Set 3 Case Digest Consti

SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada
Constitutional law 1
Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: International Treaty
Title: Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662
26, 1949
March
Facts:
warfare and that petitioner is charged of crimes which are

not based on law; (2) Participation of the United States
attorneys and their appointments is a violation of the
constitution since they are not attorneys authorized by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines; (3)
US attorneys are not proper parties in interest in the
case.
Issue:
This is a case of war crime against Shigenori Kuroda who

were charged under Hague Convention.
Can Kuruda be charged of crimes under Hague

Convention?
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the

Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 19444 who is now charged
before a military Commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties
as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war" comes
before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S.
Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military
Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents
from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
Court Ruling:
Yes.
In accordance with Article 2 of our Constitution
provides in its section 3 that The Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principle of international law as part of
the law of nation.
(1) The Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague

Convention on rules and regulations covering land
Under the Incorporation clause, the generally

accepted principles of international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. The petition of Kuroda will
not prosper, for even though the Philippines is not a
signatory of the Hague Convention, the fact that the
convention is with regards to generally accepted
principles of international law, the Philippines is bound to
adopt it automatically even without legislative
authorization.
The crime charged against the petitioner is based
on law, for, the President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate the unfinished aspect of war,
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through

the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68,
which is in conformity with the generally accepted
principles of international law. The Executive Order No.
68 is constitutional, thus the military commission has
jurisdiction over it.

Topic: Doctrine of Icorporation
Title: PHILIP MORRIS, INC., vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
AND
FORTUNE
TOBACCO
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 91332
Facts:
PHILIP MORRIS, INC , "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and
LARK filed a preliminary injunction against Fortune
Tobacco Corporation claiming that it has no right to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the identical or
confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of
Section 22 of the Trademark Law.
Fortune Tobacco
alleged further that it has been
authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark
"MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which
cannot be exclusively appropriated.
The prayer for preliminary injunction was denied file,
premised upon the following propositions:
Plaintiffs are not doing business in the Philippines .This
simply means that they are not engaged in the sale,
manufacture, importation, exportation and advertisement
of their cigarette products in the Philippines.
Plaintiffs asserts that their trademarks are entitled to
protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris
Convention of which the Philippines is a member and
ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the
Philippines and as such, have the force and effect of law
under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and
since this is an action for a violation or infringement of a
trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere
allegation is sufficient even in the absence of proof to
support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the
issue in the main case to determine whether or not there
has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such
trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is
disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Can the international law of trademark overrule our local
trademark law?
Court Ruling:
Withal, the fact that international law has been made

part of the law of the land does not by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
applied in most countries, rules of international law are
given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislative enactments
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

In this case, the respondent is asserting his rights of due
process by requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he
be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings
on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
***
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is
that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a prerequisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark
or a trade name.

Topic: Extradition Treaty
Title: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.HON.
RALPH C. LANTION, G.R. No. 139465
January
18, 2000
Facts:
This concerns the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States, the extradition of Mark
Jimenez , the court is called to decide whether to uphold
citizens right of due process or to comply our duties
under a treaty.
Private respondent also requested that preliminary, he be

given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the
United States Government, and after receiving a copy of
the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his
request.
To which the petitioner answered, they cannot provide
the documents and they can only determine whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law and
treaty have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when
the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by
the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose
any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said
documents.
They are not in a position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "Every

treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool
of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests
for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
Regional Trial court; and from performing any act
directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United
States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58
of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Issue:
Such then , private respondent filed for petition for

mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's
letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and
from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of
private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The court decided in favor of Mark Jimenez and ordered
the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of; from conducting
further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a
Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and

hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming
the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict
between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
Court Ruling:
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be
deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are
not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated

if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as
to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55).
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957];

Topic: International Trade Agreement
Title: ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ,

May 31, 1957
G.R. No. L-7995
Facts:
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines;
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) A prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (3) An exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in
the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of
the City of Manila contend that: (1) The Act was passed
in the valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival; (3) No treaty or
international obligations are infringed;
Issue:
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Whether or not theres a violation of international treaties

and obligations?
no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Court Ruling:
No, there is no violation. The Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights
and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947
guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating
against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights
by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade.
The Supreme Court ruled that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the
law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because

Topic: Extradition Treaty
Title: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
vs HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated
May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
This Petition is a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the

United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April
15, 1999. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
"immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," which prayed that petitioners application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June
5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via
the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in granting the prayer for bail
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
Court Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.
Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it.
Answer to Issue # 1. YES.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section

13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition,
the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The
provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is
subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be
a flight risk or a danger to the community.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not
even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein
respondent
(1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2)
remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well
as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is
there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time?
Answer to Issue # 2. NO.
Potential extradites are entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of
right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will
be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and
the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. He already had
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of

taking it, he ran away.
Respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction,

claimed that the petitioner has no legal standing, no
cause of action , and that the petitioner has not
exhausted all administrative remedies before going to
court.

Topic: Delegation of Power
Title: RAMON A. GONZALES
HECHANOVA, G.R. No. L-21897
1963
Executive Secretary to import the foreign rice; and that,

after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said
injunction permanent.
vs
RUFINO G.
October 22,
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter
against Executive Sec. Hechanova for authorizing
importation of rice from Vietnam and Burma.
The petitioner disputes it us unconstitutional since
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 states "that the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that
only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions.
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given
due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be
forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or
representatives from implementing the decision of the
Respondent assails that the authorized importation is not

governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for
military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged
authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1.
Issue:
Is the authority granted by the President for
importation of rice valid?
the
Court Ruling:
It is unconstitutional.
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals
Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein
- on which our view need not be expressed we are
unanimously of the opinion - assuming that said Republic
Act No. 2207 is still in force that the two Acts are
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

applicable to the proposed importation in question

because the language of said laws is such as to include
within the purview thereof all importations of rice and
corn into the Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No.
2207,
overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of

rice and corn in a manner that would foster and
accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said
commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability
to meet possible national emergency.
"it shall be unlawful for any person, association,

corporation or government agency to import rice and corn
into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of
exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines
may authorize the importation of these commodities
through any government agency that he may designate",
is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are
present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly
enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any
government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of

such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter
would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so
made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the
production of rice.
***
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government,
including those made by and/or for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar
violates this general policy of our Government, aside
from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by
invoking reasons of national security predicated upon
the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the
recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" - and
the alleged powers of the President as Commander-inChief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section
2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1),
***
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the
Government of the Philippines and other officers and
employees of the municipal and provincial governments
and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered
cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments,
offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any
description, including government-owned companies,
authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make
disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for
public use, public buildings, or public works shall give
preference to materials ... produced ... in the Philippines
or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject
to the conditions hereinbelow specified.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of
national security and/or national emergency is within the
purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof
expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to
accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such
quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet

any contingencies".
Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a
national reserve ... be deposited by the administration
throughout the country under the proper dispersal
plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence
of calamities or emergencies ...".
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not
self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives
of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those
objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus,
the conditions under which the services of citizens, as
indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are
provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof
specifies the manner in which resources necessary for
our national defense may be secured by the Government
of the Philippines, but only "during a national
mobilization",9 which does not exist. Inferentially,
therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said
resources shall be produced in such manner as
Congress may by other laws provide from time to time.
Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138
are such laws.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might
have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again
that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the civilian
population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has
a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It
implies that if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the
people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be
rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or
consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the
Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers,
i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the
people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their
own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt
means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway,
those laws permit importation but under certain
conditions, which have not been, and should be complied
with.

Topic: International Trade Agreement
Title: WIGBERTO E. TAADA , et al.vs. EDGARDO
ANGARA,PANGANIBAN, J. et al. G.R. No. 118295 May
2, 1997
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Facts:
This case is a question of constitutionality of the
international treaty our country will be committing through
World Trade Organization.
WTO is revolutionized international business and
economic relations amongst states. WTO can be best
describe by using the words of Peter Drucker, the wellknown management guru, "Increased participation in the
world economy has become the key to domestic
economic growth and prosperity.
However, petitioners claimed that WTO requires the
Philippines "to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or
impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and
the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Petitioners are praying for the nullification of the
Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, asking the
courts constitutionally imposed duty "to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97.
Issue:
1.
Is World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement

unconstitutional?
2. Will the WTO limits the sovereignty of our

country?
Court Ruling:
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign

competition that is unfair.
Answer to issue # 2.
***
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests
more effectively through the WTO than through one-onone negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." These basic principles are found
**
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national
treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules
of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law
encourages industries that are "competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development
of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets
****
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and
passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on
this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision
a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine
of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which
has contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken."
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the

absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact.
Title: People vs Vera , G.R. No. L-45685 November
16, 1937
Facts:
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights.
Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters
as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation
of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims,
the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and
the establishment of international organizations. 46 The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature
of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F.
Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone.
The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of
interdependence is here."

This case is in relation to delegation of legislative

power which is delegated to the provincial board
through the enactment of Act 4221.
People of the Republic of the Philippines and HSBC as
petitioners prayed for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
and of prohibition against the respondent JOSE O. VERA
(presiding Judge of Court of First Instance in Manila),
from taking any further action or entertaining further the
application for probation filed by Mariano Cu Unjieng
under the provisions of Act No. 4221.
History:
Mariano Cu Unjiengs was held guilty in a criminal case
and was at large for 4 years since the judgment was
rendered. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from five years and six months of prision correctional
to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of
prision mayor but applied for probation under the
provisions of Act No. 4221. The Fiscal of the City of
Manila and a private prosecution filed an opposition to
the granting of probation to Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No.
4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the

provincial boards of several provinces.
Act 4221
ACT 4221 AN ACT ESTABLISHING PROBATION
FOR PERSONS, EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR
ABOVE, CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY
THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;
PROVIDING
PROBATION
OFFICERS
THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Issue:
Question of constitutionality on Act 4221 resulting to
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
board.
Court Ruling:
Supreme Court concluded that section 11 of Act No.
4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
***
By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to
determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is
to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act
is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
Section 11 of Act No. 4221 This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee
or delegate of the legislature.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may
be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
The provincial boards may be regarded as

administrative bodies endowed with power to determine
when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces.
In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to
determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in
their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by
the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed
to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by
the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power.
In this case a delegation of authority to POEA has been
questioned. The petitioner here is Eastern Shipping Lines
who own the vessel where Vitaliano Saco was working
and was killed in an accident in Japan. The petitioner
claimed that Saco is not an OFW but just a domestic
employees thus POEA has no jurisdiction over this matter
and it should be the SSS that should take cognizance on
this case.
The petitioner also questions the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Topic: Delegation of Power to Administrative Bodies
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and

P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA
pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which
became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Title: EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs PHILIPPINE

OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION
(POEA), G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
Issue:
Is Memorandum Circular No. 2 created by POEA valid?

Facts:
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
Court Ruling:
Topic: Separation of Church and State
Yes, POEA created under Executive Order No. 797 was
authorized to issue regulations.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National
Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself
prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the
same as the format adopted by the POEA.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
Title: Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Facts:
This case is a petition against RH Law where petitioner
alleged the bill as unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of
the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as
it causes cancer and other health problems.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The
petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public

funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.
Issue:
Is the RH Law unconstitutional based on the grounds
alleged by the petitioner?
Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following
provisions
which
are
declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities
and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage
access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in
the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the

conscientious
objector
in
securing
PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March
19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 ,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not
sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion
in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by
providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe,
non-abortifacient,
effective,
legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes
to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to
religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.

Title: US vs Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122 February
27, 1922
Facts:
In July 30th, 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 2868 granting a legislative power to the Governor
General. Two days after this act was passed, the
Governor General issued a proclamation Executive Order
No. 53, fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Due to this proclamation, Ang Tang Ho was charged for
the sale of rice at an excessive price and was found
guilty for the violation of Executive Order No. 53 to which
he appealed, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and
effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and in imposing the sentence.
Act No. 2868
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of,

and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation
for this purpose," the material provisions of which
are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby
authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate,
with the consent of the Council of State,
temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government
control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution
or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay
rice, or corn that a company or individual may
acquire, and the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand.
Issues:
Question of validity of the delegation of power to the
Governor General by the Philippine Legislature through
Act No. 2868.
Court Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled- We are clearly of the opinion
and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to
issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
Reasons:
If the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make
it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No.
2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and
that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any
price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence
of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the
Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
SET 2 CASE DIGEST
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to

a crime.
Supreme court decides - The judgment of the lower court

is reversed, and the defendant discharged.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law,

but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action to depend.
The issuance of the proclamation by the GovernorGeneral was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that
power.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix
"the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand." The law is a general law
and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for
rice in Manila and other and different prices in
other and different provinces in the Philippine
Islands, and delegates the power to determine the
other and different prices to provincial treasurers
and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a
delegation of legislative power to the GovernorGeneral, and a delegation by him of that power to
provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are
hereby directed to communicate with, and execute
all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and
proper enforcement of the above regulations in
their respective localities.
Topic: Delegation of Power to the President

Title: EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities in pursuant to Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code.
The Vice President of the Philippines, Emmanuel Pelaez,
filed a civil action to stop the Auditor General and his
representatives and agents from funding the said
executive orders. Pelaez said that the EO has already
been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 therefore it is
unconstitutional.
Pelaez said that according to Republic Act No. 2370,
barrios may not be created nor altered or even changing
their names thus it is not possible for the President to
create municipalities which consists of barrios under this
new Republic Act.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No.

2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same
Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this
Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an
existing one may be changed by the provincial board of
the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal
council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at
least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said
council: Provided, however, that no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No.
2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except
by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial
board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council
of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129 creating 33 municipalities is null and void
because of the Republic Act 2370.
Court Ruling:
In Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution
provides: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Such control does not include the authority to either
abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a
new one. According to the constitution the president
doesnt have the power to create or control local
governments. Therefore the court ruled that the EO is null
and void.

Topic: Peoples Initiative and Referendum
Title:
MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 127325
March 19, 1997
Facts:
This case is in relation to delegation of power to people
at large through initiative which is to amend the
constitution and a test of validity of rules and regulations
implemented by the delegate administrative body like
Comelec.
COMELEC and Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed the DELFIN
Petition it is a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
The Delfin Petition sought to amended Sections 4 and 7
of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution.
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first
be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at
least twelve per cent of the total number of registered
voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC. To support this petition, Comelec
promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term
limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfins

Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action
for prohibition raising the following arguments:
The constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed;
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is beyond one's legal
power or authority since the COMELEC has no power
to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting
of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the people's initiative.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for

people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has
realigned funds for the purpose.
1. Can people exercise its initiative

constitution without legislative grant?
Few of the defense of the respondents are:
3. Is COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 valid?
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution grants the

COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
1.
The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of,

but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it
seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay
term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul
the entire document.
As for Comelec, it claims that COMELEC Resolution No.

2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rulemaking power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
Issues:
to
amend
2. Is R.A. NO. 6735 valid?
Court Ruling:
No. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION,
BUT
IS,
UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the

exercise of this right.
Answer to Issue # 2.
No, according to Supreme Court R.A. No. 6735 is
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest.The recognized exceptions
to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President
under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
No, Supreme Court void those parts of Resolution No.
2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

amendments to the Constitution through the system of

initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies
the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
Provisions on matters concerning the no pass-on

provision, the stand-by authority in favor of the President,
the 70% limit on input tax credit and the amendments to
be made to the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
provisions regarding income and excise taxes.
The Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions convened, and on May 23, 2005, the enrolled
copy of the consolidated House and Senate version on
disagreeing provisions was transmitted to the President,
who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005, thus, the
birth of RA 9337.
Subject: Constitutional Law I
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No.

9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which
reads as follows:

Title: ABAKADA VS. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of RA No.
9337 , petitioner claimed it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes
under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
RA 9337 amounts to an undue delegation of legislative
power, the increase in the VAT rate to 12% violates the
due process clause as it imposes an unfair and additional
tax burden to the people. It is unconstitutional for being
oppressive, excessive and confiscatory.
RA No. 9337 is a consolidation of House Bill No.
3555, House Bill No. 3705 and House Bill No. 1950
which, these three House Bills have Disagreeing
That the President, upon the recommendation of

the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%), after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
%
On July 1, 2005, RA 9337 took effect and on the
same date, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order effective immediately enjoining respondents from
implementing and enforcing RA 9337 because
accordingly, the provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President upon recommendation of the
Finance Secretary to raise the VAT rate to 12% effective

January 1, 2006 after any of the two conditions are
identified to have occurred, namely, (1) VAT collection as
a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2
4/5% or (2) National government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 %.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been an undue delegation of
power.
Court Ruling:
The case before the Court is not a delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation
or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.53 Where the law
is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to
see to it that the mandate is obeyed.54
SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to
immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch
as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise
of discretion by the President does not come into play. It
is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present. The time of taking into
effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment
of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other
than the legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of
petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law
effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over
the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the
tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also
subscribe to the position of petitioners
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive
officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or
conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which
the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to
depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient
standards, policies or limitations on their authority.49
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left
to them, including the power to determine the existence
of facts on which its operation depends.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being

unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby
DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the
full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337,
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.
SET 2 CASE DIGEST


Set 3 Case Digest Consti

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Set 3 Case Digest Consti

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

warfare and that petitioner is charged of crimes which are

This is a case of war crime against Shigenori Kuroda who

Can Kuruda be charged of crimes under Hague

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the

(1) The Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague

Under the Incorporation clause, the generally

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Withal, the fact that international law has been made

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Private respondent also requested that preliminary, he be

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "Every

Such then , private respondent filed for petition for

Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Title: ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ,

G.R. No. L-7995

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Whether or not theres a violation of international treaties

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of

Respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction,

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Executive Secretary to import the foreign rice; and that,

Respondent assails that the authorized importation is not

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

applicable to the proposed importation in question

overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of

"it shall be unlawful for any person, association,

Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Is World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement

2. Will the WTO limits the sovereignty of our

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

SET 2 CASE DIGEST

equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties