Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ATTY. REFUGIO
NOTES AND ASSIGNMENTS
JUNE 21, 2014
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
On February 10, 1976, Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged
by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court. The case was dismissed on
the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further
cognizance of this case" without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the
Juvenile Court.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the City Court of Naga or the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines and Cities of Naga and
Iriga should properly exercise jurisdiction over the accused.
SUPREME COURTS RULING:
It was very clear that the accused cannot be tried under R.A 6591 because
he was, at the time the case was filed, 17 years old thus, not within the
purview of such Act. Even Article 189 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which took effect on June 11, 1975 that defines a youthful offender as "one
who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense" cannot support the respondents Judge
contention. Such definition did not mean a transfer of jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of
age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
As a general law, P.D. 603 cannot repeal a special law like R.A. 6591 by mere
implication. The repeal must be express and specific.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and
youth throughout the country is a general law
R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it
can try in criminal cases involving offenders below the age of majority only those
accused who are under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D.
603 that would sustain respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that "together,
these two laws, the latter amending the former confer jurisdiction on youthful
offenders who are above 16 years but under 21 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the same
from the City Court."
A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be
express and specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or
fiat
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS was criminally charged before the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta for violating Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 for over speeding. Due to
the charge, Primicias thereafter initiated a legal action for the annulment of the
aforesaid ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta.
4136. Perfunctorily, the ordinance was within the purview of such Act and its
validity must be assessed in conjunction with R.A. No. 4136 not with Act No. 3992.
By its very nature, the ordinance in question is, however, inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the State.
Furthermore, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its
thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38,
Republic Act No. 4136.
Corollary the ordinance relied upon was held invalid, the issuance of the writ of
injunction was thus in order.
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on
Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so
arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic
Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on
June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by
Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in
Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit:
Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all laws,
executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict
with the provisions of this Act are repealed.
Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed
within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992
The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-avis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in force at
the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said
ordinance.
injunction
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must
not contravene . . . the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
state." 8 Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way.
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness
and certainty are all the more important so that "an average man should be
able, with due care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he
will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. The general rule
is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court
prohibition or injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the following
instances:
1.
2.
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;
3.
4.
5.
in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Information were filed in equal level jurisdictional venues against several
accused with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of PD No. 9.
Thereafter the Judge issued an Order granting the subsequent motion to
quash filed by the accused on the ground that there was no allegation that
such facts constitutes the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9.
Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden handle of
5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11- inches, which the said accused carried
outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the Judges issued the Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
residence a
Judge Purisima:
allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it
does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9.
The information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
Judge Maceren:
Paragraph 3 of PD 1081:
3.
It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong,"
"barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as
necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
Judge Polo:
And in order to restore the tranquillity and stability of the country and to
secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible
manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons
without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider
the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict
Whether or not those Informations filed by the People are sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9.
In handing down the decision, the Supreme Court basically took bearing from Art.
IV, Sec. 19, 1973 Constitution. It further stated that the questioned Information did
not comply with fundamental requirements enunciated therein.
Moreover, it was the second element among the two in paragraph 3, P.D. 9 that
removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon outside the mantle of the statute or
the city ordinance mentioned therein since the simple act of carrying any of the
weapons described does not necessitate criminal liability. It is the motivation why
should the accused bring such a weapon outside his dwelling that should control.
Aside from these there were conflicting views which was revealed during its
implementation and so the judicial task of interpreting it becomes a task to construe
and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure would naturally follow as
was done by the Highest Tribunal.
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires
that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the
designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city
ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any
P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree
in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde",
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of
this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration
of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements
do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
A bill of local application was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence then it was
referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas who suggested that instead
of the City Engineer it will be the President Protempore of the Municipal
Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to
act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May
20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one
recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which
were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation
mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the
Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved
on the Senate floor.