

Held: YES. Under the special provision applicable to

the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case.

Congress, the members of Congress are given the

Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the

power to determine the necessity of realignment of the

Second Divisions ruling which provided:

savings in the allotment for their operating expenses.

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO

226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by
a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning
where and in what manner the appeal can be brought
are only matters of procedure which this Court hast he
power to regulate.

respective powers in performance of their duties. Art

VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only
one representative from congress.
Issue: W/N the JBCs practice of having members from

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of

the Senate and the House of Representatives to be

procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art

unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the

82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

constitution.

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the

Held: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held

appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the

that the phrase a representative of congress should

Board of Investments?

be construed as to having only one representative that

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the

1987 Constitutiontook effect February 2, 1987. Thus,

would come from either house, not both. That the

framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of

Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the

the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion

appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore

was denied.

never became effective for the concurrence of the

Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the

*DOLALAS VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still

stands. The exclusivejurisdiction on appeals from
decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

*PEOPLE VS. EPRASAS

*VIVARES VS. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE
In the Vivares case, several high school students of the
St. Theresas College were not allowed to graduate

*CHAVEZ VS. JBC

because they were seen drinking liquor in public places

Facts: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by

and wearing revealing outfit in public places in violation

the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that

of the schools rules. The evidence consisted of photos

JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the

congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
Respondent

contends

that

the

phrase

representative of congress refers that both houses of

shown by the friends of the students to the school

authorities. They claimed that their right to privacy was
violated, pointing out that they limited access to their
photos to their Friends.

congress should have one representative each, and

The Supreme Court ruled against the students, stating

that these two houses are permanent and mandatory

that setting a posts or profile details privacy to

components of congress as part of the bicameral

Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be

system

viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends

of

legislature.

Both

houses

have

their

with the source of the content. The users own

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security

Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or

of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under

her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of

whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is

the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or

shared or when a person is tagged, the respective

separation of the judges and justices from their

Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or

services. What is important is the validity of the

who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting

abolition of their offices.

of which was set at Friends.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office
The court added: To illustrate, suppose A has 100

does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent

Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not

is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition

Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in

must be made in good faith.

As post, which is set at Friends, the initial audience of

100 (As own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by

or the public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a

virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no

result, the audience who can view the post is

tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there

effectively expandedand to a very large extent.

is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an

office with an occupant who would thereby lose his

*DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA

position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of

FACTS:

strict law, the question of any impairment of security of

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory

tenure does not arise.

Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the

Minister

of

the

Budget,

the

Chairman

of

the

Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from

taking

any

action

implementing

BP 129

which

*PEOPLE VS. GACOTT

Facts:

mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts

from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for

violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was
filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against
respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending

termination of their incumbency that for petitioners

that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively

justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that

in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130,

thereby the security of tenure provision of the

the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or

Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an

opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has

ISSUE:

already been abolished by Letter of Implementation

No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition,
however,

respondent

judge

granted

the

motion

espousing

Of

the former President are part of the law of the land,

Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the

the

position

that

the

Letter

and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective,

law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code

unless

which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus,

subsequent

respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18,

instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is

1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or

one such legal order issued by former President

authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered

Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to

that the case be quashed.

implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1

modified,

revoked

or

proclamations,

superseded
orders,

by

decrees,

nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised,

Issue:

revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force

and effect of law.
whether or not respondent judge in granting

the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as

Indeed,

Section

3,

Article

XVII

of

the

to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari

Constitution explicitly ordains:

Held:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations,
Yes. The error committed by respondent

executive

letters

of

issuances

not

instructions,

and

inconsistent

other

with

this

judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the

Constitution shall remain operative until amended,

light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275

repealed, or revoked.

aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy

Board could not have been expressed more clearly

*ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the

City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1
in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere
perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal

Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor

immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact

Endencias and

that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D.

pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that

No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:

SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public

Pursuant

to

Presidential

Decree

No.

1 dated

September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive

Justice

Fernando

Jugos salary

officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be

considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of

Branch of the National Government, the following

which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his

agencies

compensation

of

the

Department

of

Justice

are

herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the

applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis
supplied).

fixed

by

the

Constitution

or

by

law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on

behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was
not

received

favorably

by

Congress,

because

General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D

immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted

No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his

Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the

martial law powers have the same force and effect as

the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62
SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by

Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the

pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is

Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be

constitutional.

interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a

Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of

HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13,

the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,

Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the

especially when the interpretation sought and provided

salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of

in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation

compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation

already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which

shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the
*ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ

Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.

This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-

Facts:
1.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all

defined and established province and jurisdiction of the

members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the

Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the

Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for

legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act

the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution

declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so

and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the

as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A

Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good

legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is

Government. The Committee found the complaint not

sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further

not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;

consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the

otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial

charges contained in the complaint attached. It then

function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the

submitted its report which was duly noted by the

exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the

Batasan and sent to the archives.

United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court,

is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not

2.

On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with

only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose

the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the

present membership number more than 990 judicial

archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified

officials. The independence of the judges is of far

complaint

The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.

Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation

thereto.

Said

motion

was

disapproved by the Batasan.

greater importance than any revenue that could come

from taxing their salaries.

attached

3.

Hence,

this

petition for

prohibition

to

restrain

respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of

the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to recall from the archives and report out

and application of the Constitution and of statutes is

the resolution together with the verified complaint for

within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the

the

judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the

Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are

impeachment

of

the

President

of

the

unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article

XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with

the mandatory amendatory process provided for under

the Batasans power of impeachment

Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a

smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to
impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the

NO.
1.

The dismissal by the majority of the members of the

members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said

Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of

questioned

the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that

provisions

proceedings

at

various

derail
stages

the
by

impeachment
vesting

the

have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond

Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not

the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot

to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to

compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial

Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan

itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for

4.

Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the

impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority

Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an

the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good

unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order

Government had acted.

that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial

5.

before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall

the members of the Batasan for the approval of the

from the Archives said resolution and complaint for

resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the

impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action

Rules impose a condition not required by the

of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall

Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is

(which of course it had no authority to do and,

the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The

therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply

members

of

with any order from the Court for said recall) such an

impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial

order addressed to the Committee would actually be a

to proceed.

direct order to the Batasan itself.

of

the

Batasan

for

the

initiation

Respondents Speaker and the Members of the

3.

The Court held that if it has no authority to control the

Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa

Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority

contend that that the petition should be dismissed

to control the actions of subordinate employees acting

because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over

under the direction of the Senate. The secretary,

which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises

sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate

questions which are political in nature; (3) the

are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act

Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the

independently of the will of that body. Should the Court

Constitution and even supposing without admitting that

do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented

the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify

of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-

the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the

arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine

Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has

Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate

the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even

ordering them to do another thing.

without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court

cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due
course to the impeachment complaint.

4.

The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless

to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB

it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed

employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of

has the absolute power to execute it.

EIIB employers.
Ruling:

*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or

diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production

*ACOP VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.

Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation

*ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ

of intelligence reports and information. "illegal activities

Facts:

affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited

Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of

to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)

salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve

to produce all documents relating to Personal Service

state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the

Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla

circumstances of the case that there is reasonable

of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was

danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose

issued in connection with the investigation of funds

military matters without compelling production, no

representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB

similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on

which

other considerations.

were

legally

disbursed.

Almonte

and

Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is

around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the

directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents

subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an

be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman,

agency of the Government.

and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner

*HONASAN VS. DOJ PANEL OF INVESTIGATING

of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the

PROSECUTORS

EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The

subpoena

duces

tecum

was

issued

by

the

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations

Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an

(persons),

anonymous letter alleging that funds representing

Powers

of

the

Ombudsman

(consti),

concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ

savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been

to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been

written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned
citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance,

Law Applicable:

Section

with copies furnished several government offices,

Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

13,

Article

XI

of

the

including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Facts:

Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo

petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to

Matillano

provide documents relating tWhether or not an

Department

Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of

following in part:

subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating

filed

an

affidavit-complaint

of Justice (DOJ)

which

with

the

contains

the

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by

questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the

military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator

imputed acts were committed in relation to his public

Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II

office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held

31 which should be handled by the Office of the

and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located

Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ

Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying

Panel

Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national

Eduardo

television, stating their withdrawal of support to the

Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the

chain of command of the AFP and the Government of

part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their

of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his

lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA)

respective

of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only

evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no

program that would solve the ills of society.

jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil

and

its

members,

Matillano

and

CIDG-PNP-P/Director

Ombudsman

counter-affidavits

and

Simeon

V.

controverting

Issues:

stated that:

1.

Whether

in

regards

to

Ombudsman-

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo

DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the

Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP

Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of

meeting where they concluded the use of force,

the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of

2.

Whether

the

Ombudsman-DOJ

NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the

Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the

new government. They had a blood compact and that

ground that it was not published

he only participated due to the threat made by Senator

3.

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to

Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa

conduct the preliminary investigation because

ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga

the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade

kasamahang magtataksil.

31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio

Trillanes, Captain Gerardo

the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Gambala, CaptainAlejano

and some others who were present during the NRP

Held:

Wherefore,

the

petition

meeting he attended, having a press conference about

DISMISSED for lack of merit

for

certiorari

is

their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that

the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the
same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood
compact wound.

1.

No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses

may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1)

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with

those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2)

counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification

those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular

courts. The difference between the two, aside

2.

from the category of the courts wherein they are

filed,

is

on

theauthority to

investigate

as

prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published

The power to investigate or conduct a

preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman

before becoming effective.

case may be exercised by an investigator or

prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by
any

Provincial

or

City

Prosecutor

or

In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453

(1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

their

nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the

assistance, either in their regular capacities or as

administrative agency and not the public, need not be

deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

published. Neither is publication required of the so

circular supports the view of the respondent

called

letters

of instructions issued

by

the

Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement

administrative superiors concerning the rules on

between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of

performance of their duties.

1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640

(1954). The only circulars and regulations which

distinguished from the authority to prosecute

No.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely

Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and

an internal circular between the DOJ and the

under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and

All

concurrent

responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to

and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct

conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed

of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate

against public officers and employees.

the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

recognize

and

uphold

the

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor

deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the

3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive

preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it

jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition

because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal

so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation

law agency of the government and investigate the

conducted by the DOJ Panel.

commission of crimes under the Revised Penal

Code is derived from the Revised Administrative
Code which had been held in the Natividad
case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution.
Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the
conduct of the preliminary investigation to an
agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the
first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert
its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.

*AGBAY VS. DEPUTY SECRETARY

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations
(persons),

Powers

of

the

Ombudsman

(consti),

concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ

to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

Law Applicable:

Section

Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

13,

Article

XI

of

the

Facts:

the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo

Matillano
Department

filed

an

affidavit-complaint

of Justice (DOJ)

which

with

the

contains

the

same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood

compact wound.

following in part:

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with

counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by

questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the

military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator

imputed acts were committed in relation to his public

Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II

office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held

31 which should be handled by the Office of the

and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located

in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo

Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ

Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying

Panel

Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national

Eduardo

television, stating their withdrawal of support to the

Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the

chain of command of the AFP and the Government of

part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their

of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his

lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA)

respective

of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only

evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no

program that would solve the ills of society.

jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil

stated that:

and

its

members,

Matillano

and

CIDG-PNP-P/Director

Ombudsman

counter-affidavits

and

Simeon

V.

controverting

Issues:
1.

Whether

in

regards

to

Ombudsman-

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo

DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the

Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP

Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of

meeting where they concluded the use of force,

the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of

2.

Whether

the

Ombudsman-DOJ

NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the

Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the

new government. They had a blood compact and that

ground that it was not published

he only participated due to the threat made by Senator

3.

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to

Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa

conduct the preliminary investigation because

ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga

the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade

kasamahang magtataksil.

31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio

Trillanes, Captain Gerardo

the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Gambala, CaptainAlejano

and some others who were present during the NRP

Held:

meeting he attended, having a press conference about

DISMISSED for lack of merit

their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that

Wherefore,

the

petition

for

certiorari

is

1.

No.

agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses

first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert

may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1)

its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the

those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2)

investigation.

those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular

courts. The difference between the two, aside

2.

from the category of the courts wherein they are

filed,

is

on

theauthority to

investigate

as

prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published

The power to investigate or conduct a

preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman

before becoming effective.

case may be exercised by an investigator or

prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by
any

Provincial

or

City

Prosecutor

or

In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453

(1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

their

nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the

assistance, either in their regular capacities or as

administrative agency and not the public, need not be

deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

published. Neither is publication required of the so

circular supports the view of the respondent

called

letters

of instructions issued

by

the

Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement

administrative superiors concerning the rules on

between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of

performance of their duties.

1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640

(1954). The only circulars and regulations which

distinguished from the authority to prosecute

No.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely

Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and

an internal circular between the DOJ and the

under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and

All

concurrent

responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to

and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct

conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed

of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate

against public officers and employees.

the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

recognize

and

uphold

the

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor

deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the

3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive

preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it

jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition

because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal

so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation

law agency of the government and investigate the

conducted by the DOJ Panel.

commission of crimes under the Revised Penal

Code is derived from the Revised Administrative
Code which had been held in the Natividad

*CARINO VS. CHR

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a

case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution.

class day, some 800 public school teacher, among

Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the

them the 8 herein private respondents who were

conduct of the preliminary investigation to an

members of the Manila Public School Teachers

Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned

function

of

receiving

evidence

and

ascertaining

Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to

therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial

dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the

function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the

alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon

faculty of receiving evidence and making factual

grievances that had time and again been brought to

conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by

the latters attention.

the authority of applying the law to those factual

conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided

The respondents were preventively suspended by the

or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely,

Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be

provided

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged

by

law. This

function,

to

repeat,

the

Commission does not have.

human rights violations

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to
RULING: No.

investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the

merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,

Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced

that is to say, determine with the character of finality

it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a

and definiteness, the same issues which have been

claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings

passed upon and decided by the Secretary of

against

Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court

conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or

having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the

political rights had been transgressed.

the

teachers

in

question,

initiated

and

teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said

matter, if still timely.

*CHR EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. CHR

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has

1. RA 8522 or the General Appropriations Act of

the power under the constitution to do so; whether or

1998 provided special provisions applicable to

not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial

all Constitutional Offices.

agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,

or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine,

2. The Commission on Human Rights through

certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights

then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette Recina

violations involving civil or political rights.

and Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic,

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such

power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.

Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and

Jorge R. Coquia upgraded or raised the
salaries (A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified
selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047
September,

1998)

and

collapsed

vacant

positions (A98-062 November 1998) without

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the approval of the Department of Budget and

the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,

Management (DBM)

i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as

petitioners

Commission

on Human

and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,

Rights Employees

Association

(CHREA)

and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of

through its then President Marcial A. Sanchez,

justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The

Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals

regards claimed human rights violations involving civil

3. The

alleging that they have locus standi because

*COJUANGCO VS. ROXAS

the reorganization demoralizes the rank and

file employees and will only benefit those in top
positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA)
exempted

the

CHR

from

the

Salary

Standardization Law.

Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR

emp0wers them to reclassify, adjust salaries and
collapse vacant positions without the approval of
DBM?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to
ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits
and other incentives be given in adherence to the
policies and guidelines in accordance with applicable
laws. The mandate of the DBM under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4, Chapter 1,
Title XVII to wit: shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of
the NationalBudget, preparation and maintenance
of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency
in the management of government operations,
administration
of
compensation
and
position
classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications. Furthermore, Administrative Code, in
Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy.

*ROMUALDEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed
a petition charging the accused with violation of
Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner,
brother-in-law of former President Marcos and
therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with
evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his selfinterested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or
indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a governmentowned and controlled corporation and the Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a
private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Marcos, whereby the
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests
over all equipment and facilities including structures,
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at
the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
Shops including some of its equipment and
machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative
immunity from suit.
Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively
traced the origin of executive immunity in order to
determine the extent of its applicability. Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a
President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts
done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner
must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from
one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the
felonious acts of public officials and their close
relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the
same footing as any other trespasser.
*REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN