Running head: 2008 NATO EXPANSION 1

2008 NATO Expansion

Mark David Derham

American Military University

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The 2008 NATO expansion decision reached in Bucharest laid the framework for the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to continue its push east threatening Russia’s

territorial borders. At Bucharest, NATO leaders stated that Georgia and Ukraine would be future

NATO members. This decision was monumental especially considering Russia’s disapproval of

such an action. Russia has gone so far in the past to say that they will aim nuclear missiles at

both countries if they gain NATO membership (Baker, 2008, para. 4). This decision directly

affects Russia’s ability to maintain one of their national interests: control of the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS) that both Georgia and Ukraine are both members of. Albania and

Croatia were also offered a formal membership at Bucharest allowing NATO to move further

into the Baltic region, which has historically been an important region for the Soviet Union.

Russia has lately taken a more aggressive stance towards the Baltic States. NATO’s objective is

clear: push east towards Russia and attempt to create an atmosphere of security by forcing Russia

to submit to the West. The idea that Russia will allow this is the main cause of concern.

NATO’s “open door” policy towards European states has allowed many Eastern bloc

states to pursue NATO membership. Georgia and Ukraine both border Russia and are

extensively intertwined with Russian affairs. Ukraine is mainly engaged with Russia through its

large Russian population. Georgia is engaged with Russia through their two breakaway states,

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which are supported by Russia. NATO states their

expansion intentions are meant to foster democracy through Europe and create a stable security

environment. However, Russia views this expansion as a threat to their national security by

undermining their efforts to maintain power throughout the region. Since Georgia and Ukraine

border Russia, it is possible they are the tipping point to Russia’s decision to react beyond

political means to NATO’s expansion. The European Union is concerned that NATO expansion
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towards Russia will result in Russian military aggression. This concern ultimately resulted in

delaying Georgia and Ukraine’s membership plans. The EU believes Russia poses a major

security risk to Western Europe, and they desire to keep the status quo for the time being. This is

why Germany and France staunchly opposed Georgian and Ukraine’s accession at Bucharest.

Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and to an extent Albania and Croatia will be used as the units of

analysis. As mentioned earlier, Georgia and Ukraine are the tipping point for Russia’s

disapproval of NATO’s expansion policy. Albania and Croatia represent NATO’s expansion into

the Baltic States threatening Russia’s cooperation within the Baltic and the economic issues that

entails. For the most part, Russia needs to maintain good political status with the Baltic to ensure

stability and cooperation with their desire to create an oil pipeline through the Baltic Sea

(Kramer, 2009, para. 1).

As seen throughout history, Russia views the world through a scope of domination. Their

current goal is to return Russia to its former superpower status. Western Europe is threatened by

this, and they are already fearful of Russia’s military capabilities and their unnerving rational to

use those capabilities. Georgia views the West as the only means by to which to be removed

from under Russia’s control. This desire has recently been elevated by Russia’s occupation of

South Ossetia in August 2008 (Telegraph, 2008, para 1). Ukraine views Russia as an important

economic partner and the only means out of this is through a European Union (EU) economic

partnership.

Russia’s national interest in the international sphere boils down to ensuring sovereignty

and reinforcing the position of Russia as a superpower and an influential member of the world

(Federation of American Scientists, 2000, para. 2). Russia’s strategic interest is to project their

dominance in the region. NATO’s expansion threatens Russia’s ability to do this by limiting
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their influence within the surrounding region. Since Russia can hardly be compared to NATO in

terms of military capability, they would be less likely to use force against a NATO member. This

threat to Russia’s power is what brought about their return to a nuclear first use policy that

continues to this day (Ditz, 2009, para. 1). Russia’s reversion to a first use policy caused a great

deal of concern in the international community. The larger issue that could be affected is Russia

entering negotiations over START III that would significantly lower both their nuclear weapons

and the U.S.’s.

Georgia’s national interest is the protection of their people, and their biggest threat is

Russia. Both Georgia and Ukraine also desire to develop economically without relying on Russia

as their main economic partner. The obvious military power that Russia can deploy into Georgia

at any time was demonstrated in August 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia to support the

breakaway states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Telegraph, 2008, para. 15). Russia’s decision

to start a war with Georgia highlights their willingness to use force when they believe it will

benefit them. In this case, it was likely a message to NATO that Russia should be considered a

threat and their will should not be imposed upon lightly.

Georgia’s first reaction to Bucharest needs to address their breakaway states in order to

find a solution. NATO membership is unlikely as long there continues to be an internal separatist

movement within their territory. Georgia will continue to assert their desire to fall under the

security umbrella of the West and create a policy that asserts their independence from Russia.

NATO’s decision at Bucharest was a monumental statement for Georgia, and it confirmed that

Georgia’s strategic and national interests will be fulfilled in the future. The regional implication

is Russia will no longer be able to deploy a military force within Georgia’s borders without a

response from NATO. This will keep Russia out of Georgia’s affairs at least to a point.
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Ukraine’s actions will be to address the support needed from their people through an

official referendum that addresses their citizen’s desire to join NATO. This will hinge on their

ability to keep Russia’s manipulation out of Ukraine’s politics and their ethnic Russian

population. This could include the implementation of border restrictions or possibly only a

foreign policy shift away from Russia both politically and economically. Ukraine’s national and

strategic interests were also met at Bucharest, but the regional implication is their ability to shift

their economy towards the EU and back away from a Russian partnership. This falls on the

shoulders of the EU, and it will be very difficult judging by France and Germany’s disapproval

of their accession.

Russia will continue to try and control the CIS through both political and economic

means. The desire for Russia to be able to control Europe through their control of the oil market

is likely the path that will be followed economically (Kramer, 2009, para. 2). Politically, Russia

will continue to put pressure on the CIS in order to disrupt their NATO accession plans. Russia’s

response to the Bucharest expansion decision increased tensions significantly by stating that they

were worried over the expansion decision (CBC News, 2008, para. 1). It has been well document

that Russia is completely opposed to NATO expansion, and the security environment in Europe

will likely deteriorate as a result. Georgia and Ukraine’s approving response to NATO’s decision

increased tensions as well. This was proven by the war that broke out between Georgia and

Russia shortly after Bucharest. It can only be assumed that this was directly correlated with

NATO’s expansion decision.

Western Europe is becoming fearful of a rise in power by Russia. This is the only

possible reason for their disapproval of Georgia and Ukraine’s accession. Also, the idea that

NATO expansion will increase overall security in Europe is quickly being scattered to the winds
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as Russia’s threatening tone continues to hint otherwise. NATO’s continued expansion will be

forever threatened after Bucharest. Russia will continue to exert pressure over every decision

made by NATO, and the EU states that participate within NATO will continue to fear an

increasingly powerful Russia.

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References

Baker, P. (2008). Alliance invites in Croatia, Albania. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com.

CBC News (2008). Russia rankled over NATO expansion, missile defence: diplomat. Retrieved

from http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/04/04/russia-nato.html.

Ditz, Jason (2009). Russia retains option of preemptive nuclear strike. Antiwar. Retrieved from

http://news.antiwar.com/2009/10/13/.

Federation of American Scientists (2000). National security concept of the Russian Federation.

Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm.

Kramer, A.E. (2009). Russia gas pipeline heightens East Europe’s fears. The New York Times.

Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/europe/13pipes.html.

Telegraph (2008). Russia 'invades' Georgia as South Ossetia descends towards war. Retrieved

from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/.