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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Number 4, October

1983, pp. 497-511 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1983.0093

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Pythagoras Bound: Limit and

Unlimited in Plato's Philebus
D A V I D A. K O L B

WHY ARE THINGS the way they are? Plato and Democritus present o p p o s e d
answers to this question. Not only is one a materialist while the o t h e r is not,
but f u r t h e r , they e m p l o y d i f f e r e n t ontological strategies to answer the question "why?" Democritus traces the visible features o f things, their colors a n d
shapes and habits o f m o v e m e n t , back to d e t e r m i n a t e f u n d a m e n t a l entities,
the atoms. About the features o f the atoms themselves t h e r e is n o t h i n g m o r e
to say t h a n that they are the way they are. We can distinguish h e r e physical
atomism f r o m ontological atomism. Physical atomism is a d o c t r i n e a b o u t the
ultimate constituents o f matter. Ontological atomism is a d o c t r i n e a b o u t how
entities o f whatever kind c o m e to have the features they have, the claim that
t h e r e are basic entities which just are what they are and which are responsible for the features o f o t h e r entities by some process o f combination. T h e
question "why?" comes to an e n d at the basic entities and their features plus
a description o f the process o f combination. Democritus is an atomist in both
these senses, the material atoms playing the role o f ontologically basic units.
T h e same ontological atomist strategy can be f o u n d , however, in those who
d e n y the existence o f physical atoms. Classical positivists a n d empiricists who
postulate sense data d e n y physical atoms but keep the strategy of" regress to
entities whose features have no f u r t h e r explanation.
Plato, as r e p r e s e n t e d in the Timaeus, was a physical atomist. But he rejects
the ontological ultimacy o f physical atoms, g e n e r a t i n g t h e m out o f a formless
energy-space and basic mathematical patterns. In this article I a r g u e that
Plato is n o w h e r e an ontological atomist, n e i t h e r in the physical world n o r in
his psychology n o r in the r e a h n o f the eternal Forms.
Plato is o f t e n i n t e r p r e t e d , however, in ways which insert ontological
atomism into his views. T h e most c o m m o n way is to hold that the Forms are
brutely given. Some D e m o c r i t e a n atoms are r o u n d and others have hooks
a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g f u r t h e r to be said a b o u t why; so the Forms o f c o u r a g e
[497]

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and cow-ness just are eternally what they are. A f t e r contacting the F o r m s we
should have no m o r e "why" questions. In the later Plato, the d o c t r i n e o f the
c o m m u n i o n o f the F o r m s in o n e a n o t h e r weakens the plausibility o f this
interpretation, a n d the " P y t h a g o r e a n " g e n e r a t i o n o f the Forms described by
Aristotle refutes it.'
T h e r e is a second way ontological atomism can be smuggled into Plato.
Empiricist notions o f the relation o f universal and particular can m a k e us
r e a d his discussions o f collection and division and o f the limit and the unlimited as if what was at stake was the correct classification o f a realm o f
already given atomic particulars. Given what Plato says about the d e r i v e d
status o f sensible objects we are not likely to read him as an ontological
atomist on that level. His psychological discussions, however, can t e m p t us to
read him as building u p experiellce f r o m atomic units o f intellectual o r
sensible perception.
This article takes u p the Phi&bus, w h e r e ontological discussions o f the
m i x t u r e o f limit and unlimited are applied in ethical discussions o f pleasure
and pain. My aim is to show that i n t e r p r e t e r s o f the dialogue have b e e n
w r o n g in assuming that Plato is discussing the reclassification o f a realm o f
given atomic experiences. W h e n this psychological atomism is a b a n d o n e d
the dialogue gains in unity and cogency. S t a n d a r d interpretations o f the
Phi&bus suggest Plato wishes us to reclassify the set o f atomic e x p e r i e n c e s o f
pleasure and pain. J u d g i n g the b e t t e r life would t h e n involve finding relevant subsets and comparisons we had not previously noticed. If, however, we
avoid psychological atomism, the discussions o f pleasure a n d pain can be
seen in a new light. Plato is asking us also to individuate pleasures and pains
in new ways, so that in some cases what counts as a pleasure changes; as a
result o f this new individuation a n d classification we will use new standards
o f evaluation.
A f t e r considering psychological atomism we t u r n to the Forms, showing
that Plato also avoids ontological atomism in this realm. Recalling his clear
rejection o f the ultimacy o f physical atoms, I conclude that for Plato t h e r e
are no entities whose d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are merely given, be they F o r m s or
sensible particulars, in being or in knowledge.
W h e n Plato talks in general terms about the limit and the unlimited
(Phi&bus 15 a - 18d) i n t e r p r e t e r s c o m m o n l y suggest we are faced with a multitude o f distinct particulars which we have to classify. Plato is said to be
warning us not to use classifications which are too big or too small, too
' This article refers to the "unwritten doctrines" of Plato. The relevant passages from
Aristotle. along with many others referring to these doctrines, are translated in J. N. Findlay,
Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 4x3-454 .

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elaborate or too sketchy. Whether we start with the particulars, build small
classes a n d a r r i v e at t h e g e n e r i c class, o r s t a r t w i t h t h e g e n u s , d i v i d e it i n t o
s p e c i e s a n d a r r i v e at t h e p a r t i c u l a r s , w e a r e n o t to r e s t c o n t e n t u n t i l w e h a v e
t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e classes as well as t h e e x t r e m e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , H a c k f o r t h
says, a p r o p o s o f P l a t o ' s e x a m p l e a b o u t s o u n d , " b e t w e e n ' s o u n d ' o r ' u t t e r a n c e ' as a g e n u s a n d t h e i n f i n i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r s o u n d s w e m u s t i n t e r p o s e t h e
s p e c i e s , v o w e l s , s o n a n t s , a n d m u t e s . ''2 W e a r e to a r t i c u l a t e t h e g e n u s - s p e c i e s
s t r u c t u r e o f u n i v e r s a l s to b e a p p l i e d to a set o f f i x e d i n d i v i d u a l s .
Gosling has argued convincingly against the many interpretations which
t a k e t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e l i m i t a n d u n l i m i t e d as a d o c t r i n e a b o u t g e n u s species relations among universals alone. 3 This does not mean that we must
t a k e t h e u n i v e r s a l s as s i m p l y g i v e n . C l e a r l y P l a t o m e a n s us to b e w o r k i n g o u t
t h e i r a r t i c u l a t i o n s . I t w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e , h o w e v e r , to s u p p o s e t h a t w e m u s t
a s s u m e t h a t o n e f a c t o r , e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l o r p a r t i c u l a r , is f i x e d w h i l e t h e o t h e r
is i n d e f i n i t e a n d a d j u s t a b l e . B o t h a c h i e v e d e f i n i t e n e s s t o g e t h e r . P l a t o ' s e x amples point this out. Consider the story of Theuth the Egyptian:
W h e n one is forced to start with what is indeterminate, one should not immediately
look to the unitary aspect, but again note some n u m b e r e m b r a c i n g every plurality,
and from all these end u p at the one. Let us take u p the present point again in
connection with l e t t e r s - - H o w do you m e a n ? - - W e l l , once, I suppose, some god, or
some m a n very like a god, noticed the indeterminacy o f vocal sound. T h e Egyptians
have a story that it was someone called T h e u t h who first noticed that in this indeterminate variety there were several vocables (vowels), not j u s t one, and then that there
were others that could be s o u n d e d but were not vowels and that there was a definite
n u m b e r o f these, a n d finally he distinguished a third class o f letters that we now call
mutes. H e then distinguished the soundless ones or mutes down to single letters, a n d
did the same with the vowels a n d semivowels. W h e n he had the full count he gave
them, individually and collectively, the n a m e 'element.' As he realized that none o f us
R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1945), p. 24. Compare Guthrie: "Plato here uses ~tnetQov numerically, for the uncountable
multitude of particulars in a species" (W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. V, p. 2o9). Crombie's interpretation is
more nuanced and refuses to set the unlimited totally on the side of the universals or of
particulars, but he too seems to presume that we are dealing at all times with sets of fixed
particulars. (Cf. I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), vol. II, pp. 365, 425, 4 2 8 - 9 , 436-7).
:~ J . C . B . Gosling, Plato's Philebus (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975), pp. 16o-165. It
is not entirely clear where Gosling stands on the relation of individuation and classification. He
carefully distinguishes the limit and unlimited as Plato's Pythagorean technical tools from the
internal constitution of the object studied by means of these tools (cf. p. ~77)- Whether these
objects are individuated independently of the use of the tools to classify them seems to vary,
perhaps rightly so, since in Gosling's view Plato is discussing the application of technai to phenomena, not the constitution of objects. Cf. p. 86 and pp. 177-18o for passages that could be
interpreted either way, and p. 172 for an example, discussed below, that presupposes independent psychological givenness of the particulars.

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would ever learn about them in isolation from the rest, he concluded that this
constituted a single bond that somehow made them a single unit, and pronounced
the single skill that covered them 'the art of letters.' (17b-d, Gosling's translation)
W h a t is it that T h e u t h first notices? H e is not c r e a t i n g speech; he is
d i s c e r n i n g its structure. H e notices dpovilv ~tetQov; Gosling translates this as
"the i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f vocal s o u n d , " H a c k f o r t h as " u n l i m i t e d variety o f
s o u n d . " B o t h these m a k e ~tztetQov the m a i n n o u n , but it is an adjective:
" i n d e t e r m i n a t e s o u n d . " Earlier, Plato has described s o u n d as s o m e h o w o n e
(~ov ~ a ) a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e in its m u l t i t u d e ( 6 ~ t Q o v ~kv]0~t) (17b). It is
t e m p t i n g to gloss this as h e a r i n g a s e q u e n c e o f individual s o u n d s without
k n o w i n g t h e m in detail, s o m e t h i n g like seeing a crowd o f p e o p l e without
k n o w i n g their occupations. But T h e u t h does not arrive at h e a r i n g individual
s o u n d s as individuals until the e n d of" his process. A l t h o u g h for Plato things
are ontologically definite quite i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r a w a r e n e s s o f t h e m , it
does not automatically follow that o u r a w a r e n e s s is a process w o r k i n g u p
f r o m clearly i n d i v i d u a t e d but unclassified items. T o c o n c l u d e this o n e m u s t
a s s u m e that, on the basic level, criteria o f individuation are i n d e p e n d e n t o f
the n a t u r e s o f the items i n d i v i d u a t e d , which is ontological a t o m i s m in its
empiricist version. I f we reject this a s s u m p t i o n t h e n u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t n u m b e r a n d a b o u t kinds m a y also be u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t individuation. H e n c e the
p h r a s e &~rtQov =~.fi0et should m e a n " u n b o u n d e d in its multiplicity," w h e r e
not only are the n u m b e r a n d kinds o f items indistinct, hut their b o u n d a r i e s
f r o m o n e a n o t h e r as well?
Most discussions o f classification use a d o m a i n o f entities a l r e a d y indiv i d u a t e d by s o m e other classification. T h e ubiquitous t r a d e s p e o p l e w h o m
Socrates f o r e v e r reclassifies are a l r e a d y i n d i v i d u a t e d by their bodies. I f we
r e g r o u p t h e m into new classes, we hold stable o u r ways o f i n d i v i d u a t i n g
t h e m as people. T h e tables a n d chairs which fill m o d e r n discussions o f
p e r c e p t i o n are i n d i v i d u a t e d by their glue a n d nails a n d i n d e p e n d e n t m o v ability. T h e s e sorts o f e x a m p l e s feed the p r e j u d i c e that classification involves
only r e g r o u p i n g . But t h e r e are o t h e r sorts o f e x a m p l e s w h e r e it is not so
obvious what m a k e s u p o n e individual a n d w h e r e a c h a n g e in how we classify m a y be tied to a c h a n g e in how we individuate. T h e s e are cases w h e r e
t h e r e are no i n d e p e n d e n t criteria o f individuation available, o r those available are mistrusted. C o n s i d e r a L i b e r t a r i a n c o n v e r t e d to Marxism: he will
4 GiselaStriker (Peras und Apeiron: Das Problem der Formen in P aaatons Philebus (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 197o) translates ~trtetQov ~tk~j0et as "unbegrenzt zahlreich." I am
suggesting that fiJt~tQov need not apply only to the number of particulars involved, but to their
individuation and hence to the kind of multiplicity as well. In her discussion of ~.ovrI Striker
presupposes that speech comes before Theuth with its items already individuated but not yet
classified (p. 95).

