Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
itary
view
THE
OF M
#&~
1W6
In This Iss?(e
* Intelligence
+ Thoughtson War
~ Howto shoot a Duck
September
65
Gen Harrg
J. Lendeg,
Jr.
ASSISTANTCOMMANDANT
Brig Gen E. C. Townsend
Military Review
... .
Kinesthetic Warfare
Air Mobility
13
20
Intelligence
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Quelling Mutinies
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The Nonprofessional
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Casualty Handling
33
45
48
54
80
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39
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23
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Brian Bond
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Edmund McCaffrey
62
66
78
Stanley L. Falk
85
92
Militar yNote
Militar yBook
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....97
...107
The M81itary Raview, a publication of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression
of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command.
The VIEWS expressed
US Army or the Command
AUTHORS
and
not necessarily
those
of the
8
Editor in Chief
Assistant Editor
Lt ColAlbert N. Garland
Features Editor
r
Layout Editor
SpanishAmerican Editor
Major RerreRamos
Brazilian Editor
Assoqiate Editor
Lt ColAlgmJ. Hughes
ArmyWarCollege
Production Officer
MajNormanC, Murray
i
Staff Artist
Charles A. Moore
MILITARY flEVIEW-Pubhshed
monthly by the U S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaw
enworth, Kansas, m Eng16h, Spamsh, and Portuguese Use of funds for printing of th!s pubhcatton has
been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Za May 1965.
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The Military
Review
announces
the selection
China-Burma-India:
Colonel Charles
By almost
standards,
any
Command
of the following
AWARD
article
ARTICLE:
Command
USA
the direction
II violated
The author,
the U. S. Army
in Combhed
J. Canella,
Study
REVIEW
of military
presently
assigned
and General
Staff
operations
of management
in the CBI
and the
points
out that
of
a
combined operations.
COMING:
The British Army in the Far East, by General Sir Reginald Hewetson,
Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer for 1965; Computers and Service Schools, by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Ablett; and Allied CommandEuropes Mobile
Force by Colonel James G. Holland, Jr.
tiow
to
Major
i)onald
J. Haid,
necessa !
il~ those of tke Depart~nent
rmy, Department
of De.
of the
fewer o the U. S. Arrng Command
and Ge era,l staff Co/lege,-Edttor.
{~
there
wouldnt
Soptoinbcr
13fi5
a Duck
shoot
United Statea
Arnrg
SHOOTA OIJCK
tnent may have developed too far for
the question to be meaningful any
longer.
There is, however, a question that
has seldom been posed and never been
answered:
What
happens
when
armed helicopter meets armed heli
copter ? My aim, here, is to justify
the question. If facts can be mar
shaled in a logical fashion, if atten
tion can be focused on the problem,
then, hopefully, the technicians and
the tacticians can solve the problem
and answer the question properly.
Army Aviation Program
Until the Korean War, organic
Army aviation was entirely confined
to the employment of small, fixedwing aircraft used for directing ar
tillery fire and for carrying out OCCZI.
simml liaison missions. The helicopter,
despite interest dating back to Leo
nardo da Vinci, did not become prac
tical until after World War II, but
the success of the helicopter in medi
cal evacuation missiom+ in Korea as
sured it a place in the military air
craft inventory. The combination of
the establishment
of a separate Air
Fore> in 1947 and the helicopters
success ]n Korea resulted in the de
velopment of what has come to be
known as the Army Aviation Pro
gram.
Barely two decades have passed
SHOOTA DUCK
ering suppressive fire from the heli
copter. Originally conceived to he a
large volume of essentially unaimed
fire designed solely to force the enemy to keep his head down until onr
troops could disembark, assemble, and
take UP the fight, the use of suppress
ive fire marked the actual birth of
the armed helicopter in the US Army.
the nap-of-the-earth
flying that the
Army will have to live with in lim~
ited or general war: it will be appli
cable regardless of the nuclear environment.
Although
the details
are still
shrouded in the secrecy of intelli
gence . reports
and studies,
every
major power in the world today is ex-
US Am
A UH.1
perimenting
with helicopter arma~
ment. Since the arming of a helicopter
involves no secret or complicated proc
ess, this fact is not really surprising.
What ie strzbrge is the difference in
weaponry and philosophy among the
Varioue countries. Since there has
not yet heen a war in which both sides
have employed armed helicopters,
there will he, presurnnbly, at leaat as
much diversity in the field of tactics,
Ultimate weapona have come and
gone-from
Hannibala elephants, to
the Iongbow, to gunpe+yder, to the
5
SHOOTA OUCK
nuclear weapon. The armed helicopter
is certainly not an ultimate weapon.
But the development of the armed
helicopter employing effective tactics
may well become a significant element
of combat power in future wars.
Algerian Revolt
For a period of seven yearsfrom
the m]ddle of 1955 until 1962tbe
French colony of Algeria writhed in
the agonies of revolution. Our inter.
eet in the Algerian revolt centers
around the fact that, for the first time
in history, armed helicopters were
extensively used.
At first, the French simply la?hed
an ordinary pintle-mounted nrachine
gun in the doorways of their Vet-to/
44 s. When they received the more
powerful CH-34S, they began to uee
more than one machinegun. After dis
covering the limitation
of the smallcaliber
machineguns,
the French
turned to rockets, wire-guided mis
siles, and even mu ltiweaprm instalki
tions. Eventually, they achieved their
greatest success with a World War II
Mawscr 20-millimeter cannon which
they were able to mount so as vir
tual~ to el}minate the problems of
recoil and vihrwt ion.
Pierre Habot ]s a lieutenant com
mtinder m the French Navy. He is
also an aeronaut]ca.1 engineer und
.comhat pllut. He flew in World War
11 until the French surrendered and
then went underground for the rest
of the war wztb tbe mayuw. He later
for France in Indocbina,
flew fighters
until D]en B]wt Phu, A httk while
later h~ turned up flying helicopters
against the rebels in Algeria. While
there, he was in on most of the heli
copter armament experimentation.
Before the war ended, Babot had
be,en sh]pped to Frunce and put m
charge of all Frtinch helicopter iirmaS
SHOOTA DUCK
he was assigned to what was then the
Combat Development Office of the
Aviation .School at Fort Rucker, Ala
bama. Vanderpool and his staff be
gan testing the feasibility
of the
transport helicopter as a weapons
platform. And they did not limit
themselves to the considerations
of
defensive fire alone. A wide range of
weapons was tested on various heli
copters.
The experiments were both inge
nious and imaginative. Hampered by
a lack of funds, facilities, and official
encouragement, the development was
spurred by the enthusiasm and ini
tiative of Colonel Vanderpool and his
staff of young aviators.
ACRCompany
To facilitate selling the idea that
we should arm our helicopter, a unit
known as the 8305th Aerial Combat
Reconnaissance (ACR) Company was
organized at Fort Rucker. Influential
visitors to the US Army Aviation
Center viewed demonstrations
of
armed helicopters
staged
by the
8305th.
By 1960 it had become apparent
that
machineguns,
rockets,
and
guided missiles offered the greatest
immediate promise for use on our
helicopters. But the essentially un
aimed character of suppressive fire
remaided predominant,
and only in
the guided-missile field was any at
tempt made to achieve the accuracy
necessary to attack point Pargets.
The US Army Aviation Test Board,
then under the US Continental Army
Command ( USCONARC ), began tu
attack some of the technical problems,
even while the ACR company dealt
with the concepte. Armament systems
for helicopters had always begun by
taking some existing weapon and at
tempting to mount it in some fashion
Sqrtember1965
SHOOTA DUCK
lated much of what is now our doc
trine for helicopter armament.
The data and the report prepared
by that committee will atend as mile
stones in the history of the develop
ment of the armed helicopter, al
though events did alter some of their
recommendations. The committee felt
that the division aviation battalion,
the brigade aviation section, the ar
mored cavalry regiment, and the air
cavalry troop should have armed heli
copters. They recommended that no
aircraft
he armed with more than
one weapon system and that transport
helicopters not be armed. They set
forth three categories of weaponrylight weapons, ~rea weapons, and
point weaprms. They ako pointed up
the necessity of developing a helicop
ter weapon with an air-to-air capa
bility.
Vietnam Conflict
Just like the French in Algeria and
Indochina, we found ourselves in 1961
fighting a ragged, poorly equipped,
guerrilla enemy o~er some of tbe
worst Jungle, mountain, and ricepaddy terrain in the world. Just like
the ?&ench, we found t~t only by
using helicopters
could we move
swiftly enough to match the guerrilla
advantage jn surprise, stealth, and
initiative.
For more than a year, three com
panies of ancient CH-21s flew the
soldiers of Vietnam into battle with
tbe Viet Cong guerrillas. And then
it happened. We awoke one day to
discover that those ragged guerrillas
were shooting at our helicopters. A.Yif
by magic, machineguns began appear
ing lashed in the doorways. And tbe
cry went back to USCONARC for heli
copter armament. BY this time, how
ever, it was generally accepted that
it would be better to provide armed
8,
I
he stayed well hidden. Fortunately,
i UJ7-Is. Suppressive
fire worked.
Aimed fire was just not within our
capabilities.
An even more shattering discovery
wae made when the Viet Cong eud
denly turned UP with some .50-caliber
machineguns. Now, they could ac
SHOOTA OUCK
pression cm our senior officers in Viet
nam. Reports began flowing to Wash
ington comparing the cost effective
ness of the armed T-.% with that of
the armed UH-1.
By 1963 there were a great many
officers who had heen to Vietnam, seen
Army hviation at work, and bleseed
the armed helicopter. With something
like two-thirds of the. Army forces
;HOOTA OUCK
trying to derive universal principles
from a very special kind of war. In
my opinion, if the trend continues,
we shall find ourselves with an avia
tion element admirably suited to fight
in Vietnamand nowhere else.
Front Page News
Because we are an airminded peo
ple, news stories are even more sen
sational if they involve the shooting
down of aircraft. Somehow the stories
conjure up memories of Eddie Ricken
hacker and the sensational air battles
of World War Ii and Korea. In Viet
nam news correspondents found a new
wrinkle. They could actually go along
as passengers in the helicopter and
thereby write, with thrilling authen
ticity, of their experiences under fire.
The supposed vulnerability
of our
helicopters became front page news;
the facts of the matter eeem to indi
cate that the problem has been over
stated.
To the layman, and even to veteran
pilots, the helicopter looks too incon
gruous to fly, It looks as though you
could throw a handful of pebbles into
itsy-otor blades and cause it to thrash
itself to pieces. Even the earliest heli
copters used for medical evacuatimr in
the Korean War put the lie to this.
Although often fired npon at pointblank range, the pilots discovered
that the bullets made neat little holes,
but that the machine went on flying.
Those early helicopters vibrated so
much under the best of circumstances
that even a rotor unbalanced by bullet
hoIes would still operate. Although
much bas been made of the vulnera
bility of the helicopters in Vietnam,
the documented facts indicate that, in
the light of hours and missions flown,
we have sustained greater losses from
materiel failure and pilot error than
we have from enemy small arms fire.
10
~
ulated times, and then take absolutely
no evasive action.
Prior to this arrangement, the gun
ners bad been completely unsuccessful
; in even figuring out the direction
from which the helicopter was coming
&hen they heard its engine. The facte
suggest that there may be quite ade
quate means of shielding the infra
red emiesions of the helicopter. And
it might not be too optimistic to pre
dict that someone will invent a mis
sile that will home in on an infrared
weapon.
VulnerabilityMyth
The perpetrators
of the myth of
helicopter vulnerability have been un
successful in their efforts largely be
cause no one seriously believee that
there is any requirement
for the
Army aviator to be, like Achilles, in
vulnerable on the battlefield. The av
erage Army aviator, as a matter of
fact, considers himself to be far less
vulnerable than the infantry soldier
with his rifle for firepower and his
feet for mobility.
There might he, however, some
compelling questions that need an
swere in the area of the vulnerability
of a helicopter to an enemy armed
helicopter, It is thie question that hae
puzzled some of the best minds in the
armies, of Germany,
France,
and
Britain. One can only surmiee that
it is also the subject of thought on the
other side of the Iron Curtain.
Oddly enough, one of the major un
solved problems in helicopter arma
ment ie the question of who ehould
operate the weapon. By operate, I
mean the total tasktarget
acquisi
tion, aiming, and firing the weapon.
The simplest
helicopter
weapon
syetems are the MI and M$? systems
on the OH-19 and OH-29 observation
helicopters. These are dual, fqed,
September19S5
SHOOTA DUCK
SHOOTA DUCK
with the question of how to teach heli
copter gunnery. Aside from the fact
that no one really knows the best way
to do this, it should be evident that
the training problems will vary from
weapon system to weapon system and
. from pilot-trainee to gunner-trainee.
Besides, there are today more than
6,000 rated aviators who have never
fired any kind Qf weapon from any
kind of helicopter. It would certainly
be difficult to estimate the order of
magnitude of the training problem
when we have ~ large numbers of
armed helicopters, not to mention
three or four different weapon sys
tems.
Surely, some research in the selec
tiOn and motivation of armed heli
copter pilots will be necessary. Not
every aviator will want to be a
tiger; not all who do will have the
aptitude. The heterogeneous aviation
unit may not be the ideal environment
for a daring and aggressive armed hel
icopter pilot. This is not to suggest
that the only choice is to be a tiger
or a pussycat, hut it is certainly true
that the average aviation unit is thor
oughly imbued with tbe idea of safe
flyi~
These and other organizational
problems may add weight to consid
eration of homogeneous light observa
tion helicopter and utility tactical
transport companies. It is far more
likely that tbe necessary esprit de
corps could be fostered in a unit in
which all tbe aviators had received
the same indoctrination and training.
If one grants tbe premises that
have been presented, it becomes pos
sible to single out one, perhaps over
riding, problemthat of what kind
12
MilitarfReview
h.
. *
w
KltfESTHETIC
WARFARE
Modefor the Future Colonel Robert B. Rig% United States Armg
September
1965
KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
sia meaning originality: kimein, to
move + aisthi%+is, perception.
It might appear that this is a trite
play on words or semantic doodling.
Actually, it is not, for the basic term
is descriptive of a form of future
warfare that will be:
Best suited for a war of quick
decision.
Served
by vehicles, weapons,
and means yet to come,
Four-DimensionalCombat
Kinesthetic Warfare will be rapid
movement, maneuver, and destruction
by virtue of its rapid target finding
and sensing. This form of warfare is
four-dimensional
in character:
It is
ultraperceptive in its first dimension.
It is through the air in its second.
Thus, in consequence to these, its
third dimensicm is velocity, while its
fourth is shock impact.
In combat ar hitecture, then, these
dimensions cot! bine to where the
shockpower and Iimpact of certain US
Army forces w Auld be multiplied on
the battleground
in disproportional
favor to their numerical strength.
These forces, designed for deep-in
pehtrations
of rapid order and vioe
Ience, would be so organized,
quipped, armed, and transported as to
permit them to operate with more
precision and speed than the normaI
and heavier combat forces.
Colonel Robert B. Rigg is with the
US Armu Combat Development
CO*
mand Institute
of Advanced
Studies,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Dur
ing World War 11 he served in Eu
rope as a military observer with So
viet Army
units
and other Allied
mi{itarrj
forcee. He is a graduate
of
the United States Arm~ War College,
and wrw previously
a88&tL?d
to the
stafl of the Commander
in Chief,
.Pa@c.
14
.?
KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
Military hisfiry provides a library
of evidetye to the effect that the
progrsss and pattern. of combat is
directly related to the excellence and
limitations of logistics. Tactical and
logistical elements must be closeIy
related in respect to air mobility.
The foundation for kinesthetic warfare has been laid over the pact decade and a
half in the Armys buildup of Army aviation and its general quest for improved
mobility
KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
safety that a future war of limited
nature could come to a daily average
of 150 to 200 million dollars--m an
assumed average of about 175 mil
lion dollars per day. Possessed of a
distinctly superior co~bat mobility
inherent in kinesthetic forces, a f u
ture US ArmY would{ likely shorten
a limited war. If a two-year war could
be shortened by only 46 daye, a dollar
saving of approximately
7.8 billion
dollars could be achieved. lhe saving
in human sacrifice and suffering is
obvious, and hefein lies a value that
has no dollar price tag.
While the Armys future quest for
mobiiity must be measured against
the prime objective of victoryand
an early victory, if possible--it must
also be weighed against the human
and dollar costs that would be incur
red if it had to go to war just on a
military-technological
par with an
enemy.
Foundation and Principle
The foundation for kinesthetic war
fare has been laid over the past dec
ade and a half in the Armys Resea~ch
and Development Program, its build
up f Army aviation, and its general
ques$ for Improved mobility. The llth
Air Assault Division recently tested
a component of this foundation.
There is still more to be accomplished,
developed, and proved.
In respect to new hardware and re
lated aircraft,
kinesthetic
warfare
may be a decade or two distant. But
the foundation exists today not only
in concepts, but in American military
mindsand the effort has momentum.
In essence, this effort can best be
labeled as the principle of invoking
obsolescence: endeavoring to attain
such military technological superior
ity in firepower, mobility, and intel
ligence so as to render obeole~e a large
16
KINESTHETIC
WARFANE
missiles, or some new means as vet
undiscovered. The means probably
will be multiple rather than singular
in nature.
Is there hope that such sophisti
cated intelligence gathering
means
can be attained? It would seem so
considering the advancee American
technology is making. Some 15 years
ago it would have sounded outlandish
to predict that an orbiting communi
cation satellite could in one day ex
change with earth stations the num-
VS AmvJ
tiOiIal
KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
three-man gun crew and pilot gunner,
whereas the latter image would be a
vehicle that could carry up to a pla
toon of riflemen or an equivalent load.
Dual.Purpose Armament
Both images should be compatible
in speed, hut the smaller vehicle
should be able to land in almost the
space of the vehicle itself. Both should
have dual-purpose
armamentma
chineguns, recoilless rifles, or other
weapons that are mounted in the air
craft for air-to-ground fire and yet
can be of the breakaway type which
can be conveniently removed from the
vehicle for ground fighting use.
In present-day terms, one can vis
ualize the so-called flying saucer as
the first image, and the larger STOL
VTOL aircraft as the second. These
are but the prototypes of the more
sophisticated
vehicles requiredand
to come.
A third profile may suggest itself
in the form of a much larger capacity
air vehicle. This concept should be
rejected, however, because we do not
want large packages of men and ma
teriel in one aerial basket to the point
whWe the enemy is given just a few,
large, profitable targets. Instead, it is
better to place the military eggs in
multiple baskets, thus reducing single-shot liabilities. At the same time,
we would be protecting
ourselves
more by providing masses of targets
to the enemy rather than a few large
ones.
Since kinesthetic forces would be
entirely supplied by air, a logistical
cmgo aircraft of some form is neces
sary. The crane-type helicopter with
a detachable cargo pod is presently a
possible prototype, but other aircraft
designs could emerge in the future.
In kinesthetic warfare, supplies would
be both dropped and air landed,
18
KINESTHETIC WARFARE
of the future must not be
viewed alone in isolation boOth teym~
of a single characteristic,
but in
twins of the complete combat cycle
of find, fix, and deetroy. The creation
of these weapone would place some
segmente of combat in a stage ad
vsnced even beyond kinesthetic war
fsre, a tactical stage that might be
termed remote-control warfare. For
strategic distances at fixed targets,
we already have this in the intercon
tinental ballistic missile. But for tac
tical and operational level warfare
and against moving targets, we do not
have this complete package.
Some futurs army is going to fight
with certain portions of its men in
or missile
General
Frank
T. Mildren
.
$eptcmbor
1965
19
AIR MOBILITY
AND
GROUND FORCES
Fi
French
Arm#
A6
ro?nobilitc$ et Forces Terrestres.
Translation
by Mr. LaVergne
Dale, Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Colonel de Favit8ki ie amrigned
to the French
Armv
General
Staff.
MilitaryReview
.:)
AIR MOBILITV
choose to attack with his own nuclear
weapons. The price that must be paid
for strength is increased vulnerabil
ity; the longer it lasts, the more dan
gerous it is. Alrmobile forces, can
greatly decrease this vulnerability by
making it possible to concentrate
quickly, engage the enemy, and then
rapidly disperse.
MobililYand Vulnerability
Greater speed also provides in
creased security
in exploiting the
neutralization obtained with nuclear
weapons. Exploitation forces must be
highly mobile in order to obtain max
imum profit from the neutralization
effect of this fire and to avoid the
nuclear reactions of the adversary.
Groundmobile units, always hampered
by the natural difficulties of the ter
rain, are likely to move even slower
on a nuclear battlefield which is dotted
with contaminated zones and obstacles
created by nuclear explosions.
The reserve, aiways a vital part of
tbe commanders plans, must also be
able to move rapidly. In a system built
up around the tactical nuclear weapon,
the meet dependable reserve is con
stituted by the nuclear weapons avail
able. But there are cases in which the
commander must use conventional
troop reservee,
particularly
when
forces infiltrate his position or units
become so interlocked with friendly
forces that nuclear bursts are unsafe.
Tbe reeerve has to intervene in
time. Considering the size of the zones
of action in nuclear operations, the
increased terrain difficulties, and the
time required to assemble dispersed
units, there is reason to doubt the
usefulness of earthbound
reserves.
They may be able to do no more than
secure small zones adjncent to their
assembly areas. Outside these zones,
it will be necessary to cdl on mobile
September1905
AIR MOBILITY
22
.
The echelon at which they should
be employed with conventional forces.
The organization
and equipmsnt
of the airmobile unit.
More advanced studies may show
that todays solution would end in an
impasse in the foreseeable future, or
they may conclude that airmobile
forces will once again return maneu
ver to its former tactical importance.
What is needed now is to take the
next step in development and to pre
pare for the future. It is not only
trees that require 20 years for growth.
MilitaryREVIEW
SECOND
THOUGHTS
ONWAR
tain B. H. Liddell
September1965
23
Tfffstf6tfTS ON WAN
BOND
. .
LIDDELL
HART
BOND
LIODELL
BONO
24
HART
Yes, you are right on the mark. To put it mildly, I find much of the
writing on contemporary milita~ affairs full of jargon and repetition
+-n short, boring. since World War N, 1 have frequently set out my
views on the most hopeful strategy for the West, and these have
come to be adopted after a thne. But it is a tedious process, and I
find more interest in the reappraisal of historical events.
In 1934 you noted: The more 1 study war, the more I come to feel
that the cause of war is fundamentally psychological rather than PO
Iitical or economic. . . . Until we understand war in the fullest
Military
Review
THOUWITS
ON WAR
lIDDELL HART
Well, harclly a dearth. i think you overvalue THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE for, althoogh I would still include it in recommended reading lists
as a remarkable work of imagination, I have reservations about it
which probably arise because Crane then lacked a firsthand experience
of battle.
The bock which particularly exerted a formative influence on my
thoughtas a complement te my own experience in the First Werld
Warwas Ardant du Picqs BATTLE STUDIES: AHCIEHT AND MODERN
BATTLE. Ferdinand Fochs book on THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR put me
on to Ardant du Picq, and I read him (in French, I think) about 1920.
This was before the spate of war beoks sirch as C. E. Montagues
DISENCHANTMENT, and it clicked with my ewn reflections. It stressed,
for example, that, despite all the talk and propaganda, swords and
bayonets rarely crossed in action-battles
were decided, rather, in
the troops minds.
Of modern writers, S. L. A. Marshall, in books like PORK CHOP HILL
and THE RIVER ANO THE GAUNTLET, is particularly good in conveying
the feel of combat. I do have reservations about the possibility of
such detailed reconstructions of battlefield events because of my ex
perience of the faltitrility of human memory-which
natorally tends to
be all the greater when witnesses are trying to recollect .exactfy what
happened in the heat of action. With a fast-moving tight, the difficulty
increases. But I immensety admire Slam Marshalls work on such
case histories-better
work than anyone else has done in that way.
BOND
I wonder if you still believe that philosophers wo~d make the best
rulers? I doubt whether men without the lust for power would do even
as well in office as those with it; after all, in any realistic setting, they
would be subject to enormous pressures from discontented and ambi
tious contenders. Do you think you yourself would have been corrupted
by power if you had held, say, an important hfinistry in the 1930s or
1940s?
Septembsr1965
25
.
THOUGHTS
ON WAR
.LIODELL HART
BONO
Arent you really asking for wise professional politicians who will seek
expert advice?
LIOOELL HART
\
BONO
in 1936 you noted that gas was playing a decisive part in the Italian
conquest of Ethiopia. It has always puzzled me why gas was not em
ployed in the Second World War. Is this a curious case where popular,
antiwar sentiment and emotionalism has prevented the use of a rela
tively indestructive weapon, or do you think soldiers and governments
have been restrained by more practical considerations?
LIDDELL HART
26
Military Review
THOUGHTS
ON WAR
BONO
IIDDELL HART
1 quite agree. Indeed, Adolf Hitler was more restrained at first and
concentrated on specific military objectives, whereas the British
started area bombing, and pure terror bombing, in a thoughtless, as
WON as ruthless, way. Hitler gave repeated warnings over the bomb.
ingof Berlin before hestruck tiackat London. Also, the Germans took
more care to avoid cultural objectives than we did.
<
BOND
UDDELL HART
I doubt it. Besides Lubeck and Restock, we devastated Cologne, Oresden, and Rouen. Bonn wasaparticularly
scandalous example-it was
of no military significance, but happened to suit the test conditions
of a new radar device, called G-H, which we wanted to try out.
Incidentally, I think Noble Franklands recent book on THE BOMBING
OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY is an axcellent summary, but it rather
glides over the moral issue. i wouid also question hisviawtbat
the
traditional objectives of theenemys armed forces stillheldgood
in
an age of airpower.
$erdanrher1965
27
THOUGHTS
ON WAR
BOND
LIOOELL HART
BOiO
LIOOELL HART
20
Military Fiefiew
I
TiiOtJSHTS ON WAR
b
..
BOND
I feel that your thoughts on war were written on the assumption that
they could be useful in preparing officers for command in the next war.
Would there be any pointor, indeed, possibility-of
writing such a
book today?
lIOOELL HART
Well, that was always part of tbe object, hut my basic aim bas been
to show, and urge, tbe value of thinking more clearly and cooly aboot
warin tbe deep conviction that, if yoo wish for peace, you must
understand war. I dont think there would be much point in writing to
instruct officers in the techniques of command in modern conditions,
but, on the higher level of operational direction, books of tbe kind I
write are as relevant as ever.
BOND
tin the 1930s you frequently expressed regret about the lack of good
military history books, remarking for example: !The field of military
history is, on the whole, a peculiarly barren one. The soil is stony and
the tillage poor. The main reason for this, in your opinion, was that
the subject had been left largely to soldiers. Would you agree that
things are much better now and, if so, why?
LIOOELL HART
sound academic training. Soldiers who lack any such training1 was
indebted to some of my teachers at Cambridge-are
.
September1965
2a.
.
THOUGHTS
ON WAR.
BONO
More tffan once you suggest that commander$ might read works of
military fiction with profit, such as for ideas on the use of ruses, I
know you have admired books by Frederick Britten Austin, John Bu.
than, and C. E. Montague for this reason, but can you recommend any
published since 1945?
LIOOELL HART
For tactical instruction I would add to the fist Sir Ernest Ounlop Swin.
ton and Bernard Newman. Strategically, and prophetically, Britten Aus
tiits books were of outstanding value to students of military history,
and its a pity he is now so little read. The First World War produced ,
a large number of works of fiction which were worth reading from
the professional officers point of view.
I find it difficult to think of comparable books written since t945. I
rate Wilfiam Oenis Johnstons NINE RIVERS FROM JOROAN highly, and
there are several interesting ones on the French Army such as Paul.
Henri Simons PORTRAIT OF AN OFFICER. But as with an earlier ques
tion, tbe answer seems to be that conditions have, changed so drasti
cally that few fiction writers are concerned any longer to inculcate
practical lessons.
BOND
LIDDELL HART
30
Militarytlcviw
THOUGHTS
BOND
Revolution
purge
a Joseph
to
get
that
type
of officer
ON WAR
corpsa
Stalin.
.
IIOOELL HART
In this respect, the new states that have surunr? up since 1945 have
an enormeus advantage. I suppose the Israeli a~med services provide
the outstanding example of a young, and progressive, officer cerps
where men can reach the top in their early thirties.
BONO
In 1903 General Sir Ian Hamilton made the incredibly bold suggestion
that the army would benefit tremendously if all its officers could have
university training, preferably before being commissioned. Thirty years
later
of
and
you
advocated
university
the
right
that
;fellowships
the
to
perspectiveto
services
enable
study
should
pro.~ising
provide
the
officers
to get
equivalent
t~me
war.
LIDOELL HART
I entirely agree. The British Army remains sadly backward in ita atti
tude to the higher educatien of efficers. In 1937 I urged that entry
into the army fer officers should be entirely through the universities
the courses being subsidized by the stateinstead of through the
military colleges. War came while the matter was still under discus
sion, and nowadays the number of university entries is much lower
than between the wars.
In the United Statea it is commonplace for officers to take a degree,
and a considerable number work for a Ph. O. I know of one now spend.
ing three years studying fer a Ph. O. en armered warfare. Many of the
officers who study at St. Antonys College, Oxford, consult meis-.
raelis, Frenchmen, Germans, and Australians. But I have not ceme
upon any British efficers who are taking such a degree.
Your secendary peint is also importantthe universities would Un.
deubtedly benefit from a Ieavaning of mature men who would previde
variety and stimulus to the undergraduates of today, who mostly have
come straight from schoel.
September 1SS5
31,
THOU6HTS
OH WAR
BOND
is concerned.
It must
have
been
very
difficult,
indeed,
to
responsible
LIODELL HART
BOND
defense
of this
country
Finally,
a very
personal
question.
In 1934
you wrote:
As one matures
LIDDELL
for the
HART
should
I think it has, but that is hardly for me to say. You most ask my wife .
and secretaries. They seem to think that Jm apt to be too charitable
and too lavish of my time over other peoples manuscripts. J think the
difference in my attitude today compared with when I was composing
those THOUGHTS ON WAR is that then I tended to assume that people
could learn to think objectively about history and wan now, I just ac
cept that few people can reason objectively about anything. 1 stilt
strive to pursue that aim, but I see the absurdities of life more than
I did. i have come to see its nonsense, but one must try to five as if
it could make sense.
\
32
Military
Rsvieir
I
INTE1lIGENCE
KEYTOVICTORY
Lieutenant Colonel Fielding L. Greaves, United States Armg
INTELLIGENCE
Lieutenant
Colonel
Fielding
L.
Greates is with the Ofiee of the As
sistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,
Department
of the Arvnv. He served
i?z Europe during World War II, and
subsequentl~
was stationed
in Ger
many, China, and Turkey, and was
assigned
to the Brifish Crown CO1OTZII
of Hong Kong. FoUozoing kis com
pletion qf the 1961 Regular Course of
the U., S. An?rtIJ Command and Gen
eral Sfaff College, he served for three
yeffrs on the facultti.
34
<
faiIure, however,
dashed Ramses
hopes of defeating the Hittites, and
had the longer range effect of halting
Egyptian expansion to the north.
The 300 Spartane of Leonidas, to
gether with their alliee, held the pass
at Thermopylae against overwhelm
ing odds until the perfidious Ephial
tes furnished intelligence information
to Xerxes on the secret pathway over
Anopaea Mountain to the rear of the
Spartan position+
Similarly, it was information of a
way UP a cliff, together with the
French failure to provide security
there, which permitted Major Gen
eral James Wolfe to move hie troops
by night to the Plains of Abraham,
where the next morning he defeated
General Louis Joseph de Montealm be
fore the citadel of Quebec.
Inadequate Reconnaissance
Gentleman Johnny
Burgoynes
habitual failure to provide adequate
reconnaissance, together with his er
roneous appreciation
of the effects
which-his use of Indians would have
on the attitude of potential loyalists,
led to the steady decimation of his
forces and their ultimate surrender
at Saratoga.
In 1862 General George B. McClel
lans 70,000 men of the Army of the
Potomac faced General John B. Ma
gruders 15,000 troops
defending
Yorktown. Magruders defense was
so adroit, and McClellans intelligence
so bad, that the latter was induced to
waste a month besieging Yorktown,
giving Confederate
General Joseph
E. Johneton time to move a large
force to the defense of Richmond.
Union cavalry reconnaissance was
inept at this time, and McClellans
intelligence
work was performed
largely by civilian detectives headed
by AlIan Pinkerton.
A consistent
$eptember1965
Goliath.
Although Tarawa wasan American
victory, an intelligence failure re
35
INTELLIGENCE
US Am
US troops head for the heath on Wohai Island dnring the Inchon landing operations
in 1950
-gether with the failure of North
Korean intelligence to anticipate his
move, saw the daring and eminently
successful landing at Inchon, deep in
the enemy rear, This was counterbal
anced later by the failure of Ameri
can intelligence fully to appreciate
Chinese Communist intentions prior
to their massive intervention south
of the Yalu.
The Bay of Pigs is another classic
example, this time of a three-way in
36
INTELLIGENCE
reconnaissance-lack
of intelligence.
The reader may exercise his imag
ination to consider how the outcomes
of these battles cited might have dif
fered had the quality of the intelli
gence available to the commander
been different. Rather than extend
the liet indefinitely, we will coneider
only two more battles, claesic battlee
which have received much attention
from students of military history.
Cannae
INTELLIGENCE
38
Military Review
Tllne
F
; dn
on?
French
Arm#
a military viewpoint.
ceptional geographical
its control, if not its
for the United States
for the Free World.
The Arctics ex
situation makes
possession, 1vital
and, therefore,
Strategic Definition
Review
\--=
1917, Lenin, recognizing the need for
a short sea route between the Barents
and the Bering Seas, ordered the start
of work on the now famous G1avsev
morput.
Thus, in Russia, as in the United
States and the western
European
countries, the conquest of the Arctic
started long hefore the steam era and
followed the same purpose-trade.
Along with the advent of the first
steamers, William Henry Seward, Sec
retary of State under Presidents
S@xilher1965
North
Atlantic
air route.
Goose Bay,
The importance
of the mineral
riches was recognized at the end of
the 19th century with the discovery
of gold in Alaska and Siberia; today,
tbe Soviets still take a good part of
their gold supply from east Siberia.
Somewhat later, the improvement of
the means of research and communi
cations led to the discovery of so-called
strategic orespetroleum in Canada
and Siberia; nickel in the vicinity of
Murmansk and Norilsk; lead in Can
ada, Siberia, and east Greenland; coP
per in Murmansk and Anchorage; and
tungsten,
platinum,
and uranium,
es~cially in Canada.
Too, the Soviets, in need of in
creased food production, are now try
ing to exploit the partially frozen
grounds to feed the Siberian popula
tion. Unfortunately,
in this area ae
- in many others, we lack information
pertaining to the results obtained.
But the main economical importance
of the Arctic lies in the short routes
of communication it can offer either
within the Soviet Union or between
Europe and North America.
On the Soviet side, the northern sea
route, when open, shortens by 30 per
cent or more the distance between So
viet Europe and Soviet Asia. If we
crmsider that a single ship carries 10
times more supply than a train, we
42
---- .
..- .
$f,
#r.
US N.w
{
THE FAR NORTH
invasion route available
to an aggres
sor to enter tbe North American
Con
tinent. Although
not a serious threat
at the moment,
this possibility
must
he taken into consideration.
In the
44
Witsry
Reviaw
flND
MllTSU
Nationalist
Marine
Corps
,<
KINMEN AND MATSU
4a
,,
KINMEN ANO MATSIJ
SUBSCRIBERS
Avoid the inconvenience of renewing your subscription each year. Write to
The Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027, requesting conversion to the Automatic
Renewal Plan,
i.
S8ptember 1SS5
47!
The dissimilar
backgrounds of the
three services are seen bv many peo
ple as obstacles to the elimination
of
their overlapping
functions.
In this
article, a British officer presents his
personal
views on what should be
done to provide unified forces within
his own national defense establish.
m ent.Editor.
AI-IW
MilitaryRwiw
A UNIFIED FORCE
A UNIFIED FORCE
A UNIFIED FORCE
Modern aircraft, such as the Vulcan bomber shown here, are so complex that air
force officers must acquire a solid baae of techriical knowledge
are manned by army officers, RAF pilots miss a great opportunity of working in close contact with army formations in the field.
If responsibility for light aircraft
were given to the RAF, not only would
the air force gain additional aircraft
to operate, but a constant flow of
young pilots would gain firsthand
knowledge of the army at brigade
level. The way would also be made
September1965 .
A UNIFIED FDRCE
Communications
A UNIFIED FORCE
COMMENTS INVITED
The Military
rial publiehed.
Review
An opposite
welcomee
your commente
viewpoint
on any mate
Sepfember1335
? If You have
you in developing
only an idea,
an acceptable
query
ue; per
article.
53
Quelling
Mutinies
.Wates Armg
.
Ten,
nine,
eight,
8even,
six,
five,
four,
three,
two,
one, he 8md. At
the
end
of the countdown,
tfle murine8 fired a rocket 8hell into one of the barracks. It
tore off .wrt of the roof and 8hattered
the windoum. The rebels 8tarted
to run
out,
um,ing
white
hnndkerchief8.
Tfte
54
mutinu
WU8 over.
or
the activities
related
to
the
1962
55
MUTINIES
,.
lead helicopter was the officer who, a
week before, had been the foreign com
mander of. the army which he was
now oppoeing.
tie Objective
The objective of the assault was a
guard room which served as the cen
ter of the mutiny. As the helicopters
landed near the objective, the marines
fanned out rapidIy, moving at a
crouch, weapone at the ready. No shots
were fired. The former commander
took an electric megaphone and, in the
local Ianguage, called on the mutineers
to surrender.
When his repeated calls went un
answered, he gave a countdown which
was folfowed by one round from a
rocket launcher into the roof of the
building. Two mutineere were killed,
the roof was damaged, and all the
windows were blown out. Except for
some 30 stragglers who were rounded
up in the next day or two, the muti
neere capitulated.
The assault had
taken 40 minutes.
Elsewhere in the country, the great
powers forces struck swiftly from the
sir. One element restored order 725
kilometers west of the firs~ action
where a native battalion had revolted.
Another airborne element, some 420
kilometers south of the first action,
also disarmed mutineers.
In one of the other countries, a
rebellious army battalion had seized
the armory and armed iteelf. Elements
of the great powers troops, in six
armored cars, approached the parade
ground, then occupied by about 150
rebels, As the armored
cars ap
proached, a sniper fired on them from
a nearby roof.
The cars halted. One moved closer,
slewed its turret around, and raked
an empty hut with a long burst from
its .50.caliber machinegun. The rebels
tiptwnber 1365
MIJTINIE3
another upris
ing was being quelled at a post in a
distant part of the country.
In the third countryat a rebellious
military camp-30 men from the great
powers forces armed with subma
chineguns buret through the main
gate of -the camp before dawn. Ob.
taining eurprise, the foreign soldlers,
who had been flown in, secured the
guardroom and eeized the armory be
fore the mutineers awoke. While these
brave men succeeded, 450 other great
power troops surrounded the camp.
There were 300 mutineers captured.
By the fifth day, 5,300 great Power
troopz were reported to be in the
three countries.
Nothing
could have beerz more re
assuring
. . . than the manner
of
these troops arrival. Within hours of
their landing, the mutineer.c were dis
armed . . . [the capital] woe rekuzed,
and a...
militarg
band was giving
a concert
in the capitaSs central
park. . . .
a
armg mutinies
the soldiers
finished
soldiere
Two Aspects
and military
leaders
governmental
worked hand in glove in the period
51
MUTINIES
it was, they
gave
an excellent
mevisw
MUTINIES
MILITARY
REVIEW
+ Designed
@ Ready
+ Black
to hold
FILE
BOX
12 issues
file reference
with gold
lettering
Saptomhei1965
39
was digested
from
m
Military ft@vi8W
THE NONPROFESSIONAL
September19S5
61
PRUDENCE
MILITARY
NECESSITY
Edmund McCaffrey
Military
Review
PRUDENCE
63
,.
PRUDENCE
1
givea
MilitaryRariw
PRUDENCE
how to be politically
September1965
M. Zuckert
S5
Communist Errors in
the Anti-Bandit
War
N A dreary night near the end of August 1949, the Iast bedraggled rem
nants of a once victorious Communist guerrilla force fled by individual
infiltration from the Grammos Mountains in northern Greece to the sanctuary
of Albania. Thie Communiet force had almost subjugated Greece in three years
of bloody guerrilla warfare. Why had it failed?
66
Military Revizw
ANTI-BANDIT
in its
Background.
The Communist
forces which en
gaged the West in thie, the first com
bat of the cold war, and which almost
succeeded in taking over Greece, had
their origins in the mountains of
Greece during World War H.
The Communist Party of Greece
(KKE), long accustomed to under
ground operation under the regime of
Greek strong man Joannes Metaxas,
responded to the World War II Ger
man occupation of Greece by forming,
in September 1941, the National. Lib
eration Front ( EAM), a political co
alition dominated
by Communists.
Some six months later the EAM an
nounced the formation of the National
Popular Liberation Army (ELA.S).
This army was controlled by the
hard core of the IHCE, but by no
means did Communists constitute a
majority or even a significant number
of the rank and file. To many, the
ELA.S offered the only opportunity to
fight the invader; to othere it gave
vent to antimonarchist or anti-MetaxLieutenant
Colonel Robert W. Sel
ton is with the Military
Assistance
Division,
United
States
European
Command.
He is a graduate
of the
U. S. Armg Command
and General
Staff College and holde an M.A. in
International
Relations
from Ameri
can University,
Washington,
D. C. He
eerved in Europe during World War
11, euae Assietant
Military
AttachJ to
Greece from 195S to 1956, and was as
signed to the Ofice of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Military Operations
fvom 1959 to 196.9.
Sapteihhar19S5
WAR
ANTI-BANDIT
WAR
(
)
YUGOSLAVIA
..\
4..+
BULGARIA
_-..Xc,c,
.<--$%=+,
-.
H! JOUS&
<,
ONN
, ANII.BANDIT
roots,
nationwide
civil
war
WAR
in order
ANTI-BANDIT
WAR
First Setback
R.swiew
ANT1.BANltlT WAR
ANT}-BANDIT
WAR
Question
ANTI-BANDIT
t,,
t.ke o,.
Atb
WAR
ANT1-BANDtT WAR
.
of the rank and file of the KK.E to the
Cominform
position
against
Tito.
Markos, on the other hand, retained
his close relationship with Tito.
In early 1949 the Cominform de
clared for the establishment of an in
dependent Macedonia. The KKE was
trappedit had tochooee between the
US Arm
A m-ouD of wisoners. includine men, women. and children, cavtured by the Greek
\
Stalinist-dominated
Cominform
with
an autonomous
Macedonia,
and 1ito
with a somewhat
flexible Macedonia.
ANTI-BANDIT WAR
ANTI-BANDIT
WAR
~SeeColonelTheodomio.I%math.nwiades,
.Th!
Militarf Rwiew
ANTI-BANDIT
which demonstrated
the fu
tility of guerrillas standing to fight
well-trained and well-equipped reguIq forcee.
Following UP their advantage, the
GNA launched an aseault on the
Grammos redoubt on 24 August with
a night attack designed to envelop
the north flank of the guerrilla poei
tion and eeal the Albanian border.
Four GNA divisions and five raiding
force groups overran the Grammos
position and collapsed the guerrilla
defense by 27 August. One American
observer stated: The guerrillas were
beatenthey did not give UP.
The DAS had operated under near
optimum guerrilla conditions. during
tbe period from mid-1946 to approxi
mately mid-1948. The guerrilla opera
tion of that period reveal a maximum
exploitation of the advantages which
en joyedexperienced
the bandits
leadership; a psychological environ
ment nurtured in guerrilla tradition;
favorable terrain; privileged sanctu
ary; adequate logistical support; a
population torn with eeonomic priva
tionand political uncertainty; andna
tional sectirity forces that were poorly
trained, equipped, and led. Guerrilla
tactics were primarily haeed on bitand-run raids, terrorism, and avoiding
open combat with regular forces ex
cept under
advantageous
circum
stances.
Initial Communist success, the pros
pects of ultimate victory, and the at
trition of prolonged combat eventually
led to a dichotomy between the leader
ship of the KKE and the leadership
a battle
-September 1965
WAR
11
Stanley L. Fstk
September1965
HOSPITAi
SHIPS
Military
hospital ships, that is to
skips constructed
or- fitted out
by States special[g and solely with a
riew to assisting
the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked,
t!ze namn of which
shall hate been communicated
to the
belligerent
Powers at the commence=
??lent of hostilities,
and in any case
before they are emploged, shall be re
spected and carmot be captuved while
hostdities
/ast.
say,
\\as responsible
for carrying
all
\vounded, sick, or Injured
from
France back to the United States,
\rlth the llur~a of M~dl~ine and
Surgery in charge of caring for the
patients. In World War II, however,
the LS Army decided to assume the
responsibility of using ]t> own hos
pita~ ship. tu evacuate Army sick and
wounded.
In the peacetime
years before
-.
Stanley L. Falk w- ~he author of
Disarnrament
!n Hz.st,, rira[ Perspec
tive; whtch ap~eared in the Decem
ber 1364 issue af the MILITARY RE
VIEW. A member of tbc irrstractwrral
stafl of the fndustt-ial
CalleUe of the
Armed Fur-cex, he rrcezued his Ph. D.
degree in history
from Gwrgitown
University.
He is a graduate
of fke
US Army LarIguage .%hool, served in
the occupation of Jal)an as an Army
his forian and languagp
ofjicer, and
formerly
wa.v with the <)fice, Chipj
of Military
Hist,, ry, Department
of
tl!e Army.
86
HOSPITAL SHIPS
of
and medical
care,
In
for patients.
Carrying 35o nurses as overseas replacements, the US Army hospital ship Marigold
docks in Honohdu Harbor in 1945
87
IfOSpITAL SHIPS
HOSPITAL SHIPS
US ..lm Photos
HOSPITAl
SHIPS
Scpt8mber1965
91
The Neeessity
for Change
Major Clinton E. Granger, Jr., United
States
@ny
.
can never be completely accurate, hut
it is, nevertheless, a definite require
ment for any military organization. It
is necessary to establish common tm
derstanding of terminology and con
cepts, and to create a body of sup
porting techniques and accepted prac
tices in support of particular types of
military operations.
Acceptance of common definitions
and implications is essential to opera
tions in the field. Some of the greatest
military blunders in history have re
sulted from misunderstood orders
frequently because the choice of lan
guage in the order allowed two indi
viduals to interpret the same words
quite differently. Consider the impli
cations of an order to assume the de
fense.
MilitaryReview
CHANGE
Misinterpretation
of such an order
wotdd appear to be unlikely; yet de
fense is a broad area of action, and
~e type of defense desired must be
further defined to ensure compliance.
In fact, a definition of the type of de
fense desired will depend to a large
extent on the level of command at
which the orders may be issued.
Recognize Definitions
assigned
September 1965
formation
to permit preliminary plan
ning and coordination, and to imple
ment the commanders will in the
thousand little ways that are essential
to success.
Occasionally, victory crowns one
bold man who acts decisively; more
frequently, defeat ia the lot of the
military organization where there ia
no decisive error, but rather the cu
mulative effects of incorrect or poorly
accomplished work on the part of
many people and agencies. BattIes can
be won and lost by degrees, and it ie
on]y the additive effort of all con
cerned that will actually result in a
decisive effort or action, regardless of
the form of warfare.
Professional Knewledge
CHANGE
US
Arnw
It is bnly the additive effort of all concerned that will actually result in a decisive
effort or action, regardless of the form of warfare
MilitaryReview
CHANGE
of
terms
and
clear-cut
re
actions
Se)dsmber 1965
CHANGE
96
.
Harold
K. Johnson
Military Review
UNITED STATES
New
Sight
Phifm Corwmt
,.>,
or factual.I.tements is inte.ded.TheEditor.
Septembert965
97
MILITARY NOTES
The 1st Cavalry Oivision
heavy equipment which had to be car.
I
x
ml
DIVISION hRTllURY
AIR C8VNRY
m@J@l
SICNhL
SWADRON
BhlTMIOM
BRIGADE
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WIAL1OII
Q@@
WIMON
El
SUPPORT
6ROUP
COMMhMO
EJ&
LIGHT
Amum
BmmN
BuTKRY
BATTNIONS
MA!4EUViR BA1lALIOW-
15181 OFFICERS MB
m
16W
iULlcOPm
BA,U,,OS
WICOPTM
BAM1!B!4
MEN
AIRCRAFT
VEHICLES
8V1MOM
GfMIRhL
SUPPOR1 COMPNIV
%%
.-MhNUJVIR 84TTAWIS
AS RIOUIREO
MILITARY NOTES
US Arnw
The VH.1 Iroquois is the standard utifity helicopter. It is capable of launching SS.11
antitank missiles or 2.75-inch rockets, or firing 7.62-millimeter maehineguns.
MILITARY NOTSS
USArm!
The six OV-1 Mohawks in the
airmotile
division
will
beus-+
for reconnaissance and
surveilbmce missions
using infrared
scanners.
Cameras.
and sideloo~lng
airborne
radar
The aircraft at the top carries a SLAR.
(SL4R).
US Anm
1
100
MILITARY NOTES
Research And Cargo Ships
MILITARY NOTES
Phoenixr Missile
The Navy Phoenix
Joint Production
SKIP-I
.
.
General
Dunmnw.
C.mmrat!..
A ship that will skim over water at a speed of 50 knots per hour is being
built by a defense firm, and will be used as a research vehicle to verify labora
tory theories of both design and performance.
Tbe seven-meter vessel, designated SKIP-I, will ride approximately 30 centi
meters above the water on a cushion of air provided by a 180-horsepower lift
fan. The vehicles forward propulsion will be provided hy a pair of sternmounted, 115-horsepower engines turning variable pitch propellers .News re
lease.
102
Military Review
MILITARY NOIES
Bomb Alarm System
An optical sensor
mounted on a pole
10s
MILITARY NOTES
FRANCE
gas
tur
designed
for nse in mobile battlefield systems, is
undergoing engineering design tests.
Prime mover for tbe set is a light,
compact, single-cycle, 270-horsepower
gas turbine engine designed to operate
on any liquid fuel, including diesel,
kerosene; .lP-4, and combat ga901ine.
Tbe set is suitable for any applica
tion requiring a portable power supply
with precise ,frequent y and voltage
control, such as radar, missile ground
support, or checkout and launching
equipment.
A completely self-contained unit
including engine, generator controls,
and intake and exhaust silencersit
weighs approximately
1,300 pounds
and measures 92 inches in length and
36 inches in width and height.
Advantages of gas turbine genera
tor sets are their relatively small size
and weight, which could mean fewer
vehicles required to move them, and
fewer moving parts. This makes tur
bines potentially easier to maintain
aqd to supply with spare parts. One of
the major disadvantages, which is ex
phted to be overcome eventually, is
the turbines high fuel consumption
which is 3 to 4 times that of a dieeel
engine.US Army release.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
Missiles
Naval Oeveloomerits
ships,
during
and
one
the
tanker
entered
helicopter carrier
porarily named La Rdsolue, is also
fitted as a command ship. A third frig
ate of the Commandant
Rividre class
has begun trial rnns and is expected
to enter service in the near future,
as will the new assault landing ship
Ouragan.
Two of the four Surcouf class de
stroyers being rearmed with Tartar
missiles have rejoined the fleet; the
remaining two are expected to reenter
service sometime this year.
The French Fleet now includes the
modern, aircraft carriers Foch and
Chnnenceuu, the aircraft carrier Ar
the
helicopter
carrier
rornarzches,
cruis
Jeanne dArc, the antiaircraft
ers Co&rt and De Grasge, 18 modern
destroyers, 31 frigates, 22 submarines,
and a number of small ships.
The first French nuclear-powered
submarine, armed with 16 missiles, is
expected to be operational by the mid
dle of 1969.News item.
SWEDEN
Wiggen Aircraft
In future years, Sweden plans to
make Viggen aircraft the backbone of
her air force. Fighter, attack, and re
connaissance versions of the Viggen
will replace the Lansen, a fighter and
reconnaissance plane, and the Drake%
The new Viigen aircraft reportedly
will fly at a speed of Mach 2.5 to 3,
require a 600-meter runway, and be
able to take 15ff and land on those
highways designed for use as airstrips.News item.
MilitaryReview
US ArmII
MILITARY NOTES
Soviet Marine Conrs
AUSTRALIA
Oanvin Air tSafanse
Bloodhound
light antiaircraft
battery.
Facilities
to be prepared prior to the arrival of
the Bloodhound units include concrete
l~unching pads.News
release.
USSR
Military Service
The compulsory term of service for
Soviet soldiers with a university edu
cation has been reduced to one year.
The new regulation applies primarily
to army and navy personnel. Instead
of the customary three years, they
must serve only one year in the mili
tary, and then may fill vacancies in
the teaching profession, industry, or
agriculture
for the next two years.
This
of the
military
item.
106
measure
500
is expected
million
budget
rubles
to save
by
which
part
the
is to be cut.News
JAPAN
Defense Budget
Japan allotted 300 billion
her 1965 national budget for
purposes. This is an increase
percent over the previous
News item.
yen o
defens
of nin
year.
GREAT BRITAIN
Deployment Of Forces
Britains total force of 393,000 serv
icemen, which includes all servicss,
broadly deployed as follows:
241,0
Britain
62,0
Germany, including Berlin
Mediterranean
23,0
East of Suez
58,0
9,0
Other locations
Units east of Suez are reinforced b
Gurkha forcee totaling 14,000.New
release.
M6ilary
Ifev
BOOKS
INSIDE HITLERS HEADQUARTERS, 1939-45.
By Walter Warlimont. Translated From the
6erman by R. H. Barry. 656 Pages. Frede~
ick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1664.$9.95.
BY COL
As
WILMOTR. MCCUTCHEN,USA
General
headquarters,
and
has
set
forth
MILITARY BOOKS
NEW PERSPECTIVES IN ORGANIZATION RE
SEARCH. Edited by William W. Cooper, Har
old J. Leavitt, and Maynard W. Shelly Il.
GOG Pages. John WNey & Sons, Inc., New
York, 1964.$12.50.
Relations
1d8
Irzternationales
!
RY
JOHN R. CAMERON
Military Review
MILITARY BOOKS
WflVE1l. Scholar and Soldier. BY John Coa
IIel.574 pages. klarcourt,Brace & World,
inc.,New York, 1964.$8.75.
A thoroughly
documented, readable
account of Lord Archibald WaveRs
life through June 1941. Unfortunately,
the biography does not include those
years when Lord Wavell served as
Supreme Commander of the Allied
Forces in the Southwest Pacific and,
later, as Viceroy and Governor Gen
eral of India.
OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES. BY Sen
atorJ. William Ftdbright. 147 Pages. Random
Houso, Inc., New York, 19B4. $1.45 paper
bound.
MILITARY HISTORY
history.
Pages. Louisiana
State University
September1965
.
MILITARY BOOKS
THE GREAT OESIGN: Men and Events in the
United Nations From 1845 to 1963. By Cor
nelia Meigs. 319 Pages. Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, Mass., 1964.$6.00.
BY
USA
The diversity
of national views
wi$hin the North Atlantic Treaty Or
ganization forms the common subject
matter of these two hooks. Although
each differs in style and treatment of
material, both focus on the key is
sues and current problems of NATO.
A common thread between both
books is tbe recognized problem of
giving Europeans a greater voice in
alliance policy, particularly with re
spect to nuclear strategy and planning
for the use and control of nuclear
weapons. Both highlight the problems
facing NATO: the value of the first
is its balanced perapeetive; the second
provides clear illumination
of the
areas of agreement and the argu
ments supporting disagreement.
MilitarySlsview
110
MILITARY BOOKS
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CHARLES DE
sAU1lE.
A Critical Assessment. BY Paul
.
Reynaud,Former Premiar of Franca.- Trans
lated by MervYn Savill. 160 Pages. The
tiyssey Press, New York, 1964.$3.95.
BY COLHERMANW. LANGE,USA
Among great statesmen,
few
have
been so difficult to fathom as the cur
rent leader of France.
Paul Reynaud tackles the heart of
the problem with this critical assess
ment of General Charles de Gaulles
foreign policy.
He concludes that De Gaulles ac
tions and reactions are merely a re.
fleclion of his irreconcilable grudges.
He feels that, although his political
system is open to attack, De Gaulles
unrivaled reputation
cannot be op
posed.
The disastrous effect of the mis
takes committed under this system
will be forgotten when the situation
ie back to normal, when the Consti
tution is no longer undermined by
one-man rule.
SUBMARINES IN COMBAT. Compiled by Rear
Admiral Joseph B. Icenhower, United States
Navy, Retired. 160 Pagas. Franklin Watts,
Inc.,New York, 1964.$5.95.
BY MAJ JACKG. CALLAWAY,USA
MILITARY BOOKS
a well-known and
The author,
highly respected British writer, has
again revised his work on the German
Army in the years between the Armis.
tice of November 1918 and the uncon
ditional surrender at Reims, France,
7 May 1945.
*Although tie admits that much work
has been accomplished on recent Ger
man history during the past few years,
the author finds no cause to alter my
interpretations
of either the Army in
German politics between the two
world wars or the role played hy the
military in the opposition to Hitler.
He has included in his bibliography
what he considers the most important
of the recent publications and has
made minor amendments to the text,
but not a \vholesale revision.
Almost a classic in its field, TAe
Nemesis of Power is as important a
military history as it is a political
history. In the light of todays events,
~ts le.ssOns Of the past assume increa~.
mg Importance and cry out for re
membrance.
INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY FORCES. The
Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and
Oisarming World. Compiled by Lincoln P.
Bloomfield. 307 Pages. little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, Mass.r 1984.$5.00 clothbound. $2.50
paperbound.
BY LT COL SAMUEL L. CRCIOK,SR.,
USA
MilitaryReview