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Baguilat, Kayla

Banatin, Alyssa
Hernandez, Chad
Leoncio, Angela
Senique, Alyssa
1C
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr. (PDAF Case)
Facts: Pork Barrel began in 1922 in a form of Congressional Pork Barrel," Act 3044; from then, several
adjustments were made to address the need for a sufficient government subsidy with respect to each
local government units. Remarkably, Martial Law era began the practice of allocating lump sum to
individual legislators which is still practiced widely until today. From 2002 to 2010, similar procedures are
being observed with the said appropriation, it can also be noted that through these years, it was explicitly
requiring of prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress in certain aspects of project
implementation. It was also during this time when formal participation of non-governmental organizations
in the implementation of government projects were introduced, with the allocation budget of P250 Million
for its Operation Barrio School Program. Then it was in 2007 when Government Procurement Policy
Board (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 implementing the Procuring Entity, wherein agencies can
enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs.
Expounding on present administration, details on current PDAF are as follows:
Vice President- P200 Million divided into P100 Million each for hard and soft projects
Senators- P200 Million each, divided into P100 Million each for hard and soft projects
Representatives- P70 Million divided into P40 Million and P30 Million for hard and soft projects,
respectively
As stated in 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles, consultation with legislators is still recognized before every
appropriation, however, the P200 Million allocated for the vice president was deleted and LGUs are now
considered implementing agencies (provided they have the technical capability to implement the projects)
and legislators are also allowed to identify programs outside of his legislative district subject to
concurrence of legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House. Finally,
any realignment on PDAF shall first be endorsed by the House Committee Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance.
While it is the common practice that PDAF is discretionary funds of members of Congress, recently, an
addition of Presidential Pork Barrel ascertained for Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund.
Malampaya Funds was set forth under Section 8 of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos P.D. 910 with
the end of developing the indigenous energy resources. Furthermore, Presidential Social Fund, laid out
under Section 12 of P.D. 1869 is most commonly known as Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAG-COR), later amended as special funding facility managed and administered through
which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not included under the
regular budget.
After exemplifying the origins and the facts of PDAF, controversies regarding the issue commenced:
It can be observed that Philippine pork barrel had drastic increases through decades, notably on
former President Ramos era. **Ramos era is known to be the golden age of pork.
Commission on Audit (COA) has come across many instances where pork funds, instead of
landing to its proper budget allocation, will fall directly to legislators own disposal
Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazi and an anonymous source revealed about
the kickbacks which were considered as SOP *standard operating procedures, which ranged
from 19% to 52% of the cost of supposed projects.

P3.6 Billion controversy as received by a certain congressman, which had become medias
headline
Several concerned citizens sought for nullification of PDAF as it may be considered
unconstitutional and misused for own benefit of legislators
On July 2013, the NBI has conducted investigations on the P10 Billion defrauding of Ms. Janet
Lim Napoles over the decade, which permitted her to transfer such funds to her ghost projects
and agencies through the alleged JLN *Janet Lim Napoles Corporation
Relative to Janet Napoles, 5 lawmakers and 3 other lawmakers were charged of Plunder and
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
respectively
Chiefs-of-staff and heads and officials of three implementing agencies were also involved in the
PDAF controversy

COA released its 3-year audit report on 2013 covering the 2007-2009 Arroyo administration to determine
PDAF propriety within the said period; which details as follows: (For exact SC terminologies on the PDAF
case, kindly refer to p.81-82 of SCRA)
P8. 374 Billion released for PDAF
P32.664 Billion released for Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)
Legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House
Total VILP exceeded its total amount appropriation
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to
the government
Improper and exceeding amount of fund appropriated to implementing agencies without
endorsement
82 NGOs, expected to produce 722 projects with budget of P6.156 Billion were either found
questionable or failed to carry out the appropriation of funds
At least P900 Million from Malampaya operations royalties were transferred to ghost NGOs
Procedural Antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Samson S. Alcantara filed for prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for the Pork Barrel be declared unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents (1) Franklin M. Drilon and (2) Feliciano S. Belmonte Jr., in
their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the pork
barrel system
Petitioners (1) Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica; (2) Jose L. gonzales; (3) Reuben M. Abante;
(4) Quintin Paredes San Diego and; (5) Jose M. Villegas, Jr. filed for certiorari and petition for the
immediate assurance of:
o Temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying for PDAF
nullification as to be declared unconstitutional and to be considered as grave abuse of
discretion
o They also pray for court to issue a TRO against respondents (1) Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.;
(2)
o Florencio B. Abad; (3) Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities, to cease
expenditures under the aforesaid funds
o They also seek publicity of the following documents to COA:
Complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of PDAF and VILP
The usage of Executives lump-sum funds, particularly on Malampaya funds and
remittances of PAG-COR

Lastly, they pray for inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently offbudget, [lumpsum], discretionary funds, including but not limited to Malampaya funds and PAGCOR remittances
Petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno filed for petition, concurring to declare PDAF unconstitutional
and a cease and desist order to be issued to President Benigno Aquino III and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to members of congress

Issue:
Whether or not the PDAF and Congressional Pork Barrel laws similar thereto are unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates
a.
Separation of powers
b.
Non-delegability of legislative power
c.
Checks and balances
d.
Accountability
e.
Political dynasties
f.
Local autonomy
g.
Validity of appropriation
h.
Undue delegation
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court finds the PDAF and Congressional Pork Barrel laws unconstitutional for the
following reasons:
a. Separation of powers according to the Constitution, the Doctrine of separation of powers is about
the division and distribution of three separate powers; namely, the Executive, Legislative and the
Judiciary branch. In this case, it has violated the principle of separation of powers when it vested the
power of post-enactment authority through Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of
special provision 4; the legislators which gave them the power to identify the projects that they desire
to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Moreover, the Legislators have
accorded the post-enactment authority in the fund release and realignment as stated in the special
provision 5. These post-enactment measures which govern areas project identification, fund release
and realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight. Hence, allowed the legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Based on
the court declaration that 2013 PDAF Article as well as other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
budget, unrelated to the congressional oversight both in violation of the separation of powers principle
and unconstitutional. Furthermore, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the law over informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the executive department be deprived of what the constitution has vested as its own.
b. Non-delegability of legislative power according to section 1, article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
such power shall be vested in the congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a senate and a
house of representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision or referendum.
This explains that only the Congress which is a bicameral body and the people, through process of
initiative and referendum are the only persons who can wield legislative power and the only recognized
exemptions would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local government which, by immemorial
practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions
such as the authority of the president to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other nationals emergency, or fix within specified limits, and
subject such limitations and restrictions a congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and warfare dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program. As it confers post enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation which- as settled in Philconsa is logged in congress. The power
to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from section 29 (1), Article VI of the

1987 Constitution which states that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by the law. The act of appropriation involves (a) setting apart by law a certain
sum from public revenue for (b) a specific purpose, which is contrary to what the PDAF Article states;
that the individual legislators are given a lump sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary. These 2 acts compromise the
exercise of the power of appropriation and legislators are given the authority to legislate which is not
allowed by the constitution, thus, making it unconstitutional.
c.

Checks and Balances - the Presidents power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue
and tariff is one of an example of a constitutional check and balance. This may be found in section
27(2), article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follow: the president shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall have no
affect the item or items to which he does not approve. For the president to exercise his item-veto
power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper item which may be object of the veto. An
appropriation bill, to ensure that the president may be able to exercise his power to veto an item veto,
must contain specific appropriations of money and not only general provisions which provide
parameters of appropriation. However, due to the post-enactment authority the PDAF article gave to
the legislators it has already prevented the power of the president to veto an item because of the fact
that there are no line-items to veto in the first place. As a result the president then be faced with the
predicament of either (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
vetoing the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. . In particular,
the lump-sum amount of P24.79 billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, etc. This kind of
budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot
be an excuse to defeat what the constitution require, which makes it, therefore, unconstitutional.

d. Accountability according to Section 1 of article XI of the 1987 constitution, which states that public
office is a public trust is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the constitution which
embodies the principles of the constitution which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability. One of the accountability mechanism with which the
proper expenditure may be checked is the power congressional oversight. The congressional pork
barrel, among others the PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight because of the fact
that legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating, or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. The court finds that the PDAF article and pork barrel
unconstitutional because of the fact that the post-enactment features dilute the congressional
oversight and runs afoul of section 14, article VI of the 1987 constitution which reads as: Sec.14 No
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. And thus impairing public accountability.
e. Political dynasty the court finds that the argument raised by the petitioner to be highly speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate
the political dynasties.
f.

Local autonomy - the states policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, article II and
sections 2 and 3, article X of the Philippine constitution which reads as follow:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
The sections mentioned above states that the state empowers its local government to units to develop
and to self-sustain and become contributors to the national economy. According to Philconsa, the 1994
CDF has the intention of to make the equal the unequal, which is found flawed by the court. The
court also observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocations is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represent
the PDAF has been a personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them
on the sole account of their office. Also, the court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
which are legally mandated to assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. The
programs of LDC even their policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators. Due to the post-enactment authority legislators can simply by-pass development
councils and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Not only that they
are also given the authority to intervene with local matters and thereby subvert genuine local
autonomy, which is unconstitutional.
g. Validity of appropriation - the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision. As earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. Since the said intermediate appropriations
are made by the individual legislators, they occur outside of the law. The real appropriation made
under the 2013 PDAF article is not P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the postenactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside
of the law. Irrefragably the 201 PDAF Article does not constitute an appropriation made by the law. It
only authorizes individual legislators to be appropriate in violation of the non-delegability, again,
making the PDAF and Congressional pork barrel unconstitutional.
h. Undue delegation the issue raised regarding undue delegation of legislative power was contented
by the petitioners since the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President found in Section 8 of PD 910 is said to give the President unbridled discretion to determine
for what purpose the funds will be used. And thus making it unconstitutional because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegated law. Also contented by the
petitioner was the Use of the Malampaya funds Section 8 of PD 910 and Presidential Social Fund
Section 12 of PD 1869 but according to the Court that the provisions of Section 8 of PD 910 that the
declared unconstitutionality of the of the phrase to finance energy resources development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government regarding the Malampaya Funds is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Fund would be used as it should be and shall remain legally effective.
Section 12 of PD 1896 says that the Presidential Social Fund may be used to (1) finance priority
infrastructure development projects and (2) to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines. It is to be construe that the President is given discretion in to what he thinks may be a
project of top priority. The phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projects must be
stricken also as unconstitutional, for the same reason to the above assailed provision under section 8
of PD 910. Still, all provisions of Section 12 of PD 1896, as amended by PD 1993, remain legally
effective and subsisting.

Concurring Opinions:
Justice Carpio
Issues:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional as it was alleged to have been violating (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy
2. Whether or not Malampaya Funds created to finance priority infrastructure projects are unconstitutional
3. Whether the lump-sum PDAF negates the Presidents constitutional line-item veto power;
4. Whether the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" in Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, on the use of the Malampaya Fund, constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power; and
5. Whether the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
x x x President," in Section 12, Title IV of Presidential Decree No. 1869, relating to the Use of the
Governments Share in PAGCORs Gross Earnings, is Unconstitutional.
Discussion on the issues
1.
To answer for the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel, the court held emphasis that The
intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. The Judicial power is vested only to Judiciary, therefore the constitutionality of this
controversy lies within the power of the aforementioned department. However, it should be noted that
when the Judiciary exercises its right to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not hold superiority
over other departments. For all reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.
2.
The petitioners herein are pleading for PDAF nullity because not only they are concerned
citizens, but they are also taxpayers greatly affected by the controversy. As quoted, The COAs
Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves not merely a
systems failure, but a complete breakdown of control, expressing seriousness of the matter above.
Overall, petitioners have enough locus standi* to file their complaints.
With regards to judgment, it is relevant to look upon the doctrine of Res Judicata and
Stare Decisis. On one hand, Res Judicata must be understood to have a focal point on judgment on the
merits, therefore, based on previous court rulings, it was ascertained that presenting (or failing to present)
convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct release of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion, or pertinent evidentiary support to
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks will determine the constitutionality of such.

While on the other hand, stare decisis focuses on the doctrine created herein. Philconsa was the
first case involved against Pork Barrel provisions, however it did not reach full resolution and cannot
suffice to apply stare decisis on the present case for such reason that it heeds for more holistic
examination of the inter-relation between CDF and PDAF articles and of the intra-relation of postenactment measures contained within a particular CDF and PDAF articles.

3.
Lump Sum PDAF Negates the Presidents Exercise of the Line-Item Veto Power.
With regard to the second issue, under Section 27, Article VI of the Constitution, it provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The Presidents line-item veto in appropriation laws is intended to eliminate "wasteful parochial spending,
primarily the pork-barrel.
Hence, PDAF negates the Presidents constitutional line-item veto power, and also violates the
constitutional duty of Congress to enact a line-item GAA. Thus, Article XLIV, on the Priority Development
Assistance Fund, of the 2013 GAA is unconstitutional. Whatever funds that are still remaining from this
invalid appropriation shall revert to the unappropriated surplus or balances of the General Fund.
4. The phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" in Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, on the use of the Malampaya Fund, constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Presidential Decree No. 910, issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, mandates that royalties
and proceeds from the exploitation of energy resources shall form part of a special fund (Malampaya
Fund) to finance energy development projects of the government. Section 8 of PD No. 910 reads:
SECTION 8. Appropriations. The sum of Five Million Pesos out of any available funds from the
National Treasury is hereby appropriated and authorized to be released for the organization of the Board
and its initial operations. Henceforth, funds sufficient to fully carry out the functions and objectives of the
Board shall be appropriated every fiscal year in the General Appropriations Act.
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines
and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President.
There is only a single subject to be financed by the Malampaya Fund that is, the development and
exploitation of energy resources. No other government program would be funded by PD No. 910, except
the exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy resources as envisioned in the laws
Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has the exclusive power to appropriate public funds, and vesting
the President with the power to determine the uses of the Malampaya Fund violates the exclusive
constitutional power of Congress to appropriate public funds.
5. The phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects x x x, as may be
directed and authorized by the x x x President" under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, relating
to the Use of the Governments Share in PAGCORs Gross Earnings, is Unconstitutional.

The assailed provision in PD No. 1869 refers to the Presidents use of the governments share in the
gross earnings of PAGCOR. Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the PAGCOR charter, as amended,
provides:
Section 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the
fifty (50%) percent share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00, shall immediately be
set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
The appropriation in Section 12 has two divisible purposes: one to finance any infrastructure project, and
the other to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities.
The entire amount constituting the governments share in PAGCORs gross earnings then becomes the
specific amount to finance a specific purpose the restoration of facilities damaged or destroyed by
calamities, which is a valid appropriation.
In sum, only the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" in Section 12 of the
PAGCOR Charter is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. The rest of
Section 12 is con
------------------------------------------ACCORDINGLY, Justice Carpio has voted to GRANT the petitions and DECLARE Article XLIV, on the
Priority Development Assistance Fund, of Republic Act No. 10352 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the
separation of powers, negating the President's constitutional line-item veto power, violating the
constitutional duty of Congress to enact a line-item General Appropriations Act, and violating the
requirement of line-item appropriations in the General Appropriations Act as prescribed in the
Administrative Code of 1987. Further, the last phrase of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
authorizing the use of the Malampaya Fund for such other purposes as may hereafter be directed by the
President, and the phrase in Section 12, Title IV of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended,
authorizing the President to use the government's share in PAGCOR's gross earnings to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects as the President may determine, are likewise declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being undue delegations of legislative power. He also voted to make
permanent the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 10 September 2013. He voted to deny
petitioners' prayer for the Executive Secretary, Department of Budget and Management and Commission
on Audit to release reports and data on the funds subject of these cases, as it was not shown that they
have properly requested these agencies for the pertinent data.
Justice Brion
Discussion of the Issues
I. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Philippine government consists of three main branches: the legislative, executive and judicial; each of
which has its own carefully defined terms to ensure that no branch becomes so powerful that it can
dominate the others. No branch of government may delegate its constitutionally-assigned powers and
thereby disrupt the Constitutions carefully laid out plan of governance. Neither may one branch or any
combination of branches deny the other or others their constitutionally mandated prerogatives either
through the exercise of sheer political dominance or through collusive practices without committing a
breach that must be addressed through our constitutional processes.
II. Legislative Power of Appropriation
Part of the legislative powers of Congress is the power of the purse which is the most complete and
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.
Congress carries out the power of the purse through the appropriation of funds under a general
appropriations law (titled as the General Appropriations Act or the GAA) that can easily be characterized
as one of the most important pieces of legislation that Congress enacts each year. It is clear when the
Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the treasury, until their representatives, by law,
have assigned and set aside the public revenues of the State for specific purposes.
III Check and Balance Doctrine as Applied in the Budgeting Process
A.
Budget Preparation and Proposal and Budget Legislation

The Executive branch is the one who lays out the budget proposal that serves as basis for Congress to
act upon which is expressed under the Constitution in the following terms:
Article VII, Section 22: The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session as the basis for the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Revenue resources are required to be reported to Congress so as not to violate the Constitution
prescribed under Section 25 and 27, Article VI, with respect to the handling of public funds, the authority
of Congress to decide on the budget, and the congressional scrutiny and monitoring that should take
place. However, an aspect of the funds is that they are under the control of the President (as presidential
pork barrel).
B.
Line-Item Veto
The President has the authority to exercise his line veto power. Respectively, President cannot also deny
Congress its share in national policymaking by including lump sum appropriations in its recommended
expenditure program. A lump sum appropriation like the PDAF is wrong as it leaves the President with "no
item" to act on and denies him the exercise of his line item veto power. The option when this happens and
if he rejects an appropriation, is therefore not the veto of a specific item but the veto of the whole lump
sum appropriation.
C.
Budget Execution/Implementation
The Executive branch implements the budget by handling the allocated funds and managing their
releases. This is likewise a closely regulated phase, subject not only to the terms of the Constitution, but
to the Administrative Code as well, and to the implementing regulations issued by the Executive as
implementing agency.
D.
Budget Accountability, Scrutiny and Investigation
At the budget hearings during the legislation phase, Congress already checks on the need for the
recommended appropriations (as Congress may delete a recommended appropriation that it perceives to
be unneeded), and on the propriety, efficiency and effectiveness of budget implementation, both past and
impending. This portion of the budgetary exercise involves legislative scrutiny and legislative
investigation. Wherein, Legislative scrutiny is a timely intervention made at the point of budget
deliberations and approval, and is consequently an effective intervention by Congress in the formulation
of national policy. Legislative investigation, if at all and as the recent Napoles hearing at the Senate has
shown, can at best examine compliance with legislative purposes and intent, with aid to future legislation
as its goal, and may only possibly succeed if the legislators are truly minded to exercise their power of
investigation purposefully, with firmness and political will.

Terms to consider:
Pork Barrel- An appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representatives district
Procuring Entity- Any branch, department, office, agent or instrumentality of the government procuring
goods, consulting services, and infrastructure projects
Infrastructure- any of the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g., buildings, roads,
power supplies) needed for the operation of the society.
Lump-sum appropriation- is a single but divisible sum of money which is the source to fund several
purposes in the same appropriation.
Power of the purse - is the power to determine the areas of national life where government shall devote
its funds; to define the amount of these funds and authorize their expenditure; and provide measures to
raise revenues to defray the amounts to be spent.
Appropriation - the authorization made by law or other legislative enactment, directing payment out of
government funds under specified conditions or for specified purposes.
Veto - the authority to reject specific items in the budget bill while approving the whole bill.

Locus Standi - the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the
law or action challenged to support that partys participation in the case
line -item - a singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a
specified singular purpose.