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Constitutional law 1
FULGENCIO
S.
Facts:
This is a taxpayers class suit in petition for upholding the
constitutional right of the Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology. The principal petitioners were all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents praying for
the cancelation of timber license agreement.
The minors assert that they "represent their generation as well
as
generations
yet
unborn.",
particularly
invoking
intergenerational responsibility. They prayed, that judgment
be rendered to order honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and other persons acting on his behalf to:
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. Yes, they are upholding their rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16.
The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15.
The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
****
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that
the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable,
if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous
and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Answer to issue # 2
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph
of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Answer to issue # 3
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:
Sec. 10.
No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
***
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state.
Facts:
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
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Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC.
Only two bidders participated Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, with a higher bid at P44.00
per share
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner sends a letter to GSIS to match the bid price
of P44.00 per share and sent a managers check as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad but GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid petitioner filed for prohibition and mandamus.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution, since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy they should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
One of the GSIS claims is that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation.
Issue:
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Is GSIS correct when it says Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation?
Court Ruling:
The second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony.
***
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted
to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium..
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
provides that:
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Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. Yes, in the case at bar, court have judicial
power of review over the impeachment proceedings.
Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. This Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result
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Facts:
Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and
the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
Antecedent facts:
The Senate of the Philippines, on their first regular session of
the eleventh Congress conducted an election of officers. Sen.
Marcelo B. Fernan was nominated to the position of Senate
President by Sen. Blas Ople. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was
also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago.
By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate. Also elected were Senator
Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as
majority leader.
Issues:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Did Sen. Fernan gravely abuse of discretion in recognizing
Sen. Guingona as minority leader?
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue #1. Yes, the court assumed jurisdiction over
the petition.
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to
resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
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***
Title:
DR.
EMIGDIO
A.
BONDOC
vs
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, G.R. No.
97710
Facts:
Dr. Emigdio Bondoc filed a petition to annul the decision of the
House of Representatives of to withdraw and rescind the
nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Issue a writ of
prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in
place of respondent Camasura, a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and
discharge his functions as a member of HRET, and to be
granted such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Antecedent facts:
On May 11, 1987 election, Marciano M. Pineda of LDP and Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were candidates
for Representative of 4th District on Pampanga. Marciano M.
Pineda was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Bondoc filed
an election protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. Recount has been made.
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ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
***
***
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notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1 . Yes. Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy.
Court ruled they have jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
***
ISSUE:
Answer to issue # 2.
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prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.
***
***:
As per Section 17, Article 3 of the Philippine Constitution,
Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(Article 3 SECTION 17 Phil. Const). The Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Facts:
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Mendozas motion for reconsideration, "without justification
and despite repeated pleas precipitated the desperate resort
to hostage-taking. The IIRC recommended the referral of its
findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally
charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for
Misconduct in Office.
On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged
and dismissed him from the service.21 According to the OP,
"the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendozas] Motion for Reconsideration [that spanned for nine
(9) long months] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and
"constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the
Ombudsmans own Rules of Procedure.
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
Issue:
Was the action of the Office of the President to dismiss
Gonzalez constitutional?
Court Ruling:
In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108
the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision
***
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of
the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses
and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No
6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
***
Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have
been expressly labeled as independent." The extent of the
independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant
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specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will.
Based on the report, the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac,
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, had the worst terrorism during and
after the election, and that if the elections held in those
provinces were annulled as demanded by the circumstances
mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not
have been declared elected;
When the Senate convened , it approved a resolution referring
to the report and ordering that, pending the termination of the
protest lodged against their election, the herein petitioners,
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had
been included among the sixteen candidates for senator
receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.
As per Senate, it is essential, in order to maintain alive the
respect for democratic institutions among our people, that no
man or group of men be permitted to profit from the results of
an election held under coercion, in violation of law, and
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should
underlie all elections under the Constitution;
Issue:
Does the court have jurisdiction over this case at bar?
Court Ruling:
***
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.