Danao Development Corporation vs.

NLRC
G.R. No. L-40706-07February 16, 1978
Facts:
CIR found Danao Development Corp. guilty of unfair labor practice and said decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. The CIR issued a writ of execution for the reinstatement but the sheriff
was unable to effect any reinstatement. When the CIR was abolished, the implementation of the portion
of that decision referring to backwages was transferred to the NLRC. The latter directed Aurelio Cruz,
formerly of the Examining Division of the defunct Court of Industrial Relations, to proceed to the
premises of petitioner Danao Development Corporation and make the necessary computation of the
backwages ordered to be paid to the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC can issue the impugned alias writ of execution by the abolished CIR.
Ruling:
No. It is readily evident from the very nature of the Industrial Court's judgment of February 20,
1974 that whereas, the Portion thereof regarding reinstatement was capable of immediately execution
after the Supreme Court's decision's the same had become final, hence the writ of execution of the
industrial Court of October 16, 1974 was in accordance with law, it is equally obvious that the
backwages aspect thereof could not be the object of execution until the respective amounts due to all
the complaints has been duly ascertained in a manner wherein both parties have been duly heard. By its
very nature, a judgment ordering payment of backwages does not necessarily contemplate a simple and
straight computation of the corresponding wages of the prevailing claimants on the basis of the number
of days or months from the date of unlawful dismissal to the date of reinstatement or the date fixed by
the Court. There are other factors which must be indispensably looked into also, such as, for example,
whether or not the workers ordered reinstated have worked elsewhere during the period of lay-off, in
order that there wages corresponding to the number of days they have so worked may be deducted from
the award. Besides, some of in might have died already or have become retirable.
Therefore, the usual concept of finality which makes a judgment executory does not attach to
judgments of the nature herein concerned.

Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 88864
January 17, 1990
Facts:
In the case of Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 79535, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition questioning the decision of the NLRC on the ground that petitioner failed to sufficiently show
that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. The entry of judgment having been effected, the
NLRC in the process of execution of the said decision of the labor arbiter made a computation of the
award to the private respondents. Thus, the NLRC issued a partial writ of execution. Petitioner filed a
motion to stay execution/reconsideration citing supervening events that affect the computation of the
award.
Issue: Whether or not the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC may be stayed in view of
supervening events that would affect the computation of the awards.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent alleges that in several conferences had with the petitioner, petitioner did not
raise these objections and that the petition is dilatory. Whatever it may be, the fact cannot be denied
that such supervening events as the length of service of the private respondents, the wage exemptions
granted, and payments already made on the award would certainly affect the computation of the total
award under the decision. Thus, a prompt and immediate determination of these objections and a
recomputation of the award should be made. A denial of this opportunity to right a clear error in the
execution of the judgment constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Sampaguita Garments Corporation vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 102406
June 17, 1994
Facts:
The offense subject of the two cases is theft, claimed to have been committed by private
respondent Emilia B. Santos, an employee of petitioner Sampaguita Garments Corporation. Sampaguita
dismissed her on this ground. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the labor arbiter sustained
the company. However, his decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered her reinstatement with
back wages from the time of her illegal suspension until her actual reinstatement. Meantime, the
petitioner had also filed a criminal action against Santos for the same offense in the MTC and was
found guilty. This was affirmed by the RTC. In the first case, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for certiorari against the decision of the NLRC for lack of a showing that it was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. However, in the second case, said Court sustained the conviction.
Subsequently, Santos moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The petitioner opposed,
invoking her conviction in the criminal case. However, the NLRC sustained her on the ground that its
decision had been affirmed by this Court and had long become final and executory.
It is asserted by the petitioner that, in view of the private respondents conviction, the decision
of the NLRC calling for her reinstatement and the payment to her backwages should not now be
enforced. Otherwise, she would in effect be undeservedly rewarded when she should instead be
punished for her offense. On the other hand, the private respondent argues that the decision of the
NLRC is independent of the criminal case and in any event can no longer be modified or reversed after
having become final and executory.
Issue: Whether or not a subsequent conviction in a criminal case for the same offense that an employee
is absolved of and led to the dismissal affect the administrative decision.
Ruling:
It is true that once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed
except only for the correction of clerical errors or where supervening events render its execution
impossible or unjust. In the latter event, the interested party may ask the court to modify the judgment
to harmonize it with justice and the facts. There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of the
respondent NLRC ordering the private respondents reinstatement with back wages had indeed become
final and executory. Even so, we find, in light of the subsequent developments, that the NLRC was not
correct in sustaining the implementation of that decision.
The power of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution carries with it the right to look into the
correctness of the execution of the decision and to consider supervening events that may affect such
execution. The affirmance by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of the private
respondents conviction for theft is justification enough for the NLRC to exercise this authority and
suspend the execution of its decision.

Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113592
January 15, 1998
Facts:
Respondent Leopoldo Medrano was employed as a mechanic by INTECO until he was granted
an indefinite leave of absence, during which period he was able to secure a temporary job. When he
reported for work at INTECO, a supervisor confronted him for having worked in another firm.
Consequently, he was asked to resign. Respondent was not allowed to enter the companys premises
allegedly because his services had already been terminated.
In a complaint for illegal dismissal against INTECO, the Labor Arbiter ordered the
reinstatement of Medrano without backwages. The decision became final and executory upon failure of
petitioner to file an appeal within the reglementary period. Yet INTECO allegedly refused to comply
with the reinstatement. Thus, respondent filed a motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt and for
payment of backwages. Petitioner was found guilty of indirect contempt, and likewise directed the
reinstatement of respondent with backwages. It was affirmed by the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
Section 2, Rule X of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that the Commission or
any labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect contempt upon grounds and in the manner prescribed
under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(b),

Federico Robosa vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 176085
February 8, 2012
Facts:
Federico Robosa, along with other rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische
Manufacturing, Inc., were officers and members of CTMI Employees Union-DFA. They filed a petition
for certification election at CTMI and was granted by the Med-Arbiter. A consent election was
conducted but the union failed to garner the votes required to be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the company. Later, CTMI made directives that the union asked for the withdrawal and
determent of it, branding them as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI ignored
the request and issued a notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of
the sales driver positions.
Thus, a complaint was filed by the union and its affected members for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice, with a claim for damages. The labor arbiter handling the case denied the unions
motion for a stay order on the ground that the issues raised by the petitioners can best be ventilated
during the trial on the merits of the case. This prompted the union to file with the NLRC a petition for
the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and/or TRO. When NLRC issued the TRO,
respondent did not comply and instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for
preliminary injunction. The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
moved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible
CTMI officers in contempt of court. Contempt charge was dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.
2. Whether or not the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable.
Ruling:
1.
Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any
offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount
depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code,
however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
2.
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a criminal case. This is not the
point at issue, however, in this petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal of a contempt
charge, as in the present case, is appealable. The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt
charges against the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal.
In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, the Court declared that a distinction is made between a civil and a
criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the
benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the
court. The Court further explained that the real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be
determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.
But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal,
for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the
character of punishment to be administered.

LABOR RELATIONS
Case Digests

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Danao Development Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-40706-07, February 16, 1978
Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 88864, January 17, 1990
Sampaguita Garments Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 102406, June 17, 1994
Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113592, January 15, 1998
Federico Robosa vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012

Submitted by: Celina May R. Tang, Block A

Professor: Atty Mila Raquid-Arroyo