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now see things as part o f the g o v e r n m e n t which he did not before, for
instance Citibank. H e will see m o r e c o m p l e x individuals w h e r e b e f o r e he saw
simpler ones; a labor u n i o n will have m o r e kinds o f c o m p o n e n t s a n d m o r e
interrelations a m o n g them. Closer to the Philebus, there is the difficulty we
e x p e r i e n c e in d e c i d i n g what counts as o n e field o f knowledge.
I n such cases we d o not have a c r o w d o f particulars which n e e d only to be
classified. N o r d o we have an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t i n u u m , some p u r e p o t e n tial to be cut as we choose. We have s o m e t h i n g already differentiated as to its
generic c h a r a c t e r but still i n d e t e r m i n a t e in m o r e specific ways. T h e u t h starts
with speech s o u n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e in its multiplicity. This is n e i t h e r a blank
c o n t i n u u m n o r a c r o w d o f individual s o u n d s but an i n d e t e r m i n a t e l y multiple a n d various stretch o f speech sound. H e has already distinguished this
generically f r o m sights, smells, etc. H e discovers stretches o f s o u n d which
contrast with o t h e r stretches. H e classifies m o r e a n d m o r e finely, creating
m o r e precisely b o u n d e d a n d c o n t r a s t i n g species until he arrives at firm
particulars a r r a n g e d in the lowest species as well as at the articulated genus.
H e classifies a n d individuates; he arrives at his universals a n d his particulars
together. T h e r e is no s h a r p separation between r e c o g n i z i n g an individual
s o u n d as individual, a n d k n o w l e d g e o f what sort o f individual it is. 5
I n the T h e u t h e x a m p l e (as earlier in 1 7 a - b ) Plato evokes the e x p e r i e n c e
o f l e a r n i n g to read a n d write. We m o d e r n s should r e m e m b e r that in his time
this involved analyzing h e a r d s o u n d by taking dictation a n d r e a d i n g aloud.
O n e did not learn to read silently while facing letters which were already
spatially distinct; t h e r e was always the flowing i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f vocal
sound. 6 N o r were t h e r e neat packets o f s o u n d just waiting to be assigned to
distinct letters. T h e s o u n d equivalents o f one letter are f r e q u e n t l y quite
varied a l l o p h o n e s o f the same p h o n e m e . O n e must learn to s e g m e n t the
s o u n d stream. Are the "p" o f "pin" a n d that o f "spin" the same s o u n d ? T h e
answer varies in English and in Greek. T h e same articulation can be part o f
different phonemes.
Gosling seems to miss the point w h e n he discusses learning one's letters in
5 Cf. J. Stenzel, Plato's Method ofDDDialectic, tr. D. Allen (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,
194o), p. 142 and p. 125: "The particular only is in so far as it is this; and Io be th~ means to
have, or to fall under, this ~6og. Otherwise it is quite impossible to grasp the object, and even
&~o0"qotgcan only do so in a spurious way. Until we have grasped how the ~6og and the sensible
particular are correlated, the latter remains unknowable; it is not 'one' but 'indefinite'
(6n~tQov)." Stenzel assumes, however, that "one" and "~tnetQov" apply here only to the particulars, which seems unlikely. On this cf. A. E. Lloyd, "Plato's Description of Division," in R. Allen,
Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 225.
6 In his Confessions (VI, 3) Augustine records his puzzled astonishment at discovering
Ambrose reading silently to himself. Augustine's forced explanations of why Ambrose would
read in this unusual way testify to the opposite custom.

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terms o f a visual example. " T h e letter C can be recognized, but knowing it is

knowing it is a c o n s o n a n t , not a vowel, a n d what kind o f c o n s o n a n t it is, a n d
so on" (172, my emphasis). H e is right, the p r i n t e d letter "C" can be recognized, but this is because we already have a n o t h e r classification individuating
written letters by spatial separation. W o u l d it be so easy to recognize in a
strange-flowing script? But the sound "C" c a n n o t even be recognized e x c e p t by
learning the relevant contrasts and classification. In Plato's e x a m p l e t h e r e is
no place for Gosling's s h a r p separation between recognition o f the letter as
an individual a n d k n o w l e d g e o f what sort o f individual it is. T h e u t h realized
we could not learn letters in isolation f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , because their identity comes t h r o u g h the contrasts in which they stand. I n d i v i d u a t i o n a n d
classification o c c u r t o g e t h e r . 7
It might seem that the point I have b e e n m a k i n g concerns o u r k n o w l e d g e
o f entities and not the entities themselves. But sounds are e x p e r i e n c e s a n d
e x p e r i e n c e s are entities. T h e Philebus is c o n c e r n e d with o u r e x p e r i e n c e since
its main subject, pleasure, resides there. It is particularly a p p r o p r i a t e to his
ethical discussion that Plato discuss the classification and individuation o f
experiences. " E x p e r i e n c e , " however, is a d a n g e r o u s word to use since it is a
m o d e r n notion with c o n n o t a t i o n s f r o m Descartes and Kant. We must rem e m b e r that, for the Greeks the subject-object division was not the f u n d a mental cleft in the world it later became. W h e n Plato talks o f sensations o r
pleasures he is talking o f t h e m ontologically as items o n a par with trees a n d
t r a d e s p e o p l e , not as items in some p r i o r epistemological realm. Experiences
are entities like any other. I n s o f a r as all entities have m e a s u r e and limit in
their constitution, so will experiences. It may s o u n d paradoxical to say that
we can be u n s u r e a b o u t the complexity o f the individuation o f o u r experiences, but this betrays how d e e p l y we are influenced by an atomistic psychology that builds u p e x p e r i e n c e f r o m bits which are unclassified but already
individuated as o n e sensation o r one e x p e r i e n c e each.
Plato's physiology does not suggest an atomist psychology. Plato correlates pleasures to processes o f b u i l d u p and b r e a k d o w n within the o r g a n i s m
(Philebus 33ff). S o m e o f these may reach the soul. T h e r e are m a n y such
r h y t h m i c processes going o n at any one time; m a n y o f t h e m reach the soul
together. In addition, the soul has its own r h y t h m i c processes. T h e s e
7plato's o t h e r example, musical notes (17b-e), can be read in a way c o n s o n a n t with that o f
T h e u t h . O n e starts with indeterminately multiple sound, with areas o f differing pitch, then
distinguishes intervals as p h e n o m e n a repeatable at d i f f e r e n t pitches, then tones as the ends o f
intervals, then arrives at scales as species containing rules for individuating s o u n d into notes
related by contrasts and measures. T h e music e x a m p l e is less convincing, p e r h a p s because we
have easily available other ways o f individuating musical sounds (by strings on a lyre, holes in a
flute, etc.).

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r h y t h m s are all s u p e r p o s e d u p o n each other. T h e s u p e r p o s i t i o n o f v a r y i n g

f r e q u e n c i e s does not obligingly sort itself out into a linear series o f discrete
atomic stimuli to be c o r r e l a t e d with a parallel linear series o f discrete a t o m i c
experiences.
I f we reject psychological a t o m i s m we obtain a s t r o n g e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
the ethical a r g u m e n t in the dialogue. C o n s i d e r the passage w h e r e Plato
discusses a life o f p u r e p l e a s u r e without intelligence. P r o t a r c h u s suggests a
life o f c o m p l e t e p l e a s u r e would be j u s t fine. Socrates replies:
But if you lacked thought, memory, knowledge, and true opinion, surely to begin
with, you couldn't know even whether you were enjoying yourself or not, since you
would lack all intelligence.--True.--What is more, in the same way, as you would
lack memory, you would be unable to remember that you did enjoy yourself on any
occasion, and no recollection at all of pleasure at one moment would survive to the
next. Since you would lack the capacity for true judgment you would not judge that
you were enjoying yourself when you were, and lacking the ability to predict you
would be unable to predict your future pleasures. It wouldn't be a human life at all,
but a jelly-fish existence, or the life of one of those sea-things that live in shells.
Aren't I right? (Philebus 2 lC, Gosling's Translation.)
Gosling r e a d s this passage with an atomist psychology. A life o f p u r e pleasure w o u l d be a s t r e a m o f c o n s t a n t p l e a s u r e - e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t the e x p e r i e n c e r would be u n a b l e to reflectively j u d g e (or r e m e m b e r or predict) that he
was enjoying. T h e s t r e a m o f e x p e r i e n c e s would lack intellectual a n d reflective additions to the p l e a s u r e e x p e r i e n c e s . T h u s it would be a m e r e a n i m a l
s t r e a m o f life. Gosling shows that this fails to p r o v e that the p l e a s u r e s o f
such a b e i n g would not be m o r e pleasurable, a n d concludes
Socrates' point gets its pull, of course, as an appeal to the individual honestly to
declare his preferences. Doubtless most of us would show some opposition to a
proposal to reduce us to the condition of contented jelly-fishes, at least at the level of
declared preference. It may be that Socrates should be read as conducting an ad
hominem examination of Protarchus, which Plato hopes will elicit the same admission
from any honest reader (182).
T h e r e m a y be m o r e to the a r g u m e n t t h a n Gosling sees. His i n t e r p r e t a tion p r e s u p p o s e s that the s t r e a m o f p l e a s u r e - e x p e r i e n c e s without intelligence is in itself unified a n d distinct a n d that intelligence would e n t e r the
s t r e a m o f e x p e r i e n c e s simply as a new kind o f e x p e r i e n c e , like a new color
b e a d o n a string. I f we question these p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s we see the role o f
intelligence as m o r e c o m p l e x . T h a t few h u m a n s would choose it does not
p r o v e the life o f an oyster o r jelly-fish i n h u m a n ; it m i g h t be o n e o f those
precious things that are as difficult as they are rare. R a t h e r Plato claims we
n e e d intelligence in o r d e r to h a v e a n y t h i n g that could be called one t e m p o rally unified life o f e n j o y m e n t . Gosling suggests that Plato is trying to p r o v e
that "realizing o n e is e n j o y i n g o n e s e l f is p r e f e r r e d to j u s t e n j o y i n g o n e s e l f "

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(183). But perhaps Plato's point is that one cannot "enjoy oneself" without
realizing one is enjoying oneself'.
Plato has argued in the earlier examples that we need the limit and the
unlimited to have knowledge. It is striking that the modes of knowledge
Plato suggests to avoid the fate of the oyster are explicitly correlated to the
three parts of time. Without memory you would not know that you have
enjoyed (~X(xtQegIpast). Without true opinion about yourself you would not
know you were enjoying (XctiQovzctIpresent). Without calculated expectations about the future you would not expect future pleasure ()~cttffr~oetgI
future). A h u m a n life, as opposed to any oyster's, demands temporal unity.
This time-binding demands knowledge which will make a one out of indefinitely multiple temporal flux. Applying Theuth's method, we can only divide the moments from one another ("I am experiencing this pleasure now")
when we have intermediate contrasting unities for the parts of time. It is
only because we can unify time into a one and divide it into the intermediates of the three temporal dimensions that we can experience the present
pleasure as one individual pleasure among many, as a pleasure, and as our
own. Without this temporal one-and-many the stream of experiences is
neither a stream nor experience.
Plato has two "Kantian" insights: the need of a conceptual structure for
there to be experience of individuals, and the need of temporal synthesis fi)r
there to be experience at all. Plato links these by making the temporal
synthesis one sort of conceptual synthesis. None of this turns Plat() into
Kant. Plat() does not make the distinctively Kantian move of reversing the
dependence and holding temporal synthesis essential to our possessing concepts. Nor does he in the Philebus separate "transcendental categories" from
"empirical concepts" except by generality. Plato also differs from Kant in
subordinating discussion of experience to the more general ontological discussion of limit and unlimited; the examination of knowledge has no special
privilege. Plato is not doing epistemology but ontology; he gives necessary
ontological conditions for entities, including experiences, but not transcendental conditions for experience as such.
This reading of the oyster passage does not make it a fully convincing
argument. It remains to be shown that the h u m a n life is better than the
oyster's existence. This value j u d g m e n t is implied since h u m a n life contains
more complex unity, but such a criterion would not convince Philebus. Still,
on this reading Plato is making more than an ad hominem argument. It is
more than men's preferences which keep them from choosing the life of
pure pleasure without intelligence. Plato is trying to show the inconsistency
of the picture of a life containing nothing but pleasures which can still be
called my life in any meaningful sense.

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T h e u t h has taught us that we need differentiated concepts if we are to

know individuals. No knowledge without n u m b e r . T h e oyster teaches us that
we need knowledge to achieve the temporal unity of a life o f pleasure. No
pleasure without knowledge. T h e f u r t h e r conclusion Plato draws throughout the dialogue: no pleasure without n u m b e r . What may seem the greatest
pleasures, great just because they go beyond n u m b e r and moderation, by
that very excess threaten to disorganize life so that the experience o f pleasure is destroyed.
It is not surprising, then, that at the end of the dialogue it is the family o f
knowledge that is allowed to exclude some o f the family of pleasures which
will "prevent us [knowledge] f r o m ever coming into existence" (63d). T o
exist at all in a world where beings are mixtures of limit and unlimited
d e m a n d s constant care for balance and proportion, lest we lose reality. I f
pleasures become i m m o d e r a t e they will disrupt the time-binding and determining m i x t u r e of limit and umlimited; h u m a n experience will stop. As
always in Plato, the full opposite of an o r d e r e d life is no life at all.
In the course o f his a r g u m e n t s for measure Plato not only reclassifies but
reindividuates pleasures. 8 If what was said earlier about the connection of
classification and individuation is true, then the new species into which
Socrates divides the genus o f pleasures carry the possibility o f new modes of
individuation. We cannot suppose we are dealing with a fixed d o m a i n of
experiences already clearly identified as one pleasure or one pain each. In
fact, Plato tries to show that not all pleasures are simple felt states; he
changes the kinds of individuality some pleasures possess.
Philebus's original description (1 lb) suggests pleasures are unit experiences to be evaluated by criteria of intensity and quantity. By the end o f the
dialogue Plato has arrived at a variety of kinds of pleasures on m a n y different levels o f individuality: simple true pleasures, mixed pleasures, pleasure
at desires of pleasure, pleasurable comparative j u d g m e n t s of pleasure, pleasurable memories of pleasures, pleasurable anticipations, pleasures at the
relations o f pleasures, not to mention all the varieties of pain and the mixtures o f pleasure and pain. Seemingly simple pleasures, such as enjoying a
glass of water or laughing at a comedy, are shown to be complexes of m a n y
kinds o f interlocking experience. We do not just reclassify our pleasure at
the comedy; we analyze it and discover it has internal complexity. O n e
pleasure or pain can be a c o m p o n e n t of another. O u r a m u s e m e n t at the
c o m e d y is a pleasure, but it is a complex of other experiences as well.
If it is true that pleasures must be individuated in this more varied way,
Plato also re-individuates fields of knowledge, as is clear from the discussion of the two
arithmetics and the summary at 57D.

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that pleasures do not all have the same kinds of individuality, then it is difficult to apply the simple criterion of quantity to their evaluation. T r u t h and
falsity, mixture and purity, will assume a new importance in our evaluations.
This reading might also open an approach to Plato's notion of true and
false pleasures. When pleasures are taken as atomic experiences their "falsity" can only mean the falsity of a related j u d g m e n t which leaves the pleasure itself unchanged. If, however, pleasures can be individuated in other
ways, if something can be a compound experience and still be a pleasure,
then j u d g m e n t can be built into pleasures more intimately and pleasures
may be false in a stronger sense. "True" pleasures, on the other hand, are
not true by virtue of any related judgment. Their truth is that of "true
reality." Their internal structure is simple; in themselves, in their q~oLg
(52b3) they require no reference to another temporal moment to complete
them or to make them harmoniously pleasurable. This would seem to pose
problems for my interpretation since true pleasures look suspiciously like
psychological atoms. T r u e pleasures might, however, be thought of as the
pleasure-equivalents of prime numbers and harmonious ratios, not psychological atoms so much as self-contained units like those musical chords that
imply no build-up and d e m a n d no resolution. In his physiological section
Plato does not speak of a series of discrete bodily states but of superposed
rhythms; analogously, the true pleasures might be thought of as the experienced correlates of harmoniously bound body or soul rhythms, as the physical atoms of the Timaeus are mathematically bound flux.
I have tried to purge a residual empiricism from the interpretation of the
Philebus by removing psychological atomism from Plato's examples and ethical argument. It is a familiar theme in Plato's writings that complex entities
like cities or personalities are built from components whose mixture is correct when it approaches a norm given by the Form of the object or quality in
question. Joining the rejection of psychological atomism with the account of
physical atoms given in the Timaeus we see that the physical and psychological components themselves contain measure and limit rather than brutely
given qualities.
What of the Forms? Most interpretations of Plato treat the Forms much
as the myth in the Timaeus presents them, as given eternal exemplars, with
all questions terminated in the claim that a certain form just does contain a
certain quality in its definition.
The Philebus, however, speaks of our arriving at proper classifications and
proper divisions of genera by a process of finding measure. T h e u t h works at
making his classifications. In so doing he not only determines the indefinite
plurality of speech sound into individual units, he determines the generic
universal "speech sound" into species in a harmonious and complete manner. As he encounters the indefinitely multiple sound already distinguished

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507

in s o m e way ( f r o m smells a n d sights), so he e n c o u n t e r s unity as a definite

g e n u s n e e d i n g f u r t h e r specification. T h e s e are not two e n c o u n t e r s , b u t two
sides o f the s a m e process. W e e n c o u n t e r n e i t h e r indefiniteness n o r unity by
themselves, n o r can we e n c o u n t e r either in a p u r e state.
T o c o m e to k n o w a F o r m is to g r a s p the s t r u c t u r e d m o d u l a t i o n o f unity
in s o m e a p p r o p r i a t e field. T h e u t h ' s active specifying o f the generic universal
r e p r e s e n t s o u r a r r i v i n g at k n o w l e d g e o f the Forms. T h e r e is a notable absence h e r e o f the a p p e a l s to intuition m a d e in earlier dialogues. Also a b s e n t
is a process o f abstraction f r o m already given d e t e r m i n a t e particulars. T h e
universal is specified a n d the particulars d e t e r m i n e d t o g e t h e r . T h i s process
s e e m s to m i r r o r , in o u r knowing, the " g e n e r a t i o n " o f the F o r m s themselves.
Aristotle speaks o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f the f o r m s out o f the o n e a n d the
indefinite d y a d (Metaphysics I, 6; X I V , 1, etc.). While the details o f this
d o c t r i n e a r e far f r o m clear, e n o u g h can be m a d e out to show that the
picture o f Plato positing b r u t e l y given F o r m s is wrong. It is not e n o u g h to
claim that the F o r m s are i n t e r r e l a t e d a n d m i x e d with o n e a n o t h e r in the
fashion described in the Sophist. T h e r e is an o r d e r o f g e n e r a t i o n involved as
well. It is t r u e that the F o r m s a r e eternally what they are. Yet this is not a
b r u t e fact. T h e F o r m s are as they a r e because they are the h a r m o n i o u s
m o d u l a t i o n s o f unity into multiplicity. T h e y could no m o r e be d i f f e r e n t t h a n
t h i r t e e n could cease to be a p r i m e n u m b e r . B u t t h i r t e e n is not a b r u t e fact; it
arises f r o m the g e n e r a t i o n o f the n u m b e r s by the m i x i n g o f unity a n d the
indefinite dyad. 9
It seems likely Plato h o p e d that all the Forms, their qualities a n d interrelationships, could be d e r i v e d as h a r m o n i o u s sets o f ratios, n a t u r a l points o f
unity in the c o m b i n i n g o f limit a n d unlimited. T h e p r o p o s a l h o p e d f o r a
system o f necessary t r u t h s a b o u t the n a t u r e s o f all things, d e r i v e d f r o m the
f u n d a m e n t a l relations o f unity a n d multiplicity. T h o u g h n e v e r realized, this
p r o g r a m could have i n s p i r e d m a n y r e s e a r c h projects at the A c a d e m y .
A s s u m i n g that Aristotle is not totally m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g Plato, t h e r e is the
p r o b l e m o f relating the " u n w r i t t e n d o c t r i n e s " with the ontological discussions in the Philebus. E n o u g h o f the u n w r i t t e n doctrines can be related to the
Philebus to show that Plato is not t h e r e an ontological atomist c o n c e r n i n g the
Forms. T h e claim at 16c t h a t all entities are c o m p o s e d o f limit a n d u n l i m i t e d
fits with, t h o u g h it n e e d not e x p r e s s directly, the u n w r i t t e n d o c t r i n e s ? ~ T h e
question is m o r e o b s c u r e in c o n n e c t i o n with the f o u r f o l d division o f entities
Cf. Findlay's intriguing conjectures on how this might have been envisaged, and the
special role played by the prime numbers (Plato, pp. 67-7o ).
'" As is clear from the general movement of this essay, I accept the traditional translation
of 16c9 as referring to all entitles, rather than Striker's revised translation referring only to the
Forms. The arguments used by Pamela Huby in her review of Striker's book (Classical Review
XXII (197~), p. 333) and Gosling (Plato's Philebus, p. 84) seem convincing.

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into "limited," "unlimited," "mixed," a n d "cause" ( 2 3 c - 2 6 d ) . Explaining this

division, Plato states that the m i x t u r e o f limit a n d unlimited is carried o u t by
nous, with r e f e r e n c e to both o u r souls a n d the world soul. This mixing
activity is also c o n n e c t e d to wisdom a n d knowledge, which are said not to
exist except in souls. T h i s poses no p r o b l e m for the m i x t u r e o f limit a n d
unlimited relevant to the ethical topics discussed. But were we to apply this
description to the F o r m s themselves we would be blocked. For t h e r e is no
sense o f "cause" acceptable to Plato in which o n e could say that soul is the
cause o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f the F o r m s f r o m the o n e a n d the indefinite dyad.
T o read the u n w r i t t e n doctrines straight into the f o u r | o l d classification o f
the Philebus requires serious r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . With Jackson, o n e could t u r n
Plato's d o c t r i n e into idealism, but this seems anachronistic in the e x t r e m e . "
With the Neoplatonists a n d Findlay o n e could read the cause, nous, not as
single souls but as the F o r m o f soul, an eternal Intellect which both is a F o r m
a n d contains the Forms. '~ This, however, would be to read the entire Neoplatonic h i e r a r c h y into the Philebus, a m o v e which, I a r g u e below, goes
against Plato's intent. I n a similar vein o n e could interpret wisdom a n d
k n o w l e d g e as r e f e r r i n g to F o r m s f r o m which others could be derived. While
this could be m a d e c o n g r u e n t with Plato's overall doctrine, it is expressly
e x c l u d e d as a m e a n i n g for this text.
We should c o n c l u d e that the unwritten doctrines are not expressed directly in the f o u r f o l d classification, t h o u g h the doctrines are not e x c l u d e d
either. In addition, as Striker argues, both some F o r m s (e.g., Heat) a n d some
c o n c r e t e objects (e.g., i m p u r e pleasures) are included in the g e n u s o f the
unlimited. T h e ethical application o f the f o u r f o l d classification suggests that
"unlimited" o r "indefinite" includes those F o r m s a n d those particulars which
lack a definite ratio o r n u m b e r that makes t h e m p e r f e c t o f their kind, a n d
are always relative to a more-and-less and to c o n t r a s t i n g items. T h e r e is no
highest heat n o r any definite t e m p e r a t u r e which is perfect heat, while there
are such rules a n d ratios for F o r m s such as horse or man. '~ T h e s e points
suggest that the u n w r i t t e n doctrines be seen in the b a c k g r o u n d . H a d the
" Henry Jackson, in a series of articles in the Journal of Philology which appeared from
1882 through 1886 (vols. X through XV) argued that after the self-criticism found in the
Parmenides, Plato modified his theory in a way which eliminated the presence of the Forms in
sensible particulars and made of the theory a "thoroughgoing idealism" in which each Form is
"a thought which is eternally present in the universal mind (or which would be eternally present
in the universal mind, if in passing into time and space it retained its universality). Particulars
are the same thought imperfectly actualized by finite minds in [perceived] time and space" (Vol.
XIII, p. ~43). The phenomenalistic use to which the concept of mind is put in this theory is
more nineteenth-century than Greek.
'~ Cf. Findlay, pp. 281-295 for an account in this spirit.
~:~ Striker, pp. 41-68.

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p r o g r a m which Aristotle r e p o r t s b e e n capable o f b e i n g carried out, it would

have p r o v i d e d an e x p l a n a t i o n why the ratios that d e t e r m i n e a horse are
what they are, a n d why some F o r m s n e e d f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , given their
place in the generative scheme.
Striker also wishes to argue, however, that the "unlimited" c a n n o t be
seen as an e l e m e n t in entities. '4 This conclusion seems unnecessarily strict.
T h e t e r m ~t~etOov can be applied o n a variety o f levels. Striker h e r s e l f
shows several: the generic universal, the multiplicity o f particulars, particular individual pleasures. T h e s e all have in c o m m o n that in themselves o r in
their c o n t e x t they d e m a n d o r allow f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n . While we cannot m a k e any simple e q u a t i o n o f the "unlimited" with o n e constant e l e m e n t
in all entities, we can see it describing m a n y d i f f e r e n t levels o f i n d e t e r m i n a tion. T h e need o f m e a s u r e a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n holds equally a n d with no
special p r i m a c y for atoms o f fire, pleasures, politics, perceptions, a n d personalities, with all their d i f f e r i n g kinds o f c o m p o n e n t s a n d o f indefiniteness. This is not so d i f f e r e n t f r o m Aristotle's flexibility with "matter" a n d
"potentiality."
W h e n T h e u t h is inventing letters, he faces i n d e t e r m i n a t e l y multiple
sound, already distinguished in a generic way f r o m o t h e r kinds o f experience. P r e s u m a b l y we never face the simply indeterminate, for to do so would
be to lack any experience. I n so far as we can e x p e r i e n c e the i n d e t e r m i n a t e
it is already de-scribed o r de-limited in some generic way. So too w h e n e v e r
entities, be they F o r m s or particulars, are described as i n d e t e r m i n a t e the
entities will be already d e t e r m i n a t e in some o t h e r way. T h u s the fact that the
"unlimited" o f the f o u r f o l d classification is a g e n u s of" entities a n d not some
p u r e potential like Aristotle's p r i m a r y m a t t e r need not force us to d e n y that
d e t e r m i n a t e entities can be c o m p o s e d , on various d i f f e r e n t levels, o f the
i n d e t e r m i n a t e plus m e a s u r e o r limit. '5
T h e u n w r i t t e n doctrines again stand in the b a c k g r o u n d , uniting this
flexible use o f the term "unlimited" into a generative series o f specifications
o f the i n d e t e r m i n a t e dyad. T h e d y a d would "be" a purely i n d e t e r m i n a t e
principle, but it is not an entity. T o m a k e such a generative series plausible it
,4 Striker, pp. 45-5 o. I do not deal with all of Striker's arguments on this question nor
with her overly restrictive hermeneutic principle about what it means to take the text "on its
own." Striker (and Gosling's) various other arguments against seeing limit and unlimited as
elements in things can be met, I think, by a position which (a) refuses to separate knowing
particulars from knowing universals, (b) links classification and individuation, (c) has more
flexible and multi-leveled notions of the limit and unlimited, and (d) makes unifying back
ground reference to the unwritten doctrines. The interpretation still has difficulties with 16el2 (dismissing units into the indeterminate).
~ I am bypassing the question whether the Philebt~ does or does not presuppose the
distinction drawn in the Statesman between limit in general and normative measure (283-285).

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would be necessary to link the indefinite dyad and the Receptacle discussed
in the Timaeus. T h e Receptacle can be seen as a specification of the indefinite
dyad into the realm o f space. 16 T h e two are related as a generically determined to a simply indefinite principle. Plato seems to have thought that the
progressive limitation of the dyad described in geometrical terms eventually
produced the spatio-temporal indeterminate, which by the fact of its spatiality is generically determinate. Aristotle indicates in his criticism of Plato in
Metaphysics lo9oa 23- 9 that there is one indefinite principle, which "cries
out at the way it gets dragged about" into what Aristotle thinks are too many
different generative processes.
The unwritten doctrines stand behind the Philebus, not as necessary presuppositions but as a fuller story which, had Plato been able to complete it,
would have unified the discussion of limit and unlimited and would have
explained the details of their application to Forms and particulars. This
means that the Philebus suggests and the unwritten doctrines confirm that
Plato is nowhere an ontological atomist. There are no beings which are
brutely given as what they are. All determinations are generated by processes which are ideally those of harmonious measure; the question "why?" is
in principle answerable for any determination, based only on the notions of
unity and indefinite miltiplicity and their combination into a set of necessary
structures.'7
Plato could have reconciled his dualisms more easily had he asserted the
unchallenged primacy of the principle of unity and made it the source of the
principle o f indetermination, as do the Neoplatonists. Plato himself has little
or nothing to say about the basic principles of unity and indefiniteness
themselves. This is not coyness; as the ontological conditions of possibility
for any definite entity, the limit and the unlimited are not themselves definite entities to be spoken about. The Neoplatoists do ask and answer questions about the ultimate principles in themselves. Emanation and ~ntoxQoq~,
the power of the One which by its being makes a counterspace as it over,5 "According to Plato the one and the indefinite dyad, which he spoke of as the great and
small, are the principles of all things and even o f the Forms themselves. So Aristotle reports in
his work On the Good" (Alexander, quoted by Simplicius in his commentary on Physics 187a12,
translated by Findlay, Plato, p. 4x4). Cf. also the passages translated on p. 44 x concerning the
Timae~, and Aristotle, Metaphysics ~o85a 7-14 for the series "number, line, surface, volume" and
the reference to "species" of the indefinite dyad.
,7 This is not quite true. Plato, like Aristotle, seems to dismiss accidental determinations as
not knowable by a science o f dialectic such as he proposes. The doctrine of infimae species implies
this conclusion for both thinkers; cf. PosteriorAnalytics I, 4(73b15ff). The problem whether (and
if so where) to draw the line between determinations which are accidental and those which can
be necessarily known plagues thinkers who reject ontological atomism.

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flOWS a n d t u r n s b a c k r e c e p t i v e l y t o w a r d s its o r i g i n , ~8 t h e s e m a k e a s t o r y
P l a t o n e v e r tells. W h e t h e r h e w o u l d a p p r o v e o f it we d o n o t k n o w . I a m
i n c l i n e d to t h i n k h e w o u l d n o t , f o r it g i v e s c o m p l e t e p r i m a c y to t h e p r i n c i p l e
o f u n i t y , t u r n i n g P l a t o ' s c a r e f u l l y m a i n t a i n e d t e n s i o n i n t o a n e p i s o d e in t h e
s t o r y o f t h e r e t u r n to t h e O n e . P l a t o n e v e r m a k e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t y t h e
source of the principle of indetermination) 9 Unlike the Neoplatonists, Plato
does not make mystical union the express goal of philosophy. In the middle
d i a l o g u e s , a p p r o a c h e s to final u n i t y (in t h e Republic a n d t h e Symposium) a r e
immediately linked with generativity and measure here below, though the
n e e d to f o r c e p h i l o s o p h e r s b a c k i n t o t h e c a v e i n d i c a t e s P l a t o k n e w t h e r e was
a p r o b l e m a b o u t this. Still, t h e activities o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o h a v e esc a p e d t h e c a v e l o o k m o r e l i k e d i s c u s s i o n s in t h e A c a d e m y t h a n P l o t i n i a n
r a p t u r e . T h e y a r e e x p l o r i n g t h e w o r l d o f F o r m s , n o t s t a r i n g at t h e s u n . I n
t h e e t h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e Philebus it is b a l a n c e we a r e to m a i n t a i n , n o t
t r a n s c e n d e n c e . T h e j u d g m e n t o f lives s k e t c h e d at Philebus 66 d o e s n o t r a n k
as first a n y m y s t i c a l u n i o n . P l a t o e m p h a s i z e s m e a s u r e , w h i c h is u n i t y a l w a y s
i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e u n l i m i t e d . G i v e n t h e w a y P l a t o links his e t h i c s to his o n t o l o g y , this s u g g e s t s t h a t h e h a d n o o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of"
u n i t y was s o m e h o w the u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e , as d o t h e N e o p l a t o n i s t s . ~''
T h i s a r t i c l e h a s s h o w n t h a t P l a t o is n o t a n o n t o l o g i c a l a t o m i s t o n a n y
level. P l a t o in t h e Philebus tells us to m a i n t a i n o u r s e l v e s in t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n a u n i t y w h i c h is n e v e r c o m p l e t e a n d a d i s u n i t y w h i c h is n e v e r total.

Bates College
,8 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, II, 4; VI, 4. Plato employes dualities derived both from Parmenides and from Pythagoras. While the Parmenidean dualities (true being vs. illusion, intelligible
vs. sensible) are exclusive, dividing the world or denying it, the Pythagorean duality (limit and
unlimited) is complementary, co-prese m everywhere uniting the levels of being into a generative series. Parmenidean separatism and Pythagorean continuity of generation are never completely reconciled in Plato's text, and their tense interplay makes much that is provocative and
profound in his thought. Plotinus was himself caught between a Parmenidean-descended dualism, and a continuity of generation even stronger than Plato's. S. E. Gersh, Kin~sis Akin~tos, A
Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden: Brill, 1973), discusses the problems of
this eternal generation.
,9 Though Findlay would argue against this claim (Plato, p. 778) he does not seem to be
finding the full doctrines of emanation and ~zttox0o~ in Plato. Cf. also Philip Merlan, From
Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968 ) on the complications added to the problems of generation by the mathematicals.
~" It has become fashionable lately, following claims of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to see in
Plato the distant origin of modern nihilism. While it is true that Plato wants life to be lived
under the thought of unity, and the reality of things to be made fully present, which is deemed
to be the fatal move, would the results Nietzsche and Heidegger complain of exist if the
Neoplatonists had not made the principle of unity dominant and actively infinite?