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MIDTERMS 2015-2016

CASE
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Velayo vs Shell Company

DOCTRINE
CASE SET 1
In the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong
or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217)
may be recovered (Art. 2219).

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA

In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
"connecting factor" or "point of contract" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the places where
the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts
or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.

Globe Mackay and Radio Corp

vs CA

For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent).
All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a
person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless.
The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there
is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith.
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable.
MORAL DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE IN CASES MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE. [P]er express provision of
Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
That if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.

Amonoy vs Guitierrez

[Type here]

PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights is a loss without injury damnum absque injuria for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who

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merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; REASONS. True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30,
1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the
Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4. 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of
respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad
faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before
the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
HUMAN RELATIONS; CONCEPT OF ABUSE OF RIGHT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,
the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows: "Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honestly
and good faith. The law, therefore; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by self-legal because recognizes originated by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegally. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms
enshrined in Article ', 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible . . . ." Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house b) petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and
wittingly caused the destruction of respondents' house.

UE vs Jader

DAMAGES; PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJUR MUST BE PREMISED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF RIGHT. Petitioner
cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise
will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby,
liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised on the obligation to repair or
to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law.
SCHOOL LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS PROFESSORS. The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the
operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He
must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with
the rules set by the latter.
The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's
grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university, which is engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrong,
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized society, men must be able to assume that

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others will do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they
act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those
with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the
former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his
grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate
concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has
to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter
into believing that he had satisfied all requirements of the course. Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its
own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent.

MHP Garments vs CA

When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to
grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's
acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
CASE SET 2 & 3
A case for unfair competition, the progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the therein
private respondents' premises showed that there was sufficient time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Yet they did not apply for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the private respondents. Under
the circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court to the private respondents for violation of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Basis of damages:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(
9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx

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TORTS DOCTRINES (2015) Atty. Fajarito

MVRS Publiation vs Islamic

DaWah Council of the
Philippines

2013400036 / 2013400059

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public
officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the
nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
PAR. 4 ART. 26 THEREOF; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS; REQUIREMENTS OF LIBEL NEED NOT BE
SATISFIED BEFORE PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER DAMAGES THEREUNDER; CASE AT BAR. Private respondents claim that the
newspaper article asserts that Muslims worship the pig as their god, was published with intent to humiliate and disparage Muslims
and cast insult on Islam as a religion in this country. The publication is not only grossly false, but is also the complete opposite of
what Muslims hold dear in their religion. The trial court found that the newspaper article clearly imputes a disgraceful act on Muslims.
However, the trial court ruled that the article was not libelous because the article did not identify or name the plaintiffs . . . The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on appeal . . . on the ground that the newspaper article was libelous . . . Thus, both
the trial and appellate courts found the newspaper article in question insulting and humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings
and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact that the Court is duty bound to respect. This finding of fact
establishes that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an intentional wrongful act humiliating persons because of their
religious beliefs. Like the trial and appellate courts, we find the newspaper article in question dripping with extreme profanity, grossly
offensive and manifestly outrageous, and devoid of any social value. The article evidently incites religious hatred, discrimination and
hostility against Muslims. Private respondents have certainly suffered humiliation and mental distress because of their religious
beliefs.
Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 26 itself expressly refers to tortuous
conduct which "may not constitute criminal offenses." The purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person who
suffers injury because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress.
Under Article 26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other relief." In short, to preserve
peace and harmony in the family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in human
relations.
Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining responsibility for tortuous
conduct under Article 26. Where the tortuous act humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is published in a newspaper, the
elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied before the aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26.
In intentional tort under Article 26, the offensive statements may not even be published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at
the offended party. In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is not the injury to plaintiff's reputation, but the
harm to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiff's reputation.
Reputation is the community's opinion of what a person is. In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion of the community is
immaterial to the existence of the action although the court can consider it in awarding damages. What is material is the disturbance
on the mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind.

Concepcion vs CA

[Type here]

The offensive act or statement need not identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation. What is important is that the
plaintiff actually suffers mental or emotional distress because he saw the act or read the statement and it alludes to an identifiable
group to which he clearly belongs.
ATTENDANT FACTS PROVIDE ENOUGH BASIS IN LAW FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR RESPONDENTS. The factual
findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioner's

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posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil
Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of
respondent Nestor as a person.
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes
insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those
enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear.
The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or
analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating,
scandalous or abusive language.

Elcano vs Holl

Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary
computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.

Cinco vs Canonoy

[Type here]

Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of
age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI DELICT MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY. Where the plaintiff made essential
averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection

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exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in their
answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense
peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict, such action is principally predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code
which is quasi-delictual in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate
and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article 2177.
SECTION 3(b), RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT GOVERNS CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH MUST BE SUSPENDED AFTER THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising from
cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which
should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action
based on quasi delict.

Gasheem Shookat Baksch vs CA

QAUSI-DELICT INCLUDES DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage
to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done
and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to
property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may
be harmful "to person or property".
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
(Civil Code).
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of the latters ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want
her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person
to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of
his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

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She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in
delicto.

Dulay vs CA

Garcia vs CFI

[Type here]

Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition
of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction
was itself procured by fraud.
CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT; CONSTRUED. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v.
Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
". . . Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law."
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court
held:
"Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
RULE WHEN AN INJURY IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPLOYEE. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency
of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or
omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus
No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other
damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or
prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964,
in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved
his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit

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Andamo vs IAC

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when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already
pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the
criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in
said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries
against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the
matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in
said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same
action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of
the New Civil Code
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
(Taylor vs. Manila Electric Company, 16 Phil. 8; Vergara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 564)
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, and whenever Article 2176 refers to "fault or negligence", it covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. (Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L46179, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 472)
According to the Report of the Code Commission, Article 2177 of the Civil Code though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . . .
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, (5 SCRA 468, 470-471), the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals (176 SCRA 591), this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that
the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a

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thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
10

Heirs of Pedro Tayag

Philippine Rabit Bus Lines

vs
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties

11

Padilla vs CA

Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that: .. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not snowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to receiver damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule
III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability
which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
DECLARATION THAT THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE CIVIL MIGHT ARISE DID NOT EXIST, INDISPENSABLE. The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that
the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability
(See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; see Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1933
ed., p. 623).
AWARD OF DAMAGES IN SAME JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL JUSTIFIED; REASONS. There appear to be no sound reasons to
require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in
the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact,
exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more
studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action

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simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Cruz vs CA

FILING OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 29, NEW CIVIL CODE, NOT AN EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY. Article 29 of the New Civil Code clearly and expressly provides a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code
provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed
but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal awarding damages in the
same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability
unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability must arise did not exist.
CASE SET 4
Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not
insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment
It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the
profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. 32 This presumption is rebuttable by expert
opinion
In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc., 10 CA Reports 415 [1966], where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the
death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this Court held that: "In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however,
it must be shown that the 'injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' "
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, REQUIRED; LIABILITY ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. The probability that Lydia's death
was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of
Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the
death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required to establish civil liability. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not
blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their
mother up to the present time and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement
can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of
the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.

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2

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs

People of the Phil

2013400036 / 2013400059

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot
defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil
liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one
single decision that has become final and executory

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests
lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeepers employees."

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:

"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the
criminal cases instituted against their employees. 28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should

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be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers,
as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the
civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the
imposition of the primary civil liability
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in
the event of the latters insolvency
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that
(1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees;
(2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
(4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
3

People of the Philippines vs

Rogelio Ligon y Trias

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY. However,
it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
RATIONALE. The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded. . . . "This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished."
CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the

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Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.

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civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses
at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat
by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain
of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not
enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking
up the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the
damage done to Rosales.
MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and
control of the servant.
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
the selection, or both; and
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
2. CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE:; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL. The distinction between negligence as the
source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the performance of a contract (culpa contractual ).
3. CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to
alight from a slowly moving train.

Fores vs Miranda

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway
train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and
condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This
care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec.
3010.)
DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ATTORNEY'S FEES INCLUDED IN THE CONCEPT; AWARD BY COURT OF APPEALS MOTU
PROPRIO. Although the Court of First Instance did not provide for attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 and no appeal to the
Court of Appeals was interposed on the point, it was not an error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu propio because
attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court
deems it just and equitable.
MORAL DAMAGES NOT RECOVERABLE IN ACTION ON BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPROTATION. Moral damages
are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of transportation in view or the provisions of
Articles 2218 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. EXCEPTION TO THIS IS IN CASE OF THE DEATH OF PASSENGER. The
exception to the basic rule of damages is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, of the Civil Code that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants

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of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased." (Necesito vs.
Paras G. R. No. L-10605, Resolution on motion to reconsider, Sept. 11, 1958).
NO DEATH; PROOF OF MALICE OR BAD FAITH REQUIRED. Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are
not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The mere carelessness of the carrier's driver
does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier.
NEGLIGENCE; NOT CARRIER'S BAD FAITH. While it is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to
malice, that fact must be shown in evidence. A carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract
was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
FAILURE TO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS SAFELY. The theory that carrier's violation of its engagement to safely transport the
passenger involves a breach of the passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith,
justifying recovery of moral damages, under Article 2220 of the New Code is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be
deemed in bad faith in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed and it would never be accountable for simple
negligence while under Article 1756 of the Civil Code the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently and not
maliciously, and Article 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.

Far East Bank and Trust

Company vs CA

CARRIERS; ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; WHEN PRESUMPTION OR CARRIER'S LIABILITY ARISES. An action
for breach of contract imposes on the carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury of the passenger; the latter does
not have to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Congco vs. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil., 768, 777.) Morever, the carrier, unlike in suits
for quasi-delict may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. (Art. 1759 New Civil Code, Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. Supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900
DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF CULPA CONTRACTUAL; RULE; CASE AT BAR.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the
breach of the contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in contract
of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the
common carrier. Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of
FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be
considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will. Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed,
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of
contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration
of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil
Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICT. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasidelict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where
there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson
vs. Bank of the Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot
improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an

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actionable tort independently of the contract.

The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a preexisting contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the
parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage
claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES; WHEN AVAILABLE. Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to
serve as an example or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art.
2229, Civil Code; see Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA
431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of
gross negligence as to approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA
655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil
Code; PNB vs. Gen. Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).

CASE
VESTIL VS IAC

NOMINAL DAMAGES; WHEN AVAILABLE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to
honor its credit card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article
2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him."
FINALS 2015-2016
DOCTRINE
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of
the person who has suffered damage
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his
control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child
into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury

DINGCONG VS KANAAN

COCA-COLA VS CA

[Type here]

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed
lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause
As Jose Dingcong joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top of the house, you must answer for damages
caused by things that were thrown or fell from it (Article 1910 Civil Code).
Dingcong Jose, did not practice diligence of a good father. He could have prevented the damage, since he knew of it he could have
caused the repair of the pipes. Echevarria as a hotel guest is presumed to use the tap, thus it is the responsibility of Dingcong to
provide adequate drainage or proper pipe system.
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing

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sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either case.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and
any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such
liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the
performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought
by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of
the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict

GUILATCO VS CITY OF
DAGUPAN

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of
warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. 27
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street
DIFFERENT DAMAGES:
1. ACTUAL DAMAGES
Proven expenses - Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous
Determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount.
2.

3.

GILCHRIST VS CUDDY

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MORAL DAMAGES
may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss
determination of the amount is discretionary on the court
In awarding moral damages, the following must be taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for
damages.
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
To serve as an example for the public good
"By `irreparable injury' is not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages,
nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on
the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and
frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law."

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"One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to
break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for an injunction where the injuries
resulting will be irreparable."

SO PING BUN VS CA

"Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts where the legal
remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. And where there is a malicious interference with lawful and valid
contracts a permanent injunction will ordinarily issue without proof of express malice But the remedy by injunction cannot be used
to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered
One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of
asset if
(a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial,
(c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules
The elements of tort interference are:
(1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and
causing breach of existing ones.

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